TCR_Public/100530.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 30, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 148

                            Headlines

ABSPOKE 2005-1C2: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on Notes
ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A Certs. to 'D'
AIRPLANES PASS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Three Classes
ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 10 2004-1 Notes
ARTESIA MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-C1 Certs.

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five 2002-X1 Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2000-WF2 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-PWR2 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-PWR3 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 201 Tranches

BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class II-2A-1 Certs. to 'D'
BLUEGRASS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CASCADE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Bonds

COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A to 'Caa3'
COMM 2004-LNB4: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2004-LNB4 Certs.
CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on US$25,000,200 Certs. From Ba1
CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on 1,045,841 8.10% Certs. to Ba1
CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3,498,808 8.20% Certs. to Ba1

CORTS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on .50% Certs. to 'Ba1'
CLOVERIE NEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-009 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-C2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N 2002-CKN2 Certs.
DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A-2 Certs.
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2008-RS1 Certs.
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-CG1 Certificates
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1999-CG1 Certs.
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1998-CF1 Certs.

EMAC OWNER: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Classes
FIRST INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
GLACIER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
GLOBAL FRANCHISE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-1 Notes

GMACM HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2003-C1 Certs.
HOME RE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of 2005-2 Notes
ISCHUS SYNTHETIC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-FL2 Notes

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-CIBC7 CMBS
JUPITER HIGH-GRADE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 1996-C2 Certs.

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2004-C7 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2007-C6 Certs.
LEGG MASON: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
LEGG MASON: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
LNR CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of 2002-1 Notes

MARATHON STRUCTURED: Fitch Downgrades Rating on A-1 Notes to 'C'
MAX CMBS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2003-HQ2 Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-RM1 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-LIFE2 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-23 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-TOP15 Certs.
MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes
MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Eight Classes

NATIONSLINK FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1999-SL Certs.
NATIONSLINK FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-1
NELSON RE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Catastrophe Bonds
NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
PASCO COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Bonds

PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Certs. From 'Ba1'
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 1999-C2 Notes
RESOURCE REAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
RUTLAND RATED: Moody's Junks Ratings on Credit-Linked Notes
SAGUARO ISSUER: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Units

SALLIE MAE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Classes From 12 Deals
SILVERLEAF FINANCE: S&P Assigns Rating on $151.5 Mil. Notes
SOLSTICE ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SOUTH COAST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SPYGLASS TRUST-3: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Units at 'Ba1'

STANFIELD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
TIAA CMBS: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Certs.
TIAA STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2006-1 Certs.
TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-C4 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-Whale 7 Notes

* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 11 Classes From Two Prime RMBS Deals
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
* Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Gainesville, Texas' 1992A Bonds
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches From US SF CDOs
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various RMBS Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches From 11 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 206 Classes From 17 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 381 Classes From 22 RMBS Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 673 Classes of Certificates to 'D'
* S&P Junks Rating on Central Falls, Rhode Island's Bonds



                            *********





ABSPOKE 2005-1C2: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Rating on Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the rating on the class of notes
issued by ABSpoke 2005-1C2.

This rating action is a result of the exercise of the Optional
Termination.  The Credit Default Swap was terminated on May 10,
2010.  Prior to the exercise of the Optional Termination, the
notes were experiencing writedowns and were downgraded to 'D' by
Fitch in March 2010.

ABSpoke 2005-1C2 was an unfunded managed synthetic collateralized
debt obligation that referenced a portfolio of various asset
backed security assets.  The transaction was designed to provide
credit protection for realized losses on the referenced portfolio
through a CDS between the issuer and the swap counterparty.

Fitch has withdrawn this rating:

  -- $2,541,086 ABSpoke 2005-1C2 notes rated 'D'.


ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class A Certs. to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A certificates from ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transaction, to 'D' from
'B-'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on nine
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating action on class A reflects S&P's analysis of the
transaction following an interest shortfall to this nondeferrable
class.  S&P's 'CCC-' ratings on the deferrable E-FL through K
classes reflect continued liquidity interruptions.

According to the May 24, 2010, trustee remittance report, class A
experienced an interest shortfall of $477,086 in the current
period.  The liquidity interruption resulted from the failure of
the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities and CMBS
resecuritization collateral for ACAS 2007-1 to produce sufficient
interest proceeds to pay the full interest amount due to the
nondeferrable interest class.

According to the most recent trustee report, ACAS 2007-1 was
collateralized by 117 classes of CMBS ($1.14 billion, 99%) from 21
distinct transactions issued from 2005 through 2007 and four
classes ($11.8 million, 1%) from JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1, which is a esecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.

The aggregate principal balance of the assets totaled
$1.15 billion.

S&P had previously lowered the ratings on classes B through D to
'D' when they experienced interest shortfalls according to the
trustee remittance report dated Feb. 23, 2010.

If S&P receive notice that the interest rate swap in the
transaction has been terminated, which could require the issuer to
make termination payments to the counterparty, S&P may reexamine
the 'CCC-' ratings and take further actions.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ACAS 2007-1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

                          Rating Lowered

                     ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                                  Rating
                                  ------
                Class    To                   From
                -----    --                   ----
                A        D                    B-

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                         Class    Rating
                         -----    ------
                         E-FL     CCC-
                         E-FX     CCC-
                         F-FL     CCC-
                         F-FX     CCC-
                         G-FL     CCC-
                         G-FX     CCC-
                         H        CCC-
                         J        CCC-
                         K        CCC-


AIRPLANES PASS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Three Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on Airplanes Pass
Through Trust:

  -- Class A-8 affirmed at 'BB' and assigned a Stable Outlook;
  -- Class A-9 revised to 'CCC/RR3' from 'CCC/DR3';
  -- Classes B, C, and D revised to 'C/RR6' from 'C/DR6'.

The analysis of Airplanes is consistent with Fitch Rating's
criteria titled 'Global Rating Criteria for Aircraft Operating
Lease ABS' dated March 31, 2010.  The lone exception from stated
criteria is that aircraft were assumed to have a 30-year useful
life under the base case scenario.  While Fitch's criteria states
that the typical useful life assumption for commercial aircraft is
25 years, certain aircraft in the pool have lease terms that
extend beyond this threshold.


ARCAP 2004-1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 10 2004-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 classes issued by ARCap 2004-1
Resecuritization Trust as a result of increased interest
shortfalls and losses to the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
30.2% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 18.7% is
on Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 95.4% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade; 28.8% has a
rating in the 'CCC' category and below.  As of the April 22, 2010,
5% of the portfolio is considered defaulted per the transaction
documents.  The CDO has experienced approximately $18.4 million in
losses to date.  Due to the failure of the Interest Coverage test,
all interest proceeds beyond the payment of class H have been
reallocated to redeem approximately $3.5 million of class A
principal since Fitch's last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (29.7% of the portfolio).  Based on this
analysis, the class A notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the 'BBB' rating category and the breakeven rates
for the B and C notes are generally consistent with the 'BB' and
'B' rating category, respectively.  Similarly, the breakeven rates
for the class D and E notes are generally consistent with the 'B'
and 'CCC' rating category, respectively.

For classes F through K, Fitch assigned the ratings based on a
comparison of each class' credit enhancement relative to the
percent of underlying collateral experiencing interest shortfalls.
As of the April 22, 2010 trustee report, classes F through H are
receiving interest; however, classes J and K are deferring
interest.  Class F has been downgraded to 'CCC' given sufficient
credit enhancement to the amount of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls.  Classes G and H are downgraded to 'CC' given the
likelihood that these classes will experience interest shortfalls
in the near term and the marginal cushion relative to the assets
experiencing interest shortfalls.  Fitch believes that for classes
J and K default is inevitable because Fitch does not expect
interest to be recovered on these classes.  As such, classes J and
K have been downgraded to 'C'.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A through D notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will
continue to face refinance risk at maturity.  Fitch also assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.

ARCAP 2004-1 is backed by 65 tranches from 17 CMBS transactions
and is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred
to as first loss CRE CDO/ReREMIC) as it includes the most junior
bonds of CMBS transactions.  The transaction closed April 19,
2004.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $53,620,639 class A notes to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $30,600,000 class B notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $26,500,000 class C notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $8,500,000 class D notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $30,700,000 class E notes to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $13,600,000 class F notes to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $36,000,000 class G notes 'CC' from 'BB-';

  -- $13,000,000 class H notes 'CC' from 'B+';

  -- $31,500,000 class J notes 'C' from 'B';

  -- $20,500,000 class K notes 'C' from 'B-'.


ARTESIA MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-C1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed, assigned Loss Severity ratings, and
revises the Rating Outlook to Artesia Mortgage CMBS, Inc.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, Series 1998-C1:

  -- Interest-only Class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.5 million Class G at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive.

Fitch does not rate the $4.8 million Class NR.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F are paid in full.
The rating affirmations are the result of minimal Fitch expected
losses following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses
based on loans remaining in the pool.
As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance was reduced 94% to $10.2 million from
$187 million at issuance.  The pool has become more concentrated
with only 25 small balance loans remaining with an average loan
size of $410,146.  There are currently no delinquent or specially
serviced loans in the transaction.  Nine loans (33.1%) are
considered Fitch loans of concern due to declines in debt service
coverage ratio, occupancy, and upcoming lease expirations
including two of the top five loans (14.7%) in the transaction.

The largest loan of concern (8.8%) is secured by a multifamily
property located in Arvada, CO.  Although the property is
currently 95% occupied, decreasing rental rates are causing a
decline in performance.

The second largest loan of concern (5.9%) is secured by an office
building located in Tukwila, WA.  The property has suffered
declines in occupancy since 2007 as a result of tenant's vacating
at lease expiration and tenant's downsizing their existing space.
The borrower continues to actively market the vacant space.  The
most recent reported occupancy of 72% is as of December 2008.

Approximately 5% of the pool is scheduled to mature through the
remainder of 2010, 6% in 2011, 4%, 2012, 54%, 2013, and 17% in
2017.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating income, 15% to
2007, and 20% for those loans where 2008 or 2007 net operating
income was not available and applying an adjusted market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Under this
scenario, one loan is not expected to pay off at maturity;
however, no loss is anticipated based on Fitch's stressed value.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five 2002-X1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes,
confirmed three classes and downgraded seven classes of Banc of
America Structured Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-X1.  The downgrades are due to
interest shortfalls that the transaction is experiencing as a
result of specially serviced loans.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

On March 5, 2010, Moody's placed ten classes of this transaction
on review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review of this transaction.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the May 11, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 68% to
$92.3 million from $287.8 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 41 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 41% of the pool.

Twelve loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $5.5 million loss (30% loss severity on average).
Currently, eight loans, representing 27% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $15.5 million
loss for all specially serviced loans (63% expected loss on
average).  The servicer has recognized an aggregate $2.9 million
appraisal reduction for three of the specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on three loans
which represent 10% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate
loss of $3.6 million (38% expected loss based on a overall 75%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through
Q have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.1 million.  Due to increased trust expenses and recovery of
servicer advances, Classes K and J had also experienced interest
shortfalls in March and April 2010.  Although these shortfalls
were reimbursed in May, Moody's anticipates that Classes K and J
may periodically experience interest shortfalls because of the
pool's high exposure to specially serviced loans.  Interest
shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including workout
and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs) and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with partial 2009 or full-year 2008 operating
results for 98% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV ratio,
excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, is 70%
compared to 100% at Moody's prior review in March 2009.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCR are 1.31X and 1.77X,
respectively, compared to 1.18X and 1.47X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 13 compared to 19 at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned to
     Aaa on 7/29/2002

  -- Class B, $2,716,379, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 8/1/2005

  -- Class C, $5,036,789, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class D, $6,475,871, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class E, $9,354,036, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A1 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class F, $5,756,330, confirmed at Aa1; previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class G, $6,475,871, confirmed at Aa2 previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class H, $8,634,495, confirmed at Aa3; previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class J, $3,597,707, downgraded to Ba1 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class K, $4,317,248, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class L, $6,475,871, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class M, $2,878,166, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class N, $2,878,166, downgraded to B3 from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class O, $2,878,166, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010

  -- Class P, $2,878,166, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/5/2010


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2000-WF2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and revises Recovery Ratings on Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2000-WF2:

  -- $4.2 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR2';
  -- $2.1 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR5'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings,
as indicated:

  -- $145.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.2 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.4 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23.1 million class E at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.3 million class F at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes G, H, I, J, K and N.  Class A-1 has
paid in full.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 4.46% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $12.5 million, the majority of which are from loans
currently in special servicing.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 66.5% to $280.8 million from $838.5 million
at issuance.  Twenty-three of the remaining loans have defeased
(40.8%).

As of May 2010, there are five specially serviced loans (9.12%) in
the transaction.  The largest specially serviced loan (3.8%) is
secured by two industrial properties in Webster, NY.  The loan has
been delinquent since January 2008 and the special servicer
completed foreclosure in 2009.

The second specially serviced asset (2.8%) is an industrial
property in Westborough, MA.  The property has been vacant for
three years, and the borrower has been unable to locate a new
tenant or buyer.  The loan became real estate owned (REO) as of
February 2009.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
(1.4%, is a 69,067 sf industrial park consisting of two buildings.
The property was occupied by two tenants, one of whom vacated at
the end of their lease reducing occupancy to 44%.  Two new leases
were signed during 2009 increasing occupancy to 70%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Thirty-two loans did not payoff at maturity with 11
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-PWR2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns recovery ratings to Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2003-PWR2, as indicated:

  -- $5.3 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B';
  -- $2.7 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings and
revised Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $23.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $608.3 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26.7 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28 million class C at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.3 million class D at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12 million class E at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.7 million class F at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.3 million class G at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13.3 million class H at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.3 million class J at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $5.3 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $4 million class L at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $11 million
class P.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 1.6% of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 23.9% to $811.1 million from $1.07 billion
at issuance.  Fifteen loans (20.6%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 18 Loans of Concern (16.2%), including two
assets in special servicing (1.9%).  The largest specially
serviced asset (1.7%) is an office property located Long Beach, CA
which had transferred to special servicing in December 2009.  The
loan is delinquent and the borrower has indicated they can no
longer service the debt on the property.

The second specially serviced asset (0.2%) is an office warehouse
facility located in Columbus, OH and is in foreclosure.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in April 2009 and there is a
receiver in place.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine
value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, nine loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-PWR3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings or
recovery ratings to Bear Stearns commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2004-PWR3, as indicated:

  -- $6.9 million class L to 'B/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.5 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.8 million class N to 'CC/RR1' from 'B';
  -- $2.8 million class P to 'CC/RR1' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $133.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $469.9 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.5 million class C at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.6 million class D at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.7 million class E at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15.2 million class F at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $11.1 million class G at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $13.9 million class H at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.8 million class J at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.5 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $10.7 million class Q certificates.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 2% of the remaining pool balance from
the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not expected
to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  The
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes
over the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 32.7% to $745.6 million from $1.11 billion
at issuance.  Seven loans (9.1%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 25 Loans of Concern (28.8%), including one
asset in special servicing (0.5%).  The specially serviced asset
is a retail property located Lombard, IL which had transferred to
special servicing in August 2009.  The property is in foreclosure
and is vacant.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (5.9%) is secured by an anchored
retail property located in Aurora, CO.  The property has suffered
a decline in occupancy due to bankrupt tenants vacating their
space.  The servicer-reported March 2010 occupancy was 65%.

The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern (5.2%) is an anchored
mall located in Clay, NY.  The collateral was approximately 74%
occupied as of March 2010.  The former Bon-Ton space is vacant.
In addition, the Macy's and Sears spaces are not part of the
collateral.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine
value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 20 loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with eight loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 201 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 201
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 16 tranches, and upgraded 1
tranche from 40 RMBS transactions issued by Bear Stearns.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance WorkstationR (SFW), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 20.20%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  Certain tranches included
in this action, noted below, are wrapped by CIFG Assurance North
America, Inc.; these securities are rated at their underlying
rating pursuant to the withdrawal of CIFG's insurance financial
strength rating on November 2, 2009.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AQ1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AQ2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-EC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-FR1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE10

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE11

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE12

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE5

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE6

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE8

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE9

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc.
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on Nov 2,2009)

  -- Underlying Rating: Currently Aaa; previously on Jan 17, 2008
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-TC1

  -- Cl A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 24, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-TC2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-EC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-EC2

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE10

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE4

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE6

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE8

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-PC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-AQ1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-AQ2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-FS1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-3A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class II-2A-1 Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D' on
the class II-2A-1 mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-4, a U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction.

The downgrade to 'D' reflects S&P's assessment of principal write-
downs on the affected class during recent remittance periods.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and S&P will
adjust the ratings as S&P determine appropriate.

                          Rating Action

                 Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust 2006-4
                         Series    2006-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-2A-1    073871AC9     D                    CC


BLUEGRASS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Bluegrass ABS CDO III,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating actions are:

  -- US$280,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca; Previously on
     April 22, 2009, Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$49,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to C; Previously on
     April 22, 2009, Downgraded to Ca.

Bluegrass ABS CDO III, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of structured finance
securities.  Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities comprise over
25% of the underlying portfolio, the majority of which were
originated in 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, failure of the coverage tests, and the number of
assets that are currently on review for possible downgrade.  The
dollar amount of defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee,
has increased from $64 million in March 2009 to $76 million in
April 2010.  All the overcollateralization and interest coverage
tests are failing and have been continuously deteriorating.
Additionally, in April 2010, the Moody's ratings of approximately
$56 million of pre-2005 RMBS within the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated expected loss projections for certain RMBS.

An Event of Default under Section 5.01(i) of the Indenture was
declared by the Trustee on August 1, 2008, due to the ratio of the
Net Outstanding Portfolio Collateral Balance to the Aggregate
Outstanding Amount of the Class A Notes being less than 100%.  On
December 11, 2008, an acceleration of maturity was declared by the
Trustee.  As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CASCADE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Cascade Funding CDO I,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Delayed
     Draw Notes due March 2042; Downgraded to Caa3; Previously on
     February 10, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due March 2042; Downgraded to C; Previously on February 10,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca

Cascade Funding CDO I, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of structured finance
securities.  Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities comprise over
90% of the underlying portfolio, the majority of which were
originated in 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, failure of the coverage tests, and number of assets
that are currently on review for possible downgrade.  The dollar
amount of defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, has
increased from $43 million in February 2009 to $85 million in
April 2010.  The overcollateralization and interest coverage tests
are failing and have been continuously deteriorating.
Additionally, in April 2010, the Moody's ratings of approximately
$84 million of pre-2005 RMBS within the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated expected loss projections for certain RMBS.

An Event of Default under Section 5.1(a) of the Indenture was
declared by the Trustee on December 8, 2008, because of a default
in the payment of accrued interest on a Class B Note.  On January
26, 2009, an acceleration of maturity was declared by the Trustee.
As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1 the City
of Central Falls (Rhode Island) general obligation bond rating,
affecting approximately $21.9 million in outstanding debt.  The
bonds are secured by a general obligation unlimited tax pledge.
At this time, Moody's has also downgraded the city's Rhode Island
Health and Education Building Corporation Bond Issue, Series 2007B
to Ba1 from A1.  Both ratings are also under review for possible
downgrade.

The downgrade reflects the appointment of a temporary receiver by
the Superior Court with broad fiscal powers that may threaten
bondholder security.  The rating action also reflects the city's
weak financial position, including a sizable fiscal 2010 projected
deficit of $3 million or 17% of revenues.

The Watchlist action reflects the possibility of further rating
movement in the near term.  Resolution of the Watchlist will
reflect Moody's evaluation of the powers of the receiver as it
relates to the city's obligations, including contracts with public
employee unions, and Moody's assessment of the city's financial
position and liquidity levels.  Further, it is also not clear that
the city will benefit from continued access to the capital markets
to fund operations potentially threatening the ability to
refinance outstanding tax anticipation notes, payable June 30,
2010, and finance government operations.

The last rating action with respect to the City of Central Falls
(RI), was on December 16, 2009, when a municipal finance scale
rating of Baa3 was affirmed.  The rating was subsequently
recalibrated to Baa1 on May 1, 2010.


CITY OF MIAMI BEACH: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 rating on $520,000
of outstanding Housing Authority of the City of Miami Beach, FL,
Mortgage Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 1997A (Section 8 Assisted
- Midtown Plaza Project).  The outlook has been revised to Stable
from Negative.  The affirmation is based on the property's recent
financial performance, most notably the increase in debt service
coverage to 1.25x in 2009.

Shep Davis, formerly known as Midtown Plaza, is a 49 unit building
located in Miami Beach, FL.  The housing project is designated for
elderly and handicapped tenants who receive rent subsidies under
the US Section 8 code.

                         Credit Strengths

Audited financial statements show that prior to 2007, the
property's Debt Service Coverage Ratios were below 1.0x, but have
recently increased to (2007) 1.03x, (2008) 1.09x, and (2009)
1.25x.  Additionally, total revenues and Net Operating Income have
increased approximately 11% and 23%, respectively, since 2007.
Operating expenses during this time have only increased 4%.  The
current levels of debt service coverage and growth in revenue and
NOI indicate improving financial performance.

The property was at 100% physical occupancy as of April 7, 2010,
and has had great historical success with maintaining a low
vacancy rate.  This factor is especially important for small
housing developments such as this.

Currently, studio and one-bedroom rents are 77% and 73% of fair
market rents.  Therefore, future increases in rental rates are
possible with approval from HUD.

Shep Davis' building and property are in excellent physical
conditions, as seen by the most recent Real Estate Assessment
Center score of 97b.

                         Credit Weaknesses

Although the past three fiscal years have shown signs of the
property's financial improvement, only the DSCRs of the past two
fiscal years were comparable to other Section 8 investment grade
benchmarks.  Years prior to 2007 showed signs of rapid financial
deterioration and inconsistent levels of net operating income.  As
a result, it may be too soon to tell if the project will be able
to maintain this type of elevated performance over the life of the
bonds.

The bonds do not amortize evenly, specifically during the last
debt service payment in September 2012.  At this time there is a
bullet payment of $234,000 in principal that will deplete the Debt
Service Reserve Fund, currently valued at $170,000, and a
significant portion of other funds pledged to debt service.  Since
there is the risk that the additional pledged funds (ie: Reserve
and Replacement) may be tapped for purposes other debt service,
the remaining payments of principal and interest will be heavily
dependent on NOI over the next few years.

The property is contractually obligated to release excess funds
from the Surplus Fund to the developer when the DSCR is above
1.15x (after remedying funds pledged to debt service).  In 2009
the property's DSCR exceeded this level, and as a result, it will
soon forfeit the excess money.

                        Recent Developments

In 2008, Shep Davis received a real estate tax rebate that it had
appealed in the previous year.  Moody's has adjusted this rebate
in an effort to accurately report 2008's revenues and 2007's tax
expenses.

                              Outlook

The outlook on the bonds has been revised to Stable from Negative
as a result of the property's recent financial performance.

Key Statistics

  -- 2009 Debt Service Coverage Ratio: 1.25x
  -- September 1, 2012 Principal Due: $234,000
  -- Debt Service Reserve Fund: $170,000
  -- April 7, 2010 Occupancy: 100%
  -- Rents are below fair market rents (Studio 77%, 1-BR 73%)
  -- Bond Maturity: 9/1/2012

The last rating action for this program was taken on March 5,
2008, when the rating was downgraded to Ba2 from A3 and the
outlook was revised to Negative from Stable.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Coast Investment Grade
2002-1, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

* $246,900,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
  2017, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/21/2009, Downgraded to
  Caa1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance originally backed by a portfolio primarily
comprised of Collateralized Loan Obligations from 2004-2006
vintages.

The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through several factors, including a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase
in the weighted average rating factor), an increase in assets
rated Caa1 or below and a failure of principal and interest
coverage tests.  The ratings of approximately 27% of the
underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review
of the transaction in July 2009.  The WARF of the portfolio is
currently 4264 compared to 3742 in July 2009.  In this same
period, the percent of performing securities rated Caa1 and below
increased from approximately 43% to 52%.  In addition, the trustee
reports that all Overcollateralization Ratio Tests are currently
failing.

Moody's also notes that on April 1, 2009, as reported by the
Trustee, an Event of Default occurred as described in Section 5.1
(d) of the Indenture dated May 30, 2002, due to a failure to
satisfy the minimum Class A Overcollateralization Ratio.  As
provided in Article V of the Indenture, during the occurrence and
continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


COMM 2004-LNB4: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2004-LNB4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2004-LNB4, a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.
S&P lowered seven of the ratings to 'D' and S&P lowered its
ratings on three classes to 'CCC-'.

The downgrades of the class N and O certificates to 'D' follow
principal losses sustained by the classes as reported in the
May 17, 2010, remittance report.  The class N certificate reported
a loss of 3.8% of its opening certificate balance ($3.1 million),
and the class O certificate lost 100% of its $3.1 million opening
balance.  In addition, the class P certificate, which Standard &
Poor's does not rate, lost 100% of its $1.5 million opening
balance.

The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of the Mercado
Del Rancho asset that was with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC.  The asset consisted of a two-building,
71,200-sq.-ft. office property in Scottsdale, Ariz., and had a
total exposure of $8.4 million.  The asset was transferred to
CWCapital in January 2009 due to imminent payment default.  The
trust incurred a $4.7 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on April 13, 2010, which was reflected in the most
recent remittance report.

The downgrades of the class H, J, K, L, and M certificates to 'D'
reflect recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions related to eight
assets that are currently with CWCapital.  As of the May 17, 2010,
remittance report, appraisal reduction amounts totaling
$45.5 million were in effect for these eight assets.

The total reported ASER amount for the May report was $270,461,
and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.3 million.
Standard & Poor's considered the eight ASERs ($270,461), all of
which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special
servicing fees, in determining its rating actions.  Interest
shortfalls have affected the class H, J, and K certificates for
the past six months, the class L certificate for the past seven
months, and class M certificate for the past right months.  The
total accumulated shortfalls across the five classes totaled
$828,571 as of the May 17, 2010, remittance report.  S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.

As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 101 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$951.1 million, down from 118 assets totaling $1.22 billion at
issuance.  Nine assets, totaling $113.5 million (11.9%), are with
the special servicer.  The payment status of the delinquent assets
is: two ($26.8 million, 2.8%) are real estate owned (REO), six
($67.5 million, 7.1%) are in foreclosure, and one ($19.3 million,
2.0%) is 30 days delinquent.  To date, the trust has experienced
principal losses on four loans totaling $18.2 million.  Based on
the May 17, 2010, remittance report, the weighted average loss for
these loans was approximately 53.0%.

                         Ratings Lowered

                          COMM 2004-LNB4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                  Reported
        Rating                             interest shortfalls ($)
        ------                             -----------------------
Class To   From   Credit enhancement (%)  Current    Accumulated
----- --   ----   ----------------------  -------    -----------
E     CCC- B-     7.05                    0          0
F     CCC- CCC+   5.45                    0          0
G     CCC- CCC    3.84                    25,145     191,707
H     D    CCC    2.56                    56,001     286,761
J     D    CCC-   2.08                    17,511     105,065
K     D    CCC-   1.75                    11,673     70,036
L     D    CCC-   1.11                    23,349     158,022
M     D    CCC-   0.31                    29,184     208,687
N     D    CCC-   0.00                    11,673     94,797
O     D    CCC-   0.00                    11,673     105,054


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on US$25,000,200 Certs. From Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded these
certificates issued by CorTS Trust for Unum Notes:

* US$25,000,200 7.5% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
  Certificates; Upgraded to Baa3; Previously on May 19, 2004
  Downgraded to Ba1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $27,778,000
6.75% Notes due December 15, 2028, issued by UNUM Corporation
which were upgraded to Baa3 by Moody's on May 12, 2010.


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on 1,045,841 8.10% Certs. to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by CorTS Trust III for
Provident Financing Trust I:

* 1,045,841 8.10% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities Certificates;
  Upgraded to Ba1; Previously on May 19, 2004 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $28,600,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Ba1 by Moody's on May 12, 2010.


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Ups Ratings on 3,498,808 8.20% Certs. to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by CorTS Trust II for
Provident Financing Trust I:

* 3,498,808 8.20% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities Certificates;
  Upgraded to Ba1; Previously on May 19, 2004 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $96,861,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Ba1 by Moody's on May 12, 2010.


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on .50% Certs. to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by CorTS Trust for Provident
Financing Trust I:

* 2,090,823 8.50% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities Certificates;
  Upgraded to Ba1; Previously on May 19, 2004 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $60,000,000
7.405% Capital Securities issued by Provident Financing Trust I
which were upgraded to Ba1 by Moody's on May 12, 2010.


CLOVERIE NEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-009 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Cloverie New Mexico 2006-9, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Cloverie New Mexico 2006-9

  -- EUR19.5M Cloverie Certificates, Series 2006-009 Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 25, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio has deteriorated from 939 from the last rating action to
989, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of
Ba2.  The reference portfolio includes an exposure to Ambac
Assurance Corporation which has experienced a credit event in
March.  Since inception of the transaction , the subordination of
the rated tranche has been reduced due to credit events on Lehman
Brothers Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal
National Mortgage Association and Tribune Corporation.  These
credit events lead to a decrease of approximately 2% of the
subordination of the tranche.  The portfolio has the highest
industry concentrations in Insurance (12%), Telecommunications
(12%), Banking (11%) and Utilities:Electric (8%).


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C2, assigns Loss Severity Ratings, and revises Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $73.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $205.7 million class A-1-A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $392.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only classes A-X and A-SP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26.6 million class B at 'AA+/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.9 million class C at 'AA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.5 million class D at 'A/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class E at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class F at 'BBB+/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $9.7 million class G at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $10.9 million class H at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.0 million class J at 'BB-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.6 million class K at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.6 million class L at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.4 million class N at 'CCC/RR1';

  -- $1.2 million class O at 'CC/RR3'.

Fitch does not rate the $6 million class M and the $11.3 million
class P.

The rating affirmations are the result of sufficient credit
enhancement to offset losses following Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses and expected losses associated with
specially serviced loans.  Fitch expects losses of 1% of the
remaining pool balance, approximately $8 million, from loans in
special servicing and the loans that are not expected to refinance
at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  Rating Outlooks
reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over the next
one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the transaction has paid
down 16.8% to $804.5 million from $966.8 million at issuance.
Fourteen loans, representing 17.7% of the pool are fully defeased.
Two loans totaling 1% of the pool are currently specially
serviced.

The largest loan of concern (2.9%) is secured by a 360-unit
multifamily complex in Fort Meyers, FL.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in early 2009 after the pervious operator did
not have sufficient cash flow to fund debt service payments.  The
special servicer took control of the asset as permitted under the
loan documents, and in July 2009, the loan was transferred back to
the master servicer.  Although the loan remains current,
performance continues to be impacted by weakness in the local
economy.  The operator remains focused on aggressively marketing
the property in an effort to attract more prospective tenants to
the subject.

The next loan of concern (1.6%) is secured by a 400-unit
multifamily complex in Houston, TX.  The loan is being monitored
for delinquency, due to a history of late payments.  In addition,
the property's cash flow has declined since issuance as a result
of impacts felt from the weak economy.  The servicer continues to
monitor the delinquency.

The largest specially serviced loan (0.6%) is secured by a 92-unit
multifamily complex in De Witt Township, MI.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in November 2009 for payment default.
Foreclosure is being pursued while the servicer continues
discussions with the borrower.

Approximately 5% of the pool matures in 2011, 21.6% in 2013, and
54.4% in 2014.  There are no loan maturities in 2010 or 2012.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating income (15%
decline for 2007 or 5% decline for 2009 net operating income when
2008 income was not available) and applying an adjusted market cap
rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 36 loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity, with five loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N 2002-CKN2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
N commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CKN2, a
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D' from
'CCC-' and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class as
reported in the May 17, 2010, remittance report.  The class N
certificate reported a loss of 31.3% of its opening certificate
balance ($2.3 million).  In addition, the class O certificate,
which Standard & Poor's does not rate, has lost 100% of its
$3.0 million opening balance.

The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of the Fayette
Promenade Shopping Center asset that was with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC.  The Fayette Promenade
Shopping Center asset is a 31,512-sq.-ft. retail property in
Fayetteville, Ga., and had a total exposure of $7.1 million.  The
asset was transferred to C-III on May 30, 2007, due to payment
default.  The trust incurred a $3.1 million realized loss when the
asset was liquidated on April 21, 2010, and the loss was reflected
in the most recent remittance report.  Based on the May 2010
remittance report data, the loss severity for this loan was 80%.

As of the May 17, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 185 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$754.8 million, down from 204 assets totaling $918.1 million at
issuance.  Eleven assets, totaling $32.8 million (4.4%), are with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
on eight loans totaling $16.5 million.  Based on the May 2010
remittance report, the weighted average loss severity for these
loans was approximately 48.0%.

Standard & Poor's rates 15 additional classes from this
transaction.  S&P's ratings on 11 of the 15 classes are currently
on CreditWatch with negative implications.

            Rating Lowered And Off Creditwatch Negative

                   CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKN2

                            Rating
                            ------
                  Class   To       From
                  -----   --       ----
                  N       D        CCC-/Watch Neg


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Davis Square Funding IV
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$387,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $308,837,709), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on October 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

  -- US$950,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $758,128,743), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on October 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Davis Square Funding IV Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2003 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  Moody's notes that
the weighted average rating factor, as reported by the trustee,
has increased from 634 in October 2009 to 707 in May 2010.  The
defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased
from $213 million to $270 million in that period.  Also, in May
2010, approximately $477 million of pre-2005 RMBS within the
underlying portfolio were on review for possible downgrade as a
result of Moody's updated loss projections.  In addition, the
Trustee reports that the transaction is currently failing its par
coverage tests.  Moody's notes that the transaction is negatively
effected by a large pay-fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap
where payments to the hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of
the excess spread in the deal.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Class A-2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
class A-2 certificates from five resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit RMBS transactions issued by Deutsche
Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust in 2007 by lowering them
to 'D'.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of principal write-downs
the certificateholders for these classes sustained during recent
remittance periods.  The rating actions did not occur earlier due
to a system error.

                                                 First period of
Issue name                             Class    write-down
----------                             -----    ---------------
Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
Series 2007-RS3                        A-2      January 2010

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
Series 2007-RS4                        A-2      March 2010

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
Series 2007-RS5                        A-2      February 2010

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
Series 2007-RS6                        A-2      February 2010

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
Series 2007-RS7                        A-2      February 2010

S&P lowered all of the affected ratings from the 'AAA' rating
category.

                          Rating Actions

   Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
                          Series 2007-RS5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25157RAB4     D                    AAA

   Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates
                          Series 2007-RS7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25157NAB3     D                    AAA

   Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
                          Series 2007-RS3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25156VAB6     D                    AAA

   Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
                          Series 2007-RS6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25157QAB6     D                    AAA

   Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Re-REMIC Trust Certificates,
                          Series 2007-RS4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25157PAB8     D                    AAA


DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2008-RS1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of certificates from Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc.
REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2008-RS1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on classes 2-A-1 and 2-A-X and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P initially
rated certificates from loan groups 2, 3, and 4 out of the four
group structures within DMS 2008-RS1.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
Because guarantees from Fannie Mae support the underlying assets
backing classes 2-A-1 and 2-A-X, the performance deterioration is
severe.  However, S&P believes credit enhancement is sufficient to
maintain the ratings on these classes.

S&P lowered the ratings on classes 3-A-2 and 3-A-3 to 'D' from
'AAA' and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  The 'D' ratings
reflect the occurrence of realized losses during recent remittance
periods.  These losses were passed through from one of the
underlying certificates (class II-2-A1 from Bear Stearns Alt-A
Trust 2006-4) that incurred recent losses.

DMS 2008-RS1, which closed in February 2008, is a residential
mortgage-backed securities resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit transaction, collateralized by four underlying
classes that support four independent groups within the re-REMIC.
On the closing date, S&P rated certificates for groups 2, 3, and 4
within the DMS 2008-RS1.  The loans securing the three underlying
classes supporting these groups, which are included in three
different trusts, consist predominantly of fixed-rate and long-
reset adjustable-rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

The 3-A-1, 3-A-2, and 3-A-3 classes from DMS 2008-RS1 are
supported by the II-2A-1 class from Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2006-
4 (currently rated 'D').  The performance of the loans securing
the II-2A-1 certificate from Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2006-4 has
declined precipitously in recent months to the point that the II-
2A-1 certificate has incurred a principal loss.  The losses that
passed through from this underlying class caused classes 3-A-2 and
3-A-3 from DMS 2008-RS1 to default.  This pool had experienced
losses of 13.96% as of the April 2010 distribution, and currently
has approximately 27.42% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses
to date, the current pool factor of 0.4069 (40.69%), which
represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the
original balance, and the dollar amount of loans in the
transaction that are currently delinquent, in foreclosure, or
whose underlying properties are in REO, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults, S&P's current projected loss for
this pool is 29.73%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement
available to cover losses to the 3-A-1 class.

The 4-A-1, 4-A-2, and 4-A-3 classes from DMS 2008-RS1 are
supported by the 3-A-1 class from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust
2007-AR5 (currently rated 'CC').  The performance of the loans
securing this trust has declined precipitously in recent months.
This pool had experienced losses of 10.32% as of the April 2010
distribution, and currently has approximately 14.15% in delinquent
loans.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of
0.6665 (66.65%), and the dollar amount of loans in the transaction
that are currently delinquent, in foreclosure, or whose underlying
properties are in REO, as well as S&P's projection of future
defaults, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is 20.54%,
which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to cover
losses to the 4-A-1, 4-A-2, and 4-A-3 classes.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance.  The performance
deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the
market's expectation.

                          Rating Actions

    Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. REMIC Trust Certificates
                          Series 2008-RS1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   2-A-1      25156BAE4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A-X      25156BAF1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A-1      25156BAG9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A-2      25156BAH7     D                    AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A-3      25156BAJ3     D                    AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-1      25156BAL8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-2      25156BAM6     CC                   AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-3      25156BAN4     CC                   AAA/Watch Neg


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-CG1 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-CG1.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
to the remaining Fitch rated classes following Fitch's prospective
review of potential stressed and expected losses associated with
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of 4.6%, or
$8.5 million, from loans in special servicing and loans that
cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance.  These
losses will be absorbed by the unrated class NR.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 88.1% to $186.5 million from $1.564 billion
at issuance.  Of the remaining 46 loans, eight (37.7%) have
defeased.

There are five specially serviced loans in the pool (8.7%), two
are 60 days delinquent and three are 90+ days delinquent.

The largest specially serviced asset (2%) is a 160 unit limited
service hotel located in Tallahassee, FL.  The loan transferred in
September 2008 due to monetary default.  As a result of the
current market, the property has experienced significant
performance decline.  A receiver was appointed and listed the
property for sale.  The receiver has chosen a buyer to work with,
and a purchase agreement is being prepared.

The other specially serviced asset (2%) is a 168 unit garden-style
apartment in Savannah, GA.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 and is over 60 days delinquent.  As of YE
2010, the property was 83% occupied with a 1.39 times NOI (net
operating income) DSCR (debt-service coverage ratio).

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, two loans (3.1% of the
pool) incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- Interest-only class S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11 million class B-1 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23.4 million class B-2 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.6 million class B-3 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $66.5 million class B-4 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.6 million class B-5 at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27.4 million class B-6 at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $15.6 million class B-7 at 'B-/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $11.2 million NR class.  Classes A-1A, A-
1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, and A-4 have paid in full.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1999-CG1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions to DLJ Commercial
Mortgage Corp., series 1999-CG1:

Fitch downgrades this class and assigns RR ratings as indicated:

  -- $12.4 million class B-6 to 'CC/RR1' from 'B+';
  -- $12.4 million class B-7 to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch downgrades this class as indicated:

  -- $2 million class B-8 to 'D' from 'C/RR6'.

Fitch affirms this class and assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $21.7 million class B-4 at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-Only class S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms this class, assigns LS rating, and revises Outlook
as indicated:

  -- $9.3 million class B-5 at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook revised to
     Stable from Negative.

Fitch upgrades this class and assigns LS rating as indicated:

  -- $13.6 million B-3 at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, and B-2 are paid in full.
Fitch does not rate class C.

The rating actions are due to Fitch expected losses (13.5% of the
current deal balance) upon the disposition of specially serviced
assets along with expected losses from Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses.  Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one to two
years.

There are 19 of the original 278 loans remaining in the
transaction, three of which have defeased (1.9% of the current
transaction balance).  There are 11 specially serviced loans of
which, two are non-performing matured, one is real estate owned,
three are in foreclosure, and five are current.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  One loan did not payoff at maturity and one loan
incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1998-CF1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings to DLJ
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-CF1:

  -- $27.1 million class B-4 to 'AAA/LS2' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Stable;

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes, revises Outlooks and
assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- Interest-Only class S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.6 million class B-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.3 million class B-7 at 'B-/LS3' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $15 million class B-5, $15 million class
B-6 or $5.6 million class C certificates.  Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-
2, A-3, C-P, and B-1, and B-2 are paid in full.

The upgrade is due to significant paydown resulting in increased
credit enhancement to the remaining bonds.  Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets are 4.3%
of the remaining pool balance, approximately $3 million.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 91.6% to $70.7 million from $838.8 million
at issuance.  Three of the remaining loans have defeased (11.7%).

As of March 2010, there is one specially serviced loan secured by
a 70,325 square foot retail property in St. Louis, MO.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 17, 2009 due to
imminent default.  The property is currently 70% occupied and the
anchor tenant renewed their lease at a 50% reduction to the
previous rent.  The special servicer is pursuing foreclosure.
Receiver has been appointed and the foreclosure is anticipated for
July 2010.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.


EMAC OWNER: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on these classes of
EMAC Owner Trust Note Pool Certificates:

Series 1998-1

  -- Class IO remains at 'CC';
  -- Class A-3 revised to 'CC/RR3' from 'CC/RR1';
  -- Classes B, C, D, E, and PI affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

Series 1999-1

  -- Class IO affirmed at 'CC';
  -- Class A-1 revised to 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR2';
  -- Class A-2 revised to 'D/RR4' from 'D/RR3';
  -- Classes B, C, D, E, F, and G affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

Series 2000-1

  -- Class IO downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- Classes A-1 and A-2 affirmed at 'D/RR2';
  -- Classes B, C, D, E, and F affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

Based on Fitch's analysis, potential recoveries for the Class A-3
notes in 1998-1 and the Class A-1 and A-2 notes in 1999-1 have
decreased, resulting in RR rating revisions.  The RR differential
between the class A-1 and A-2 notes in 1999-1 is a result of the
class A-1 notes no longer having an outstanding balance due to
both principal payments received and writedowns incurred, while
the class A-2 notes are expected to receive future interest and
principal payments.

In the 2000-1 transaction, default is probable for the Class IO
notes.  As such, they have been downgraded to 'CC'.  In addition,
classes that have incurred principal writedowns have been affirmed
at 'D', consistent with Fitch's rating definitions.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria,' dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral, if any, given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans, if any.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations,' dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions and may
take additional rating actions in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


FIRST INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions, including assigning
Recovery Ratings as indicated, on the First International Bank
small business loan asset-backed securities transactions listed
below:

FIB Business Loan Trust, Series 2000-A

  -- Class A downgraded to 'C/RR3' from 'B-';
  -- Class M-1 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
  -- Class M-2 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
  -- Class B affirmed at 'C/RR6'.

FIB SBA Loan Trust, Series 2000-1

  -- Class A downgraded to 'C/RR5' from 'CC/RR4';
  -- Class M affirmed at 'C/RR6'.

The downgrades reflect continued deterioration within the
collateral pools for both outstanding series.  In particular, the
2000-A series recently experienced a loss which led to an
undercollateralized position for the class A note.  The 2000-1
series remains significantly undercollateralized with minimal
recovery expectations for the pool.  As delinquencies and losses
continue to roll through the trusts, Fitch anticipates available
credit support to further decline for the outstanding notes.  As
of the April 2010 reporting period, cumulative net losses were
23.21% and 31.93% for the 2000-A and 2000-1 series, respectively.
As a result of continued deterioration in performance, Fitch's
recovery expectations for the distressed notes have changed,
leading to an affirmation of long-term ratings on the subordinate
notes for both series, and revisions, if applicable, to the
Recovery Ratings.  For additional detail, please refer to Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings', dated Aug. 17,
2009.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in "Fitch's Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria", issued Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis incorporated a review of collateral
characteristics, in particular, focusing on delinquent and
defaulted loans within the pool.  All loans over 60 days
delinquent were deemed defaulted loans.  The defaulted loans were
applied loss and recovery expectations based on collateral type
and historical recovery performance to establish an expected net
loss assumption for the transaction.  Fitch stressed the cashflow
generated by the underlying assets by applying its expected net
loss assumption.  Furthermore, Fitch applied a loss multiplier to
evaluate break-even cash flow runs to determine the level of
expected cumulative losses the structure can withstand at a given
rating level.  The loss multiplier scale utilized is consistent
with that of other commercial asset backed security transactions.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in "Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations," dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 5-6 for 'AAA' to 1.5 for 'BB'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions and may
take additional rating action in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings to GE Capital Commercial Mortgage
Corp. Series 2002-1 as indicated:

  -- $6.5 million class L to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.8 million class M to 'B/LS4' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

  -- $10.4 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B';

  -- $5.2 million class O to 'C/RR3' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Outlooks and
LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $88.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $595.3 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $36.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.4 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.0 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.2 million class G at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.4 million class H at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.2 million class J at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.9 million class K at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

Class A-1 and X-2's notional have been paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the $14.4 million class P certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 1.71% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $13.8 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the March 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 22.51% to $804.8 million from
$1,038.6 million at issuance.  Twenty-eight of the remaining loans
have defeased (27.35).

As of March 2010, there are three specially serviced loans (4.9%).
The largest specially serviced loan, 38 Chauncy Street (2.5%), is
secured by a 130,142 square foot office building located in
Boston, MA.  The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2010 due to imminent default.  The special servicer is in
negotiations with the borrower regarding a loan modification that
would require the borrower to contribute additional equity.  Fitch
expects that the loan will not default during the term; however,
upon maturity a loss of 5% is estimated based on the base case
stress.

The second largest specially serviced loan, Highland Greens Apt
(2.1%), is secured by a 415-unit multifamily property located in
Lithonia, GA.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
November 2009 due to monetary default and is currently real estate
owned.  The special servicer is working to stabilize the property,
whose current occupancy is 88%, and is not marketing the property
for sale.  A recent appraisal valuation indicates that losses are
likely upon the resolution of this asset.

The third largest specially serviced loan, Park Colony Apartments
(0.2%), is secured by a 86-unit multifamily property located in
Houston, TX.  The loan transferred to the special servicer in
March 2010 due to monetary default and is currently in
foreclosure.  An updated appraisal valuation indicates that losses
are likely upon the resolution of the asset.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Under this
scenario, 16 loans are not expected to pay off at maturity with
six loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed
value.


GLACIER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of four classes of notes issued by Glacier Funding CDO II,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$100,000 Class A-1 First Priority Voting Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2042 (current balance of $30,324),
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on April 22, 2009 Confirmed at
     B1;

  -- US$324,900,000 Class A-1 First Priority Non-Voting Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2042 (current balance of
     $98,521,349), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on April 22,
     2009 Confirmed at B1;

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to C; previously on
     April 22, 2009 Confirmed at Caa3;

  -- US$65,750,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to C; previously on April 22,
     2009 Confirmed at Ca.

Glacier Funding CDO II, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
originated in 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities and failure of the coverage tests.  The defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased from
$38 million in March 2009 to $45 million in May 2010.  During the
same time, the Class A/B coverage ratio decreased from 77.63% to
62.67%.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of 2005-2007 subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM
RMBS which are currently on review for possible downgrade were
stressed.  For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with
exposure to such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain
projections of the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth
in Moody's press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January
14th for Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the
anticipated ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers,
the stress varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset
type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team and are no longer on review for downgrade.


GLOBAL FRANCHISE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed, downgraded and assigned a Rating
Outlook to classes in Global Franchise Trust 1998-1:

  -- Class A-X at 'BB+';
  -- Class A-2 at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BB';
  -- Class B to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR2';
  -- Class C at 'C/RR6';
  -- Classes D and E at 'D/RR6'.

The affirmation of and Stable Outlook assignment to the class A-2
notes reflects the class's ability to pass Fitch's 'BB+' stress
case.  The downgrade to the class A-3 notes reflects the class's
inability to receive full principal and interest under Fitch's 'B'
stress scenario.

Furthermore, the class A-3, B, C, D, and E notes are experiencing
accumulating interest shortfalls.  As these shortfalls continue to
grow, it becomes less likely they will be able to be repaid from
monthly collections.

In reviewing the transactions, Fitch took into account analytical
considerations outlined in Fitch's 'Global Structured Finance
Rating Criteria,' dated Sept. 30, 2009, including asset quality,
credit enhancement, financial structure, legal structure, and
originator and servicer quality.

Fitch's analysis first incorporated anticipated losses on
currently defaulted collateral, if any, given Fitch's recovery
expectations.  Fitch's recovery expectations are based on
historical collateral-specific recoveries experienced in the
franchise asset backed securities (ABS) sector since 1994.  The
resulting anticipated collateral losses were then applied to the
transaction structure, enabling Fitch to assess the impact of the
expected losses on the securities and available credit
enhancement.

Next, to assess the structure's ability to withstand additional
loan defaults, Fitch assumed additional borrowers would default
based on their current fixed charged coverage ratios.  Under
specific scenarios for each rating category, borrowers with an
FCCR below a defined level were assumed to default and realize a
loss in the near future.  If a class was able to withstand the
assumed defaults without incurring a loss, it was considered to
have passed that particular scenario.  These FCCR 'hurdles' for
the respective scenarios ranged from 1.0 times for the 'B' case to
2.0x for the 'AAA' case.  FCCR default levels were based on an
analysis of historical franchise loan obligor FCCR data from 2005-
2009 and particularly focused on the level of borrower
deterioration that occurred in the most recent economic downturn.

Additionally, to review possible concentration risks within the
pool, Fitch evaluated the impact of the default of the largest
performing obligors.  Similar to the analysis detailed above,
Fitch applied loss and recovery expectations to the performing
obligors based on collateral type and historical recovery
performance.  The expected loss assumption was then compared to
the credit support available to the outstanding notes given
Fitch's expected losses on the currently defaulted loans, if any.
Consistent with the obligor approach detailed in 'Rating US
Equipment Lease and Loan Securitizations,' dated June 16, 2008,
Fitch applied losses from the largest performing obligors
commensurate with the individual rating category.  The number of
obligors ranges from 1.5 at 'BB' up to 5-6 at 'AAA'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions and may
take additional rating actions in the event of changes in
performance and credit enhancement measures.


GMACM HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 29
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 32 tranches from 27 RMBS
transactions issued by GMACM.  The collateral backing these deal
primarily consists of closed-end second mortgages and home equity
line of credit securitizations.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by MBIA Insurance Corporation (rated B3).  For securities insured
by a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the
higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and
(ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of
the guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.  Certain other tranches included in this
action, noted below, are wrapped by Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company.  Moody's withdrew the insurance financial strength rating
of FGIC in March 2009.  As a result securities wrapped by FGIC are
rated at their underlying rating without consideration of FGIC's
guaranty.  RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation
are rated at their underlying rating without consideration of
Ambac's guaranty.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2000-HE2

  -- Variable Funding Notes, Confirmed at B3; previously on
     Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2000-HE4, GMACM Home Equity
Loan-Backed Term Notes, Series 2000-HE4

  -- Variable Funding Notes, Confirmed at B3; previously on
     Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-HE3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-HE3

  -- Cl. VPRN, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-HE4

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. VPRN, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HE5

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-1 VPRN, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3VPRN, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE2

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-1VPRN, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-3VPRN, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2002-HE1

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- CL. A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan-Backed Term Notes, Series 2001-HE2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Notes 2004 Variable Funding Trust Notes

  -- Revolving Facility, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV1

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV2

  -- Cl. A-I, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-II, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2002-HLTV1

  -- Cl. A-I, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2004-HLTV1

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2006-HLTV1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Issuer Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2003-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned a Recovery Rating to
this class of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C1:

  -- $4 million class P to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-'.

Fitch has affirmed, revised the Rating Outlooks, and assigned Loss
Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $6 million class N at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $2 million class O at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS Ratings to these
classes:

  -- $110.2 million class A-2B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $676.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-Only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $54.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.1 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class F at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.1 million class G at 'AA-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class H at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class J at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.1 million class K at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.1 million class L at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6 million class M at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

The $14.1 million class S is not rated by Fitch.  Classes A-1, A-
2A, and X-2 have paid in full.

The downgrade is due to a slight increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's review of the specially serviced loan and its
prospective review of potential stresses to the transaction.  The
affirmations are based on the pool's generally stable performance
relative to the previous review and a strong weighted-average
Fitch stressed loan-to-value ratio of 52.7% for all non-defeased
loans in the pool.  Fitch expects losses of approximately 1% of
the remaining pool balance ($9.6 million) from loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test
and from the loan in special servicing.  The Rating Outlooks
indicate the likely direction of any changes to the ratings over
the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 38.2% to $996.5 million, from
$1.61 billion at issuance.  Nine loans (28.2%) have defeased,
including the largest loan (21.7%).  Of the original 76 loans, 46
remain.  Of the loans in the pool, 99.6% mature (87.5%) or are
anticipated to repay (12.1%) by first-quarter 2013.

Fitch has identified five Loans of Concern (5.2%), including two
of the top 10 remaining loans (4.6%) and one loan in special
servicing (0.2%).  The specially serviced loan is a 99-unit
multifamily property located in Tallahassee, FL that transferred
to special servicing in December 2009 for monetary default.  The
special servicer is attempting to negotiate with the borrower
while pursuing other options including foreclosure.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (2.5%) is secured by the
leasehold interest in a 424,378-square foot office property
located in Newark, NJ.  As of Feb. 2, 2010, the property was 85.5%
occupied, up from 76.1% at the previous review but still lower
than the building's 98.5% occupancy level at issuance.  The
initial decline in occupancy was attributable to the loss of a
major tenant in 2007; and as a result, the servicer-reported debt
service coverage ratio fell to 0.83 times in 2008.  The borrower
has had some success in re-leasing the space and the reported DSCR
rose to 1.09x for the first three quarters of 2009.  In 2012, the
year the loan matures, leases corresponding to an additional 31%
of the space will expire.  Rents for a majority of the space are
below market.  The loan, which represents a debt amount per square
foot of $59 on the leasehold interest, remains current with the
master servicer.

The second-largest Fitch Loan of Concern (2.1%) is collateralized
by three office properties totaling 208,067 sf, which are located
in Baton Rouge, LA (two properties) and Metairie, LA (one).  While
previously reported hurricane damage has been repaired and the
most recent servicer-reported DSCR was strong at 1.57x (for the
first three quarters of 2009), upcoming rollover is significant.
Leases corresponding to approximately 26% of the space expire in
2010 and an additional 30% is scheduled to expire in 2011.
Several of the expiring spaces have rents that are above average
market levels.  The loan matures in March 2013.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by generally applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
servicer-reported net operating income and applying an adjusted,
property type-specific market capitalization rate between 7.25%
and 9.5% to determine value.  In the case of four loans with
meaningful differentials between the 2009 versus 2008 reported
NOI, the more updated 2009 performance was used to determine the
Fitch value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test incorporating an 8% interest rate and a 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to be
able to pay off at maturity.  Under this scenario, eight loans are
not expected to pay off at maturity, of which four incur a modeled
loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


HOME RE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of 2005-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes from Home Re 2005-2 Ltd., a residential mortgage-backed
securities risk transfer securitization.

The downgrades are based on S&P's view that cumulative losses will
increase as a result of an increase in delinquencies that S&P has
observed in the transaction's reference pool.

During its review, S&P look at several things, including the
losses S&P is projecting based on the performance and seasoning of
the mortgage pools, the change in delinquencies over time, and the
rating on the applicable party responsible for making certain
interest payments.

The collateral for this transaction is predominantly made up of
Alternative-A loans.  S&P will continue to evaluate the ratings on
this transaction and adjust them as necessary.

                          Rating Actions

                        Home Re 2005-2 Ltd.
                       Series      2005-2LLC

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-2        43731PAC4     CCC                  AA
        M-3        43731PAD2     CCC                  AA-
        M-4        43731PAE0     CCC                  A+
        M-5        43731PAF7     CCC                  A+
        M-6        43731PAG5     CCC                  A
        M-7        43731PAH3     CCC                  BBB+
        M-8        43731PAJ9     CCC                  BBB
        M-9        43731PAK6     CCC                  BBB-
        B-1        43731PAL4     CCC                  BB+
        B-2        43731PAM2     CCC                  BB
        B-3        43731PAN0     CCC                  BB


ISCHUS SYNTHETIC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of notes from Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd., Sorin
Real Estate CDO II Ltd., and Pinnacle Point Funding Ltd., three
U.S. collateralized debt obligation of asset-backed securities
transactions.  One of these ratings remains on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CC'
ratings on 12 classes from these three transactions.

These rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of
default and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd. and Sorin Real Estate CDO II
Ltd. each triggered an EOD following a default in the payment of
interest due on the non-payment-in-kind classes (classes X, A-1LB,
and A-2L for Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.; and classes SS,
A, X, and B for Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.).  For Pinnacle
Point Funding Ltd., S&P has received notice from the trustee that
a majority of the controlling classholders has directed the
trustee to proceed with the liquidation of the collateral backing
the rated notes.

                           Rating Actions

                                           Rating
                                           ------
  Deal Name                     Class To             From
  ---------                     ----- --             ----
  Ischus Syn. ABS 2006-1 Ltd.   X     D              CCC
  Ischus Syn. ABS 2006-1 Ltd.   A-1LB D              CC
  Ischus Syn. ABS 2006-1 Ltd.   A-2L  D              CC
  Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd. SS    D              CC
  Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd. A     D              CC
  Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd. X     D              CC
  Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd. B     D              CC
  Pinnacle Point Fdg Ltd.       ABCP  CCC-/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

        Deal Name                           Class          Rating
        ---------                           -----          ------
        Ischus Syn ABS 2006-1 Ltd.          A-3L           CC
        Ischus Syn ABS 2006-1 Ltd.          B-1L           CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       C              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       D              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       E              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       F              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       G              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       H              CC
        Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd.       J              CC
        Pinnacle Point Fdg Ltd.             A-1            CC
        Pinnacle Point Fdg Ltd.             A-2            CC
        Pinnacle Point Fdg Ltd.             B              CC


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-FL2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes from J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2006-FL2, reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 10.9% for the pooled
classes.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.  The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect additional
sensitivity analysis related to further negative credit migration
of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 51.8% of the pool is
expected to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the average cash flow decline
is 13.8% from fourth quarter 2009 cash flows.  In its review,
Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating statements and rent
rolls, updated property valuations, and recent lease and sales
comparisons.  Given that the loan positions within the pooled
portion of the CMBS are the lower leveraged A-notes (average base
case LTV of 108.7%), Fitch estimates the average recoveries on the
pooled loans will be approximately 78.9% in the base case.  The
defaults are determined considering the total leverage of each
asset, including additional B-notes and mezzanine debt, however, a
default may not result in a loss to the pooled portion given its
lower leverage position.  The base case term and refinance DSCR
for the pooled A-notes is 2.09x and 1.53x, respectively.

The transaction is collateralized by nine loans, four of which are
secured by office properties (47.7%), four secured by hotels
(35.4%), and one loan secured by a retail property (16.9%).  All
of the final extension options on the loans are within the next
five years and are: 30.2% in 2011, 2.8% in 2012, and 67.0% in
2013.

Fitch identified one Loan of Concern within the pool, Menlo Oaks
Corporate Center (7.3%), which is specially serviced.  In
addition, Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations for two
loans in the 'B' stress scenario.  The two contributors to losses
(by unpaid principal balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are Menlo
Oaks Corporate Center (83.7%) and Marina Village (13.6%).  The two
junior non-pooled component classes linked to the Lehigh Valley
loan survive their base case stress resulting in no defaults and
no losses.

The largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the Menlo
Oaks Corporate Center loan, is secured by a class 'B', office park
totaling 374,139 sf located in Silicon Valley in the city of Menlo
Park, California.  At issuance, major tenants at the property
consisted of E*Trade Financial (42% of NRA), IBM (16.2%), Access
Intelligence (4.8%), and FBI/US Government (4.6%).  The E*Trade
and IBM leases, which combined accounted for 217,524 sf (58.2% of
NRA) had lease expiration dates in August 2010 and March 2010,
respectively.  Due to the rollover risk associated with the two
leases, the loan was structured so that a cash management
agreement and leasing cost reserve would become effective if the
loan extended past its original two year term.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in October 2009, following the
loan's inability to extend at its maturity in September 2009.
Also, the borrower requested to amend the loan's rollover reserve
requirements associated with the E*Trade space.  E*Trade has
renewed 76,010 sf of the 157,026 sf they occupy at rent with the
submarket but significantly below rates negotiated between years
1998 and 2000, when the submarket was booming.  As a result rental
revenue from E*Trade has significantly declined.  The loan is
still with the special servicer who is contemplating a
modification to the leasing cost reserve requirements.  IBM
(16.2%) vacated its premises at its lease expiration of March
2010, reducing occupancy to 53.9% from 70.1%.  In addition, given
that E*Trade is renewing only 76,010 sf of its 157,026 sf, unless
new tenants are signed on at the property, occupancy is expected
to decline to approximately 32.2%.

The second largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the
Marina Village loan, is collateralized by 34 office buildings
totaling 1,162,319 sf on 73 acres, located in a 205-acre master-
planned development located in Alameda, California, within the San
Francisco Bay Area.  The property consists of low-rise and mid-
rise office buildings (collateral), a shopping center, a hotel,
178-unit residential town-home community, and open space along the
waterfront (with a 990-berth marina).  As of September 2009, the
occupancy at the property was 69.4%, a significant drop since
issuance when occupancy was 79.6%.  Average rental rate at the
property was approximately $22.92 psf including reimbursements,
compared to $24.22 psf at issuance.

The transaction follows a pro-rata pay structure which may revert
to sequential pay under two conditions: a) specially serviced
assets in the deal account for more than 20% of the outstanding
deal balance, or b) 80% of the original pool balance has been paid
down.  In addition, any principal distribution received from a
loan in special servicing will be applied sequentially.  Also, the
transaction is structured so principal disbursements and interest
from the underlying mortgages are combined into one account which
then is used for principal and interest distributions to the
bonds.  The pro-rata nature of the transaction combined with the
commingling of principal and interest remittances have resulted in
interest shortfalls, stemming from servicing fees, to result in a
principal loss to the junior-most class L.  The principal loss is
recoverable in future periods, similarly to an interest shortfall,
if excess interest becomes available.  Since the principal loss
may be recovered, class L was assigned a rating of 'C' instead of
'D'.

Fitch removed these classes from Rating Watch Negative and has
downgraded, assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity Ratings, and
Recovery Ratings, as indicated to the pooled classes:

  -- $21.9 million class E to 'A/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $21.9 million class F to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.4 million class G to 'BB/RR1' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.3 million class H to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.3 million class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21.9 million class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative and has
affirmed these classes, assigns Rating Outlooks, and LS Ratings as
indicated to the pooled classes:

  -- $285.5 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $298.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $58.5 million class B at 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53.6 million class C at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.4 million class D at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and has
affirmed, and assigned Recovery Ratings to these junior non-pooled
component classes:

  -- $7.4 million class LV-1 at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.6 million class LV-2 at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed this class and revised the Rating
Outlook as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

Class X1 has paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the senior
position of the CMBS note or property specific performance
warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled
certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay interest
shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the classes.
The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the current
outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is used to
assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class H reflects modeled recoveries of
34.4% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($8.2
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($59,025);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($8.3 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($9.2 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2003-CIBC7 CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-CIBC7 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 16 additional classes from
the same transaction, including four "FS" raked classes.  S&P
removed three of the 16 affirmed ratings from CreditWatch
negative.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades reflect
credit support erosion S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the transaction's seven specially serviced assets,
as well as potential losses associated with four loans that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the assets in the
trust.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.80x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 67.8%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.45x and an LTV ratio of 84.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 22.5% and 27.8%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude 24 ($211.5 million, 17.4%) defeased loans, two
($15.3 million, 1.3%) loans collateralized by cooperative housing
properties, the transaction's seven ($56.9 million, 4.7%)
specially serviced assets, and four ($9.8 million, 0.8%) assets
that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the seven specially serviced assets and four
assets that S&P determined to be credit-impaired and included them
in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  The affirmations of the ratings on the
"FS" raked certificates follow S&P's analysis of The Forum Shops
loan.  The raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from
a subordinate non-pooled portion of this loan.  The loan is
secured by a leasehold interest in The Forum Shops at Caesars in
Las Vegas.  As of December 2009, the reported DSC was 2.70x/2.29x
(senior component only/whole-loan balance) and occupancy was
95.0%.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the May 2010 remittance report, seven assets ($56.9 million,
4.7%) in the trust were with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc. The payment status of the specially serviced assets
is: two ($30.9 million, 2.5%) are real estate owned; two
($6.4 million, 0.5%) are in foreclosure; and three ($19.6 million,
1.6%) are 90-plus days delinquent.  Six of the specially serviced
assets have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$24.2 million.

The Rainier Office Portfolio asset ($19.0 million total exposure,
1.6%) is the eighth-largest exposure in the pool and the largest
asset with the special servicer.  The exposure is secured by four
office properties comprising 479,717 sq. ft. in Texas.  As of
December 2009, consolidated DSC and occupancy were 0.50x and
57.0%, respectively.  The asset was transferred to the special
servicer in October 2008 and became REO in January 2010.  There is
a $6.3 million ARA in effect.  According to the special servicer,
buyers have been secured for all of the properties.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The University Gardens asset ($14.6 million total exposure, 1.2%),
is the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
asset is secured by a 320-bed (80-unit) student housing complex
near Florida A&M University in Tallahassee, Fla.  Cash flow as of
December 2008 was negative.  The asset was transferred to the
special servicer in February 2007 and became REO in October 2007.
There is a $5.7 million ARA in effect.  According to the special
servicer, the property is being evaluated in preparation for a new
marketing effort.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The five remaining specially serviced assets have balances that,
individually, represent less than 0.8% of the trust balance.  S&P
estimated losses for all of these assets, and the weighted average
estimated loss severity was 38.9%.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined four
loans ($9.8 million, 0.8%) to be credit-impaired.  The credit-
impaired assets have balances that individually represent less
than 0.4% of the total pool balance.  Each of these assets has
experienced a decline in performance since issuance, which has
significantly reduced the assets' DSC, all of which are under
1.00x.  The current weighted average DSC for these assets is
0.40x, down from 1.48x at issuance.  As a result, S&P views these
loans to be at an increased risk of default and loss.

S&P's analysis also considered the transaction's near-term
maturities.  By balance, 23.2% of the assets have final maturities
through year-end 2010, excluding defeased loans and assets with
the special servicer.  The largest of these is The Forum Shops
loan (18.3%) which S&P discuss further below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the May 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $1.22 billion, down from $1.47 billion
at issuance.  The pool includes 166 assets, down from 184 at
issuance.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.,
provided financial information for 98.0% of the nondefeased assets
in the trust; 72.9% was full-year 2009 data, 24.4% was full-year
2008 data, and 2.7% was interim 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.79x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were
1.80x and 67.8%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude 24 ($211.5 million, 17.4%) defeased loans, two
($15.3 million, 1.3%) loans collateralized by cooperative housing
properties, the transaction's seven ($56.9 million, 4.7%)
specially serviced assets, and four ($9.8 million, 0.8%) assets
that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the seven specially serviced assets and four
assets that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  Servicer-
reported financial information was available for all of the
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  If S&P utilize
this information in calculating its adjusted DSC, the resulting
figure would be 1.73x.  The master servicer reported a watchlist
of 31 loans ($384.3 million, 31.6%).  Twenty-eight assets
($151.2 million, 12.4%) in the pool have a reported DSC of less
than 1.10x, and 20 assets ($115.5 million, 9.5%) have a reported
DSC of less than 1.00x.

                    Summary Of Top 10 Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $523.9 million (43.1%).  Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.03x
for the top 10 exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for
the top 10 exposures are 1.95x and 63.8%, respectively.  As of the
May 2010 remittance report, three ($288.3 million, 23.7%) of the
top 10 exposures appear on the master servicer's watchlist.
Details of these are:

The Forum Shops loan is the largest exposure in the pool, with a
trust balance of $223.1 million (18.3%) and a whole-loan balance
of $511.2 million.  The $511.2 million whole-loan balance consists
of a $432.2 million senior component, which is split into three
pari passu notes, one ($144.1 million, 11.8%) of which is included
in the subject trust, and a $79.0 million (6.5%) subordinate note
which is also included in the subject trust.  The "FS" rake
certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from this subordinate
note.  The property is an anchored retail center containing a
total of 655,079 sq. ft. of space.  The property opened in 1992,
and was expanded in 1997 and 2004.  The master servicer reported a
DSC of 2.29x for the whole-loan balance (2.70x for the senior
component only) as of December 2009.  Occupancy was 95.0% for the
same period.  According to the May 2010 watchlist report comments,
the loan appears on the watchlist due to ongoing litigation
between the current sponsor, the Simon Property Group, and a
former partner in the subject's ownership group.  S&P's updated
valuation for this asset is comparable to its value at issuance,
and the resulting LTV ratio of 47.8% for the whole-loan balance is
consistent with the current ratings.  The loan is scheduled to
mature on Dec. 1, 2010, but the master servicer has indicated that
the exposure will likely be paid off on June 1, 2010.

The Potomac Run loan is the fourth-largest loan in the pool and
the second-largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
loan has a trust balance of $42.8 million (3.5%) and is secured by
a 361,375-sq.-ft. retail property in Sterling, Va.  According to
the watchlist report comments, the asset appears on the watchlist
due to Circuit City's November 2008 bankruptcy filing.  Circuit
City, which occupied 9.1% of the property's net rentable area,
vacated the property in March 2009.  The master servicer has
indicated that the space has since been leased to hhgregg Inc.
Reported DSC was 1.16x as of December 2009 and occupancy was 97.6%
as of March 2010.  The hhgregg Inc. lease, and the associated
income, should improve the DSC to approximately 1.25x.

The Versailles and Dana Point Apartments Portfolio loan is the
seventh-largest loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of
$22.4 million (1.8%) and is secured by two multifamily properties
comprising 652 units in Dallas.  According to the watchlist report
comments, the asset appears on the watchlist due to poor financial
performance.  Reported DSC and occupancy were 0.94x and 80.2%,
respectively, as of December 2008.  The loan had an anticipated
repayment date of July 1, 2008.  The master servicer has indicated
that, pursuant to the transaction's offering documents, the loan
is now subject to a revised interest rate, and the difference
between the revised interest rate and the initial interest rate
will be deferred and become payable after the principal balance of
the loan has been paid in full.  The loan's maturity date is
July 1, 2033.

Standard & Poor's stressed the collateral assets according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class     To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----           ----------------------
      H         BB+     BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.99
      J         BB-     BB+/Watch Neg                    3.53
      K         B       BB/Watch Neg                     3.08
      L         CCC     BB-/Watch Neg                    2.31
      M         CCC-    B/Watch Neg                      1.55
      N         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                     1.25
      P         CCC-    CCC+/Watch Neg                   0.94

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class     To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----           ----------------------
      E         A-      A-/Watch Neg                     8.11
      F         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                   6.58
      G         BBB     BBB/Watch Neg                    5.67

              Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7

      Class     Rating                 Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     ------                 ----------------------
      A-2       AAA                                     16.18
      A-3       AAA                                     16.18
      A-4       AAA                                     16.18
      A-1A      AAA                                     16.18
      B         AA+                                     13.13
      C         AA-                                     11.92
      D         A                                        9.48
      X-1       AAA                                       N/A
      X-2       AAA                                       N/A

            Ratings Affirmed (Non-Pooled Certificates)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-CIBC7

      Class     Rating                 Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     ------                 ----------------------
      FS-1      AAA                                      N/A
      FS-2      AAA                                      N/A
      FS-3      AAA                                      N/A
      FS-4      AA+                                      N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


JUPITER HIGH-GRADE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Jupiter High-Grade CDO
Ltd. The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$489,950,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2041 (current balance of $355,622,007), Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$113,800,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2041 (current balance of $83,409,821), Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$82,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 10,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Jupiter High-Grade CDO Ltd., issued on December 2, 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
residential mortgage-backed securities.  RMBS comprise
approximately 70% of the underlying portfolio, of which the
majority were originated in 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, failure of the coverage tests, and number of assets
that are currently on review for possible downgrade.  In this case
Moody's notes that the dollar amount of defaulted securities, as
reported by the trustee, has increased from $37.9 million in
January 2009 to $144.5 million in April 2010.  During the same
time, Class A/B overcollateralization ratio decreased from 96.87%
to 75.19%.  Also, in April 2010, the ratings of approximately
$344.8 million of pre-2005 RMBS in the underlying portfolio were
placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's
updated loss projections applicable to certain RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it upgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd.:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on April 16,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to B3; previously on April 16,
     2010 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of this note:

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     April 16, 2010 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions taken on the
Class E and Class F notes result primarily from improvement in the
overcollateralization of the notes, a significant reduction in the
exposure to defaulted assets, and stabilization in the credit
quality of the collateral since the last rating action in August
2009.  The actions also consider the implications of a recent
agreement announced by KKR Financial Holdings LLC which stipulates
that -- subject to certain conditions -- KKR Financial Holdings
LLC will not undertake any future cancellation of mezzanine and
junior notes issued to it by KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd.
Moody's determined that the Class C notes did not benefit from
these positive developments, and as a result, the rating of the
notes was confirmed.

Moody's observes that the transaction's overcollateralization
ratios have improved steadily since July 2009.  Based on the April
2010 trustee report, the senior overcollateralization ratio is
133.92% compared to a level of 129.02% as of July 2009.  The Class
C/D overcollateralization ratio is 123.30% compared to 118.79% as
of July 2009.  The Class E overcollateralization ratio is 118.88%
compared to 114.53% as of July 2009.  There are no defaulted
assets currently held by the deal.  For comparison, the dollar
amount of defaulted assets held by the deal stood at $37.9 million
in July 2009.

On July 10, 2009, KKR Financial Holdings LLC surrendered for
cancellation $64 million of the principal amount of the Class D
Notes, without receiving any payment in exchange.  The surrendered
notes were cancelled upon receipt by the trustee, and the related
debt was extinguished by the issuer.  On August 18, 2009, in
consideration of the impact of this note cancellation on the
operation of the overcolateralization tests and the related cash
flow re-diversion throughout the entire capital structure of KKR
Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., Moody's upgraded the Class E notes and
the Class F notes.  Moody's' also noted that the senior notes were
negatively impacted by the note cancellation, resulting in a
downgrade of the Class A-1 notes and the Class A-2 notes.  In
November 2009, KKR Financial Holdings LLC announced that it had
agreed not to undertake a comparable surrender for cancellation of
any mezzanine notes or junior notes issued to it by KKR Financial
CLO 2005-1, Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., KKR Financial
CLO 2006-1, Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd. or KKR Financial
2007-A, Ltd. without consideration in the future, for so long as
no challenge is brought to the company's prior surrender of CLO
notes by the controlling class note holders of KKR Financial CLO
2005-2, Ltd.  Moody's views this development as beneficial to
maintaining the predictability of future cash flow diversion based
on overcollateralization tests that were put in place at the
deal's closing.

KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$58,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on March 16, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on March 16,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$64,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017 (current outstanding balance of
     $52,000,000), Upgraded to Caa1; previously on March 16, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

In addition, Moody's confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2017, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on March 16,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at Ca; previously on March 16,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions taken on the
Class B, Class C, and Class D notes result primarily from
improvement in the overcollateralization of the notes, a reduction
in the exposure to defaulted assets, and stabilization in the
credit quality of the collateral since the last rating action in
August 2009.  The actions also consider the implications of a
recent agreement announced by KKR Financial Holdings LLC which
stipulates that -- subject to certain conditions -- KKR Financial
Holdings LLC will not undertake any future cancellation of
mezzanine and junior notes issued to it by KKR Financial CLO 2005-
1, Ltd.  Moody's determined that the Class E and Class F notes did
not benefit from these positive developments, and as a result, the
ratings of the notes were confirmed.

Moody's observes that the transaction's overcollateralization
ratios have improved steadily since July 2009.  Based on the April
2010 trustee report, the senior overcollateralization ratio is
130.38% compared to a level of 125.97% as of July 2009.  The Class
C/D overcollateralization ratio is 113.37% compared to 109.53% as
of July 2009.  The Class E overcollateralization ratio is 111.49%
compared to 107.72% as of July 2009.  Additionally, the dollar
amount of defaulted securities has decreased from about
$74.2 million in July 2009 to $18.9 million in April 2010.  Due to
the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used
by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

On July 10, 2009, KKR Financial Holdings LLC surrendered for
cancellation $12 million of the principal amount of the Class D
Notes, without receiving any payment in exchange.  The surrendered
notes were cancelled upon receipt by the trustee, and the related
debt was extinguished by the issuer.  On August 18, 2009, in
consideration of the impact of this note cancellation on the
operation of the overcollateralization tests and the related cash
flow re-diversion throughout the entire capital structure of KKR
Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd., Moody's upgraded the Class D notes and
Class E notes.  Moodys' also noted that the senior notes were
negatively impacted by the note cancellation, although the overall
effect on their ratings was not material.  In November 2009 KKR
Financial Holdings LLC announced that it had agreed not to
undertake a comparable surrender for cancellation of any mezzanine
notes or junior notes issued to it by KKR Financial CLO 2005-1,
Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2006-1,
Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd. or KKR Financial 2007-A, Ltd.
without consideration in the future, for so long as no challenge
is brought to the company's prior surrender of CLO notes by the
controlling class note holders of KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd.
Moody's views this development as beneficial to maintaining the
predictability of future cash flow diversion based on
overcollateralization tests that were put in place at the deal's
closing.

KKR Financial CLO 2005-1, Ltd., issued in March 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 1996-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust II,
Multiclass Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1996-C2.  The
downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the pool based on a
decline in loan diversity, realized losses from specially serviced
loans and anticipated losses from watchlisted loans.

The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 26, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to
$11.8 million from $397.2 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in
size from 2% to 23% of the pool.  No loans have underlying ratings
or are defeased.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $30.9 million realized loss (69% loss severity on
average).  Realized losses have resulted in the elimination of
classes H and J and a 98% principal loss to class G.  No loans are
currently in special servicing.  Five loans, representing 49% of
the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Moody's has
assumed a high default probability on seven poorly performing
loans, representing 78% of the pool.  Two of these loans are
secured by multifamily properties and the remaining five loans are
secured by limited service hotel properties.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $3.4 million expected loss for the troubled
loans (38% expected loss severity on average assuming an overall
75% default probability).

Moody's was provided with partial-year 2009 and full-year 2009
operating results for 100% and 95% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio is 63% compared to
96% at last review.

Moody's actual and stressed debt service coverage ratio are 1.23X
and 2.36X, respectively, compared to 1.05X and 1.49X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 2
compared to 9 at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class F, $11,602,954, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2 on 7/19/2006

  -- Class G, $240,331, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to C
     from B2 on 7/19/2006


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2004-C7 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Series 2004-C7 on review for possible downgrade
due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized
losses and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
watchlisted loans.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the May 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 28% to $1 billion
from $1.4 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 80 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 48% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 21% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Seventeen loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $6.2 million (52% loss severity on
average).  Four loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Carson Valley Plaza Loan ($45.4 million -- 4.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a 265,000 square foot retail center located in
Carson City, Nevada.  This loan was transferred to special
servicing in August 26, 2009 due to maturity default.  The
remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily and office properties.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B, $10,614,000, currently rated Aa1 on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa1 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class C, $14,153,000, currently rated Aa2 on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa2 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class D, $15,921,000, currently rated Aa3 on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa3 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class E, $12,383,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at A1 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class F, $12,383,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at A2 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class G, $12,383,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at A3 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class H, $12,384,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa1 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class J, $8,845,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa2 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class K, $17,691,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa3 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class L, $3,538,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba1 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class M, $5,307,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba2 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class N, $3,538,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba3 on 11/9/2004

  -- Class P, $1,769,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from B1 on
     9/4/2008

  -- Class Q, $3,538,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from B2 on
     9/4/2008

  -- Class S, $3,538,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade, previously downgraded to Caa1 from B3 on
     9/4/2008


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2007-C6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 12 classes,
confirmed two classes, and affirmed five classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C6.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from a decline in loan
diversity and realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The confirmations and affirmations
are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 14 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 16, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the May 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $2.95 billion
from $2.98 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 180 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
58% of the pool.  One loan, representing 1% of the pool, has an
investment grade underlying rating.

Forty-four loans, representing 31% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly the Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of $2.1 million (80% loss severity).  Thirteen
loans, representing 23% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Innkeepers
Portfolio Loan ($412.7 million -- 14% of the pool), which
represents a pari-passu interest in a $825.4 million first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 45 extended stay, limited
service, and full service hotels across 16 states.  The properties
are primarily flagged as Residence Inns, which comprises 74% of
the portfolio by loan balance.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in April 2010 due to imminent default.
Occupancy and revenue per available room for the 12-month period
ending December 2009 were 69% and $75.65, respectively, compared
to 73% and $90.29 in December 2008.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Greensboro Park
Loan ($108.9 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
485,047 square foot two-building office property in Mclean,
Virginia.  The property was 86% leased as of December 2009
compared to 91% at last review.  The loan transferred into special
servicing in March 2010 due to imminent default.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $150.8 million loss (23% expected loss on
average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 27 poorly
performing loans representing 15% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $97.2 million loss (22% weighted average expected loss
based on a 60% probability default) from these troubled loans.
Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the
timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with partial year 2009 operating results for
81% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 111% compared to 148% at Moody's
prior review.  The previous review was part of Moody's first
quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.29X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
1.03X and 0.87X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's new cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an investment grade underlying rating is the 707
Broad Street Loan ($42 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is
secured by an office building located in Newark, New Jersey.  The
property was 98% leased as of December 2009 compared to 95% in
February 2008.  Property performance has remained stable, but
Moody's stressed the cash flow due to potential cash flow
volatility resulting from soft market conditions and the October
2010 lease expiration of the State of New Jersey, which leases 58%
of the net rentable area.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.94X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and
2.04X at Moody's last full review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 24% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the PECO Portfolio Loan
($323.8 million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by 39 cross-
collateralized retail properties totaling 4.25 million square
feet.  The properties are located across thirteen different
states, with the majority located in New York (31%), North
Carolina (14%), and Florida (13%) by portfolio NRA.  Performance
has remained stable since securitization, although leasing has
declined to 90% as of September 2009 compared to 97% at
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.82X,
respectively, compared to 152% and 0.68X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Potomac Mills Loan ($246 million --
8.3% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a
$410 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
1.5 million square foot anchored retail center in Woodbridge,
Virginia.  The center is anchored by Costco, JC Penney Outlet, and
AMC Theatre.  Performance has improved since securitization due to
increased rental rates and recoveries.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 121% and 0.74X, respectively, compared to 151% and 0.63X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the One Sansome Street Loan
($139.6 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a Class
A office building located in the financial district of San
Francisco, California.  The loan is currently on the servicer's
watchlist due to default on the bridge mezzanine loan.  The
property was 80% leased as of December 2009 compared to 94% in
December 2008.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.77X,
respectively, compared to 100% and 0.97X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $453,173,522, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-2FL, $39,839,430, affirmed at Aaa;, previously
     assigned Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-3, $169,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $67,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-4, $910,408,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A-1A, $421,129,794, confirmed at Aaa; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned Aaa
     on 9/11/2007

  -- Class AM, $227,893,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class A-MFL, $70,000,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class A-J, $156,395,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A1;
     previously on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class B, $33,513,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A2; previously
     on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class C, $37,237,000, downgraded to B1 from A3; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, $33,513,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa1; previously
     on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, $29,789,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa2;
     previously on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class F, $29,790,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3;
     previously on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class G, $33,513,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     on 4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class H, $37,236,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class J, $40,961,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class K, $29,789,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously on
     4/16/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade


LEGG MASON: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from Legg Mason Real Estate CDO II Corp. and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
criteria, which was the primary driver of its rating actions.  The
downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated asset-specific recovery
rates for the eight underlying loan assets ($87.9 million, 15.9%
of the collateral pool) reported as defaulted in the April 2010
trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a review of the current
credit characteristics of all of the underlying collateral assets,
as well as the transaction's liability structure.

According to the April 26, 2010 trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included these:

* Thirty-four whole loans and senior-participation loans
  ($435.6 million, 79.1%);

* Four commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) tranches
  ($62.7 million, 11.4%);

* Five CRE CDO tranches ($27.3 million, 4.9%); and

* Two subordinate-interest loans ($25.2 million, 4.6%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its credit estimates for
all of the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on
its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most
recent financial data provided by the collateral manager, Legg
Mason Real Estate Capital II, and the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., as well as market and valuation data from third-party
providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes eight
defaulted loan assets ($87.9 million, 15.9%).  Standard & Poor's
has estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan assets
reported as defaulted, which ranged from 42.7% to 70.9%.  S&P
based S&P's recovery rates on the information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers.

The defaulted loan assets are:

* The Felcor Portfolio pari passu loan ($21.2 million, 3.9%);

* The Bella Vista senior-interest loan ($14.6 million, 2.7%);

* The Inwood Portfolio senior-interest loan ($11.0 million, 2.0%);

* The Hamilton Building pari passu loan ($9.8 million, 1.8%);

* The Huntington Ridge Apartments senior-interest loan
  ($8.5 million, 1.5%);

* The Fairway Estates senior-interest loan ($8.2 million, 1.5%);

* The Court Glen senior-interest loan ($7.9 million, 1.4%); and

* The Store It Here senior-interest loan ($6.7 million, 1.2%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               Legg Mason Real Estate CDO II Corp.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class     To                   From
           -----     --                   ----
           A-1T      BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
           A-1R      BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2       BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
           B         BB+                  AA+/Watch Neg
           C         B+                   A/Watch Neg
           D         B+                   A-/Watch Neg


LEGG MASON: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes from Legg Mason Real Estate CDO I Ltd. and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
criteria, which was the primary driver of S&P's rating actions.
The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated asset-specific
recovery rates for the six underlying loan assets ($79.9 million,
14.8% of the collateral pool) reported as defaulted in the April
2010 trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
current credit characteristics of all of the underlying collateral
assets, as well as the transaction's liability structure.

According to the April 26, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included these:

* Thirty-one whole loans and senior-participation loans
  ($478.9 million, 88.6%);

* Three subordinate-interest loans ($36.5 million, 6.7%); and

* Four commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) tranches
  ($25.2 million, 4.7%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its credit estimates for
all of the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on
its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most
recent financial data provided by the collateral manager, Legg
Mason Real Estate Capital II, and the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., as well as market and valuation data from third-party
providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes six
defaulted loan assets ($79.9 million, 14.8%) and one defaulted
CMBS tranche ($5.0 million, 0.9%).  Standard & Poor's has
estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan assets
reported as defaulted, which ranged from 0% to 73.2%.  S&P based
its recovery rates on the information from the collateral manager,
special servicer, and third-party data providers.

The defaulted loan assets are:

* The 200 Building senior-interest loan ($19.6 million, 3.6%);

* The Felcor Portfolio pari passu loan ($17.4 million, 3.2%);

* The Taylors Crossing senior-interest loan ($15.2 million, 2.8%);

* The Extended Stay Hotel Portfolio subordinated loan
  ($10.0 million, 1.9%);

* The Casa Grande Apartments senior-interest loan ($9.9 million,
  1.8%); and

* The Hamilton Building pari passu loan ($7.9 million, 1.5%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 Legg Mason Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-IT      BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
          A-R       BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
          A-2       BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
          B         BB+                  AA/Watch Neg
          C         BB                   A+/Watch Neg
          D         B+                   A/Watch Neg
          E         B                    A-/Watch Neg
          F-1       B-                   BBB+/Watch Neg
          F-2       B-                   BBB+/Watch Neg
          G         CCC+                 BBB/Watch Neg


LNR CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of 2002-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of LNR CDO 2002-1
Ltd./Corp. as a result of increased interest shortfalls and losses
to the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, the credit
quality of the portfolio has declined to a current weighted
average Fitch derived rating of 'CCC+', down from 'B-' at last
review.  Further, 15.3% of the portfolio is currently on Rating
Watch Negative.  Approximately 89.6% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade; 42% has a rating in the
'CCC' category and below.  As of the April 22, 2010 trustee
report, 48.2% of the portfolio is experiencing interest
shortfalls.  The CDO has experienced approximately $132.7 million
in losses to date.  Due to the failure of the class D
overcollateralization tests, all interest proceeds beyond the
payment of classes D-FX and D-FL have been reallocated to redeem
approximately $11.7 million of class A principal since Fitch's
last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls (48.2% of the portfolio).  Based on this
analysis, the class A notes' breakeven rates are generally
consistent with the 'A' rating category and the breakeven rates
for the B and C notes are generally consistent with the 'BBB' and
'BB' rating category, respectively.

The breakeven rates for classes D through H fail Fitch's base cash
flow model stress.  These classes' respective credit enhancement
levels were compared to the percent of underlying collateral
experiencing interest shortfalls.  Classes D-FX and D-FL have been
downgraded to 'CCC' since default is a real possibility.
Although, their credit enhancement level currently exceeds the
total percentage of assets experiencing interest shortfalls,
further deterioration could quickly erode that cushion.  Classes
E-FX, E-FX, and E-FL have been downgraded to 'CC' given that
default appears probable since their credit enhancement level is
slightly below the total percentage of assets experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Fitch believes that for classes F through H
default appears inevitable because Fitch does not expect full
recoveries on these classes.  As such, classes F through H have
been downgraded to 'C'.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A through C notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will
continue to face refinance risk at maturity.  Fitch also assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.

LNR 2002-1 is backed by 130 tranches from 22 CMBS transactions and
is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred to as
first loss CRE CDO) as it includes the most junior bonds of CMBS
transactions.  The transaction closed in July 2002.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $86,379,943 class A notes to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $80,000,000 class B notes to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $25,000,000 class C notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $40,150,000 class D-FX notes to 'CCC' from 'BBB-';

  -- $45,000,000 class D-FL notes to 'CCC' from 'BBB-';

  -- $22,000,000 class E-FX notes to 'CC' from 'BB';

  -- $33,059,000 class E-FXD notes to 'CC' from 'BB';

  -- $21,000,000 class E-FL notes to 'CC' from 'BB';

  -- $25,000,000 class F-FX notes to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $27,041,000 class F-FL notes to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $40,032,000 class G notes to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $54,042,000 class H notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or
lower.  The Rating Outlooks for classes D-FX, D-FL, E-FX, E-FXD,
E-FL, F-FX, F-FL, and G were Stable prior to the downgrades.


MARATHON STRUCTURED: Fitch Downgrades Rating on A-1 Notes to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class of notes issued by Marathon
Structured Funding I, LLC, as a result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
May 2009.

As of the April 15, 2010 trustee report, the current balance of
the portfolio is $78.8 million.  Approximately 62.1% of the
portfolio has been downgraded since May 2009, resulting in 88.8%
of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 78% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or below,
compared to 75.1% and 52.7%, respectively, at last review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Due
to the extent of collateral deterioration and the sequential pay
structure of the transaction, Fitch believes that the likelihood
of default can be assessed without using the Structured Finance
Portfolio Credit Model or performing cash flow model analysis
under the framework described in the 'Global Criteria for Cash
Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Fitch expects the class A-1 notes to continue to receive full
interest payments, but the continued deterioration of the
portfolio resulted in the class A-1 notes being significantly
undercollateralized.  Fitch believes default is inevitable for
this class of notes.

Marathon I is a structured finance collateralized debt obligation
that closed in March 2005 and is managed by Marathon Asset
Management, LLC.  The transaction exited its reinvestment period
in January 2008.  Marathon I's current portfolio is composed of
approximately 59.3% subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities, 32.9% of structured finance CDOs, 16.7% of corporate
CDOs, and 2.2% commercial asset-backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

  -- $102,710,786 class A-1 notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Fitch does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' and lower.


MAX CMBS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from MAX CMBS I Ltd.'s series 2007-1 and 2008-1 and COMM
2008-RS3 and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on 14 classes from two of these
transactions.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transactions
following its downgrades of 32 commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that serve as collateral for MAX 2007-1
and MAX 2008-1.  The certificates are from 23 transactions
totaling $986.2 million (12.5% of the pool balance for these
deals).  The downgrades also reflect the lowering of S&P's credit
estimates on all unrated CMBS collateral ($1.1 billion, 14.5%).

The collateral for COMM 2008-RS3 consists of classes A-2A, A-2B,
C, E, F, G, H, J, and K from MAX 2008-1.  S&P lowered its ratings
on the COMM 2008-RS3 classes concurrently with the downgrades of
the respective MAX 2008-1 classes.

MAX CMBS I Ltd., the issuer, has the ability to issue one or more
series of notes.  The first series, MAX 2007-1, is cross-
collateralized with the second series, MAX 2008-1.  The issuer in
the COMM 2008-RS3 transaction is a grantor trust that primarily
holds certain securities from MAX 2008-1 and has a similar
priority of distribution.

According to the May 20, 2010, trustee report, MAX 2008-1 and
MAX 2007-1 are collateralized by 156 CMBS certificates
($7.114 billion, 90% of the combined transaction balances) from 99
distinct transactions issued between 2005 and 2007.  The
collateral also includes 12 collateralized debt obligation classes
($776.6 million, 10%) from 12 distinct transactions.  MAX 2007-1
and MAX 2008-1 have exposure to Standard & Poor's downgraded CMBS,
including these:

* Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. 2007-GG9 (classes A-
  4, A-M, and A-J; $226.2 million, 2.9%);

* COMM 2007-C9 (classes A-M and A-J; $195.8 million, 2.5%); and

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 (classes A-M and A-J;
  $70.5 million, 0.9%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed MAX 2007-1, MAX 2008-1, and COMM 2008-
RS3 and its underlying collateral according to S&P's current
criteria.  S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                          MAX CMBS I Ltd.
                       Series 2007-1 notes

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              B+               BB+/Watch Neg

                          MAX CMBS I Ltd.
                       Series 2008-1 notes

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              B+               BB+/Watch Neg
         A-2A             CCC              B/Watch Neg
         A-2B             CCC              B/Watch Neg

                           COMM 2008-RS3
      Commercial mortgage-related securities series 2008-RS3

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-2A             CCC              B/Watch Neg
         A-2B             CCC              B/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                          MAX CMBS I Ltd.
                        Series 2008-1 notes

                      Class            Rating
                      -----            ------
                      C                CCC-
                      E                CCC-
                      F                CCC-
                      G                CCC-
                      H                CCC-
                      J                CCC-
                      K                CCC-

                          COMM 2008-RS3
      Commercial mortgage-related securities series 2008-RS3

                      Class            Rating
                      -----            ------
                      B                CCC-
                      C                CCC-
                      D                CCC-
                      E                CCC-
                      F                CCC-
                      G                CCC-
                      H                CCC-


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded 20 classes of ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-7.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The downgrades include Classes A-4, A-4FL and A-1A, which have the
longest weighted average life among the super senior Aaa classes
with 30% initial credit support.  Depending on the magnitude,
severity, and timing of losses from specially serviced loans and
the balance of the pool, along with any loan payoffs, sequential
paydowns may not reach these classes.  Losses are likely to erode
the credit enhancement cushion for the super senior classes
creating a potential differential in expected loss between those
super senior classes benefiting first from paydowns and those
classes receiving paydowns last.  Although Moody's believe that it
is unlikely that Classes A-4, A-4FL and A-1A will actually
experience losses, the expected level of credit enhancement and
their priority in the cash flow waterfall no longer provide an
adequate cushion to maintain Aaa ratings.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed debt
service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

On April 1, 2010, Moody's placed 21 classes of this transaction on
review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review of this transaction.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the May 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $2.72 billion
from $2.79 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 324 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 20%
of the pool.  The pool contains two loans, representing 1% of the
pool, with investment grade underlying ratings that remain
unchanged since securitization.

Seventy-seven loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $9.1 million loss (24% loss severity on average).
Currently, forty-nine loans, representing 23% of the pool, are in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the One
Pacific Plaza Loan ($105.0 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 428,244 square foot office building located in
Huntington Beach, California.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in November 2009 due to the borrower disclosing it could
no longer cover debt service payments.  Performance has declined
since last review due to a decline in occupancy.  The lender filed
for foreclosure in January 2010 and a receivership hearing is
scheduled for May 2010.  As of April 2010 the property was 74%
leased.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 10 Milk Street
Loan ($58.0 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
229,843 SF class B office building located in the financial
district area of Boston, Massachusetts.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in March 2010 due to a borrower request for a
loan modification.  The property lost its two largest tenants
resulting in a current leasing of 65%.  The loan is current.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Mervyn's
Corporate Headquarters Loan ($42.7 million -- 1.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 336,000 SF office building in Hayward,
California.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2008 due to imminent default.  The property was 100%
leased to Mervyn's LLC for use as their corporate offices under a
20-year NNN lease.  Mervyn's LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in July 2008.  It subsequently closed all of its stores
and rejected the lease for this property in January 2009.  The
subject is currently 100% vacant and being marketed for sale by a
local broker.

The remaining 46 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, office, retail, industrial and lodging properties.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $296.8 million loss for all
specially serviced loans (47% expected loss on average).  The
servicer has recognized an aggregate $158.6 million appraisal
reduction for 34 of the specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on nine loans which
represent 5% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate loss of
$17.5 million (overall 12% expected loss based on a overall 70%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with partial 2009 or full-year 2008 operating
results for 94% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV ratio,
excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, is 129%
compared to 149% at Moody's prior review in February 2009.  The
previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS transactions.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCR are 1.26X and 0.92X,
respectively, compared to 1.04X and 0.85X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 122, essentially the same as at last review.

The three largest performing loans represent 7% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest loan is the Commons at Calabasas Loan
($101.5 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
171,097 SF grocery anchored retail center located in Calabasas,
California.  As of January 2010 the property was 99% leased
compared to 100% at year end 2008.  Tenants include Ralphs Grocery
Co. (31% of the net rentable area; lease expiration November 2023)
and Edwards Theaters (20% of the NRA; lease expiration December
2023).  The property is performing slightly below Moody's original
projections due to increased operating expenses.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.68X, respectively, compared to 151%
and 0.63X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Residence Inn Bethesda
Loan ($46.3 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
187 room extended stay hotel located in Bethesda, Maryland.
Occupancy and revenue per available room for the 12 month period
ending December 2009 were 85% and $149, respectively, compared to
84% and $153 for the same period in 2008.  The property has
performed in-line with Moody's projections at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 1.02X, respectively,
compared to 154% and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Millbridge Apartments
Loan ($40.0 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured by an
848 unit multifamily complex located in Clementon, New Jersey.  As
of January 2010 the property was 91% leased compared to 96% at
year end 2007.  The property has performed in-line with Moody's
projections at securitization.  This loan is currently on the
master servicer's watchlist for failing a debt service coverage
test in September 2009 which could result in termination of the
current property management company.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 115% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 157% and 0.69X
at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $8,692,520, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     to Aaa on 6/20/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned to
     Aaa on 6/20/2007

  -- Class A-2, $110,798,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     to Aaa on 6/20/2007

  -- Class A-2FL, $30,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned to Aaa on 6/20/2007

  -- Class A-3FL, $204,236,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned to Aaa on 6/20/2007

  -- Class A-SB, $102,775,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class A-4, $787,943,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-4FL, $55,000,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-1A, $598,664,916, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class AM, $233,551,000, downgraded to A3 from Aaa; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class AM-FL, $45,000,000, downgraded to A3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class AJ, $174,358,000, downgraded to B1 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class AJ-FL, $45,000,000, downgraded to B1 from A1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class B, $55,710,000, downgraded to Caa1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class C, $27,855,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class D, $45,264,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class E, $27,856,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class F, $34,818,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class G, $27,855,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class H, $24,373,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class J, $10,446,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class K, $10,446,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class L, $10,445,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class M, $6,964,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class N, $6,964,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class P, $6,964,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2003-HQ2 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms, assigns Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings
to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I, Inc.'s mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2003-HQ2:

  -- $107.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- $522.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- $41.9 million class C at 'AA-/LS1', Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class D at 'A/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class E at 'A-/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.5 million class F at 'BBB/LS2', Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.2 million class G at 'BBB-/LS3', Outlook Stable;
  -- $14 million class H at 'BB+/LS2', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

  -- $5.8 million class J;
  -- $2.3 million class K;
  -- $2.3 million class L;
  -- $4.7 million class M;
  -- $2.3 million class N;
  -- $5.3 million class O.

The affirmations are the result of stable pool performance and
minimal Fitch expected losses following Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses and expected losses associated with
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of less than 1%
of the remaining pool balance, approximately $1.7 million, from
the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not expected
to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  The
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any changes to the
ratings over the next one to two years.  As of the May 2010
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has
decreased 15.8% to $784.8 million, from $931.6 million at
issuance.  Twelve loans (15.8%) have defeased since issuance.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, there are three loans in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan (1.2%) is
a 142,360 square foot single-story retail center located in
Aberdeen, Washington.  The sponsor DBSI, Inc. and master tenant
for the property declared bankruptcy in November 2008.  A plan to
replace DBSI as the lessee was received and the reinstatement case
was approved.  The loan remains current at the special servicer
and awaits final closing of the proposed plan.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1%) transferred to
special servicing in June 2009 due to the risk of imminent
default.  The loan is current at the special servicer and is
performing under a three year extension modification which closed
in April 2010.  The collateral is a 57,600 square foot strip
retail center in Miami, FL.  Occupancy has declined to 63% as two
major tenants have vacated.

The third largest specially serviced loan (0.5%) transferred to
special servicing in January 2009 due to imminent payment default.
The borrower consented to the appointment of a receiver with the
right to sell the asset and it remains on the market with
discussions continuing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, eight are not expected to pay
off at maturity, with two loans incurring a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-RM1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates series 1999-RM1, as indicated:

  -- $8.6 million class N to 'C/RR1' from 'CCC'.

Fitch upgrades and assigns a Loss Severity rating to this class:

  -- $6.2 million class H to 'AAA/LS3' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms, assigns LS ratings and revises
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- Interest Only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.6 million class J at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.9 million class K at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.4 million class L at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.6 million class M at 'B+/LS3'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $3.6 million class O certificates.

The downgrade is the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates for
the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which is
similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 10.0%, approximately $5.5 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 93.6% to $54.9 million from $859.3 million
at issuance.  Of the remaining 24 loans, one loan (3.1%) is
defeased.

Fitch has identified nine Loans of Concern (39.2%), including one
asset in special servicing (7.5%).  The specially serviced asset
is a hotel property located Lexington, NC which had transferred to
special servicing in December 2009.  The property is in
foreclosure and operations are being stabilized by the receiver.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern (14.24%) is secured by an office
property located in Boulder, CO.  The owner is the sole tenant of
the property and has a lease that expires in September 2010.  25%
of the space is subleased.

The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern (5.2%) is a manufactured
housing community located in Springfield, MI.  The borrower has
requested a loan modification.  The borrower is having trouble
increasing occupancy, due to the difficulty of finding financing
for renters of mobile homes.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, all loans are expected to
refinance at maturity.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-LIFE2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2000-LIFE2:

  -- $9.2 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB+';
  -- $3.1 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB';
  -- $4 million class L to 'CC/RR1' from 'B+';
  -- $6.7 million class M to 'C/RR4' from 'B';
  -- $2.9 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';
  -- $1 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes and assigned Loss
Severity ratings and Rating Outlooks:

  -- $187.4 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $24.9 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.8 million class E at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.7 million class F at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.1 million class G at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.6 million class H at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $5.5 million class P certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 4.67% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $14.6 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 59% to $313.5 million from $765.3 million at
issuance.  14 of the remaining 55 loans have defeased (24.8%).

As of May 2010, there are ten specially serviced loans (12.4%).
The largest specially serviced loan (3.9%), is secured by a
117,792 square foot office building located in Denver, CO.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2009 for monetary
default.  The special servicer is working to take title to the
asset through a foreclosure sale scheduled this month.  Per the
servicer, the January 2010 occupancy was 97.6%.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.8%) is secured by a
202 unit multifamily property located in Rock Hill, SC.  The loan
transferred to special servicing due to monetary default.  The
special servicing is pursuing foreclosure and has reported the
most recent occupancy to be 67% as of January 2010 with a year end
2009 debt service coverage ratio of .68 times.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Fitch considered loans that could refinance
to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, three loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity however they did not incur a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-23 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Morgan Stanley ACES SPC, Series 2006-23,
a collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating actions:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ACES SPC, Series 2006-23

  -- US$10,000,000 Class IB Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     September 20, 2016, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 25,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 955 from the last rating action to 1354,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba2.
Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of the rated
tranches has been reduced due to credit events on CIT Group Inc.,
Thomson S.A., Syncora Guarantee Inc, Idearc, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp., Federal National Mortgage Association, Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., Aiful Corporation and Ambac Assurance
Corporation.

Six of these nine credits events occured after the last rating
action taken on February 25, 2009, when the transaction was
downgraded to Caa2.  The seven credit events for which a cash
settlement has been determined lead to a decrease of approximately
3.0% of the subordination of the tranche.  Based on the
information provided by the last Trustee report, the determination
of the losses due to the last two credit events are pending a
valuation process according to the documentation of the
transaction.  The portfolio has the highest industry
concentrations in Insurance (10%), Telecommunications (7.5%), and
Energy (6.7%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-TOP15 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-TOP15 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing and increased credit quality
dispersion.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the May 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to
$738.8 million from $889.8 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 109 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 43% of the pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans, representing 2% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Aiken
Exchange Loan ($7.4 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 101,000 square foot retail center located in Aiken, South
Carolina.  This loan is currently in the process of foreclosure.
The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of multifamily, hotel and industrial properties.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B, $22,243,000, Aa2 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Aa2 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class C, $23,356,000, A2 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned A2 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class D, $5,561,000, A3 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned A3 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class E, $8,897,000, Baa1 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Baa1 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class F, $6,674,000, Baa2 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Baa2 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class G, $8,897,000, Baa3 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Baa3 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class H, $3,337,000, Ba1 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Ba1 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class J, $3,337,000, Ba2 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Ba2 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class K, $2,224,000, Ba3 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned Ba3 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class L, $2,224,000, B1 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned B1 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class M, $2,225,000, B2 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned B2 on 8/4/2004

  -- Class N, $2,224,000, B3 on review for possible downgrade;
     previously assigned B3 on 8/4/2004


MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain View CLO III Ltd.:

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due April, 2021,
     Upgraded to A1; previously on March 17, 2010 A2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due April, 2021,
     Upgraded to Baa1; previously on March 17, 2010 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes, Due
     April, 2021, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on March 17, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes, Due
     April, 2021, Upgraded to B2; previously on March 17, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes, Due
     April, 2021, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2010
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
rated notes since the last rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an increase
in the average credit rating (as measured through the weighted
average rating factor).  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has decreased from 2824 as of the May 2009 trustee
report to 2588 as of the last trustee report, dated April 30,
2010.  In undertaking its analysis, Moody's took into
consideration a notable decrease in the proportion of securities
under review for possible downgrade or with negative outlook,
which was reflected in the weighted average rating factor assumed
in its modeling.  Credit improvement is also observed in a
decrease in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, which has
declined to about $10MM from approximately $12MM in May 2009.  Due
to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
the latest Moody's CLO methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The overcollateralization of the rated notes has increased since
the last rating action in June 2009.  Currently, all these tests
are in compliance whereas Class E Par Value Test was failing in
May 2009.  As of the April 2010 trustee report, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E Par Value Tests are reported at
121.5%, 112.7%, 106.7%, and 103.5% versus May 2009 levels of
119.7%, 111.1%, 105.2%, and 102.0%, respectively.

Mountain View CLO III Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1,
Ltd.:

  -- US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Upgraded to Aa3; previously on April 15, 2010 A1 Placed Under
     Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes
     Due April 2019, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on April 15, 2010
     A1 Placed Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Upgraded to Baa1; previously on April 15, 2010 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Upgraded to Baa1; previously on April 15, 2010 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on April 15, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
     2019, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on April 15, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$19,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Upgraded to B2; previously on April 15, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Upgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on April 15, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, an increase in the overcollateralization of the notes,
and reduction in the exposure to second lien loans and defaulted
assets since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an increase
in the average credit rating (as measured through the weighted
average rating factor).  In particular, as of the latest trustee
report dated May 3, 2010, the weighted average rating factor has
decreased from 2722 in July 2009 to 2617 as of the last trustee
report.  In undertaking its analysis, Moody's took into
consideration a notable decrease in the proportion of securities
under review for possible downgrade or with negative outlook,
which was reflected in the weighted average rating factor assumed
in its modeling.  Credit improvement is also observed in a
decrease in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, which has
declined to about $6.4MM from approximately $13.6MM in July 2009.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in the latest Moody's CLO methodology, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in July 2009.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 118.70%, 111.72%,
106.41%, and 103.03%, respectively, versus July 2009 levels of
117.32%, 110.39%, 105.13%, and 101.73%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
Moody's notes that the Class E notes are no longer deferring
interest and all deferred interest has been repaid.

Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


NATIONSLINK FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1999-SL Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms, assigns Loss Severity ratings, and Rating
Outlooks to NationsLink Funding Corporation's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 1999-SL:

  -- $4.5 million class F at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.6 million class G at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the notional $24.1 million class X.  Classes
A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-IV, B, C, D, and E have paid in
full.

The rating affirmations are the result of stable performance, no
delinquencies, and $13 million in overcollateralization to offset
the increased concentration, adverse selection and limited
financial reporting.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has been reduced 99%, to $11.1 million from $1.18 billion
at issuance.  Although, the transaction has paid down
significantly, the pool still remains diverse by property type
with 169 loans of the original 2,755 remaining.

The transaction's structure has reverted to standard sequential
pay.  The deal includes an overcollateralization feature which
creates a first loss piece that absorbs any losses that otherwise
would result in principal loss to the trust.  The current
overcollateralization amount is equal to $13 million (over 100% of
the pool).  To date, the overcollateralization structure of the
pool has prevented any principal losses to the trust.

The transaction continues to have stable performance with a
history of low delinquencies.  Approximately 1% of the pool is
scheduled to mature through the remainder of 2010, 7% in 2011, 29%
in 2012 and 62% in 2013.  The weighted average mortgage coupon for
the pool is 7.91%.  There are currently no delinquent or specially
serviced loans in the deal.  Fitch has identified six loans (1.1%)
as Fitch Loans of Concern due to upcoming maturities within the
next six months.


NATIONSLINK FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed one class of NationsLink Funding Corporation, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-1.  The rating
action is due to significant increased credit subordination
resulting from loan payoffs and amortization and key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable
ranges.

The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the May 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to
$28.0 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 21 mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 76% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
No loans have underlying ratings.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $5.4 million realized loss (18% loss severity on
average).  One loan, representing 2% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist.  A second loan, representing 3% of the pool,
is currently in special servicing and is pending return to the
master servicer.  Moody's has assumed a high default probability
on one poorly performing loan, representing 2% of the pool.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $0.2 million expected loss for
the troubled loan (38% expected loss severity assuming a 75%
probability of default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 100% of the performing loans.  Excluding the
troubled loan, Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 51% compared
to 71% at last review.

Excluding the troubled loan, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR are
1.99X and 2.91X, respectively, compared to 1.64X and 1.75X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 10
compared to 101 at last full review.  The decline in Herf has been
mitigated by increased credit support.  The pool balance has
declined by 67% since Moody's last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 2/05/1999

  -- Class J, $2,133,307, upgraded to A3 from B3; previously
     assigned B3 on 2/05/1999


NELSON RE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Catastrophe Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on the
Class H and Class I catastrophe bonds of Nelson Re Ltd.:

-- Class H ($45.0 million) catastrophe bonds confirmed at B3 with
    a stable outlook (removed from under review for possible
    downgrade);

-- Class I ($67.5 million) catastrophe bonds confirmed at B1 with
    a stable outlook (removed from under review for possible
    downgrade).

The Class G ($67.5 million) catastrophe bonds remain at Ca with a
developing outlook.

In November 2009, Moody's placed the Class H and I notes on review
for possible downgrade due to organizational changes at Nelson
Re's sponsor, Glacier Reinsurance AG (and not because of incurred
losses), and what impact this might have on client's perceptions
and the quality of business ceded to Nelson Re.

Based on discussions with Glacier Re and portfolio statistics as
of April 1, 2010, Moody's believes that the quality of the bound
portfolio remains largely consistent with that contemplated when
the ratings were originally assigned.  In particular, the average
limit per contract has gone down slightly and the average modeled
loss per treaty has remained stable.  Furthermore, in Moody's
opinion, recent Windstorm Xynthia losses will not attach the Class
H or I notes.  For these reasons, the rating agency has decided to
remove the Class H and I notes from under review and confirmed the
ratings with a stable outlook.

The Ca rating on the Class G securities assumes that the notes
will attach due to Hurricane Ike (2009) and that recovery of
promised principal and interest will be less than 60%.  The
developing outlook reflects the possibility that ultimate
recoveries could be significantly better or worse than
contemplated.  The extent of ultimate recoveries remains very
uncertain at this point as ceding companies continue to report
losses to Glacier and Glacier continues to pay out losses.

Nelson Re issued the Class G, H and I notes in June 2008 as a way
for note holders to provide per occurrence excess-of-loss
reinsurance to Glacier Re for U.S. hurricane/earthquake events
(Class G) and European windstorm events (Class H and I).

The last rating action occurred on November 24, 2009 when Moody's
downgraded the Class G bonds to Ca with a developing outlook and
placed the Class H and I bonds under review for possible
downgrade.


NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of four class of notes issued North Street Reference
Linked Notes, 2003-5 Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action
are:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Caa2; previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Caa2; previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to B2.

North Street Reference Linked Notes, 2003-5 Ltd., is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation issuance that references a
portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage Backed Securities with
the majority originated in 2003 and 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference obligations.
Credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the Moody's Weighted Average Rating
Factor and an increase in assets rated Caa1 or below.  As reported
by the trustee, the Moody's WARF of the reference portfolio has
increased from 430 in March 2009 to 842 in May 2010 and reference
obligations rated Caa1 or below increased from approximately 3.3%
to 7.7% respectively.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


PASCO COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Bonds
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 rating on
$1,165,000 of outstanding Pasco County (Florida) Federal Assisted
Housing Inc, Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Series 1979 (Hudson Hills -
Section 8).  The negative outlook has also been affirmed.  The
rating is based primarily upon a low debt service coverage ratio,
as well as ongoing financial support from the Pasco County Housing
Authority.

Legal Security:

The bonds are secured by revenues derived from operations of
Hudson Hills Manor, a 64-unit multifamily rental property located
in Pasco County, Florida.  Pledged revenues include payments
received from a Housing Assistance Payment Contract with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Though Hudson Hills
has been receiving financial support from Pasco County Housing
Authority since 2003, the Authority is not legally obligated to
continue to support the property.  The rating on the Series 1979
addresses the operating performance of the property independent of
the financial support provided by the Authority.

Strengths:

Rent levels: Hudson Hills Manor's rent levels are substantially
less than the Fair Market Rent levels in Pasco County for each
apartment type available at the property.  On average, the
property's rent levels are 40% below FMR.  Moody's views this as a
credit strength because the property is eligible for annual rental
rate increases under current HUD regulations, as well as the
possibility of petitioning HUD for a larger, one-time rate
increase to bring the property rent levels back in line with FMRs.
Petitioning HUD for such an increase is at the option of the
property manager.  The property manager expects to receive a 1.8%
increase in its HAP contract revenue in 2010 due to an Operating
Cost Adjustment Factor increase.

Occupancy: Property management reports that the physical occupancy
of Hudson Hills Manor is approximately 95%.  In addition, there
are over 500 families on the property's waiting list.

Reserve Funds: Funds held for the benefit of bondholders and the
property are adequately funded.  Fund balances provided by the
Trustee show that the Debt Service Reserve Fund remains untapped
and fully-funded, an important characteristic at this rating
level.  The Replacement Reserve Fund has an ample amount available
for capital expenses.  Maintaining the property's physical
condition is important to support occupancy levels and remain
eligible for the Section 8 subsidy.  The current HUD REAC score
for the property is 82c.  The property has begun to accumulate a
modest Surplus Fund balance, which may be used to pay debt service
only after the Debt Service Reserve Fund has been used.

Challenges:

Volatility of Debt Service Coverage: While revenue has increased
over the past three years, and automatic future increases are
limited to HUD-approved HAP contract increases, operating expenses
have been trending upwards as well.  From fiscal year 2007 through
fiscal year 2008, rental revenue increased by 1.3%, and from FY08
to FY09 increased by an additional 14.5%.  Operating expenses
increased by 7.8% and then fell by 2.8% over the same time
periods.  The Debt Service Coverage Ratio was 0.74x (FY2007),
0.57x (FY2008), and 0.93x (FY2009).  While the recent trend in
Debt Service Coverage is favorable, it is unclear whether the
property's operating performance will continue to improve.

Small size leads to vulnerability: The small size of this property
makes it vulnerable to sudden shocks.  Small reductions to revenue
or increases in expenses lead to large debt service coverage
changes.  The property does not generate enough margin to cover
unexpected changes to its financial position.

                              Outlook

The outlook on the bonds is negative.  The property remains
dependent on external support to remain financially viable.

                What could change the rating - UP?

* Several periods of substantial debt service coverage growth
* Operating without external financial support

               What could change the rating - DOWN?

* Using Debt Service Reserve Fund moneys to pay debt service

Key Statistics:

* Debt outstanding: $1,165,000

* Bond maturity: 4/1/2020

* HAP contract maturity: 9/1/2020

* Debt Service Coverage Ratio: 0.74 (FY2007); 0.57 (FY2008); 0.93
  (FY2009)

* Occupancy: 95%

* REAC: 82c

* HAP as a percentage of FMR: 60%


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Certs. From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust, Series
UPC-1:

* US$32,363,000 PREFERREDPLUS 7.40% Trust Certificates; Upgraded
  to Baa3; Previously on May 19, 2004 Downgraded to Ba1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the $35,480,000
aggregate principal of the 6.75% Notes due December 15, 2028,
issued by UnumProvident Corporation which were upgraded to Baa3 by
Moody's on May 12, 2010.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 1999-C2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed five classes of Prudential Securities Secured Financing,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2.
The downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and estimated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to
significant increased credit subordination resulting from loan
payoffs and amortization and key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable ranges.

The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the May 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to
$112.4 million from $869.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 45 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 49% of the pool.  Five loans, representing 15% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
No loans have underlying ratings.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $14.4 million realized loss (13% loss severity on
average).  Five loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Six loans, representing 12% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  Moody's has assumed a
high default probability on five poorly performing loans,
representing 13% of the pool.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$12.2 million expected loss for the specially serviced and
troubled loans (43% expected loss on average, assuming a 100%
probability of default for specially serviced loans and 75%
probability of default for troubled loans).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 96% and 100% of the performing loans,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 65% compared to 75% at
Moody's last full review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.40X and 1.94X, respectively, compared to
1.51X and 1.70X at last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 15
compared to 79 at last full review.  The decline in Herf has been
mitigated by increased credit support.  The pool balance has
declined by 41% since Moody's last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-EC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/27/1999

  -- Class A-EC2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/27/1999

  -- Class E, $13,504,398, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A1 on 6/29/2006

  -- Class F, $15,213,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 7/09/2007

  -- Class G, $15,213,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa3 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class N, $8,693,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     downgraded to Caa1 from B3 on 6/29/2006


RESOURCE REAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2006-1 Ltd. and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
criteria, which was the primary driver of S&P's rating actions.
The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated asset-specific
recovery rates for one underlying loan asset ($10.5 million, 3.5%
of the collateral pool) reported as impaired in the April 2010
trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a review of the current
credit characteristics of all of the underlying collateral assets,
as well as the transaction's liability structure.

According to the April 26, 2010 trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool included these:

* Eleven subordinate-interest loans ($148.9 million, 49.7%);

* Seven whole loans and senior-participation loans
  ($116.2 million, 38.8%);

* Four commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) tranches
  ($17.5 million, 5.8%); and

* Two CRE CDO tranches ($17.3 million, 5.8%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its credit estimates for
all of the non-impaired loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on
its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most
recent financial data provided by the collateral manager, Resource
Real Estate Inc., and the trustee, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
as well as market and valuation data from third-party providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes one
impaired loan asset, the Citigroup Property Investors Hilton
Portfolio (Sage Portfolio) subordinated loan ($10.5 million,
3.5%).  Standard & Poor's has estimated an asset-specific recovery
rate of 58.3% for this asset.  S&P based its recovery rate on the
information from the collateral manager, special servicer, and
third-party data providers.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class     To                   From
           -----     --                   ----
           A-1       BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2-FL    BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2-FX    BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
           B         BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
           C         BBB-                 A+/Watch Neg
           D         BB+                  A-/Watch Neg
           E         BB+                  BBB+/Watch Neg
           F         BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
           G         B+                   BBB-/Watch Neg


RUTLAND RATED: Moody's Junks Ratings on Credit-Linked Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued Rutland Rated Investments
Series 13.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Secured Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2042,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3;

Rutland Rated Investments Series 13 (Villa 2005-1) is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation issuance that references a
portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage Backed Securities with
the majority originated in 2004 and 2005.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference portfolio.
Credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the Moody's Weighted Average Rating
Factor and an increase in the percentage of reference obligations
rated Caa1 or below.  As reported by the trustee, the Moody's WARF
of the underlying pool of referece obligations has increased from
1,271 in March 2009 to 2,538 in May 2010 and the percentage of
reference obligations rated Caa1 or below increased from
approximately 10% to 22% respectively.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


SAGUARO ISSUER: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Units
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these units issued by Saguaro Issuer Trust:

* Tranche: US$11,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units,
  Series K; Confirmed at Ba1; Previously on September 18, 2009,
  Ba1, Placed on review for downgrade

  -- Underlying Security: $11,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series A of National
     Westminster Bank PLC; Confirmed at Ba1 on April 22, 2010

* Tranche: US$34,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units,
  Series L; Confirmed at Ba1; September 18, 2009, Ba1, Placed on
  review for downgrade

  -- Underlying Security: $34,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series B of National
     Westminster Bank PLC; Confirmed at Ba1 on April 22, 2010

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
ratings of the underlying Principal Certificates.  The Principal
Units are related to the Principal Certificates issued by IIG
Funding Trust, which are, in turn, related to the underlying
securities mentioned above.


SALLIE MAE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Classes From 12 Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 63
classes of notes and certificates from 12 Sallie Mae private
student loan asset-backed securities transactions issued between
2002 and 2007.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
A-1 classes from series 2003-C, 2004-A, 2004-B, 2005-B, 2006-A,
and 2006-B.  S&P removed all 69 ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of the deterioration in
collateral performance for these transactions, including higher-
than-expected levels of delinquencies, defaults, and net losses,
as well as reductions in available credit support, including
excess spread.  S&P's default projections and rating actions on
each transaction also incorporate its negative outlook on private
student loans for 2010 and its view that private student loan
performance will likely remain under pressure over the next year.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the available credit
enhancement is sufficient to support the respective classes at
their current rating levels.  S&P expects these classes to be
fully repaid over the next three to nine months.

                         Pool Performance

For the quarterly performance period ended February 2010 (March
2010 quarterly distribution date), all 12 transactions had between
12 and 30 quarters of performance, with collateral pool factors
(the principal balance remaining in the pool as a percent of the
original pool balance) ranging between approximately 50% and 97%.
At the same time, the percentage of loans in repayment was between
65% and 93% (see table 1).

                              Table 1

                  Transaction
                  seasoning    Pool
        Series    (quarters)   factor (%)   Repayment* (%)
        ------    -----------  ----------   --------------
        2002-A    30           49.64        93.21
        2003-A    28           52.77        87.54
        2003-B    27           60.31        85.79
        2003-C    26           62.25        87.39
        2004-A    24           62.98        85.72
        2004-B    23           73.43        82.01
        2005-A    20           77.12        78.97
        2005-B    18           83.25        76.66
        2006-A    16           89.85        72.87
        2006-B    15           87.22        76.06
        2006-C    14           88.52        70.76
        2007-A    12           96.81        64.55

* Repayment: as a percent of the current collateral balance; does
  not include accrued interest.

Ninety-plus-day delinquencies were up 118%-165% compared with the
quarterly period ended November 2008 (following Sallie Mae's
changes to its forbearance policy in late 2008) and ranged from
3.5% to 6.3% in February 2010.  Total delinquencies increased 50%-
92% and ranged from 7.8% to 13.9% during same period (see table
2).  On a year over year basis, total delinquencies increased
approximately 4.0%-22.0%.

                              Table 2

                                   90-plus         Total
Series        Forbearance (1)(%)  delinq. (2)(%)  delinq. (3)(%)
------        ------------------  --------------  --------------
2002-A        0.96                3.49             7.84
2003-A        1.84                4.24             8.86
2003-B        1.79                4.64             9.51
2003-C        1.79                4.57             9.75
2004-A        1.75                4.95             10.35
2004-B        2.53                4.79             9.77
2005-A        3.29                5.95             11.25
2005-B        3.58                5.22             10.96
2006-A        4.37                4.84             10.87
2006-B        4.15                5.56             12.41
2006-C        4.61                6.32             13.93
2007-A        5.45                5.07             11.66

(1) Forbearance: as a % of loans in repayment and forbearance.
(2) 90-plus day delinquencies: as a % of loans in repayment.
(3) Total delinquencies: as a % of loans in repayment.

The rate of defaults has accelerated over the past 12 months.
Cumulative default percentages ranged between 5.0% and 10.2% in
February, with increases of 5%-21% from the prior quarter and 39%-
271% from February 2009 (see table 3).  Since Sallie Mae tightened
its forbearance policy in late 2008, the balance of loans in
forbearance declined significantly, from more than 10.0% for most
of the transactions before the change in policy to current levels
of approximately 1.0%-5.50%for the quarterly performance period
ended February 2010.

From the transaction closing dates until November 2008, Sallie Mae
Inc., at its option, purchased all of the loans that became 180
days delinquent out of the Series 2002-A through 2005-A trusts.
Accordingly, Sallie Mae has estimated cumulative defaults for
these series using its current charge-off guidelines.

The cumulative default percentages for each series in table 3
reflect the amount of defaulted principal only, as a percent of
the initial collateral balance.

The higher levels of delinquencies and defaults have eroded
available credit support, as evidenced in the declining total
parities and overcollateralization amounts.  Total parity (the
total pool balance plus the balance of the cash capitalization
account, divided by the aggregate balance of the outstanding
notes) levels for most transactions declined over the past year
and were between 101.00% and 104.0%.  Overcollateralization levels
(the pool balance plus the cash capitalization account minus the
aggregate note balance, divided by the aggregate note balance)
have also decreased below their floors (2.00% of initial asset
balance) for all transactions, except for the 2007-A transactions.

                              Table 3

                 Cumulative      Current-quarter  12-month cum.
   Series        default (4)(%)  default (5)(%)   default (6)(%)
   ------        --------------  ---------------   -------------
   2002-A        7.79             0.40             2.19
   2003-A        8.33             0.54             2.95
   2003-B        8.70             0.58             3.36
   2003-C        9.36             0.62             3.64
   2004-A        10.20            0.71             4.03
   2004-B        8.02             0.69             3.86
   2005-A        9.66             0.90             5.04
   2005-B        6.74             0.76             3.97
   2006-A        5.88             0.83             3.79
   2006-B        7.05             1.03             4.57
   2006-C        7.75             1.07             4.96
   2007-A        4.98             0.86             3.64

(4) Cumulative default: as a % of initial collateral balance.

(5) Current quarterly default: as a % of initial collateral
    balance.

(6) 12-month cumulative default: the % incurred within the past
    year--Feb. 2009-Feb. 2010 (as a % of initial collateral
    balance).

                              Table 4

                Total             Mezzanine     Senior
       Series   parity (7)(%)     parity(8)(%)  parity(9)(%)
       ------   -------------     ------------  ------------
       2002-A   104.28            111.83        118.24
       2003-A   102.48            110.78        117.68
       2003-B   101.85            110.41        117.40
       2003-C   101.52            110.13        116.98
       2004-A   101.78            110.35        117.45
       2004-B   102.14            110.27        116.99
       2005-A   101.31            108.35        114.08
       2005-B   101.72            108.50        113.99
       2006-A   102.39            108.38        113.16
       2006-B   101.71            107.78        112.64
       2006-C   101.36            107.20        111.86
       2007-A   102.48            107.90        112.19

(7) Total parity: the total pool balance plus cash capitalization
    account plus reserve account over total notes outstanding.

(8) Mezzanine parity: total pool balance plus cash capitalization
    account plus reserve account over class A and B notes
    outstanding.

(9) Senior parity: total pool balance plus cash capitalization
    account plus reserve account over class A notes outstanding.

                              Table 5

                          O/C               Current
            Series        floor (10)($)     O/C ($)
            ------        -------------     -------
            2002-A        14,610,252        12,420,992
            2003-A        21,273,655        10,403,079
            2003-B        26,997,409        10,582,571
            2003-C        27,055,542        8,592,565
            2004-A        26,855,942        10,705,973
            2004-B        30,302,999        16,596,866
            2005-A        33,181,274        11,348,397
            2005-B        34,203,099        17,424,071
            2006-A        45,105,432        38,930,451
            2006-B        44,987,785        25,708,071
            2006-C        24,108,710        10,784969
            2007-A        45,010,033        45,010,033

(10) O/C-Overcollateralization: equals the pool balance plus the
     cash collateralization account minus aggregate note balance.
     O/C floor is 2% of the initial asset balance (collateral
     balance plus the cash collateralization account).

          Default Expectations And Net Loss Projections

Based on S&P's view of the current and projected performance of
these pools of private student loans, S&P has raised its lifetime
cumulative default expectations for each trust to 12.0%-23.0% of
the original pool balance (see table 6) from 7%-10%.  S&P assumed
future stressed recovery rates of approximately 20%-30% of the
dollar amount of cumulative defaults, which results in S&P's
expectation for remaining cumulative net losses ranging from 6.0%
to 13.0%.

                              Table 6

         Projected                                       Projected
         lifetime         Cumulative                     remaining
         cumulative       default         Recovery       cumulative
Series   default (12)(%)  to date (13)(%) assumption(%)  net loss (14)(%)
------   ---------------  --------------- -------------  ----------------
2002-A  12.0-14.0      7.79           20.0-30.0      6.0-9.0
2003-A  14.0-16.0      8.33           20.0-30.0      7.0-10.0
2003-B  15.0-17.0      8.70           20.0-30.0      7.0-10.0
2003-C  16.0-18.0      9.36           20.0-30.0      7.0-10.0
2004-A  18.0-20.0      10.20          20.0-30.0      8.0-11.0
2004-B  16.0-18.0      8.02           20.0-30.0      7.0-10.0
2005-A  20.0-22.0      9.66           20.0-30.0      9.0-12.0
2005-B  20.0-22.0      6.74           20.0-30.0      11.0-13.0
2006-A  20.0-22.0      5.88           20.0-30.0      11.0-13.0
2006-B  21.0-23.0      7.05           20.0-30.0      11.0-13.0
2006-C  21.0-23.0      7.75           20.0-30.0      11.0-13.0
2007-A  21.0-23.0      4.98           20.0-30.0      11.0-13.0

(12) Projected lifetime cumulative default - as a % of initial
     collateral balance.

(13) Cumulative defaults as of the March 2010 distribution date,
     as a % of the initial collateral balance.

(14) Projected remaining cumulative net loss: as a % of current
     collateral balance (as of the March 2010 distribution date).

                            Structure

Each of the transactions has a five-year lockout period during
which principal is paid sequentially to the class A, B, and C
notes.  After the five-year lockout (the step-down date), if the
cumulative realized loss trigger is not in effect and the
overcollateralization amount is at its target level (i.e., 15.0%
of senior debt, 10.125% of mezzanine debt, 3.0% of overall debt,
and 2.0% of the initial pool balance), the class B and C notes are
entitled to receive payments of principal if there are funds
available in the principal distribution account after paying the
class A noteholders' principal distribution amount.

The cumulative realized loss triggers switch the principal payment
priority back to sequential if cumulative net losses exceed 15%
within five years, 18% within seven years, or 20% thereafter.

In addition, the transactions pay principal sequentially within
the subclasses of the class A notes, provided that if the class A
notes become undercollateralized (i.e., breach the class A note
parity trigger), the class A notes outstanding will be paid pro
rata (based on their outstanding balances) until their principal
balances have been reduced to zero or the class A notes become
collateralized again.

             Breakeven Cash Flow Modeling Assumptions

S&P ran midstream breakeven cash flows for these transactions
under various interest rate scenarios and rating stress
assumptions.  These cash flow runs provided breakeven percentages
(breakevens) that represent the maximum amount of remaining
cumulative net losses a transaction can absorb (as a percent of
the pool balance as of the cash flow cutoff date) before failing
to pay full and timely interest and ultimate principal.  These are
some of the major assumptions S&P modeled:

* Moderately front-loaded and straight-line default curves that
  covered periods between two to six years, depending on the
  seasoning of transaction;

* Recovery rates in the range of 20%-30%;

* Prepayment speeds starting at approximately 2 CPR (constant
  prepayment rate, an annualized prepayment speed stated as a
  percentage of the current loan balance) and ramping up over
  eight years to a maximum rate of 5-10 CPR.  After eight years,
  S&P held the applicable maximum rate constant; and

* Failure of auctions for the life of each transaction.  S&P
  determined the coupons for auction-rate notes based on the
  applicable "maximum rate" definition in the respective
  transaction documents.

        Breakeven Cash Flow Modeling Results/Rating Actions

In general, transactions containing auction-rate class A notes
yielded lower breakevens and loss coverage multiples, primarily
because S&P assumed, in its cash flows, continued failure of the
auction-rate market for the life of the related transactions.  As
a result, the class A auction-rate coupons will increase to their
respective maximum rates.  The maximum rates for the class A
auction-rate notes in the 2003 vintage transactions are between
LIBOR plus 1.50% and LIBOR plus 3.50%, depending on the ratings
assigned to these auction-rate notes at the time of the failed
auction.  This increase in the cost of funds -- and the resulting
pressure on excess spread -- also caused parity levels to decline,
as principal collections were used to cover interest expenses in
its cash flows for some periods.

S&P's cash flow runs indicated that the class A notes are able to
absorb remaining cumulative net losses in the range of 16.00%-
32.00% before a payment default would occur.  After considering
the aforementioned breakevens and remaining expected net losses of
6.0%-13.0%, S&P lowered its ratings on the class A notes from
series 2002-A to 'AA' and the ratings on the class A notes from
all other series to the 'A' rating category to reflect S&P's view
of the current loss coverage levels.

S&P assigned higher ratings on the class A-2 notes from the 2003-
A, 2003-B, 2003-C, 2004-A, 2004-B, 2005-A, 2005-B,2006-A, 2006-B,
and 2006-C transactions and the class A-1 notes from the 2007-A
transaction given their senior positions in the respective capital
structures, the sequential-pay structure of the deals, the current
class balances, and S&P's expectations regarding the likelihood of
repayment in full of the remaining class balances before the class
A notes become undercollateralized (i.e., breached the class A
note parity trigger), at which point all class A notes outstanding
will be paid pro rata (based on their outstanding balance) until
their principal balances have been reduced to zero.

The affirmations of the ratings on the A-1 notes from series 2003-
C, 2004-A, 2004-B, 2005-B, 2006-A, and 2006-B reflect S&P's view
of the notes' relatively short remaining lifetimes (based on the
remaining class balances) and its view that, over the short-term
risk horizon, the loss coverage given the current credit
enhancement levels is consistent with the outstanding ratings.

The breakevens for the class B notes ranged between 11.0%-28.25%.
After comparing these breakevens to the related trusts' remaining
expected net losses of 6.0%-13.0%, S&P lowered the class B ratings
to the 'BBB' rating category for all series except 2002-A, which
S&P lowered to 'A-'.

The class C notes had breakevens ranging from 8.5% to 26.50%.
After comparing these breakevens to S&P's remaining expected net
losses of 6.0%-13.0%, S&P lowered its ratings on the class C notes
from series 2002-A, 2006-A, 2006-B, and 2007-A to the 'BBB' rating
category and lowered the class C notes from the other series to
the 'BB' rating category.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
student loan receivables backing these transactions relative to
S&P's revised cumulative default expectations and available credit
enhancement, and will take rating actions as S&P considers
appropriate.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust

                                Rating
                                ------
            Series     Class    To        From
            ------     -----    --        ----
            2002-A     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2002-A     B        A-        AA/Watch Neg
            2002-A     C        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2003-A     A-2      AA-       AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-A     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-A     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-A     B        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2003-A     C        BB-       BBB/Watch Neg
            2003-B     A-2      AA-       AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-B     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-B     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-B     B        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2003-B     C        BB-       BBB/Watch Neg
            2003-C     A-2      AA-       AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-C     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-C     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-C     A-5      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2003-C     B        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2003-C     C        BB-       BBB/Watch Neg
            2004-A     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-A     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-A     B        BBB       A/Watch Neg
            2004-A     C        BB        BBB/Watch Neg
            2004-B     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-B     A-3      A+        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-B     A-4      A+        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-B     B        BBB+      A/Watch Neg
            2004-B     C        BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
            2005-A     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-A     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-A     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-A     B        BBB+      A/Watch Neg
            2005-A     C        BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
            2005-B     A-2      AA-       AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-B     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-B     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-B     B        BBB       A/Watch Neg
            2005-B     C        BB        BBB/Watch Neg
            2006-A     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-A     A-3      A+        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-A     A-4      A+        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-A     A-5      A+        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-A     B        BBB+      AA-/Watch Neg
            2006-A     C        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2006-B     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-B     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-B     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-B     A-5      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-B     B        BBB+      AA-/Watch Neg
            2006-B     C        BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2006-C     A-2      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-C     A-3      A-        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-C     A-4      A-        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-C     A-5      A-        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-C     B        BBB       AA-/Watch Neg
            2006-C     C        BB+       A/Watch Neg
            2007-A     A-1      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2007-A     A-2      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2007-A     A-3      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2007-A     A-4      A         AAA/Watch Neg
            2007-A     B        BBB+      AA/Watch Neg
            2007-A     C-1      BBB-      A/Watch Neg
            2007-A     C-2      BBB-      A/Watch Neg

       Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust

                                    Rating
                                     ------
            Series     Class      To         From
            ------     -----      --         ----
            2003-C     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-A     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2004-B     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2005-B     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-A     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
            2006-B     A-1        AAA        AAA/Watch Neg


SILVERLEAF FINANCE: S&P Assigns Rating on $151.5 Mil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Silverleaf Finance VII LLC's $151.5 million vacation
timeshare loan-backed notes series 2010-A.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 24,
2010.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion of:

* The available credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
  overcollateralization, a reserve account, and available excess
  spread; and

* Silverleaf Resort Inc.'s demonstrated servicing ability and
  experience in the timeshare market.

                   Preliminary Ratings Assigned

             Silverleaf Finance VII LLC Series 2010-A

            Class         Rating       Amount (mil. $)
            -----         ------       ---------------
            A             A                      73.9
            B             BBB                    28.1
            C             BB                     49.5


SOLSTICE ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Solstice ABS CBO
Ltd./Solstice ABS CBO Inc.  The notes affected by the rating
actions are:

  -- US$225,000,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2036; Downgraded to Ca; Previously on
     3/18/2009, Downgraded to B3;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2036; Downgraded to C; Previously on
     3/18/2009, Downgraded to Ca.

Solstice ABS CBO Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed primarily by a portfolio of structured finance securities.
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2001 and
2003 comprise over 25% of the underlying portfolio.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, an increase in the weighted average rating factor,
failure of the coverage tests, and the number of assets that are
currently on review for possible downgrade.  The dollar amount of
defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, has increased
from $5.3 million in March 2009 to $16.5 million in April 2010.
All the overcollateralization tests are failing and have been
continuously deteriorating.  The WARF has increased from 3403 in
March 2009 to 4996 in May 2010.  Additionally, in April 2010, the
Moody's ratings of approximately $18 million of pre-2005 RMBS
within the underlying portfolio were placed on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated expected loss projections
for certain RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM

securities remain on review for downgrade.  Current public ratings
will be used for securities that have undergone an in depth review
by Moody's RMBS team, and that are no longer on review for
downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


SOUTH COAST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by South Coast Funding IV
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$110,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to C; previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

South Coast Funding IV Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities originated between 2001 and 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, number of assets that are currently on review for
possible downgrade and failure of the par coverage tests.  In this
case Moody's notes that the defaulted securities, as reported by
the trustee, have increased from $58 million in September 2009 to
$85 million in April 2010.  Also, in April, approximately
$96 million of non-defaulted pre-2005 RMBS within the underlying
portfolio were placed on review for possible downgrade as a result
of Moody's updated loss projections.  In addition, the Trustee
reports that the transaction is currently failing its par coverage
tests.  Moody's notes that the transaction is negatively effected
by a large pay-fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap where
payments to the hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of the
excess spread in the deal.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


SPYGLASS TRUST-3: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Units at 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of these units issued by Spyglass Trust-3:

* $70,000,000 Face Amount of Spyglass Trust-3 Principal Units;
  Confirmed at Ba1; Previously on September 18, 2009 Ba1, Placed
  on Review for Downgrade.

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are the Primary Capital
Floating Rate Notes (Series A) issued by National Westminster Bank
PLC which were confirmed at Ba1 by Moody's on April 22, 2010.


STANFIELD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stanfield CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 (current
     balance of $970,186), Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2014 (current
     balance of $913,117), Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions result from its
consideration of the insufficient collateralization remaining for
the above notes.  Based on the last trustee report, dated April 8,
2010, one loan obligation rated Ba3 (maturing in November 2010)
constitutes 100% of the performing collateral balance.  Defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$8.5 million, but are expected to have extremely low recoveries.
In Moody's assessment, the amount of par collateralization from
the remaining asset represents a level of collateralization
consistent with a Ca rating.

The rating actions also reflect concerns about incremental losses
arising from the potential for liquidation of the collateral
should an event of default occur.  Based on the same trustee
report, the Class D interest coverage test was reported at 3.4%
versus a test level of 115% and on the recent payment date, some
of the principal proceeds were used to pay interest due on the
Class D notes.  Accordingly, there is an increased likelihood that
an event of default may occur as a result of a failure to pay
interest on the Class D notes.  As provided in the indenture dated
June 24, 1999, during the occurrence of an event of default, a
majority of the Class D noteholders may direct the trustee to
proceed with the sale and liquidation of the collateral, thereby
exposing the noteholders to losses resulting from selling the
collateral at less than par.

Stanfield CLO Ltd., issued in June of 1999, is a collateralized
loan obligation originally backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


TIAA CMBS: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 2001-C1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings to TIAA
CMBS I Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2001-C1:

  -- $14.7 million class J to 'AAA/LS2' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11 million class K to 'AA/LS2' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.7 million class L to 'BBB/LS2' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class M to 'BB/LS3' from 'B+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class N to 'BB'/LS3 from 'B'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes
as indicated:

  -- Interest only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.7 million class E at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.7 million class G at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $33 million class H at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $17.5 million class O.  Classes A-1, A2,
A3, A4, A-5 and B have been paid in full.

The upgrades are due to stable performance of the transaction and
significant pay down resulting in sufficient credit support to
offset Fitch expected losses following Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses.  Fitch expects losses of 1% of the
remaining pool balance, approximately $2 million, from loans that
are not expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance test.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 86.2% to $201.4 million from $1.5 billion at
issuance.  Of the remaining 86 loans, seven loans (14.9%) are
defeased and there are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity and incur a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.


TIAA STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by TIAA Structured Finance
CDO I Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$387,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     due November 2030 (Current Outstanding Principal:
     $97,130,627), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on April 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
     November 2030 (Current Outstanding Principal: $7,519,790),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on April 2, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1.

TIAA Structured Finance CDO I Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential
Mortgage Backed Securities with the majority originated between
2001-2003.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the Moody's Weighted Average Rating
Factor, the number of underlying assets currently on review for
possible downgrade and a failure of coverage tests.  In this case,
Moody's notes that, as reported by the trustee, the WARF of the
underlying portfolio has increased from 1,858 in April 2009 to
3,969 in May 2010.  Also, the Moody's ratings of approximately
$24 million of performing par (approximately 16% of performing
par) within the underlying portfolio were placed on review for
possible downgrade.  Currently, the Trustee reports that the all
interest and principal coverage tests are failing.

The transaction experienced on June 2, 2008, as reported by the
Trustee, an Event of Default, as described in Section 5.1(a) of
the Indenture dated December 14, 2000.  The default event was a
default in the payment of interest to the Class B Notes when
interest came due and payable occurred and lasting in excess of
three business days.  As provided in Article V of the Indenture
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default,
certain parties to the transaction may be entitled to direct the
Trustee to take particular actions with respect to the Collateral
and the Notes, including the sale and liquidation of the assets.
The severity of losses of certain tranches may be different
depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12 for
Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2006-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms TimberStar Trust I, series 2006-1,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The Negative Rating Outlook on class F is due to the significant
decline in cash flow from YE 2008 and continued pressure on timber
prices.  The affirmations are due to the stable Fitch calculated
value since issuance.  The transaction is a single borrower,
interest-only loan with an expected repayment date of Oct. 15,
2016.  As of the May 2009 distribution date the transaction
balance is $800 million, unchanged since issuance.

Collateral for the loan is a first-priority mortgage lien on
timberlands located in Texas (43% of the total acreage), Louisiana
(31%), and Arkansas (26%).

At issuance total acreage was 875,180 of which 99,993 was non-
mortgage acrerage considered higher and better use (HBU) land that
is expected to be sold.  Timber growing on the HBU land is pledged
as security for the trust; however, any proceeds from the sale of
the land will not be pledged to the trust.  As of December 2009,
HBU has been reduced by 25,782 acres to 74,211 acres, resulting in
total acreage of 849,398.

The servicer reported December 2009 trailing 12 months debt
service ratio was 1.37 times compared to issuance of 1.41x.  The
total harvest volume for this same period was 2.3 million tons
compared to issuance projections of 3.5 million tons.  Harvest
volume was kept intentionally low due to low demand as a result of
the economic downturn.  Fitch reviewed the borrower prepared
December 2009 trailing 12-month financial statements, 2010 budget
and harvest plan, and a December 2009 appraisal.

The actual 2009 net cash flow was down 21.5% from YE 2008 but was
6.3% above Fitch issuance expectations.  Fitch's collateral value
is based on a 30-year period.  As a result, Fitch's loan-to-value
improved to 62.7% from 76.1% at issuance.  In addition, the annual
appraised value as of YE 2009 was down 12.1% from YE 2008 due
primarily to a significantly higher discount rate used by the
appraiser, but is still up approximately 22% over the appraised
value at issuance.

Fitch has affirmed the ratings and revised one Rating Outlook:

  -- $400,000,000 class A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80,000,000 class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80,000,000 class C at 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $80,000,000 class D at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30,000,000 class E at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $130,000,000 class F at 'BB'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.


TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Tricadia CDO 2006-5,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$55,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/18/2009, Downgraded to
     Caa1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$56,000,000 Class C Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/18/2009, Downgraded to Caa2
     and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

Tricadia CDO 2006-5, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Collateralized Loan
Obligations with the majority originated in 2004 and 2005.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the Moody's Weighted Average Rating
Factor, defaulted assets and a failure of coverage tests.  Moody's
notes that, as reported by the trustee, the WARF of the underlying
portfolio has increased from 620 in March 2009 to 3,022 in May
2010 and the amount of defaulted assets increased from
$18.9million to $39.1million during the same period.  Currently,
the Trustee reports that the Senior and Class D/E Par Coverage
Tests are failing.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-C4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings and
Rating Outlooks to Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C4, as
noted below:

  -- $187.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $210.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-P at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.3 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.3 million class G at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.3 million class H at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.1 million class J at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class K at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.7 million class L at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.7 million class M at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.1 million class N at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.5 million class O at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $18 million class P certificates and class
A-1 has paid in full.

The rating affirmations are the result of sufficient credit
enhancement to offset Fitch expected losses following Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses and expected losses
associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses
of 1% of the remaining pool balance, approximately $5.8 million,
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any changes to the
ratings over the next one to two years.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate principal balance has decreased 34.8% to $581.4 million
from $891.8 million at issuance.  There are 115 of the original
140 loans remaining in transaction, nine of which have defeased
(9.2% of the current transaction balance).  There is one specially
serviced loan, a 100-unit multifamily property located in Pass
Christian, MS.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to payment delinquency.  The servicer is
currently working with the borrower to determine a resolution
strategy.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Fitch considered loans that could refinance
to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher to payoff
at maturity.  Fifty-four loans did not payoff at maturity, and ten
loans incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-Whale 7 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes from the pooled portion of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-Whale 7 reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 5.31%.  The non-pooled
junior component certificates were also downgraded to reflect
Fitch's significant loss expectations on these assets.  Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate values and cash flow declines.  The
Negative Ratings Outlooks reflect additional sensitivity analysis
related to further negative credit migration of the underlying
collateral.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end
of this release.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, approximately 58.04% of the pooled
loans, and all of the non-pooled components, are modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 13.2% from generally third- and fourth-quarter 2009 servicer-
reported financial data.  In its review, Fitch analyzed servicer
reported operating statements and rent rolls, updated property
valuations, and recent lease and sales comparisons.  Given that
the loan positions within the pooled portion of the commercial
mortgage backed securities are the lower leveraged A-notes
(average base case loan-to-value of 92.1%), Fitch estimates that
average recoveries on the pooled loans will be approximately 90.9%
in the base case, whereas the more highly leveraged non-pooled
component notes (average base case LTV of 169.2%) have a lower
modeled recovery of 3.3%.

The transaction is collateralized by 10 loans, five of which are
secured by hotels (89.2%), four by office (9.2%), and one by
retail (1.6%).  All of the final maturity dates including all
extension options for the non-specially serviced loans are in
2011.

Fitch identified six Loans of Concern within the pool (84.8%), two
of which are specially serviced (5.4%).  Fitch's analysis resulted
in loss expectations for seven A-notes, and each of the B-note
non-pooled components in the 'B' stress scenario.  The three
largest pooled contributors to losses (by unpaid principal
balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are: Kyo-Ya Hotels (43.8%),
Westin Aruba (4.5%), and Colonial Mall - Myrtle Beach (1.6%).

The Kyo-Ya Hotel Portfolio was originally collateralized by eight
full-service hotels, of which five were located in Hawaii, two in
Orlando, FL and one in San Francisco, CA.  In April 2007, the two
Orlando properties were released (Hyatt Regency Grand Cypress and
The Villas at Grand Cypress).  The current portfolio includes
5,231 rooms.  Fitch considers this a loan of concern based on
declining cash flow at the hotels as well as the negative outlook
for the hotel sector.  While many of the hotels are outperforming
their competitive set, the overall net operating income (NOI) has
declined 32% as of the trailing 12 months ended September 2009
compared to year-end 2008.  As of August 2009, occupancy, ADR and
RevPAR were 74.2%, $204, and $152, respectively, compared to
81.2%, $216, and $175 at issuance.  In addition, with five of the
six hotels located in Hawaii, which is expected to be a struggling
market for the next few years, performance is not expected to
improve in the near term.  A lockbox is in place, and excess cash
is being trapped by the master servicer.  The balance as of May
2010 is $54.5 million and can be used as extra collateral by the
servicer.  Fitch included the current and expected future reserve
amounts in the recovery assumption.

The Westin Aruba is a 478-room, real estate owned hotel property
located in Palm Beach, Aruba.  The property has beachfront access,
retail and meeting space, as well as a nightclub and a 12,000
square foot casino.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
November 2008 when the borrower failed to make operating advances
to the hotel operator as specified in the loan agreement.  The
property has been REO since May 2009, when the special servicer
foreclosed on the mezzanine lender who had foreclosed on the
original sponsor.

The special servicer continues to streamline operations in an
effort to reduce expenses as well as complete necessary repairs.
The casino lease payment was reduced by the original borrower
prior to foreclosure by the mezzanine lender, and the original
borrower continues to lease the casino.  A lawsuit has been filed
on behalf of the trust to contest the lease reduction.  The
servicer is currently waiting for a ruling on the litigation
before marketing the property for sale, as the casino lease
payment impacts the value of the asset.  The current property cash
flow does not cover the scheduled debt service and the servicer is
advancing a reduced interest payment based on an appraisal
reduction.

The Colonial Mall - Myrtle Beach is collateralized by a 524,767 sf
regional mall located in Myrtle Beach, SC.  Anchors include J.C.
Penney, two Belk stores, Bass Pro Shops, and the newly constructed
Carmike Cinemas; in-line tenants are a typical mix of national
retailers, with some local tenants.  The anchors, with the
exception of the cinema and the improvements to the Belk #2 store,
are part of the collateral.  The Belk #2 store pays ground rent.
In 2004, a new super-regional mall opened 15 miles from the
subject, resulting in declines in occupancy and sales.  Issuance
expectations assumed some level of performance stabilization;
however, improved performance expectations have not been realized
and occupancy has declined.  At issuance, the total mall was 90.6%
occupied, which was lower than historical rates in excess of 95%.
In 2008, the total mall and in-line occupancy dropped to 86.7% and
71.8%, respectively.  Per the December 2009 rent roll, the total
mall and in-line occupancy were 84.2% and 66.5%, respectively.
J.C.  Penney and both Belk store's (60% of the total anchor space)
leases expire in 2011.  The in-line space rollover is: 8.6% in
2010; 5.5% in 2011; 6.9% in 2012; and 9.6% in 2013.

Fitch removes these classes from Rating Watch Negative and has
downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity Ratings
to these pooled classes:

  -- $573.5 million class A-2 to 'A/LS2' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $98.6 million class B to 'BBB/LS2' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $95 million class C to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $76.8 million class D to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $75.2 million class E to 'BB/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $70.4 million class F to 'BB/LS4' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $71.8 million class G 'B/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
Recovery Ratings to these pooled certificates:

  -- $64.9 million class H to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BBB';
  -- $21.9 million class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB+';
  -- $25.4 million class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $28.3 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-'.

Additionally, Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative
and assigns Recovery Ratings to these non-pooled component
certificates:

  -- $68.9 million class KH-1 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $54.1 million class KH-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $18 million class BH-1 to 'CCC/RR4' from 'A-';
  -- $28 million class BH-2 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';
  -- $56 million class BH-3 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $46 million class BH-4 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB+;
  -- $3.3 million class WA to 'C/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $2 million class BP-1 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB+';
  -- $2.2 million class BP-2 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $5 million class WB to 'CC'/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $2.3 million class MB-1 to 'CC/RR6' 'BBB+';
  -- $2.6 million class MB-2 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB';
  -- $2.6 million class MB-3 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $2.5 million class MB-4 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $1.2 million class CM to 'C/RR6' from 'BB+'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and assigns LS Ratings and Rating
Outlooks:

  -- $929.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Rating Outlooks:

  -- Interest-only class X-1B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

Interest-only class X-1A and rake class UV have paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class H reflects modeled recoveries of
46.5% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($30.0
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($206,903);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($30.1 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($33.2 million).

The assignment of 'RR4' to class BH-1 reflects modeled recoveries
of 32.7% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery
proceeds are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($5.8
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($13,939);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($5.9 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($6.5 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 11 Classes From Two Prime RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes in the 2 prime U.S.
residential mortgage backed security transactions listed below,
and assigned Loss Severity or Recovery Ratings ratings as
indicated.

$5.7 Million Saxon Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 1994-2

  -- Class A-10 (805570DS4) affirmed at 'AAA'/LS1;
  -- Class A-11 (805570DT2) affirmed at 'AAA/LS1';
  -- Class I (805570HV3) affirmed at 'AAA';
  -- Class M (805570DU9) affirmed at 'AA/LS2';
  -- Class P affirmed at 'AAA/LS1';
  -- Class B-1 (805570DV7) affirmed at 'A/LS3';
  -- Class B-2 (805570DW5) affirmed at 'BBB/LS3';
  -- Class B-3 (805570DY1) affirmed at 'B/LS3';
  -- Class B-4 (805570DZ8) affirmed at 'D/RR6'.

$38 Million Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 1992-
18

  -- Class A11 (74434UA87) affirmed at 'AAA';
  -- Class M (74434RVD0) affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'.

The rating actions were taken as part of Fitch's ongoing
surveillance process of existing transactions.  Due to the small
pool size on the transactions the projected defaults were based on
the pre-2005 vintage and product averages.  The severity of 31% on
both transactions was derived by incorporating the transaction-
specific historical loss severity and the pre-2005 vintage and
product averages.  The 60+ delinquency percentage for Saxon
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 1994-2 and Prudential Home
Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 1992-18 are 2.92% and 0%
respectively; the base case expected losses are 1.27% and .26%
respectively.  Fitch affirmed all the above ratings based on each
class' credit enhancement being able to withstand the expected
loss in each rating stress scenario.

In addition to the long-term ratings Fitch also provides Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings.  Loss Severity ratings are assigned
to classes with long-term ratings of 'B' or higher while Recovery
Ratings are assigned to classes with long-term ratings below 'B'.
Additional information is available on Fitch's website in the
reports 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'
and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on classes of notes
issued by five structured finance collateralized debt obligations
that closed in 1999 and 2000.  The downgrades are primarily due to
continued negative migration in the SF assets of the underlying
portfolios.  The rating actions are detailed at the end of this
press release.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The analytical
scope of each CDO review varied depending on the quality of the
portfolio and credit enhancement for the CDO's classes available
from subordination and excess spread.

For all transactions, this review considered realized losses and
credit migration in the underlying portfolios since last review,
the ongoing and future impact of interest rate hedges,
availability of excess spread to pay down the notes, or
conversely, erosion of par due to the use of principal proceeds to
pay interest, and the likelihood of these trends to continue.

For the three transactions where expected losses from assets with
a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and lower already significantly
exceed the CE level of the most senior class of notes, Fitch
believes that the probability of default for all classes of notes
can be evaluated without factoring potential further losses from
the remaining portion of the portfolios and without considering
the outcomes of various interest rate and default timing scenarios
as described in the relevant criteria.  Therefore these
transactions were not modeled using the Structured Finance
Portfolio Credit Model or cash flow model.

Additionally, due to the writedowns in the underlying collateral
portfolios, the total collateral balances in the portfolios of two
of those three transactions are already lower than the outstanding
balances of their respective senior tranches, indicating that
default is inevitable for the entire capital structure.  The
highest rating on the classes in these transactions is 'C'.

For the remaining two transactions, expected losses from
distressed assets did not exceed the CE level of the senior class
of notes.  Fitch used SF PCM to project losses from the
transaction's entire portfolio.  The resulting rating loss rates
were substantially higher than the senior notes' CE levels.
Further, the transactions' portfolios generate only marginal
amounts of excess spread.  The likelihood of default for the notes
can be assessed, therefore, without performing cash flow model
analysis.

All five of the transactions have entered an Event of Default due
to failing collateralization coverage requirements, although none
have accelerated their maturities.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Bleecker Structured Asset Funding, Ltd.

  -- $4,023,977 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $28,167,837 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'.

The losses expected from the distressed portion of the portfolio
of Bleecker already exceed the CE level of the most senior class.
Although some interest is being used to pay down the notes, it is
not sufficient to offset the expected losses.

Bleecker is a cash CDO that closed on March 28, 2000 and is
managed by Clinton Group, Inc.  As of the April 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities,
commercial asset-backed securities, and corporate bonds, from
primarily 1999 through 2002 vintage transactions.

Diversified Asset Securitization Holdings I, L.P.

  -- $61,611,491 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B;
  -- $ 12,717,968 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on DASH I, but did not cash flow
model the transaction.  The CE level for the class A-1 and A-2
notes exceeds the losses expected from the distressed portion of
the portfolio; however, the resulting 'CCC' RLR from SF PCM is
comparable to the class A CE.  Although a small portion of
interest is being used to pay down the notes, it is not sufficient
to offset the expected losses.

DASH I is a cash CDO that closed on Dec. 28, 1999 and is managed
by Asset Allocation & Management, LLC.  As of the April 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS and
corporate CDOs, from primarily 1996 through 2002 vintage
transactions.

Prudential Structured Finance CBO I, Ltd.

  -- $8,018,819 class A-2L notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B/LS3';
  -- $4,200,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $8,000,000 class B-1L notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $2,500,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $5,000,000 class B-2L notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Prudential CBO I but did not
cash flow model the transaction.  The CE level for the class A-2L
notes exceeds the losses expected from the distressed portion of
the portfolio; however, the resulting 'CCC' RLR from SF PCM is
comparable to the class A-2L CE level.  The class A-2L notes are
currently receiving a marginal amount of excess spread, which is
not expected to have a significant impact on the class's
likelihood of receiving full principal repayment.  The class B-1
and B-2 notes are currently undercollateralized, and their accrued
interest is being deferred.

Prudential SF CBO I is a cash flow CDO that closed on Oct.  26,
2000 and is managed by the Prudential Investment Corporation.  As
of the April 2, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
ABS and RMBS securities primarily from 1998 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

SFA Collateralized Asset Backed Securities I Trust

  -- $46,818,084 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $14,000,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $8,500,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

The senior notes of SFA CABS I are undercollateralized as a result
of writedowns to the portfolio.  There is not enough interest to
fulfill the interest obligation to the class B-1 and class B-2
notes (together class B).  Principal is being used to service
class B interest, and the remaining is being used to pay down
class A.

SFA CABS I is a CDO that closed on June 22, 2000 and is managed by
Structured Finance Advisors.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of primarily ABS, CMBS, and RMBS from
1998 through 2002 vintage transactions.

Varick Structured Asset Fund, Ltd.

  -- $16,254,494 class A-1 notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $97,526,964 class A-2 notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.

The senior notes of Varick are undercollateralized as a result of
writedowns to the portfolio.  The available interest is not
sufficient to fulfill the obligation to the out of the money
interest rate swap that expires in December 2012.  A portion of
principal collections is being used to fulfill the interest due to
class A-1 and class A-2 notes.

Varick is a cash CDO that closed on Sept. 29, 2000 and is managed
by Clinton Group, Inc.  As of the April 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of RMBS, CMBS, corporate and structured
finance CDOs, various consumer and commercial ABS, from primarily
1997 through 2003 vintage transactions.


* Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Gainesville, Texas' 1992A Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Services affirms the Ba3 rating on $1,865,000 of
outstanding Gainesville, Texas, Housing Authority Multifamily
Mortgage Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 1992A.  The outlook
remains negative.  The affirmation is based primarily on
consistently poor debt service coverage levels and the near
expiration of the HAP contracts.

                          Legal Security

The bonds are secured by the revenues derived from a pool of four
properties, consisting of 196 units among Pecan Creek Village,
Turner Apartments, Washington Court and Walnut Lane Apartments.
The properties are located in the city of Gainesville in Cooke
County, Texas.  The pledged revenues to the 1992 Series
bondholders are dependent on the life of the HAP contracts; after
the HAP contracts expire, bondholders no longer have a lien on
rental income.  The HAP contracts for Pecan Creek and Turner
Apartments expire in 2011, while the HAP contracts for Washington
Court and Walnut Lane expire in 2020.

                       Recent Developments

The 2009 Debt Service Coverage Ratio for the pooled properties was
0.61x, up slightly from 2007 (0.58x).  It is also important to
note that current occupancy levels have fluctuated over the last
few years.  The change in the weighted average occupancy decreased
from 97% in 2007 to 84% in 2010, driven by competition and changes
by HUD concerning the minimum age of required tenants.

                             Strengths

* Sufficiently funded funds

* Fully funded debt service reserve fund

* Fully funded contingency reserve fund of $500,000

* 2009 Audited Financials remain stable compared to 2007

* High REAC for Turner and Walnut (84c and 91c, respectively)

* Rental rates are below FMR: eligible for rent increases with
  approval from HUD

                            Challenges

* Fluctuations in occupancy levels

* Low REAC score for Pecan Creek Apartments, which may lead to
  future increases in capital expenditure for repairs or
  renovations.

* Poor 2009 DSCR: 0.61x; relative to other Section 8 credits

* Missing 2008 Financials

                              Outlook

The outlook on the bonds remains negative.  The outlook is based
upon consistently low debt service coverage levels and the 2011
expiration date of the HAP contracts for Pecan Village and Turner
apartments.

Key Statistics (As of 2009 Audited Financial Statements):

* Recent Occupancy: 75%, 91% and 84 % (Turner, Pecan Creek and
  Washington Court / Walnut lane)

* Most recent REAC scores: 84c, 91c and 60b

* HAP expiration: 06/01/2011, 06/01/2011 and 06/01/2020

* Debt Maturity: 6/1/2020

* 1 bedroom Contract Rent as % of HUD FMR: 80%

* Debt Service Coverage Ratio: 0.61x

* Reserve and Replacement per unit: $1,055

* Surplus Fund per unit: $2,551

* Flow of funds: Open at 1.00x

The last rating action for this program was taken on June 11,
2008, when the rating was downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 and the
outlook was Affirmed Negative.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches From US SF CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of 3 tranches contained within 3 US Structured Finance
CDOs.  The tranches affected by the actions are from CDOs that
have experienced an Event of Default and in each case the Trustee
has been directed to liquidate the collateral as a post-event-of-
default remedy.  Moody's has been notified by the respective
Trustee in each of these cases that a final distribution of
liquidation proceeds has taken place (except for retention of a
small amount of residual funds in certain cases).

ZAIS Investment Grade Limited VIII

* Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to C, previously on 4/22/2009
  Downgraded to Ca

McKinley II Funding, Ltd.

* US$71,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2045, Downgraded
  to C, previously on 4/24/2009 Downgraded to Ca

Zenith Funding, Ltd.

* Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to C, previously on 4/24/2009
  Downgraded to Ca

The rating actions taken reflect the changes in severity of loss
associated with certain tranches and reflect the final liquidation
distribution.


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 281
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 17 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 57 tranches from 16 RMBS transactions, backed by prime
jumbo loans, issued by Chase Mortgage Finance Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust 2006-S1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust 2007-S6

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2006-S2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A10, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A15, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A17, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A18, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A19, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A5, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2006-S3

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2006-S4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A1

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A1, Upgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A2, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 9-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A2, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 10-A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 11-A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-A5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-M1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-S1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-L1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-F1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-M5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-S5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-L5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-F5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-M8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-S8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-L8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 11-F8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 24, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-A4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 12-M3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-S3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-L3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 12-F3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-A3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 12-A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-A2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 24, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-M2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-S2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-L2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 13-F2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A3

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A11, Upgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A12, Upgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A14, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A17, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A19, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A20, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A12, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A13, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A18, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A19, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A20, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A21, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A22, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A23, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A6, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A7, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A8, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A9, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A10, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A11, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. 3-A12, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A13, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A16, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A17, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A18, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A19, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A20, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A21, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A7, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 24, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S5

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A19, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2005-S1

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A9, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A10, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A13, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A14, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A15, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A16, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A17, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A18, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2005-S2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-27, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-28, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-29, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2005-S3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2006-A1

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 28, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
tranches from five U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 13 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  One
additional tranche from one of the affected transactions remains
on CreditWatch negative.  S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other
tranches from three transactions and removed three of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.  The rating
remaining on CreditWatch affects a transaction that has
significant exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

The 17 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $2.038 billion.  All five affected transactions
are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed securities
(ABS), which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
    Transaction                      Class To    From
    -----------                      ----- --    ----
    Arroyo CDO I Ltd.                B     BBB   BBB/Watch Neg
    Arroyo CDO I Ltd.                C-1   CCC   CCC/Watch Neg
    Arroyo CDO I Ltd.                C-2   CCC   CCC/Watch Neg
    CAMBER 3 PLC                     A-1   CC    CCC/Watch Neg
    G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.               A-1   CCC-  A/Watch Neg
    G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.               A-2   CC    BB+/Watch Neg
    G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.               A-3   CC    B+/Watch Neg
    G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.               B     CC    CCC+/Watch Neg
    G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.               C     CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
    Helios Series I Multi Asset CBO  A     BB+   BBB+
    Helios Series I Multi Asset CBO  B     CCC+  B-
    Independence II CDO Ltd.         A     BBB   A-/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  A-1   AA    AAA
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  A-2   BBB+  AAA
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  B-1   B+    AA/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  B-2   B+    AA/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  C     CCC   A-/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  D     CCC-  BBB/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  E     CCC-  BBB-/Watch Neg
    RFC CDO II Ltd.                  F     CCC-  BB/Watch Neg

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

           Transaction          Class       Rating
           -----------          -----       ------
           CAMBER 3 PLC         S           A/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Transaction          Class       Rating
              -----------          -----       ------
              Arroyo CDO I Ltd.    A           AAA
              CAMBER 3 PLC         A-2         CC
              CAMBER 3 PLC         B           CC
              CAMBER 3 PLC         C           CC
              CAMBER 3 PLC         D           CC
              G-STAR 2005-5 Ltd.   Income Note CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches From Five CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 28
tranches from five U.S. corporate collateralized debt obligation
of CDO transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  The affected tranches have a total
issuance amount of $1.459 billion.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 13 tranches from f Corp. transactions and removed
one of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to S&P's updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
new CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions S&P used in its analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate S&P assumed for the cash flows generated for the
'AAA' liability rating for each transaction.

         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

         Transaction                    Recovery rate (%)
         -----------                    -----------------
         Ashford CDO II Ltd.            21.2
         Granite Ventures I Ltd.        45.2
         Primus CLO II Ltd.             43.1
         Gresham St CDO Funding 2003-1  46.2
         Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd.       25.7
         Zais Investment Grade VI       30.9
         Zais Investment Grade X        28.5

                          Rating Actions

                                           Rating
                                           ------
    Transaction                   Class  To     From
    -----------                   -----  --     ----
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            X      A-     AAA/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            A-1LA  BBB-   A/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            A-1LB  BB     BBB+/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            A-2L   B      BB/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            A-3L   CCC    B+/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            B-1L   CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg
    Ashford CDO II Ltd            B-2L   CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
    Gresham St CDO Funding 2003-1 B      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
    Gresham St CDO Funding 2003-1 C      A+     AAA/Watch Neg
    Gresham St CDO Funding 2003-1 D      CCC-   A-/Watch Neg
    Gresham St CDO Funding 2003-1 PrefSh CCC-   BBB-/Watch Neg
    Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd       A-1LA  BBB+   AA/Watch Neg
    Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd       A-1LB  BBB-   A-/Watch Neg
    Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd       A-2L   BBB-   A-/Watch Neg
    Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd       A-3L   B+     BBB-/Watch Neg
    Tricadia CDO 2003-1 Ltd       A-4L   B-     BB-/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      A-1    A+     AAA/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      A-2a   A-     AA/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      A-2b   A-     AA/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      A-3    BBB    A+/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      B-1    B-     BB+/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade VI      B-2    B-     BB+/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       A-1a   BBB-   A/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       A-1b   BBB-   A/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       A-2    BB+    BBB-/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       A-3    B+     BB/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       A-4    CCC+   B-/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       B      CC     CCC/Watch Neg
    Zais Investment Grade X       S      A      AAA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Transaction              Class  Rating
              -----------              -----  ------
              Granite Ventures I Ltd   A-1    AA+
              Granite Ventures I Ltd.  A-2    AA
              Granite Ventures I Ltd   B      A-
              Granite Ventures I Ltd   C      BB+
              Granite Ventures I Ltd   D      CCC+
              Primus CLO II Ltd        A      AA-
              Primus CLO II Ltd        B      A+
              Primus CLO II Ltd        C      BBB
              Primus CLO II Ltd        D      BB+
              Primus CLO II Ltd        E      CCC-
              Zais Investment Grade X  C      CC
              Zais Investment Grade X  D      CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches From 11 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 57
tranches from 11 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 33 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Twenty-two of the lowered ratings and eight additional tranches
remain on CreditWatch negative.  S&P affirmed its ratings on 11
other tranches from four transactions and removed three of them
from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.  S&P's ratings
remaining on CreditWatch primarily affect transactions for which a
significant portion of the collateral assets currently have
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications or that have
significant exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

The 57 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $2.759 billion.  Eight of the 11 affected
transactions are CDO of commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions.  Two of the 11 affected transactions are mezzanine
structured finance CDOs of asset-backed securities, which are
collateralized in large part by mezzanine tranches of RMBS and
other SF securities.  The other deal is a high-grade SF CDO of ABS
that was collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through
'A' rated tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                          Rating
                                          ------
  Transaction                  Class To            From
  -----------                  ----- --            ----
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             A     B+            AA/Watch Neg
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             B     CCC-          A-/Watch Neg
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             C     CC            BBB-/Watch Neg
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             D     CC            BB+/Watch Neg
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             E     CC            BB/Watch Neg
  Acacia CRE CDO 1             F     CC            B+/Watch Neg
  Ajax Two                     B     A             AA+
  Ajax Two                     C     CCC           BBB-/Watch Neg
  Ajax Two                     PrfSh CC            BB/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 B-1   A/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 B-2   A/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 C-1   BBB/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 C-2   BBB/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 D-1   B/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 D-2   B/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 E-1   CCC/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter St Solar 2004-1 E-2   CCC/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-1                BFL   BB+/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-1                BFX   BB+/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-1                C     B+/Watch Neg  BB-/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3                A-1   A+            AAA
  G-Star 2003-3                A-2   BB+           AA+/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3                A-3   CCC-          A+/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3                B-1   CC            BBB/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3                B-2   CC            BB/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2003-3                PfdSh CC            CCC-/Watch Neg
  Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd.     A     BB+           AA/Watch Neg
  Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd.     B     CCC+          AA/Watch Neg
  Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd.     C     CCC-          AA/Watch Neg
  Kirkwood CDO 2004-1 Ltd.     D     CCC-          A/Watch Neg
  Knollwood CDO                A-1   CC            BB/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          A     B-/Watch Neg  BBB-/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          B     CCC/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          C     CCC-/WatchNeg B+/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          D     CCC-/WatchNeg B/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          E     CC            CCC+/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          F     CC            CCC/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          G     CC            CCC/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          H     CC            CCC-/Watch Neg
  Lenox Street 2007-1          J     CC            CCC-/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            I-A   BB+           A+/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            I-B   BB-           A-/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            II    CCC+          BBB+/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            III   CCC-          BB+/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            IV-FL CC            B+/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            IV-FX CC            B+/Watch Neg
  Newcastle CDO VII            V     CC            CCC+/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II    B-1   AA+           AA+/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II    B-2   AA            AA/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      A-1   BB/Watch Neg  A-/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      A-2   B/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      B     B-/Watch Neg  BBB-/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      C     CCC-/WatchNeg BB/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      D     CCC-/WatchNeg B+/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      E     CCC-/WatchNeg B/Watch Neg
  Sorin Real Estate CDO I      F     CC/Watch Neg  CCC+/Watch Neg
  Zais Investment Grade IX     A-1   BB+           BBB+/Watch Neg
  Zais Investment Grade IX     A-2   B             BB-/Watch Neg
  Zais Investment Grade IX     B     CCC-          CCC+/Watch Neg
  Zais Investment Grade IX     X     AAA           AAA/Watch Neg

            Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

  Transaction                        Class      Rating
  -----------                        -----      ------
  Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1   A-1        AA+/Watch Neg
  Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1   A-2        AA+/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-1                      A-1MM      AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
  G-Star 2002-1                      A-2        AAA/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II          C-1        A/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II          C-2A       BBB-/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II          C-2B       BBB-/Watch Neg
  N-Star Real Estate CDO II          D          B+/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Transaction                        Class      Rating
       -----------                        -----      ------
       Ajax Two                           A-2A       AAA
       Ajax Two                           A-2B       AAA
       Knollwood CDO                      C          CC
       N-Star Real Estate CDO II          A-1        AAA
       N-Star Real Estate CDO II          A-2A       AAA
       N-Star Real Estate CDO II          A-2B       AAA
       Zais Investment Grade IX           C          CC
       Zais Investment Grade IX           D          CC

                    Other Ratings Outstanding

       Transaction                        Class      Rating
       -----------                        -----      ------
       Knollwood CDO                      A-2        D
       Knollwood CDO                      B          D


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 206 Classes From 17 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 206
classes from 17 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by a mix of U.S. prime jumbo mortgage and
Alternative-A residential mortgage loan collateral from 2005,
2006, and 2007.  S&P removed 153 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 112 classes from 11 of the transactions with
downgraded classes, as well as three additional transactions, and
removed 28 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses, due to increased
delinquencies.  Conversely, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the amount of credit enhancement available for these
classes is sufficient to cover losses associated with the current
rating levels.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P applied its loss
projections at the structural level.  In order to maintain a 'B'
rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its view, a class
could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating on prime jumbo structures.
For example, on prime jumbo structures, in general, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 127% of its
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.  For Alt-A structures, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110% of its
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls or write-downs in the final period of
particular cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have
experienced any principal shortfalls or write-downs in any of the
prior periods of the particular stress scenario; however, the
structural mechanics of the transactions created circumstances in
which one or more classes within a transaction may have relied on
principal proceeds to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier
periods, thus resulting in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group, or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance
that is insufficient to cover the necessary interest obligations
of the related liabilities.

Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, the available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the
interest-principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final payment period, a situation may occur in which
available funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and
principal requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as
principal in prior periods was used to satisfy interest
obligations.  Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior
certificates can be exposed to this risk due to the fact that
structures may pay principal pro rata with senior support classes.
Although the senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any
of the prior periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo and Alt-A mortgage
loans secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                          Rating Actions

               Banc of America Funding 2006-7 Trust
                        Series      2006-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-4      05951KAE3     BB-                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      05951KAH6     BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      05951KAJ2     BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
    T2-A-5     05951KBB8     CC                   CCC

              CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-11
                        Series      2007-11

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        12544LAA9     CC                   CCC
    A-2        12544LAB7     CC                   CCC
    A-3        12544LAC5     CC                   CCC
    A-4        12544LAD3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-5        12544LAE1     CC                   CCC
    A-6        12544LAF8     CC                   CCC
    A-7        12544LAG6     CC                   CCC
    A-8        12544LAH4     CC                   CCC
    A-9        12544LAJ0     CC                   CCC
    A-10       12544LAK7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-11       12544LAL5     CC                   CCC
    A-12       12544LAM3     CC                   CCC
    A-13       12544LAN1     CC                   CCC
    A-14       12544LAP6     CC                   CCC
    A-15       12544LAQ4     CC                   CCC
    A-16       12544LAR2     CC                   CCC
    A-17       12544LAS0     CC                   CCC
    A-18       12544LAT8     CC                   CCC
    A-19       12544LAU5     CC                   CCC
    PO         12544LAW1     CC                   CCC

        Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust Series 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-11      17312XAL8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

         Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2006-5
                        Series      2006-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-4       17310FAD7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IA-14      17310FAP0     B                    A+/Watch Neg

        Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-2
                        Series      2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-1       173107AA1     BB                   A+/Watch Neg
    IA-3       173107AC7     BB                   A+/Watch Neg
    IA-4       173107AD5     BB                   A+/Watch Neg
    IA-5       173107AE3     A+                   A+/Watch Neg
    IA-7       173107AG8     BB                   A+/Watch Neg
    IIA-1      173107AK9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IIIA-1     173107AM5     BB                   AA-/Watch Neg
    A-PO       173107AP8     BB                   A+/Watch Neg

         Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-5
                        Series      2007-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-1       17312KAA0     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    IA-2       17312KAB8     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IA-3       17312KAC6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IA-4       17312KAD4     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IA-6       17312KAF9     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    IA-8       17312KAH5     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IA-9       17312KAJ1     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    IA-10      17312KAK8     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IA-11      17312KAL6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    IIA-1      17312KAN2     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    IIIA-1     17312KAQ5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-PO       17312KAS1     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-12
                       Series      2005-12

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      225470RS4     CC                   CCC
    4-A-1      225470RV7     CC                   CCC
    5-A-1      225470RW5     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      225470RX3     CC                   CCC
    A-P        225470SF1     CC                   CCC

                 CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-5
                        Series      2007-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      22944BAA6     CC                   CCC
    1-A-2      22944BAB4     CC                   CCC
    1-A-4      22944BAD0     CC                   CCC
    1-A-6      22944BAF5     CC                   CCC
    1-A-9      22944BAJ7     CC                   CCC
    1-A-10     22944BAK4     CC                   CCC
    1-A-11     22944BAL2     CC                   CCC
    1-A-12     22944BAM0     CC                   CCC
    D-P        22944BDU9     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      22944BAN8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      22944BAQ1     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      22944BAR9     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      22944BAS7     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      22944BAT5     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      22944BAU2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      22944BAV0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      22944BAW8     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    3-A-6      22944BAZ1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-8      22944BBB3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-9      22944BBC1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-13     22944BBG2     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-15     22944BBJ6     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-16     22944BBK3     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-17     22944BBL1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-19     22944BBN7     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      22944BBQ0     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    4-A-5      22944BBT4     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-8      22944BBW7     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-10     22944BBY3     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-13     22944BCB2     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-16     22944BCE6     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-18     22944BCG1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-19     22944BCH9     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-20     22944BCJ5     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-21     22944BCK2     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-22     22944BCL0     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-23     22944BCM8     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-24     22944BCN6     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-25     22944BCP1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-26     22944BCQ9     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-27     22944BCR7     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-28     22944BCS5     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-29     22944BCT3     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-30     22944BCU0     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-31     22944BCV8     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-32     22944BCW6     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-33     22944BCX4     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      22944BCY2     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      22944BCZ9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-3      22944BDA3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-5      22944BDC9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      22944BDD7     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    6-A-2      22944BDE5     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-3      22944BDF2     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-5      22944BDH8     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    7-A-1      22944BDJ4     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    7-A-2      22944BDK1     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    8-A-1      22944BDL9     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    8-A-2      22944BDM7     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    9-A-1      22944BDN5     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    9-A-2      22944BDP0     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    10-A-1     22944BDQ8     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    10-A-2     22944BDR6     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-M        22944BDS4     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    B-4        22944BEH7     CC                   CCC
    B-5        22944BEP9     CC                   CCC
    B-6        22944BEQ7     D                    CCC

                CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-7
                        Series      2007-7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A-3      12638DAF3     CC                   CCC
        3-A-3      12638DAJ5     CC                   CCC
        AM         12638DBN5     CC                   CCC
        2-P        12638DBH8     D                    CCC
        3-P        12638DBJ4     D                    CCC

       First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-AR2
                       Series      2006-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      32052KAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    32052KAD7     B-                   B-/Watch Neg

                  GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3F
                        Series      2006-3F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-6       362334JM7     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    2A-7       362334JV7     BBB-                 A+/Watch Neg
    3A-11      362334KH6     CC                   CCC
    3A-16      362334KN3     BB                   A/Watch Neg
    3A-18      362334KQ6     CC                   CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
                       Series      2007-AR1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A2        362290AB4     CC                   CCC
    2A2        362290AD0     CC                   CCC
    3A2        362290AJ7     CC                   CCC
    4A1        362290AK4     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
    4A2        362290AL2     CC                   CCC
    5A1        362290AM0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    5A2        362290AN8     CC                   CCC
    6A1        362290AP3     A                    A/Watch Neg
    6A2        362290AQ1     CC                   CCC

             IndyMac IMJA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A4
                       Series      2007-A4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        45670VAB1     CC                   CCC
        PO         45670VAC9     CC                   CCC

           MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-1
                        Series      2006-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      57643MLX0     BBB                  AA+/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      57643MLY8     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      57643MLZ5     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      57643MMA9     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      57643MMB7     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      57643MMC5     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      57643MMD3     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      57643MME1     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      57643MMF8     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     57643MMH4     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     57643MMJ0     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     57643MMK7     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     57643MML5     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      57643MMM3     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      57643MMP6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      57643MNE0     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      57643MMQ4     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    15-PO      57643MMV3     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    30-PO      57643MMW1     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    B-1        57643MMX9     CC                   CCC

             MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      55274QAA3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      55274QAB1     BB-                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      55274QAC9     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      55274QAD7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      55274QAE5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      55274QAF2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      55274QAH8     BBB+                 BBB+/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      55274QAJ4     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     55274QAK1     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     55274QAL9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     55274QAM7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     55274QAN5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     55274QAP0     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-15     55274QAQ8     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-16     55274QAR6     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-18     55274QAT2     BB-                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A-19     55274QAU9     BB-                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A-20     55274QAV7     BB-                  BB-/Watch Neg
    1-A-22     55274QAX3     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-23     55274QAY1     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-24     55274QAZ8     B                    B/Watch Neg
    1-A-26     55274QBB0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-27     55274QBC8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-28     55274QBD6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-30     55274QBF1     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    1-A-31     55274QBG9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-32     55274QBH7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-33     55274QBJ3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-34     55274QBK0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    1-A-35     55274QBL8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      55274QBM6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      55274QBN4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    PO         55274QBS3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    B-1        55274QBU8     CC                   CCC

                   Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       81744JAA7     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-XA       81744JAL3     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       81744JAC3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       81744JAD1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    4-A1       81744JAG4     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    5-A1       81744JAJ8     A                    A/Watch Neg

      Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust, LLC Series 2006-A Trust
                        Series      2006-A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       92977TAA0     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    1-A2       92977TAB8     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    2-A1       92977TAC6     B                    BB+/Watch Neg
    2-A2       92977TAD4     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    3-A1       92977TAE2     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       92977TAF9     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    4-A1       92977TAG7     BB                   AA+/Watch Neg
    4-A2       92977TAH5     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    B-1        92977TAK8     CC                   CCC
    B-2        92977TAL6     D                    CC

       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-12 Trust
                        Series      2007-12

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        94986FAA5     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-2        94986FAB3     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-3        94986FAC1     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-4        94986FAD9     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-5        94986FAE7     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-6        94986FAF4     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-7        94986FAG2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-8        94986FAH0     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-9        94986FAJ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-10       94986FAK3     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-11       94986FAL1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-12       94986FAM9     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-13       94986FAN7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-14       94986FAP2     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-15       94986FAQ0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-16       94986FAR8     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-17       94986FAS6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-18       94986FAT4     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-19       94986FAU1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-20       94986FAV9     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-21       94986FAW7     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-PO       94986FAX5     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

               Banc of America Funding 2006-7 Trust
                        Series      2006-7

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A-1      05951KAB9     CCC
                  1-A-2      05951KAC7     CCC
                  1-A-5      05951KAF0     CCC
                  1-A-9      05951KAK9     CCC
                  1-A-10     05951KAL7     CCC
                  1-A-11     05951KAM5     CCC
                  1-A-12     05951KAN3     CCC
                  30-PO      05951KAQ6     CCC
                  T2-A-7     05951KBD4     CCC

                Banc of America Funding 2007-C Trust
                        Series      2007-C

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  6-A-1      059522AA0     BB
                  6-A-2      059522AB8     CCC
                  7-A-1      059522AC6     CCC
                  7-A-2      059522AD4     CCC
                  7-A-3      059522AE2     CCC
                  7-A-4      059522AF9     CCC
                  1-A-1      059522AT9     CCC
                  1-A-2      059522AU6     BB
                  1-A-3      059522AV4     BB
                  1-A-4      059522AW2     BB
                  1-A-5      059522AX0     CCC
                  2-A-1      059522AY8     BB
                  2-A-2      059522AZ5     CCC
                  3-A-1      059522BA9     CCC
                  3-A-2      059522BB7     CCC
                  4-A-1      059522BC5     BBB-
                  4-A-2      059522BD3     BBB-
                  4-A-3      059522BE1     BBB-
                  4-A-4      059522BF8     CCC
                  5-A-2      059522BH4     CCC

         Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-7
                        Series      2007-7

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  IA-1       173104AA8     BBB-
                  IA-2       173104AB6     B
                  IIA-1      173104AD2     AAA
                  IIA-IO     173104AE0     AAA
                  IIIA-1     173104AF7     AA+
                  IIIA-IO    173104AG5     AA+
                  A-PO       173104AH3     B

                 CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-5
                        Series      2007-5

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  B-1        22944BEE4     CCC
                  B-2        22944BEF1     CCC

                CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-7
                        Series      2007-7

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A-1      12638DAA4     CCC
                  1-A-2      12638DAB2     CCC
                  1-P        12638DBG0     CCC
                  2-A-1      12638DAD8     CCC
                  2-A-2      12638DAE6     CCC
                  2-A-4      12638DBL9     CCC
                  3-A-1      12638DAG1     CCC
                  3-A-2      12638DAH9     CCC
                  3-A-4      12638DBM7     CCC

        First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-AR2
                       Series      2006-AR2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  II-A-1     32052KAB1     CCC
                  IV-A-1     32052KAE5     CCC
                  A-M        32052KAF2     CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3F
                        Series      2006-3F

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1A-1       362334JG0     CCC
                  1A-2       362334JH8     CCC
                  1A-3       362334JJ4     CCC
                  1A-4       362334JK1     CCC
                  1A-5       362334JL9     CCC
                  1A-7       362334JN5     CCC
                  2A-1       362334JP0     CCC
                  2A-2       362334GM0     CCC
                  2A-3       362334JR6     CCC
                  2A-4       362334JS4     CCC
                  2A-5       362334JT2     CCC
                  2A-6       362334JU9     CCC
                  2A-8       362334JW5     CCC
                  3A-1       362334HG2     CCC
                  3A-4       362334KA1     CCC
                  3A-7       362334KD5     CCC
                  3A-8       362334KE3     CCC
                  3A-9       362334KF0     CCC
                  3A-12      362334KJ2     CCC
                  3A-14      362334KL7     CCC
                  3A-15      362334KM5     CCC
                  3A-17      362334KP8     CCC
                  4A-1       362334HH0     CCC
                  5A-1       362334HJ6     CCC
                  A-P        362334KU7     CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
                       Series      2007-AR1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1A1        362290AA6     CCC
                  2A1        362290AC2     CCC
                  3A1        362290AH1     CCC

             IndyMac IMJA Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-A4
                       Series      2007-A4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        45670VAA3     CCC

                  Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A2       81744JAB5     CCC
                  3-A1       81744JAE9     CCC
                  3-A2       81744JAF6     CCC
                  4-A2       81744JAH2     CCC
                  5-A2       81744JAK5     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 381 Classes From 22 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 381
classes from 22 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by a mix of U.S. prime jumbo mortgage and
Alternative-A residential mortgage loan collateral issued in 2005.
S&P removed 317 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
165 classes from 17 of the transactions with downgraded classes
and one additional transaction and removed 129 of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses, due to increased
delinquencies.  Conversely, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the amount of credit enhancement available for these
classes is sufficient to cover losses associated with the current
rating levels.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P applied its loss
projections at the structural level.  In order to maintain a 'B'
rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a class
could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its
analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
127% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of its base-case loss
assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls or write-downs in the final period of
particular cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have
experienced any principal shortfalls or write-downs in any of the
prior periods of the particular stress scenario; however, the
structural mechanics of the transactions created circumstances in
which one or more classes within a transaction may have relied on
principal proceeds to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier
periods, thus resulting in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group, or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance
that is insufficient to cover the necessary interest obligations
of the related liabilities.

Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, the available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final payment period, a situation may occur in which
available funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and
principal requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as
principal in prior periods was used to satisfy interest
obligations.  Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior
certificates can be exposed to this risk due to the fact that
structures may pay principal pro rata with senior support classes.
Although the senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any
of the prior periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                         Rating Actions

               Banc of America Funding 2005-4 Trust
                        Series      2005-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05946XZV8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05946XZW6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      05946XZX4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05946XZY2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05946XZZ9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      05946XA29     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      05946XA37     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      05946XA45     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1        05946XA52     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        05946XA60     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-IO      05946XA78     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05946XA86     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        05946XA94     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    B-2        05946XB28     CC                   CCC
    B-3        05946XB36     CC                   CCC

             Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
                        Series      2005-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05949CAA4     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05949CAB2     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      05949CAC0     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05949CAD8     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      05949CAE6     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      05949CAF3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      05949CAH9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      05949CAJ5     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     05949CAK2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     05949CAL0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     05949CAM8     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     05949CAN6     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     05949CAP1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-15     05949CAQ9     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-16     05949CAR7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-17     05949CAS5     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-18     05949CAT3     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-19     05949CAU0     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-20     05949CAV8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-22     05949CAX4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-23     05949CAY2     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-24     05949CAZ9     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-25     05949CBA3     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-26     05949CBB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-IO      05949CBD7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05949CBE5     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05949CBF2     B                    BB+/Watch Neg
    15-PO      05949CBH8     B                    BB+/Watch Neg
    15-B-2     05949CBN5     CC                   CCC
    30-B-5     05949CBR6     D                    CC

              Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-10
                        Series      2005-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       05949CLF1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05949CLG9     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       05949CLH7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05949CLJ3     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      05949CLK0     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      05949CLL8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      05949CLM6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      05949CLN4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      05949CLP9     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     05949CLR5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     05949CLS3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     05949CLT1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     05949CLU8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-15     05949CLV6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-16     05949CLW4     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A17      05949CLX2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-18     05949CLY0     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-19     05949CLZ7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-20     05949CMA1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05949CMC7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05949CMD5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       05949CME3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    15-PO      05949CMF0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    X-IO       05949CMG8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

              Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05949A5A4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05949A5B2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      05949A5C0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05949A5D8     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      05949A5E6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      05949A5G1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     05949A5K2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     05949A5L0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     05949A5M8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A13      05949A5N6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05949A5Q9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IO       05949A5R7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-PO       05949A5S5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg

              Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-8
                        Series      2005-8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        05949CGN0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        05949CGP5     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-3        05949CGQ3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-4        05949CGR1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-6        05949CGT7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-8        05949CGV2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-9        05949CGW0     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-10       05949CGX8     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-11       05949CGY6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-12       05949CGZ3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-13       05949CHA7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-14       05949CHB5     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05949CHE9     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg

              Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-9
                        Series      2005-9

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        3-A-1      05949CJX5     BBB                  AAA
        3-A-2      05949CKH8     BBB                  AAA
        3-A-3      05949CKJ4     BBB                  AAA
        4-A-1      05949CJY3     A-                   AAA
        4-A-2      05949CKK1     A-                   AAA
        4-A-3      05949CKL9     A-                   AAA
        15-PO      05949CKA3     BBB                  AAA

                   Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        07387ACJ2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        07387ACK9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M          07387ACL7     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg

              CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        12669GQQ7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        12669GQR5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        12669GQS3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        12669GQT1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-5        12669GQU8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-6        12669GQV6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-7        12669GQW4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    PO         12669GQY0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                        Series      2005-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      225458JU3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     225458JV1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-1     225458LD8     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-2     225458LE6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-3     225458LF3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-4     225458LG1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225458JW9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    225458JX7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    225458JY5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-4    225458JZ2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-5    225458KA5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-6    225458KB3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-7    225458KC1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-8    225458KD9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-9    225458KE7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-10   225458KF4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-11   225458KG2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-12   225458KH0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-13   225458KJ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-1      225458LC0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-2      225458ML9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VII-A-1    225458LH9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VII-A-2    225458LJ5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VII-A-3    225458LK2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VII-A-4    225458LL0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VII-A-5    225458LM8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        225458LP1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        225458MM7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    D-B-1      225458LU0     CC                   CCC
    III-A-14   225458KK3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-15   225458KL1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-16   225458KM9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-17   225458KN7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-18   225458KP2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-19   225458KQ0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-20   225458KR8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-21   225458KS6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-22   225458KT4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-23   225458KU1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-24   225458KV9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-25   225458KW7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-26   225458KX5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-27   225458KY3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-28   225458KZ0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-29   225458LA4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-30   225458MF2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-33   225458MJ4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-34   225458MK1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-1     225458LB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                        Series      2005-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      225458E46     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      225458E53     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      225458E61     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-4      225458E79     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-5      225458E87     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-6      225458E95     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-7      225458F29     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-8      225458F37     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-9      225458L48     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-10     225458L55     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    I-A-11     225458L63     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    A-P        225458H35     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    IV-A-1     225458G36     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-2     225458G44     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-3     225458G51     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    V-A-1      225458G69     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-1     225458G77     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    C-P        225458H43     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     225458F45     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     225458F52     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     225458F78     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     225458F86     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     225458F94     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225458G28     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    D-B-1      225458H84     CC                   CCC
    D-B-2      225458H92     D                    CC

   CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-1
                        Series      2005-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      225458AA6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      225458AB4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      225458AC2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-4      225458AD0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-5      225458AE8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-6      225458AF5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-7      225458AG3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-8      225458AH1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-9      225458AJ7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-10     225458AK4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-11     225458AL2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-12     225458AM0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-13     225458AN8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-14     225458AP3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-15     225458AQ1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-16     225458AR9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-17     225458AS7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-18     225458AT5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-19     225458AU2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-20     225458AV0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-22     225458AX6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-23     225458AY4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-24     225458AZ1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-25     225458BA5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-26     225458BB3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-27     225458BC1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-28     225458BD9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225458BR8     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    225458BS6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    225458BT4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-4    225458BU1     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-5    225458BV9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-6    225458BF4     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        225458BX5     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        225458BY3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     225458BK3     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     225458BL1     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     225458BM9     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     225458BP2     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     225458BQ0     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
    D-B-1      225458BZ0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    D-B-2      225458CA4     CC                   CCC
    D-B-3      225458CB2     CC                   CCC
    I-A-29     225458BE7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg

            CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-10
                       Series      2005-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    VII-A-1    225470FD0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225470DW0     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    225470DX8     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    225470DY6     CC                   CCC
    III-A-4    225470DZ3     CC                   CCC
    IV-A-1     225470EA7     CC                   CCC
    IV-A-2     225470EB5     CC                   CCC
    V-A-1      225470EC3     CC                   CCC
    V-A-3      225470EE9     CC                   CCC
    V-A-4      225470EF6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    V-A-5      225470EG4     CC                   CCC
    V-A-6      225470EH2     CC                   CCC
    V-A-7      225470EJ8     CC                   CCC
    VI-A-6     225470ET6     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-7     225470EU3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-8     225470EV1     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-9     225470EW9     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-10    225470EX7     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-11    225470EY5     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-12    225470EZ2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-13    225470FA6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-14    225470FB4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    VI-A-15    225470FC2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-B-1     225470GF4     CC                   CCC
    V-A-8      225470EK5     CC                   CCC
    V-A-9      225470EL3     CC                   CCC
    V-A-10     225470EM1     CC                   CCC
    VIII-A-1   225470FE8     CC                   CCC
    VIII-A-2   225470FF5     CC                   CCC
    VIII-A-3   225470FG3     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    VIII-A-4   225470FH1     CC                   CCC
    IX-A-1     225470FJ7     CC                   CCC
    X-A-1      225470FK4     CC                   CCC
    X-A-2      225470FL2     CC                   CCC
    X-A-3      225470FM0     CC                   CCC
    X-A-4      225470FN8     CC                   CCC
    X-A-5      225470FP3     CC                   CCC
    A-P2       225470FW8     CC                   CCC
    VI-A-1     225470EN9     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-3     225470EQ2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    VI-A-5     225470ES8     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      225458PM4     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    PP         225458RM2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        225458RB6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    225458PX0     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    225458PY8     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    225458PZ5     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-4    225458QA9     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-5    225458QB7     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-6    225458QC5     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-7    225458QD3     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-8    225458QE1     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-10   225458QG6     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-11   225458QH4     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-12   225458QJ0     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-13   225458QK7     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-14   225458QL5     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-15   225458QM3     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-16   225458QN1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-17   225458QP6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-18   225458QQ4     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    C-B-2      225458RD2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    D-B-2      225458RG5     CC                   CCC
    C-B-3      225458RE0     CC                   CCC
    D-B-3      225458RH3     CC                   CCC
    D-B-4      225458PF9     CC                   CCC
    C-B-4      225458PJ1     CC                   CCC
    III-A-19   225458QR2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-20   225458QS0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-21   225458QT8     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-22   225458QU5     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-23   225458QV3     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-24   225458QW1     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-25   225458QX9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-X      225458RA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     225458PN2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     225458PQ5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     225458PR3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     225458PS1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     225458PT9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-7     225458PU6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-9     225458PW2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-X       225458QZ4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    C-B-1      225458RC4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    D-B-1      225458RF7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     225458PP7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F
                       Series      2005-4F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-1       36242DV91     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-1       36242DW25     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-1       36242DW33     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-2       36242DW58     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-3       36242DW66     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A4       36242DW74     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A5       36242DW82     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-6       36242DW90     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-7       36242DX24     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-8       36242DX32     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-9       36242DX40     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-10      36242DX57     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-11      36242DX65     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-12      36242DX73     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-13      36242DX81     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-1       36242DX99     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-2       36242DY23     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-1       36242DY31     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        36242DY49     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        36242DY56     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         36242DY64     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    B4         36242DZ48     CC                   CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-8F
                       Series      2005-8F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-1       362341VN6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-1       362341VP1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-3       362341VR7     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-4       362341VS5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-5       362341VT3     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-6       362341VU0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2A-7       362341VV8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    2A-8       362341VW6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A-1       362341VX4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A-2       362341VY2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A-4       362341WA3     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A-5       362341WB1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A-6       362341WC9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-7       362341WD7     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    4A-1       362341WE5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    5A-1       362341WF2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    6A-1       362341WH8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    7A-1       362341WJ4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-P        362341WK1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    B1         362341WM7     CC                   CCC

       Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI 2005-A1
                       Series      2005-A1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        59020UQC2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     59020UQD0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     59020UQP3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A      59020UQE8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59020UQF5     BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        59020UQG3     CCC                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    M-3        59020UQH1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    B-1        59020UQJ7     CC                   CCC
    B-2        59020UQK4     D                    CC

    Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLMI 2005-A5
                       Series      2005-A5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        59020UYL3     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        59020UYM1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        59020UYN9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        59020UYP4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-5        59020UYQ2     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-6        59020UYR0     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-7        59020UYS8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-8        59020UYT6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-9        59020UYU3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59020UYW9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-3        59020UYY5     CC                   CCC
    B-2        59020UZA6     D                    CC

                    Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      74160MJX1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      74160MJY9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      74160MJZ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-4      74160MKA9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-5      74160MKB7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-6      74160MKC5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-7      74160MLM2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-PO       74160MKD3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-X        74160MKE1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     74160MKR2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-B-1     74160MLC4     CC                   CCC
    I-B-4      74160MLF7     CC                   CCC

                   RFMSI Series 2005-SA1 Trust
                       Series      2005-SA1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      76111XTB9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      76111XTC7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      76111XTD5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A       76111XTE3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A      76111XTF0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76111XTJ2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        76111XTK9     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    M-3        76111XTL7     D                    BBB/Watch Neg

   Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-17
                       Series      2005-17

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       863579VH8     BB-                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       863579VJ4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A1       863579VK1     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    2-A2       863579VL9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    3-A1       863579VM7     BB+                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    3-A2       863579VN5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    B1-I       863579VY1     CC                   CCC
    B2-I       863579VZ8     CC                   CCC
    4-A1       863579VP0     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    4-A2       863579VQ8     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A3       863579VR6     BBB+                 AA/Watch Neg
    4-A4       863579VS4     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    4-A5       863579VT2     B                    BBB-/Watch Neg
    5-A1       863579VV7     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    5-A2       863579VW5     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    5-A3       863579VX3     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    B1-II      863579WD6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    B2-II      863579WE4     CC                   CCC
    B3-II      863579WF1     CC                   CCC

      Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-10
                       Series      2005-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       86359DFM4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       86359DFN2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       86359DFP7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       86359DFQ5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       86359DFR3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A4       86359DFS1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       86359DFT9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       86359DFU6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A3       86359DFV4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A4       86359DFW2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A1       86359DFZ5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A2       86359DGA9     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A4       86359DGC5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A5       86359DGD3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A6       86359DGE1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A8       86359DGG6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A9       86359DGH4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A1       86359DGK7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A2       86359DGL5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A3       86359DGM3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A4       86359DGN1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A5       86359DGP6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A6       86359DGQ4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A7       86359DGR2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A9       86359DGT8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-1       86359DGV3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    7A-1       86359DGW1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    8A-1       86359DGX9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AP         86359DGY7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AX         86359DGZ4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    PAX        86359DHA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         86359DHB6     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    B2         86359DHC4     CC                   CCC
    B3         86359DHD2     CC                   CCC
    B4         86359DHE0     CC                   CCC

       Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-6
                        Series      2005-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       863576BB9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       863576BC7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       863576BD5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A4       863576BE3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       863576BF0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       863576BG8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       863576BH6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A4       863576BJ2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A5       863576BK9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A7       863576BM5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A8       863576BN3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A9       863576BP8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A10      863576BQ6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A12      863576BS2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A13      863576BT0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A14      863576BU7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A15      863576BV5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A16      863576BW3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A17      863576BX1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A18      863576BY9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A19      863576BZ6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A20      863576CA0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A21      863576CB8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       863576CC6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       863576CD4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A1       863576CE2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-1       863576CF9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-2       863576CG7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-3       863576CH5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-4       863576CJ1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-6       863576CL6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-7       863576CM4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-8       863576CN2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-9       863576CP7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-10      863576CQ5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-11      863576CR3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    AP         863576CS1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AX         863576CT9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    PAX        863576CU6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         863576CV4     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    B2         863576CW2     CC                   CCC
    B3         863576CX0     CC                   CCC
    B4         863576CY8     CC                   CCC

      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR9 Trust
                       Series      2005-AR9

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      94982HAA5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      94982HAB3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     94982HAC1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     94982HAD9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    94982HAG2     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    94982HAH0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-1     94982HAJ6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    IV-A-2     94982HAK3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        94982HAL1     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    B-2        94982HAM9     CC                   B+/Watch Neg
    B-3        94982HAN7     CC                   CCC
    B-4        94982HAP2     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc
                        Series      2005-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 15-B-1     05949CBM7     CCC

              Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-9
                        Series      2005-9

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      05949CJF4     B-
                 1-A-2      05949CJG2     B-
                 1-A-4      05949CJJ6     B-
                 1-A-5      05949CJK3     B-
                 1-A-6      05949CJL1     B-
                 1-A-7      05949CJM9     B-
                 1-A-8      05949CJN7     B-
                 1-A-9      05949CJP2     B-
                 1-A-10     05949CJQ0     B-
                 1-A-12     05949CJS6     B-
                 30-PO      05949CJV9     B-
                 2-A-1      05949CJW7     AAA
                 15-IO      05949CJZ0     AAA
                 B-1        05949CKB1     CCC
                 B-2        05949CKC9     CCC

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
                        Series      2005-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-B-1      225458J33     CCC
                 C-B-2      225458H68     CCC

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-10
                       Series      2005-10

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 VI-A-2     225470EP4     CCC
                 VI-A-4     225470ER0     CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F
                       Series      2005-4F

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 B2         36242DY72     CCC
                 B3         36242DY80     CCC

    Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLMI 2005-A5
                       Series      2005-A5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        59020UYX7     CCC

                   Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 II-A-2     74160MKM3     CCC
                 II-A-3     74160MKN1     CCC
                 II-A-4     74160MKP6     CCC
                 II-A-7     74160MKS0     CCC
                 II-A-8     74160MKT8     CCC
                 II-A-9     74160MKU5     CCC
                 II-A-10    74160MKV3     CCC
                 II-A-11    74160MKW1     CCC
                 II-A-12    74160MKX9     CCC
                 II-PO      74160MKY7     CCC
                 I-B-1      74160MKH4     CCC
                 I-B-2      74160MKJ0     CCC
                 I-B-3      74160MKK7     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 673 Classes of Certificates to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
673 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 496 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued between
2000 and 2008.  S&P removed one of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P placed
its ratings on six additional classes from one of the affected
transactions on CreditWatch negative, and 88 classes from another
affected transaction remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

Approximately 76.97% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A or subprime mortgage loan
collateral.  The 673 defaulted classes consisted of these:

* 377 classes from Alt-A transactions (56.02% of all defaults);

* 141 from subprime transactions (20.95% of all defaults);

* 82 from prime jumbo transactions;

* 21 from closed-end second-lien transactions;

* 13 from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
  transactions;

* 11 from home equity line of credit transactions.

* Nine from reperforming transactions;

* Nine from risk transfer transactions;

* Six from outside-the-guidelines transactions;

* Two from seasoned loan transactions;

* One from a first-lien high loan-to-value transaction; and

* One from a document-deficient transaction.

The 673 downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of principal
write-downs on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  Fifty of the defaulted ratings affect classes that are
bond insured by Ambac Assurance Corp. (currently rated 'R').
Although these classes are wrapped by insurance, the losses were
not covered and were still allocated to the respective classes.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the fact that the affected
classes are within a group that includes a class that defaulted
from a 'B-' rating or higher.  S&P lowered approximately 99.70% of
the ratings from the 'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories, and S&P
lowered 99.85% from a speculative-grade category.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements affecting these
transactions after S&P completes its reviews of the underlying
credit enhancement.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor
its ratings on securities that experience principal write-downs,
and S&P will adjust the ratings as S&P determines appropriate.


* S&P Junks Rating on Central Falls, Rhode Island's Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
on Central Falls, Rhode Island's general obligation debt to 'C'
from 'BBB-'.

Standard & Poor's has also assigned its developing outlook on the
city's GO debt, indicating it could raise or lower the rating.

The rating action reflects Standard & Poor's view of the city's
filing of a petition with the State of Rhode Island Superior Court
requesting the appointment of a receiver to oversee the affairs of
the city to assist in balancing the city's budget.  Pursuant to an
order dated May 19, 2010, Rhode Island Superior Court granted the
request and appointed a temporary receiver for the city and a
permanent receiver on or before June 8, 2010.

The city closed fiscal year-end 2009 with a negligible, but still
positive, reserve of $41,347; and it is facing deficits that city
officials are projecting will be above 20% of budget in the
current fiscal 2010 and fiscal 2011 due to state aid cuts and
increases to pension costs.

It is Standard & Poor's understanding that the receiver will
commence a comprehensive review of the city's financial condition
and that the receiver is empowered to oversee the municipal
operations of the city to restore its fiscal health.  The city
remains current with all debt obligations.



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***