TCR_Public/100523.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 23, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 141

                            Headlines



ACA ABS: S&P Lowers Rating on 26 Note Classes to 'D'
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on 15 Series 2004-5 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-PWR5 Notes
CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Various Certificates

DRYDEN XVIII: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $14 Million Notes to Caa1
DUKE FUNDING: Fitch Revises Rating Information on Class A-2
E-TRADE ABS: Moody's Junks $37.7 Million Class A-2 Notes
FMC REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes

GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: Fitch Junks Ratings on Four Classes
GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 14 Classes
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-GL II Certs.
HALCYON LOAN: Moody's Raises Rating on $15.5 Million Notes to Ca
HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-1 Notes
HELLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999 PH-1 Notes
JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-C8 Certs.
JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-LDP1 Securities
LB COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class F to 'CC/RR3'

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-C3 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 16 Classes of CMBS
G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Puts Default Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Junks Rating on $57 Million Class L
LNR CFL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Four Series of Notes
MKP CBO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Classes A-1 & A-2 Notes
MKP CBO: Moody's Junks Rating on $17 Million Class C Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-TOP13 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating son Seven 2007-XLF Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Ups Rating on $3MM Class A-13 Notes to B+
NEWCASTLE CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Three Classes
RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE: S&P Assigns Low-B Ratings on 2010-I Notes
RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 1999-1 Certificates

STARWOOD HOTELS: Moody's Keeps Rating on Times Square Certs.
STREETERVILLE ABS: Moody's Junks Rating on $850 Million Notes
STRUCTURED ASSET: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1996-CFL Certs.
TABERNA PREFERRED: S&P Lowers Rating on Eight Note Classes to 'D'

* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 68 Classes From 18 RMBS Transactions



                            *********

ACA ABS: S&P Lowers Rating on 26 Note Classes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
26 classes of notes from four cash flow and two hybrid U.S.
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions.  One of these
ratings was previously on CreditWatch negative.

ACA ABS 2006-2 Ltd., Blue Bell Funding Ltd., Clifton I CDO Ltd.,
and Sherwood III ABS CDO Ltd. are cash flow CDO transactions, and
Cherry Creek CDO II Ltd. and Stack 2006-1 Ltd. are hybrid CDO
transactions.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect the implementation of our
criteria for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an
event of default (EOD) and may be subject to acceleration or
liquidation."

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on the hybrid CDO transactions
because the transactions did not have proceeds to pay back par
payments to the noteholders after making the termination payments
on the credit default swap contracts.  For the four cash flow
transactions, we have received notices from the trustees stating
that after the liquidation of the portfolio assets, the available
proceeds were insufficient to pay the noteholders in full."


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on 15 Series 2004-5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of 15 classes and
downgraded three classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
5.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged loans, increased credit quality dispersion and
refinance risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  Four loans, representing 2% of the pool,
mature within the next six months and a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed DSCR remaining
within acceptable ranges.  The decline in loan concentration, as
measured by the Herfindahl (Index), has been mitigated by
increased credit support due to loan payoffs and amortization.
The pool's balance has declined by 28% since last review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.

As of the May10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to
$915.6 million from $1.36 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 88 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 45% of the pool.  Currently, there is one loan,
representing 15% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  The three additional loans that had underlying ratings at
last review have all paid off.  Five loans, representing 8% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 3% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC; formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan was liquidated from the pool resulting in an aggregate
loss of approximately $1.0 million (1% loss severity).  Five
loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Huntington
Apartment ($8.5 million -- 1% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 212-unit multi-family property
located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2009 for maturity default.  The remaining
four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of self
storage, retail and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $9.4 million loss for these specially serviced loans
(40% expected loss on average).  The special servicer has
recognized a cumulative $4.3 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on eight poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool.  Moody's estimates a
$15.2 million aggregate loss for these troubled loans (overall 38%
expected loss based on a weighted average 75% default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 92% and 72% of the pool, respectively, of
the non-defeased pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 88% compared to 95%
at last review.  Although the pool's overall leverage has
declined, credit quality dispersion has increased.  Based on
Moody's analysis, 22% of the conduit pool has an LTV in excess of
100% compared to 18% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.44X and 1.19X, respectively, compared to
1.38X and 1.06X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 33 compared to 56 at
last review.  The decline in Herf has been mitigated by increased
credit support.  The pool balance has declined by 28% since
Moody's last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Bank of America Center
Loan ($137.0 million -- 15% of the pool), which represents a 33%
participation interest in a $417.0 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by three office buildings totaling 1.8 million
square feet (SF) located in downtown San Francisco, California.
The largest tenants are Bank of America (21% of the net rentable
area; lease expiration in September 2015), Kirkland and Ellis (7%
of the NRA; lease expiration in September 2016) and Goldman Sachs
(6% of the NRA; lease expiration in August 2010).  The complex was
90% leased as of March 2010 compared to 97% at last review.
Property performance has declined since last review due to lower
occupancy declining rents and increased expenses.  In addition,
Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow because the
property's in-place rents are approximately 25% above market
rates.  The loan is full term interest-only and matures in
September 2011.  Vornado Realty is the sponsor.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.36X at last review.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 16% of the
pool.  The largest loan is the Cheltenham Square Mall Loan
($54.4 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a the
borrower's interest in a 639,406 SF anchored mall (423,440 SF of
collateral) located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The mall is
shadow anchored by Home Depot.  The collateral's largest tenants
are Target (32% of the NRA; lease expiration in January 2030);
Burlington Coat Factory (19% of the NRA; lease expiration in
February 2012) and Shop Rite (17% of the NRA: lease expiration in
March 2015).  As of March 2010, the property was 96% leased
compared to 85% at the end of 2009 and 98% at last review.  The
occupancy fluctuation was due to the departure of Seaman's and
Value City, which were recently replaced by DSW, American
Signature and Conway.  The loan's initial five year interest-only
period has expired and the loan is amortizing on a 25-year
schedule.  Thor Equities is the sponsor.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 113% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.84X
at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the ICG Portfolio
($48.7 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by two office
properties located in Washington DC.  The two buildings total
259,184 SF.  The property is also encumbered with a $3.0 million
B-note.  The largest tenants are Fannie Mae (34% of the NRA; lease
expiration in September 2013); Georgetown University (19% of the
NRA; lease expiration in October 2018) and Medstar (7% of the NRA;
lease expiration in October 2018).  As of March 2010, the
buildings were 80% leased compared to 71% at the end of 2009 and
95% at last review.  Leasing has fluctuated due to tenants
downsizing and upsizing.  Fannie Mae recently increased its share
of the NRA to 87,137 SF from 62,48 SF at securitization while
Medstar downsized to 19,078 SF from 66,873 SF at securitization.
The loan has benefitted from 3% of principal amortization since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 0.92X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Sun Communities Portfolio
Loan ($38.6 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five manufactured housing communities containing a
total of 1,646 pads.  As of December 2009, the portfolio was 71%
leased, essentially the same as at last review.  The loan has
benefitted from 6% principal amortization since last review.  Sun
Communities is the sponsor.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94%
and 1.0X , respectively, compared to 98% and 0.95X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $4,982,297, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-3, $305,377,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-4, $188,667,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-AB, $39,487,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-1A, $106,624,344, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-J, $90,241,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class B, $39,161,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned
     Aa2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class C, $13,621,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously assigned
     Aa3 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class D, $22,135,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned A2
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class E, $11,919,000, affirmed at A3; previously assigned A3
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class F, $17,026,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously assigned
     Baa1 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class G, $11,919,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned
     Baa2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class H, $22,134,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
     Baa3 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class J, $6,811,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1; previously
     assigned Ba1 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class K, $6,811,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class L, $3,405,000, downgrade to Caa2 from Ba3; previously
     assigned Ba3 on 11/29/2004


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-PWR5 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR5.
Rating actions are listed at the end of this release.

The affirmations are to due sufficient credit enhancement to
offset Fitch expected losses following Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses and expected losses associated with
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of approximately
1.0% of the remaining pool balance, approximately $10.4 million,
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

There are currently two loans in special servicing.  The largest
(4.7%) transferred due to a maturity default.  The loan has been
extended until September 2011 and will be transferred back to the
master servicer.  The other specially serviced loan (0.57%) is
secured by a 51,000 square foot retail center located in Garden
City, NY.  The loan transferred to the special servicer due to
imminent default in February 2009.  The center lost a second major
tenant in December 2008 which reduced the occupancy to 26%.  A
recent appraisal indicates losses.

As of the April distribution date, the pool has paid down 15.5% to
$1.04 billion from $1.23 billion at issuance and 10 loans (19%)
have defeased.

The top 10 non-defeased loans represent 32.6% of the pool.  The
loans have generally experienced stable performance since
issuance.  None of the loans have reported debt service coverage
ratios below 1.47 times.  The largest loan in the pool is 2941
Fairview Park Drive which is collateralized by a 353,000 sf office
building in Falls Church, VA.  The servicer reported occupancy and
debt service coverage ratio as of year end 2009, the most recent
available, were 100% and 1.47x, respectively.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted, property specific market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Twenty-nine loans did not pay off at
maturity with two loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings to these classes, as
indicated:

  -- $73.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $134 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $579.1 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.3 million class B at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class C at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20 million class D at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class E at 'A'/LS4; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.4 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class G at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.5 million class H at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.6 million class J at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.2 million class L at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class M at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class N at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.1 million class P at 'CCC/RR1'.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $11.6 million
class Q certificates.


CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded three classes of Notes issued
by CMBSpoke 2006-I Segregated Portfolio due to deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by a deterioration in the weighted
average rating factor since last review.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's review, is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

CMBspoke 2006-I is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial mortgage
backed securities debt (100% of the pool balance).  All of the
CMBS reference obligations were securitized between 2002 and 2006.
As of the April 23, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate par amount
of reference obligations is $3.32 billion, compared to
$3.33 billion at securitization; the aggregate issued Note balance
is $100 million, the same as that at securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 38 compared to 6 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa1 (86.6% compared to 100% at last review), and A1-A3
(10% compared to 0% at last review) and Baa1 -- Baa3 (3.4%
compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 3.7 years
compared to 7.2 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 63%, compared to 68% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 39.3% compared to 66.0% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to greater ratings dispersion than at the time of
last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B3; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 8, 2009.


CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Various Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of CVS Credit Lease
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series A-1 and Series A-2.  The
rating of the A-1 Certificate is affirmed at Baa2 based on the
current rating of CVS Caremark Corporation (senior unsecured debt
rating Baa2, stable outlook).  The rating of the A-2 Certificate
is affirmed at Ba1 based on CVS's rating as well as the balloon
risk at the certificate's final distribution date.

This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities.

As of the March 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance remained the same as at
securitization.  The Certificates are supported by 96 single-
tenant, stand-alone retail buildings leased to CVS.  Each building
is subject to a fully bondable triple net lease guaranteed by CVS.
Payments on the leases are sufficient to pay all interest on both
Certificates, 100% of the principal of the A-1 Certificates
(October 10, 2010 final distribution date) and 44% of the
principal of the Class A-2 Certificates (January 10, 2023 final
distribution date).  The remaining principal of the A-2
Certificate is insured under residual value insurance policies
issued by Financial Structures Limited and reinsured by Royal
Indemnity Company (Royal).  On September 28, 2006, Moody's
downgraded Royal's financial strength rating to B2 from Ba3 and
subsequently withdrew the rating.  The rating on the A-2
Certificates is notched down from CVS's rating due to the size of
the loan balance at maturity relative to the value of the
collateral assuming the existing tenant is no longer in occupancy
(the dark value).

CVS, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, is the largest
provider of prescriptions in the United States.  The company fills
or manages more than 1 billion prescriptions annually through
about 7,000 CVS pharmacy stores, its pharmacy benefits management
operation, its mail order and specialty pharmacy division,
Caremark Pharmacy Services, and its on-line pharmacy.

Moody's rating action is:

* Series A-1, $158,700,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously
  downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1 on 9/22/2006

* Series A-2, $125,000,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously downgraded
  to Ba1 from Baa2 on 12/2/2003

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


DRYDEN XVIII: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $14 Million Notes to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited:

   -- U.S. $14,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Caa1; previously on April 6,
      2010 C Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes.  These positive developments coincide with higher than
expected realized recoveries on defaulted securities, and
reinvestment of principal repayments and sale proceeds into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated April 14, 2010, the weighted
average rating factor is 2344 compared to 2628 in June 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 6% of the
underlying portfolio versus 12% in June 2009.  Additionally, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about $10MM
from approximately $30MM in June 2009.  Due to the impact of
revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Currently, all the overcollateralization tests are in compliance
whereas they were all failing in June 2009.  Specifically, as of
the April 2010 trustee report, the Class A and Class B
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 108.48% and 104.62%,
respectively, versus the June 2009 levels of 103.3% and 99.61%,
respectively.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class B
Notes are no longer being deferred as a result of the cure of the
Class A overcollateralization ratio test.  As a result of the
significant improvement in the Class A overcollateralization
level, Moody's notes that its concerns about a potential Event of
Default have receded.

Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited, issued in October 2007,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.


DUKE FUNDING: Fitch Revises Rating Information on Class A-2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings published an amended version of a press release
originally issued April 27, 2010, containing revised rating
information on Duke Funding High Grade III, Ltd./Inc. class A-2.
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions for classes of
notes issued by several diversified structured finance (DSF)
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that closed in 2005 with
exposure to structured finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. Due
to the extent of collateral deterioration within the portfolios,
Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all the classes
in the 13 transactions can be assessed without using the
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) or performing
cash flow model analysis under the framework described in the
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Of the 13 transactions, two have entered an Event of Default: one
due to failing collateralization coverage requirements and one due
to default in the payment of accrued interest to non-deferrable
classes.  One of those transactions have accelerated their
maturities.

Due to the writedowns in the underlying collateral portfolios, the
total collateral balances in the portfolios of C-BASS CBO XIV,
Ltd./Corp., and TORO ABS CDO I, LTD./LLC, are already lower than
the outstanding balances of their respective senior tranches,
indicating that default is inevitable for the entire capital
structure.  The highest rating on the classes in these
transactions is 'C'.

The remaining 11 transactions maintain positive credit enhancement
(CE) levels for at least their senior rated tranches, when the CE
levels are computed based off the sum of the total collateral
balance and cash in the principal collection accounts.  However,
losses expected from the distressed assets in these portfolios are
likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement levels even
for the most senior classes of notes in these transactions.

In two transactions, non deferrable classes of notes which have
missed their full interest payment were downgraded to 'D'.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

ABSpoke 2005-1, Ltd.
  -- $25,000,000 ABSpoke 2005-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-1, Ltd., is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
May 19, 2005. To date, write-down credit events total
$65.4 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $9.6 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS),
asset-backed securities (ABS), and CDOs, primarily from 2003 and
2004 vintage transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-IVA, Ltd.
  -- $95,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-IVA is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
April 21, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$71.5 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $113.5 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, CMBS, and CDOs, primarily from
2003 and 2004 vintage transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-VA, Ltd.
  -- $20,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-VA is a static synthetic CDO that closed on May 5,
2005.  To date, write-down credit events total $20.4 million,
eroding the first loss tranche to $33.1 million.  Fitch projects
additional losses to exceed the remaining balance of the first
loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS and CMBS primarily from 2003 and 2004 vintage
transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-XA, Ltd.
  -- $30,000,000 variable floating-rate notes to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-XA, Ltd., is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
Oct. 27, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$67.1 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $7.9 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the March 17, 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS primarily from 2004 and
2005 vintage transactions.

Blue Heron Funding VI, Ltd.
  -- $868,213,454 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $25,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- EUR89,936,000 (USD equivalent $105,000,000) class B notes
     affirmed at 'C';

  -- EUR89,936,000 (USD equivalent $105,000,000) class B
     additional interest notes affirmed at 'C' (interest only);

  -- $6,250,000 certificates affirmed at 'AAA' (principal only).

Blue Heron VI CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on Dec. 21,
2005, and is managed by Brightwater Capital Management.  The
rating assigned to the certificates is based on the rating of the
certificate protection asset, which is comprised of U.S.
government-backed Resolution Funding Corp. zero-coupon bonds.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2003 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.
  -- $229,256 class A-1V notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $325,314,157 class A-1NVA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $444,756,494 class A-1NVB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $81,650,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $41,304,634 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $25,191,681 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Broderick CDO 1 Ltd. is a static cash flow CDO that closed in
December 2005 with a portfolio selected by SCM Advisors LLC.  As
of the March 25, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised
of primarily RMBS and CDOs from 2004 to 2006 vintage transactions.

C-BASS CBO XIV, Ltd./Corp
  -- $278,179,706 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $29,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $30,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $17,060,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

C-Bass CBO XIV, Ltd. (C-Bass XIV) is a cash CDO that closed on
Sept. 22, 2005, and is managed by C-BASS Investment Management
LLC.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2003
through 2005 vintage transactions.

Duke Funding High Grade III, Ltd./Inc.
  -- $413,143,898 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $1,217,074,415 class A-1B1 notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $1,217,074,415 class A-1B2 (IO) notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $102,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $8,000,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';

  -- $8,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';

  -- $46,846,186 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $47,035,233 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $13,505,052 class D notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $19,151,849 subordinated notes affirmed at 'C'.

Duke Funding High Grade III, Ltd./Inc. (Duke III) is a cash flow
CDO that closed on Aug. 3, 2005, and is managed by Duke Funding
Management, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ellington Management
Group, LLC.  Duke III declared an Event of Default Dec. 12, 2008,
due to the class A notes being undercollateralized.  The required
majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity
of the transaction on Jan. 28, 2009. As of the March 30, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of primarily RMBS from
2004 to 2007 vintage transactions.

Duke Funding IX, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $143,750,000 class A1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC';
  -- $8,000,000 class A2F notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $292,000,000 class A2V notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $11,342,850 class A3F notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $176,140,960 class A3V notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $86,539,363 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.

Duke Funding IX, Ltd./Corp. (Duke IX) is a hybrid SF CDO that
closed on Nov. 9, 2005, and is managed by Duke Funding Management,
LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ellington Management Group, LLC.
Duke IX declared an Event of Default on Aug. 13, 2009, due to
default in the payment of accrued interest on the class A2 notes.
To date, the majority of the controlling class of noteholders has
not voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction.  As of
the March 9, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
primarily RMBS from 2004 to 2007 vintage transactions.

Fort Sheridan ABS CDO, Ltd./Inc.
  -- $679,128,755 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $34,589,996 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $44,966,995 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,182,633 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $1,970,858 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $4,644,350 class C-3 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fort Sheridan ABS CDO, Ltd./Inc. (Fort Sheridan) is a cash CDO
that closed on March 30, 2005, and is managed by Vanderbilt
Capital Advisors LLC.  As of the February 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily
from 2004 through 2007 vintage transactions.

Jupiter High Grade CDO III, Ltd./Inc.
  -- $1,121,746,956 class A-1 NV notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $215,762 class A-1VA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $345,219,298 class A-1VB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $74,339,803 class A-2A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $65,050,000 class A-2B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $83,632,278 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $43,605,507 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Jupiter High Grade CDO III, Ltd./Inc. (Jupiter III) is a cash CDO
that closed on Aug. 10, 2005, and is managed by Maxim Advisory
LLC.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2006
vintage transactions.

Orient Point CDO, Ltd/Inc.
  -- $625,474,503 class A-1NVA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $628,131,985 class A-1NVB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $241,589 class A-1V notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $99,250,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $47,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,953,821 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,650,284 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $16,138,685 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

Orient Point CDO, Ltd/Inc. (Orient Point) is a cash CDO that
closed on Oct. 25, 2005, and is managed by Fortis Investment
Management USA, Inc.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of RMBS and CDOs, primarily from 2004
through 2006 vintage transactions.

TORO ABS CDO I, LTD./LLC
  -- $804,747,407 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $73,433,128 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,881,893 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Toro ABS CDO I, Ltd./LLC. (Toro I) is a cash CDO that closed on
June 30, 2005.  The initial portfolio was selected by Merrill
Lynch Investment Managers (MLIM) and is currently managed by
BlackRock Inc.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2006
vintage transactions.


E-TRADE ABS: Moody's Junks $37.7 Million Class A-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes of notes issued E-Trade ABS CDO III, Ltd.  The notes
affected are as follows:

   -- U.S. $201,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2025 (Current Outstanding Balance of
      $18,359,316.44), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on July 17,
      2009 Downgraded to Ba1

   -- U.S. $37,750,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2040 (Current Outstanding Balance of
      $37,750,000.00), Downgraded to Ca; previously on July 17,
      2009 Downgraded to Caa2

E-Trade ABS CDO III, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage
Backed Securities (RMBS) with the majority originated in 2004.


FMC REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eight classes of Notes issued by
FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1 on review for possible downgrade due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by deterioration in the weighted average rating factor
and an increase in defaulted assets since last review.  The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1 is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
currently backed by a portfolio of first mortgage loans (40% of
the pool balance), B/C-notes (28%), and mezzanine loans (32%).

Eight assets with a par balance of $127.2 million (27.6% of the
pool balance, including cash principal) were listed as defaulted
as of the 4/21/2010 Trustee report, compared to 15.6% at last
review.

The current WARF, as reported by the Trustee on 4/21/2010, is
4,762 compared to 4,601 at last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  Moody's review will focus on potential losses from
defaulted collateral and these key indicators.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Class B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Confirmed at Aa2

  -- Class C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- Class D, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class E, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Class F, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Class G, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- Class H, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Caa1

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated 4/15/2009.


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 15 and upgrades nine classes of four Ford
Credit Auto Owner Trust transactions as part of its on going
surveillance process.

The affirmations and upgrades are a result of continued available
credit enhancement in excess of stressed remaining losses.  The
collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base case
expectations.  Currently, the securities can withstand stress
scenarios consistent with the current rating categories and still
make full payments of interest and principal in accordance with
the terms of the documents.

As before, the ratings reflect the quality of Ford Motor Credit
Co.'s retail auto loan originations, the sound financial and legal
structure of the transactions, and servicing provided by FMCC.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

2006-B

  -- Class A-4 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2007-B

  -- Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2008-B

  -- Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Positive.

2008-C

  -- Class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Positive.


GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: Fitch Junks Ratings on Four Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Gramercy Real Estate
CDO 2005-1, Ltd./LLC (Gramercy 2005-1) reflecting Fitch's base
case loss expectation of 26%. Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.

The transaction is collateralized by both senior and subordinate
commercial real estate (CRE) debt: 56.2% is either whole loans or
A-notes, 10% mezzanine debt, 4.1% B-notes, 2.4% CRE preferred
equity, 25.2% commercial mortgage backed securities, and 1.9% CRE
CDOs, as of the April 2010 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations. Fitch expects significant losses upon default for
the subordinate positions, since they are generally highly
leveraged debt classes. Further, seven assets (10.3%) are
currently considered defaulted while six loans (19.3%) are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern.  Fitch expects significant
losses on the defaulted assets and Loans of Concern.

Gramercy 2005-1 is a $985.5 million CRE collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) managed by GKK Manager LLC, an affiliate of
Gramercy Capital Corp.  The transaction has a five-year
reinvestment period that ends in July 2010.

The class C/D/E and F/G/H overcollateralization (OC) tests were
failing as of the April 2010 payment date; consequently, all
interest (after class E) and principal proceeds were redirected to
redeem the class A-1 notes.  Since they are failing by relatively
small margins, it is possible that at least one of the OC tests
may cure within the next few quarters.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 57.1% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 13.4% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally first quarter 2010).  Fitch estimates that
recoveries will average 54.4% in the base case.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
whole loan (5.6%) secured by three office buildings located in
Ontario, California.  Two of the buildings existed when the
property was acquired, and the third building was completed by the
sponsor in 2008.  The newly constructed building has had
negligible leasing activity since completion and remains nearly
vacant.  Further, the two older buildings lost a large tenant due
to bankruptcy in 2008.  Total occupancy is currently 38%, and is
expected to remain low as the Ontario office market has struggled
amid the economic downturn.  As such, Fitch modeled a term default
with a significant loss in its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (3.5%) secured by ownership interests in a
multifamily property located in New York City.  The property
contains over 11,000 residential units and approximately 120,000
square feet of office and retail space.  The sponsors' plan was to
convert the majority of rent controlled units to market rates;
however, the plan has faced significant economic and legal
hurdles.  The loan became delinquent in January 2010, and the
special servicer is attempting to gain control of the property via
judicial foreclosure.  Fitch modeled no recovery on this highly
leveraged mezzanine position.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (4%) secured by ownership interests in a newly
constructed 12-story office building located in the East End sub-
market of Washington, D.C. Leasing has been slower than expected,
and the property is currently 63% occupied, primarily by national
law firms on long-term leases.  Despite the stability afforded by
the existing tenancy, the mezzanine position is considered highly
leveraged and as such, Fitch modeled a term default with a partial
loss.

This transaction was analyzed according to 'Surveillance Criteria
for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs,' which applies stresses
to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The default levels were
then compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash
flow model of the CDO under the various default timing and
interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.'  Based on this analysis,
the credit characteristics of class A-1 are generally consistent
with the 'BBB' rating category, the credit characteristics of
classes A-2 and B are generally consistent with the 'BB' rating
category, and the credit characteristics of classes C through F
are generally consistent with the 'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes G through K are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class's credit enhancement.  Based on this analysis, classes
G and H are consistent with the 'CCC' rating category, meaning
default is a real possibility.  Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 26% exceeds these classes' respective current credit
enhancement levels.  The ratings for classes J and K are deemed to
be consistent with the 'CC' rating category, meaning default
appears probable given that these classes' credit enhancement
levels are below the total losses expected from the currently
defaulted assets and Loans of Concern in the pool.

Classes A through F were assigned a Negative Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation of further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.  These classes were also assigned Loss
Severity (LS) ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS5' indicating each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class's
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes G through K were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) to provide
a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed
or defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(57.1% and 54.4%, respectively), the 'B' stress USD LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class's tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.  The
assumptions for the 'B' stress USD LIBOR up-stress scenario are
found in Fitch's report, 'Criteria for Interest Rate Stresses in
Structured Finance Transactions' (Feb. 17, 2010), available on
Fitch's web site at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

Classes G through K are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class's principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
the following classes as indicated:

  -- $497,097,768 class A-1 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook Neg.;

  -- $57,000,000 class A-2 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $102,500,000 class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $47,000,000 class C to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $12,500,000 class D to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,000,000 class E to 'B/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,070,732 class F to 'B/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18,588,799 class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $28,159,171 class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $49,969,079 class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $35,597,088 class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC'.

Additionally, classes A-1 through H are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.


GRAMERCY REAL ESTATE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 14 Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes from Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd. and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on two other classes from the same
transaction.

"The rating actions follow our analysis of the transaction using
our updated U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO) criteria, which was the primary driver of our
rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect our estimated asset-
specific recovery rates for the two underlying loan assets
($65.0 million, 5.9% of the collateral pool) that were reported as
defaulted in the March 2010 trustee report.  Our analysis included
a review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying collateral assets, as well as the transaction's
liability structure."

According to the March 31, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes the following:

   * Forty-six commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
     tranches ($820.6 million, 74.5%);

   * Seven subordinate-interest loans ($195.9 million, 17.8%); and

   * Three whole loans and senior participation loans
     ($85.5 million, 7.8%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the non-defaulted loan assets.  "We based the analyses on our
adjusted net cash flows, which we derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral manager, GKK Manager
LLC, and the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as well as market and
valuation data from third-party providers."

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes two
defaulted loan assets ($65.0 million, 5.9%) and one defaulted CMBS
tranche ($5.0 million, 0.5%).  Standard & Poor's estimated that
there would be no recovery upon the eventual resolution of the two
loan assets.  "We based the recovery rates on the information from
the collateral manager, special servicer, and third-party data
providers.  The recovery rates for the CMBS collateral reflect the
methodology we outlined in "Recovery Rates For CMBS Collateral In
Resecuritization Transactions," published May 28, 2008.  The
defaulted loan assets are: The Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper
Village subordinated loan ($44.4 million, 4.0%); and The Jewelry
Center subordinated loan ($20.6 million, 1.9%).  According to the
trustee report, the deal is failing all three
overcollateralization tests."

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with our current criteria.  "Our
analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings."

   RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

   Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
   Collateralized debt obligations
                     Rating
   Class     To                   From
   A-1       BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2       BB+                  AA-/Watch Neg
   A-3       B                    BBB/Watch Neg
   B-FL      CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
   B-FX      CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
   C-FL      CCC-                 B+/Watch Neg
   C-FX      CCC-                 B+/Watch Neg
   D         CCC-                 B+/Watch Neg
   E         CCC-                 B/Watch Neg
   F         CCC-                 B-/Watch Neg
   G-FL      CCC-                 CCC+/Watch Neg
   G-FX      CCC-                 CCC+/Watch Neg
   H-FL      CCC-                 CCC/Watch Neg
   H-FX      CCC-                 CCC/Watch Neg


   RATINGS AFFIRMED

   Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
   Collateralized debt obligations

   Class     Rating
   J         CCC-
   K         CCC-


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-GL II Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two pooled
classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-GL II.  The
affirmations reflect the positive impact of lower leverage due to
amortization on the single remaining loan in the pool, the
inherent value of the asset, strong sponsorship and the offsetting
negative impact of the deteriorating performance of the underlying
collateral.  The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $76 million
from $80 million since last review.  The 25-year fixed rate loan
with a rate of 7.80% has an anticipated repayment date of June 11,
2010 with a final maturity date of December 11, 2022.  The loan
sponsor, an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Host Hotels &
Resorts, Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating of Ba1; outlook
Negative), has notified the master servicer (Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC) that they do not anticipate paying off the loan at
the ARD date.  An additional deferred interest will accrue at
2.0%.

The Marriott Desert Springs Loan ($75.7 million -- 100% of pooled
balance) is secured by an 884-room full-service resort hotel
located in Palm Desert, CA.  The hotel features two 18-hole golf
courses, a 38,000 square foot spa, 49,000 square feet of meeting
space and other amenities typical of a resort hotel of this
caliber.  The property was built in 1987.  The property's
operating performance has deteriorated significantly in the last
two years.  Revenue per Available Room for calendar year 2008 was
$123.61 compared to full year 2009 results of $95.91.  Net House
Profit showed a similar dramatic decline during the same period
going from $10.4 million in 2008 down to $4.7 million in 2009.
Budget for 2010 year end results are projecting further slide in
both RevPAR and Net House Profit.  According to the master
servicer, the current reserve amount as of mid-April 2010 was
$21.7 million including a debt service reserve of $4.7 million.

The lodging sector experienced unprecedented levels of stress
during the last 18 month-period.  High-end properties, and
particularly, luxury and resort segments suffered the steepest
declines in RevPAR performance.  However, March 2010 was the first
month where US lodging segment as a whole achieved positive RevPAR
growth compared to the same period from the prior year since 4Q
2008.  Luxury and upper-tier segments are expected to show strong
rebound as demand and average daily rate for these segments have
fallen the most.  Although Moody's believe the lodging sector has
bottomed out and is on its way to recovery, Moody's anticipate
that it will take some time for the increase in RevPAR to
translate to growing bottom lines.  As such, Moody's stabilized
value for this property remains unchanged from last review at
$74.9 million.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio declined
slightly to 101% from 106% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio for the loan is at 0.40X compared to 1.08X
at last review.  Although the stressed DSCR as well as actual DSCR
are below 1.0X, Moody's believe that the combination of strong
sponsorship, inherent value of the asset and debt service reserve
warrants an affirmation at this time.  The pool has not
experienced any losses since securitization.

Moody's rating action is:

* Class F, $47,480,911, affirmed at Baa3; previously on March 5,
  2009 downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1

* Class G, $28,183,997, affirmed at B3; previously on March 5,
  2009 downgraded to B3 from B1


HALCYON LOAN: Moody's Raises Rating on $15.5 Million Notes to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Halcyon Loan Investors CLO II, Ltd:

   -- U.S.$270,500,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
      $262,051,683), Upgraded to Aa3; previously on March 17,
      2010, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

   -- U.S.$30,250,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2021, Upgraded to A3; previously on March 17, 2010
      Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

   -- U.S.$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 17, 2010 Ba2
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

   -- U.S.$18,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on
      March 17, 2010 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

   -- U.S.$21,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2021,Upgraded to B3; previously on March 17,
      2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

   -- U.S.$15,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2021,Upgraded to Ca; previously on June 17, 2009
      Downgraded to C.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the rated notes and improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the previous rating action in June
2009.  These positive developments coincide with realization of
higher than expected recoveries on defaulted securities, and
reinvestment of principal repayments and sale proceeds into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Moody's notes that the transaction's overcollateralization levels
have sharply rebounded from significantly depressed levels seen at
the time of the rating action in June 2009.  Currently, all the
overcollateralization tests are in compliance whereas they were
all failing in May 2009.  Specifically, as of the April 2010
trustee report, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
Overcollateralization Ratio Tests are reported at 120.8%, 114.1%,
107.1%, and 102.6% versus May 2009 levels of 110.7%, 104.6%,
98.3%, and 94.2%, respectively.  As a result, interest payments on
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are no
longer being deferred given the cure of the previously failing
overcollateralization ratio tests.  Moody's observes that the
calculation of the overcollateralization tests in May 2009 was
severely impacted by significant exposure to Caa-rated assets and
defaulted securities with depressed market valuations.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a decrease
in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.
In particular, as of the last trustee report dated April 14, 2010,
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 15.4% of the
underlying portfolio versus 18.5% in May 2009.  Additionally,
defaulted securities have been reduced to about $9 million, which
is significantly less than the $24 million in defaulted collateral
reported in May 2009.  Due to the impact of revised and updated
key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Halcyon Loan Investors CLO II, Ltd, issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by HARBOR Series 2006-2 LLC due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
increased ratings distribution since last review.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

HARBOR Series 2006-2 LLC is a static, synthetic CRE CDO currently
backed by portfolio of commercial mortgage back security reference
obligations (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2004 and 2006.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 88 compared to 63 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa (29.9% compared to 36.7% at last review), Aa1-Aa3 (36.4%
compared to 41.9% at last review), and A1-A3 (6.9% compared to
5.4% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 5.6 years
compared to 6.8 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 54.5% compared to a mean of 54.4% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 55.0% compared to 59.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by HARBOR Series 2006-1 LLC due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
increased ratings distribution since last review.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

HARBOR Series 2006-1 LLC is a static, synthetic CRE CDO currently
backed by portfolio of commercial mortgage back security reference
obligations (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2005 and 2006.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 57 compared to 20 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa (51.1% compared to 68.9% at last review), Aa1-Aa3 (27.6%
compared to 16.0% at last review), A1-A3 (15.1% compared to 15.1%
at last review), and Baa1-Baa3 (6.3% compared to 0.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 4.6 years
compared to 6.5 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 61.0% compared to a mean of 63.6% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 47.0% compared to 60.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


HELLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999 PH-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of two classes,
affirmed three classes and downgraded two classes of Heller
Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999 PH-1.  The upgrades are due to increased
credit subordination due to amortization and loan payoffs.  The
pool balance has decreased by 67% since Moody's last review.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans and concerns about loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  Twelve loans, representing 57% of the pool,
have or will mature within the next seven months or have passed
their respective anticipated repayment dates.  All of these loans
are either on the servicer's watchlist or are in special
servicing.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.  Although
loan concentration, which is measured by Herf, has declined
significantly since securitization, it is similar to last review.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 84%
to $160.4 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 85% of the pool.  The pool includes
one loan with an investment grade underlying rating, representing
6% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 8% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Eight loans, representing 35% of the current pool balance, are
currently on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist
includes loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC; formerly
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association) monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated since securitization, resulting in
a $16.9 million loss (47% overall loss severity).  Six loans,
representing 27% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Somerset Grove II Loan
($33.2 million -- 20.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
450,000 square foot office building located in Somerset, New
Jersey.  At securitization the property was 100% leased to AT&T
Corp. (AT&T).  AT&T vacated in 2008 but continued to pay rent
until its April 2009 lease expiration.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in January 2009 for imminent default and
matured in May 2009.  The loan is currently real estate owned
(REO).

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily and manufactured housing properties.  Moody's has
estimated a $26.5 million aggregate loss for the specially
serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four loans,
representing approximately 17% of the pool.  These loans mature
within the next 12 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X or have significant performance problems.  Moody's has
estimated a $7.9 million aggregate loss on these loans (29%
weighted average expected loss based on an overall 63% default
probability).

Moody's was provided with partial and year-end 2009 and full-year
2008 operating statements for 65% and 89%, respectively, of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool,
excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, is 87% compared
to 89% at Moody's prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.13X and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
1.14X and 1.43X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 8, essentially the same as last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Station Plaza Office
Complex Loan ($10.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 320,500 square foot office building located in Trenton, New
Jersey.  The property has been 100% leased since securitization,
with 87% of the space leased to several New Jersey State agencies
through October 2017.  The loan, which matures in August 2013,
fully amortizes over its 15-year term and has amortized by
approximately 19% since last review.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.84X, respectively, compared
to Aaa and 3.07X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 36% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Barefoot Landing Loan ($29.8 million -
- 18.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 244,000 square foot
entertainment/retail center located in Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina.  The property was 95% leased as of December 2009
compared to 100% at last review.  The property's financial
performance declined since last review due to lower rental
revenues and increased expenses.  The decline in performance has
been partially offset by principal amortization.  The loan has
amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
95% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.31X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Springfield -- Prescott &
IDOT Loan ($17.5 million -- 10.9%), which is secured by a 248,500
square foot office complex located in Springfield, Illinois.  The
complex was 100% leased as of April 2010, the same as last review.
The largest tenant is the Illinois Department of Public Aid (73%
of net rentable area; lease expiration 6/2014).  The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist because it passed its January 2009
ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.27X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Springfield -- Bressmer-
Mendenhall Loan ($10.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 157,620 square foot office complex located in
Springfield, Illinois.  The complex currently 100% vacant after
formerly being 100% leased to two state agencies.  Due to the
vacancy and the soft Springfield office market, Moody's is
projecting a high probability of default on the loan.  The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 200% and 0.59X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.26X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 5/27/1999

  -- Class D, $3,104,816, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 8/2/2006

  -- Class E, $12,622,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 10/10/2006

  -- Class F, $37,865,000, upgraded to Aa1 from Aa3; previously
     upgraded to Aa3 from A1 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class G, $17,670,000, upgraded to Aa3 from A2; previously
     upgraded to A2 from A3 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class L, $15,146,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from B3 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class M, $7,573,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on 5/21/2009


JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-C8 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded two classes and affirmed five classes of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C8.  The upgrades are due to the
increased credit support due to loan payoffs and principal
amortization.  The deal has amortized by approximately 53% since
Moody's prior review in March 2009.  The downgrades are due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged
loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio remaining within acceptable ranges.  The decline in
loan concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl Index, has been
mitigated by increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.

As of the April 15, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 86% to $102.1 million
from $731.5 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 71% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 11% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
One loan, the Vartan Building Loan ($14.3 million -- 14.0% of the
pool) was included in the most recent remittance statement but it
paid off on May 4, 2010 and is no longer in the pool.

Seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC; formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $41.1 million loss (41% loss severity on average).  Six
loans, representing 40% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Woodfield
Gardens Apartments Loan ($21.0 million -- 20.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 692-unit apartment complex located in
Rolling Meadows, a suburb of Chicago, Illinois.  The loan has been
in special servicing since May 2007.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of office, multifamily, and self storage properties.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $19.2 million loss for these specially
serviced loans (overall 47% expected loss).  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $10.5 million appraisal reduction for
three of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two loans
representing 7% of the pool.  These loans are both on the
servicer's watchlist and either mature within the next month or
have experienced a significant decline in performance.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $2.5 million loss for these loans
(overall 38% expected loss based on a weighted average 76% default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 88% and 74%, respectively, of the performing
pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
conduit weighted average LTV is 66% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.15X and 1.75X, respectively, compared to
1.08X and 1.32X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 8 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.  The
decline in Herf has been mitigated by increased credit support.

The top three non-defeased performing loans represent 15.0% of the
pool balance.  The largest performing loan is the Post
Distribution Building Loan ($6.5 million -- 6.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 264,000 square foot industrial building
located in suburban Tacoma, Washington.  The property is 100%
leased toPacific Distribution through February 2013.  Although
performance has been stable, Moody's analysis reflects a stressed
cash flow based on a dark/lit analysis.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.64X at
last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Quail Park III Loan
($5.3 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,296
square foot office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The
center was 82% leased as of March 2010 compared to 93% at year-end
2009.  Moody's analysis is based on a stressed cash flow due to
Moody's concern about potential income volatility due to upcoming
lease rollovers and a soft office market.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.41X, respectively, compared 65% and
1.71X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Ridge Terrace Health Care
Center Loan ($3.5 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 120-bed nursing home located in Lantana, Florida.  The
property has experience negative cash flow since 2007.  Moody's
has assumed a high probability of default due to the property's
poor performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 200% and
0.73X, respectively, compared 65% and 1.71X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 8/17/1999
     assigned Aaa

  -- Class C, $9,697,909, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 7/6/2006
     upgraded to Aaa from A1

  -- Class D, $14,630,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     10/17/2007 upgraded to Aaa from Aa2

  -- Class E, $25,603,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa2; previously on
     3/19/2009 upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3

  -- Class F, $10,972,000, affirmed at A3; previously on 9/25/2008
     upgraded to A3 from Baa1

  -- Class G, $16,459,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3, previously
     on 3/11/2004 downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2

  -- Class H, $20,116,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     on 3/19/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from B3

  -- Class J, $4,671,672, affirmed at C; previously on 6/15/2005
     downgraded to C from Ca


JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-LDP1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-LDP1 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from the
same transaction and removed five of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.51x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 92.2% for the trust collateral.  S&P further stressed the
loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.05x and an LTV ratio of 117.8%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 61.0% and
27.6%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude five ($43.9 million, 2.1%) of the 15 specially
serviced assets and 13 defeased loans ($138.9 million, 6.5%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for the five specially serviced assets
and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
classes reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1
and X-2 interest-only (IO) certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 2010 remittance report, 15 loans ($140.0 million,
6.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc.  A breakdown of the specially serviced loans by
payment status is: five ($34.6 million, 1.6%) are matured
balloons, five ($39.9 million, 1.9%) are 90-plus-days delinquent,
one ($2.6 million, 0.1%) is 60 days delinquent, and four
($63.3 million, 3.0%) are current.  Four of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$10.9 million.  S&P estimated losses for five ($43.9 million,
2.1%) of the 15 specially serviced loans, and the weighted average
loss severity for these five loans was 29.5%.

The 50 West 57th Street loan ($23.1 million, 1.1%) is the largest
loan with the special servicer and is secured by a 78,600-sq.-ft.
office building in New York.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Sept. 18, 2009, after the borrower notified
the master servicer, also Midland, that it would not be able to
pay off the loan on its Oct. 1, 2009, maturity date due to an
inability to refinance.  Subsequently, the loan maturity was
extended to Feb. 1, 2013, and the loan was returned to the master
servicer on April 26, 2010.  For the 12-month period ended Dec.
31, 2008, the reported DSC was 1.57x and occupancy was 70.0%.

The remaining 14 specially serviced loans ($116.9 million, 5.5%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.9% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for five of these loans
($43.9 million, 2.1%).  Midland is reviewing resolution strategies
for the remaining nine loans ($73.0 million, 3.4%), including
possible loan modifications.

Three loans totaling $211.1 (9.9%) were previously with the
special servicer and have since been returned to the master
servicer.  Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is 0.75% of all future
principal and interest payments for loans equal to or greater than
$20.0 million or 1.0% for loans less than $20.0 million if the
loans perform and remain with the master servicer.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the April 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 202 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.14 billion, down from 233 loans and $2.88 billion at issuance.
Midland provided financial information for 99.2% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool, and 98% of the information was
either full-year 2008, interim-2009, or full-year 2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.54x for the loans in the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.51x and 92.2%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted figures
exclude five specially serviced loans for which S&P estimated
losses separately.  The weighted average reported DSC for these
five loans was 0.92x.  Thirty-six loans ($503.2 million, 23.5%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Seven loans
($46.9 million, 2.2%) have reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.10x,
and 23 loans ($142.1 million, 6.6%) have reported DSC less than
1.0x.

                      Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $899.5 million (42.0%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.67x for these
loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.55x and 90.1%,
respectively, for the top 10 real estate exposures.  Three of the
top 10 real estate exposures appear on the master servicer's
watchlist, and details of these loans are:

The Woodbridge Center loan ($203.5 million, 9.5%) is the largest
real estate exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by
1.1 million sq. ft. of a 1.6 million-sq.-ft. retail mall in
Woodbridge, N.J., owned by General Growth Properties Inc.  The
loan was recently returned to the master servicer from the special
servicer, where it was transferred in April 2009 following GGP's
bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  On Dec. 15, 2009, the
bankruptcy court confirmed a modification plan for 85 GGP loans,
including this loan.  The loan was recently modified with a new
maturity date of June 1, 2014.  As of the 12 months ended Dec. 31,
2008, the reported DSC was 2.15x and occupancy was 98.8%, compared
with 1.99x and 96.0%, respectively, at issuance.

The Water's Edge loan ($76.7 million, 3.6%) is the fifth-largest
real estate exposure in the pool and is secured by 243,433 sq. ft.
of office space built in 2002 in Playa Vista, Calif.  The property
is 100% leased to Electronic Arts through 2013.  The loan appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to an anticipated repayment
date of Feb. 11, 2010.  The loan is current, and Midland has
indicated that the borrower has not requested a payoff.  Effective
March 11, 2010, the new interest rate is 7.785%, and the payments
switched to amortizing from interest only.  As of the 12 months
ended Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.64x, compared with
1.43x at issuance.

The 400 6th Street S.W. loan ($37.5 million, 1.8%) is the eighth-
largest real estate exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by
a 128,723-sq.-ft. office building in Washington, D.C.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to a loan covenant
violation.  The property is 100% leased to the Child and Family
Services Agency until Jan. 31, 2012.  As of year-end 2009, the
reported DSC was 1.97x, compared with a DSC of 1.83x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP1

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-J       AA-     AAA/Watch Neg                    16.74
     A-JFL     AA-     AAA/Watch Neg                    16.74
     B         A       AA/Watch Neg                     13.54
     C         A-      AA-/Watch Neg                    12.37
     D         BBB+    A/Watch Neg                       9.84
     E         BBB     A-/Watch Neg                      8.50
     F         BB+     BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.31
     G         BB      BBB-/Watch Neg                    4.97
     H         B+      BB/Watch Neg                      3.45
     J         B       B+/Watch Neg                      2.95

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP1

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     K         B-      B-/Watch Neg                      2.28
     L         CCC+    CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.77
     M         CCC     CCC/Watch Neg                     1.44
     N         CCC-    CCC-/Watch Neg                    1.10
     P         CCC-    CCC-/Watch Neg                    0.59

                         Ratings Affirmed

      J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP1

      Class     Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     ------                  ----------------------
      A-2       AAA                                      25.82
      A-3       AAA                                      25.82
      A-4       AAA                                      25.82
      A-SB      AAA                                      25.82
      A-1A      AAA                                      25.82
      X-1       AAA                                        N/A
      X-2       AAA                                        N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


LB COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class F to 'CC/RR3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to
these classes of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust II's
commercial pass-through certificates, series 1996-C2:

  -- $11.6 million class F to 'CC/RR3' from 'B';
  -- Interest-only class IO to 'CC' from 'AAA'.

In addition, Fitch affirms this class:

  -- $0.2 million class G at 'D/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class J, which has been reduced to zero due to
losses.  Classes A, B, C, D and E have been paid in full.

The downgrades of class IO and F to 'CC' reflect the high
probability of default.  Fitch expects losses of 2.9% of the
remaining pool balance, approximately $0.3 million, from the loans
that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance test.

To date, the transaction has incurred $29.5 million in losses,
7.4% of the original balance.  As of the April 2010 distribution
date, the pool has paid down 97% to $11.8 million from
$397.2 million at issuance.  Ten of the original 109 loans remain
outstanding, none of which have defeased or are in special
servicing.  Fitch identified five Loans of Concern (33.8%) within
the pool.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating income and
applying an adjusted property specific market cap rate between
7.25% and 10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Two loans did not
pay off at maturity and only one loan incurred a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-C3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded six classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3.  The downgrades are due to
higher losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted
loans and refinance risk associated with loans approaching
maturity.  Twenty nine loans, representing 93% of the pool, have
either passed their anticipated repayment dates or have matured.
Twenty of the loans, representing 52% of the pool, have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.00X.

The affirmations and confirmation are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's DSCR
remaining within acceptable ranges.  The decline in loan
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl (Index), has been
mitigated by increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.  The pool's balance has declined by 74% since last
review.

Moody's placed seven classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 8, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 82% to
$235.4 million from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 36 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 65% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 34% of the pool.

The pool includes a credit tenant lease component, which
represents 3% of the pool.  There are no loans with underlying
ratings.  At last review, three loans, representing 29% of the
pool, had investment grade underlying ratings.  However, two of
the loans have defeased or paid off and the third loan, Sangertown
Square, has experienced a decline in performance and is currently
in special servicing due to a balloon default.

Seven loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$5.4 million loss (18% loss severity on average).  There are 21
loans, representing 72% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Sangertown
Square Loan ($55.1 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 855,000 square foot regional mall located in New Hartford
(Oneida County), New York.  The mall is anchored by Sears, JC
Penney and Macy's.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in December 2009 due to imminent default and has passed its
December 2009 ARD.  The borrower is seeking a loan modification
and extension.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.37X,
respectively, compared to 62% and 1.61X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Southern Company
Center Loan ($33.9 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 336,000 square office building located in downtown Atlanta,
Georgia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2006 when the building lost its largest tenant, Southern
Company Service.  The property was 60% leased as of August 2009.

The remaining 19 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, industrial, retail, and multifamily properties.  Moody's
estimates a $59.2 million aggregate loss for all the specially
serviced loans (50% loss severity on average).  The special
servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.9 million appraisal
reduction for two of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on two loans
representing approximately 4% of the pool.  These loans are either
on the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature within
the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than
1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.2 million loss from
these loans (overall 38% expected loss based on a weighted average
75% default probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of losses
from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.0 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 93% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 78%, essentially
the same as at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.37X, respectively, essentially
the same as at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8, compared to 31 at last review.  The decline
in Herf has been mitigated by increased credit support.

The three largest conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Pepper Square Shopping Center Loan
($16.3 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 192,000
square foot retail shopping center located in Dallas, Texas.  The
center is anchored by Stein Mart and was 90% leased as of
September 2009.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist
because it passed it February 2010 ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.2X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Central Forest Shopping Center Loan
($8.7 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000
square foot retail center located in Dallas, Texas.  The property
is anchored by Office Depot and was 82% leased as of September
2009.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because it
passed its February 2010 ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.37X at last
review.

The third largest loan is Mooresville Festival Shopping Center
Loan ($6.4 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by an
160,000 square foot retail center located in Mooresville, North
Carolina.  The property is anchored by Kohl's Department store and
was 99% leased as of December 2009.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because it passed its January 2010 ARD.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.41X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.37% at last review.

The CTL component includes three loans secured by 3 properties
leased under bondable leases.  The CTL exposures are Walgreen Co.
($4.3 million -- 2.0% of the pool; Moody's senior unsecured rating
A2, stable outlook) and CVS/Caremark Corp. ($2.2 million -- 0.9%;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2, stable outlook).

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 5/18/2000

  -- Class B, $48,024,715, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 7/11/2005

  -- Class C, $48,964,000, affirmed at Aaa; upgraded to Aaa from
     Aa1on 11/7/2006

  -- Class D, $19,585,000, affirmed at Aaa; upgraded to Aaa from
     Aa3 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class E, $13,057,000, affirmed at Aa2; upgraded to Aa2 from
     A2 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class F, $13,057,000, affirmed at A1; upgraded to A1 from
     Baa1 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class G, $11,751,000, confirmed at A2; previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class H, $20,891,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class J, $16,322,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class K, $9,792,000 downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class L, $10,466,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class M, $11,751,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class N, $3,917,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 16 Classes of CMBS
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1 and removed six of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"Our analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, we calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC)
of 1.64x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 72.8%.  We further
stressed the loans' cash flows under our 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.35x and an LTV ratio of 93.0%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
24.6% and 22.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations we
noted above exclude three specially serviced assets ($8.9 million;
1.0%) and 17 defeased loans ($279.2 million; 29.9%).  We
separately estimated losses for the three specially serviced
assets, which we included in our 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures."

"The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  We affirmed our rating on the class XCL
interest-only (IO) certificates based on our current criteria."

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 16, 2010, remittance report, five assets
($37.4 million; 4.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  Following the
remittance date, an additional asset was transferred to the
special servicer ($1.5 million; 0.2%).  The payment status
of the six assets currently with the special servicer
($38.8 million; 4.2%) is as follows: one is real estate owned
(REO) ($2.5 million; 0.3%), one is in foreclosure ($5.6 million;
0.6%), one is 90-plus-days delinquent ($0.8 million; 0.1%), and
three are matured loans with balloon balances outstanding
($29.9 million; 3.2%).  Two of the specially serviced assets
have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$2.9 million.

The Riverpointe Apartments loan ($15.3 million, 1.6%), the eighth-
largest asset in the pool secured by real estate, is secured by a
228-unit multifamily property built in 1996 in Richland, Wash.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on March 9, 2010,
as the loan matured on Feb. 11, 2010, and was not repaid.  For
year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 94.3% and
1.54x, respectively.  The special servicer reports that the
borrower may be granted a six-month forbearance, and in the
meantime, the borrower will work on obtaining refinancing.

The Crosspointe Apartments loan ($13.1 million; 1.4%) is by
secured a 200-unit multifamily property built in 1996 in
Kennewick, Wash.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on March 9, 2010, as this loan matured on Feb. 11, 2010, and was
not repaid.  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC
were 90.5% and 1.35x, respectively.  The special servicer reports
that the borrower may be granted a six month forbearance, and in
the meantime, the borrower will work on obtaining refinancing.

The four ($8.9 million, 1.0%) remaining specially serviced assets
have balances that individually represent 0.6% or less of the
total pool balance.   We separately estimated losses for three of
these four assets and arrived at a weighted average loss severity
of 37.0%.  CWCapital has indicated that the borrower is working on
obtaining refinancing for the remaining specially serviced asset.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 16, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $934.3 million (93 assets), down
from $1.4 billion (114 loans) at issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A.,
the master servicer, provided financial information for 98.2% of
the pool balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial
information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or full-year
2009 data with the exception of one loan ($763,726).  We
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.67x for the loans in the
pool based on the reported figures.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.64x and 72.8%, respectively, and exclude three specially
serviced assets ($8.9 million; 1.0%) and 17 defeased loans
($279.2 million; 29.9%).  We separately estimated losses for the
three specially serviced assets.  The trust has experienced
$6.7 million of principal losses to date. Twenty-one loans are on
the master servicer's watchlist ($287.7 million; 30.7%).  Three
loans ($9.9 million, 1.1%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and
1.1x, and six loans ($17.4 million, 1.9%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

SUMMARY OF TOP 10 LOANS

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $397.3 million (42.5%).  Using servicer-
reported information, we calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.82x.  Our adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were
1.77x and 67.2%, respectively.  Three of the top 10 loans secured
by real estate are on the master servicer's watchlist.

The Stonebriar Centre loan ($163.4 million; 17.5%) is the largest
loan in the pool and is secured by approximately 700,000 sq. ft.
of a 1.6 million-sq.-ft. fully enclosed regional mall constructed
in 2000 in Frisco, Texas.  The loan was placed on the master
servicer's watchlist following General Growth Properties' (GGP's)
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  However, the
loan's special purpose borrower, a GGP related entity, was not
included in GGP's filing.  For year-end 2009, the reported
occupancy and DSC were 99.9% and 2.21x, respectively.

The Cedar Hill I & III and 10320 Little Patuxent Parkway loan, the
fourth-largest asset in the pool secured by real estate, consists
of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted notes.  The Cedar
Hill I & III note is secured by two adjacent three-story office
properties that total 91,109 sq. ft. and were built in 1989 in
Vienna, Va.  This exposure was placed on the master servicer's
watchlist due to the maturities of two General Services
Administration (GSA) leases, which account for 99% of the
aggregate square footage.  The master servicer reports that
extensions for these two leases are finalized but need to be
executed and expects that the maturity on one lease (51,185 sq.
ft.) will be extended to September 2019 and the maturity on the
other lease (38,600 sq. ft.) will be extended to March 2020.  For
year-end 2009, the occupancy and DSC were 100% and 1.58x,
respectively.  The 10320 Little Patuxent Parkway note is secured
by a 138,696-sq.-ft. multi-tenanted office building constructed in
1982 in Columbia, Md.  This exposure was placed on the watchlist
due to a low DSC.  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and
DSC were 69% and 0.87x, respectively.

The Festival at Old Bridge ($19.8 million; 2.1%) loan is the
sixth-largest asset in the pool secured by real estate. The
collateral comprises a 235,142-sq.-ft. retail center built in 1990
in Woodridge, Va.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to deferred maintenance.  For the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 93% and 1.94x,
respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to our
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with our affirmed ratings.

   RATINGS AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

   LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
               Rating
   Class     To      From        Credit enhancement (%)
   H         A       A/Watch Neg                   8.83
   J         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                7.54
   K         BBB     BBB/Watch Neg                 6.44
   L         BB+     BB+/Watch Neg                 4.42
   M         BB      BB/Watch Neg                  3.69
   N         BB-     BB-/Watch Neg                 2.95

   RATINGS AFFIRMED

   LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

   Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
   A-3       AAA                       24.42
   A-4       AAA                       24.42
   A-1B      AAA                       24.42
   B         AAA                       21.67
   C         AAA                       18.92
   D         AAA                       16.72
   E         AA+                       14.70
   F         AA                        12.86
   G         A+                        10.84
   XCL       AAA                         N/A

   N/A-Not applicable.


G-FORCE 2005-RR: S&P Puts Default Ratings on 3 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-
through certificates from G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC, a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction.  "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on five
classes from the transaction."

"The downgrades primarily reflect our analysis of the transaction
following interest shortfalls to the transaction.  We lowered our
ratings on classes L, M, and N to 'D' from 'CCC-' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls.  We expect these classes to
continue experiencing liquidity interruptions for the foreseeable
future.  Our analysis also reflects the transaction's exposure to
CMBS collateral that Standard & Poor's has downgraded."

The liquidity interruptions to G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC resulted from
interest shortfalls to the underlying CMBS collateral.  The
interest shortfalls were primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (ASERs), servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees.

According to the April 22, 2010, trustee report, G-FORCE 2005-RR
LLC is collateralized by 39 CMBS classes ($434.9 million, 100%)
from 14 distinct transactions issued between 1998 and 2000. G-
FORCE 2005-RR LLC has exposure to Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc.'s series 2000-WF1 (class K; $7.1 million, 1.6%), a
CMBS certificate that Standard & Poor's has downgraded.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with our current criteria.  Our
analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

   RATINGS LOWERED

   G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
   Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                          Rating
   Class            To               From
   E                BB               BB+
   F                BB-              BB
   G                B                BB-
   H                CCC+             B-
   J                CCC              CCC+
   K                CCC-             CCC
   L                D                CCC-
   M                D                CCC-
   N                D                CCC-

   RATINGS AFFIRMED

   G-FORCE 2005-RR LLC
   Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

   Class            Rating
   A-1              A
   A-2              A
   B                BBB
   C                BB+
   D                BB+


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Junks Rating on $57 Million Class L
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings-New York-13 May 2010: Fitch Ratings has downgraded
four classes from Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-LLF C5, reflecting Fitch's base case
loss expectation of 6.1%. Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.

As with the analysis of recent vintage fixed-rate U.S. commercial
mortgage backed security (CMBS) transactions, loans were assumed
to default during the term if the stressed cash flow would cause
the loan to fall below 0.95 times (x) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) or at maturity if the loan could not meet a refinance test
of 1.25x DSCR based on a refinance rate of 8%-9% with a 30-year
amortization schedule. However, the rating category stresses were
created by using higher property level cash flow stresses adhering
to the 'U.S. CREL CDO Surveillance Criteria', as floating-rate
CMBS loan pools are highly concentrated and similar in composition
to CREL CDO pools. In many cases, the CMBS notes are senior
portions of notes held in CDO transactions. The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the senior position of the CMBS note or property specific
performance warranted an alternative analysis.

The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect additional sensitivity
analysis related to further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral including additional cash flow declines and
full recognition of maturity defaults at all rating categories.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 44.8% of the pool
is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 10.4%. To determine a sustainable Fitch cash flow and
stressed value, Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating
statements and rent rolls, updated property valuations, and recent
sales comparisons. Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
relatively stable, with an approximate base case recovery of
86.5%.

The transaction is collateralized by nine loans, four of which are
secured by hotels (80.8%), three by multifamily (10.3%), and the
remaining two by office buildings (9%). All of the final extension
options on the loans are within the next five years and are as
follows: 18.5% in 2010, 29.1% in 2011, 5.3% in 2012, and 47.1% in
2013.

Fitch identified two Loans of Concern (13.5%) within the pool, one
of which is specially serviced, Sheraton Keauhou Bay (8.3%).
Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations for five loans in
the 'B' stress scenario. The largest contributors to losses (by
unpaid principal balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are as
follows: Sheraton Keauhou Bay (8.3%), Walt Disney Swan & Dolphin
(47.2%), and Continental Grand II (5.1%).

The Sheraton Keauhou Bay Resort & Spa is secured by a 521-room
full-service hotel located on Hawaii's Big Island's west coast,
with the Pacific Ocean surrounding the site on three sides.
Beginning in 2001, the property underwent a $70 million
($134,357/key) renovation, and was formally re-branded to a
Sheraton in April, 2005. At issuance, the loan was underwritten
with the expectation that the renovations and repositioning would
result in stronger market penetration and higher cash flow. The
property failed to stabilize, however, due in large part to the
difficulty the economy has experienced and its negative impact on
travel demand. The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 for monetary default. In early 2009, foreclosure
proceedings were initiated, and a foreclosure sale was completed
in July 2009. The property is currently being marketed for sale
and at this time, it is anticipated that a sale will close by the
end of the second quarter of 2010.

Walt Disney Swan and Dolphin consists of a two-hotel portfolio
totaling 2,267 rooms, located in the heart of the Walt Disney
World Resort complex, specifically within the EPCOT Resort Area.
At issuance, $36 million ($16,850/key) was reserved for capital
improvements. The improvements included renovations to the lobby,
guestrooms, food and beverage outlets, meeting space, and other
common areas. All of the reserves have been spent, and planned
renovations are complete. Performance has declined since issuance,
largely due to the impacts of the weak economy on the hospitality
sector. As of August 2009, occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR were 70.9%,
$174.26, and $123.50, respectively, compared with 80.2%, $171.82,
and $137.72 at issuance, and the underwritten figures of 80%,
$190, and $152, respectively. However, the subject's penetration
rates for occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR remain positive at 113%,
108%, and 122%, respectively. As the loan does not pass Fitch's
refinance test, a maturity default was modeled in Fitch's base
case.

Continental Grand II is secured by a 238,388 square foot office
building located in the Superblock area of El Segundo, CA, within
the greater South Bay area of Los Angeles. Major tenants at the
property include Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc. (42.8% of the
NRA), Regus Business Center, Corp. (17.1%), and Learning Tree
International, Inc. (14.4%). Boeing Satellite Systems indicated to
the servicer they will be vacating their space at the June 30,
2010 lease expiration. Fitch classified this loan as a Loan of
Concern, and a term default was modeled in Fitch's base case.

Fitch has removed the following classes from Rating Watch Negative
and downgraded the ratings and assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity Ratings, and Recovery Ratings, as indicated:

  -- $40.9 million class H to 'BBB/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.7 million class J to 'BBB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $32.8 million class K to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $57 million class L to 'C/RR3' from 'B'.

In addition, Fitch has removed the following classes from Rating
Watch Negative and affirmed the ratings and assigned Rating
Outlooks, and Loss Severity Ratings as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X-FLP at 'AAA': Outlook Stable;
  -- $281.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $58.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53.6 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34.1 million class D at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.4 million class E at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.4 million class F at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45 million class G at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following class and revises the
Rating Outlook as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

Classes A-1 and X-1 have paid in full.


LNR CFL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity Ratings to these LNR CFL 2004-1 LTD., Series 2004-CFL,
CMBS resecuritization notes:

  -- $3.7 million class I-8 to 'AAA/LS1' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $7.8 million class I-9 to 'A/LS1' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.7 million class I-10 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class I-11 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class I-12 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $242,972 class I-13 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Outlooks and LS
Ratings these classes:

  -- $878,412 class I-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.2 million class I-6 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.2 million class I-7 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Classes I-1 through I-4 have paid in full.

LNR CFL 2004-1 is collateralized by a portion of class I in SASCO
1996-CFL, which has been upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB+'.

The upgrades are the result of the low leverage of the remaining
collateral, and the lack of expected losses.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
series GE, GG, GU, FE, and FU tranches from Magnolia Finance II
PLC's series 2006-6GE, 2006-6GG, 2006-6GU, 2006-6FE, and 2006-6FU,
respectively, to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrades follow write-downs in the underlying reference
portfolio, which have caused the tranches from Magnolia Finance II
PLC's series 2006-6GE, 2006-6GG, 2006-6GU, 2006-6FE, and 2006-6FU
to incur principal losses.


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Four Series of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on four
series of notes from Magnolia Finance II PLC, a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The rating withdrawals follow the redemption and cancellation of
the notes.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CE

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          CE                    NR                 D

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CG

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          CG                    NR                 D

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CU

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          CU                    NR                 D

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5D2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          D2                    NR                 D


MKP CBO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Classes A-1 & A-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes of notes issued by MKP CBO IV Inc.  The notes affected are
as follows:

   -- U.S. $ 280,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes, Due 2040 (current balance of
      $102,106,957), Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 4,
      2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

   -- U.S $ 47,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes, Due 2040, Downgraded to C; previously
      on February 4, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

MKP CBO IV Inc., issued on March 9, 2005, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed
securities.  RMBS comprise approximately 74% of the underlying
portfolio, of which the majority were originated in 2004.


MKP CBO: Moody's Junks Rating on $17 Million Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes of notes issued by MKP CBO III Ltd.  The notes affected
are as follows:

   -- U.S. $45,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Notes (current balance of $45,455,207), Due
      2039, Downgraded to Ca; previously on July 31, 2009
      Downgraded to B1;

   -- U.S $17,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
      Notes, Due 2039, Downgraded to C; previously on March 18,
      2009 Downgraded to Ca.

MKP CBO III Ltd., issued on March 7, 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed
securities.  RMBS comprise approximately 72% of the underlying
portfolio, of which the majority were originated in 2003 and 2004.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-TOP13 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 18 classes, and assigns Rating Outlooks and
Loss Severity ratings to Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-TOP13, as
indicated:

  -- $74.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $127 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $589.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.2 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.1 million class E at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class F at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.6 million class G at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class H at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class J at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3 million class K at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class L at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class M at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.5 million class N at 'B/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $937.8 million interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $668.1 million interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate class P.

The affirmations are due to continued expected stable performance
of the pool following Fitch's prospective analysis of the
transaction.  To date, the pool has incurred no losses.  Fitch
expects losses of approximately 1% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $6.5 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 22.6% to $937.8 million from $1.027 billion
at issuance.  Fifteen of the remaining loans have defeased
(16.6%), and as of April 2010, there are three specially serviced
loans (0.9%).

The largest specially serviced loan (0.6%) is secured by a 44,504
sf retail property located in Sunrise, FL.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in March 2010 due to monetary default.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.2%) is secured by an
80 unit multifamily property located in Pensacola, FL.  The third
loan in special servicing (0.1%) is cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted with the second largest loan in special servicing
and is a 68 unit multifamily property located in Bay Minette, AL.
The loans transferred to special servicing in February 2010 due to
monetary default.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying a property specific adjusted market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Thirteen loans are not expected to pay off at
maturity and six loans were modeled with a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating son Seven 2007-XLF Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded seven classes of Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital I Inc. Series 2007-XLF.  This includes
four pooled classes, and three non-pooled, or rake, classes
associated with the HRO Hotel Portfolio Loan and the Starco Office
Portfolio Loan.  The downgrades were due to the deterioration in
the overall performance of the assets in the trust, the
significant concentration of loans secured by riskier property
types including hotels and undeveloped land, and refinancing risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Approximately 78% of the loans by pooled balance
mature during calendar year 2011.  Moody's also affirmed one
pooled class.  Moody's placed seven classes on review for possible
downgrade on May 5, 2010.  This action concludes Moody's review.
The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 42% to $796 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization due to the payoff of five
loans initially in the pool and partial loan pay downs associated
with five additional loans.  The certificates are collateralized
by ten floating-rate loans ranging in size from 3% to 20% of the
pooled trust mortgage balance.  The largest three loans account
for 50% of the pooled balance.  The pool composition includes
office properties (47% of the pooled balance), hotel properties
(40%) and undeveloped land (13%).

There is currently one loan in special servicing (The New Boston
Office Portfolio Loan -- 8.0% of the pooled balance).  It was
transferred to special servicing on February 8, 2010 due to the
borrower's inability to post additional collateral of $3.5 million
required to satisfy the debt service coverage ratio test necessary
to qualify for the maturity extension to February 9, 2011.  The
loan was modified on April 9, 2010 and will be transferred back to
the master servicer once the three month rehabilitation period is
completed.  Terms of the loan modification include an extension of
the loan maturity to February 9, 2011 with the option to extend
for an additional twelve months.  The additional collateral
required to satisfy the DSCR test can be posted in installments
through January 9, 2011.  Property release provisions were
modified to allow the release of an underperforming property in a
manner that would be accretive to the lender.  Additionally, a
letter of credit in the amount of $9.2 million that was posted by
the borrower in July 2007 to meet the DSCR test after the release
of one property can now be drawn and applied to pay down the loan.
The servicer expects that this will occur on the May 2010 payment
date.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is 91%,
compared to 83% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio for pooled loans is 0.85X, compared to 1.14X at
last review.

Major remaining loans in the transaction include:

The Crowne Plaza Times Square Loan ($151.8 million -- 20%) is
secured by leasehold interests in a 770-key, full service hotel
located at 49th Street and Broadway in the Times Square area of
New York, NY.  The hotel underwent an $85 million renovation that
was completed in late 2008.  In addition to the hotel rooms, loan
collateral includes approximately 180,328 square feet of office
space, 42,121 square feet of retail space and a 159-car parking
garage.  The commercial component was 98% leased as of December
2009.  Two tenants, American Management Associates (155,506 square
feet) and TSI Broadway (46,820 square feet), lease approximately
91% of the commercial space with lease expirations in 2016 and
2019, respectively.  The commercial component contributes
approximately 13% of total gross revenue.

Revenue per available room, calculated by multiplying the average
daily rate by the occupancy rate, for calendar year 2009 decreased
approximately 19% to $208 from $258 at securitization.  Moody's
has a stable outlook for the US lodging industry and although
Moody's expect positive US RevPAR growth in 2010, Moody's think
that it will take some time for the increase in RevPAR to
translate to growing bottom lines.  The loan is interest-only for
the full term with extension options through December 2011.
Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 93% and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage is 0.91X.  Moody's current underlying rating for
the pooled debt is B3.

The HRO Portfolio Loan ($133.3 million -- 17%) is secured by six
full-service hotels totaling 2,179 keys.  The loan has paid down
approximately 12% since securitization due to the release of the
205-key Sheraton College Park hotel.  The six remaining hotels are
branded as Westin, Sheraton, Hilton and Marriott.  One of the
Sheraton hotels, the Sheraton Danbury with 242 keys, is now
without a flag and is currently known as the Danbury Plaza Hotel
and Conference Center.  At securitization the objective for the
portfolio was to improve performance through renovations and
aggressive management.  These assets have not met expectations.
RevPAR for the portfolio was $48 in calendar year 2009 compared to
$72 in 2007.  The last hotel to be renovated was the 349-key
Sheraton Buckhead (Atlanta, Georgia) that re-opened in November
2009 after a $59 million ($169,000/key) renovation and was re-
flagged as a Marriott.

The loan is interest only for the full term with extension options
through October 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 103% and
Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.44X.  Moody's current underlying rating
for the pooled debt is Caa1.  Additionally, there are junior trust
loans secured by the portfolio that are the rake classes M-HRO and
N-HRO that have been downgraded to Caa2 from B1 and Caa3 from B2,
respectively.

Babcock Ranch Loan ($100 million -- 13%) is secured by a 17,890-
acre parcel of vacant land located in Charlotte County and Lee
County, Florida, approximately 15-miles northeast of downtown Fort
Meyers.  The collateral is part of the larger Babcock Ranch that
totals 91,361 acres, with the remaining acres having been sold to
the State of Florida for preservation.  The loan sponsor, Kitson &
Partners and MSREF V Domestic Funding, L.P., intends to develop
the property into a planned community containing at least 17,870
residential units and 6 million square feet of commercial space
with electricity provided by a to-be-constructed solar energy
facility.  The mortgage loan was made in order to provide the
borrower with financing during the period necessary for it to
obtain the approvals needed for development.

Values for undeveloped land in south Florida have fallen
significantly over the past two years as home prices have fallen
and the inventory of unsold homes has risen.  The Cape Coral-Fort
Meyers metro area reportedly has the third highest metro
residential foreclosure rate in the nation with one in every 35
housing units receiving a foreclosure filing (2.82%) despite a
decrease in the rate of foreclosures from 2009 to 1st Quarter
2010.

The loan is interest-only for the full term with extension options
through August 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 93%,
compared to 62% at Moody's last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating for the pooled debt is Caa1.

The Starco Portfolio Loan ($76.2 million -- 10%) is secured by
eight Class A and Class B office properties containing 786,133
square feet.  Seven of the properties are located in northern
Virginia and one is located in Columbia, Maryland.  Four of the
properties are located in the Route 28 Corridor South submarket
that had a 22% vacancy rate as of 1st Quarter 2010.  As of
February 2010, the portfolio was 89% leased with individual
property occupancies ranging from 74% to 100%.  The loan is
interest-only for the full term with extension options through
December 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 102% and Moody's
stressed DSCR is 0.87X.  Moody's current underlying rating for the
pooled debt is B3.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $280,606,489, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     February 23, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, $229,729,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously on February 23, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, $41,211,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa

  -- Class C, $41,211,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A1; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa1

  -- Class D, $25,190,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A3 from Aa2

  -- Class M-HRO, $5,261,723, downgraded to Caa2 from B1;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B1 from Baa2

  -- Class N-HRO, $8,111,822, downgraded to Caa3 from B2;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B2 from Baa3

  -- Class M-STR, $2,886,176, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Ups Rating on $3MM Class A-13 Notes to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the
$3 million class A-13 secured fixed-rate notes from Morgan Stanley
ACES SPC's series 2006-8 to 'B+' from 'B'.

"Our rating on the class A-13 notes is dependent on the lowest of
our ratings on (i) the reference obligation, Virgin Media Finance
PLC's EUR225 million 8.75% bonds due April 15, 2014 ('B+'); (ii)
the swap payments guarantor, Morgan Stanley (A/Negative/A-1); and
(iii) the underlying security, BA Master Credit Card Trust II's
series 2001-B class A certificates due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA')."

"The rating action reflects the May 10, 2010, raising of our
rating on the reference obligation, Virgin Media Finance PLC's
EUR225 million 8.75% bonds due April 15, 2014, to 'B+' from 'B'."


NEWCASTLE CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
tranches from two CUSIP commercial mortgage-backed securities-
(CMBS-) backed collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions:
NewCastle CDO IV Ltd. and NewCastle CDO X Ltd.  Both transactions
have experienced subordinate debt cancellation without payment.
The 14 downgraded tranches have a total issuance amount of
$757 million.  "In addition, we reviewed a third CUSIP CMBS-backed
CDO deal, N-Star Real Estate CDO III Ltd., which also experienced
subordinate debt cancellation.  We did not lower the ratings on
the nine tranches from this transaction, but the ratings remain on
CreditWatch negative due to a high number of the underlying debt
with ratings on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, the ratings on
all eight downgraded tranches from NewCastle CDO IV remain on
CreditWatch for the same reason.  We also withdrew our rating on
the class B notes from NewCastle CDO X on account of its complete
cancellation."

"All of the affected transactions are U.S. cash flow CDOs backed
by CUSIP CMBS.  The rating actions reflect our understanding that
subordinate debt from the CDO was partially or wholly cancelled
before the debt was paid out, as the payment waterfall originally
contemplated.  We understand that such actions took place either
after the CDO manager purchased the debt using principal proceeds
at a discount from par, or after the subordinate noteholders
submitted the debt for cancellation without payment.  We have
already taken rating actions separately on other types of CDO
transactions that have been subject to cancellation of subordinate
notes in a similar fashion."

"In addition to credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio
of CMBS securities, the downgrades also reflect additional
stresses, which reflect our view of increased credit risks and
credit stability considerations regarding CDO tranches that have
experienced note cancellations."

"In our opinion, cancellation of subordinate debt affects one of
the five key areas of our analytical framework that we describe in
"Principles-Based Rating Methodology For Global Structured Finance
Securities," which we published May 29, 2007, on RatingsDirect on
the Global Credit Portal, at www.globalcreditportal.com.  The
cancellation of subordinate debt primarily affects the payment
structure and cash flow mechanics of a transaction.  We also
believe that debt cancellation affects credit stability."

PAYMENT STRUCTURE AND CASH FLOW MECHANICS

"When we assess the creditworthiness of a tranche, the structural
features of a transaction represent a key factor in our analysis.
The overcollateralization (O/C) tests and other interest/principal
diversion mechanisms have a significant impact on the cash flow
modeling results, and thus constitute a major part of our rating
methodology.  Generally, all other factors being equal, the
redemption or cancellation of subordinate debt in a CDO makes the
subordinate coverage tests less likely to fail, which, in our
view, may dilute the structural features originally designed to
protect the senior notes from credit deterioration or losses in
the underlying CDO portfolio.  The senior notes in most cash flow
CDOs typically benefit from protection provided by an
interest/principal coverage test.  When the coverage test is
breached, the transaction documents typically state that first
interest collections and then principal proceeds that would
otherwise be paid to more subordinate notes and equity are applied
to reduce the principal of the senior notes.  In our opinion, the
cancellation of subordinate debt, resulting in the alteration of
interest/principal diversion test calculations, diminishes our
ability to rely (for purposes of our credit analysis) on these
structural elements of the transaction (and the potential credit
support they are designed to provide to the senior notes) when we
apply our quantitative modeling to the transaction."

CREDIT STABILITY

"Standard & Poor's explicitly recognizes credit stability as a
factor in its ratings.  In our view, the O/C tests and related
structural features enhance the credit stability of the senior
notes in a CDO.  When these structural features are altered in a
manner that diminishes their effectiveness, the credit stability
of the senior tranches may decline.  Accordingly, we believe
the cancellation of subordinate debt and the potential resulting
impact on the transaction's structural features could create
greater uncertainty as to whether the ratings meet our criteria
for credit stability."

ANALYTICAL APPROACH

"In the case of transactions we believe have experienced
subordinated debt cancellations, our surveillance reviews will
include the application of an additional rating stress designed to
assess the potential creditworthiness of the affected transactions
without the support of interest diversion tests linked to
outstanding subordinated tranches.  Accordingly, we took the
following approach in our review of the three transactions:  We
generated cash flow analysis using two scenarios.  The first
scenario gave effect to the current balances of the notes
(including any note cancellations) when modeling the interest or
principal diversion mechanisms.  For purposes of the second
scenario, we assumed that currently outstanding subordinated
tranches had been cancelled and, accordingly, we only reflected
the balance of the senior notes in the calculation of any interest
or principal diversion mechanisms.  For each tranche, we applied
the lower of the rating levels indicated by the cash flow analysis
under the two scenarios described as the starting point for our
rating analysis.  We then reviewed the level of cushion relative
to our credit stability criteria and made further adjustments to
the ratings that we believe are appropriate."

The following lists the notes that were cancelled without payment.

                                         Partially cancelled
Transaction                 Tranche(s)            amount ($)
NewCastle CDO X             A3, B and C           63,750,000
NewCastle CDO IV            III-FX and IV-FL       3,915,000
N-Star Real Estate CDO III  C-1A                   4,962,512

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS
                                       Rating
Transaction           Class      To             From
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  S          AAA            AAA/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  A-1        AA+            AA+/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  A-2        BBB+           AA/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  A-3        BBB-           A-/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  C          BB-            BBB-/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  D          B              B+/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  E          CCC+           B-/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.  F          CCC            CCC+/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. I          A+/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. II-FL Def  BBB+/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. II-FX Def  BBB+/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. III-FL Def BB+/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. III-FX Def BB+/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. IV-FL Def  B/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. IV-FX Def  B/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
Newcastle CDO IV Ltd. V- Def     CCC-/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
N-Star Real Estate    A-1        AA/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    A-2A       A+/Watch Neg   A+/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    A-2B       A+/Watch Neg   A+/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    B          BBB/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    C-1A       BB+/Watch Neg  BB+/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    C-1B       BB+/Watch Neg  BB+/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    C-2A       BB/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    C-2B       BB/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
CDO III
N-Star Real Estate    D          B-/Watch Neg   B-/Watch Neg
CDO III

RATING WITHDRAWN
                                       Rating
Transaction            Class       To          From
Newcastle CDO X Ltd.   B           NR          BBB+/Watch Neg

NR-Not rated.


RESIDENTIAL REINSURANCE: S&P Assigns Low-B Ratings on 2010-I Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
preliminary 'BB', 'B+', and 'B-' ratings to the Class 1, Class 2,
and Class 3 Series 2010-I notes, respectively, to be issued by
Residential Reinsurance 2010 Ltd.

Res Re 2010 is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted company
licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands.  HSBC Bank
(Cayman) Ltd., as share trustee, holds all of Res Re 2010's issued
and outstanding shares in trust for charitable or similar
purposes.

The cedents will be United Services Automobile Assoc., a
reciprocal interinsurance exchange organized under the laws of
Texas; USAA Casualty Insurance Co., a Texas corporation; USAA
Texas Lloyd's Co., a Texas Lloyd's plan insurer; USAA General
Indemnity Co., a stock insurance company domiciled in Texas; and
Garrison Property & Casualty Insurance Co. These companies
(collectively referred to as USAA) are all rated AAA/Stable/-- and
will be responsible for the quarterly payment due under the
retrocession contract in place between them and Res Re 2010.  In
each class of notes, the cedents will be transferring a portion of
their U.S. hurricane exposure, earthquake exposure, and -- for the
first time in the occurrence classes -- severe thunderstorm,
winter storm, and wildfire exposure via a securitization to 144A
fixed-income investors.  Covered losses for all three classes will
be calculated on a per-occurrence basis.

                           Ratings List

                   Preliminary ratings assigned

                 Residential Reinsurance 2010 Ltd.

                       Series 2010-I notes

                 Class 1                       BB
                 Class 2                       B+
                 Class 3                       B-


RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 1999-1 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of Rite Aid Pass-
Through Trust Certificates, Series 1999-1 based on the current
rating of Rite Aid Corporation (senior unsecured debt rating
Caa3/Ca; stable outlook) and the value of the collateral
supporting the Certificates.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 2, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 22%
to $129.9 million from $167.6 million at securitization.  This
credit tenant lease transaction is supported by 53 stand-alone
retail buildings leased by Rite Aid.  The stores are located in 14
states and the District of Columbia, with the largest
concentration in California.  Each property is subject to a fully
bondable, triple net lease guaranteed by Rite Aid.

The final distribution date of the Certificates is January 2,
2021.  Based on Rite Aid's scheduled lease payments during the
initial lease term, there is a balloon payment due at the maturity
of the Certificates.  To mitigate this balloon risk, the
transaction was structured with residual insurance policies issued
by Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford; financial strength
debt rating A2, stable outlook) to provide the principal balloon
payment.  The ratings of the Certificates are higher than Rite
Aid's debt rating because of the quality of the underlying
collateral, which was primarily newly constructed at
securitization, and the enhancement provided by the Hartford
residual insurance policies.

Moody's rating action is:

* Series A-1, $37,327,535, affirmed at B3; previously downgraded
  to B3 from B1 on 11/29/2000

* Series A-2, $92,576,523, affirmed at B3; previously downgraded
  to B3 from B1 on 11/29/2000

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


STARWOOD HOTELS: Moody's Keeps Rating on Times Square Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of Times Square
Hotel Trust 8.523% Mortgage and Lease Amortizing Certificates
based on the lease obligation of Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc., and the underlying value of the real estate.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 1, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 15%
to $143.8 million from $168.9 million at securitization.  This
credit tenant lease transaction is supported by a 53-story W hotel
located on the corner of Broadway and West 47th Street in New York
City.  The property includes 509 guestrooms, 22,000 square feet of
meeting and dining space and 13,000 square feet of retail space.

The hotel property is subject to triple net leases guaranteed by
Starwood (senior unsecured debt rating Ba1, stable outlook).  The
CTL transaction is assigned a higher rating than that of the
lessee because it reflects the credit quality of Starwood as well
as the security of the underlying real estate.  The hotel is a
flagship property for the W chain located in the Times Square sub-
market of New York City.

Moody's rating action is:

* Cusip 887367AA8, $143,792,165, affirmed at Baa3; previously
  assigned Baa3 on 8/9/2001

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


STREETERVILLE ABS: Moody's Junks Rating on $850 Million Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one class
of notes issued by Streeterville ABS CDO, Ltd.  The notes affected
are as follows:

   -- U.S.$850,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
      Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2040 (current balance
      of $497,035,286), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
      March 16, 2010 Downgraded to B2

Streeterville ABS CDO, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities (RMBS) originated between 2003 and 2005, with
the majority originated in 2003.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1996-CFL Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Loss Severity Ratings to
Structured Asset Securities Corp.'s multiclass pass-through
certificates, series 1996-CFL:

  -- $38.5 million class I to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed this class:

  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The class J certificates are not rated by Fitch, and classes A
through H and class P have been paid in full.

The upgrade of class I reflects the low leverage of the remaining
loans, all of which are seasoned and have experienced significant
amortization.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any changes to the ratings over the next one to two years.

The affirmations of classes X-1 and X-2 reflect the classes'
senior position in the transaction's waterfall.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 97.3% to $51.9 million from $1.9 billion at
issuance.  Twenty two loans remain, of which 20 are fully
amortizing.  There are no specially serviced or delinquent loans.
Maturity dates include 2010 (0.6%); 2011 (6.1%); 2014 (9.4%); 2015
(17.7%) and 2017 (50.2%).

As the loans are seasoned with significant amortization, each loan
passed Fitch's refinance test.  All remaining loans' LTVs, based
on a Fitch stressed property specific cap rate and a stressed
servicer reported NOI, were below 75% with a weighted average of
42%.  LTVs ranged from 75% to less than 1%.  As a result, Fitch
does not expect any principal losses.

The largest loan in the pool is the Kmart Distribution Center, a
warehouse property located in Ocala, FL.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in 2002 and returned to master servicing in
2006; however, it has remained current on debt service since 2004.
Although the loan remains a Fitch Loan of Concern due to lack of
recent financial information reported to the servicer, the loan is
low levered, with a current loan per square foot of $10.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 or 2009 fiscal year-end net operating
income, if available or higher reductions to the latest reported
net operating income if year-end 2008 or 2009 was unavailable.
Property specific stressed cap rates between 8% and 9% were
applied to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgaged backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  All loans
in the pool, due to significant amortization, had resulting debt
service coverage ratios 1.25 times or greater and were considered
to result in full principal repayment.


TABERNA PREFERRED: S&P Lowers Rating on Eight Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
eight classes of notes from TABERNA Preferred Funding III Ltd. and
TABERNA Preferred Funding IV Ltd.  In addition, S&P affirmed the
company's 'CC' ratings on 10 other classes from the same
transactions.  These transactions are trust preferred CDOs backed
by REIT trust preferred securities.

S&P said, "These rating actions reflect the implementation of our
criteria for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an
EOD and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation."

According to the latest trustee report, there was a default on the
interest payment due on the most senior non-deferrable classes
(classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2A, and A-2B of TABERNA Preferred
Funding III Ltd. and classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 of TABERNA
Preferred Funding IV Ltd.).  Prior rating actions reflect the fact
that both transactions previously triggered an EOD following a
default on the interest payments due on certain non-deferrable
classes (classes B-1 and B-2 of TABERNA Preferred Funding III Ltd.
and classes B-1 and B-2 for TABERNA Preferred Funding IV Ltd.).


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions as detailed at the
end of this release for classes of notes issued by eight
structured finance collateralized debt obligations that closed in
2002 with exposure to structured finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Fitch primarily based its analysis of these transactions on
comparing the credit enhancements levels for each class of notes,
calculated based off the par portfolio balance, including cash in
principal collection accounts, to the minimum level of loss
expected from assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and
lower.

Only in two transactions, Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc., and SFA ABS CDO
III, Ltd./Inc., did their respective senior classes' CE levels
meaningfully exceed the minimum level of loss expected from the
portfolios.  For these two CDOs, Fitch complemented the above
analysis with the use of Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model
to project future loss levels at various rating levels.  The 'CCC'
rating loss rate, the lowest rating level loss projected by SF
PCM, exceeds the credit enhancement levels for all the classes of
notes in both Orchard Park and SFA ABS III.  Further, there is
only a negligible amount of interest proceeds being used to pay
down the notes in Orchard Park, while in SFA ABS III there is an
ongoing erosion of principal proceeds to pay accrued interest.
Therefore, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all
notes in these transactions can be assessed without performing
cash flow model analysis under the framework described in the
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Due to the extent of collateral deterioration in the remaining six
transactions, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default can be
assessed without using SF PCM or cash flow model analysis.  As the
result of writedowns, the portfolio of South Coast Funding II,
Ltd., is lower than the outstanding balance of the senior tranche,
indicating that default is inevitable for the entire capital
structure.  The remaining five transactions maintain positive CE
levels for at least the senior tranches.  However, future losses
expected from the assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and
lower are likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement
levels even for the most senior classes of notes in the
transactions.

Of the eight transactions, six have entered an Event of Default
due to failing collateralization coverage requirements.  The
controlling class in four of those transactions, Mulberry Street
CDO, Ltd., Oceanview CBO I, Ltd., Fulton Street CDO, Ltd., and
South Coast Funding II, Ltd., have accelerated the notes'
maturities whereby redirecting funds otherwise available to pay
other classes' interest due to pay down the most senior classes
outstanding.  However, due to the writedowns already experienced
and future expected losses in the respective portfolios, the
benefit of the accelerations is unlikely to fully compensate for
the lack of par coverage to the senior classes in these
transactions.

Three transactions contain non deferrable classes of notes which
have missed their full interest payment.  These classes have been
downgraded to 'D'.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Charles River CDO I, Ltd.

  -- $157,466,687 class A-1A downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $7,358,256 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $20,000,000 class A-2F downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $15,000,000 class A-2V downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $3,464,574 class B-F affirmed at 'C';

  -- $20,187,232 class B-V affirmed at 'C';

  -- $6,348,091 class C affirmed at 'C';

  -- $5,679,128 Combination Securities downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC'.

Charles River CDO I, Ltd. is a cash CDO that closed on Nov. 26,
2002, and is managed by TCW Investment Management Company.
Charles River declared an Event of Default on Feb. 2, 2010, due to
the class A-1 overcollaterization test falling below 100%.  The
controlling class has not elected to accelerate the maturity of
the transaction.  The majority of the interest is being used to
pay the out of the money interest rate swap that expires in 2012.
Part of the interest due to class A-1A and all of the interest due
to class A-2 is being fulfilled through the use of principal.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
commercial mortgage-backed securities, residential mortgage-backed
securities, asset-backed securities, real estate investment
trusts, and CDOs from primarily 2002 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Fulton Street CDO, Ltd.

  -- $76,820,274 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $34,000,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $11,284,252 class B-1 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11,533,844 class B-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $8,787,333 class C affirmed at 'C'.

Fulton Street CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on March 27,
2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management
Corporation., which assumed the responsibility from Clinton Group,
Inc., in November 2008.  Fulton Street declared an Event of
Default on Sept. 17 2008, due to the class A-1 overcollaterization
test falling below 102%.  The required majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction on
Sept. 24, 2008.  As a result of the acceleration of maturity, the
class A-2 notes are no longer receiving timely interest
distributions.  A sizable portion of interest is being used to pay
the out of the money interest rate swap that expires in 2012.  A
nominal amount of excess spread and all principal is being used to
pay down the class A-1 notes.  As of the April 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, corporate
bonds, and CDOs from primarily 2000 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Mulberry Street CDO, Ltd.

  -- $25,830,817 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $52,500,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $33,697,837 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,632,279 class C affirmed at 'C'.

Mulberry Street CDO Ltd./Corp. is a cash CDO that closed on
Dec. 18, 2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management
Corporation, which assumed the responsibility from the Clinton
Group, Inc., in October 2008.  Mulberry Street declared an Event
of Default on Aug. 28, 2008, due to the class A-1
overcollaterization test falling below 102%.  The required
majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity
of the transaction on Oct. 16, 2008.  As a result of the
acceleration of maturity, the class A-2 notes are no longer
receiving timely interest distributions.  A sizable portion of
interest is being used to pay the out of the money interest rate
swap that expires in December 2012.  A nominal amount of excess
spread and all principal is being used to pay down the class A-1
notes.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, ABS, SF CDOs, CMBS, and corporate CDOs from
primarily 1997 and 1999 through 2006 vintage transactions.

Oceanview CBO I, Ltd.

  -- $34,115,099 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'.
  -- $28,000,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,582,830 class B-F affirmed at 'C';
  -- $7,073,580 class B-V affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,309,450 Combo Notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Oceanview CBO I, Ltd./Corp., is a cash CDO that closed on June 27,
2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management Corporation,
which assumed the responsibility from Deerfield Capital Management
LLC. in April 2010.  Oceanview CBO I declared an Event of Default
on Dec. 7, 2009, due to the class A-1 overcollaterization test
falling below 103%.  The required majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction on
March 3, 2010.  Principal proceeds are currently being used to pay
a portion of the interest rate swap payment and the entire accrued
interest for the class A-1B and A-2 notes.  As of the March 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, ABS, SF CDOs,
CMBS, corporate CDOs, and senior unsecured corporate debt from
primarily 1997 through 2005 vintage transactions.

Oceanview A-1B Custodial Receipts

  -- $25,000,000 Oceanview A1B Custodial Receipts downgraded to
     'C' from 'CCC'.

Oceanview A-1B Custodial Receipts are a resecuritization of a
portion of the class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I combined
with insurance provided by a guarantor.  When Oceanview CBO I
closed in June 2002, XL Capital Assurance Inc., the predecessor of
Syncora Guarantee Inc., had privately insured $25 million of the
$70 million class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I.

In September 2008, Fitch withdrew the 'CCC' Insurer Financial
Strength rating of Syncora and its subsidiaries.  Prior to
September 2008, the rating of the Custodial Receipts was primarily
based on the IFS rating of Syncora as guarantor.  Because Fitch
had withdrawn the rating of the guarantor, the rating of the
Custodial Receipts is now based on the unenhanced credit profile
of the underlying collateral, the Oceanview CBO I class A-1B
notes.

Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $33,958,339 class A-1 (series 1) downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $34,909,024 class A-1 (series 2) downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $51,800,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc., is a static cash CDO that closed on Dec.
20, 2002 with Credit Suisse as administrative agent.  A nominal
amount of interest proceeds are currently being used to redeem the
class A-1 notes.  As of the March 25, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of CDOs, RMBS, ABS and CMBS from 2000
through 2003 vintage transactions.

SFA ABS CDO III, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $41,929,728 class A downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $50,000,000 class B downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $14,471,366 class C affirmed at 'C'.

SFA ABS CDO III, Ltd./Corp., is a SF CDO that closed on June 25,
2002, and is managed by Structured Finance Advisors.  SFA III
declared an Event of Default in July 2005 due to the maturity
dates of securities in the portfolio exceeding the maturity dates
of the class B and C notes.  Another Event of Default occurred in
April 2008 due to the class A, B and C notes being
undercollateralized.  To date, the required majority of the
controlling class has not voted to accelerate the transaction.
Principal proceeds are currently being used to pay a portion of
the interest rate swap payment and the entire accrued interest for
the class A and B notes.  As of the March 30, 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, ABS, CDOs and ABS from 1996
through 2005 vintage transactions.

South Coast Funding II, Ltd.

  -- $220,408,859 class A-1 downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $40,050,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $42,500,000 class A-3 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $36,865,832 class B affirmed at 'C'.

South Coast Funding II, Ltd., is a CDO that closed on June 6,
2002, and is managed by TCW Investment Management Company.  South
Coast II declared an Event of Default on Feb. 10, 2009, due to the
class A notes being undercollateralized.  The required majority of
the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity of the
transaction as of March 2, 2010.  Principal proceeds are currently
being used to fulfill part of the class A-1 accrued interest
distribution.  Additionally, the acceleration has caused proceeds
to be diverted to redeem class A-1 principal rather than pay
accrued interest to the class A-2 and A-3 notes, both non-
deferrable classes.  As of the April 5, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of primarily RMBS, CMBS, CDOs and
commercial ABS from 1999 through 2006 vintage transactions.


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 68 Classes From 18 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 68
classes from 18 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent mortgage loan
collateral issued from 2002 through 2007.  "We removed 22 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, we affirmed our ratings on 86 classes from 16 of the
downgraded transactions, as well as two additional transactions
and removed seven of them from CreditWatch negative."

The "scratch-and-dent" collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of reperforming, nonperforming,
outside-the-guidelines, and document-deficient first-lien, fixed-
and adjustable-rate, residential mortgage loans secured by one- to
four-family properties.

"The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate our current and projected losses, which we based on
the dollar amounts of loans currently in the transactions'
delinquency, foreclosure, and real estate owned (REO) pipelines,
as well as our projection of future defaults.  We also
incorporated cumulative losses to date in our analysis when
assessing rating outcomes."

"As part of our analysis, we considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, the risk profile of the underlying
mortgage pools influences our default projections, while our
outlook for housing-price declines and the health of the housing
market influence our loss severity assumptions.  Furthermore, we
adjusted our loss expectations for each deal based on upward
trends in delinquencies."

"To assess the creditworthiness of each class, we reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we assessed whether, in our
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions we used
in our analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
we assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
we would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of our base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while we would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of our base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
our view, withstand approximately 150% of our base-case loss
assumptions under our analysis."

"The lowered ratings reflect our belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given our current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies.  The
affirmations reflect our belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions."

"We monitor these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in our view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  We will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as we determine
appropriate.

RATING ACTIONS

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-SD1
Series     2007-SD1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
IV-A       026933AA9     CCC                  B
IV-M-1     026933AB7     CC                   CCC

Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-C
Series     2006-C
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
1-A1       07325DAB0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2       07325DAC8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3       07325DAD6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
1-A4       07325DAE4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
1-A5       07325DAF1     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
2-A2       07325DAH7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
2-A3       07325DAJ3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
2-A4       07325DAK0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
M-1        07325DAL8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
M-2        07325DAM6     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2
Series     2003-SD2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-2        07384YLM6     BB                   A+
B-3        07384YLN4     CC                   BBB
B-4        07384YMH6     CC                   CCC
B-5        07384YMJ2     CC                   CCC

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD2
Series     2004-SD2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-3        07384YTP1     B                    BBB
B-4        07384YTS5     CC                   B
B-5        07384YTT3     CC                   CCC

Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W1
Series     2002-W1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-3        31392CMP6     CC                   BB

Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2004-W14
Series     2004-W14
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-1        31394BU28     B                    A
B-2        31394BU36     CC                   BBB
B-3        31394BU44     CC                   BB
B-4        31394BU51     CC                   CCC

Financial Asset Securities Corp.
Series     2004-RP1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
II-B-3     92922FYX0     CCC                  BBB
I-B-4      92922FYR3     CC                   CCC
II-B-4     92922FYY8     CCC                  BB
II-B-5     92922FYZ5     CC                   CCC

GSAMP Trust 2005-SD1
Series     2005-SD1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
A          36242DVZ3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
M-1        36242DWD1     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
M-2        36242DWE9     A+                   A+/Watch Neg
M-3        36242DWF6     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
B-1        36242DWG4     CC                   B/Watch Neg

GSAMP Trust Series 2005-SEA1
Series     2005-SEA1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-3        36242DL92     BB                   BBB-

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
Series     2005-RP1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B3         36242DXR9     B                    BBB
B4         36242DXS7     CCC                  BB
B5         36242DXT5     CC                   CCC

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-SD1
Series     2003-SD1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        61746RCG4     B                    BB+

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2002-2
Series     T-048
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
1M         12669UAH3     BBB                  AA
1-B-1      12669UAJ9     CC                   A
1B-2       12669UAK6     CC                   CCC
2B-3       12669UAS9     CCC                  BB
2B-4       12669UAT7     CC                   B

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2002-R3
Series     T-051
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-2        12669UBB5     CCC                  BBB
B-3        12669UAW0     CC                   BB

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R3
Series     2003-T-058
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B1         12669E2R6     BB                   A
B2         12669E2S4     CC                   BBB
B3         12669E2T2     CC                   B-

RePerforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R4
Series     2003-R4
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
B-1        12669FFU2     B                    A
B-2        12669FFV0     CC                   BBB

Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
Series     2007-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
1-A1       81441XAA2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2       81441XAB0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3       81441XAC8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
2-A        81441XAD6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
M-1        81441XAE4     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
M-2        81441XAF1     CC                   A/Watch Neg
B-1        81441XAG9     D                    BBB/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Secs Corp. Mtg Ln Trust Ser 2006-RF3
Series     2006-RF3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
1-A1       863592AA9     CCC                  AAA
1-A2       863592AB7     CCC                  AAA
1-A3       863592AC5     CCC                  AAA
1-A4       863592AD3     CCC                  AAA
1-AP       863592AE1     CCC                  AAA
2-A        863592AG6     CCC                  AAA
B1-1       863592AH4     CCC                  A
B2-1       863592AJ0     CCC                  B
B3-1       863592AK7     CC                   CCC
3-A1       863592AP6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
3-A2       863592AQ4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
3-AP       863592AR2     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
4-A        863592AT8     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
B1-II      863592AU5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
B2-II      863592AV3     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
B3-II      863592AW1     CC                   A-/Watch Neg

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
GEL1
Series     2006-GEL1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M3         863576EJ9     CCC                  BBB+
M4         863576EK6     CC                   BB

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2
Series     2003-SD2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
I-A        07384YLH7     AAA
II-A       07384YLJ3     AAA
III-A      07384YLK0     AAA
B-1        07384YLL8     AA+

Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD2
Series     2004-SD2
Class      CUSIP         Rating
I-A        07384YTH9     AAA
II-A       07384YTJ5     AAA
III-A      07384YTK2     AAA
IV-A       07384YTL0     AAA
B-1        07384YTM8     AA
B-2        07384YTN6     A

Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W1
Series     2002-W1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
1A-4       31392CMJ0     AAA
1A-IO      31392CMK7     AAA
2A         31392CMS0     AAA
2A-IO      31392CMU5     AAA
3A         31392CMV3     AAA
M          31392CML5     AA
B-1        31392CMM3     A
B-2        31392CMN1     BBB
3M         31392CMW1     AA
3B-1       31392CMX9     A
3B-2       31392CMY7     BBB
3B-3       31392CMZ4     BB
3B-4       31392CNA8     B

Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2002-W6
Series     2002-W6
Class      CUSIP         Rating
3M         31392DG71     AA
3B-1       31392DG89     A
3B-2       31392DG97     BBB
3B-3       31392DH21     BB
3B-4       31392DH39     B

Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2004-W14
Series     2004-W14
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M          31394BT95     AA

Financial Asset Securities Corp.
Series     2004-RP1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
I-F        92922FYJ1     AAA
I-HJ       92922FYK8     AAA
I-S        92922FYL6     AAA
II-A       92922FZD3     AAA
I-B-1      92922FYN2     AA
II-B-1     92922FYV4     AA
I-B-2      92922FYP7     A
II-B-2     92922FYW2     A
I-B-3      92922FYQ5     BBB

GSAMP Trust Series 2005-SEA1
Series     2005-SEA1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A          36242DL35     AAA
M-A        36242DL43     AAA
M-1        36242DL50     AA
M-2        36242DL68     A
B-1        36242DL76     BBB+
B-2        36242DL84     BBB

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1
Series     2005-RP1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
1AF        36242DXG3     AAA
1AS        36242DXH1     AAA
1A2        36242DXJ7     AAA
1A3        36242DXK4     AAA
1A4        36242DXL2     AAA
AX         36242DXM0     AAA
2A1        36242DXN8     AAA
B1         36242DXP3     AA
B2         36242DXQ1     A

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-SD1
Series     2003-SD1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A-1        61746RCE9     AAA
A-2        61746RCK5     AAA
M-1        61746RCF6     AA

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2002-2
Series     T-048
Class      CUSIP         Rating
2M         12669UAP5     AA
2B-1       12669UAQ3     A
2B-2       12669UAR1     BBB

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2002-R3
Series     T-051
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M          12669UAZ3     AA
B-1        12669UBA7     A

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R3
Series     2003-T-058
Class      CUSIP         Rating
M          12669E2Q8     AA

RePerforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2003-R4
Series     2003-R4
Class      CUSIP         Rating
1A-PO      12669FFQ1     AAA
1A-IO      12669FFR9     AAA
2A-IO      12669FJB0     AAA
1A-4       12669FFP3     AAA
2A         12669FFS7     AAA
M          12669FFT5     AA

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Series 2005-R1
Series     2005-R1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
1A-F1      12669GWN7     AAA
1A-F2      12669GXD8     AAA
1A-S       12669GWP2     AAA
2A-1       12669GXE6     AAA
2A-2       12669GXF3     AAA
2A-PO      12669GXG1     AAA
2A-IO      12669GXH9     AAA

Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
GEL1
Series     2006-GEL1
Class      CUSIP         Rating
A1         863576EE0     AAA
A2         863576EF7     AAA
M1         863576EG5     AA
M2         863576EH3     A+



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                          *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
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The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.

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