TCR_Public/100509.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 9, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 127

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2005-4: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
ACA ABS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes of Notes
ACT 2005-RR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Puts BB Rating on Liquidity Facility
ARLO III: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2005 Notes to 'CC'

ARLO III: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2005 Notes to 'CC'
ANTHRACITE CRE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 10 2006-HY3 CRE CDOs
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-7SR Notes
APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ARCAP 2004-RR3: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes

ARCAP 2006-RR7: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
AUSTIN CONVENTION: Moody's Downgrades Revenue Bond Rating to 'Ba1'
AVALON RE: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes From 'CCC'
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 217 Tranches
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 312 Tranches

BANK OF NOVA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Credit-Linked Notes to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-WF1 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 79 Tranches
BLUE BELL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
BODEGA BAY: S&P Raises Rating on Series 1996 Certs. From 'BB'

CAELUS RE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Series 2010-1 Class A Notes
CALCULUS CMBS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Trust Units
CAPMARK VII-CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of CRE CDOs
CENTERPOINT ENERGY: Moody's Reviews on Debt & Obligations
CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches

COLORADO EDUCATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2007A Bonds
COMM 2004-LNB3: DBRS Downgrades Class J to 'B'
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-C3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2001-CK1 Notes
CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 169 Tranches

CSFB HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 71 Tranches From 20 RMBS
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 45 Tranches
EASTMAN HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2000-C1 Notes
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

FORUM HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Bond Rating on $129 Mil. Debt
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 2001-1 Notes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Junks Rating on Series 2003A Certs. From 'A'
GRENADIER FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches

HARTFORD MEZZANINE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of CDOs
HELLER FINANCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-PH1 Notes
HOLYOKE HOSPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Bond Ratings to 'Ba2'
INDYMAC INDA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 133 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five 2007-LDP11 Certificates

JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2000-C9 Certificates
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2004-CIBC8 Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-CIBC2 Certs.
KLIO I: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches of Notes
LA VERNE: S&P Gives Stable Outlook on Debt, Affirms BB Rating

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2002-C Notes
LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches From 19 RMBS
MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 111 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-LC1 Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Tranches

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-IQ7 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2001-TOP3 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2007-XLF Notes
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'

OFFICE PORTFOLIO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2001-HRPT Certs.
ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
PRIME MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches
RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches

SANDELMAN PARTNERS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
SEAWALL SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-2 Notes
SECURITIZED PRODUCT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
SG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
SIERRA KINGS: S&P Affirms 'C' Rating on Series 2002 Bonds

SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C1 Notes
STOCKTON PUBLIC: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006A Bonds to 'BB'
TRANSFERABLE CUSTODIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings to 'B3'
VARICK STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2005-1 Notes

ZOHAR II: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes

* Fitch Reviews Ratings on Outstanding Dealer Floorplan Securities
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 SF CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches From 11 Hybrid CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Tranches From Six CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 26 Classes From Eight RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches From 10 Hybrid CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 55 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 233 Classes From 14 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Raises Ratings on 50 Tranches From 22 CLO Transactions



                            *********





ABACUS 2005-4: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eight classes of Notes issued
by Abacus 2005-4, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as evidenced
by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and a
decrease in the weighted average recovery rate since last review.
The rating action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Abacus 2005-4, Ltd., is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial
mortgage backed securities debt (100% of the pool balance).  All
of the CMBS reference obligations were securitized between 2004
and 2005.  As of the April 21, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
par amount of reference obligations is $6.0 billion, the same as
that at securitization; the aggregate issued Note balance of the
transaction is $600 million, the same as that at securitization.

As of the April 22, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in 85% asset backed securities, 8% residential mortgage
backed securities and 7% cash.  The Abacus transactions feature a
mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an Additional
Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the "Affected
Party") to terminate their obligations to provide support for the
term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism suggests that it
is limited to an Event of Default on the underlying term asset to
the extent that these assets have such provisions.  It is Moody's
opinion that this excludes all except one of the RMBS term assets,
which typically lack underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest
rating of the current ABS and the one RMBS term asset is Aaa (on
review for possible downgrade) and based on the outlook for the
term asset on review, Moody's did not add any additional expected
loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to monitor the term asset
holdings as part of its on-going surveillance of CRE CDO
transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 12 compared to 4 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa3 (96.7% compared to 100% at last review) and A1-A3
(3.3% compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 4.3 years compared to 5.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 69% compared to a mean of 70% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 56% compared to 70% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on February 26, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on February 26,
     2010 A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on February 26, 2010
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E Series 1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February
     26, 2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E Series 2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February
     26, 2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E Series 3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February
     26, 2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


ACA ABS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of notes from ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd., ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.,
and Sheffield CDO II Ltd. to 'D' and removed two of these ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time,
S&P withdrew its rating on class S issued by Sheffield CDO II Ltd.
and removed it from CreditWatch negative.

ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd. and ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd. are cash flow
collateralized debt obligation transactions, and Sheffield CDO II
Ltd. is a hybrid CDO transaction.

The rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

S&P lowered its ratings on the hybrid CDO transaction because the
transactions did not have proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payments on the credit
default swap contracts.  For the two cash flow transactions, S&P
has received notices from the trustees stating that after the
liquidation of the portfolio assets, the available proceeds were
insufficient to pay the noteholders in full.  The rating
withdrawal on class S notes follows the complete paydown on the
final payment date.

                          Rating Actions

                                           Rating
                                           ------
   Transaction                Class       To     From
   -----------                -----       --     ----
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      A-1         D      CCC-/Watch Neg
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      A-2         D      CC
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      A-3         D      CC
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      B           D      CC
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      C           D      CC
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      D           D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd.        A-1         D      CCC-/Watch Neg
   ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd.        A-2         D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd.        B           D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-1 Ltd.        C           D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        A-1S        D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        A-1J        D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        A-2V        D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        A-2F        D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        A-3         D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        B           D      CC
   ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.        Combo Secs  D      CC
   Sheffield CDO II Ltd.      S           NR     CCC/Watch Neg

                         NR -- Not rated.


ACT 2005-RR: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes issued by ACT 2005-RR
Depositor Corp. as a result of increased interest shortfalls and
losses to the underlying commercial mortgage backed securities.  A
complete list of rating actions follows at the end of this
release.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
18.6% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 7.1% is on
Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 99.1% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade; 78.3% has a rating in
the 'CCC' category and below.  The CDO has experienced
$471.1 million in losses to date, including $193.7 million since
the last review.  The A-1 notes have paid down $13.1 million since
issuance.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The degree of correlated default
risk of this collateral is high given the CMBS and vintage
concentrations.  Further, in its review, Fitch analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the default of the distressed
collateral ('CCC' category and lower) and assets that are
experiencing interest shortfalls (66.5% of the portfolio).  Given
the high probability of default of the underlying assets and the
expected limited recovery prospects upon default, class A-1FL has
been downgraded to 'CC', indicating default is probable.

Fitch's loss expectation exceeds the credit enhancement available
to classes A-2 and A-3.  The 66.5% of interest shortfalls exceeds
the credit enhancement to classes A-2 and A-3.  Fitch believes the
CMBS classes that are experiencing interest shortfalls are likely
to continue and recovery prospects are low.  As such, classes A-2
and A-3 have been downgraded to 'C', indicating default is
inevitable.  As of the April 22, 2010 trustee report, the interest
collected from the underlying collateral was insufficient to pay
the aggregate of the trustee fee, the senior collateral
administrator fee, and the Note Interest Rate on the classes.  As
a result, funds were withdrawn from the Reserve Account in the
amount of approximately $727,000 in accordance with the
transaction documents.  The Reserve Account balance is
$3.9 million as of the April 22, 2010 payment date.  All rated
classes are current on interest.

ACT 2005-RR is backed by 116 tranches of 40 CMBS transactions and
is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred to as
first loss CRE CDO/ReREMIC) as it includes the most junior bonds
of CMBS transactions.  Approximately 45% of the portfolio consists
of first loss 'NR' bonds which are highly susceptible to losses.
The transaction closed Nov. 9, 2005.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $209,945,740 class A-1FL to 'CC' from 'B';
  -- $118,000,000 class A-2 to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $165,614,000 class A-3 to 'C' from 'CC'.

Fitch does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.
Prior to the rating action the Outlook for class A-1FL was Stable.


ALPINE SECURITIZATION: DBRS Puts BB Rating on Liquidity Facility
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the rating of R-1 (high) for the Commercial
Paper (CP) issued by Alpine Securitization Corp. (Alpine), an
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) vehicle administered by
Credit Suisse, New York branch.  In addition, DBRS has confirmed
the ratings and revised the tranche sizes of the aggregate
liquidity facilities (the Liquidity) provided to Alpine by Credit
Suisse.

The $7,093,009,881 aggregate liquidity facilities are tranched as:

  -- $6,770,447,455 rated AAA
  -- $73,162,269 rated AA
  -- $42,290,653 rated A
  -- $63,124,241 rated BBB
  -- $60,674,316 rated BB
  -- $12,824,729 rated B
  -- $70,486,218 unrated

The ratings are based on January 31, 2010 data.

The CP rating reflects the AAA credit quality of Alpine's asset
portfolio.  The updated credit quality aspect of the CP rating is
based on both the portfolio of assets and the available program-
wide credit enhancement (PWCE).  The rationale for the CP rating
is based on the updated AAA credit quality assessment as well as
DBRS' prior and ongoing review of legal, operational and liquidity
risks associated with Alpine's overall risk profile.

The ratings assigned to the Liquidity reflect the credit quality
of Alpine's asset portfolio based on an analysis that assesses
each transaction to a term standard.  The tranching of the
Liquidity reflects the credit risk of the portfolio at each rating
level.  The tranche sizes are expected to vary each month based on
changes in portfolio composition.

For Alpine, both the CP and the Liquidity ratings use DBRS'
simulation methodology, which was developed to analyze diverse
ABCP conduit portfolios.  This analysis uses the DBRS CDO Toolbox
simulation model, with adjustments to reflect the unique structure
of an ABCP conduit and its underlying assets.  DBRS determines
attachment points for risk based on an analysis of the portfolio
and models the portfolio based on key inputs such as asset
ratings, asset tenors and recovery rates.  The attachment points
determine the portion of the exposure rated AAA, AA, A through B
as well as unrated.

DBRS models the portfolio on an ongoing basis to reflect changes
in Alpine's portfolio composition and credit quality.  The rating
results are updated and posted on the DBRS website.


ARLO III: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2005 Notes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the notes
issued by Arlo III Ltd.' series 2005 (Hyde Park), a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation.

The lowered rating follows a number of recent credit events within
the transaction's underlying portfolio.  Specifically, write-downs
in the underlying reference portfolio caused the notes to incur a
partial principal loss.

                          Rating Lowered

               Arlo III Ltd. Series 2005 (Hyde Park)

                                        Rating
                                        ------
           Class                 To                 From
           -----                 --                 ----
           Notes                 CC                 CCC-


ARLO III: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2005 Notes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the notes
issued by Arlo III Ltd.'s series 2005 (Green Park), a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation.

The lowered rating follows a number of recent credit events within
the transaction's underlying portfolio.  Specifically, write-downs
in the underlying reference portfolio caused the notes to incur a
partial principal loss.

                          Rating Lowered

               Arlo III Ltd. Series 2005 (Green Park)

                                        Rating
                                        ------
           Class                 To                 From
           -----                 --                 ----
           Notes                 CC                 CCC-


ANTHRACITE CRE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 10 2006-HY3 CRE CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 10
classes from Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the same
time, S&P removed six of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following the downgrades of five underlying CMBS certificates that
collateralize Anthracite 2006-HY3.  The downgraded underlying
certificates are from four transactions and total $27.2 million
(4.9% of the total asset balance).

The affirmations also reflect the application of S&P's updated
U.S. CRE CDO criteria for CRE loans.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying CRE loans.

According to the April 19, 2010, trustee report, 56 CMBS
certificates ($413.9 million, 74%) from 15 distinct transactions
issued between 2004 and 2006 collateralized Anthracite 2006-HY3.
Anthracite 2006-HY3 has significant exposure to these CMBS
certificates that Standard & Poor has downgraded:

* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1 (classes H and P;
  $12.3 million, 2.2%); and

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-5 (class
  J; $7.9 million, 1.4%).

The current assets also included six commercial real estate loans
($145.8 million, 26%), which are all either subordinate B notes or
mezzanine loans.  Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its
credit estimates on the CRE loan assets.  S&P based its analyses
on its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from servicer
provided data for the related senior notes held in CMBS
transactions, as well as market or valuation data from third-party
providers.

Standard & Poor's analyzed Anthracite 2006-HY3 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg
         B-FL             B+               B+/Watch Neg
         B-FX             B+               B+/Watch Neg
         C-FL             CCC+             CCC+/Watch Neg
         C-FX             CCC+             CCC+/Watch Neg
         D                CCC              CCC/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.

                     Class            Rating
                     -----            ------
                     E-FL             CCC-
                     E-FX             CCC-
                     F                CCC-
                     G                CCC-


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-7SR Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded nine classes of Notes issued
by Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-7SR, Ltd., due to deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate
since last review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's
current review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-7SR, Ltd., is a synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps
referencing $1.8 billion par amount of commercial mortgage backed
securities debt (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS
reference obligations were securitized between 2006 (80%) and 2007
(20%).  As of the April 26, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
issued Note balance of the transaction is $297 million, the same
as at securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,933 compared to 749 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (58% compared to 57% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (22% compared to 40% at last review), B1-B3 (7% compared to 3%
at last review), and Caa1-C (13% compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 7.5 years compared to 8.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 14.2% compared to a mean of 15.5% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 23% compared to 53% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to the higher diversity of ratings distribution
in the reference obligations pool.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-A, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-B, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


APHEX CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded two classes of Notes issued
by Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd. due to deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate
since last review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's
current review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-4, Ltd. is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing
$1.8 billion par amount of commercial mortgage backed securities
debt (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2005 (37%) and 2006 (63%).
As of the April 26, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate issued Note
balance of the transaction is $270 million, the same as at
securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,149, compared to 718 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: A1-A3 (15% compared to 35% at last review), Baa1-
Baa3 (52% compared to 35% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (20% compared
to 25% at last review), B1-B3 (6% compared to 3% at last review),
and Caa1-C (7% compared to 2% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 6.1 years compared to 7.4 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 16.5% compared to a mean of 18.4% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 28% compared to 37% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to the higher diversity of ratings distribution
in the reference obligations pool.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on February 26,
     2010 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


ARCAP 2004-RR3: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes issued by ARCAP 2004-RR3
Resecuritization, Inc. as a result of increased interest
shortfalls and losses to the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities.  Three classes were affirmed due to adequate credit
enhancement to their respective current ratings.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
15.1% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 1.4% is on
Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 61.6% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade; 19.7% has a rating in
the 'CCC' category and below.  The CDO has experienced
$17.8 million in losses to date, including $5.4 million since the
last review.  The A-2 notes have paid down $20.5 million since
issuance.  Class A-1 notes have PIF.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The degree of correlated default
risk of this collateral is high given the CMBS and vintage
concentrations.  The credit enhancement to the class A-2 and B
notes are consistent with the 'BBB' and 'BB' category rating loss
rates generated by PCM, respectively.  Similarly, the credit
enhancement to classes C through E notes and classes F and G are
consistent with the 'B' and 'CCC' category rating loss rates,
respectively.

Further, in its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity
to the default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and
lower) and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (16.5%
of the portfolio).  Given the high probability of default of the
underlying assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon
default, classes H and J have been downgraded to 'CC', indicating
default is probable.

For classes K through N, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
classes' current or likely future interest-shortfalls that are
unlikely to be recouped.  As of the April 21, 2010 trustee report,
classes K through N are not receiving current interest.  Fitch
believes that for these classes default is inevitable, because
Fitch does not expect interest to be recovered on these classes.
As such, classes K through N have been downgraded to 'C'.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A-2 through E notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will
continue to face refinance risk and maturity defaults.  Fitch also
assigned Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for
the collateral under the 'Mean' stress.  The LS rating should
always be considered in conjunction with probability of default
indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.

ARCAP 2004-RR3 is backed by 53 tranches from 18 CMBS transactions
and is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred
to as first loss CRE CDO/ReREMIC) as it includes the most junior
bonds of CMBS transactions.  The transaction closed Sept. 30,
2004.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $40,907,000 class B notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $31,362,000 class C notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook to
     Negative;

  -- $6,818,000 class D notes to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $13,636,000 class F notes to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $12,954,000 class G notes to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $18,408,000 class H notes to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $8,863,000 class J notes to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $8,182,000 class K notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $8,863,000 class L notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $12,954,000 class M notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $5,454,000 class N notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:

  -- $252,003,928 class A-2 notes at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X at 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $16,363,000 class E notes at 'B/LS5'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable and assign 'LS5'.


ARCAP 2006-RR7: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 12 classes issued by ARCAP 2006-RR7
Resecuritization, Inc. as a result of increased interest
shortfalls and losses to the underlying commercial mortgage backed
securities.  Three classes were affirmed due to adequate credit
enhancement to their respective current ratings.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
26.1% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 2.2% is on
Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 94.6% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade; 63.2% has a rating
below 'CCC'.  The collateralized debt obligation has experienced
$90.2 million in losses to date, including $69.1 million since the
last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The degree of correlated default
risk of this collateral is high given the CMBS and vintage
concentrations.  The credit enhancement to the class A-D and A
notes are consistent with the 'BBB' and 'BB' category rating loss
rates generated by PCM.  Similarly, the credit enhancement to the
class B notes is consistent with the 'CCC' category rating loss
rate.

Further, in its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity
to the default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and
lower) and assets that are experiencing interest shortfalls (68.1%
of the portfolio).  Given the high probability of default of the
underlying assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon
default, classes C through G have been downgraded to 'CC',
indicating default is probable.

For classes H through O, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
classes' current or likely future interest-shortfalls that are
unlikely to be recouped.  As of the April 22, 2010 trustee report,
the class H notes received a partial interest payment and classes
K through N are not receiving current interest.  Fitch believes
that for these classes default is inevitable because Fitch does
not expect interest to be recovered on these classes.  As such,
classes K through N have been downgraded to 'C'.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A-D through B notes
reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will
continue to face refinance risk and maturity defaults.  Fitch also
assigned Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for
the collateral under the 'Mean' stress.  The LS rating should
always be considered in conjunction with probability of default
indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.

ARCAP 2006-RR7 is backed by 42 tranches from 24 CMBS transactions
and is considered a CMBS B-piece resecuritization (also referred
to as first loss CRE CDO/ReREMIC) as it includes the most junior
bonds of CMBS transactions.  The transaction closed May 2, 2006.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $47,126,000 class A notes to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $94,019,000 class B notes to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $52,766,000 class C notes to 'CC' from 'B';

  -- $21,107,000 class D notes to 'CC' from 'B';

  -- $22,066,000 class E notes to 'CC' from 'CCC';

  -- $40,294,000 class H notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $56,604,000 class J notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $14,391,000 class K notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $14,390,000 class L notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $24,944,000 class M notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $13,432,000 class N notes to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $14,391,000 class O notes to 'C' from 'CC'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks to these classes as indicated:

  -- $68,000,000 class A-D notes at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $34,538,000 class F notes at 'CC';

  -- $28,781,000 class G notes at 'CC'.


AUSTIN CONVENTION: Moody's Downgrades Revenue Bond Rating to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the Austin Convention
Enterprises, Inc.'s rating on its Convention Center Hotel Revenue
Refunding Bonds, Series 2006A to Ba1 from Baa3, and confirmed the
rating on its Revenue Refunding Bonds, Series 2006B at Ba2 to
conclude the review for possible downgrade.  The outlook is
stable.

The principal reasons for the downgrade are the operating
performance and liquidity levels.  ACE is experiencing lower than
projected occupancy rates and revenue per available room.  In 2009
there was a 5% decline in occupancy rates and 9% decline in RevPAR
compared to 2008 actuals.  The difference is larger when the
figures are compared to the original projections at the time of
the 2006 ratings.  The 2010 first quarter was stronger than
budgeted, however the 2010 year end occupancy rate of 73% is still
expected to be 4% lower than what was originally projected for
2010.  Having said that, the stable outlook is predicated upon
management's forecast that states 2010 total revenue to exceed
2009 by 3.7%, signifying an end to the declined figures in 2009.

The project's surety provider, Syncora Guarantee Inc. (formally XL
Capital Assurance Inc.) whose insurance financial strength rating
is currently Ca with a developing outlook, is a credit weakness
since ACE is not planning to fully cash fund its debt service.

Austin Convention Enterprises, Inc.'s (ACE) ratings were assigned
by evaluating factors Moody's believe are relevant to the credit
profile of the issuer, such as i) the business risk and
competitive position of the company versus others within its
industry, ii) the capital structure and financial risk of the
company, iii) the projected performance of the company over the
near-to-intermediate term, and iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk.  These attributes were compared against other
issuers both within and outside of ACE's core industry and ACE's
ratings are believed to be comparable to those of other issuers of
similar credit risk.

The last rating action was on November 24, 2009, when the Baa3 and
Ba2 ratings of the Series 2006A and Series 2006B Convention Center
Hotel Revenue Refunding Bonds were put under review for possible
downgrade.

Austin Convention Enterprises Inc. was established to construct,
acquire, and operate the Hilton Austin hotel project (the
Project), which includes a hotel, parking garage and other related
facilities.  The 800-room full service hotel opened in
December 27, 2003, and is adjacent to the Austin Convention Center
located in downtown Austin, Texas.

ACE issued three tiers of tax exempt bonds totaling $265 million
in June 2001 -- ACE Hotel First Tier Revenue Bonds Series 2001A,
ACE Hotel Second Tier Revenue Bonds Series 2001B, and ACE Hotel
Third Tier Revenue Bonds Series 2001C -- to finance the Project.
In December 2006, ACE issued the tax exempt Series 2006A and 2006B
bonds totaling $260 million to refund the Series 2001A and 2001B
bonds.  Proceeds of the 2006A and 2006B bonds were used to
purchase the securities for the escrow account.  Contemporaneously
therewith, $7.71 million of the $20.5 million Series 2001C bonds
were retired.  The Series 2001C bonds, which were not refunded, do
not carry an underlying rating.


AVALON RE: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes From 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its rating
on the Class B notes issued by Avalon Re Ltd. to 'BBB+' from
'CCC'.

Previously, Standard & Poor's had indicated that there were two
claims that could have caused a loss to the Class B noteholders.
The first was related to a spill at a Lake Charles oil refinery,
and the second involved claims related to exposure to lead paint.
The policy related to Lake Charles covered $150 million of losses
in excess of $170 million, and the current estimate of total
losses was $111 million.  The lead paint claims involved lawsuits
currently being adjudicated in various states.  There is no
current estimate on losses, but the maximum exposure is $100
million.  Oil Casualty Insurance Ltd. (BBB+/Stable/--) retained a
10% share of covered losses above the attachment point, while
Avalon Re retained the remaining 90%.

OCIL has submitted a final proof-of-loss claim, which indicates
the notes are no longer at risk for these two events or any other
covered events, save the July 2007 steam pipe explosion on
Lexington Avenue in New York City.  S&P had indicated that the
losses claimed by OCIL related to the explosion could be as high
as $50 million, and the final principal loss to the Class C
noteholders is not expected to exceed $42.3 million, based on the
final proof-of-loss claim.

As a result, S&P is now linking the rating on the Class B notes to
the rating on OCIL as premium payer under the reinsurance
agreement between it and Avalon Re Ltd.  OCIL will owe a premium
payment equal to 10 basis points multiplied by the notional amount
of Class B notes outstanding to Avalon Re Ltd. on the maturity
date.  The remaining credit exposure of the Class B notes is to
The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (A/Negative/A-1), the guarantor of
the swap counterparty, Goldman Sachs International.  Under the
term of the total return swap, Goldman Sachs International is
taking on the market and credit risk on the assets in the
collateral account that are used to support payments to OCIL, the
noteholders, or both.

The notes had been scheduled to mature on June 6, 2008, but OCIL
had extended them pursuant to the terms of the transaction
documents.  OCIL repurchased a portion ($7.012 million) of the
Class B notes in September 2009.

                           Ratings List

                          Avalon Re Ltd.

                                          To        From
                                          --        ----
            Class B notes                 BBB+      CCC


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 217 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 217
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche and confirmed the
ratings of three tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by
prime jumbo loans, issued by Banc of America in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranche A issued by Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4 is wrapped by Assured
Guaranty Corp (rated Aa3).  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2005-6 Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A, Current Rating at Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on Jun 2,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp.  (Confirmed at
     Aa3; Outlook Negative on 12/18/2009)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-8, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-8, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-9, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-10, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-13, Confirmed at A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-14, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-15, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-A Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-B Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-C Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-D Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jun 2, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-E Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jun 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-F

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities,Inc Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 312 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 312
tranches, upgraded the ratings of five tranches and confirmed the
ratings of 10 tranches from 11 RMBS transactions, backed by prime
jumbo loans, issued by Banc of America.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

A list of updated estimated pool losses and tranche recovery
details is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of
this review period and may be found at:

List of actions:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-1 Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-2 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-21, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-22, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-3 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-14, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-15, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-16, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-17, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-18, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-19, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-20, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-5 Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-6 Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, 2006-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-B Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-I Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. S-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. S-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. S-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. S-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-3 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-3A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-3B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. T-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2007-C Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2007-1 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-29, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-30, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-31, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-32, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-21, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-22, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-23, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-24, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-25, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-26, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2008-A Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Upgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANK OF NOVA: S&P Downgrades Rating on Credit-Linked Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Bank of
Nova Scotia's C$98.465 million portfolio credit-linked note, a
synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D' from 'CCC-' because the note
incurred a partial loss.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-WF1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2000-WF1:

Fitch downgrades, revises the Rating Outlook, and assigns Recovery
Ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $13.3 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $6.7 million class I to 'CC/RR5' from 'BBB-';; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $5.6 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.9 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.3 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch also affirms, assigns Loss Severity ratings, and revises the
Rating Outlook to these classes as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.4 million class D at 'AAA'/LS5; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26.6 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.9 million class F at 'AAA'/LS5; Outlook Stable.

  -- $15.5 million class G at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $279,090 class M.  Classes A-1, A-2, B,
and C are paid in full.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 25.7% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $23.3 million.  The majority of the Fitch
total expected losses (99%) are associated with loans currently in
special servicing with the largest specially serviced loan
representing 65% of Fitch's total expected loss.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
89.8% to $90.5 million from $888.6 million at issuance.  There are
34 of the original 131 loans remaining in the transaction, nine of
which have defeased (29.8% of the current transaction balance).
Nine loans (44.8%) are currently in special servicing.  Fitch
expects losses from loans currently in special servicing to
deplete classes J, K, L, M, and impact class I significantly.

The largest specially serviced loan (15.5%) is secured by a vacant
five-story 306,284 square foot office building located in
Richmond, VA.  The loan transferred to special servicing on
March 20, 2009, due to imminent default.  The property was 100%
leased to Circuit City and served as their headquarters building.
Circuit City filed bankruptcy and the lease was rejected.  The
foreclosure sale was completed in August 2009.  Following transfer
of the title of the asset and termination of the court appointed
receiver, Cushman & Wakefield Thalhimer was retained as the
property manager.

The second largest specially serviced loan (6.4%) is secured by an
89,778 sf single and partial two-story retail shopping center
located in Tustin, CA.  The loan is subject to a ground lease with
annual ground lease payments of $305,000 which expires on
April 30, 2060.  The debt service payments are current; however,
the loan matured April 1, 2010.  The borrower has been unable to
secure financing of existing debt and has requested an extension.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, one loan (3.8% of the
pool) incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 79 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 79
tranches and has upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches from 8 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities I Trust in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
downgrade actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, Moody's has adjusted the ratings of two tranches of
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC5, to address
a credit guaranty that was not accurately accounted for in the
previous rating action on Feb 11, 2009.  The corrected ratings
announced give credit to the guaranty provided to the Class II-A-1
and II-A-2 tranches by Assured Guaranty Corp, resulting in the
upgrade of these tranches.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Class 1-A-3 issued by Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust
2005-AC5 and Class A-5 issued by Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities I Trust 2005-AC9 are wrapped by Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company (insurance financial strength rating withdrawn).
Classes II-A-1 and II-A-2 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities I Trust 2005-AC5 are wrapped by Assured Guaranty Corp.
(rated Aa3).  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  Moody's withdrew
the insurance financial strength rating of Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company's in March 2009.  As a result securities wrapped
by FGIC are rated at their underlying rating without consideration
for FGIC's guaranty.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  --Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/24/2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp.  (Confirmed at
     Aa3; Outlook Negative on 12/18/2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp.  (Confirmed at
     Aa3; Outlook Negative on 12/18/2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/24/2009)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust I Series 2005-
AC7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BLUE BELL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on five
classes of notes issued by Blue Bell Funding, Ltd./Corp.

This rating action is a result of the sale and liquidation of Blue
Bell's portfolio following an event of default on Feb. 26, 2010,
declaration of acceleration on March 2, 2010, and notice of a
direction to sell and liquidate the collateral by the requisite
noteholders on April 1, 2010.  The sale of collateral was
completed on April 19, 2010, and the final distribution date was
on April 28, 2010.  Proceeds from the sale were insufficient to
repay the entire outstanding balance of the funding notes.  The
class A-1, A-2, B and C notes did not receive any interest or
principal distributions.

Blue Bell was a structured finance collateralized debt obligation
that closed on Dec. 5, 2003, and was managed by Ventras Capital
Advisors LLC, who had replaced Capmark Investments LP in September
2009.  The portfolio was composed of residential mortgage-backed
securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities and SF CDOs and
asset-backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn these ratings:

  -- $389,828,510 funding notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     withdrawn;

  -- $55,000,000 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     withdrawn;

  -- $20,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     withdrawn;

  -- $39,625,170 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     withdrawn;

  -- $22,882,331 class C notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     withdrawn.


BODEGA BAY: S&P Raises Rating on Series 1996 Certs. From 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'A-' from
'BB' on Bodega Bay Fire Protection District, Calif.'s certificates
of participation, series 1996.  The outlook is stable.

"The raised rating is based on S&P's view of the district's
substantially improved financial position and demonstrated voter
support for an increased tax levy," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Jen Hansen.

The district has been improving its financial position following
the near-doubling of the district's parcel tax in April 2004.
Since that time, reserve balances have risen from a low of 8.2% in
fiscal 2003 to what S&P considers to be a very strong 48% of
expenditures, or $865,000, at fiscal year-end 2009.  Management is
expecting a slight drawdown in fund balances of about $50,000 in
fiscal 2010.

For 2011, management projects an additional drawdown in fund
balances of about $100,000, which it attributes partially to the
termination of the agreement between Bodega Bay and the Russian
River Fire Protection District that had created efficiencies by
sharing executive staff.  However, according to the district,
reserves will remain at what S&P considers to be very strong at
42% of expenditures.  S&P understands that the district is
planning to levy its maximum allowable parcel tax in fiscal 2011,
which it has not done previously; management expects the tax will
generate an additional $100,000 in revenue annually.  District
management reports that as part of a plan to increase revenues, it
may, in 2012, bring to property owners a benefit assessment levy.

Bodega Bay Fire Protection District provides fire and ambulance
services in and around the unincorporated Town of Bodega Bay,
located about 40 miles north of San Francisco.  The current
population stands at about 2,500.


CAELUS RE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Series 2010-1 Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
preliminary 'BB+' rating to the Series 2010-1 Class A principal-
at-risk variable-rate notes to be issued by Caelus Re II Ltd.

Caelus Re II is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted company
licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands.  HSBC Bank
(Cayman) Ltd., as share trustee, holds all of Caelus Re II's
issued and outstanding shares in trust for charitable or similar
purposes.  The ceding insurer will be Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co. (Nationwide; A+/Negative/--) and certain subsidiaries and
affiliates.

Caelus Re II will cover losses -- plus loss reserves, if
applicable -- of Nationwide on a per-occurrence basis due to
hurricanes and earthquakes in the covered areas.

The risk modeling for hurricane loss estimates is based on AIR
Worldwide Corp.'s model CLASIC/2 V12.0 (standard catalog).  The
risk modeling for earthquake is based on v8 of the AIR U.S.
Earthquake Model in CLASIC/2 V11.5 (time-dependent catalog).
These models will be placed in escrow for the term of the
transaction and will be used to calculate the annual resets.

                           Ratings List

                         Caelus Re II Ltd.

                    Series 2010-1 Class A notes

                Preliminary rating              BB+


CALCULUS CMBS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Trust Units
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded seven Trust Units issued by
CALCULUS CMBS Resecuritization Trust due to deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate
since last review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's
current review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

CALCULUS CMBS Resecuritization Trust is a synthetic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps
referencing to 100% commercial mortgage backed securities debt
issued in 2004 (3% of notional balance), 2005 (77%), and 2006
(20%).

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 34 compared to 15 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa3 (80% compared to 87% at last review), and A1-A3 (20%
compared to 13% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 5.5 years compared to 6.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 56.5% compared to a mean of 62.7% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 57% compared to 64% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to the higher diversity of ratings distribution
in the reference obligations pool.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Credit Default Swap Class A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously
     on February 26, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-6, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February 26,
     2010 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on a periodic basis through a full
review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a press release
dated March 10, 2009.


CAPMARK VII-CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of CRE CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes from Capmark VII-CRE Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of
S&P's rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the 10 underlying loan assets
($167.4 million, 21.9% of the collateral pool) reported as
defaulted in the April trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying collateral assets, as well as the transaction's
liability structure.

According to the April 8, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* 46 whole loans and senior participations ($745.0 million,
  97.8%); andTwo subordinate interest loans ($16.9 million, 2.2%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated its credit estimates for
all of the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on
its adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most
recent financial data provided by the collateral manager, Urdang
Capital Management Inc., and the trustee, Bank of America Merrill
Lynch, as well as market and valuation data from third-party
providers.   Urdang Capital Management Inc. replaced Capmark
Investment L.P. as collateral manager on March 31, 2010.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes 10
defaulted loan assets ($167.4 million, 21.9%).  Standard & Poor's
estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan assets
reported as defaulted, which ranged from 0% through 100%.  S&P
based the recovery rates on information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers.  The
reported defaulted loan assets are:

* The One Loudoun senior interest loan ($39.2 million, 5.2%);

* The National Gateway at Potomac Yard senior interest loan
  ($25.2 million, 3.3%);

* The Town Square Las Vegas senior interest loan ($20.0 million,
  2.6%);

* The Warm Spring Crossing II senior interest loan ($15.4 million,
  2.0%);

* The Classic/Stamford senior interest loan ($15.4 million, 2.0%);

* The Dalcor Properties subordinated loan ($15.0 million, 1.9%);

* The La Palma Apartments senior interest loan ($14.3 million,
  1.9%);

* The Woodland Park Apartments senior interest loan
  ($13.5 million, 1.8%);

* The North Central Business Center senior interest loan
  ($7.4 million, 0.9%); and

* The Gables Floresta subordinated loan ($1.9 million, 0.3%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing all
three principal coverage tests but is passing all interest
coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                       Capmark VII-CRE Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                           Rating
                           ------
         Class     To                   From
         -----     --                   ----
         A-1       BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
         A-2       B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
         B         CCC+                 AA/Watch Neg
         C         CCC-                 A+/Watch Neg
         D         CCC-                 A/Watch Neg
         E         CCC-                 A-/Watch Neg
         F         CCC-                 BBB+/Watch Neg
         G         CCC-                 BBB/Watch Neg
         H         CCC-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
         J         CCC-                 BB/Watch Neg


CENTERPOINT ENERGY: Moody's Reviews on Debt & Obligations
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of CenterPoint Energy
Houston Electric, LLC's (Baa3 issuer rating) debt and supported
obligations under review for possible upgrade.  Moody's also
changed the rating outlooks for CEHE's parent CenterPoint Energy,
Inc. (Ba1 senior unsecured) and CNP's subsidiary and CenterPoint
Energy Resources Corp. (Baa3 senior unsecured) to positive from
stable.  In its actions, Moody's cited CenterPoint's solid
financial performance and improving financial position.

"CenterPoint Energy Houston is sustaining solid results despite a
large capital program and a weak economy," said Moody's Vice
President Mihoko Manabe.  "As for the CenterPoint Energy parent
company and CenterPoint Energy Resources, an improved balance
sheet and ample near-term liquidity should support a substantial
investment in the riskier field services business."

Moody's said that it could upgrade CEHE over the next few months
if the company continues to perform well.  Although CEHE faces
some uncertainty related to its imminent rate filing, Moody's
noted the generally constructive regulatory environment in Texas
and its expectation that the rate order would have at least a
neutral impact on CEHE's credit profile.

According to Moody's, CenterPoint's equity has strengthened by
organic means as well as from stock issued in recent years from
the conversion of convertible notes, offerings to the public as
well as to company stock plans.  As a result, these efforts have
reduced its debt/capital ratio to 66% at year-end 2009 (55%
excluding securitization debt), which is still high but down
significantly from the 70% range registered in prior years and
coming closer to about the 50% average for Baa3-rated electric
transmission and distribution holding companies.

CenterPoint's regulated businesses currently comprise almost 90%
of operating income, lending considerable stability to its
financial results.  Over the next few years, however, this
regulated component is expected to decline, with the unregulated
Field Services business growing faster than the mature regulated
utilities.  This spurt in Field Services stems from CERC's
gathering agreement with subsidiaries of Encana Corporation and
Royal Dutch Shell plc.  CenterPoint recently announced that the
gathering agreement was expanding beyond the initial project to
gather and treat the burgeoning gas volumes in the Haynesville
Shale.

Moody's noted that, while the Encana/Shell project will increase
CenterPoint's exposure to a riskier non-rate regulated business,
the project brings a new source of stable fee-based income with a
lower risk profile than under a conventional gathering and
processing contract.  The long-term agreement charges fixed
gathering fees, guarantees minimum volumes, and is structured with
some return-protecting mechanisms.  The project does not entail
gas processing, which would present commodity price risk.  Encana
and Shell are highly creditworthy counterparties that have made
sizable investments in the Haynesville Shale that substantiate
their strong strategic interests there.

Moody's said that this gathering project entails numerous risks
for CERC -- including construction risk in the near term and
volume risk longer term -- which at this early stage have been
mitigated by the project being financed mostly with equity.
Moody's added that more such investment in the midstream business
would entail sufficient additional equity to sustain CenterPoint's
positive rating momentum.

Another factor Moody's considered in the positive outlook for CNP
in particular is a decrease in the parent's indebtedness, which
indicates less structural subordination of CNP's debt to those of
its subsidiaries.  Less structural subordination would be a reason
to keep CNP's ratings notched closely to those of its subsidiaries
should they be upgraded, said Moody's.  Excluding CNP debt that is
collateralized by CEHE's mortgage, the amount of outstanding debt
at the parent has decreased from $2.4 billion (24% of total) in
October 2007 to $1.4 billion (about 15%, adjusting for bonds
repurchased and redeemed after December 31, 2009).  Given the
substantial cash balance with which it started 2010
($740 million), CNP has stated plans to retire rather than to
refinance $200 million of debt this September, which would further
reduce parent debt.

Among the issues that Moody's will be watching over the next
twelve to eighteen months are CERC's performance under the
Shell/Encana project and the evolution of CNP's capital structure
as the company pursues these initiatives and any future
transactions.  Moody's said that if these entities continue their
positive trajectory, either or both of them could be considered
for a ratings upgrade.

These CEHE's debt obligations are placed under review for upgrade:

On Review for Possible Upgrade:

Issuer: Brazos River Authority, TX

  -- Senior Secured Revenue Bonds, Placed on Review for Possible
     Upgrade, currently Baa1

  -- Senior Unsecured Revenue Bonds, Placed on Review for Possible
     Upgrade, currently Baa1

Issuer: CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC

  -- Issuer Rating, Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     currently Baa3

  -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
     Possible Upgrade, currently Baa1

  -- Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Placed on Review for
     Possible Upgrade, currently Baa3

Issuer: Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, TX

  -- Senior Secured Revenue Bonds, Placed on Review for Possible
     Upgrade, currently a range of Baa2 to Baa1

Issuer: Matagorda County Navigation District 1, TX

  -- Senior Secured Revenue Bonds, Placed on Review for Possible
     Upgrade, currently Baa1

  -- Senior Unsecured Revenue Bonds, Placed on Review for Possible
     Upgrade, currently a range of Ba1 to Baa1

Issuer: Reliant Energy HL&P

  -- Senior Secured First Mortgage Bonds, Placed on Review for
     Possible Upgrade, currently Baa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Positive

Issuer: CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: CenterPoint Energy, Inc.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Reliant Energy HL&P

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Moody's last rating action for the CenterPoint companies occurred
on June 30, 2009, when their ratings were affirmed and CEHE's
rating outlook was changed to positive from stable.

Headquartered in Houston, Texas, CenterPoint Energy, Inc., is
engaged in electric and natural gas transmission and distribution,
field services, and competitive gas sales and services.


CENTEX HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 63
tranches from 9 RMBS transactions issued by Centex Home Equity
Loan Trust and Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust.  Additionally,
the ratings of 10 classes were confirmed.  The collateral backing
these deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-
rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-A

  -- Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-B

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-C

  -- Cl. AF-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 13, 2009

     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-D

  -- Cl. AF-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-A

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Asset-Backed Certificates,
Series 2007-C

  -- Cl. 1-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010

     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-B

  -- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-B

  -- Cl. 1-AV-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-1, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AV-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


COLORADO EDUCATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2007A Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to positive
from stable on The Colorado Educational and Cultural Facilities
Authority's series 2007A charter school revenue bonds and series
2007B taxable charter school revenue bonds, supported by Windsor
Academy Building Corp., issued for Windsor Charter Academy.

At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'BB+' rating on
the bonds.  The outlook revision reflects S&P's opinion of recent
enrollment growth.

Should this growth translate into positive increases into positive
financial operations, S&P could raise the rating.

The rating reflects S&P's opinion of:

* The need to renew the school's charter multiple times over the
  life of the bonds (as for most charter schools).  However, the
  school had successful charter renewals in 2004 and 2009.  The
  charter next comes up for renewal in 2014;

* A November 2007 voter-approved property tax millage levy
  override within the public school district for both public and
  charter schools, providing Windsor Academy with about $90,000
  per year for operating costs;

* Completion of new classroom space and an increase in enrollment
  to 410 in fiscal 2010 (389 full-time equivalents) from 272 in
  2007, and the acceptance of 450 students for the 2011 academic
  year, with a good wait list of 195.  Final phase III
  construction was completed in October 2008;

* A shortfall of general fund expenditures over revenues of
  $102,665 in the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009, or 3.9% of
  expenditures, before the transfer out of $150,430 to a capital
  reserve fund and the receipt of $97,568 in casualty insurance
  proceeds;

* A favorable 91 days' cash on hand, using the charter school's
  method of investing the school's cash with the district and
  reporting it in the charter school's financial statement as a
  receivable due to the charter school;

* A high annual debt service carrying charge of 17% of combined
  internal service fund (which receives lease debt service
  payments directly from per pupil revenues remitted from the
  state treasurer) and general fund revenues.  The school is now
  paying level annual debt service nearly equal to maximum annual
  debt service; and

* No current plans for further debt.

"The positive outlook reflects S&P's view of the school's recent
enrollment growth," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst David
Hitchcock.  "Should this growth translate into positive financial
operations, S&P could raise the rating," Mr. Hitchcock added.

Charter school lease payments, subject to annual appropriation by
the charter school board, secure the bonds.  A mortgage and
security interest on Windsor Academy's facilities provides
bondholder security.  As Windsor Academy's only school building
and site, the leased property is highly essential; therefore, S&P
believes non-appropriation risk is mitigated.

Bond proceeds were used to pay off an earlier construction loan,
to expand the existing facility, and for other improvements, such
as converting a gymnasium into classroom space, building a new
15,000-square-foot gymnasium, two computer labs, and a band room,
as well as purchasing a one-acre parcel across the street for
additional parking.  The school's goal at the time of bond sale
was to complete construction by fall 2008, which it has now
accomplished.

Windsor Academy is in Windsor, Colo. (population estimated at
15,604), about 40 miles north of the Denver metropolitan
statistical area.  Weld County School District No.  R-4 initially
chartered Windsor Academy in September 2000 as a K-6 school with
157 students in its first year; the school district added seventh
and eighth grades over the next two years.


COMM 2004-LNB3: DBRS Downgrades Class J to 'B'
----------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed Classes A-2 through Class G, with Stable
trends.  Furthermore, DBRS has downgraded the ratings of six
classes of COMM 2004-LNB3.

  -- Class J downgraded to B from BB (high)
  -- Class K downgraded to CCC from BB (low)
  -- Class L downgraded to CCC - Interest in Arrears from B (high)
  -- Class M downgraded to C - Interest in Arrears from B (low)
  -- Class N downgraded to C - Interest in Arrears from CCC
  -- Class O downgraded to D from C - Interest in Arrears.

Classes J through N continue to carry a Negative trend.  In
addition, Class H is placed Under Review Developing.

The downgrades are a result of the recent liquidation of
Christy Estates Apartments (0.5% of the pool at issuance), at a
$1.8 million loss, and estimated losses associated with the Beyman
(Crossed Rollup) loans, representing a combined 2.1% of the pool:
Windover of Melbourne, Windover Goldenpoint. and Wedgewood Park.

Class O experienced a loss as a result of the liquidation of
Christy Estates Apartments.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in June 2009 for imminent default and became Real Estate
Owned (REO) following a December 2009 foreclosure sale.  The loan
was secured by an apartment/extended stay hotel (187 and 70 units,
respectively) located in Corpus Christi, Texas and a July 2009
appraisal valued the property at $2.1 million.  According to the
April 2010 remittance report, gross sale proceeds for the asset
totaled $3.5 million.

The Beyman (Crossed Rollup) loans are secured by multifamily
properties in Florida and are all crossed-collateralized.  The
loans were transferred to special servicing in June 2009, after
failing to obtain new financing at the July 1, 2009 maturity date.
The three loans have been on the servicer's watchlist since
July/August 2007 for low DSCRs, after experiencing a decline in
the combined DSCR (0.83x, as of Q2 2009) after switching to P&I
debt service payments, in January 2007.  The properties were
collectively valued at $14.3 million in July 2009, at which time
they reported occupancy rates between 85% and 94%.  The borrower
has requested an extension and modification which is being
considered by the special servicer while also dual tracking with
foreclosure.  DBRS will continue to monitor the status of the
loans closely.  The ratings take into consideration a liquidation
of The Beyman and assume the updated appraised value.

The performance of the transaction's remaining assets remains
stable overall.  The ten largest loans in the pool are strong,
many of which remain shadow-rated investment-grade by DBRS.  As of
the April 2010 reporting, the servicer's watchlist is small
representing only 3.3% of the pool and a total of 12 loans (22.1%
of the pool) are defeased.  DBRS will review the transaction again
upon receipt of a greater number of loan level YE2009 financials.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-C3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Loss Severity ratings and
Recovery Ratings, and revises Outlooks for Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial pass-through
certificates, series 2003-C3:

  -- $19.4 million class H to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.4 million class J to 'B/LS4' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $12.9 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+' Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.5 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $10.8 million class M to 'CCC/RR3' from 'B+';

  -- $2.2 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $4.3 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes
as indicated:

  -- $15.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $55 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $862.4 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- IO classes A-X, A-SP and A-Y at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $38.8 million class D at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.4 million class E at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.4 million class F at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.9 million class G at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.4 million class 622A at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.7 million class 622B at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.7 million class 622C at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.7 million class 622D at 'BBB-/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17 million class 622E at 'BB/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.5 million class 622F at 'BB/LS1'.  Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $19.1 million class P.  Classes A-1 and A-
2 have been paid in full.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 2.8% of the remaining pooled
balance, approximately $33 million.  The majority of the Fitch's
total expected losses are associated with loans currently in
special servicing.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
30.7% to $1.22 billion from $1.76 billion at issuance.  There are
229 of the original 250 loans remaining in the transaction, 25 of
which have defeased (16.2% of the current transaction balance).
Ten loans (5.3%) are currently in special servicing.  Fitch
expects losses from loans currently in special servicing to
deplete classes N thru P and impact class M significantly.

The largest loan (1.7%) in special servicing is collateralized by
a 708 unit multifamily property in Houston, TX.  In 2009, the loan
was extended for 12-months and return to the master servicer.  The
loan transferred back to special servicing in January 2010 due to
hurricane Ike damage and the borrower's ongoing litigation with
the insurance company; the insurance company has settled with
borrower and has recently issued a claims check.  The loan is
anticipated to be extended again and no near-term losses are
anticipated at this time.

The second largest loan (0.8%) in special servicing is secured by
an 81,054 square foot office building in Chester, PA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to payment
default.  The servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio and
occupancy as of June 2009 was 0.98x and 77%, respectively.  The
servicer expects the borrower to submit workout proposal and
updated financial information.

The third largest loan (0.7%) in special servicing is secured by
an 84,295 sf office building in Orlando, FL.  The loan originally
transferred to special servicing in December 2008 due to an
unauthorized transfer of ownership to an individual whose assets
were then seized by the authorities.  The property is currently
being managed by a court appointed receiver.  The receiver has
indicated that it intends to keep the loan current and sell the
property which may include an assumption of the loan.

The largest loan in the transaction, 622 Third Avenue, (18.8%),
is secured by a one million sf class A office building located
in midtown Manhattan.  The whole loan is divided into a
$191.6 million pooled portion, a $37.8 million non-pooled portion
(representing classes 622A through 622F) and a B-note held outside
of the trust.  As of April 2010, occupancy is 90% compared to 98%
at issuance.  Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-
defeased loans by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end
net operating income and applying an adjusted market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
seven loans (2.6% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2001-CK1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-
CK1:

  -- $27.4 million class J to 'BB/LS4' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.5 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded and assigned the Recovery Rating
as indicated to this class:

  -- $7.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B+'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings and
revises Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $324.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class A-CP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class A-X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class A-Y at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.9 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.6 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.6 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.2 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.7 million class G at 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.5 million class H at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

  -- $15 million class M;
  -- $5 million class N;
  -- $4.4 million class O.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 4.8% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $27 million, from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the transaction has paid
down approximately 43.8% to $560.3 million from $997.1 million at
issuance.  Thirty-six loans (47%) have defeased.  The Outlooks
reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over the next
one to two years.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, there are seven specially
serviced loans (9.5%).  The largest specially serviced loan is the
real estate owned Alliance IJ Portfolio, secured by a portfolio of
four multifamily properties.  Three of the properties have been
disposed of, and the remaining multifamily property is on the
market for sale.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the College Park
medical Office Building (2.1%) which is a 173,787 square foot
structure located in Detroit, Michigan with a maturity date of
Aug. 1, 2011.  The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2010.

Reflections Apartments (2%) is the third largest specially
serviced loan and is a 282 unit multifamily property located in
Fort Myers, Florida.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2008 for payment default and has subsequently been
modified with a maturity date extension until April 1, 2011.  The
loan will be monitored until it can be transferred back to the
master servicer.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 14 are not expected to pay off
at maturity, with four loans incurring a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 169 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 169
tranches and has confirmed the ratings of 5 tranches from 12 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by CSFB Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Trust in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The downgrade actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-12

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-3-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-6A

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CSFB HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 71 Tranches From 20 RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 71
tranches from 20 RMBS transactions issued by CSFB Home Equity
Asset Trust.  Additionally, the ratings of 25 classes have been
confirmed and the ratings of 3 classes have been upgraded.  The
collateral backing these deal primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-3

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 45 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 45
tranches from 7 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by Countrywide.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-14

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-63

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-71

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-84

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


EASTMAN HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Eastman Hill Funding
I, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$512,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due September
     29, 2031 (current balance of $119,912,527), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due September 29,
     2031 (current balance of $2,342,042), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on February 26, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$522,000,000 Class A-2 Interest-Only Notes Due September
     29, 2031, Downgraded to B1; previously on February 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3.

Eastman Hill Funding I, Limited, issued on July 2, 2001, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
corporate bonds and residential mortgage-backed securities.  RMBS
comprise approximately 41% of the underlying portfolio, of which
the majority were issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions consider the
nonpayment of interest to the investors of Class A-1 Floating Rate
Notes, Class A-1 Fixed Rate Notes and Class A-2 Interest-Only
Notes since the January 2, 2009 payment date.  Moody's has
assessed the ratings on Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Class A-1
Fixed Rate Notes and Class A-2 Interest-Only Notes based on the
fact that interest has not been paid on these notes and the
guidelines set forth in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default," dated November
11, 2009.  In addition, Moody's analysis indicates that the Class
A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Class A-1 Fixed Rate Notes and Class A-2
Interest-Only Notes are likely to experience very high recovery,
consistent with a B1 rating.  According to Trustee information, an
Event of Default on this transaction has not been declared.

Moody's received a notice from the Trustee, dated as of April 9,
2010, that there has been an ongoing litigation related to the
permission of use of asset swaps in the transaction.  As a result,
the Trustee has deposited all amounts due and owing to noteholders
into escrow accounts.  On October 2, 2009, the Court ordered the
disbursement of 81% of the funds held in escrow to noteholders,
and to continue to hold in escrow the remaining 19% of funds.  On
October 2, 2009 and April 2, 2010, the Court ordered the release
to noteholders 96% of the amounts held in escrow for the
September 30, 2009 and March 30, 2010 payment dates, and to
continue to escrow 4% of such amounts.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodologies and their supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
the publications below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)


  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
     Default (November 11, 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2000-C1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity Ratings and
Outlooks to First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-C1:

  -- $7.8 million class K to 'B-/LS3' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.8 million class L to 'B-/LS3' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch also downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these class:

  -- $8.7 million class M to 'CCC/RR3' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings
and Outlooks as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class, IO at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34.9 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25.2 million class E at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.1 million class G at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.8 million class H at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.9 million class J at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $8.7 million class N.  Classes A-1, A-2
and B have paid in full.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
upon the disposition of specially serviced assets along with
expected losses from Fitch's prospective review of potential
stresses.  Fitch expects losses of 10.6% of the remaining
transaction balance, or $16.1 million, from loans in special
servicing and loans are not expected to refinance at maturity
based on Fitch's refinance test.  Rating Outlooks reflect the
likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one
to two years.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 80.4% to $152.2 million from $776.3 million
at issuance.

There are 31 of the original 143 loans remaining in transaction,
seven of which have defeased (24.4% of the current transaction
balance).  Fitch identified 16 Loans of Concern (42.5%) within the
pool, of which 10 (30.3%) are specially serviced.

The largest specially serviced loan (7%) is a 70,853 square foot
(sq ft) retail property in Chicago, IL.  The loan transferred in
January 2010 for monetary default regarding the loan's impending
maturity in February 2010.  According to the servicer, the
borrower has been unable to secure takeout financing and the
servicer is discussing a possible extension of the loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan (6%) is a 141 room
hotel in Tampa, FL.  The loan transferred in August 2009 for
imminent default.  The servicer approved a modification for the
loan in December 2009 and the loan was brought current.  The loan
will continue to be monitored for return as a corrected loan.  The
modification includes a 12-month extension.

The third largest specially serviced loan (6%) is secured by a
206,011 square feet retail property in Decatur, IL.  The loan
transferred January 2010 due to the borrower's request for a
discounted payoff.  Per the borrower the property is currently 87%
leased, however, due to vacant anchor tenant space, the property
is only 8% occupied.  The servicer is continuing negotiations with
the borrower regarding the discounted payoff proposal.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Seven loans did not pay off at maturity with three
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings conducted its review of all outstanding U.S. dealer
floorplan asset-backed securities to assess the consistency of the
outstanding ratings with the revised rating criteria published on
Dec. 31, 2009.  As part thereof, Fitch downgrades two classes of
outstanding notes issued by Ford Credit Floorplan Master Owner
Trust A, series 2006-4 as listed below, removes them from Rating
Watch Negative and assigns Stable Rating Outlooks.

The rating actions are driven by the revised rating methodology
outlined in the new criteria, despite FCFMOT A performing within
the agency's initial expectations, the improvements in the
profitability and health of Ford's dealer network, and the recent
Issuer Default Rating upgrades by Fitch of both Ford Motor Company
and its captive finance subsidiary Ford Motor Credit Company.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks:

  -- Class A notes to 'A' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's rating actions are based solely on the application of the
current dealer floorplan criteria and the breakeven loss coverage
levels provided by the structure's credit enhancement which are
commensurate with 'A' rating stress levels for the class A notes
and 'BB' rating stress levels for the class B notes.

Similar to the last review conducted in April 2009, the review of
2006-4 is not driven by the asset performance of the trust.  The
2006-4 series performance in the second half of 2009 and through
March 2010 exhibited significant improvements over 2008 and the
first half of 2009, evidenced by improved dealer network health as
measured by a composition of internal credit groups.  In addition,
FCFMOT A has not experienced any net losses year to date and
monthly payment rates remain within historical ranges.

The revised rating criteria for the floorplan ABS applies higher
stress levels to non-diversified, high systemic risk bearing
dealer floorplan platforms.  Based on the exposure to systemic
risks, the updated criteria classifies dealer floorplan platforms
into two categories, A and B, with the category B designation
being assigned to the high systemic risk platforms.  Consistent
with Fitch's current dealer floorplan criteria, 2006-4 is assessed
as a category B platform.

Assessing the transaction under the updated criteria and
reflective of the utility value approach commensurate with
category B dealer floorplan platforms, Fitch made these
assumptions when analyzing 2006-4, all consistent with the revised
criteria:

  -- Dealer default levels were calculated assuming 100% initial
     defaults at 'AAA' stresses with dealer 'revival' credits
     based on the diversification of dealer franchises and dealer
     metrics, including absorption rate and internal credit tiers.
     Initial dealer default levels were then assumed at 90%, 75%,
     65%, and 50% for 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' level stresses,
     respectively.

  -- Dealer revival credit was haircut by 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and
     5% for 'AAA', 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' stresses,
     respectively.

  -- Base case recovery rates were derived based on the values of
     one year old vehicles and were further haircut.

  -- Asset yield was haircut by 35%, 30%, 25%, 20%, and 15%, for
     'AAA', 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' stresses, respectively.

  -- A 1% servicing fee is modeled on top of waterfall.

  -- The notes were assessed on their ability to withstand 48%
     dealer defaults at 'AA' stress levels, 38% at 'A', 31.3% at
     'BBB', and 29.6% at 'BB' at stress levels.

The primary assets of 2006-4 are receivables backed by dealer
floorplan financing agreements between FMCC and automotive dealers
primarily franchised by Ford. FMCC sponsors and services 2006-4.

The 2006-4 series was last reviewed in April 2009 when the class A
notes were downgraded to 'AA' from 'AAA', and the class B notes
were downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A'.  The downgrades were primarily
driven by the financial challenges impacting Ford and FMCC, along
with the poor state of the U.S. economy and auto industry as a
whole.


FORUM HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Bond Rating on $129 Mil. Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ca bond rating for
Forum Health (Youngstown, OH), affecting approximately
$129 million of debt as listed at the end of this report.  The
rating outlook remains negative.

Legal Security: Gross revenue pledge and mortgages on the primary
facilities

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                            Challenges

* Forum voluntarily filed to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
  U.S. Bankruptcy Code on March 16, 2009 and since then has been
  working on a plan of reorganization as well as asset sales.  The
  Ca rating level reflects no overall change in Moody's assessment
  that the recovery value of the bonds will be notably less than
  100% given the current information available.  As discussed
  below, the ultimate recovery value could improve if a potential
  acquisition is completed.

* Weak unrestricted cash of $37 million (37 days cash on hand) as
  of March 31, 2010.  As of March 31, 2010, Forum has an
  additional $44 million in the debt service reserve fund, which
  was previously funded under requirements of a master forbearance
  agreement.

* Accelerated bond repayments as J.P.Morgan did not renew the
  standby bond purchase agreement supporting the Series 1997B
  bonds ($26 million outstanding) and so the bonds are being
  repaid under a 5-year term loan; additionally, Forum's Series
  2002B bonds ($8 million outstanding) were accelerated following
  a draw on Fifth Third Bank's letter of credit.

* Heavily unionized workforce with about 75% of employees in
  unions, compared with a much smaller portion at Forum's primary
  competitor

* Even with operating improvement, margins remain weak and
  affected by competitive and economic challenges; the area has
  experienced population declines and below-average wealth levels

* Competition from a financially strong and equally-sized hospital
  system, which opened a new hospital in 2007

* Deferred capital spending in order to preserve cash levels

                            Strengths

* Forum is in discussions with a potential buyer for the system's
  assets; the likelihood of completing a transaction is unknown,
  given a history of delays and inability to complete other
  potential asset sales

* Unrestricted cash levels have been maintained (and recently grew
  in 2010) as a result of revenue cycle initiatives to improve
  collections, expense reduction initiatives and minimal capital
  spending.  In addition, the system has not made pension funding
  payments and filed for a Distressed Termination with the PBGC on
  September 15, 2009.

                             Outlook

The rating outlook remains negative.  A lower rating will be
considered if the recovery on the bonds is lower than Moody's
current estimates.

Rated Debt (as of December 31, 2009):

  -- Series 1997A ($69 million outstanding): Ca underlying rating;
     MBIA insured

  -- Series 1997B ($26 million): Ca underlying rating; MBIA
     insurance and standby bond purchase agreement from JPMorgan
     (as discussed above JPMorgan did not renew the agreement)

  -- Series 2002A ($26 million): rated Ca

  -- Series 2002B ($8 million): Letter of credit from Fifth Third

The rating assigned to Forum Health was issued on Moody's
municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to
recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.

The last rating action was on March 16, 2009, when the rating for
Forum Health was downgraded to Ca from Caa2 and the negative
outlook maintained.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 2001-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on GE Capital
Commercial Mortgage Corp., series 2001-1:

Fitch downgrades, assigns Loss Severity ratings and Rating
Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $14.1 million class G to 'A/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $25.4 million class H to 'B/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.3 million class I to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to this
class:

  -- $9.9 million class J to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BB+'.

In addition, Fitch affirms, assigns LS ratings and Rating Outlooks
to these classes:

  -- $692.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.5 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.5 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Interest-Only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes K, L, M, or N.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
(5.8% of the original deal balance) upon the disposition of
specially serviced assets along with expected losses from Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses.  Rating Outlooks reflect
the likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next
one to two years.

There are 138 of the original 151 loans remaining in transaction,
47 of which have defeased (38.9% of the current transaction
balance).  There are 14 specially serviced loans, of which, two
are in foreclosure, nine are 90+ days delinquent, and three are
current.  The largest specially serviced asset (1.7%) is a 280-
unit extended stay hotel property in Atlanta, GA.  The loan was
transferred April 1, 2009, due to poor performance.  As of
April 9, 2010, a moisture study identified substantial issues and
recommended significant remediation.  The property will not be
marketed until the moisture damage is properly repaired.  The
receiver is currently prospecting new sources of potential revenue
and ways to limit expenses.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.6%) is a 163,798
square foot anchored retail property in Federal Way, WA.  The loan
transferred Nov.  19, 2009 when the borrower indicated that he was
unable or unwilling to remit future payments as due.  The borrower
would like to negotiate a discounted payoff, but no proposal has
been received to date.

The third largest specially serviced asset (1.4%) is a 302-unit
multifamily property in Norcross, GA.  The loan was transferred to
special servicer Oct. 20, 2009, due to imminent payment default,
and payments after Oct. 1, 2009, are currently delinquent.  The
borrower has requested a modification, which is under review, and
foreclosure has been initiated.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Forty-six loans
did not pay off at maturity and 15 loans incurred a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Junks Rating on Series 2003A Certs. From 'A'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on GMAC
Commercial Military Housing Trust V's (Naval Weapons Station Earle
Laurelwood project) certificates series 2003A to 'C' from 'A', due
to the expiration of the project's 801 Department of Defense
Housing Lease on April 30, 2010.  The outlook remains negative.

Under the terms of the lease, the project will receive payments of
approximately $1.2 million in 2010 until the lease's expiration on
April 30, 2010.  In May 2009, the Department of Defense announced
that it would allow unimpeded public access to the housing upon
termination of the lease in 2010; if access is not provided, the
U.S. Government is obligated to purchase the units from the owner
of the project.   On April 9, 2010, Congressman Chris Smith of New
Jersey announced the U.S. Navy will not make the military housing
inside Naval Weapons Station Earle available to civilians.

The project owner, Laurelwood Homes LLC, is the owner of 300 units
of military housing at Naval Weapons Station Earle, in Colts Neck,
N.J.  Laurelwood Homes leases this housing to the Navy under the
801 Department of Defense Housing Lease program.  As of April 14,
2010, the owner has not presented any plans to Standard & Poor's
regarding the conversion of the project to civilian housing.


GRENADIER FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on three
classes of notes issued by Grenadier Funding, Ltd./Corp.

This rating action is a result of the sale and liquidation of
Grenadier's portfolio following an event of default on Dec. 28,
2009, declaration of acceleration on Jan. 5, 2010, and notice of a
direction to sell and liquidate the collateral by the requisite
noteholders on April 23, 2010.  The sale of collateral was
completed and the final distribution date was on April 29, 2010.
Proceeds from the sale were insufficient to repay the entire
outstanding balance of the funding notes, which Fitch does not
rate.  The class A-1, A-2, and B notes did not receive any
interest or principal distributions.

Grenadier was a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
July 21, 2003, and was managed by ACA Management LLC until May
2008, when management duties were transferred to Solidus Capital,
LLC.  The portfolio referenced residential mortgage-backed
securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, and asset-
backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn these ratings:

  -- $60,000,000 class A-1 notes to 'D' from 'C' and withdrawn;
  -- $15,000,000 class A-2 notes to 'D' from 'C' and withdrawn;
  -- $86,650,063 class B notes to 'D' from 'C' and withdrawn.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches from 3 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-14

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HARTFORD MEZZANINE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of CDOs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from Hartford Mezzanine Investors I - CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.,
a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transaction.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of
S&P's rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the three underlying loan assets
($58.1 million, 11.6% of the collateral pool) that were reported
as defaulted on the April trustee report.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying collateral assets, as well as the transaction's
liability structure.

According to the April 23, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* Seventeen subordinate-interest loans ($285.2 million, 57.2%);

* Seven whole loans and senior-participation loans
  ($154.5 million, 30.9%);

* One credit-tenant loan ($34.3 million, 6.9%); and

* Two commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) tranches
  ($25.0 million, 5.0%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its
adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral managers, Key Real
Estate Equity Capital Inc. and Hartford Investment Management Co.,
and the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., as well as market and
valuation data from third-party providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes three
defaulted loan assets ($58.1 million, 11.6%).  Standard & Poor's
has estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan assets
reported as defaulted, which ranged from 0% through 37.1%.  S&P
based the recovery rates on information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers.  The
defaulted loan assets are:

* The Georgian Towers subordinated loan ($25.0 million, 5.0%);

* The Campus at Playa Vista senior-interest loan ($24.1 million,
  4.8%); and

* The Olentangy Commons subordinated loan ($9.0 million, 1.8%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing all
three interest coverage tests and all three overcollateralization
tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Hartford Mezzanine Investors I - CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class     To                   From
           -----     --                   ----
           A-1       A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2       BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
           A-3       BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
           B         BB+                  AA/Watch Neg
           C         BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
           D         BB+                  A/Watch Neg
           E         BB+                  A-/Watch Neg
           F         BB-                  BBB+/Watch Neg
           G         B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
           H         B                    BBB-/Watch Neg
           J         CCC+                 BB/Watch Neg
           K         CCC-                 B/Watch Neg


HELLER FINANCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-PH1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on Heller Financial
Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp., series 2000-PH1 as indicated.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings to these classes:

  -- $7.2 million class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $9.6 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $5.9 million class M to 'D/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes, and assigns Loss
Severity ratings and Rating Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $45.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.9 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.4 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.3 million class G at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-Only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate classes H, J, or N.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
(2.8% of the original deal balance) upon the disposition of
specially serviced assets along with expected losses from Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses.  Rating Outlooks reflect
the likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next
one to two years.

There are 40 of the original 235 loans remaining in the
transaction, eight of which have defeased (22.5% of the current
transaction balance).  There are 15 specially serviced loans of
which, two are real estate owned, three are in foreclosure, eight
are non-performing matured, and two are current.

The largest specially serviced asset (7.1%) is a 511-unit
multifamily property in Topeka, KS.  The loan transferred Nov. 19,
2009 due to imminent monetary default.  The borrower expressed
hardship relating to weak market fundamentals and high property
tax expenses but will continue to make full debt service payments.
The foreclosure process has been initiated.

The second largest specially serviced asset (6.4%) is a 1,234,197
square foot industrial property in Chicago, IL.  The loan
transferred Oct.  15, 2009 due to maturity default.  The property
is performing well with occupancy and a debt service coverage
ratio of 92.6% and 1.09 times, respectively.  The special servicer
is currently marketing the property.

The third largest specially serviced asset (4.9%) is a 159,779
square foot office property in Akron, OH.  The loan transferred
March 2, 2010, due to a non-monetary default regarding the failure
to properly set up a Lockbox.  Occupancy is currently 76%, but Key
Bank is expected to leave their space in September 2010, which
would reduce occupancy to 63%.  Counsel has been assigned.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Eight loans did not pay off at maturity and
no loans incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


HOLYOKE HOSPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Bond Ratings to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating assigned to
Holyoke Hospital's bonds to Ba2 from Ba1.  The downgrade is
attributable to continued operating losses through four months FY
2010, and Moody's expectation that operating losses will continue
through the rest of the year and result in a further weakened
balance sheet and limit the hospital's financial flexibility going
forward.  The outlook remains negative at the lower rating level
reflecting the fundamental challenges facing the hospital.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a revenue pledge.  There
is no mortgage.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                            Challenges

* Long-term trend of declining patient volumes, although
  medical/surgical volumes grew 4% in FY 2009 Moody's do not
  expect significant volume growth going forward

* Small absolute size of hospital and weak market position.
  Holyoke is significantly smaller than its primary competitors,
  Baystate Medical Center (rated A2/Stable) and Mercy Medical
  Center (part of Catholic Health East, rated A1/Negative).

* Profitability is highly dependent on state supplemental funding.
  Despite the improvement in FY 2009, the long-term trend is one
  of marginal profitability.  Results through January 2010 suggest
  that Holyoke will incur an operating loss in FY 2010 without
  supplemental funding

* Underfunded pension.  Although the pension plan is frozen, there
  was an unfunded liability of $24 million (70% funded status) at
  the last measurement date and Holyoke will have to make future
  cash contributions to the plan.

* High and growing average age of plant of 17.7 years at FYE 2009
  that puts Holyoke at a disadvantage when competing with other
  area hospitals that make capital investments more regularly.
  Holyoke has underinvested in the physical plant, with the
  capital spending ratio averaging just 0.6 over the last three
  years.

                             Strengths

* State of Massachusetts submitted a CMS Waiver request that would
  provide $3.6 million in both FY 2010 and FY 2011 to Holyoke.
  Although Moody's expect the waiver to be approved, timing and
  receipt of the money are not known.

* Profitability in FY 2009 improved, although Moody's do not
  expect it to be sustainable.  Including supplemental payments of
  $2.1 million, the system recorded operating cash flow of
  $5.4 million (3.9% margin).  Net of supplemental payments,
  "core" operating profitability was stronger than its been in
  several years

                    Recent Developments/Results

Through four months FY 2010, Holyoke is performing negatively to
budget and is on track to record an operating loss of as much as
$5 million, which could mean ending the year with little or
negative cash flow from operations (based on January 31, 2010
annualized results).

Our expectation of an operating loss of this magnitude and the
negative impact it will have on the system's balance sheet and
financial flexibility is the primary factor behind the downgrade.
Moody's note, however that Massachusetts submitted a waiver
request to CMS on March 1, 2010 that, if approved, will provide
Holyoke with $3.6 million of supplemental funding in both FY 2010
and 2011.  With the receipt of the CMS funds and possible
additional funding from Massachusetts via the Essential Community
Provider Trust Fund, Holyoke may end FY 2010 with a cash balance
similar to the balance, despite having flat or negative operating
cash flow.  Through four months, Holyoke's operating loss is
$1.9 million (-4.1% margin), translating into negative operating
cash flow of $59,000.

Holyoke has pursued several strategic initiatives over the past
two years to shore up the system's financial position.  These
include closing the transitional care unit and employing
additional physicians, including orthopedic surgeons and OB/gyns
in order to increase volumes.  As a result of closing the TCU and
increased medical/surgical volume, Holyoke recorded improved
financial results in FY 2009 as compared to FY 2008 with operating
cash flow of $5.4 million (3.9% margin), as compared to
$4.8 million (3.4% margin).  In addition, Holyoke received only
$2.1 million of supplemental funding in 2009, as compared to
$4 million in 2008, indicating that "core" operating profitability
improved substantially over FY 2008.  Nevertheless, Holyoke faces
considerable fundamental challenges which contribute to variable
operating results and the maintenance of the negative outlook.
Moody's believe the primary credit challenge is its third place
market share in the demographically challenged market of
Springfield, MA.  Additionally, Holyoke has suffered generally
declining inpatient and surgical volume trends over the past five
years.

Through four months FY 2010, Holyoke has $11.8 million
unrestricted cash and investments, translating into a weak 31 days
cash on hand, down slightly from FYE 2009 at 36 days.  Including
the receipt of the CMS funds, Moody's expect Holyoke to have
approximately $12 million of unrestricted cash and investments on
hand at FYE 2010 which would equate to approximately 31 days cash
and 88% cash to debt.  Investments are allocated among cash and
cash equivalents (62%) and domestic equity mutual funds (38%).
All investments are liquid on a monthly basis.

                             Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the nature of the fundamental
challenges facing Holyoke and the fact that the system is likely
to show a significant operating loss in FY 2010, even with
supplemental funding.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Increasing patient volumes; improved and consistent profitability;
increase in unrestricted cash and improvement in balance sheet
metrics

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Declining absolute cash balance; continued operating losses;
reduction in supplemental funding

Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Valley Health Systems Inc.,
     and Affiliates

  -- First number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2009

  -- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 6,422; 6,573 (TCU admissions excluded from
  both years)

* Total operating revenues: $141.6 million; $138.2 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $5.9 million; $6.3 million

* Total debt outstanding: $16.0 million; $13.4 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $3.8 million; $3.8 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: 1.5 times; 1.5
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: 1.6 times; 1.9 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 3.3 times; 2.5 times

* Days cash on hand: 38 days; 36 days

* Cash-to-debt: 90 %; 98%

* Operating margin: (1.3%); (0.6%)

* Operating cash flow margin: 3.4%; 3.9%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of September 30, 2009)

  -- Series 1993B; fixed rate ($8.3 million outstanding) rated Ba2

The last rating action was on March 31, 2009, when the rating of
Holyoke was affirmed at Ba1 and the outlook revised to negative
from stable.

The rating assigned to Holyoke was issued on Moody's municipal
rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to recalibrate all
U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and therefore, upon
implementation of the methodology published in conjunction with
this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated to a global scale
rating comparable to other credits with a similar risk profile.
Market participants should not view the recalibration of municipal
ratings as rating upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the
ratings to a different rating scale.  This recalibration does not
reflect an improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's
credit opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.


INDYMAC INDA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 133 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 133
tranches from 19 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by IndyMac.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDB Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR11

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR13

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3

     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR15

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR17

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR19

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR21

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR25

  -- Cl. 1-A-1-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR27

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR29

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR31

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR33

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR35

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Five 2007-LDP11 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of five classes and
downgraded 20 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-LDP11.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses from
specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans and
concerns about loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Forty-one loans, representing 25% of the pool,
mature within the next 36 months.  Thirty-four of these loans (23%
of the pool) have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage less
than 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 20 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 31, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$5.37 billion from $5.41 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 265 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  There are no loans with underlying
ratings.  One loan, representing 1.2% of the pool, had an
underlying rating at securitization but it is now analyzed as part
of the conduit pool due to a decline in performance.

Seventy-nine loans, including five of the pool's top ten loans,
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Watchlisted loans
represent 38% of the current pool balance.  The watchlist includes
loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established
as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC; formerly Commercial
Mortgage Securities Association) monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
ChampionsGate Hotel Loan ($97.8 million -- 1.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 730-room hotel located near Orlando,
Florida.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in January
2010 and is currently 30 days delinquent.  The remaining twenty-
six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of multifamily,
manufactured housing, office, retail, industrial and hotel
properties.  Moody's has estimated a $367.5 million aggregate loss
for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 34 loans,
representing approximately 21% of the pool.  These loans mature
within the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X, have significant performance problems or are currently
delinquent.  Moody's has estimated a $248.5 million aggregate loss
on these loans (22% weighted average expected loss based on an
overall 44% default probability).

Moody's was provided with partial and year-end 2009 and full-year
2008 operating statements for 84% and 92%, respectively, of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool,
excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, is 135% compared
to 140% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's prior review was part of
the first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2008 vintage conduit
and fusion transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.17X and 0.79X, respectively, compared to
1.12X and 0.76X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 54 compared to 61 at last review.

The loan that originally had an underlying rating is the 175 West
72nd Street Loan ($62.5 million -- 1.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a mixed-use building located on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan.  The property consists of a 133-unit multifamily
component and 17,000 square feet of ground floor retail.  The
apartments are a mix of rent-controlled, rent-stabilized and
market rent units.  Moody's initial analysis reflected increased
cash flow due to the conversion of below market units to market
rent levels.  The conversion of units to market rent is occurring
slower than originally anticipated.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 85% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.31X at
securitization.

The top three loans represent 14% of the pool.  The largest
conduit loan is the GSA Portfolio Loan ($284.0 million -- 5.3% of
the pool), which is secured by nine office properties located in
West Virginia (4 properties), New York (2), Colorado (1),
Pennsylvania (1) and Kansas (1).  The portfolio totals 1.1 million
square feet and is approximately 100% leased compared to 97% at
securitization.  The portfolio is 97% leased to the Government
Service Administration.  The loan is interest only for its entire
term and matures in 2012.  Although performance has been stable,
Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow due to concerns
about near term lease expirations and softer real estate
fundamentals in several of the markets in which the properties are
located.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 147% and 0.70X,
respectively, compared to 152% and 0.69X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Maple Drive Portfolio Loan
($220.0 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by three
office properties located in Beverly Hills, California.  The three
properties total 583,000 square feet.  As of October 2009 the
portfolio was 92% leased compared to 97% at securitization.  The
largest tenant is Fox Interactive Media (28% of the net rentable
area; lease expiration 5/2016).  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
130% and 0.73X, respectively, compared to 145% and 0.67X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the 315 Park Avenue South Loan
($219.0 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
333,000 square foot office building located in New York, New York.
The property was 100% leased as of February 2010, the same as at
securitization.  The largest tenant is Credit Suisse (81% of NRA;
lease expiration 4/2017).  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 142%
and 0.69X, respectively, compared to 161% and 0.62X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $22,935,857, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 8/01/2007

  -- Class A-2, $915,605,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 8/01/2007

  -- Class A-2FL, $70,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 8/01/2007

  -- Class A-3, $283,043,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 8/01/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 8/01/2007

  -- Class A-4, $1,179,634,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class A-SB, $123,791,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class A-1A, $1,154,497,796, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class A-M, $541,415,000, downgraded to A3 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class A-J, $426,365,000, downgraded to B2 from A2; previously
     A2 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class B, $33,839,000, downgraded to Caa2 from A3; previously
     A3 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class C, $81,212,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa1; previously
     Baa1 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class D, $54,141,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa2; previously
     Baa2 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class E, $27,071,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously
     Baa3 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class F, $47,374,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     Ba1 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class G, $54,142,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     Ba2 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class H, $67,676,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     Ba3 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class J, $47,374,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously B2
     on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class K, $74,445,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously B3
     on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class L, $20,303,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     Caa1 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class M, $13,535,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     Caa1 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class N, $20,304,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     Caa2 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class P, $6,767,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     Caa2 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class Q, $13,536,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     Caa3 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010

  -- Class T, $20,303,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     Caa3 on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/2010


JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2000-C9 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance
Corp.'s mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-C9, and
assigns Loss Severity ratings:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.3 million class G at 'AA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.4 million class H at 'BB+/LS2'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $16.4 million class J certificates.  The
class K and class NR certificates have been reduced to zero due to
realized losses.  The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E have been
paid in full.

The rating affirmations are due to an increase in Fitch expected
losses following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses
and expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.
Fitch expects losses of 6% (approximately $3.3 million) of the
remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and the
loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 93.4% to $54.1 million from $814.4 million
at issuance.  Three of the remaining loans have defeased (13.5%).

As of April 2010, there are six specially serviced loans (34%).
The largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 1,017,399
square foot industrial facility located in Elizabeth, NJ.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2009 for imminent
default due to market conditions, which have prevented the
borrower from fully leasing the property.  The special servicer is
working with the borrower to cure the default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 250
unit multifamily property located in Colorado Springs, Co. The
loan is currently in foreclosure and the special servicer is
working with the borrower to take title to the property or payoff
the loan.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, one loan is not expected to
payoff at maturity and incurs a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2004-CIBC8 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-CIBC8 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 14 other classes from the
same transaction and removed two of them from CreditWatch
negative.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect the credit support erosion that S&P
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of four
specially serviced loans, as well as potential losses associated
with one loan that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.65x and a loan-to-value ratio of 77.3%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.28x and an LTV ratio of 96.8%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
38.5% and 22.2%, respectively.  S&P's weighted average DSC and LTV
calculations exclude four specially serviced loans ($24.0 million;
2.2%), one loan that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($4.6 million; 0.4%), and eight defeased loans ($56.7 million;
5.3%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the four specially
serviced loans and the one loan that S&P determined to be credit-
impaired, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss severity figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X1
and X2 interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 12, 2010, remittance report, five loans
($26.2 million; 2.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
ORIX Capital Markets LLC.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: two are real estate owned ($11.3 million;
1.1%), two are 90-plus-days delinquent ($6.9 million; 0.6%), and
one is in its grace period ($8.0 million; 0.7%).

The Hebron Heights asset ($10.2 million total exposure, 0.8%) is
the largest asset with the special servicer and has an appraisal
reduction amount in effect totaling $6.3 million.  The property, a
59,429-sq.-ft. retail center in Carrollton, Texas, was transferred
to the special servicer on Aug. 1, 2008, and the asset is
classified as REO.  The most recent financial performance data for
the asset indicated a DSC of 1.18x for year-end 2007 and 0.58x for
the six months ended June 30, 2008.  S&P expects a significant
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The four ($17.2 million, 1.6%) remaining specially serviced assets
have balances that individually represent less than 0.8% of the
total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated losses for three of
these four assets, as well as one loan that S&P determined to be
credit-impaired, which S&P discuss below.  S&P arrived at a
weighted average loss severity of 39.7% for four of the five
specially serviced assets.  ORIX has indicated that it is
considering a modification for the fifth specially serviced asset.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined the
Newport Center One loan ($4.6 million; 0.4%) to be credit-
impaired.  The loan is secured by a 67,500-sq.-ft. suburban office
building built in 1987 and renovated in 2003 in Colorado Springs,
Co. The loan appears on the master servicer's (Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC's) watchlist due to the upcoming lease expiration of
a major tenant.  The property currently has one tenant, a
Government Services Administration entity that occupies 55% of the
gross leasable area pursuant to a lease expiring in May 2010.
While the property manager does not believe that the tenant will
be leaving, it is S&P's understanding that a draft letter of
intent has not yet been circulated.  Lockheed Martin Corp. had
occupied the remaining 45% of the GLA, but it did not renew its
lease in August 2009.  Given the property's low occupancy, S&P
considers this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

S&P's analysis also considered the transaction's near-term
maturities.  By balance, 17.7% and 10.4% of the loans mature by
the end of 2010 and 2011, respectively, after excluding the eight
defeased loans and five specially serviced assets.  Of the 17.7%,
by balance, maturing in 2010, S&P attribute 13.5% to the Forum
Shops loan ($144.3 million), the largest loan in the pool.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 12, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $1.1 billion (97 loans), compared
with $1.3 billion (105 loans) at issuance.  The master servicer
provided financial information for 99.7% of the pool balance.  All
but one percent of the servicer-provided financial information was
full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or full-year 2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.68x for the loans in the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.65x and 77.3%, respectively, and exclude four specially
serviced assets ($24.0 million; 2.2%), one loan that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired ($4.6 million; 0.4%), and eight
defeased loans ($56.7 million; 5.3%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for the specially serviced and credit-impaired loans.  The
trust has experienced $13.9 million of principal losses (1.1%) to
date.  Twenty-two loans are on the master servicer's watchlist
($354.2 million; 33.0%).  Five loans ($18.7 million, 1.7%) have a
reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 10 loans ($51.9 million,
4.8%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $536.8 million (50.1%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.86x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans
were 1.79x and 75.6%, respectively.  Three of the top 10 loans are
on the master servicer's watchlist; one of these loans matures in
2010, which S&P discuss below.

The Forum Shops loan, the largest loan in the pool, has a
$144.3 million trust balance (13.5%) and a $512.1 million whole-
loan balance.  The whole loan consists of three pari-passu notes:
a $144.3 million note that was contributed to this transaction, a
$144.3 million note that was contributed to the JPMC 2003-CIBC7
transaction, and another $144.3 million note that was contributed
to the JPMC 2004-C1 transaction.  In addition to the first
mortgage, the whole loan includes a $79.1 million subordinate B
note that was also contributed to the JPMC 2004-C1 transaction.
The loan is secured by a leasehold interest in the Forum Shops at
Caesars Palace in Las Vegas.  The property is a class A super
regional mall containing a total of 641,753 sq. ft. that opened in
1992 with additions in 1997 and 2003.  The loan appears on the
watchlist due to ongoing litigation between the current sponsor,
the Simon Property Group, and a former partner in the subject's
ownership group.  According to the master servicer, a court date
has not yet been set.  In addition, the loan matures on Dec. 1,
2010, and the master servicer was unable to obtain an updated
status on repayment.  For year-end 2008, the reported occupancy
and DSC were 99.6% and 2.57x, respectively.

The Harbor Plaza loan ($79.6 million; 7.4%) is the second-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by a seven-building office complex
in Stamford, Conn., built in 1983 and consisting of 731,202 sq.
ft. The loan appears on the watchlist due to a decrease in
occupancy.  At year-end 2007, the reported occupancy was 88%,
which declined to 68% at year-end 2008 and remained at that level
through 2009.  For year-end 2009, the reported DSC was 1.41x.

The Central Bergen Properties loan ($22.7 million; 2.1%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool secured by real estate.  The
collateral consists of a 1,145,223-sq.-ft. property in Garfield,
N.J., built in 1902; the property is used for both manufacturing
and storage purposes.  The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a low DSC.  For year-end 2008, the reported DSC
was 1.34x and for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 88% and 1.21x, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC8

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----             ----------------------
    K          B       B+/Watch Neg                       1.92
    L          CCC     B-/Watch Neg                       1.33
    M          CCC-    CCC+/Watch Neg                     0.89
    N          CCC-    CCC/Watch Neg                      0.45

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC8

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----             ----------------------
    H         BBB-     BBB-/Watch Neg                     3.08
    J         BB       BB/Watch Neg                       2.50

                         Ratings Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC8

            Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------   ----------------------
            A-1A      AAA                       15.66
            A-2       AAA                       15.66
            A-3       AAA                       15.66
            A-4       AAA                       15.66
            B         AA+                       12.73
            C         AA                        11.42
            D         A                          8.79
            E         A-                         7.47
            F         BBB+                       6.01
            G         BBB                        4.84
            X-1       AAA                         N/A
            X-2       AAA                         N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-CIBC2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2001-CIBC2 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from the
same transaction and removed four of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P withdrew its rating on
the class A2 certificate following the receipt of its remaining
principal balance as noted on the April 2010 remittance report.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes reflect credit support erosion that S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of six
specially serviced assets, as well as potential losses associated
with two loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.39x and a loan-to-value ratio of 72.6%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.18x and an LTV ratio of 94.2%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
27.8% and 26.2%, respectively.  All of the adjusted DSC and LTV
calculations excluded six ($46.3 million, 6.1%) of the nine
specially serviced assets, two ($8.2 million, 1.1%) credit-
impaired loans, and 40 ($265.4 million, 35.0%) defeased loans.
S&P separately estimated losses for the specially serviced loans
and credit-impaired assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X1
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 2010 remittance report, nine assets
($63.6 million, 8.4%) were with the special servicer, Centerline
Servicing Inc. (Centerline).  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: seven ($48.7 million, 6.4%) are 90-plus-days
delinquent and two ($15.0 million, 2.0%) are less than 30 days
delinquent.  Three of the specially serviced loans have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect totaling $13.0 million.

The Gateway Executive Park loan, the largest loan with the special
servicer and the eighth-largest loan in the pool, has a total
exposure of $16.1 million (2.0%), which consists of $15.1 million
of unpaid principal balance and $1.0 million of advancing and
interest thereon.  The loan is secured by a 231,253-sq.-ft.
suburban office complex in Schaumburg, Ill.  The asset was
transferred to Centerline on March 30, 2009, due to imminent
payment default.  As of Dec. 31, 2008, the property had a DSC of
0.71x and was 86.0% occupied.  S&P anticipate a significant loss
upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The 230 East Avenue loan, the second-largest loan with the special
servicer and the 10th-largest loan in the pool, has a total
exposure of $14.4 million (1.8%), which consists of $13.9 million
of unpaid principal balance and $0.4 million of advancing and
interest thereon.  The loan is secured by a 162,829-sq.-ft. office
building in Norwalk, Conn., and was transferred to Centerline on
Dec. 23, 2009, due to imminent default.  As of the 11 months ended
Nov. 30, 2009, the property had a DSC of 0.17x and was 22.1%
occupied.

S&P anticipates a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The Wright Point Office Complex loan, the third-largest loan with
the special servicer, has a total exposure of $9.7 million (1.3%),
which consists of $9.6 million of unpaid principal balance and
$0.8 million of advancing and interest thereon.  The asset was
transferred to Centerline on Jan. 14, 2010, due to imminent
default.  As of the 10 months ended Oct. 31, 2009, DSC for the
property was 0.89x, and as of Dec. 31, 2009, the property was
82.5% occupied.  Centerline has indicated that is currently
negotiating a loan modification with the borrower.

The six remaining specially serviced loans ($24.9 million, 3.3%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.9% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses ranging from 10.0% to
79.3% for four of these assets ($17.3 million, 2.3%).  S&P did not
provide loss estimates for the remaining two specially serviced
assets ($7.6 million, 1.0%), as one of them was transferred due to
issues with insurance coverage, and the other was a recent
transfer.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined two
loans ($8.2 million, 1.1%) to be credit-impaired.  The Sierra
Technology Center loan ($7.1 million, 0.9%) is secured by a
109,012-sq.-ft. office building in Austin, Texas.  As of the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2009, DSC for the property was negative
0.34x.  The property is currently vacant.  Consequently, S&P has
determined this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

The Hulen Place Apartments loan ($1.1 million, 0.2%) is secured by
a 108-unit multifamily complex in Fort Worth, Texas.  As of Dec.
31, 2008, DSC for the property was negative 0.92x, with 62.6%
occupancy.  As of the six months ended June 30, 2009, DSC for the
property was negative 0.19x, with 70.1% occupancy.  This occupancy
figure has remained the same through Dec. 31, 2009.  Given the
ongoing occupancy and cash flow issues affecting the property, S&P
has determined this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

Two loans ($69.2 million, 7.2%) that were previously with the
special servicer have been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided the loans
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $758.1 million, which represents 78.8% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There are 118 assets
in the pool, down from 143 at issuance.  The master servicer for
the transaction, Midland Loan Services Inc., provided financial
information for 99.2% of the loans in the pool, and 98.2% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008, interim-2009, or
full-year 2009 data.  In arriving at S&P's current ratings, S&P
also considered the outstanding nondefeased performing loans with
final maturities in 2010 and 2011 ($413.8 million, 54.6%).

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.35x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.39x
and 72.6%, respectively, which exclude six specially serviced
assets ($46.3 million, 6.1%), two loans S&P determined to be
credit-impaired ($8.2 million, 1.1%), and 40 defeased loans
($265.4 million, 35.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for
these eight specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  If S&P
included the specially serviced and credit-impaired assets in its
calculation, S&P's adjusted DSC would be 1.33x.  To date, the
trust has experienced principal losses of $14.1 million relating
to eight assets.  Twenty-one loans ($148.6 million, 19.6%),
including the largest, second-, and fifth-largest real estate
exposures in the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Twenty-one loans ($106.4 million, 14.0%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.10x, and 18 of these loans ($94.5 million, 12.5%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $220.5 million (29.1%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.42x for the
top 10 exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for these loans were
1.34x and 76.7%, respectively.  The largest, second-, and fifth-
largest real estate exposures appear on the master servicer's
watchlist.

The Colin Creek Mall loan ($65.8 million, 8.7%), the largest loan
in the pool, is secured by 332,055 sq. ft. of a 1.1 million-sq.-
ft. regional mall in Plano, Texas.  The loan appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to its recent transfer back to the master
servicer on April 1, 2010.  The loan had been with the special
servicer due to the bankruptcy filing of General Growth Properties
on April 16, 2009.  On Dec. 15, 2009, the bankruptcy court
confirmed a modification plan for 85 GGP loans, including the
Colin Creek Mall loan.  Centerline has confirmed that the maturity
date of this loan was extended 60 months until July 10, 2016.  As
of Dec. 31, 2008, DSC for the property was 1.53x, and as of
Oct. 1, 2009, the property was 94.7% occupied.

The Augusta Exchange Shopping Center loan ($22.7 million, 3.0%),
the second-largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 257,780-sq.-
ft. anchored retail center in Augusta, Ga.  The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of Sept. 30,
2009, DSC for the property was 0.73x, and as of April, 1, 2010,
occupancy was 93.8%.  The property experienced significant tenant
turnover during 2009, resulting in lower average rents at the
property due to a decline in market rents.

The Crocker Richmond Portfolio loan ($17.2 million, 2.3%), the
fifth-largest loan in the pool, is secured by a three-property,
233,034-sq.-ft. office portfolio in Richmond, Va.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of
Dec. 31, 2008, DSC for the property was 0.98x.  As of the six
months ended June 30, 2009, DSC for the property was 0.86x.  The
property was 82.1% occupied as of Nov. 4, 2009.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC-2

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    H      BB-            BB+/Watch Neg                    4.36
    J      CCC+           BB/Watch Neg                     3.41
    K      CCC            B+/Watch Neg                     1.82
    L      CCC-           B-/Watch Neg                     1.19
    M      CCC-           CCC+/Watch Neg                   0.55

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC-2

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    D      AA+            AA+/Watch Neg                   14.03
    E      A+             A+/Watch Neg                    10.22
    F      A-             A-/Watch Neg                     8.64
    G      BBB            BBB/Watch Neg                    5.31

                         Ratings Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC-2

            Class  Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
            -----  ------        ----------------------
            A3     AAA                            26.08
            B      AAA                            21.01
            C      AAA                            15.93
            X1     AAA                              N/A

                        Rating Withdrawn

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC2

               Class     To                   From
               -----     --                   ----
               A2        NR                   AAA

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


KLIO I: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches of Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
tranches of notes from Klio II Funding Ltd., Altius IV Funding
Ltd., and Paragon CDO Ltd.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'CC' ratings on nine tranches from all three transactions.

Klio II Funding Ltd. and Altius IV Funding Ltd. are cash flow
collateralized debt obligation transactions, and Paragon CDO Ltd.
is a hybrid CDO transaction.

The rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of
default and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

Altius IV Funding Ltd. triggered an EOD following a default on the
interest payment due on the non-payment-in-kind (non-PIK) classes
(classes A-1F, A-1B, A-1V, A-2a, A-2b, and B).

Paragon CDO Ltd. triggered an EOD under its indenture because of a
continuing EOD under swap agreement (result of the issuer's
failure to make due payment to the swap counterparty).  Therefore,
no interest was distributed on the payment date.  As a result, the
interest payments due on the non-PIK classes (classes super
senior, A, and B) were in default.

S&P received a notice of liquidation for Klio II Funding Ltd. from
the trustee indicating that a majority of the requisite
noteholders has directed to sell and liquidate the collateral.

                          Rating Actions

                                       Rating
                                       ------
   Transaction            Class    To              From
   -----------            -----    --              ----
   Klio II Funding Ltd.   A-LT     CCC-/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. A-1F     D               CCC-
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. A-1B     D               CC
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. A-1V     D               CC
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. A-2a     D               CC
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. A-2b     D               CC
   Altius IV Funding Ltd. B        D               CC
   Paragon CDO Ltd.       Super Sr D               CC
   Paragon CDO Ltd.       A        D               CC
   Paragon CDO Ltd.       B        D               CC

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Transaction                     Class             Rating
      -----------                     -----             ------
      Klio II Funding Ltd.            A-1               CC
      Klio II Funding Ltd.            A-2               CC
      Klio II Funding Ltd.            B                 CC
      Klio II Funding Ltd.            C                 CC
      Klio II Funding Ltd.            Pref.  shares      CC
      Altius IV Funding Ltd.          C                 CC
      Altius IV Funding Ltd.          D                 CC
      Altius IV Funding Ltd.          E                 CC
      Paragon CDO Ltd.                C                 CC


LA VERNE: S&P Gives Stable Outlook on Debt, Affirms BB Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the rating outlook to
stable from negative on the City of La Verne, California's series
2003A and 2003B debt, issued for Brethren Hillcrest Homes.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' rating and underlying rating on
the bonds.

"The rating actions are based on S&P's view of Hillcrest's
progress with turnaround initiatives that S&P believes are
improving the organization's financial performance," said Standard
& Poor's credit analyst Kenneth Gacka.  "The progress is tempered
by S&P's view of a weak, though somewhat improved, balance sheet
with high leverage and very low liquidity."

According to management, construction delays, project cost
overruns, and some vacancy issues contributed to a sizable decline
in Hillcrest's balance sheet strength and weakened operating
performance starting in fiscal 2007.  In early 2008, a new CEO and
CFO were appointed and have since begun implementing a corrective-
action plan to restore the organization's financial strength.

Management estimates that entrance fees received for fiscal 2010
(net of refunds) will exceed the prior year's -- the $2.9 million
received through the first nine months of fiscal 2010 is roughly
equivalent to the amount received for all of fiscal 2009.
Management reports that sales are up significantly over the prior
year as well.  Additionally, management reports that it has
employed cost control measures to improve financial performance,
and that Hillcrest's average monthly operating expenses (excluding
one-time legal fees) have declined by 5.2% when comparing March
2010 year-to-date financials to fiscal 2009.

Operating margins have been negative for the last three audited
fiscal years, but are positive through the nine-month period ended
March 31, 2010, with a $0.5 million operating profit (a 3.8%
margin).  Adjusted maximum annual debt service coverage was, in
S&P's view, low in fiscal 2009 at 1.5x, but was above Hillcrest's
1.3x covenant.  Hillcrest has consistently exceeded its covenant
for MADS coverage.  For the interim period, profit margin has
improved to 5.7% and MADS coverage is improved yet, in S&P's
opinion, only adequate at 1.9x.

Adjusted debt to capitalization was high, in S&P's view, at 57.9%
at March 31, 2010, but has improved compared to recent fiscal
year-ends.  S&P understand that Hillcrest has no plans to issue
additional debt in the near future.

Hillcrest operates a continuing-care retirement facility that was
established in 1947 and was the first in California to be
accredited by the Continuing Care Accreditation Commission.  The
facility currently has 232 independent-living units, 72 assisted-
living units (including a 24-bed memory care facility), and 74
skilled-nursing-facility beds (although it is licensed for 79).
The campus is located on 53 acres in La Verne, approximately 30
miles east of Los Angeles.  At June 30, 2009, Hillcrest had
$43.9 million of long-term debt.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2002-C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P lowered two of these
ratings to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 16 other
classes from LB-UBS 2002-C2 and removed eight of the ratings from
CreditWatch negative.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on
five CMBS classes from Dadeland Mall Mortgage Trust's series 2002-
C2A.

The rating actions on LB-UBS 2002-C2 follow S&P's analysis of the
transaction using its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The
downgrades of the subordinate classes also reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of four specially serviced assets.  In addition,
interest shortfalls primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and nonrecoverable advance declarations
prompted us to lower S&P's ratings on classes S and T to 'D'.  S&P
expects these interest shortfalls to continue for the foreseeable
future.

S&P's analysis of LB-UBS 2002-C2 included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.72x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 61.8%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.49x and an LTV
of 78.9%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 18.4% and 24.6%, respectively.  All of the adjusted
DSC and LTV calculations excluded four ($24.1 million, 2.9%) of
the five specially serviced assets and 18 ($157.5 million, 18.7%)
defeased loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for the specially
serviced loans, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest LB-
UBS 2002-C2 certificates reflect subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class X-CL and X-D interest-only LB-UBS 2002-C2
certificates based on S&P's current criteria.

The affirmations on the Dadeland Mall 2002-C2A ratings follow
S&P's revised valuation of the Dadeland Mall, which secures a
subordinate B note that is the sole source of cash flow for the
Dadeland Mall 2002-C2A securities.  S&P discuss
the Dadeland Mall loan in detail below.

                     Credit Considerations

As of the April 2010 remittance report for LB-UBS 2002-C2, five
assets ($26.6 million, 3.2%) are with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc.  The payment status of the assets is: one
($5.6 million, 0.7%) is real estate owned, one ($4.1 million,
0.5%) is in foreclosure, one ($8.5 million, 1.0%) is a matured
balloon, and two ($8.4 million, 1.0%) are more than 90 days
delinquent.  Appraisal reduction amounts totaling $11.2 million
are in effect on these five specially serviced assets.

The 10 & 14 Pidgeon Hill loan ($8.5 million, 1.0%) is the largest
specially serviced asset and is secured by an 88,510-sq.-ft.
office building in Sterling, Va.  The loan transferred to LNR on
April 8, 2009, due to imminent default.  Negotiations for an
extension and modification are ongoing.  As of Dec. 31, 2008, the
property had a DSC of 0.08x, with 56.3% occupancy.

The four remaining specially serviced assets ($18.1 million, 2.1%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.7% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses ranging from 29.9% to
89.1% for three of these assets ($15.6 million, 1.8%).  S&P did
not provide a loss estimate for the remaining specially serviced
asset ($2.5 million, 0.3%), as a modification has been approved.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance of LB-UBS 2002-C2 was $844.7 million, which represents
69.8% of the aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance.  There
are 77 loans in the pool, down from 111 at issuance.  The master
servicer for the transaction, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., provided
financial information for 97.8% of the loans in the pool, and
98.8% of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008,
interim-2009, or full-year 2009 data.  In arriving at S&P's
current ratings, S&P also considered the outstanding nondefeased,
performing loans with final maturities in 2011 and 2012
($674.5 million, 79.9%).

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.80x for the LB-UBS
2002-C2 pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.72x and 61.8%, respectively, which exclude four
specially serviced assets ($24.1 million, 2.9%) and 18 defeased
loans ($157.5 million, 18.7%).  To date, the trust has realized
losses of $767,072 in connection with six loans.  Seventeen loans
($125.4 million, 14.8%), including the fourth-, sixth-, and 10th-
largest real estate exposures in the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Nine loans ($57.8 million, 6.8%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 real estate exposures for LB-UBS 2002-C2 have an
aggregate outstanding balance of $488.2 million (57.8%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.92x for the top 10 exposures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
these loans were 1.78x and 60.6%, respectively.  The fourth-,
sixth-, and 10th-largest real estate exposures appear on the
master servicer's watchlist.

The 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue loan ($45.6 million, 5.4%) is the
fourth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 259,081-sq.-
ft. office building in Washington, D.C.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to upcoming lease expirations
affecting a large percentage of the building.  All expiring
tenants, except one occupying 1.1% of the net rentable area, have
renewed or extended their leases.  As of Dec. 31, 2009, the
reported DSC was 1.20x, with 94.0% occupancy.

The Bank of America Tower loan ($31.3 million, 3.7%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 299,629-sq.-ft.
office building in St.  Petersburg, Fla.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  As of the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 0.91x.  As of Jan. 31,
2010, the property was 81.2% occupied.

The Southern Shopping Center loan ($11.7 million, 1.4%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 250,566-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in Norfolk, Va.  The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy.  As of the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.56x.  As of
Dec. 31, 2009, the property was 72.3% occupied.

                          Dadeland Mall

The Dadeland Mall loan is a $179.5 million whole loan that
consists of an A note totaling $155.2 million, which is split
into two pari passu pieces, and a subordinate B note totaling
$24.3 million.  The A note comprises an A-1 note with an
outstanding principal balance of $141.6 million and an A-2 note
with an outstanding principal balance of $13.6 million.  The LB-
UBS 2002-2 transaction includes both A notes, which together
represent the largest real estate exposure in the transaction.
The whole loan's subordinate B note is the sole source of cash
flow for the Dadeland Mall 2002-C2A securities.

The Dadeland Mall mortgage loan is secured by 422,363 sq. ft. of
a 1.4 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Coral Gables, Fla.
Reported DSC for the whole loan was 2.30x for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2009.  The collateral portion of the mall was
96.3% occupied as of Jan. 31, 2010, with overall property
occupancy at 99.0%.  Using a capitalization rate of 7.25%, S&P's
analysis yielded a stressed whole loan LTV ratio of 38.7%.

The April 16, 2010 remittance report for Dadeland Mall 2002-C2,
notes that the securities experienced interest shortfalls due to
nonrecurring expenses associated with Lehman Brothers' Sept. 25,
2008, bankruptcy filing.  While these shortfalls were originally
assessed in the November 2009 remittance report on a pro rata
basis to all five certificate classes in the trust, it is S&P's
understanding that the trustee will restate the report and apply
these interest shortfalls only to the most subordinate class of
certificates, in accordance with the waterfall provisions of the
transaction documents.  As a result, the class B-5 certificates
will have a cumulative interest shortfall equal to 0.05% of the
certificate balance.  At this time, S&P considers these shortfalls
to be isolated events, economically insignificant, and not
implying any weakening of the credit strength of the collateral.
S&P will continue to monitor the situation, however, and take
actions as S&P determine appropriate.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the LB-UBS 2002-C2 pool
according to S&P's conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.  The affirmations of the Dadeland Mall 2002-C2 ratings
are consistent with S&P's revised valuation of the Dadeland Mall.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    P      B+             BB-/Watch Neg                    3.02
    Q      CCC            B/Watch Neg                      2.13
    S      D              B-/Watch Neg                     1.77
    T      D              CCC/Watch Neg                    1.41

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class  To             From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --             ----           ----------------------
    F      AA+            AA+/Watch Neg                   14.67
    G      AA             AA/Watch Neg                    13.23
    H      AA-            AA-/Watch Neg                   11.44
    J      A-             A-/Watch Neg                     9.29
    K      BBB+           BBB+/Watch Neg                   7.50
    L      BBB-           BBB-/Watch Neg                   5.71
    M      BB+            BB+/Watch Neg                    4.28
    N      BB             BB/Watch Neg                     3.56

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C2
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2

           Class   Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
           -----   ------        ----------------------
           A-3     AAA                            27.03
           A-4     AAA                            27.03
           B       AAA                            25.06
           C       AAA                            21.83
           D       AAA                            19.68
           E       AAA                            17.53
           X-CL    AAA                              N/A
           X-D     AAA                              N/A

                   Dadeland Mall Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C2A

                          Class   Rating
                          -----   ------
                          B-1     AAA
                          B-2     AAA
                          B-3     AAA
                          B-4     AAA
                          B-5     AA+

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches From 19 RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 55
tranches from 19 RMBS transactions issued by Long Beach.  The
collateral backing these deal primarily consists of first-lien
subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 20.20%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by MBIA Insurance Corporation (rated B3).  For securities insured
by a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the
higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and
(ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of
the guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1

  -- Cl. I/II-M1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I/II-M2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I/II-M3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I/II-M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I/II-M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL2

  -- Cl. I-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL3

  -- Cl. I-A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 20,
     2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL1

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 111 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 111
tranches from 29 RMBS transactions issued by MASTR Asset Backed
Securities Trust.  Additionally, the ratings of 22 classes were
confirmed.  The collateral backing this deal primarily consists of
first-lien, fixed or adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.  (Aa3, Outlook Negative).  For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WMC1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM3

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-FRE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-NC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-NC3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-WMC2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-WMC3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-WMC4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-NCW

  -- Cl. A-1, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 20,
     2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 20,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp.
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-LC1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 11 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LC1.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from loans in
special servicing and highly leveraged watchlisted loans,
increased credit quality dispersion and concerns about refinancing
risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
lending environment.  Eleven loans, representing 18% of the pool,
mature within the next three years.  Four of these loans (3.4% of
the pool) have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
below 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 11 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 28, 2010.  This rating action
concludes that review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased 6% to $1.45 billion from
$1.55 billion at securitization.  The 139 mortgage loans that
collateralize these Certificates range in size from less than 1%
to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37% of the
pool.  The pool contains one loan, representing 8% of the pool,
with an investment grade underlying rating.  Two loans,
representing 1% of the pool, have defeased and are secured with
U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since last review,
resulting in a $1.25 million loss (69% loss severity).  Seven
loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the East Empire
Industrial Portfolio in Bend, Oregon ($11.5 million, 0.8% of the
pool), which is secured by three industrial buildings totaling
153,240 square feet.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in December 2007 and is now real estate owned (REO).  An
appraisal reduction totaling $4.0 million was realized April 2010.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
retail, industrial and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates
an aggregate $15.5 million loss for the specially serviced loans,
which represents an overall 43% expected loss.  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $13.8 million appraisal reduction for all
seven of the specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 11 watchlisted
loans, representing 4% of the pool, due to declining property
performance concerns.  Moody's estimates a $9.1 million aggregate
loss for these troubled loans (overall 26% expected loss based on
55% probability of default).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 operating statements for
95% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit
pool, excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, is 101%
compared to 104% at last review.  Although the pool's overall
performance has improved slightly since last review, credit
quality dispersion has increased.  Based on Moody's analysis, 56%
of the pool has an LTV greater than 100% compared to 29% at last
review and 20% of the pool has an LTV greater than 120% compared
to 15% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.40x and 1.02x, respectively, compared to
1.30x and 0.98x at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loans' actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure loan size diversity,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 43.  The
pool has a Herf of 38 compared to 40 at last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Glendale Galleria Loan
($117 million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.3 million square foot regional mall
(661,000 square feet of retail and office collateral) located in
Glendale, California.  The loan represents a 44% pari-passu
interest in a $260 million amortizing loan.  There is also a
$37 million B Note and $47 million of mezzanine debt held outside
the trust.  As of December 2009, the property was 95% leased
compared to 93% at last review.  Financial performance has
declined from last review due to lower revenue achievement and
higher operating expenses.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa1and 1.26X, respectively, compared to A3 and
1.40X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 16.3% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Colonial Mall Bel Air Loan
($120.2 million -- 8.3%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.3 million square foot regional mall (1.0 million
square feet of collateral) located in Mobile, Alabama.  Although
property performance has been stable in recent years, same-store
in-line tenant sales declined 8% between year-end 2008 and year-
end 2009.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and
0.92x, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.92x at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Four Forest Plaza and
Lakeside Square Loan ($58.8 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is
secured by two office buildings totaling 792,000 square feet
located in Dallas, Texas.  Performance has been stable since last
review.  The borrower has been chronically late in making debt
service payments and the loan is currently 30+ days delinquent.
The loan's anticipated repayment date is November 2010.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.79x, respectively, compared
to 122% and 0.91x at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the CNL-Cirrus MOB Portfolio
Loan ($57.7 million -- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by
seven medical office buildings and one surgical center located in
Dallas, Texas (six) and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (two).  The
portfolio totals 338,000 square feet and was 79% leased as of
December 2009 compared to 85% in December 2008.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.94x, respectively, compared to 96%
and 1.1x at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $77,316,265, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-3, $43,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-3FL, $119,667,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-1A, $210,459,210, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-SB, $88,067,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-4, $425,698,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class A-4FC, $25,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class AM, $154,625,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class X, $1,451,829,720, notional, affirmed at Aaa,
     previously assigned Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class AJ, $94,708,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class B, $32,858,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class C, $15,463,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class D, $28,992,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class E, $15,463,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class F, $25,126,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class G, $19,329,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class H, $21,261,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     April 28, 2010;

  -- Class J, $7,731,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class K, $5,798,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;

  -- Class L, $5,799,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on April 28, 2010;


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 14
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from three RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Merrill
Lynch.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades three classes, affirms 13 classes, and
assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2003-IQ4, as indicated:

Fitch downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $5.4 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.8 million class M to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B';
  -- $1.8 million class N to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks and LS
ratings as indicated:

  -- $11.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $449.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.2 million class B at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.7 million class C at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.5 million class D at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class E at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.3 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.2 million class G at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.2 million class H at 'BB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.6 million class J at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $1.8 million class K at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $558.8 million interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $426.3 million interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate class O.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 1.1% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $6.1 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 23.2% to $588.9 million from $727.7 million
at issuance.  Seven of the remaining loans have defeased (10.8%).

As of April 2010, there are four specially serviced loans (5.5%).
The largest specially serviced loan (3.1%) is secured by a 84,395
square foot retail property located in Los Angeles, CA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2010 due to imminent
default.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.2%) is secured by
101,286 sf office property located in Wauwatosa, WI (approximately
seven miles west of Milwaukee).  The loan transferred to special
servicing in August of 2009 due to concerns over being able to
refinance at the maturity date in November of 2009.  The borrower
continues to make principal and interest payments on the loan, and
an extension is expected.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Four loans did not
pay off at maturity with two loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Various Actions on 2004-IQ7 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust, series 2004-IQ7:

Fitch downgrades, assigns LS ratings and Rating Outlooks to these
classes:

  -- $5.4 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4.3 million class J to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.2 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings (RRs)
to these classes:

  -- $2.2 million class L to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B+';
  -- $2.2 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B';
  -- $2.2 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings
and Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $34.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $550.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-Y at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.1 million class B at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.7 million class C at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.8 million class D at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.4 million class E at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.4 million class F at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.3 million class G at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate class O.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
(1.6% of the current deal balance) upon the disposition of
specially serviced assets along with expected losses from Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses.  Outlooks reflect the
likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one
to two years.

There are 123 of the original 129 loans remaining in the
transaction, seven of which have defeased (15.4% of the current
transaction balance).  There are two specially serviced loans of
which, one is 90+ days delinquent, and one is non-performing
matured.

The largest specially serviced asset (1.7%) is a 85,753 square
foot mixed-use property in Coral Spring, FL.  The loan transferred
Jan. 28, 2009, due to maturity default.  A two-year loan extension
proposal was presented to the borrower.  Counsel has been engaged.

The second specially serviced asset (0.3%) is a 105-unit
multifamily property in Middle Island, NY.  The loan transferred
Aug. 6, 2007, due to monetary default.  Payments for October 2009
and on are currently delinquent.  The loan will remain in special
servicing until three consecutive monthly payments are made.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Fifty-four loans did not payoff at maturity, and 16
loans incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2001-TOP3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded eight classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I
Trust 2001-TOP3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-TOP3.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and highly leveraged loans and concerns
about refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity
in an adverse environment.  Excluding defeased loans, 93 loans,
representing 67% of the pool, mature within the next two years.
Ten of these loans, representing 7% of the pool that have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed eight classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 25, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 32% to $699.9 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 133 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 32% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan,
representing 5% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  Twenty loans, representing 16% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last
review represented 15% of the pool.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Detroit
Center Tool Building ($13.7 million -- 2% of the pool), which is
secured by an industrial building located in Sterling Heights,
Michigan.  The loan transferred into special servicing in December
2009 because the building's sole tenant vacated the property at
the expiration of its lease.  The loan is in the process of
foreclosure.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of industrial, retail and office properties.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $22.5 million loss for all of the specially serviced
loans (overall 59% expected loss).  The servicer has recognized an
aggregate $6.2 million appraisal reduction for two of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five loans
representing 12% of the pool.  These loans either mature within
the next two years and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than
1.00X or have experienced significant declines in performance.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $6.0 million loss for these
loans (overall 25% expected loss based on a weighted average 57%
default probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 98% and 88%, respectively, of the pool.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's conduit
weighted average LTV is 71% compared to 73% at Moody's prior
review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.51X and 1.67X, respectively, compared to
1.55X and 1.65X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 41 compared to 43 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with the underlying rating is the Federal Plaza Loan
($32.4 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 242,000
square foot anchored retail center located approximately 20 miles
north of Washington, D.C.  in Rockville, Maryland.  The center was
93% leased as of December 2009 compared to 96% at last review.
Major tenants include T.J.Maxx and Ross Dress for Less.
Performance has been relatively stable since last review.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.70X
compared to A3 and 1.77X at Moody's last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 15.1% of the
pool balance.  The largest conduit loan is the 140 Kendrick Street
Loan ($50.8 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by
three office buildings located in Needham, Massachusetts.  The
buildings total 381,000 square feet and are 100% leased to
Parametric Technology Corporation as its corporate headquarters
through November 2012.  The loan matures in July 2013.  Property
performance has been stable since securitization.  Moody's
valuation reflects a dark lit analysis and reflects weaker market
fundamentals than at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 85% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.27X at last
review.

The second conduit loan is the 111 Pine Street Loan ($31.2 million
-- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 216,000 square foot
office building located in the Financial District of San
Francisco, California.  The property was 81% leased as of December
2009, essentially the same as last review.  The largest tenant is
First Republic Bank which leases 49% of the property's net
rentable area through November 2010.  The servicer has indicated
that First Republic has negotiated a ten-year renewal for the
space.  Financial performance has declined slightly since last
review and the property has significant near-term lease
expirations.  The loan matures in June 2011.  Moody's has assumed
a high probability of a maturity default due to the property's
significant near-term lease rollover exposure and a soft San
Francisco office market.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100%
and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.15X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the York Galleria Loan
($23.7 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 769,300 square foot regional mall located
in York, Pennsylvania.  The loan represents a 50% pari pasu
interest in a $47.4 million loan.  The mall is anchored by Sears,
JC Penney, Boscov's and Bon Ton.  The inline space was 91% leased
as of March 2010 compared to 99% at last review.  The loan matures
in December 2010.  Moody's stressed the cash flow due to concerns
about near term lease rollover and a weak retail environment.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.26X, respectively,
compared 82% and 1.32X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-4, $557,235,583, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     7/30/2001 assigned Aaa

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 7/30/2001
     assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, $30,843,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 7/9/2007
     upgraded to Aaa from Aa1

  -- Class C, $28,273,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa2; previously
     on 3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, $12,852,000, downgraded to A3 from A1; previously on
     3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, $17,992,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2; previously
     on 3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, $11,566,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously
     on 3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class G, $11,566,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1; previously
     on 3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class H, $10,281,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     on 3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class J, $8,996,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously on
     3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class L, $5,140,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
     3/25/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class M, $1,339,369, affirmed at C; previously on 3/25/2010
     downgraded to C from Ca


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2007-XLF Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Capital I Inc Series 2007-XLF under review for possible
downgrade.  This includes four pooled classes due to the
deterioration in the overall performance of the assets in the
trust and three non-pooled, or rake, classes due to performance
issues specific to the HRO Hotel Portfolio Loan and the Starco
Office Portfolio Loan.

The certificates are collateralized by ten floating-rate loans.
The largest three account for 49.7% of the pooled balance.  The
pool composition includes office properties (47.3% of the pooled
balance), hotel properties (39.8% of the pooled balance), and land
(12.9%).

There is currently one loan in special servicing (The New Boston
Office Portfolio Loan -- 8.0% of the pooled balance).  It was
transferred to special servicing on February 8, 2010 due to the
borrower's inability to post additional collateral of $3.5 million
required to satisfy the debt service coverage ratio test necessary
to qualify for the maturity extension to February 9, 2011.  The
loan was modified on April 9, 2010, and will be transferred back
to the master servicer once the three month rehabilitation period
is completed.  Terms of the loan modification include an extension
of the loan maturity to February 9, 2011, with the option to
extend for an additional twelve months.  The additional collateral
required to satisfy the DSCR test can be posted in installments
through January 9, 2011.  Property release provisions were
modified to allow the release of an underperforming property in a
manner that would be accretive to the lender.  Additionally, a
letter of credit in the amount of $9.2 million that was posted by
the borrower in July 2007 to meet the DSCR test after the release
of one property can now be drawn and applied to pay down the loan.
The servicer expects that this will occur on the May 2010 payment
date.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $229,729,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 affirmed at Aaa

  -- Class B, $41,211,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Aa2 from
     Aaa

  -- Class C, $41,211,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A1 from
     Aa1

  -- Class D, $25,190,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A3 from
     Aa2

  -- Class M-HRO, $5,261,723, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B1 from
     Baa2

  -- Class N-HRO, $8,111,822, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B2 from
     Baa3

  -- Class M-STR, $2,886,176, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 from
     Baa3


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D' from
'CCC-'on the class C notes from National Collegiate Student Loan
Trust 2006-1.

S&P lowered its rating to 'D' because this class did not receive
interest payments on the April  26, 2010, distribution date due to
a breach of the transaction's class C note interest trigger.  The
class C note interest trigger is tested monthly, and the breach
can be cured if the transaction passes the appropriate performance
tests on subsequent distribution dates.  However, S&P believes
that while the class C note interest trigger may cure for short
periods going forward, it will be breached over the long term due
to the adverse performance trends displayed by the underlying pool
of private student loans and the current pace of defaults the
transaction experiences.  Although this transaction has a reserve
account in place for the benefit of the rated notes, the
transaction documents do not contemplate a withdrawal from the
reserve account when the class C interest reprioritization is in
effect.

The transaction breached its class C note interest trigger due to
a combination of the failure of the cumulative default rate and
parity tests and TERI's discontinuation of making claim payments.
The transaction failed its cumulative default rate test after it
exceeded the scheduled cumulative default threshold rate, which
resets upward each year through May 2013 (see cumulative default
rate threshold resets below).  As of the April 26, 2010, payment
date, the cumulative default rate was 14.31%, which exceeded the
threshold rate at that time of 11.75%.  The threshold will
increase to 15.75% on May 1, 2010.  S&P believes the transaction
may cure the trigger in the next distribution period solely due to
this increased threshold level.  However, S&P expects that within
the subsequent two to three distribution periods, the rising
cumulative default rate will once again cause the transaction to
breach the trigger threshold.

The transaction failed its parity test because the aggregate
outstanding balance of the class A and B notes exceeded the sum of
the collateral balance plus the amounts on deposit in the reserve
account by 0.04% as of the April 26, 2010, distribution date.  S&P
expects that the parity test will continue to fail for the
foreseeable future.

     Cumulative Default Rate Threshold Resets - Series 2006-1

               Date                          CDR (%)
               ----                          -------
               3/1/2007                         1.50
               5/1/2007                         2.00
               5/1/2008                         5.75
               5/1/2009                        11.75
               5/1/2010                        15.75
               5/1/2011                        19.00
               5/1/2012                        21.00
               5/1/2013                        22.50

                  CDR -- Cumulative default rate.


OFFICE PORTFOLIO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2001-HRPT Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Office Portfolio Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-HRPT and assigned
Rating Outlooks:

  -- $5.2 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $91 million class A-2FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class IO at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class B-FL at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.6 million class C-FL at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11 million class D at 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10 million class E at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.1 million class E-FL at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.7 million class F at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.8 million class G at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.1 million class H at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmations and Stable Outlook assignments are a result of
stable performance since the previous Fitch rating action.  A
decline in portfolio-wide occupancy to 89.8% from 94.3% has been
offset by a 2% increase in Fitch-adjusted net cash flow and
scheduled amortization.

The transaction collateral consists of approximately 2.1 million
square feet of office space corresponding to six properties
located in four metropolitan markets.  Occupancy has remained
relatively steady for four of the six collateral properties,
ranging from 87%-100% as of Dec. 1, 2009.  However, two
properties, Lakewood on the Park in Austin, TX and Herald Square
in Washington, D.C., have experienced notable declines in
occupancy relative to the previous review at 12% and 17%,
respectively.  Across the portfolio, rollover is most concentrated
in 2010 and 2012.  The portfolio-wide expiration schedule is:

  -- 2010: 11.1%;
  -- 2011: 8.1%;
  -- 2012: 17.9%;
  -- 2013: 7.4%;
  -- 2014: 8.1%.

Weighted-average rents in place at each of the six properties are
at or slightly below market.

Fitch analyzed the most recent operating statement analysis
reports provided by the servicer, which were dated as of Sept. 30,
2009.  The Fitch-adjusted net cash flow increased slightly to
approximately $30.8 million, representing an increase of 2%
relative to the previous review and a decrease of 6.3% compared
with issuance.  The debt service coverage ratio for the portfolio,
based on the Fitch stressed NCF and a 9.66% refinance constant,
was 1.39 times as of third-quarter 2009.

The fixed-rate loan has a 6.814% coupon and has amortized
approximately 11.9% since issuance.  The current balance of the
transaction is $229 million, down from $259.8 million at issuance.
The loan is scheduled to mature Jan. 31, 2011, with no extension
options.  Leverage is moderate, with a loan amount per square foot
of $107 and a Fitch stressed loan-to-value ratio of approximately
66.9% based on capitalization of the Fitch-adjusted net cash flow
at a rate of 9%.


ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of notes issued from Origen Manufactured Housing Contract
Trust's series 2002-A, 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B.  In addition,
S&P placed five of the lowered ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Furthermore, S&P affirmed its ratings on
28 classes of notes and certificates issued by Origen Manufactured
Housing Contract Trust's series 2002-A, 2004-A, 2004-B, 2005-A,
and 2005-B.

Standard & Poor's revised its loss expectations upward for six of
the eight outstanding Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
series and maintained its initial loss expectation for two series.
S&P based the increased loss expectations on its analysis of each
transaction's current performance including an increase in the
monthly net loss rate, repossession inventory, delinquencies, and
declining recovery rates during the last several months, combined
with S&P's forward-looking analysis.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's view that current credit
enhancement for class M-2 from series 2002-A, as well as all
classes from series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B, is no longer
sufficient to maintain the current ratings in relation to S&P's
revised expected net losses.  The current loss performance and
recovery rates for these transactions have reduced the amount of
available credit enhancement for each of these deals.

Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on five of the downgraded
notes on CreditWatch negative due to its assessment of the
increase in repossession inventory, increases in losses for series
2006-A, and the recent spikes in cumulative net losses for series
2007-A and 2007-B resulting from the treatment of "late-stage"
delinquencies and repossessed inventory under the recently
instituted charge-off policy for series 2007-A and 2007-B.
According to this policy, loans must be charged off when they
become more than 360 days delinquent or 180 days after the
collateral has been repossessed, whichever comes first.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the current credit
enhancement in each transaction is sufficient to maintain the
ratings at the current rating levels in relation to S&P's revised
or initial expected net losses.

                             Table 1a

                      Cumulative Net Losses
                (As of the April 2010 distribution)

                  Pool                 Former(ii)    Revised
                  factor  Current      lifetime      lifetime
   Series  Month  (%)     CNL (%) (i)  CNL exp. (%)  CNL exp. (%)
   ------  -----  ------  -----------  ------------  ------------
   2002-A  97     35.77   20.57        27.5-28.5     29.5-30.5
   2004-A  74     44.08   7.14         12.0-13.0     13.0-14.0
   2004-B  67     48.17   5.74         11.5-12.5     11.5-12.5
   2005-A  59     54.38   4.22         11.5-12.5     11.5-12.5
   2005-B  52     60.78   4.22         10.5-11.5     13.5-14.5
   2006-A  44     67.64   3.93         10.0-11.0     14.5-15.5
   2007-A  37     73.00   4.10         8.25-9.25     12.0-14.0
   2007-B  30     79.69   3.98         8.00-9.00     14.0-16.0

     (i) CNL-cumulative net loss.

     (ii) For series 2002-A, initial expected losses were 12.00%
          and have been revised several times since deal
          inception.  Losses were revised to 27.50%-28.50% in
          2008.

                             Table 1B

                      Collateral Performance
                (As of the April 2010 distribution)

                       Pool    60-plus
                       factor  day           Repo
        Series  Month  (%)     delinq. (%)   Inventory (%)
        ------  -----  ------  -----------   -------------
        2002-A  97     35.77   1.73          0.58
        2004-A  74     44.08   0.72          0.93
        2004-B  67     48.17   0.54          0.97
        2005-A  59     54.38   0.53          1.92
        2005-B  52     60.78   1.10          3.46
        2006-A  44     67.64   2.02          3.42
        2007-A  37     73.00   1.15          2.48
        2007-B  30     79.69   1.79          2.10

Series 2002-A through 2005-B are structured, based on the
transaction documents, with a sequential principal payment
structure, which pays principal to the senior classes of notes in
full before the subordinate classes receive principal payments.
However, if certain performance tests defined in the transaction
documents are met and credit enhancement is at its targeted level
on or after a defined date for each transaction, the mezzanine and
subordinate tranches will receive a pro rata share of principal
with the class A notes.  Series 2002-A has been unable to meet the
performance tests, and as such, the transaction continues to pay
principal sequentially, and S&P expects this to continue in the
future.  Series 2004-A, 2004-B, and 2005-A have each passed their
defined performance tests and their credit enhancement is at the
target levels.  As such, they are currently paying principal pro
rata, and S&P expects this to continue in the future.  Series
2005-B is currently not at its target overcollateralization
amount, so it is paying principal sequentially.  S&P believes that
this transaction may eventually switch to a pro rata principal
payment structure.  As such, S&P reviewed all classes using both
sequential and pro rata principal payment structures.

Series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B are structured, based on the
transaction documents, with a sequential principal payment
structure.  In addition, each transaction contains performance
tests, which if met at a defined date, will allow for a reduction
in the required overcollateralization amount.  Currently, however,
increased losses and delinquencies are reducing each transaction's
overcollateralization.  These are not the defined reductions that
the transaction documents allow to reduce overcollateralization.

Furthermore, series 2007-A and series 2007-B have breached loss
and delinquency performance tests which, as per the transaction
documents, require the servicer, Green Tree Servicing LLC, to
fully charge-off loans when the loan becomes more than 360 days
delinquent or 180 days after the collateral has been repossessed,
whichever comes first.  To date, none of the series S&P reviewed,
except for series 2004-A, has a charge-off policy based on
delinquencies or time in repossession.  Therefore, most charge-
offs are taken when repossessed collateral is liquidated and the
loss is actually realized.  As a result of the change in the
charge-off policy for series 2007-A and 2007-B, a sizeable
percentage of delinquent loans and repossessed inventory has been
charged-off even though the collateral has yet to be liquidated.
This has caused spikes in the cumulative net losses for series
2007-A and 2007-B, as much of the charged-off collateral has not
realized recoveries.  S&P believes that the pace of net losses
will eventually slow as recoveries are realized; however,
repossession inventory continues to rise and delinquencies have
started to increase, which S&P believes could cause additional
charge-offs in the near future.

The issuer initially structured each transaction with credit
enhancement in the form of subordination for the higher rated
tranches, and all classes benefit from overcollateralization and
excess spread.  In addition, series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B are
insured by a bond insurance policy issued from Ambac Assurance
Corp. (R/--/--).  Under S&P's criteria, the issue credit rating on
a fully credit-enhanced bond issue is the higher of two ratings:
the rating on the credit enhancer, or the SPUR (Standard & Poor's
underlying rating) on the class.

                             Table 2

                     Hard Credit Support (ii)
               (As of the April 2010 distribution)

                               Total hard    Current Total
                       Pool    credit        hard credit
                       factor  support at    support (ii)
     Series  Class(i)  (%)     Issuance (%) (ii) (% of current)
     ------  --------  ------  ------------  ------------------
     2002-A  A         35.77   28.00         69.10
     2002-A  M-1       35.77   19.50         45.34
     2002-A  M-2       35.77   11.50         22.97
     2002-A  B-1       35.77    4.00          2.00
     2004-A  A         44.08   34.00         63.00
     2004-A  M-1       44.08   24.00         45.50
     2004-A  M-2       44.08   16.00         31.50
     2004-B  A         48.17   35.50         63.00
     2004-B  M-1       48.17   26.00         46.38
     2004-B  M-2       48.17   20.50         36.75
     2004-B  B-1       48.17   15.50         28.00
     2004-B  B-2       48.17   13.50         24.50
     2005-A  A         54.38   35.25         62.56
     2005-A  M-1       54.38   26.00         46.37
     2005-A  M-2       54.38   19.00         34.13
     2005-A  B         54.38   13.00         23.63
     2005-B  A         60.78   35.25         58.01
     2005-B  M-1       60.78   26.25         43.20
     2005-B  M-2       60.78   19.75         32.51
     2005-B  B-1       60.78   12.75         20.99
     2006-A  A         67.64   10.50         15.37
     2007-A  A         73.00    8.00          7.91
     2007-B  A         79.69    9.50          8.54

     (i) Class A represents all class A notes in the series.

     (ii) Consists of overcollateralization and subordination as a
          percent of the total pool balance.  Excludes excess
          spread, which also provides additional enhancement.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of each
transaction to consider whether the credit enhancement remains
sufficient, in S&P's view, to cover its revised cumulative net
loss expectations under its stress scenarios for each of the
affirmed ratings.  In addition, S&P will assess whether further
rating actions are necessary for the ratings placed on CreditWatch
Negative.   S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch actions in the
next 90 days.

        Ratings Lowered And Placed On Creditwatch Negative

            Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                                      Rating
                                      ------
              Series   Class   To               From
              ------   -----   --               ----
              2006-A   A-1     BB+/Watch Neg    BBB
              2006-A   A-2     BB+/Watch Neg    BBB
              2007-A   A-1     BB-/Watch Neg    BBB
              2007-A   A-2     BB-/Watch Neg    BBB
              2007-B   A-1     BB-/Watch Neg    BBB

                          Ratings Lowered

            Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
                   Series   Class   To    From
                   ------   -----   --    ----
                   2002-A   M-2     B-    BB-

                         Ratings Affirmed

            Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust

                      Series   Class  Rating
                      ------   -----  ------
                      2002-A   A-1    AA
                      2002-A   A-2    AA
                      2002-A   A-3    AA
                      2002-A   A-4    AA
                      2002-A   M-1    A-
                      2002-A   B-1    CCC-
                      2004-A   A-3    AAA
                      2004-A   A-4    AAA
                      2004-A   M-1    AA
                      2004-A   M-2    A
                      2004-B   A-3    AAA
                      2004-B   A-4    AAA
                      2004-B   M-1    AA
                      2004-B   M-2    A
                      2004-B   B-1    BBB+
                      2004-B   B-2    BBB
                      2005-A   A-2    AAA
                      2005-A   A-3    AAA
                      2005-A   A-4    AAA
                      2005-A   M-1    AA
                      2005-A   M-2    A
                      2005-A   B      BBB
                      2005-B   A-2    AAA
                      2005-B   A-3    AAA
                      2005-B   A-4    AAA
                      2005-B   M-1    AA
                      2005-B   M-2    A
                      2005-B   B-1    BBB


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B+' rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series QWS-1's $40 million 7.75% trust
certificates on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating on the certificates is based solely on the rating on
the underlying security, Qwest Capital Funding Inc.'s $40 million
7.75% notes due Feb. 15, 2031 ('B+/Watch Pos').

The rating action reflects the April 22, 2010, placement of S&P's
rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with positive
implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on the
series QWS-1 certificates due to changes in its rating assigned to
the underlying security.


PRIME MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 23
tranches from three RMBS transactions, backed by prime jumbo
loans, issued by Prime Mortgage Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed rate prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A1-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A1-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 5, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. BX, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 55
tranches, confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from nine RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by RFMSI Series
Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA3 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA4 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. I-A3-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-3-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2005-SA5 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2006-S1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2006-SA1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2006-SA4 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. III-A-X-1, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2007-SA1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca
  -- Cl. II-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2007-SA2 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SANDELMAN PARTNERS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Sandelman Partners CRE
CDO I Ltd. /LLC reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of
44.5%.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective
views regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of
this release.

The transaction is primarily collateralized by both subordinate
and senior commercial real estate debt: 28% of the total
collateral is either B-notes or mezzanine loans and 28% is either
whole loans or A-notes.  Fitch expects significant losses upon
default for the subordinate assets since they are generally highly
leveraged debt classes.  Further, three loans (24.1%) are
defaulted while three loans (17.9%) are considered Fitch Loans of
Concern.  Fitch expects significant losses on the defaulted assets
and Fitch Loans of Concern.

Sandelman Partners CRE CDO I is currently a $474.2 million CRE
collateralized debt obligation managed by Sandelman Partners, LP.
The transaction has a five-year reinvestment period that ends in
March 2012.  As of the March 2010 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested: commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS; 35.8%), CRE whole loans/A-notes
(28%), B-notes (14.3%), mezzanine loans (13.7%), real estate term
loans (8.1%), and cash (0.1%).

As of the March 2010 trustee report, all principal coverage tests
were failing.  As a result, all interest proceeds (after class C)
and all principal proceeds are being redirected to redeem the
class A-1 notes.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 58.1% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 11.9% from generally third and fourth quarter
2009 cash flows.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
low at 23.4%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
whole loan (9.9%) secured by a resort development site located in
the Northwestern United States.  The sponsor's plan called for the
development and sale of lots, condominiums, and townhouses.  The
loan previously defaulted in December 2008 after lot sales failed
to materialize amid the economic downturn.  All development
activity has stopped.  Although previously delinquent, the loan
was restructured in March 2010.  Fitch modeled a significant loss
on the whole loan under its base case scenario.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a B-note and rake bond (together 7.4%) secured by a 569-room
hotel located in Beverly Hills, California.  The property
underwent an $80 million renovation starting in 2003; however,
performance has struggled during the recent economic downturn.
Revenue per available room declined 25% between third quarter 2008
and year end 2009.  Given the notes subordinate position, Fitch
modeled a term default with a substantial loss under its base case
scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a subordinate term loan (6%) secured by a large
resort/convention center hotel located in Miami, Florida.  The
loan collateral includes the hotel areas, a commercial building,
the outdoor pools and garden areas, an interest in non-sold
condominiums, the income stream from rental of condominium-hotel
units, the marina, and the parking lot.  The term loan is over 90-
days delinquent.  Given the subordinate position of the term loan,
Fitch modeled a term default with a substantial loss under its
base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs', which applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The default levels were
then compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash
flow model of the CDO under the various default timing and
interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based on this analysis,
the credit characteristics for class A-1 are generally consistent
with the 'BB' rating category, while the credit characteristics
for class A-2 are generally consistent with the 'B' rating
category.

The ratings for classes B through H are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement.  Based on this analysis, classes B
and C are consistent with the 'CCC' rating category, meaning
default is a real possibility.  Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 44.5% exceeds these classes' respective current credit
enhancement levels.

The ratings for classes D and E are deemed to be consistent with
the 'CC' rating category, meaning default appears probable given
that losses expected on the current defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern in the pool exceed these classes' respective
credit enhancement levels.  The ratings for classes F through H
are deemed to be consistent with the 'C' rating category, meaning
Fitch considers default to be inevitable based on Fitch's base
case expected losses from defaulted loans.

Classes A-1 and A-2 were each assigned a Negative Rating Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings of 'LS4' for class A-1 and 'LS5'
for class A-2.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential
loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche
size to the expected loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.
LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes B through H were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(58.1% and 23.4%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class B reflects modeled recoveries of
25% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($0 million);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($9.3 million);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($9.3 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($13.1 million).

Classes C through H are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class' principal balance.

This class has paid in full:

  -- $0 class S 'PIF'; previously rated 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS and RRs to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $223,158,296 class A-1 to 'BB/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $61,000,000 class A-2 to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37,250,000 class B to 'CCC/RR5' from 'BBB+';

  -- $26,000,000 class C to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $11,311,589 class D to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $11,820,262 class E to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $13,071,169 class F to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $11,829,170 class G to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $9,341,759 class H to 'C/RR6' from 'B'.

Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.


SEAWALL SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded one class of Notes issued by
Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the look-through underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by a deterioration in the weighted
average rating factor since last review.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 is a direct pass through of Class C-2
(Underlying Class) from Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. This rating action is
a result of the downgrade of the Underlying Class on April 28,
2010.

The rating action is:

  -- Class C-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 30, 2009
     Confirmed at A3

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated January 30, 2009.


SECURITIZED PRODUCT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Securitized Product of
Restructured Collateral Limited SPC, Series 2005-1.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$5,545,000 Class A2 Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$5,545,000 Class B Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1.

Securitized Product of Restructured Collateral Limited SPC, Series
2005-1, issued on February 1, 2005, is a repackaging of the Class
A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2035 and
the Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2035 issued by Varick Structured Asset Fund, Ltd. Varick
Structured Asset Fund, Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a diversified portfolio of structured
finance securities.  Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
comprise approximately 23% of the underlying portfolio, of which
the majority were originated in 2002 and 2003.  The Moody's
ratings assigned to the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes issued by
Varick Structured Asset Fund, Ltd., were downgraded to Caa3 from
Caa2 on April 30, 2010.  Also, in April 2010, the Moody's ratings
of approximately $14.9 million (13% of the underlying collateral
portfolio) of pre-2005 RMBS within Varick Structured Asset Fund
Ltd.'s underlying portfolio were placed on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of the transaction's structure and the deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of Varick Structured Asset
Fund Ltd.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodologies and its supplements for structured notes and ABS
CDOs as described in Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

  -- Moody's Refines Its Approach to Rating Structured Notes (July
     1997)

  -- Rating CDO Repacks: An Application Of The Structured Note
     Methodology (February 2004)

  -- Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes
     (February 2004)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


SG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 21
tranches from 5 RMBS transactions issued by SG Mortgage Securities
Trust.  Additionally, the ratings of 3 classes have been
confirmed.  The collateral backing these deal primarily consists
of first-lien, fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential
mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.  For details regarding Moody's approach to
estimating losses on subprime pools originated in 2005, 2006, and
2007, please refer to the methodology publication "Subprime RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" available on Moodys.com.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-FRE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SIERRA KINGS: S&P Affirms 'C' Rating on Series 2002 Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'C' long-term and
underlying rating on the Sierra Kings Health Care District,
Calif.'s outstanding series 2002 general obligation bonds and
removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where it was placed Oct. 13, 2009.  The outlook is stable.

"The CreditWatch removal reflects S&P's view of the district's
timely debt service payments, turnaround efforts, and liquidity
improvement," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Geraldine
Poon.  "Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the situation
to see if debt service payments are being continued and the
resolution of the bankruptcy, as well as the final 2009 audit."

"While there is little likelihood of a raised rating in the next
year, a lower rating would be the result of insufficient pledged
revenues or if S&P believes that a payment default is likely to be
imminent," Ms. Poon said.

The district (estimated population of approximately 50,000)
encompasses a 366-square-mile area in southeastern Fresno County,
located in California's San Joaquin Valley.  The hospital is
located in the City of Reedley, about 30 miles southeast of the
City of Fresno.  The local area economy is centered on
agriculture, particularly in fruit orchards.  Employment
opportunities in services, trade, and government, especially in
nearby Fresno and Visalia, are also accessible.


SOVEREIGN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings for
Sovereign Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C1, as indicated:

  -- $105.2 million class A-J to 'BBB-/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.2 million class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $17.7 million class C to 'B/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20.3 million class D to 'B-/LS4' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $10.1 million class E to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded and assigned or revised the
Recovery Rating as indicated for these classes:

  -- $7.6 million class F to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-';
  -- $2.5 million class H to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC/RR2';
  -- $3.8 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3';
  -- $3.6 million class L to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6'.

Class M has been downgraded to 'D/RR6' due to realized losses.

Fitch has also affirmed and assigned LS ratings as indicated to
these classes:

  -- $441.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $228.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

The $2.5 million class G remains at 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised the Recovery Rating on this class:

  -- $2.5 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'C/RR5'.

Class N is not rated by Fitch.  Class A-1 has been paid in full.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed
rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 4.3% of the
remaining pool balance, approximately $38 million, from the loans
in special servicing and the loans that are not expected to
refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

The loans in this transaction do not have the same features as a
typical commercial mortgage backed security transaction as most of
the loans in the pool were not originated for securitization.
Therefore, the loans lack some of the structural features and
reporting requirements seen in typical CMBS loans.  In addition,
the loan pool is not geographically diverse, as 58.3% and 17.6% of
the properties are located in New York and New Jersey,
respectively.

Fitch has identified 62 Loans of Concern (25.5%), including seven
loans in special servicing (4.3%) as of the April 2010 remittance.
Two of the specially serviced loans have been liquidated with
significant loss severities.

The largest specially serviced asset (2%) is a 299-unit
multifamily property in Bradenton, FL.  The loan transferred in
September 2008 for payment default and is in foreclosure.  The
servicer-reported occupancy as of December 2009 was 84%.

The second largest specially serviced asset (0.3%) is a 207-unit
multifamily property located in Hialeah, FL.  The property
transferred to special servicing in February 2010 as the borrower
was unable to refinance.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 114 non-specially serviced
loans are not expected to payoff at maturity with 48 loans
incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


STOCKTON PUBLIC: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006A Bonds to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating
and underlying rating to 'BB' from 'BBB' on Stockton Public
Financing Authority, Calif.'s series 2006A and B revenue bonds,
issued on behalf of the Stockton Redevelopment Agency.

"The rating action reflects S&P's view of a deterioration in the
regional real estate market that S&P calculate will reduce
coverage of maximum annual debt service to less than 1x for two of
three obligations that support series 2009A and B debt service, as
well as S&P's opinion of the risk that assessed values will
recover before exhaustion of one or more of the obligation's
reserve funds," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Chris
Morgan.

The series A and B bonds are secured by three separate loans to be
paid to the authority from tax increment revenues, net of a 20%
housing set-aside requirement, from three separate project areas:
North, Midtown Merged, and South Merged.  Located 83 miles east of
San Francisco, Stockton ('A+/Negative' issuer credit rating)
serves a population of 289,927 and a total AV of $20 billion.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that regional economic
stress is taking its toll on AV levels such that MADS coverage is
likely to be inadequate in fiscal 2010 for two of the three loans
attributable to the series 2006A and B.  S&P believes that the
presence of fully funded reserve funds attributable to each
project area provides a medium-term cushion to fund debt service
payments; however, given each project area's high volatility
ratios, S&P believes that further AV declines could quickly
exhaust at least one of the three reserve funds.


TRANSFERABLE CUSTODIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one classes of custodial receipts issued by Transferable
Custodial Receipts.  The rating action is:

  -- US$20,500,000 Transferable Custodian Receipts, Downgraded
     to B3; previously on April 30, 2009 Upgraded to A1.

Transferable Custodial Receipts, issued on October 11, 2002, is a
repackaging of the Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes issued by Bristol
CDO I Ltd., a collateralized debt obligation issuance that is
backed by a portfolio of asset-backed securities, including
exposure to Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated
between 1998 and 2002.  The Moody's rating assigned to the Class
A-2 Notes issued by Bristol CDO I Ltd. currently B3.  Moody's
explained that its rating of the Transferable Custodial Receipts
is directly linked to, and will change as a result of, Moody's
rating assigned to the Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes.


VARICK STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Varick Structured Asset
Fund, Ltd. The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2035 (current balance of
     $16,279,122), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on April 22,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2035 (current balance of
     $97,674,729), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on April 22,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Varick Structured Asset Fund, Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed primarily by a diversified portfolio of
structured finance securities.  Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities comprise approximately 23% of the underlying portfolio,
of which the majority were originated in 2002 and 2003.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the
result of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through
numerous factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, failure of the coverage tests, and number
of assets that are currently on review for possible downgrade.
The dollar amount of defaulted securities, as reported by the
trustee, has increased from $21.5 million in March 2009 to
$25.9 million in March 2010.  During the same time, the Class A
overcollateralization ratio decreased from 73.31% to 68.60% and
the coverage test is failing.  Also, in April 2010, approximately
$14.9 million of pre-2005 RMBS within the underlying portfolio
were placed on review for possible downgrade as a result of
Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2005-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a
U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transaction.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implication.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of its
rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the four underlying loan assets
($37.6 million, 6.0% of the collateral pool) that were reported as
defaulted in the March trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying collateral assets, as well as the transaction's
liability structure.

According to the March 31, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool, excluding cash, includes 46 whole loans and
senior participations ($591.8 million, 100%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its
adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral servicer, Wrightwood
Capital Manager LLC, and the trustee, Bank of America Merrill
Lynch, as well as market and valuation data from third-party
providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes four
defaulted loan assets ($37.6 million, 6.0%).  Standard & Poor's
has estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan assets
reported as defaulted, which ranged from 48.5% through 90.9%.  S&P
based the recovery rates on information from the collateral
manager, special servicer, and third-party data providers.  The
reported defaulted loan assets are:

* The 315 West 35th Street senior-interest loan ($13.8 million,
  2.2%);

* The One Vintage Park senior-interest loan ($9.9 million, 1.6%);

* The Concord Chase Apartments senior-interest loan ($8.7 million,
  1.4%); and

* The Resort at Squaw Creek senior-interest loan ($5.2 million,
  0.8%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

          Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
          A-R       BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
          B         B+                   AA/Watch Neg
          C         B+                   A+/Watch Neg
          D         B                    A-/Watch Neg
          E         CCC+                 BBB+/Watch Neg
          F         CCC+                 BBB-/Watch Neg
          G         CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
          H         CCC-                 BB-/Watch Neg


ZOHAR II: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of notes issued by Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd. and Zohar III Ltd.
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Both transactions are cash flow collateralized loan obligations
collateralized in large part by middle-market loans.  Three of the
notes from Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd. have a financial guarantee
insurance policy issued by MBIA Insurance Corp.  Accordingly, S&P
lowered its ratings on these notes to 'BB+' to reflect Standard &
Poor's rating on MBIA.

The downgrades primarily reflect the application of S&P's updated
corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.  For a number
of the tranches S&P reviewed, the "largest-obligor default test,"
which S&P introduced as part of its criteria update, was the
constraining factor for the revised ratings.

Standard & Poor's updated corporate CDO criteria include two
supplemental "outside the model" tests intended to address event
risk and model risk that may be present in rated transactions.
The first test is the largest-obligor default test.  This test
assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement
(not counting excess spread) to withstand specified combinations
of underlying asset defaults based on the ratings on the
underlying assets, with a flat recovery of 5%.  The second test is
the "largest-industry default test," which assesses whether a CDO
tranche rated 'AAA', 'AA+', 'AA', or 'AA-' has sufficient credit
enhancement (not counting excess spread) to withstand the default
of all obligors in the transaction's largest industry, with a flat
recovery of 17%, or to otherwise meet an alternative largest-
industry default test.  Either of these tests may be a limiting
factor for S&P's rating on a CDO tranche, in addition to the cash
flow analysis and output of CDO Evaluator, which the rating
committee also reviews for each transaction.

Both transactions have a relatively small number of obligors in
their collateral portfolios.  The transactions also have a
relatively high level of concentration in their portfolios to some
of these obligors; for this reason, S&P believes there is a high
level of concentration risk which the rated notes have exposure
to.  According to S&P's records, the top 10 obligors in the two
transactions represent more than 40% and 50% of the total
performing collateral for Zohar III Ltd. and Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd.,
respectively.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Transaction                Class         To     From
  -----------                -----         --     ----
  Zohar III Ltd.             A-1R          AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Zohar III Ltd.             Swingline Nts AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Zohar III Ltd.             A-1T          AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Zohar III Ltd.             A-1D          AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Zohar III Ltd.             A-2           BB+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Zohar III Ltd.             A-3           CCC+   AA/Watch Neg
  Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd.       A-1           BB+    AA/Watch Neg
  Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd.       A-2           BB+    AA/Watch Neg
  Zohar II 2005-1 Ltd.       A-3           BB+    AA/Watch Neg


* Fitch Reviews Ratings on Outstanding Dealer Floorplan Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has conducted a review of all outstanding U.S.
dealer floorplan asset-backed securities to assess the consistency
of outstanding ratings with the revised rating criteria published
on Dec. 31, 2009.

As part thereof, Fitch removes from Rating Watch Negative and
affirms four classes of outstanding notes issued by SWIFT Master
Auto Receivables Trust series 2007-2 and assigns Rating Outlooks:

  -- Class A notes at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D notes at 'B'; Outlook Stable.

The rating action is based on the commencement of the scheduled
accumulation period in April 2010, during which all collections
begin to accumulate in a cash accumulation account until series
2007-2 is paid in full by its expected maturity date on Oct. 16,
2010, according to the transaction documents.  Fitch expects the
transaction to be paid in full on schedule with the date listed
above.

Loss coverage currently available for each class of notes is lower
than expectations derived under the revised criteria.  However,
Fitch affirmed the current ratings due to the strong performance
trends exhibited by the collateral and the short time horizon of
six months during which the cash will accumulate in the cash
accumulation account until the notes are paid off on Oct. 16,
2010, the expected maturity date.  Fitch's default and loss
expectations reflect a lifetime expectation; thus the incremental
loss derived under the revised criteria is not expected to be
realized over the next six months.  This is most evidenced by the
performance trends exhibited by the series 2007-2 over the past
year.  Through March 2010, the transaction has exhibited improving
monthly payment rates, and has not experienced any net losses to
date.  Fitch will continue to closely monitor the 2007-2 cash
accumulation process and period, and may take rating actions
should this process deviate from the schedule specified in the
transaction documents.

The revised rating criteria for dealer floor plan ABS applies
higher stress levels to non-diversified, high systemic risk
bearing dealer floorplan platforms.  Based on the exposure to
systemic risks, the updated criteria classifies dealer floorplan
platforms into two categories, A and B, with the category B
designation being assigned to the high systemic risk platforms.
Consistent with Fitch's current dealer floorplan criteria, 2007-2
is assessed as a category B platform.

Assessing the transaction under the updated criteria and
reflective of the utility value approach commensurate with
category B dealer floorplan platforms, Fitch made these
assumptions when analyzing 2007-2, consistent with the revised
criteria:

  -- Dealer default levels were calculated assuming 100% initial
     defaults at 'AAA' stresses with dealer 'revival' credits
     based on the diversification of dealer franchises and certain
     dealer metrics including absorption rate and internal credit
     tiers.  Initial dealer default levels were then assumed at
     90%, 75%, 65%, and 50% for 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' level
     stresses, respectively.

  -- Dealer revival credit was haircut by 25%, 20%, 15%, 10%, 5%
     and 0% for 'AAA', 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', 'BB' and 'B' stresses,
     respectively.

  -- Base case recovery rates were derived based on the values of
     one year old vehicles and were further haircut.

  -- Asset yield was haircut by 30%, 25%, 20%, 15%, 10% and 5% for
     'AAA', 'AA', 'A', 'BBB', 'BB' and 'B' stresses, respectively.

  -- 1% servicing fee is modeled on top of waterfall.

  -- The notes were assessed on their ability to withstand 64.1%
     dealer defaults at 'AA' stress levels, 52.3% at 'A', 43.3% at
     'BBB', 32.5% at 'BB' and 22.8% at 'B' stress levels.
     Currently the AA, BBB, BB and B notes can withstand 24.6%,
     17.8%, 14.9%, and 13.9%, net losses, respectively.

  -- The primary assets of 2007-2 are receivables backed by dealer
     floorplan financing agreements between GMAC Inc. and
     automotive dealers primarily franchised by General Motors
     Company.  2007-2 is sponsored and serviced by GMAC.

SMART 2007-2 was last reviewed in April 2009 when the class A
notes were downgraded to 'AA' from 'AAA', the class B notes were
downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A+', the class C notes were downgraded
to 'BB' from 'BBB+', and the class D notes were downgraded to 'B'
from 'BB+'.  The downgrades were primarily driven by the financial
challenges impacting GM and GMAC, along with the weakened state of
the U.S. economy and auto industry as a whole.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 11 SF CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions as detailed at the
end of this release for classes of notes issued by 11 structured
finance collateralized debt obligations that closed in 2003 and
2004 with exposure to structured finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Fitch primarily based its analysis of these transactions on
comparing the credit enhancements levels for each class of notes,
calculated based off the par portfolio balance including cash in
principal collection accounts, to the minimum level of loss
expected from assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and
lower.

Only in two transactions, Bluegrass ABS CDO II, Ltd., and Jupiter
High-Grade CDO, Ltd./Inc., did their respective senior classes' CE
levels meaningfully exceeded the minimum level of loss expected
from the portfolios.  For these two CDOs, Fitch complemented the
above analysis with the use of Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model to project future loss levels at various rating levels.  The
'CCC' rating loss rate, the lowest rating level loss projected by
SF PCM, exceeds the credit enhancement levels for all the classes
of notes in both Bluegrass II and Jupiter.  Further, there is only
a negligible amount of interest proceeds used to pay down the
notes in Jupiter, while in Bluegrass II, there is an ongoing
erosion of principal proceeds to pay down interest due.
Therefore, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all
notes in these transactions can be assessed without performing
cash flow model analysis under the framework described in the
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Due to the extent of collateral deterioration in the remaining
nine transactions, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default
can be assessed without using SF PCM or cash flow model analysis.

Specifically, due to the writedowns in the underlying collateral
portfolios, the total collateral balances in the portfolios of ACA
ABS 2003-1, Ltd., South Coast Funding III, Ltd. and Independence V
CDO, Ltd./Inc. are already lower than the outstanding balances of
their respective senior tranches, indicating that default is
inevitable for the entire capital structure.

The remaining six transactions maintain positive CE levels for at
least their senior tranches.  However, future losses expected from
the assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and lower are
likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement levels even
for the most senior classes of notes in the transactions.

Of the 11 transactions, three have entered an Event of Default due
to failing collateralization coverage requirements.  The
controlling class in two of those transactions, Independence V CDO
and South Coast Funding III, Ltd., have accelerated the notes'
maturities whereby redirecting funds otherwise available to pay
other classes' interest due to pay down the most senior classes
outstanding.  However, due to the writedowns already experienced
and future expected losses in the respective portfolios, the
benefit of the accelerations is unlikely to fully compensate for
the lack of par coverage to the senior classes in these
transactions.

Two transactions contain non-deferrable classes of notes which
have missed their full interest payment.  These classes have been
downgraded to 'D'.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

ACA ABS 2003-1, Ltd.

  -- $51,776,716 class A-R notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $135,913,880 class A-T notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $30,000,000 class A-M notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $29,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $17,995,395 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

ACA ABS 2003-1, Limited is a SF CDO that closed on May 20, 2003
and is now managed by Solidus Capital, LLC, who assumed the
responsibility from ACA Management, LLC in April 2008.  As of the
April 10, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, Asset Backed securities,
SF CDOs, Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities, and Real Estate
Investment Trusts from primarily 1996, 1999 and 2002 through 2006
vintage transactions.

Blue Heron V, Ltd.

  -- $85,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $5,000,000 certificates notes affirmed at 'AAA'.

Blue Heron V CDO, Ltd. is a cash CDO that closed on Feb. 25, 2003
and is managed by Brightwater Capital Management.  The rating
assigned to the certificates is based on the rating of the
certificate protection asset, which is comprised of U.S.
government-backed Resolution Funding Corp. zero-coupon bonds.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, from primarily 2003 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Blue Heron VII, Ltd.

  -- $884,872,527 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $25,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- EUR88,451,000 (US$ equivalent $105,000,000) class B notes
     affirmed at 'C';

  -- EUR88,451,000 (US$ equivalent $105,000,000) class B
     Additional Interest notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $6,250,000 certificates notes affirmed at 'AAA'.

Blue Heron VII CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on May 30,
2003, and is managed by Brightwater Capital Management.  The
rating assigned to the certificates is based on the rating of the
certificate protection asset, which is comprised of U.S.
government-backed Resolution Funding Corp. zero-coupon bonds.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, from primarily 2003 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Blue Heron Funding IX, Ltd.

  -- $85,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $5,000,000 certificates affirmed at 'AAA'.

Blue Heron IX CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on Feb. 25,
2004, and is managed by Brightwater Capital Management.  The
rating assigned to the certificates is based on the rating of the
certificate protection asset, which is comprised of U.S.
government-backed Resolution Funding Corp. zero-coupon bonds.
Blue Heron IX declared an Event of Default on Sept. 29, 2008, due
to default in the payment of accrued interest on the class A
notes.  As of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, from 2000 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Bluegrass ABS CDO II, Ltd.

  -- $0 class A-1LT notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';

  -- $0 class A-1MM notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $37,509,191 class A-1MT-a notes downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $86,521,201 class A-1MT-b notes downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $44,497,025 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $52,800,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $12,540,136 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $6,189,467 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Bluegrass ABS CDO II, Ltd., is a SF CDO that closed on April 14,
2004, and is managed by Invesco Institutional N.A. Inc.  The 'C'
rating on the class A-1MM notes is the short-term rating that
corresponds to the 'CC' long-term rating of the class A-1LT and A-
1MT notes.  As of the April 5, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS, ABS, CMBS, and SF CDOs from 2002 through
2007 vintage transactions.

Davis Square Funding III, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $254,733,802 class A-1LT-a notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $755,886,653 class A-1LT-b-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $60,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $20,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $79,947,586 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Davis Square Funding III, Ltd./Corp., is a cash CDO that closed on
Oct. 21, 2004, and is managed by TCW Investment Management
Company.  As of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, from primarily 2003
through 2007 vintage transactions.

Independence V CDO, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $152,439,203 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $84,000,000 class A-2A notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $15,000,000 class A-2B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $56,400,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $25,612,544 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $19,100,000 series 1 preference shares affirmed at 'C';
  -- $5,500,000 series 2 preference shares affirmed at 'C'.

Independence V CDO, Ltd./Inc., is a SF CDO that closed on Feb. 25,
2004, and is managed by Declaration Management & Research LLC.
Independence V declared an Event of Default on Feb. 28, 2008, due
to class A and B notes being undercollateralized.  The required
majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity
of the transaction on March 14, 2008.  As of the March 1, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, CMBS, CDOs and
ABS from primarily 2003 through 2006 vintage transactions.

Jupiter High-Grade CDO Ltd./Inc.

  -- $355,622,007 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $83,409,821 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $82,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $41,250,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,233,346 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Jupiter High-Grade CDO, Ltd., is a static cash flow CDO which
closed in December 2004 with a portfolio initially selected by
Maxim Advisory LLC and is currently managed by Harding Advisory
LLC.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, corporate and SF CDOs, from 2001 through 2005
vintage transactions.

MIURA 2004-1

  -- $37,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $43,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $20,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

MIURA 2004-1 is a partially funded, synthetic collateralized CDO
that closed on Sept. 28, 2004.  As of the March 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, corporate and SF CDOs,
from 1999 through 2005 vintage transactions.

Mulberry Street CDO II, Ltd.

  -- $21,945,941 class A-1U notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $73,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $4,762,232 class B-F notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $44,652,640 class B-V notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $9,137,885 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd./Corp. is a cash CDO that closed on
June 26, 2003.  In November 2008, Cutwater Asset Management
Corporation replaced the Clinton Group, Inc. as a manager of the
transaction.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised primarily of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, from 2002
through 2007 vintage transactions.

South Coast Funding III, Ltd.

  -- $206,035,112 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $81,652,298 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $38,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,000,000 class A-3A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $9,000,000 class A-3B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $11,122,795 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $32,623,423 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

South Coast Funding III, Ltd., is a SF CDO that closed on July 10,
2003, and is managed by TCW Investment Management Company.  South
Coast III entered an Event of Default on Feb. 10, 2009, due to the
class A notes being undercollateralized.  The required majority of
the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity of the
transaction on Feb. 26, 2010.  As of the March, 31, 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, REITs, CMBS, SF CDOs
and ABS from primarily 2002 through 2007 vintage transactions.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 Tranches From 11 Hybrid CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 23
tranches from 11 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 15 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
S&P's rating on one of the downgraded tranches remains on
CreditWatch negative, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrade.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 34 other
tranches and removed one of them from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.  S&P's
CreditWatch placements primarily affect transactions for which a
significant portion of the collateral assets currently have
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications or that have
significant exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

The 23 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $5.182 billion.  Seven of the 11 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  Three of the 11 are
high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were collateralized at origination
primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated tranches of RMBS and other SF
securities.  The other transaction is a retranching of other CDO
tranches.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Transaction                     Class To           From
  -----------                     ----- -            ----
Bluegrass ABS CDO II            A1MTa CCC-         BB
Bluegrass ABS CDO II            A1MTb CCC-         BB
C-Bass CBO VI                   C     A            AAA
C-Bass CBO VI                   D     B-           AA
C-Bass CBO VI                   E     CCC-         A+
CBO Holdings III                A     BB           AAA
Los Robles CDO                  A-1a  CCC-         BB/Watch Neg
Los Robles CDO                  A-1b  CC           CCC-/Watch Neg
Los Robles CDO                  TRS   CCC-srp      BBsrp/Watch Neg
Mid Ocean CBO 2000-1            A-1L  CCC-         CCC
Parkridge Lane Structured Fin.  A-2   B+           BB+/Watch Neg
  Special Opportunities CDO I
Parkridge Lane Structured Fin.  B     CCC+         B+/Watch Neg
  Special Opportunities CDO I
Parkridge Lane Structured Fin.  C     CCC-         CCC+/Watch Neg
  Special Opportunities CDO I
Parkridge Lane Structured Fin.  D     CCC-         CCC/Watch Neg
  Special Opportunities CDO I
Parkridge Lane Structured Fin.  E     CCC-         CCC-/Watch Neg
  Special Opportunities CDO I
Saturn Ventures 2005-1          A-1   BB+/WatchNeg BBB-/WatchNeg
Saturn Ventures 2005-1          A-2   CC           B-/Watch Neg
Sierra Madre Funding            A1LTa CC           BB+/Watch Neg
Sierra Madre Funding            A1LTb CC           BB+/Watch Neg
Sierra Madre Funding            A-2   CC           B-/Watch Neg
Sierra Madre Funding            B     CC           CCC-/Watch Neg
Summer Street 2005-HG1          A-1   CC           BB/Watch Neg
Trainer Wortham First Republic  A-1   BB-          A-/Watch Neg
CBO III
West Coast Funding I            A-1a  CCC-         BB+/Watch Neg

                        Ratings Affirmed

     Transaction                             Class    Rating
     -----------                             -----    ------
     Bluegrass ABS CDO II                    A-2      CC
     Bluegrass ABS CDO II                    B        CC
     Bluegrass ABS CDO II                    C-1      CC
     Bluegrass ABS CDO II                    C-2      CC
     Bluegrass ABS CDO II                    TypeICom CC
     C-Bass CBO VI                           A        AAA
     C-Bass CBO VI                           B        AAA
     Los Robles CDO                          A-2      CC
     Los Robles CDO                          A-3      CC
     Los Robles CDO                          B        CC
     Los Robles CDO                          C        CC
     Los Robles CDO                          D        CC
     Saturn Ventures 2005-1                  A-3      CC
     Saturn Ventures 2005-1                  B        CC
     Saturn Ventures 2005-1                  C        CC
     Sierra Madre Funding                    C        CC
     Sierra Madre Funding                    D        CC
     Summer Street 2005-HG1                  A-2      CC
     Summer Street 2005-HG1                  B        CC
     Summer Street 2005-HG1                  C        CC
     Summer Street 2005-HG1                  D        CC
     Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III  A-2      CC
     Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III  B        CC
     Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III  C        CC
     Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III  D        CC
     Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III  PrefShs  CC
     West Coast Funding I                    A-1b     CC
     West Coast Funding I                    A-1v     CC
     West Coast Funding I                    A-2      CC
     West Coast Funding I                    A-3      CC
     West Coast Funding I                    B        CC
     West Coast Funding I                    C        CC
     West Coast Funding I                    D        CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Tranches From Six CDO Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 24
tranches from six U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 15 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P placed two of the lowered ratings on CreditWatch
negative, and S&P's ratings on seven of the downgraded tranches
remain on CreditWatch negative, which indicates a significant
likelihood of further downgrades.  S&P also affirmed its ratings
on 11 other tranches from five of the downgraded transactions.
Lastly, S&P withdrew its rating on one tranche from E*Trade ABS
CDO III Ltd. following its complete paydown.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on the underlying
U.S. subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
S&P's CreditWatch placements primarily affect transactions that
currently have a significant portion of the ratings on their
collateral assets on CreditWatch with negative implications or
that have significant exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC'
category.

The 24 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $2.695 billion.  Five of the six affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of residential mortgaged-backed securities and other SF
securities.  The other transaction is a high-grade SF CDO of ABS
that was collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through
'A' rated tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                        Rating
                                        ------
   Transaction             Class   To             From
   -----------             -----   --             ----
   Altius I Funding        A-1LT-a CCC-           BBB/Watch Neg
   Altius I Funding        A-1LT-b CCC-           BBB/Watch Neg
   Altius I Funding        A-2     CC             BB+/Watch Neg
   Altius I Funding        B       CC             CCC/Watch Neg
   Bluegrass ABS CDO III   A-1     CC             BBB/Watch Neg
   E*Trade ABS CDO III     A1      A-/Watch Neg   AAA
   E*Trade ABS CDO III     A2      CCC-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
   E*Trade ABS CDO III     B       CC             CCC/Watch Neg
   E*Trade ABS CDO III     SeriesI NR             CC
   Fortress ABS
    Opportunities          A       BBB+/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
   Fortress ABS
    Opportunities          A-1a    BBB+/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
   Fortress ABS
    Opportunities          A-2     BBB+/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
   Fortress ABS
    Opportunities          B       B/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
   Fortress ABS
    Opportunities          Ba      B/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
   South Coast Funding VI  A-1     BB+/Watch Neg  AAA
   South Coast Funding VI  A-2     CCC-/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
   South Coast Funding VI  B       CC             B/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       A-1J    CC             A/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       A-1S    CCC-           AA+/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       A-2     CC             BB+/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       A-3F    CC             CCC+/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       A-3V    CC             CCC+/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       BF      CC             CCC-/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       BV      CC             CCC-/Watch Neg
   Summit RMBS CDO I       Comb I  CC             CCC-/Watch Neg

                         NR - Not rated.

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Transaction             Class   Rating
              -----------             -----   ------
              Altius I Funding        C       CC
              Altius I Funding        D       CC
              Altius I Funding        E       CC
              Bluegrass ABS CDO III   C       CC
              Bluegrass ABS CDO III   D-1     CC
              Bluegrass ABS CDO III   D-2     CC
              E*Trade ABS CDO III     C       CC
              E*Trade ABS CDO III     PrefShs CC
              South Coast Funding VI  C       CC
              Summit RMBS CDO I       Comb II CC
              Summit RMBS CDO I       PrefSh  CC

                    Other Outstanding Ratings

              Transaction             Class   Rating
              -----------             -----   ------
              Bluegrass ABS CDO III   A-2     D
              Bluegrass ABS CDO III   B       D


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 26 Classes From Eight RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 26
classes from eight residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo, Alternative-A, subprime,
and scratch-and-dent collateral issued between 2004 and 2006.  At
the same time, S&P removed seven of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 58 classes from seven of the transactions with
downgraded classes and from three additional transactions and
removed four from CreditWatch negative.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each
transaction rated between 2005 and 2007.  S&P derived its loss
projections using its criteria listed in the "Related Research"
section below.  As part of its analysis, S&P considered the
characteristics of the underlying mortgage collateral, as well as
macroeconomic influences.  For example, the risk profile of the
underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default projections,
while its outlook for housing-price declines and the health of the
housing market influence its loss severity assumptions.
Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss expectations for each deal
based on upward trends in delinquencies.

The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's current and
projected losses, which S&P based on the dollar amount of loans in
the transactions that are currently delinquent, in foreclosure, or
whose underlying properties are real estate owned, as well as
S&P's projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated
cumulative losses to date in its ratings analysis.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  For Alt-A, subprime, and scratch-and-dent
transactions, to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed
whether a class could withstand losses exceeding the base-case
loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating category,
up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general, S&P
would assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

For the prime jumbo transactions, S&P assessed whether a class
could withstand 127% of its base-case loss assumption in order to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P assessed whether a different
class could withstand 154% of its base-case loss assumption to
maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating
could withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

For transactions backed by nonperforming loans, S&P calculated its
projected defaults by evaluating the current pipeline of
delinquent loans.  S&P incorporated the available liquidation data
to arrive at S&P's opinion of the potential loss severity and the
extent of defaults.  S&P used this information in conjunction with
its rating-specific assumptions to project cash flows and assess
whether the outstanding ratings on the classes were appropriate,
in S&P's view.  Based on S&P's view of the timing and amount of
cash flow available for a security, S&P adjusted its ratings
accordingly.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

The collateral backing these transactions originally consisted
predominantly of prime jumbo, Alt-A, subprime, and scratch-and-
dent first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate residential mortgage
loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

                           Rating Actions

                    RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust
                       Series      2005-SP3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76112BS50     B                    BBB
        M-2        76112BS68     CC                   CCC
        M-3        76112BS76     CC                   CCC

                    RALI Series 2005-QA4 Trust
                       Series      2005-QA4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-IV-1     76110H4L0     B                    BB+

                    RAMP Series 2004-RS5 Trust
                       Series      2004-RS5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-I-4      7609853Z2     CCC                  BB
        A-I-5      7609854A6     CCC                  BB
        A-I-6      7609854B4     CCC                  BB
        M-II-1     7609854G3     BBB                  AA
        M-II-2     7609854H1     CC                   A
        M-II-3     7609854J7     CC                   BB
        M-II-4     7609854K4     CC                   CCC

                    RAMP Series 2004-RS6 Trust
                       Series      2004-RS6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-I-3      7609855F4     CCC                  BB
        M-II-1     7609855L1     A                    AA

                    RAMP Series 2004-RZ4 Trust
                       Series      2004-RZ4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B          76112BHQ6     B-                   BB

                   RASC Series 2004-KS11 Trust
                      Series      2004-KS11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76110WJ31     B                    BBB+
        M-2        76110WJ49     CC                   CCC

                    RFMSI Series 2005-S7 Trust
                        Series      2005-S7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        76111XZR7     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-2        76111XZS5     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-3        76111XZT3     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-4        76111XZU0     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-5        76111XZV8     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-6        76111XZW6     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    A-7        76111XZX4     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-8        76111XZY2     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-9        76111XZZ9     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-P        76111XA29     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-V        76111XA37     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    M-1        76111XA60     CC                   CCC
    M-2        76111XA78     CC                   CCC

                    RFMSI Series 2006-S2 Trust
                       Series      2006-S2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-6        76111XM42     B+                   BB-


                         Ratings Affirmed

                     RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust
                       Series      2005-SP3

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-2        76112BS35     AAA
                  A-3        76112BS43     AAA

                    RALI Series 2005-QA1 Trust
                       Series      2005-QA1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        76110HM63     AAA
                  A-2        76110HQ51     AAA
                  M-1        76110HM71     BBB
                  M-2        76110HM89     CCC

                    RALI Series 2005-QA4 Trust
                       Series      2005-QA4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-1      76110H4E6     CCC
                  A-l-2      76110H4F3     CCC
                  A-II-1     76110H4G1     CCC
                  A-II-2     76110H4H9     CCC
                  A-III-1    76110H4J5     CCC
                  A-III-2    76110H4K2     CCC
                  A-IV-2     76110H4M8     CCC
                  A-V        76110H4N6     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2004-RS6 Trust
                       Series      2004-RS6

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-4      7609855A5     AAA
                  A-I-5      7609855B3     AAA
                  A-I-6      7609855C1     AAA
                  M-I-1      7609855D9     AA
                  M-I-2      7609855E7     A
                  M-II-2     7609855M9     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2004-RZ4 Trust
                       Series      2004-RZ4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-3        76112BHF0     AAA
                  M-1        76112BHG8     AA+
                  M-2        76112BHH6     AA-
                  M-3        76112BHJ2     A
                  M-4        76112BHK9     A-
                  M-5        76112BHL7     BBB+
                  M-6        76112BHM5     BBB
                  M-7        76112BHN3     BBB-

                    RAMP Series 2006-RZ2 Trust
                       Series      2006-RZ2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-2        75156UAB3     BB+
                  A-3        75156UAC1     BB
                  M-1        75156UAD9     CCC
                  M-2        75156UAE7     CCC

                    RASC Series 2004-KS11 Trust
                       Series      2004-KS11

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-3      76110WH82     AAA
                  A-II-1     76110WH90     AAA
                  A-II-2     76110WJ23     AAA

                    RFMSI Series 2006-S2 Trust
                       Series      2006-S2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        76111XL76     BB-
                  A-2        76111XL84     CCC
                  A-3        76111XL92     CCC
                  A-4        76111XM26     BBB
                  A-5        76111XM34     CCC
                  A-7        76111XM59     CCC
                  A-P        76111XM67     CCC
                  A-V        76111XM75     BBB

                    RFMSI Series 2006-S4 Trust
                       Series      2006-S4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        762010AA4     CCC
                  A-2        762010AB2     CCC
                  A-3        762010AC0     CCC
                  A-4        762010AD8     CCC
                  A-5        762010AE6     CCC
                  A-6        762010AF3     CCC
                  A-7        762010AG1     B
                  A-9        762010AJ5     CCC
                  A-10       762010AK2     CCC
                  A-P        762010AL0     CCC
                  A-V        762010AM8     B


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches From 10 Hybrid CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 38
tranches from 10 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 29 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P placed five of the lowered ratings on
CreditWatch negative, and its ratings on two of the downgraded
tranches remain on CreditWatch negative, indicating a significant
likelihood of further downgrades.  S&P also affirmed its ratings
on 35 other tranches.  The rating on one additional tranche
remains on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P withdrew its
rating on one tranche from E*Trade ABS CDO III following the
complete paydown of the notes.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.  S&P's
CreditWatch placements primarily affect transactions for which a
significant portion of the collateral assets currently have
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications or that have
significant exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

The 38 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $6.336 billion.  Six of the 10 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities (ABS), which are collateralized in large part by
mezzanine tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The other
four deals are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were collateralized
at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated tranches of
RMBS and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                        Rating
                                        ------
  Transaction              Class   To            From
  -----------              -----   --            ----
Barrington II CDO          A1-S    CCC-          BB+/Watch Neg
Barrington II CDO          X       A             AAA/Watch Neg
Bernoulli HighGrade CDO I  A-1B    CCC-          B/Watch Neg
Birch Real Estate CDO I    A-1     AA/Watch Neg   AAA
Birch Real Estate CDO I    A-2     BBB/Watch Neg  AA
Birch Real Estate CDO I    A-2L    BBB/Watch Neg  AA
Birch Real Estate CDO I    A-3L    CCC/Watch Neg  BB-
Birch Real Estate CDO I    B-1     CC            CCC-
Davis Square Funding V     A-1-a   CC            BB-/Watch Neg
Davis Square Funding V     A-1-b   CC            BB-/Watch Neg
Davis Square Funding V     A-2     CC            B+/Watch Neg
Davis Square Funding V     S       AA            AAA
Diversified Asset          A-1L    BB+           A/Watch Neg
Securitization Hdgs.  III
Diversified Asset          A-2     BB+           A/Watch Neg
Securitization Hdgs.  III
E*Trade ABS CDO III        A1      A-/Watch Neg  AAA
E*Trade ABS CDO III        A2      CCC-/WatchNeg BBB/Watch Neg
E*Trade ABS CDO III        B       CC            CCC/Watch Neg
E*Trade ABS CDO III        Ser I   NR            CC
Independence I CDO         A       BB+/WatchNeg  BBB/Watch Neg
Kleros Preferred Fdg II    A1      CC            BB-/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        A-1J    CC            BBB/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        A-1S    CC            A/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        A-2     CC            BBB-/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        A-3     CC            BB-/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        BF      CC            B-/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        BV      CC            B-/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        CF      CC            CCC/Watch Neg
Nautilus RMBS CDO I        CV      CC            CCC/Watch Neg
Putnam Structured Product  A1LT-d  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1LT-e  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1LT-i  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1LT-j  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MM-f  A/A-1         AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MM-g  A/A-1         AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MM-h  A/A-1         AAA/A-1/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MT-a  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MT-b  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A1MT-c  A             AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1
Putnam Structured Product  A2      BB+           AAA/Watch Neg
CDO 2002-1

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

  Transaction                                 Class  Rating
  -----------                                 -----  ------
  Davis Square Funding VII                    S      BBB/WatchNeg

                          Ratings Affirmed

     Transaction                                 Class  Rating
     -----------                                 -----  ------
     Barrington II CDO                           A1J-M  CC
     Barrington II CDO                           A1J-Q  CC
     Barrington II CDO                           A1-M   CC
     Barrington II CDO                           A1-Q   CC
     Barrington II CDO                           A2     CC
     Barrington II CDO                           A-3    CC
     Barrington II CDO                           B      CC
     Barrington II CDO                           C      CC
     Barrington II CDO                           D      CC
     Bernoulli High Grade CDO I                  A-1A   CC
     Bernoulli High Grade CDO I                  A-2    CC
     Bernoulli High Grade CDO I                  B      CC
     Bernoulli High Grade CDO I                  C      CC
     Bernoulli High Grade CDO I                  D      CC
     Birch Real Estate CDO I                     A-1L   AAA
     Davis Square Funding V                      B      CC
     Davis Square Funding V                      C      CC
     Davis Square Funding V                      D      CC
     Davis Square Funding V                      E      CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    A-1a   CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    A-1b   CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    A-2    CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    A-3    CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    B      CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    C      CC
     Davis Square Funding VII                    D      CC
     Diversified Asset Securitization Hdgs.  III  A-3L   CC
     Diversified Asset Securitization Hdgs.  III  B-1L   CC
     E*Trade ABS CDO III                         C      CC
     E*Trade ABS CDO III                         PrefShr CC
     Kleros Preferred Funding II                 A2     CC
     Kleros Preferred Funding II                 B      CC
     Kleros Preferred Funding II                 C      CC
     Kleros Preferred Funding II                 D      CC
     Kleros Preferred Funding II                 E      CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 55 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 55
classes from five residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2006 and 2007.  S&P removed 36 of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 31 classes from four of the downgraded
transactions and from two additional transactions and removed four
of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes benefit from
overcollateralization and excess spread.  The underlying pools of
loans backing these transactions consists of different
combinations of fixed- and adjustable-rate, hybrid, and option
adjustable-rate mortgage Alt-A mortgage loans.

                          Rating Actions

           Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR4
                        Series    2006-AR4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        07401JAA6     B-                   B-/Watch Neg

       Chevy Chase Funding LLC Mortgage-Backed Certificates
                         Series    2006-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        16678XAA2     CC                   CCC
        A-2        16678XAB0     CC                   CCC
        A-1I       16678X9A6     CC                   CCC
        A-2I       16678X9B4     CC                   CCC
        A-NA       16678X9C2     CC                   CCC
        IO         16678X9J7     CC                   CCC
        NIO        16678X9K4     CC                   CCC
        B-1        16678XAC8     CC                   CCC
        B-1I       16678X9D0     CC                   CCC
        B-1NA      16678X9E8     CC                   CCC

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR9
                        Series    2006-AR9

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       17310RAA7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       17310RAB5     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       17310RAC3     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A4       17310RAD1     A-                   A/Watch Neg
    1-M1       17310RAE9     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
    1-M2       17310RAF6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    1-M3       17310RAG4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    1-M4       17310RAH2     CC                   CCC
    2-A        17310RAM1     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    2-AIO      17310RAP4     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    2-BIO      17310RAQ2     CC                   CCC
    2-B1       17310RAS8     CC                   CCC
    2-B2       17310RAT6     CC                   CCC

  Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OA1
                        Series    2006-OA1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        25150QAA5     BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg

           MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-1A       576431AA8     CC                   CCC
    I-2A1      576431AB6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-2A2      576431AC4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-2A4      576431AE0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-X-1      576431AF7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-X-2      576431AG5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-X-3      576431AH3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     576431AK6     CC                   CCC

                MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      55275SAA8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      55275SAB6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      55275SAC4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      55275SAD2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      55275SAE0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      55275SAF7     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      55275SAG5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      55275SAH3     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      55275SAJ9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      55275SAK6     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      55275SAL4     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      55275SAM2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-7      55275SAN0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-8      55275SAP5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-9      55275SAQ3     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-10     55275SBG4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-11     55275SBH2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-12     55275SBJ8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-13     55275SBK5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-15     55275SBM1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      55275SAR1     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
    15-A-X     55275SAX8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-A-X     55275SAY6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        55275SAZ3     CC                   CCC
    B-2        55275SBA7     CC                   CCC
    B-4        55275SBC3     D                    CC

                         Ratings Affirmed

          American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-1A-1     02660CAA8     CCC

  Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OA1
                        Series    2006-OA1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-2        25150QAB3     CCC
                  A-3        25150QAC1     CCC

           MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-2A3      576431AD2     CCC
                  II-A-1     576431AJ9     CCC
                  II-A-3     576431AL4     CCC
                  II-A-3X    576431AM2     CCC
                  II-A-4     576431AN0     CCC
                  II-A-4X    576431AP5     CCC
                  II-A-5     576431AQ3     CCC
                  II-A-5X    576431AR1     CCC
                  II-A-6     576431AS9     CCC
                  II-A-6X    576431AT7     CCC
                  II-A-7     576431AU4     CCC
                  II-A-7X    576431AV2     CCC
                  II-A-8     576431AW0     CCC
                  II-A-9     576431AX8     CCC
                  II-A-10    576431AY6     CCC
                  II-A-11    576431AZ3     CCC
                  II-A-12    576431BA7     CCC
                  II-A-13    576431BB5     CCC
                  II-A-14    576431BC3     CCC
                  II-A-15    576431BD1     CCC

                MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  2-A-14     55275SBL3     CCC
                  3-A-2      55275SAS9     CCC
                  15-PO      55275SAV2     CCC
                  30-PO      55275SAW0     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 233 Classes From 14 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 233
classes from 14 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2005 and 2006 and removed 144 of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 96 classes from the downgraded transactions and one additional
deal and removed 39 of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies.  Conversely, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's
belief that the amount of credit enhancement available for these
classes is sufficient to cover losses associated with these rating
levels.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P applied its
projected losses on the structural level in order to determine the
impact such losses would have on each class.  In order to maintain
a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether the class can
withstand the base-case loss assumptions S&P use in its analysis.
To maintain an 'AAA' rating, S&P assessed whether the class can
withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions,
subject to individual caps and qualitative factors applied to
specific transactions.  To maintain a rating in categories between
'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P assessed whether the class can
withstand losses exceeding the base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for a
'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would assess whether one class
could withstand approximately 130% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 155% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                          Rating Actions

               Banc of America Funding 2005-8 Trust
                        Series      2005-8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05946XX57     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05946XX65     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05946XX81     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      05946XX99     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      05946XY23     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      05946XY31     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      05946XY49     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      05946XY56     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A-7      05946XY64     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A-8      05946XY72     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-9      05946XY80     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      05946XY98     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      05946XZ22     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      05946XZ30     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    3-A-4      05946XZ48     B                    AA+/Watch Neg
    3-A-5      05946XZ55     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      05946XZ63     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      05946XZ71     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-3      05946XZ89     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-4      05946XZ97     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-5      05946X2A0     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-6      05946X2B8     B                    A/Watch Neg
    4-A-9      05946X2E2     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-10     05946X2F9     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-11     05946X2G7     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-12     05946X2H5     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-13     05946X2J1     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-14     05946X2K8     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-15     05946X2L6     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-16     05946X2M4     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-17     05946X2N2     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-18     05946X2P7     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-19     05946X2Q5     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-20     05946X2R3     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-21     05946X2S1     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-22     05946X2T9     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-23     05946X2U6     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-24     05946X2V4     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-25     05946X2W2     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-26     05946X2X0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-27     05946X2Y8     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-28     05946X2Z5     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    4-A-29     05946X3A9     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    30-IO      05946X3B7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05946X3C5     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg

              Banc of America Mortgage 2006-A Trust
                       Series      2006-A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05949CRP3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05949CRQ1     B                    BB-/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05949CRS7     B+                   A-/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      05949CRT5     B                    BB-/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      05949CRU2     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      05949CRV0     BBB-                 AA+/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      05949CRW8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      05949CRX6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

            Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
                       Series      2005-L

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    2-A-1      05949CPG5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      05949CPJ9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      05949CPK6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      05949CPL4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      05949CPM2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      05949CPN0     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      05949CPP5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      05949CPQ3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5
                      Series      2006-AR5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A4A      17309FAG3     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    1-A6A      17309FAK4     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    1-A7A      17309FAL2     A                    AA/Watch Neg
    2-A5A      17309FAY4     CC                   CCC
    2-A7A      17309FBB3     CC                   CCC

            CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-11
                       Series      2005-11

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    3-A-6      2254W0NM3     BBB                  AA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      2254W0NQ4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      2254W0NR2     B                    A/Watch Neg
    5-A-3      2254W0NS0     B                    A/Watch Neg
    5-A-4      2254W0NT8     B                    A/Watch Neg
    5-X        2254W0PS8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      2254W0NU5     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-2      2254W0NV3     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-3      2254W0NW1     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-4      2254W0NX9     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-5      2254W0NY7     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-6      2254W0NZ4     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-7      2254W0PA7     B                    A/Watch Neg
    6-A-8      2254W0PB5     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-1      2254W0PE9     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-2      2254W0PF6     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-3      2254W0PG4     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-4      2254W0PH2     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-5      2254W0PJ8     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-7      2254W0PL3     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-8      2254W0PM1     B                    A/Watch Neg
    8-A-9      2254W0PN9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    8-A-10     2254W0PP4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        2254W0PQ2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2006-7
                        Series      2006-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      22942KAA8     CC                   CCC
    1-A-2      22942KAB6     CC                   CCC
    1-A-3      22942KAC4     CC                   CCC
    2-A-1      22942KAD2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      22942KAE0     CC                   CCC
    2-A-3      22942KAF7     CC                   CCC
    2-A-5      22942KAH3     CC                   CCC
    2-A-6      22942KAJ9     CC                   CCC
    3-A-3      22942KAM2     CC                   CCC
    3-A-5      22942KAP5     CC                   CCC
    3-A-6      22942KAQ3     CC                   CCC
    3-A-7      22942KAR1     CC                   CCC
    3-A-8      22942KAS9     CC                   CCC
    3-A-9      22942KAT7     CC                   CCC
    3-A-10     22942KAU4     CC                   CCC
    3-A-11     22942KAV2     CC                   CCC
    3-A-12     22942KAW0     CC                   CCC
    4-A-1      22942KAX8     CC                   CCC
    5-A-1      22942KAY6     CC                   CCC
    5-A-2      22942KAZ3     CC                   CCC
    5-A-3      22942KBA7     CC                   CCC
    D-X        22942KCQ1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    D-P        22942KCR9     CC                   CCC
    6-A-1      22942KBB5     CC                   CCC
    6-A-2      22942KBC3     CC                   CCC
    6-A-3      22942KBD1     CC                   CCC
    7-A-1      22942KBE9     CC                   CCC
    7-A-2      22942KBF6     CC                   CCC
    7-A-3      22942KBG4     CC                   CCC
    7-A-4      22942KBH2     CC                   CCC
    7-A-5      22942KBJ8     CC                   CCC
    7-A-6      22942KDR8     CC                   CCC
    7-A-7      22942KDS6     CC                   CCC
    8-A-1      22942KBK5     CC                   CCC
    8-A-2      22942KBL3     CC                   CCC
    8-A-3      22942KBM1     CC                   CCC
    8-A-4      22942KBN9     CC                   CCC
    8-A-5      22942KBP4     CC                   CCC
    8-A-6      22942KBQ2     CC                   CCC
    8-A-7      22942KBR0     CC                   CCC
    8-A-8      22942KBS8     CC                   CCC
    8-A-9      22942KBT6     CC                   CCC
    8-A-10     22942KBU3     CC                   CCC
    8-A-11     22942KBV1     CC                   CCC
    8-A-12     22942KBW9     CC                   CCC
    9-A-1      22942KBX7     CC                   CCC
    9-A-2      22942KBY5     CC                   CCC
    9-A-3      22942KBZ2     CC                   CCC
    9-A-4      22942KCA6     CC                   CCC
    9-A-5      22942KCB4     CC                   CCC
    10-A-1     22942KCC2     CC                   CCC
    10-A-2     22942KCD0     CC                   CCC
    10-A-3     22942KCE8     CC                   CCC
    10-A-4     22942KCF5     CC                   CCC
    10-A-6     22942KCH1     CC                   CCC
    11-A-1     22942KCK4     CC                   CCC
    11-A-2     22942KCL2     CC                   CCC
    11-A-3     22942KCM0     CC                   CCC
    11-A-4     22942KCN8     CC                   CCC
    12-A-1     22942KCP3     CC                   CCC
    10-A-5     22942KCG3     CC                   CCC

             CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    2-A-1      225470YF4     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      225470YG2     BBB                  AA-/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      225470YH0     BBB                  AA-/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      225470D91     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      225470E41     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      225470ZD8     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-2      225470ZE6     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-3      225470ZF3     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-4      225470ZG1     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-5      225470ZH9     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-6      225470ZJ5     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-7      225470ZK2     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    6-A-8      225470ZL0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    6-A-9      225470E33     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-X        225470ZM8     BBB                  AA-/Watch Neg
    1-A-1      225470YD9     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      225470YE7     CC                   CCC
    3-A-1      225470YJ6     CC                   CCC
    3-A-2      225470YK3     CC                   CCC
    4-A-1      225470YL1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      225470YM9     CC                   CCC
    4-A-3      225470YN7     CC                   CCC
    4-A-4      225470YP2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    4-A-5      225470YQ0     CC                   CCC
    4-A-6      225470YR8     CC                   CCC
    4-A-7      225470YS6     CC                   CCC
    4-A-8      225470YT4     CC                   CCC
    4-A-9      225470YU1     CC                   CCC
    4-A-10     225470YV9     CC                   CCC
    4-A-11     225470YW7     CC                   CCC
    5-A-1      225470YX5     CC                   CCC
    5-A-2      225470YY3     CC                   CCC
    5-A-3      225470YZ0     CC                   CCC
    5-A-4      225470ZA4     CC                   CCC
    5-A-5      225470ZB2     CC                   CCC
    5-A-7      225470E25     CC                   CCC
    A-P        225470ZP1     CC                   CCC
    D-X        225470ZN6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg

       First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-AR1
                       Series      2006-AR1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      32051GX83     A                    A/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      32051GX91     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     32051GY25     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     32051GY33     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    32051GY58     BBB-                 BBB+/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    32051GY66     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    IV-A-1     32051GY74     A                    A/Watch Neg
    IV-A-2     32051GY82     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9F
                       Series      2005-9F

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        4A-2       362341T66     CC                   CCC
        5A-2       362341T82     CC                   CCC
        6A-2       362341U23     CC                   CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4F
                       Series      2006-4F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-1       362650AA1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-1       362650AB9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-2       362334QD9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-4       362650AD5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-5       362650AE3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-6       362650AF0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-7       362650AG8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-8       362650AH6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-9       362650AJ2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A-10      362650AK9     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-11      362650AL7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    3A-1       362650AM5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    3A-2       362650BP7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    4A-1       362650AN3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    4A-2       362650AP8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    5A-1       362650AQ6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    5A-2       362650AR4     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    5A-4       362650AT0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-5       362650AU7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-6       362650AV5     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    5A-7       362650AW3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-8       362650AX1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-9       362650AY9     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    5A-10      362650AZ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-11      362650BA0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    6A-1       362650BB8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    6A-2       362650BQ5     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-3       362650BR3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    A-P        362650BC6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    A-X        362650BD4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        362650BF9     CC                   CCC

                GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2
                      Series      2006-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A1        36297TAA0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1X         36297TAL6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A1        36297TAB8     A                    A/Watch Neg
    2A2        36297TAC6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    3A1        36297TAE2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    4A1        36297TAG7     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    5A1        36297TAJ1     BB-                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1B1        36297TAM4     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    1B2        36297TAN2     B                    B/Watch Neg

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2006-A2
                       Series      2006-A2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    4-A-1      466247K51     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      466247K69     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      466247K77     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      466247K85     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-3      466247K93     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-4      466247L27     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-B-1     466247L68     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    II-B-3     466247L84     CC                   CCC
    II-B-4     466247H48     CC                   CCC

           MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      576438AA3     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      576438AB1     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      576438AC9     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      576438AD7     BBB+                 AA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      576438AE5     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      576438AF2     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      576438AG0     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      576438AH8     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      576438AJ4     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    B-1        576438AM7     CC                   CCC

                    RFMSI Series 2005-S7 Trust
                      Series      2005-S7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        76111XZR7     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-2        76111XZS5     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-3        76111XZT3     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-4        76111XZU0     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-5        76111XZV8     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-6        76111XZW6     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    A-7        76111XZX4     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-8        76111XZY2     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-9        76111XZZ9     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-P        76111XA29     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    A-V        76111XA37     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    M-1        76111XA60     CC                   CCC
    M-2        76111XA78     D                    CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

               Banc of America Funding 2006-3 Trust
                        Series      2006-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M          058931BR6     CCC

             Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc
                        Series      2005-L

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-1      05949CPD2     CCC
                 1-A-2      05949CPE0     CCC
                 2-A-2      05949CPH3     CCC

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5
                       Series      2006-AR5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A1A      17309FAA6     CCC
                 1-A1B      17309FAB4     CCC
                 1-AIO      17309FAC2     CCC
                 1-A2A      17309FAD0     CCC
                 1-A3A      17309FAE8     CCC
                 1-23B      17309FAF5     CCC
                 1-A5A      17309FAH1     CCC
                 1-45B      17309FAJ7     CCC
                 1-67B      17309FAM0     CCC

             CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2005-11
                       Series      2005-11

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 7-A-1      2254W0PC3     CCC

                CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2006-7
                        Series      2006-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-A-4      22942KAG5     CCC
                 3-A-1      22942KAK6     CCC
                 3-A-2      22942KAL4     CCC
                 3-A-4      22942KAN0     CCC

             CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-2
                       Series      2006-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 5-A-6      225470ZC0     CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9F
                       Series      2005-9F

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1A-1       362341Q36     CCC
                 1A-2       362341Q44     CCC
                 1A-3       362341Q51     CCC
                 1A-4       362341Q69     CCC
                 1A-5       362341Q77     CCC
                 1A-6       362341Q85     CCC
                 1A-7       362341Q93     CCC
                 1A-9       362341R35     CCC
                 1A-10      362341R43     CCC
                 1A-11      362341R50     CCC
                 1A-12      362341R68     CCC
                 1A-13      362341R76     CCC
                 1A-14      362341R84     CCC
                 1A-15      362341R92     CCC
                 1A-16      362341X46     CCC
                 2A-1       362341S26     CCC
                 2A-2       362341S34     CCC
                 2A-3       362341S42     CCC
                 2A-4       362341S59     CCC
                 2A-5       362341S67     CCC
                 2A-6       362341S75     CCC
                 2A-7       362341S83     CCC
                 2A-8       362341S91     CCC
                 3A-1       362341T25     CCC
                 3A-2       362341T33     CCC
                 3A-3       362341T41     CCC
                 1A-P       362341U56     CCC
                 1A-X       362341U72     CCC
                 4A-1       362341T58     CCC
                 5A-1       362341T74     CCC
                 6A-1       362341T90     CCC
                 2A-X       362341U80     CCC
                 2A-P       362341U64     CCC

                GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2
                       Series      2006-AR2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2A3        36297TAD4     CCC
                 3A2        36297TAF9     CCC
                 4A2        36297TAH5     CCC
                 5A2        36297TAK8     CCC
                 1B3        36297TAP7     CCC

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2006-A2
                       Series      2006-A2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 II-B-2     466247L76     CCC


* S&P Raises Ratings on 50 Tranches From 22 CLO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 50
tranches from 22 U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligation
transactions.  The affected classes totaled $4.24 billion in
issuance.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 93
classes of notes from the same transactions.

The upgrades follow a review of the performance of S&P's rated
U.S. CLOs and reflect positive performance trends S&P observe in
the transactions since S&P last reviewed them.  The upgraded
transactions have benefited from improved performance in the
corporate loan market, and in some cases, from trades made by the
collateral managers that S&P believes increased the credit quality
of the underlying loan portfolio.

After S&P updated its criteria for rating corporate CDOs in
September of 2009, S&P reviewed all of the deals that S&P
upgraded.  Most of the deals S&P upgraded were reviewed last year
in November or December, and S&P adjusted their ratings after S&P
applied the updated criteria for rating corporate CDOs.  The
performance of the CLOs S&P upgraded has improved since its last
review.  In S&P's view, depending on the specific transaction, the
improvements have been caused by increases in senior
overcollateralization ratio test results, reductions in the level
of 'CCC' rated assets held, and higher recovery rates upon the
sale of some defaulted collateral and unscheduled principal
payments used to reduce the balance of the senior notes.
Additionally, S&P incorporated updated information in its analysis
for some transactions that contain loans from obligors making
their way through the bankruptcy process.

S&P identified the transactions based on the review of cash flow
analysis generated across its rated CLO transactions.  S&P then
conducted individual analyst and committee reviews of the more
detailed cash flow results and transaction performance.  Standard
& Poor's will continue to review the performance of its rated
transactions and adjust the ratings as appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                                      Rating
                                                      ------
  Transaction                            Class       To     From
  -----------                            -----       --     ----
  Atlantis Funding Ltd.                  A-1         AA-    A+
  Atrium IV                              D-1         B-     CCC+
  Atrium IV                              D-2         B-     CCC+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 A-1A        AA-    A+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 A-1B-1      AA-    A+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 A-1B-2      AA-    A+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 A2          A      A-
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 B-1 Def     BBB-   BB+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 B-2 Def     BBB-   BB+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 C-1 Def     B+     CCC+
  Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 C-2 Def     B+     CCC+
  Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   D-1         CCC+   CCC-
  Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   D-2         CCC+   CCC-
  Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  D           B+     CCC+
  Castle Hill I - Ingots Ltd.            B           A+     A
  Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       D-1         B-     CCC+
  Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       D-2         B-     CCC+
  Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       D-3         B-     CCC+
  Flagship CLO VI                        E           CCC+   CCC-
  Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-1 Nw Rev  AA+    A+
  Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-1 NwTrm   AA+    A+
  Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-1 Revolv  AA+    A+
  Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-1 Term    AA+    A+
  Franklin CLO IV Ltd.                   C           BBB    BB+
  Franklin CLO IV Ltd.                   D           CCC+   CCC-
  Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    D           CCC+   CCC-
  Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                C           B      CCC+
  Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      E           CCC+   CCC-
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            A-1         A+     A-
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            A-2A        BBB+   BB+
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            A-2B        BBB+   BB+
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            B-1A        BBB    BB+
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            B-1B        BBB    BB+
  Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            B-2         B+     CCC+
  Katonah V Ltd.                         A-1         AA+    AA
  Katonah V Ltd.                         A-2         A+     A
  Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          D           BB-    B+
  Magnetite V CLO Ltd.                   A           AA+    A+
  Magnetite V CLO Ltd.                   B           A-     BBB-
  Magnetite V CLO Ltd.                   C           B+     CCC-
  Magnetite V CLO Ltd.                   D           CCC+   CCC-
  Market Square CLO Ltd.                 A           AA     AA-
  Market Square CLO Ltd.                 B           BBB    BBB-
  PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  D           CCC+   CCC-
  Race Point CLO Ltd.                    D-1         B      CCC+
  Race Point CLO Ltd.                    D-2         B      CCC+
  Race Point CLO Ltd.                    D-3         B      CCC+
  Rampart CLO 2006-I Ltd.                C           BB     B+
  Rampart CLO 2006-I Ltd.                D           B+     CCC+
  Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             D           CCC+   CCC-

                         Ratings Affirmed

    Transactions                           Class       Rating
    ------------                           -----       ------
    Atlantis Funding Ltd.                  A-2         A+
    Atlantis Funding Ltd.                  B           BBB-
    Atlantis Funding Ltd.                  C           B+
    Atrium IV                              A-1a        AA-
    Atrium IV                              A-1b        AA-
    Atrium IV                              A-2         AA-
    Atrium IV                              A-3         A-
    Atrium IV                              B           BB+
    Atrium IV                              C           B+
    Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I                 P           AAA
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   A-1         AA-
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   A-2-A       AA+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   A-3         AA-
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   B           A
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VII Ltd.   C           BBB+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  A-1         AA+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  A-2-a       AA+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  A-2-b       AA+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  B           A+
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII Ltd.  C           BBB
    Castle Hill I - Ingots Ltd.            A-1         AAA
    Castle Hill I - Ingots Ltd.            A-2         AA+
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       A           AA+
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       B-1         A+
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       B-2         A+
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       C-1         BBB
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       C-2         BBB
    Dryden V-Leveraged Loan CDO 2003       E           CCC-
    Flagship CLO VI                        A-1a        AA+
    Flagship CLO VI                        A-1b        A+
    Flagship CLO VI                        A-2         A+
    Flagship CLO VI                        B           A-
    Flagship CLO VI                        C           BBB-
    Flagship CLO VI                        D           BB
    Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-2         A+
    Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     A-2 NwTrm   A+
    Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     B           BBB+
    Fortress Credit Investments I Ltd.     B NwTrm     BBB+
    Franklin CLO IV Ltd.                   A           AA+
    Franklin CLO IV Ltd.                   B           A+
    Franklin CLO IV Ltd.                   E           CCC-
    Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    A-1         AA+
    Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    A-2         AA+
    Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    B           A+
    Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    C           BB+
    Franklin CLO V Ltd.                    E           CCC-
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                A-1         AA-
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                A-1b        AA-
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                A-2         BBB+
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                B-1         BB+
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                B-2         BB+
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                D-1         CCC-
    Gannett Peak CLO I Ltd.                D-2         CCC-
    Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      A-1A        AAA
    Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      A-1B        AA+
    Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      B           A+
    Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      C           BBB+
    Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007 Ltd.      D           BB+
    Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            C           CCC-
    Hewett's Island CLO II Ltd.            D           CC
    Katonah V Ltd.                         B-1         B+
    Katonah V Ltd.                         B-2         B+
    Katonah V Ltd.                         C           CCC-
    Katonah V Ltd.                         D           CC
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          A-1         AA
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          A-2a        AA+
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          A-2b        AA
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          A-3         A+
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          B           BBB+
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          C           BB+
    Madison Park Funding III Ltd.          Q           B+
    Market Square CLO Ltd.                 C           BB
    Market Square CLO Ltd.                 D           CCC+
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  A-1         A+
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  A-2a        AA+
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  A-2b        A+
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  A-3         A-
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  B           BBB-
    PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                  C           BB-
    Race Point CLO Ltd.                    A-1         AAA
    Race Point CLO Ltd.                    A-2         AAA
    Race Point CLO Ltd.                    B-1         AA+
    Race Point CLO Ltd.                    B-2         AA+
    Race Point CLO Ltd.                    C           BBB+
    Rampart CLO 2006-I Ltd.                A-1         AA+
    Rampart CLO 2006-I Ltd.                A-2         AA-
    Rampart CLO 2006-I Ltd.                B           A-
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             A-1         AA+
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             A-1J        AA+
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             A-1S        AA+
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             A-2         AA-
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             B           BBB+
    Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.             C           BB+



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***