TCR_Public/100502.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

               Sunday, May 2, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 120

                            Headlines

ACA ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ALLEGHENY COUNTY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tax Bonds
ARBOR REALTY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 17 Classes of Securities
ARMOR MCP: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
AUSTIN HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on 1998 A Bonds

AVIS BUDGET: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Nine Series of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2008-LS1 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Confirms Rating on Class A-4A Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 194 Tranches
BANK OF AMERICA: S&P Puts Ratings on CreditWatch Developing

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-PWR4 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2004-PWR5 Certs.
BEEBE MEDICAL: Moody's Downgrades Underlying Bond Ratings to 'Ba3'
BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CARRINGTON HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 122 Tranches

CENTERLINE 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs.
CHARTWELL CBO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
COPERNICUS EURO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
CORPORATE-BACKED CALLABLE: S&P Raises Cert. Ratings to 'BB+'
CORTS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Certificates

CORTS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $100 Mil. Certs. to 'BB+'
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 16 2002-CP5 Securities
CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
DETROIT CITY: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Tax Increment Bonds
DLJ MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-CKP1 Notes

FAIRFIELD STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
FIRST CHICAGO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 1997-CHL1 Notes
FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 70 Tranches
GLIMCHER REALTY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Redeemable Stocks
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2007-RR2 Notes

GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2006-FL4 Certs. to 'D'
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N-SO Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007- EOP Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Certificates
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 328 Tranches

HESPERIA REDEVELOPMENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Tax Bonds
HIGHLAND PARK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-1 Notes
HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certs. to 'D'

JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1999-C7 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-C3 Certs.
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2003-PM1 Securities
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2001-C7 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006-C1 Certs. to 'D'

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-CCL-C2 Certs.
LODESTONE RE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class A 2010-1 Notes
LOUISIANA LOCAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on 2002A Bonds
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating
MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches

MERITAGE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2005-LC1 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 2001-IQ Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1998-XL1 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 1999-FNV1 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on $3 Mil. Notes to 'B-'
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 115 Tranches
N-STAR REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
N-STAR REL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
POLLUTION CONTROL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1991A Bonds

PPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Ratings on $25 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on QWS-1 Certs.
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on QWS-2 Certs.
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on Positive Watch
PROTECTIVE FINANCE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-PL Certs.

RADIAN ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes of Certs.
SADDLE MOUNTAIN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on $13.1 Million Bonds
SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N Certs. to 'D'
SANDSTONE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SANKATY HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

SATURNS TRUST: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Series 2003-8 Units
SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
SOLAR INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
SOLAR INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Two 2003-15 Units

STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Raises Rating on Series 2005-3 Units to 'BB'
TEXAS PUBLIC: S&P Raises Rating on 2004 Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
TIMES SQUARE: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'BB' Rating
TUCKAHOE CREDIT: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on 2001-CTL1 Certificates
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-C1 Certs.

WAVELAND INGOTS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
WELLS FARGO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches

* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 186 Bonds From 136 RMBS Deals to 'D'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Diversified SF CDO Deals
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Tranches From Four REIT Trusts
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Eight RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes From Six RMBS Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 48 Tranches From 12 CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 182 Classes From 21 RMBS Transactions



                            *********



ACA ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by ACA ABS 2002-1, Limited.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     due August 1, 2034, Downgraded to A3; previously on 8/24/2009
     Downgraded to A1;

  -- Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     due August 1, 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/24/2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

ACA ABS 2002-1, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities originated between 2002 and 2003.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, number of assets that are currently on review for
possible downgrade and failure of the coverage tests.  The
defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, has increased
from $7.3 million in August 2009 to $14.0 million in March 2010.
Also, in April, approximately $29 million of pre-2005 RMBS within
the underlying portfolio were placed on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.  In
addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is currently
failing its interest coverage test.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


ALLEGHENY COUNTY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tax Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Allegheny County
Redevelopment Authority, PA's tax increment revenue bonds as part
of its continuous surveillance effort:

  -- Approximately $11.3 million series 2000A (Robinson Mall
     Project) downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';

  -- Approximately $3.6 million series 2000B (Robinson Mall
     Project) downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB'.

The Rating Outlook for the 2000A bonds is Stable.  Fitch has
placed the 2000B bonds on Rating Watch Negative for a potential
downgrade.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' on the 2000A bonds
     reflects the weak coverage of debt service from pledged tax
     increment revenue from the mall properties (excluding Sears
     and J.C. Penney) largely stemming from prior year property
     appeals and adjustments and less than projected growth in the
     project area's assessed value.

  -- The downgrade to 'BB-' on the 2000B bonds is based on
     separate joint, not several, guaranty agreements with Sears
     (Fitch Issuer Default Rating 'BB-') and J.C. Penney (IDR
     'BBB-') as tax increment revenue pledged to bondholders has
     consistently failed to generate sum-sufficient coverage of
     annual debt service according to Fitch calculations.

  -- The Negative Watch on the 2000B bonds reflects uncertainty
     regarding the current status of separate guaranty agreements
     between the authority and Sear's and J.C. Penney.  The
     Negative Watch will be resolved following confirmation by
     Fitch that the guaranty agreements remain enforceable and
     adequately provide for the timely payment of the companies'
     respective pro-rata share of debt service on the 2000B bonds.

  -- Pledged tax increment revenues are generated against a
     relatively small but fully developed project area dominated
     by retail tenants highly exposed to general economic
     conditions and consumer spending patterns.

  -- The indenture creates a closed flow of funds whereby surplus
     tax increment revenues from years prior have been deposited
     into the redemption fund supporting the continued servicing
     of annual debt obligations.

  -- All bonds are repaid within seven years and no additional
     debt is contemplated.

  -- The economic characteristics of the immediate retail service
     area are solid.  In addition, the project benefits from
     direct interstate access which helps to attract shoppers from
     a wider trade area.

What Could Trigger A Downgrade For The 2000b Bonds?

  -- Fitch's finding that guaranty agreements no longer require
     contributions sufficient to provide timely debt service
     payments may result in a rating downgrade as coverage from
     pledged tax increment revenues is not expected to cover debt
     service on the 2000B bonds at a level commensurate with the
     'BB-' rating.

Key Rating Driver For The 2000a Bonds:

  -- Pledged tax increment revenues provide weak coverage of debt
     service on the 2000A bonds, therefore adverse changes in
     economic or business conditions (including but not limited to
     tenant bankruptcy or relocations), property assessments,
     taxpayer appeals, and/or taxpayer delinquencies may present a
     material default risk warranting negative rating action.

Security:

The 2000A bonds are secured by the tax increment revenue derived
from the mall properties, excluding the two parcels owned by Sears
and J.C. Penney.  As additional security, the mall developer and
owner, Robinson Mall-JCP Associates, LTD, a subsidiary of Forest
City Enterprises (not rated by Fitch), has entered into a minimum
payment agreement pursuant to which it has agreed to make payments
in an amount sufficient to pay debt service in the event pledged
tax increment revenue is insufficient.

The 2000B bonds are secured by tax increment revenue generated
against the Sears and J.C. Penney properties and a junior lien on
tax increment revenue from the mall properties.  Additionally,
Sears and J.C. Penney have each entered into a minimum guaranty
agreement securing their respective pro-rata share of debt service
on the 2000B bonds in the event that pledged tax increment revenue
is insufficient.

Credit Summary:

Allegheny County, Montour School District, and the Township of
Robinson adopted a tax increment financing plan to provide funding
through the issuance of tax increment bonds for the construction
of roadways, utility and infrastructure improvements benefiting a
regional shopping mall in Robinson Township, Pennsylvania.  The
Mall at Robinson opened in fall 2001 along a bustling corridor
connecting the Pittsburgh International Airport and the downtown
business district.  Unlike regional competitors, the mall has the
advantage of direct interstate access, which helps to attract
shoppers from a wider trade area including portions of eastern
Ohio and western West Virginia.  The area immediately surrounding
the mall exhibits strong population growth, favorable income
characteristics, and low levels of unemployment relative to the
state and nation.  The mall's anchor tenants are Macy's (Fitch IDR
'BBB-' with a Negative Outlook), J.C. Penney, Sears and Dick's
Sporting Goods (not rated by Fitch).  The mall also houses
approximately 120 'in-line' retailers and eateries under long-term
triple-net leases that generally extend from five to 10 years.
The authority reports no recent closures or vacancies of
significance and an occupancy rate of approximately 97%.  The
authority reports there are no additional capital needs at the
mall that would require debt financing.  Remaining undeveloped
acreage is topographically challenged and not conducive to retail
or commercial use.

The 2000A bonds are expected to achieve a narrow 1.09 times
coverage ratio in 2010.  According to Fitch calculations the
pledged tax increment revenues failed to cover debt service on the
2000A bonds in 2006 (0.89x) and 2008 (0.96x) as a result of
various adjustments for municipal overpayments and refunds
stemming from assessment appeals.  According to the project
consultant, the back-log of appeals was cleared in 2009 and there
are no material appeals presently outstanding.  Tax increment
revenue generated from the Sears and J.C. Penney properties has
not and is not expected to cover debt service on the 2000B bonds.
Surplus pledged tax increment revenue generated during the
interest only period following issuance accumulated in the
redemption fund pursuant to the trust indenture, providing a
cushion to service debt in years when a pledged revenue deficiency
has existed.  The availability of these funds has to date negated
the need to call upon the minimum guaranty agreements provided by
Sears, J.C. Penney, and Forest City.  Fitch calculations verified
with the project consultant suggest a sufficient balance in the
redemption fund to cover debt service on both series of bonds
through final maturity based on tax increment revenue generated
under a scenario with no growth in assessed value.  Adverse
changes in AV or in pledged tax increment revenue may present a
material default risk warranting negative rating action.

Project area AV failed to meet original growth projections
resulting in coverage levels below original rating expectations.
AV growth is tempered by the county's base-year assessment system,
which assesses real property based on its market value as of
Jan. 1, 2002 (including new construction and other adjustments).
The base-year assessment system was ruled unconstitutional by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2009.  The county has adopted a plan
to complete a countywide reassessment by 2012.  At present, it is
not clear if any change in assessment practice would affect tax
increment collections.  Fitch notes that the municipal parties to
the tax increment plan previously agreed to amend the plan upon
the occurrence of a change in the calculation of real estate taxes
or assessment practice, in order to preserve their expectations
that the amount of tax increment revenue required for debt service
would be available for such purpose.


ARBOR REALTY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 17 Classes of Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 17
classes from Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2005-1 Ltd.
and Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2006-1 Ltd.  Both
Arbor 2005-1 and Arbor 2006-1 are commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.  S&P removed all 17
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The affirmations reflect S&P's analysis of the transactions
following S&P's rating actions on underlying CRE CDO securities
that serve as collateral for Arbor 2005-1 and Arbor 2006-1.

According to the April 15, 2010, trustee report, Arbor 2005-1's
current asset pool included these:

* Twelve whole loans and senior participations ($175.6 million,
  37.8% of the collateral pool);

* Twenty-one subordinate interest loans ($247.1 million, 53.2%);

* Two CRE CDO tranches ($24.5 million, 5.3%); and

* Two commercial mortgage-backed securities tranches
  ($17.1 million, 3.7%).

According to the March 31, 2010, trustee report, Arbor 2006-1's
current asset pool included these:

* Twenty-eight whole loans and senior participations
  ($455.3 million, 74.1% of the collateral pool);

* Sixteen subordinate interest loans ($122.3 million, 19.9%);

* Three CRE CDO tranches ($30.4 million, 4.9%); and

* Two CMBS tranches ($6.5 million, 1.1%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed Arbor 2005-1 and Arbor 2006-1 and the
underlying collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities 2005-1 Ltd.
                       Floating-rate notes

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A                A+               A+/Watch Neg
         A-2              A                A/Watch Neg
         B                BBB+             BBB+/Watch Neg
         C                BBB              BBB/Watch Neg
         D                BBB-             BBB-/Watch Neg
         E                BBB-             BBB-/Watch Neg
         F                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg
         G                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg
         H                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg

           Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities 2006-1 Ltd.
                        Floating-rate notes

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1A             BBB+             BBB+/Watch Neg
         A-1AR            BBB+             BBB+/Watch Neg
         A-2              BBB              BBB/Watch Neg
         B                BBB-             BBB-/Watch Neg
         C                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg
         D                BB+              BB+/Watch Neg
         E                BB               BB/Watch Neg
         F                BB-              BB-/Watch Neg


ARMOR MCP: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded ratings on nine tranches
issued by Armor MCP 2005-1 L.P, four tranches issued by EASI
Finance Limited Partnership 2007-1, 11 tranches from SASI Finance
Limited Partnership 2006-A, 81 tranches from nine deals issued by
RESI Finance Limited Partnership, and 12 tranches from 5 deals
issued by RESIX Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes.

These prime jumbo synthetic transactions provide the owner of a
sizable pool of mortgages (as the "Protection Buyer") credit
protection through a credit default swap with the issuer (as the
"Protection Seller") of the notes.  Through this agreement, the
Protection Buyer pays a fee in return for the transfer of a
portion of the reference portfolio credit risk.

Investors in the notes have an interest in the holdings of the
issuer, which include highly rated investment instruments, a
forward delivery agreement and fee collections on the agreement
with the Protection Buyer.  Investors are exposed to losses from
the reference portfolio but benefit only indirectly from cash
flows from these assets.  Depending on the class of notes held,
investors have credit protection from subordination.

The reference portfolios of these transactions include prime
conforming and nonconforming fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
mortgages purchased from various originators.  The actions are a
result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in
conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain under
duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

Issuer: Armor MCP 2005-1 L.P.

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-7, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-8, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-9, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: EASI Finance Limited Partnership 2007-1

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-A

  -- Class A4 Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-C

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-D, Real Estate
Synthetic Investment Securities, Series 2005-D

  -- Cl. A3 Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A4 Notes, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A5 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-A

  -- Cl. A2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A3 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A4 Notes, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. A5 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-B

  -- Cl. A2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A4 Notes, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. A5 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-C

  -- Cl. A1 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A2 Notes, Downgraded to A3; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. A3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. A5 Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. A4 Notes, Downgraded to B1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2007-A

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2007-B

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit Linked Notes, Series 2005-D

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit Linked Notes, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 16, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 16, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit Linked Notes, Series 2006-A

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2005-A

  -- Class B7, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class B8, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: RESIX Finance Limited Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2006-C

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 12, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Real Estate Synthetic Investment Securities, Series 2005-B

  -- Class A4 Notes, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 30, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A5 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on May 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: SASI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-A, Sovereign Asset
Synthetic Investment Securities, Series 2006-A

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B9, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 16, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B10, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 16, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca


AUSTIN HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Rating on 1998 A Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa1 rating on Austin
Housing Finance Corporation, Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds
(Rutland Place Apartments Project), Series 1998 A, of which
approximately $11.18 million of debt remains outstanding.  The
outlook remains Negative.

The project is a 294-unit multifamily housing development located
in North Central Austin submarket, and is comprised of 16 garden
style apartment buildings (known as Rutland Place I) and 15 other
apartment buildings (known as Rutland Place II).  Phase I of the
project was built in 1979 and Phase II was built in 1985.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security from the project.

                            Strengths

  -- The gross revenue from the property is deposited into a
     revenue fund with the trustee and is used first to pay debt
     service, fees and insurance expense before operating expenses

  -- Owner support in the form of advances to cover operating
     deficits and avoid further taps on the debt service reserve
     fund which stands at the same level as a year ago ($108,331)

  -- Occupancy has increased significantly from a low 72%, due to
     fire damage in 2008 which affected 5.4% of total units, to
     90% as of March 2010.

  -- Satisfactory physical condition of the property.

                            Challenges

  -- Very thin debt service coverage level of 0.72 times based on
     un-audited 12-month operating statement ending December 31,
     2009; however, this improved from 0.66 times in 2008.

  -- As of December 31, 2009, debt service reserve fund remains
     below requirement (12% of total requirement).

  -- Increase in vacancy and concessions has negatively impacted
     coverage.

  -- The property is subject to rental housing restrictions such
     as income limitations restricting the pool of potential
     tenants as well as owner's ability to maximize rental income.

  -- Competition from a large inventory of housing units in the
     local market is likely to continue to depress rental revenue.

  -- The project is a stand-alone housing development that can be
     affected quickly and severely by significant changes in
     economic conditions.

The rating assigned to this transaction was issued on Moody's
municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to
recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.

The last rating action was on March 27, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded the bonds to Caa1 from B3 and affirmed the Negative
outlook.


AVIS BUDGET: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Nine Series of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has taken rating actions on nine series of rental car
asset backed notes issued by three different sponsors: Avis Budget
Car Rental LLC, Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, and Hertz
Corporation.  The rating actions are motivated, to varying degrees
according to the related sponsor, by improved rental car fleet
diversification, improved outlook for the Detroit Three vehicle
manufactures, and in the case of Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group,
the upgrade in November 2009 in the corporate rating of the
sponsor.  Additionally, Moody's notes that Hertz and DTAG have
announced the pending acquisition of DTAG by Hertz scheduled to
close in latter 2010.  Moody's views the pending acquisition as
positive to DTAG-sponsored ABS and will take appropriate action as
the transaction comes to fruition, and views it as credit neutral
to Hertz-sponsored ABS.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from monoline
insurance.  The current ratings on the below notes are consistent
with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at the higher
of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and any
underlying rating.

Complete Rating Actions:

ISSUER: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC

  * Series Description: Series 2003-4 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  * Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Ba1; previously Ba3, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba1; previously Ba3, placed under review
     for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly XL
     Capital Assurance (Ca; previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to
     Ca from Caa1)

  * Series Description: Series 2005-4 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  * Class Description: Class A-1, A-2 and A-3

  -- Current Rating: Ba1; previously Ba3, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2 under
     review for possible upgrade; previously on 3/26/2010 Caa2
     placed under review for possible upgrade)

  * Series Description: Series 2006-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  -- Current Rating: Baa2; previously Ba1, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  * Series Description: Series 2007-2 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  -- Current Rating: Baa2, previously Ba1; placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2 under
     review for possible upgrade; previously on 3/26/2010 Caa2
     placed under review for possible upgrade)

ISSUER: Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC

  -- Series Description: Series 2005-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed
     Notes

  -- Class Description: A-4 and A-5

  -- Current Rating Baa2 Confirmed; previously Baa2, placed under
     review for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating Baa2 Confirmed; previously Baa2, placed
     under review for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Series Description: Series 2005-2 Rental Car Asset-Backed
     Notes

  * Class Description: A-5 and A-6

  -- Current Rating Baa2 Confirmed; previously Baa2, placed under
     review for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating Baa2 Confirmed; previously Baa2, placed
     under review for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2 under
     review for possible upgrade; previously on 3/26/2010 Caa2
     placed under review for possible upgrade)

ISSUER: Rental Car Finance Corp.

  -- Series Description: Series 2005-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed
     Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-1 and A-2

  -- Current Rating: B1; previously Caa2, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating: B1; previously Caa2, placed under review
     for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly XL
     Capital Assurance (Ca; previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to
     Ca from Caa1)

  * Series Description: Series 2006-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  * Class Description: Class A

  -- Current Rating: Ba1; previously Caa1, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba1; previously Caa1, placed under review
     for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2 under
     review for possible upgrade; previously on 3/26/2010 Caa2
     placed under review for possible upgrade)

  * Series Description: Series 2007-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed
    Notes

  * Class Description: Class A

  -- Current Rating: Ba2; previously Caa1, placed under review for
     possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba2; previously Caa1, placed under review
     for possible upgrade on Dec 15, 2009

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (rating withdrawn; previously rated Caa3 on 3/25/2009)

                   Principal Rating Methodology

The primary asset backing the notes is the monthly lease payments
owed by the related sponsoring rental car company under an
operating lease, as well as a pool of vehicles comprising the bulk
of the sponsor's daily rental car fleet, including both program
vehicles (acquired vehicles subject to repurchase, or guaranteed a
minimum depreciation or resale value, by the related auto
manufacturer at pre-set prices) and non-program vehicles (acquired
vehicles that do not benefit from such repurchase or guaranteed
depreciation agreements).  The vehicles are owned by a bankruptcy-
remote entity, referred to as the lessor, which may also be the
issuer or be an affiliate of the issuer.  The sponsor and/or
operating affiliates act as lessees.  For quantitative analysis
Moody's uses a monte carlo simulation model which simulates the
potential cash flows from the vehicle assets and any additional
credit enhancements and the rated obligation repayment
requirements.

The key factors in Moody's rating analysis include the probability
of default of the sponsor, the likelihood of a bankruptcy or
default by the auto manufacturers providing vehicles to the rental
car fleet owned by the lessor, and the recovery rate on the rental
car fleet in case the rental car sponsor defaults.  Monte Carlo
simulation modeling was used to assess the impact on bondholders
of these variables.  The default probability of the sponsor is
simulated based on its current corporate probability of default
rating and Moody's idealized default rates.  For surveillance
purposes, in the event that an upgrade above the initial rating is
being considered, Moody's stress the rating of the sponsor as
lessee to provide a limited degree of de-linkage of the rated ABS
from the corporate rating of the sponsor, otherwise, the current
rating of the sponsor is used.

All of the sponsoring rental car companies fleets include both
program vehicles and non-program vehicles (also known as 'risk'
vehicles).  Under the terms of the simulation, in cases where the
related sponsor does not default it is assumed that bondholders
are repaid in full and no liquidation of the lessor's rental car
fleet is necessary.  In cases where the sponsor does default, the
lessor's fleet must be liquidated in order to repay their secured
loans to the Issuer, and ultimately the bondholders.  In those
cases, the default probability of the related auto manufacturers
must also be simulated.  Due to the Detroit Three's current highly
uncertain credit status, their defaults were simulated based on
estimates for probability of default provided by Moody's corporate
analysts that incorporated the likelihood of both Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  The default probability of other
manufacturers is derived from their respective ratings.  For each
manufacturer simulated to be in Chapter 11, Moody's further
simulate whether each such manufacturer will honor its obligation
with respect to program vehicles or default on that obligation.

In simulating liquidation of the rental car fleet following a
sponsor default, it is assumed that the portion of the program
vehicle fleet associated with non-defaulting manufacturers (both
non-bankrupt manufacturers and bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers
honoring their program obligations) is returned to the related
manufacturer at full book value.  For the non-program (risk)
fleet, as well as the portion of the program fleet associated with
defaulting manufacturers not honoring obligations on their program
vehicles, it is assumed the vehicles will be sold in the open
market.For vehicles sold in the open market, the market value of a
vehicle at time of liquidation before any haircuts are applied is
estimated using market depreciation data from the National
Automobile Dealers Association for each manufacturer with vehicles
in the collateral pool.  In making this calculation Moody's
generally assume a purchase price for program and non-program
(risk) vehicles which is 10% below MSRP, to give credit to the
volume discounts typically achieved by rental car companies.
However, in the case of Avis Budget, Moody's assume the discount
for non-program (risk) vehicles is 15% to reflect both the terms
required under the transaction documentation and historic
performance.  In addition, Moody's assume a delay in sale of six
months and therefore net an additional six months of depreciation.
This six month delay in fleet liquidation following the sponsor's
default contemplates potential legal challenges to obtaining
control of the fleet and the potential difficulties of marshaling
and selling such a large quantity of vehicles.  The base
liquidation value of sold vehicles is determined by applying a
base haircut to this estimated depreciated market value.  The base
haircut is simulated using a triangular distribution (i.e.,
minimum, mode, maximum) with values of (5%, 15%, 30%).  The
resulting calculation provides the base liquidation value.

Additional haircuts may be applied to the base liquidation value
depending on the manufacturer's simulated status: non-bankrupt,
bankrupt Chapter 11 or bankrupt Chapter 7.  No further haircuts
are applied to either (i) non-program (risk) and program vehicles
from non-bankrupt manufacturers or (ii) program vehicles from
bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers who are assumed to honor their
program obligations.  However, in all other cases, the base
liquidation value is further reduced.  For bankrupt Chapter 11
manufacturers, Moody's reduce the base liquidation of their non-
program (risk) vehicles and their program vehicles whose
obligations are assumed not to be honored by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (14%, 18%, 19%).
For manufacturers assumed to be in Chapter 7, Moody's reduce base
liquidation value of their vehicles by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (25%, 35%, 50%).

With respect to transaction maturity, for analytical purposes
Moody's is assigning each transaction to one of three assumed
maturity buckets based on its actual remaining expected maturity.
If the remaining expected maturity is less than 18 months, a
remaining maturity of 12 months will be assumed.  If the remaining
expected maturity is 18 months or more but less than 37 months, 24
months will the input to the model.  If the remaining expected
maturity is 37 months or more, 60 months will be assumed.  This is
a method of quantifying Moody's view that there is greater
uncertainty regarding fleet mix by manufacturer for transactions
with longer terms than for those with shorter terms.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 2008-LS1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded 22 classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-LS1.
The downgrades are due to higher losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans.  The affirmations are due to
key rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio,
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 21 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 1, 2010, due to anticipated losses
from specially serviced and poorly performing loans.  On April 21,
2010, class A-1A was also placed on review for possible downgrade.
This action concludes the review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $2.32 billion
from $2.34 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 236 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 28%
of the pool.

Sixty nine loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.7 million loss (53% loss severity on average).  There are 26
loans, representing 13% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Memphis and
Orlando Industrial Portfolio Loan ($59.5 million -- 2.6% of the
pool), which is secured by six industrial properties located in
Tennessee and Florida.  The properties total 822,300 square feet.
The portfolio's performance has declined since securitization due
to a decline in occupancy, from 97% at securitization to 78% as of
September 2008.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2010 due to imminent default and is currently 30+ days
delinquent.

The remaining 25 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
mixed use, retail, and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates
a $115.0 million aggregate loss for all the specially serviced
loans (40% expected loss on average).  The special servicer has
recognized an aggregate $46.5 million appraisal reduction for 13
of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 27 loans
representing approximately 23% of the pool.  These loans are
either on the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature
within the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $99.2 million loss
from these loans (19% expected loss on average based on a weighted
average 47% default probability).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of losses from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes N through S
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.8 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 99%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 123% compared to 161% at Moody's
last review in February 2009.  The last review was part of the
first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2009 vintage conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.18X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
0.95X and 0.70X at Moody's last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 65, similar to last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan
($150.0 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by three
office buildings located in Chantilly, Virginia.  The properties
total 694,000 square feet and were 99% leased as of December 2009,
essentially the same as at securitization.  The two largest
tenants are CSC Information, which leases 44% of the net rentable
area through December 2010, and Northrop Grumman Information
Technology, which leases 21% of the NRA through February 2017.
Although property performance has been stable since
securitization, Moody's has stressed the cash flow due to concerns
about potential increased vacancy due to near-term lease
expirations.  More than 30% of the NRA expires within the next 12
months.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
upcoming lease expirations.  Due to anticipated increased vacancy
and the current soft office market conditions, Moody's has assumed
a high default probability for this loan.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 203% and 0.51X, respectively, compared to 186%
and 0.56X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 600 West Chicago Loan
($134.0 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which represents a pari pasu
interest in a $265.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by 1.5 million square foot Class A office complex located
in Chicago, Illinois.  The property was 92% leased as of September
2009 compared to 84% at securitization.  The three largest tenants
are Banker's Life & Casualty, which leases 14% of the NRA through
November 2018; Level 3 Communications, which leases 13% of the NRA
through November 2015 and William Winfrey Jr. Company, which
leases 11% of the NRA through January 2016.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 183%
and 0.58X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Hallmark Building Loan
($64.0 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
305,000 square foot office property located in Dulles, Virginia.
The property was 84% leased as of December 2009 compared to 90% at
securitization.  Another 8% of the NRA is expected to become
vacant in 2010.  The two largest tenants are Qiviliq, LLC, which
leases 20% of the NRA through July 2019 and Electronic Warfare
Associates, which leases 25% of the NRA through March 2015.  Due
to the increased vacancy and the current soft office market
conditions, Moody's has assumed a high probability of default
before maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 236% and
0.46X, respectively, compared to 197% and 0.55% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $13,538,254, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-2, $76,020,000 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-3, $75,846,000 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class XW, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-4A, $134,000,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-4B, $806,996,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-4BF, $20,000,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-1A, $426,894,949, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/22/2010

  -- Class A-SM, $70,350,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-M, $234,502,000, downgraded to A1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-J, $99,663,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class B, $32,244,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class C, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ba3 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class D, $23,450,000, downgraded to B3 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class E, $23,450,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class F, $26,381,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class G, $23,450,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class H, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class J, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class K, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class L, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class M, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class N, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class O, $5,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class P, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class Q, $11,725,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Confirms Rating on Class A-4A Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of Class A-4A
from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-LS1.  This action is a
correction to rating actions announced on April 28th where a
misinterpretation of the cash flow waterfall led to the rating of
Class A-4A being erroneously downgraded to Aa1.  The corrected
rating action is:

  -- Class A-4A, $134,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010.

The updated press release is:

  -- Moody's Affirms Four, Confirms One and Downgrades 21 CMBS
     Classes of BACM 2008-LS1

Approximately $2.3 Billion of Structured Securities Affected

Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes,
confirmed one class, and downgraded 21 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2008-LS1.  The downgrades are due to higher
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans.
The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 21 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 1, 2010, due to anticipated losses
from specially serviced and poorly performing loans.  On April 21,
2010, class A-1A was also placed on review for possible downgrade.
This action concludes the review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $2.32 billion
from $2.34 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 236 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 28%
of the pool.

Sixty nine loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.7 million loss (53% loss severity on average).  There are 26
loans, representing 13% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Memphis and
Orlando Industrial Portfolio Loan ($59.5 million -- 2.6% of the
pool), which is secured by six industrial properties located in
Tennessee and Florida.  The properties total 822,300 square feet.
The portfolio's performance has declined since securitization due
to a decline in occupancy, from 97% at securitization to 78% as of
September 2008.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2010 due to imminent default and is currently 30+ days
delinquent.

The remaining 25 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
mixed use, retail, and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates
a $115.0 million aggregate loss for all the specially serviced
loans (40% expected loss on average).  The special servicer has
recognized an aggregate $46.5 million appraisal reduction for 13
of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 27 loans
representing approximately 23% of the pool.  These loans are
either on the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature
within the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $99.2 million loss
from these loans (19% expected loss on average based on a weighted
average 47% default probability).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of losses from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes N through
S have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.8 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 99%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 123% compared to 161% at Moody's
last review in February 2009.  The last review was part of the
first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2009 vintage conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.18X and 0.91X, respectively, compared to
0.95X and 0.70X at Moody's last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 65, similar to last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the COPT Office Portfolio Loan
($150.0 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by three
office buildings located in Chantilly, Virginia.  The properties
total 694,000 square feet and were 99% leased as of December 2009,
essentially the same as at securitization.  The two largest
tenants are CSC Information, which leases 44% of the net rentable
area through December 2010, and Northrop Grumman Information
Technology, which leases 21% of the NRA through February 2017.
Although property performance has been stable since
securitization, Moody's has stressed the cash flow due to concerns
about potential increased vacancy due to near-term lease
expirations.  More than 30% of the NRA expires within the next 12
months.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
upcoming lease expirations.  Due to anticipated increased vacancy
and the current soft office market conditions, Moody's has assumed
a high default probability for this loan.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 203% and 0.51X, respectively, compared to 186%
and 0.56X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 600 West Chicago Loan
($134.0 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which represents a pari pasu
interest in a $265.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by 1.5 million square foot Class A office complex located
in Chicago, Illinois.  The property was 92% leased as of September
2009 compared to 84% at securitization.  The three largest tenants
are Banker's Life & Casualty, which leases 14% of the NRA through
November 2018; Level 3 Communications, which leases 13% of the NRA
through November 2015 and William Winfrey Jr. Company, which
leases 11% of the NRA through January 2016.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 183%
and 0.58X at last review.

The third largest loan is The Hallmark Building Loan
($64.0 million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
305,000 square foot office property located in Dulles, Virginia.
The property was 84% leased as of December 2009 compared to 90% at
securitization.  Another 8% of the NRA is expected to become
vacant in 2010.  The two largest tenants are Qiviliq, LLC, which
leases 20% of the NRA through July 2019 and Electronic Warfare
Associates, which leases 25% of the NRA through March 2015.  Due
to the increased vacancy and the current soft office market
conditions, Moody's has assumed a high probability of default
before maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 236% and
0.46X, respectively, compared to 197% and 0.55% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $13,538,254, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-2, $76,020,000 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-3, $75,846,000 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/24/2008

  -- Class XW, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/24/2008

  -- Class A-4A, $134,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010


  -- Class A-4B, $806,996,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-4BF, $20,000,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-1A, $426,894,949, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/22/2010

  -- Class A-SM, $70,350,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-M, $234,502,000, downgraded to A1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class A-J, $99,663,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class B, $32,244,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class C, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ba3 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class D, $23,450,000, downgraded to B3 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class E, $23,450,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class F, $26,381,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     4/1/2010

  -- Class G, $23,450,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class H, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class J, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class K, $29,312,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class L, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class M, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class N, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class O, $5,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class P, $8,793,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010

  -- Class Q, $11,725,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/1/2010


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 194 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 194
tranches from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-10

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-11

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-12

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-11, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-12, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2005-9

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-8

  -- Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-CB-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. CB-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-CB-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANK OF AMERICA: S&P Puts Ratings on CreditWatch Developing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it place certain
issues of Bank of America N.A. on CreditWatch with developing
implications in anticipation of its sale of First Republic Bank to
a number of investors.  Pursuant to the sale agreement, upon
closing of the transaction (expected sometime in the second
quarter), the affected issues will be sold to the new owners.
When the transaction is completed, S&P will reassess the ratings
on these obligations.  The CreditWatch with developing
implications signals that the new ratings could be raised,
lowered, or remain at their current level.

                           Ratings List

                       Bank of America N.A.

    Counterparty Credit Rating                A+/Negative/A-1

                       Bank of America N.A.

    CreditWatch Action                     To              From
    ------------------                     --              ----
    $10 Mil 8.75% Pfd Stk Noncum Ser B     BB+/Watch Dev   BB+
    $60 Mil 7.25% Noncum Perpetual Ser D   BB+/Watch Dev   BB+
    $55 Mil 10.5% Noncum Pfd Stk Ser A     BB+/Watch Dev   BB+
    $70 Mil 7.75% Sub Notes Due 9/15/2012  A/Watch Dev     A


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-PWR4 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2004-PWR4:

  -- $2.4 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from B; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings
and Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $96.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $630.9 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.1 million class B at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.4 million class C at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.3 million class D at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.6 million class E at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.6 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.4 million class G at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.7 million class H at 'BBB-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.6 million class J at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.8 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.8 million class L at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.4 million class M at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.4 million class P at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $7.7 million class Q.  Class A-1 has paid
in full.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with the specially serviced asset.
Fitch expects losses of 1% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $8.3 million, from the loan in special servicing and
loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 12.5% to $835.3 million from $954.9 million
at issuance.  Eight of the remaining loans have defeased (13.7%).

As of April 2010, there is one specially serviced loan (1.2%).
The specially serviced loan is secured by a 140,602 square foot
retail center located in Payson, AZ.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2009 for imminent default.  The loan
was previously modified by the lender; however, subsequent to the
modification the anchor tenant, Bashas' Supermarkets Inc. (38% of
NRA), filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and has requested
rent abatement for a two-year period and reduced rent for an
additional year.  The special servicer approved the modification
of the Bashas' lease commensurate with market rates.  A recent
appraisal indicated a value below the debt amount, and losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Twenty loans did not payoff at maturity with five
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2004-PWR5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
and affirmed ten classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-PWR5.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are
due to key rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed nine classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 22, 2010 due to higher expected losses
for the pool.  This action concludes the review.  The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions

As of the March 31, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to
$1.04 billion from $1.23 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 120 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  The pool contains ten loans,
representing 19% of the pool, that have defeased and are secured
by U.S. Government bonds.  Defeasance at last review represented
11% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 4% of the pool, have
investment grade underlying ratings.  Three other loans previously
had underlying ratings but due to declines in performance they are
now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Reistertown
Plaza Loan ($48.8 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 791,661 square foot retail center located in Baltimore,
Maryland.  The property is anchored by the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, Home Depot, and Burlington Coat
Factory.  The property was 83% leased as of December 2009 compared
to 96% at last review.  The loan had an investment grade
underlying rating at last review but due to performance declines
it is now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.  The most recent
appraisal as of October 2009 valued the property at $62.8 million.
The loan transferred into special servicing in August 2009 due to
imminent maturity default.  The borrower has negotiated a loan
modification and the loan is anticipated to be returned to the
master servicer.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.01X,
respectively, compared to 71% and 1.18X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 623 Stewart
Avenue Loan ($6.7 million -- 0 .6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 51,000 square foot retail center located in Garden City, New
York.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2009 due to imminent default.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.8
million loss for this specially serviced loan (53% expected loss).
The servicer has recognized a $3.4 million appraisal reduction for
this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 2.4% of the pool and has estimated
an aggregate $5.9 million loss (25% weighted average expected loss
based on a 70% probability default) from these troubled loans.
Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the
timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 98%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 82% compared to 86% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.52X and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
1.48X and 1.21X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The pool has a Herf of 35 compared to 44
at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the New Castle
Marketplace Loan ($11.6 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is
secured by a retail center located in New Castle, Delaware.  The
property has been 100% leased since securitization and performance
has been stable.  The loan amortizes on a 15-year schedule and has
amortized 18% since last review.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.40X compared to Aaa and
1.71X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the New
Hampshire Tower Loan ($6.6 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 206,369 square foot office building located in
Manchester, New Hampshire.  The property is currently on the
servicer's watchlist due to a significant increase in vacancy.
The property was 54% leased as of June 2009 compared to 99% in
2007.  Property performance has declined due to the increase in
vacancy.  The loan fully amortizes on a 10-year schedule, which
has partially mitigated the decline in performance.  The loan has
amortized 35% since last review.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.94X compared to Aa3 and
2.01X at last review.

In addition to the Reistertown Plaza Loan, which is in special
servicing, two other loans had underlying ratings at last review
but due to declines in performance are now analyzed as part of the
conduit pool.  The World Apparel Center Loan ($35.9 million --
3.4% of the pool) represents a pari passu interest in a
$211.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
1.15 million square foot office building located in the Garment
District office submarket of Manhattan.  The property's largest
tenant is the Jones Apparel Group, which occupies 25% of the net
rentable area through April 2012.  The property's performance has
declined since last review due to decreased revenues and increased
operating expenses.  The property was 75% leased as of December
2009 compared to 87% at last review.  The loan is currently on the
watchlist due to increased vacancy.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 73% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.34X at last
review.

The Palmetto Business Park Loan ($12.5 million -- 1.2% of the
pool) is secured by a 492,020 square foot industrial building
located in Palmetto, Florida.  The largest tenant is General
Electric, which occupies 60% of the NRA through March 2011.  The
loan is currently on the servicer's watchlist due to increased
vacancy.  The property was 72% leased as of September 2009
compared to 93% at last review.  The property's performance has
declined since last review due to decreased revenues.  Part of the
decline has been mitigated by amortization.  The loan amortizes on
a 20-year schedule and has amortized 10% since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.39X, respectively,
compared to 57% and 1.56X at last review.

The top three performing non-defeased conduit loans represent 15%
of the pool balance.  The largest loan is the 2941 Fairview Park
Drive Loan ($70.0 million -- 6.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 352,583 square foot Class A office building located in Falls
Church, Virginia.  The largest tenant is General Dynamics, which
occupies 48% NRA through March 2019.  The property was 100%
occupied as of September 2009, essentially the same as at last
review.  Performance has improved since securitization and the
loan benefits from amortization.  The loan has amortized 4% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 0.98X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Summit Louisville Loan
($54.8 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 341,243
square foot retail center located in Louisville, Kentucky.  The
center is anchored by Bed Bath and Beyond, Barnes and Noble, and
Office Depot.  The property was 96% leased as of December 2009,
the same as at last review.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to
84% and 1.15X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Evergreen A Portfolio Loan
($30.3 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by three
single-tenant office buildings located near Sacramento,
California.  The loan is currently on the servicer's watchlist due
to increased vacancy.  The property was 89% leased as of September
2009 compared to 100% at last review.  The increased vacancy is
caused by one tenant, which occupied the smallest building (22%
total property NRA), vacating at end of its lease term in
September 2010.  A replacement tenant has leased approximately 50%
of the vacated space and the other half is currently being
marketed.  This loan matures in November 2010.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 98% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 92% and
1.15X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $73,865,775, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/8/2004

  -- Class A-3, $134,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/8/2004

  -- Class A-4, $100,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/8/2004

  -- Class A-5, $579,079,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/8/2004

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/8/2004

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/8/2004

  -- Class B, $29,291,000, affirmed at Aa2, previously assigned
     Aa2 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class C, $9,250,000, affirmed at Aa3, previously assigned Aa3
     on 11/8/2004

  -- Class D, $20,042,000, affirmed at A2, previously assigned A2
     on 11/8/2004

  -- Class E, $13,875,000, affirmed at A3, previously assigned A3
     on 11/8/2004

  -- Class F, $15,416,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1;
     previously on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible
     downgrade

  -- Class G, $9,250,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2; previously
     on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class H, $18,500,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously
     on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class J, $4,625,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba1; previously on
     4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class K, $4,625,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously on
     4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class L, $6,167,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
     on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class M, $4,625,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class N, $4,625,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B2; previously
     on 4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class P, $3,083,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously on
     4/22/2010 placed on review for possible downgrade


BEEBE MEDICAL: Moody's Downgrades Underlying Bond Ratings to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Beebe Medical Center's
underlying bond ratings to Ba3 from Baa1 and maintains the rating
on Watchlist for possible further downgrade.  The rating affects
$80.9 million of rated debt outstanding (listed in the RATED DEBT
section at the end of this report) issued through the Delaware
Health Facilities Authority.  The Series 2002 and Series 2005B
variable rate demand bonds are jointly supported by Beebe Medical
Center and secured by letters of credit from PNC Bank.  The
enhanced rating on the bonds have been downgraded to Aa2/VMIG1
from Aaa/VMIG1.

The multi-notch rating downgrade stems from the extraordinary
legal challenges currently facing the hospital and the uncertainty
as to how and when recently filed civil lawsuits will be resolved.
Amongst other options, Beebe's management reports that they are
considering a bankruptcy filing for protection given the events
that have transpired in recent months.  There are currently 18
civil action lawsuits filed against Beebe citing negligence and
its failure to report alleged misconduct by a pediatrician who
formerly was on staff at Beebe.  More lawsuits are expected to be
filed.

The current situation characterized as "event risk" or an
unforeseen event can potentially have a serious material impact on
the hospital's operating and financial performance.  The rating
action also reflects the uncertainty of the magnitude of the legal
and financial liability facing Beebe and the ability of the
hospital to continue to operate as a going concern.  The
maintenance of the rating on Watchlist for possible further
downgrade reflects Moody's belief that if Beebe files for
bankruptcy protection, a lower rating may be warranted based on
the estimated recovery value of the bonds at the time.

Beebe currently maintains approximately $85.5 million of
unrestricted cash and investments as of March 31, 2010 compared to
$80.9 million of rated debt outstanding.  Of the rated debt,
$36.1 million (45%) are variable rate demand bonds and the
remaining $44.8 million (55%) are fixed rate bonds.  The Series
2002 and Series 2005B variable rate demand bonds are secured by
PNC Bank letters of credit.  Management is currently in
discussions with PNC Bank to remedy a technical event of default
that was triggered under the Series 2005B letter of credit
following the recent rating action by another rating agency to
downgrade Beebe's bond rating to below investment grade and which
also resulted in a swap termination by JP Morgan Chase Bank,
counterparty to the swap related to the Series 2002 and 2005B
bonds.  The swap was terminated at a cost of approximately
$5.0 million with $3.5 million of swap collateral posted at the
time.

Moody's will continue to monitor the current situation as it
develops and based on ongoing discussions and disclosure received
from management, Moody's will assess the findings with respect to
the hospital's credit profile.

LEGAL SECURITY: The bonds are secured by a gross revenue pledge of
and a mortgage lien on the Beebe Medical Center's main campus
facility in Lewes as well as the outpatient care center and
outpatient surgery center located in Rehoboth, DE.  Beebe Medical
Center currently is the only member of the obligated group.

INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES: None.  As of April 2010, The
counterparty, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.  terminated the floating-
to-fixed payor interest rate swap agreement, in the notional
amount of $36.1 million related to the Series 2002 and 2005B bonds
following the downgrade of the bond rating to below investment
grade or BBB- by S&P which triggered a termination event and the
decision by the counterparty to terminate the swap.  At
termination, the mark-to-market value of the swap was a liability
of $5.0 million.  The swap was terminated at a cost of
$5.0 million with $3.5 million of collateral posted against the
swap at the time.  Currently, there are no swaps outstanding.

                              Outlook

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Beebe Medical Center, Inc.
     Consolidated Financial Statements

  -- First number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2009

  -- Investment returns smoothed at 6%

  -- Inpatient admissions: 9,562, 9,134

  -- Total operating revenues: $216.5 million; $243.0 million

* Moody's adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $29.2 million; $30.4 million

* Total debt outstanding: $85.0 million; $81.8 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $7.6 million; $7.6 million

* MADS Coverage based on reported investment income: 3.17 times;
  1.69 times

* Moody's adjusted MADS coverage: 3.84 times; 3.99 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 3.21 times; 2.99 times

* Days cash on hand: 182 days; 136 days

* Cash-to-debt: 115%, 100%

* Operating margin: 3.7%; 2.9%

* Operating cash flow margin: 10.9%; 10.4%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of June 30, 2009):

  -- Series 2002 (variable rate) ($17.4 million outstanding);
     rated Aa2/VMIG1 secured by a letter of credit support from
     PNC Bank (expires February 28, 2012), Ba3 underlying rating

  -- Series 2004A (fixed rate) ($22.8 million outstanding); rated
     Ba3

  -- Series 2005A (fixed rate) ($22.0 million outstanding); rated
     Ba3

  -- Series 2005B (variable rate) ($18.7 million outstanding);
     Aa2/VMIG1 secured by letter of credit support from PNC Bank
     (expires September 21, 2012); Ba3 underlying rating

               What could change the rating -- UP

Given the rating placement on Watchlist for possible downgrade, a
rating upgrade is unlikely in the short-term; over the longer-
term, a rating upgrade would be considered if the hospital is able
to sustain current level of financial performance to demonstrate
long-term viability and definitively resolve current legal issues
without filing for bankruptcy or materially impairing financial
assets.

              What could change the rating -- DOWN

Significant weakening of operating and financial performance;
material decline in liquidity and/or increase in debt; payment
default or bankruptcy filing; in the event of a default, a lower
estimated recovery value of the bonds could result in a lower
rating.

The rating assigned to Beebe Medical Center was issued on Moody's
municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to
recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.

The last rating action on Beebe Medical Center was on April 15,
2010, when the Baa1 bond rating was placed on Watchlist for
possible downgrade.


BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Bristol CDO I, Ltd.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$223,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes (current
     balance of $34,725,994), Downgraded to B3; previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

  -- US$20,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes (current
     balance of $3,185,158), Downgraded to B3; previously on
     September 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3.

Bristol CDO I, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed by a portfolio of asset-backed securities, including
exposure to Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated
between 1998 and 2002.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities and failure of the coverage tests.  The defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased from
$18.6 million in August 2009 to $30.5 million in April 2010.
During the same time, the Class A/B coverage ratio decreased from
81.12% to 68.71%.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned
transactions will have varying stress levels that are based on
specific RMBS asset types.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of pre-
2005 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team and are no longer on review for downgrade.


CARRINGTON HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 122 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 122
tranches from 19 RMBS transactions issued by Carrington Home
Equity Loan Trust.  Additionally, Moody's has upgraded the ratings
of 3 tranches and confirmed the ratings of 4 tranches from the
same transactions.  The collateral backing these deal primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Carrington Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC4

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-FRE2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca

     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC2

  -- Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC3

  -- Cl. A-1D, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC5

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT2

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC4

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-RFC1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-FRE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-RFC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CENTERLINE 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 16 classes of Certificates
issued by Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust due to the
deterioration in credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the interest shortfalls and realized
losses since last review.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization Trust is a CRE CDO transaction
backed by 89% commercial mortgage backed securities and 11% CRE
CDO securities.  84% of the CMBS securities were issued in 2006
and 2007.  As of the April 21, 2010 Trustee Report, the aggregate
Certificate balance including the first loss Certificate (Class Q)
has decreased to $940 million from $986 million at issuance, due
to pay-down to the Class A-1 of $0.8 million and realized losses
of $45 million to Class Q.

As of the April 21, 2010 payment date, approximately 69% of the
collateral experienced interest shortfalls, causing interest
shortfalls up to Class C in the transaction.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 8,961 compared to 8,242 at last review.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Baa1-
Baa3 (0% compared to 0.5% at last review Ba1-Ba3 (0.4% compared to
1.6% at last review), B1-B3 (5.9% compared to 6.4% at last
review), and Caa1-C (93.7% compared to 91.5% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 9.3 years, compared to 9.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 0.7%, the same as that at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 0% compared to 99.9% at last review.  The
current low MAC is due to the low ratings variability of very-high
risk collateral concentrated within a small number of collateral
names.

Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class H, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class J, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class L, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class M, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class N, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class O, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Confirmed at Caa3

  -- Class P, Downgraded to C; previously on January 11, 2009
     Confirmed at Caa3

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.


CHARTWELL CBO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Chartwell CBO I:

  -- US$110,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2012
     (current balance of $34,959,591.34), Upgraded to B1;
     previously on May 6, 2009 Downgraded to B3;

  -- US$12,800,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2012, \
     Upgraded to Ca; previously on May 6, 2009 Downgraded to C.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the increase in the overcollateralization of the
Class A notes.  Both the Class A notes and the Class B notes have
benefited from the delevering of the Class A notes, whose balance
has been reduced by approximately 40% or $23.2 million since the
last rating action in May 2009.

The Class A overcollateralization ratio has increased since the
last rating action in May 2009.  According to the latest trustee
report dated April 1, 2010, the Class A overcollateralization
ratio was reported at 130.83% versus the April 2009 level of
127.74%.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in the latest Moody's CLO methodology, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Chartwell CBO I, issued in September 2000, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
and senior unsecured bonds.


COPERNICUS EURO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of Copernicus Euro CDO I
B.V. and removed them from Rating Watch Negative.  Loss Severity
ratings were assigned to four classes.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class B-1 notes (ISIN XS0131035007): downgraded to 'AA' from
     'AAA'; off RWN; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-2';

  -- Class B-2 notes (ISIN XS0131115536): downgraded to 'AA' from
     'AAA'; off RWN; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-2';

  -- Class C-1 notes (ISIN XS0131036310): downgraded to 'B' from
     'BBB'; off RWN; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-4';

  -- Class C-2 notes (ISIN XS0131113838): downgraded to 'B' from
     'BBB'; off RWN; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-4';

  -- Class D notes (ISIN XS0131037045): downgraded to 'CC' from
     'B'; off RWN; Recovery Rating revised to 'RR6' from 'RR1';

Fitch employed its global rating criteria for corporate CDOs to
analyse the quality of the underlying assets.  In accordance with
the agency's cash flow analysis criteria, Fitch also took into
account the transactions' priority of payments including relevant
structural features such as the excess spread-trapping mechanism
and coverage tests.

All classes of Copernicus have been downgraded and class B-1, B-2
C-1 and C-2 have been assigned a negative outlook.  While the
class B notes are amortizing and benefit from high levels of over-
collateralization, the remaining portfolio is highly concentrated.
As per the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio references 14
issuers with the 2 largest issuers representing approximately 25%
of the portfolio.  In Fitch's view this level of obligor
concentration risk, in a portfolio of non-investment grade
entities, is not commensurate with Fitch's 'AAA' rating.  The
downgrade of class C notes reflects low interest coverage levels
and market value risk associated with long-dated assets which must
be sold before the maturity of the rated notes.

All interest coverage tests have been breached.  Class B-2, C-2
and D each pay a fixed coupon above 6.5% which is higher than the
portfolio's weighted-average interest rate.  The portfolio
consists solely of floating-rate assets and the current low
interest rates are unfavorable for the transaction.  Class C and D
IC tests are at 57% and 35.3% respectively indicating that
expected interest proceeds from the portfolio are not sufficient
to ensure the interest payment of class C and class D.  This is
detrimental to the transaction as the credit enhancement levels
for all classes are being reduced as principal proceeds are being
used to maintain the interest payment on these classes.

Class D is currently shut off from any interest distribution due
to the breach of the IC tests.  The class D fixed coupon is 11.2%
and interest on any capitalized interest will also be at 11.2%.
If class D capitalizes interest for a significant period of time
repayment of the capitalized interest will be difficult.  The
class D over-collateralization ratio is currently at 103%, just
above par.  However, class D is expected to become under-
collateralized as principal proceeds are used to maintain the
class C current on its interest payment.  In addition, 27.7% of
the portfolio now consists of long-dated assets.  The sale of
these assets below par prior to the transaction maturity date in
August 2013 would further erode the class D's OC ratio.  In
Fitch's view, default on the notional repayment of class D is
probable and class D has thus been downgraded to 'CC'.

Fitch expects class B-1, B-2, C-1 and C-2 to remain current on
their interest payments.  However, principal proceeds will be used
to maintain the interest payments on these classes.  Class D will
unlikely receive any proceeds in the near-term.  The interest rate
swap payment due by Copernicus currently represents approximately
40% of the expected portfolio interest proceeds.  However, the
swap will mature in August 2010 and the agency thus expects all IC
tests to then increase sharply but class C's and D's IC tests may
remain breached.  Fitch expects class B-1 and B-2 notional to be
repaid as the portfolio amortizes.  Repayment of class C-1 and C-2
notional will be highly sensitive to interest rate movements and
to the sale price of the long-dated assets.

The agency has assigned Issuer Report Grades of "satisfactory"
(three stars) to Copernicus Euro CDO I B.V.  Reporting
characteristics that prevent the transaction from earning an IRG
higher than "satisfactory" include the under-collateralization
event of default level not being provided in the reports.


CORPORATE-BACKED CALLABLE: S&P Raises Cert. Ratings to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on
Corporate-Backed Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney
Debenture-Backed Series 2006-1's class A-1 and A-2 certificates to
'BB+' from 'BB'.

S&P's ratings on the certificates are dependent on its rating on
the underlying securities, J.C. Penney Co. Inc.'s 7.625%
debentures due March 1, 2097 ('BB+').

The rating actions follow the April 7, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying securities to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed on review
for upgrade these certificates issued by CorTS Trust for US West
Communications Debentures:

* $40,565,000 7.50% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
  Certificates; Ba1, Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on
  December 15, 2006 Upgraded to Ba1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are $42,700,000 7.125%
Debentures due November 15, 2043, issued by Qwest Corporation
which were placed on review for upgrade by Moody's on April 22,
2010.


CORTS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $100 Mil. Certs. to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on CorTS
Trust For J.C. Penney Debentures' $100 million certificates to
'BB+' from 'BB'.

The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on the
underlying securities, J.C. Penney Co. Inc.'s 7.625% debentures
due March 1, 2097 ('BB+').

The rating action follows the April 7, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying securities to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Affirms Ratings on 16 2002-CP5 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2002-CP5
and removed 11 of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.36x and a loan-to-value ratio of 80.9%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.17x and an LTV ratio of 102.2%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
26.2% and 24.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude 21 defeased loans ($302.4 million, 34.1%),
four ($19.7 million, 2.2%) of the eight specially serviced assets,
and five loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($46.7 million, 5.3%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
nine specially serviced and credit-impaired assets and included
them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-X
interest-only certificate based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 2010 remittance report, eight assets
($39.2 million, 4.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The payment status of the
specially serviced assets is: one is in foreclosure ($6.7 million,
0.8%), three are 90-plus-days delinquent ($13.0 million, 1.5%),
one is 30 days delinquent ($8.9 million, 1.0%), one is less than
30 days delinquent ($4.4 million, 0.5%), and two are current
($6.2 million, 0.7%).  Three of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $4.0 million.

The Corporate Pointe at Summerlin Center loan, which has a total
exposure of $9.0 million (1.0%), is the largest loan with the
special servicer.  The loan is 30 days delinquent and is secured
by two office buildings with a total of 109,933 sq. ft. built in
2001 in Las Vegas, Nev.  The asset is owned by General Growth
Properties (GGP) and was transferred to the special servicer on
April 20, 2009, following GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16,
2009.  On Dec. 15, 2009, the bankruptcy court confirmed a
modification plan for 85 GGP loans, including this loan.
According to Berkadia, the modification extended the loan's
maturity date to March 2016, and Berkadia is in the process of
returning the loan to the master servicer.  As of year-end 2008,
the reported DSC was 1.60x and occupancy was 81.0%, compared with
1.61x and 84.0%, respectively, at issuance.

Three of the specially serviced assets are cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted -- Century Plaza Apartments ($4.8 million,
0.5%), Caesar's Palace Apartments ($4.4 million, 0.5%), and
Commander's Palace Apartments ($1.4 million, 0.2%).  These assets
have a total of 622 apartment units built in 1965 and 1966 in
Killeen, Texas.  As of Oct. 31, 2009, the DSC and occupancy were
0.71x and 72%, compared with 1.26x and 99%, respectively, for
Century Plaza Apartments at issuance; 0.63x and 63%, compared with
1.26x and 98%, respectively, for Caesar's Palace Apartments; and
0.82x and 82%, compared with 1.26x and 100%, respectively, for
Commander's Palace Apartments.  The loans were transferred to
special servicing on Dec. 31, 2009, due to payment default.
Berkadia is considering a possible forbearance on the loans.

The Holiday Inn-Paris loan ($2.9 million, 0.3%) is the sixth-
largest loan with the special servicer.  The loan is 90-plus-days
delinquent and is secured by a 117-room hotel in Paris, Texas,
which has lost its Holiday Inn flag.  A forbearance and discounted
payoff have been approved by Berkadia and are in place.  Berkadia
anticipates that the resolution of the loan will be in September
2010.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution
of this asset.

The three remaining specially serviced assets listed in the April
2010 remittance report ($16.8 million, 1.9%) have balances that
individually represent less than 1.0% of the total pool balance.
S&P estimated losses for these assets that resulted in a weighted
average loss severity of 21.9%.  All three assets have experienced
declines in occupancy and were transferred to the special servicer
due to imminent default.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P has determined
five loans ($46.7 million, 5.3%) to be credit-impaired.  The 30
A&B Vreeland Road loan ($14.1 million, 1.6%) is the eighth-largest
loan in the pool and the largest loan S&P determined to be credit-
impaired.  The loan is secured by a 151,530-sq.-ft. office
building completed in 1980 in Florham Park, N.J.  Mack-Cali
Realty, the tenant (27.0% of net rentable area {NRA}), vacated its
space when its lease expired on May 31, 2009.  The DSC and
occupancy were reported at 1.01x and 58.5% as of Sept. 30, 2009,
down from 1.29x and 100.0%, respectively, at issuance.  Per the
master servicer's watchlist comments, the DSC was 0.78x after
Mack-Cali vacated the space.

The Metaldyne Portfolio loan ($12.8 million, 1.5%) is the 10th-
largest loan in the pool and the second-largest credit-impaired
loan.  The loan is secured by six assets totaling 607,044 sq. ft.:
three in Michigan, one in Ohio, and one in Indiana.  Metaldyne is
an auto parts supplier that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
May 27, 2009.  Two of the six leases have been rejected in
bankruptcy.  DSC was reported as 0.85x as of the trailing-six-
months ended June 2009, down from 1.29x at issuance.

The remaining three credit-impaired loans are secured by
properties that have lost numerous tenants and are experiencing
high vacancy rates.  S&P views all of the credit-impaired loans to
be at an increased risk of default and loss.

Six loans totaling $31.0 million (2.6%) that were previously with
the special servicer have been returned to the master servicer.
According to the transaction documents, the special servicer is
entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.00% of all future principal
and interest payments on the corrected loans, provided that they
continue to perform and remain with the master servicer.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $888.3 million, which is 74.9% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 111 loans, down from 141 loans at
issuance.  As of the April 2010 remittance report, the master
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc., had provided financial
information for 99.8% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, and
98.5% of the information was full-year 2008, interim-2009, or
full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.28x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV, which exclude 21 defeased loans ($302.4 million,
34.1%), four ($19.7 million, 2.2%) of the eight specially serviced
assets, and five loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($46.7 million, 5.3%), were 1.36x and 80.9%, respectively.  S&P
separately estimated losses for these nine specially serviced and
credit-impaired assets.  If S&P included the specially serviced
and credit-impaired assets in S&P's calculation, its adjusted DSC
would be 1.32x.  S&P's analysis resulted in a positive cash flow
adjustment for one of the top 10 loans in the pool due to recent
leasing activity.  The transaction has experienced eight principal
losses totaling $17.3 million to date.

Thirty-seven loans ($196.9 million, 22.2%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including four of the top 10 loans.  Thirty-
one loans ($208.5 million, 23.5%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x,
and 25 of these loans ($163.5 million, 18.4%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$280.3 million (31.6%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.31x for the top 10 loans.
None of the top 10 loans are with the special servicer at this
time.  Four of the top 10 loans ($65.7 million, 7.4%) appear on
the master servicer's watchlist, two of which S&P determined to be
credit-impaired and S&P discuss in detail above.  S&P discusses
the other two loans in detail below.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
for the top 10 loans are 1.32x and 82.7%, respectively.

S&P's higher adjusted DSC primarily reflects a positive cash flow
adjustment for one of the top 10 loans in the pool due to recent
leasing activity.  The Plaza Escuela loan is the third-largest
loan in the pool, with a trust balance of $38.2 million (4.3%),
and is secured by a 153,176-sq.-ft. retail property in Walnut
Creek, Calif.  S&P calculated a DSC of 0.99x for the full-year
ended Dec. 31, 2008 based on servicer-reported numbers.  S&P then
gave credit for three new tenants with leases that commenced in
2009 for a total of 18% of NRA.

The Golden Triangle I & II loan is the sixth-largest loan in the
pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
loan has a trust balance of $25.1 million (2.8%) and is secured by
two office buildings with a total of 241,942 sq. ft. in Greenbelt,
Md.  According to the master servicer's comments, the loan appears
on the watchlist due to low occupancy, which has been improving
recently.  Reported occupancy based on the Sept. 30, 2009, rent
roll was 86.1%, up from 75.0% as of Dec. 31, 2008, but down from
94.0% at issuance.  Reported DSC as of Dec. 31, 2009, was 0.63x,
up from 0.54x as of Dec. 31, 2008, and down from 1.48x at
issuance.

The Centerville Park Apartments loan is the ninth-largest loan in
the pool and the third-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of $13.7 million (1.5%)
and is secured by a 530-unit apartment complex built in 1967 in
West Carrollton, Ohio.  This asset was returned from the special
servicer on Nov. 16, 2009, and is being monitored by Midland for
90 days.  According to the master servicer's comments, the asset
appears on the watchlist due to low DSC.  The reported DSC as of
Dec. 30, 2009, was 0.97x, and occupancy based on the Jan. 4, 2010,
rent roll was 89.0%, down from 1.38x and 96.0%, respectively, at
issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
are consistent with the affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To      From          Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----          ----------------------
      D         AA+     AA+/Watch Neg              13.06
      E         AA-     AA-/Watch Neg              11.06
      F         A+      A+/Watch Neg               10.06
      G         A-      A-/Watch Neg                8.22
      H         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg              6.55
      J         BB+     BB+/Watch Neg               4.05
      K         BB-     BB-/Watch Neg               3.38
      L         B-      B-/Watch Neg                2.38
      M         CCC     CCC/Watch Neg               1.55
      N         CCC-    CCC-/Watch Neg              1.05
      O         CCC-    CCC-/Watch Neg              0.52

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CP5

           Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----     ------      ----------------------
           A-1       AAA                          21.90
           A-2       AAA                          21.90
           B         AAA                          17.23
           C         AAA                          14.73
           A-X       AAA                            N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded nine classes of Notes issued
by Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd. due to the
deterioration in credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by the increase in weighted average rating factor and a
decrease in the weighted average recovery rate.  The rating
actions, which concludes this review, are the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO
transaction backed by 100% commercial mortgage backed securities,
92% of which was issued in 2005 and 2006.  As of the April 22,
2010 Trustee Report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction
including Preferred Shares has decreased to $388 million from $390
million at issuance, with pay-down directed to the Class A Note.

Twenty-four assets with a par balance of $143 million (37% of the
pool balance) were listed as defaulted as of the April 22, 2010
Trustee Report, compared to 5% at last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 7,613 compared to 4,244 at last review.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Baa1-
Baa3 (3.3% compared to 20.1% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (4.3%
compared to 6.8% at last review), B1-B3 (17.4% compared to 37.5%
at last review), and Caa1-C (75.0% compared to 35.6% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 7.4 years, compared to 8.5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 2%, compared to 6.6% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100% compared to 30.8% at last review.
The high MAC is due to the increase of very-high risk collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 6, 2009.


DETROIT CITY: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Tax Increment Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' rating on
Detroit City Local Development Finance Authority, Mich.'s tax-
increment bonds series 1997A and 1997B, and its 'B-' rating on the
authority's series 1997C and 1998A bonds.  S&P removed the bonds
from CreditWatch Negative, where they had been placed June 15,
2009, given the finalization of the sale of certain Chrysler LLC
assets to Fiat SpA (BB+/Watch Neg/B).

"The speculative-grade ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the
concentration of the property tax base in one taxpayer with more
than 95% of the taxable value of the project area in one auto
assembly plant, now owned by Fiat," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Jane Ridley.  The ratings also reflect S&P's view of:

* Fluctuations in the tax base that create variations in coverage;

* Original projected low coverage of just 1.2x over the life of
  the bonds; and

* The long term of the bonds with a final maturity in 2021.

In S&P's view, offsetting factors include:

* The demonstrated importance of the facility to Fiat, who
  purchased selected assets of the Chrysler company in 2009,
  including this site, which was Chrysler's only North American
  assembly plant building the Jeep Grand Cherokee sport utility
  vehicle; and

* Adequate debt service coverage in fiscal 2009 totaling 1.09x for
  all debt; coverage of senior debt only was higher at 1.83x.

In 2009 Chrysler and Fiat reached an agreement to sell most of the
assets of Chrysler LLC to Fiat and partner to form Chrysler Group
LLC.  The sale of assets included the Jefferson Avenue North plant
that makes up 95% of the taxable value in the project area.

The stable outlook on the bonds reflects Standard & Poor's
expectation that the project area will continue to generate
sufficient tax increment revenues to keep debt service coverage at
adequate levels over the life of the bonds.


DLJ MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-CKP1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes and
downgraded three classes of DLJ Mortgage Corporation, Series 2000-
CKP1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and poorly performing watchlisted loans and loans facing
maturity in an adverse economic climate.  Ninety three loans,
representing 89% of the pool, mature before December 2010.
Twenty-four of these loans, representing 13% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 56% to $563 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 125 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
43% of the pool.  Twenty three loans, representing 26% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by United States Government
securities.  One loan, representing 14% of the pool, has an
investment grade underlying rating.

Sixty-one loans, representing 47% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $49 million realized
loss (35% loss severity on average).  Currently there are seven
loans, representing 3% of the pool, in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the Crystal Mountain Office
Park Loan ($5.0 million -- 0.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 57,000 square foot office building located in Austin, Texas.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in September 2009
due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The loan matures on October 1, 2010.  The loan is cross
collateralized and cross defaulted with the Lake Pointe Center
II Loan ($3.8 million -- 0.6% of the pool), the second largest
loan in special servicing, which is also secured by an office
building located in Austin, Texas.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of multifamily, retail and healthcare properties.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $8.7 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (54% expected loss on average).  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $1.7 million appraisal reduction for two
of the specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 19 loans
representing 9% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate loss of
$15.4 million (29% expected loss on average based on a weighted
average 67% probability of default) from these troubled loans.
Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the
timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes B6, B7 and
nonrated class C have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls
totaling $5.5 million.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's was provided with year-end 2009 operating statements for
98% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit
pool is 81% compared to 85% at last review.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.17 X and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.23X and 1.33X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 25 compared to 53 at last review.  The
decline in herf has been mitigated by increased subordination due
to principal amortization and loan payoffs.  The pool's balance
has declined 43% since last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the 437 Madison Avenue Loan
($79.6 million -- 14.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
leasehold interest in a 780,000 square foot office building
located in the Plaza District of midtown Manhattan.  As of
February 2010, the property was 96% leased, compared to 100% at
last review and at securitization.  The largest tenant is Omnicom
Group Inc., which occupies 44% of the premises through December
2020.  Performance has improved since last review due to higher
rental revenues.  The loan matures on June, 1, 2010.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.66X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.41X at Moody's last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 12% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Valencia Marketplace Power Center Loan
($43.8 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 530,000
square foot power retail center located in Valencia, California.
The largest tenants are Wal-Mart (28% of the gross leasable area
(GLA), lease expiration October 2016) and Toys 'R' US (8.5% of the
GLA; lease expiration January 2022).  The property was 100% leased
as of February 2010, the same as at last review.  Although
occupancy has been stable, performance has declined due to a
decrease in rents and an increase in expenses.  The decline in
performance has been offset by 7% amortization since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to 77% and 1.27X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the One Bulfinch Place Loan
($13.4 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by an 83,000
square foot office building located in the Government Center/North
Station submarket of Boston, Massachusetts.  The property is 65%
leased to the Suffolk County D.A. through December 2013.  The
property was 100% leased as of September 2009, the same as last
review.  Although occupancy has been stable, performance has
declined slightly since last review due to increased expenses.
The decline in performance has been partially mitigated by 5%
amortization since last review.  The loan matures on July 1, 2010.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.15X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.88X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is Chandler Sunset Plaza Loan
($12.6 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 126,000
square foot retail center located in Chandler, Arizona.  The
property was 74% leased as of September 2009 compared to 99% at
last review.  The largest tenants are Cort Furniture (29% of the
GLA, lease expiration January 2015) and the Chandler Library (17%
of the GLA, lease expiration January 2020).  Performance has
declined since last review due to increased vacancy.  The loan
matures on August 1, 2010.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102%
and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.50X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1B, $321,807,462, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 11/6/2000

  -- Class S, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/6/2000

  -- Class A-2, $51,596,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded
     to Aaa from Aa3 on 12/8/2005

  -- Class A-3, $58,047,000 affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded
     to Aaa from A1 on 12/08/2006

  -- Class A-4, $16,124,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded
     to Aa2 from A3 on 12/8/2006

  -- Class B-1, $16,124,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously upgraded
     to Aa3 from A1 on 12/20/2007

  -- Class B-2, $25,798,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     to Baa1 from Ba1 on 2/27/2007

  -- Class B-3, $12,899,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1;
     previously upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2 on 2/27/2007

  -- Class B-5, $17,736,000, downgraded to C from Caa3, previously
     downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2 on 2/27/2007

  -- Class B-6, $8,562,568, downgraded to C from Ca, previously
     downgraded to Ca from Caa3 on 2/27/2007


FAIRFIELD STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 10 classes of Notes issued by
Fairfield Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations
due to the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor and an increase in defaulted assets since last
review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's current
review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Fairfield Street Solar 2004-1 Ltd. is a revolving CRE CDO which
became static at the end of the reinvestment end period in
November 2009.  The transaction is backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (67% of the pool balance),
CDOs (13%), REIT Debt (10%), rake bonds (5%), and grantor trust
loans (5%).

As of the 3/31/2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction has decreased to $514.9 million from $515 million
at issuance, with the paydowns directed to the class A and A-2a
Notes.  However, the current collateral par balance has increased
to over $606 million dollars from $560 million at last review.
The increase in overcollateralization is the result of
reinvestment feature, which ended in November 2009, that allowed
the collateral manager to purchase CUSIP collateral with a Moody's
rating of A2 or higher.  Additionally, the pool contains 12 assets
totaling $54 million that are listed as defaulted assets.  Moody's
modeled the deal excluding these defaulted assets.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.  The
current bottom-dollar WARF is 1,951 compared to 900 at last
review.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,316, which is
the WARF excluding defaulted collateral.  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates (including defaulted assets)
is: Aaa-Aa3 (18.3% compared to 9.7% at last review), A1-A3 (8.0%
compared to 15.6% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (17.4% compared to
32.2% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (31.4% compared to 31.9% at last
review), B1-B3 (11.2% compared to 9.7% at last review), and Caa1-C
(13.6% compared to 0.9% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL (excluding
defaulted assets) of 5.5 compared to 6.3 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
(excluding defaulted assets) with a mean of 32.4% compared to a
mean of 29.3% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC (excluding defaulted collateral) of 17.3% compared
to 22.6% at last review.  The relatively low MAC is due to the
greater diversity of the ratings distribution, collateral vintages
and more granular pool concentration.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

For non-CUSIP collateral (treated in CDOROM v2.5 as secured
corporate debt), the updated asset correlations are approximately
30% compared to 15% previously.  The updated asset correlations
for non-CUSIP collateral reflect a reduction in the maximum over-
concentration stress by half in CDOROM v2.5 due to the diversity
of tenants, property types and geographic locations inherent in
the collateral pools.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2a, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2b, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2010 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FIRST CHICAGO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 1997-CHL1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and affirmed the classes of First
Chicago/Lennar Trust I, series 1997-CHL1.  The downgrade reflects
Fitch's view that a default on the class is inevitable given that
interest shortfalls on the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities collateral are unlikely to be recouped and future
losses are expected.  The affirmation reflects the adequacy of the
credit enhancement to the class relative to the expected losses.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, the CDO has paid
down by $25.5 million.  Approximately 97% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade, and 31% has a Fitch
derived rating in the 'CCC' category and below, all of which are
first loss positions within their respective CMBS transaction.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Due
to the concentrated and distressed nature of the remaining assets
in the pool, the class G notes are downgraded to 'C' due to
Fitch's expectation that losses are likely as over 30% of the
portfolio are first loss positions and that existing interest
shortfalls are unlikely to be repaid.  Fitch notes that as of the
March 31, 2010 payment date, the cumulative interest shortfall for
class G is $51,500 and its available credit enhancement is less
than 2%.

The rating for class F notes is based on its current credit
enhancement (66.5%) and the credit quality of the underlying
bonds; 68% of the pool has a Fitch derived rating of 'BB+' or
better.  The Negative Rating Outlook on the class F notes reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to
face refinance risk and maturity defaults.  Fitch also assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the notes.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or
LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

FC/Lennar 97 is a CMBS re-securitization which closed April 30,
1997.  The portfolio consists of CMBS bonds from the 1995 and 1996
vintages.  There are a total of nine assets from six obligors.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
this class as indicated:

  -- $9.5 million class F notes at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch has downgraded this class as indicated:

  -- $18.4 million class G notes to 'C' from 'CC'.


FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 70 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seventy
tranches from fifteen RMBS transactions issued by Fremont Home
Loan Trust.  Additionally, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of one
tranche and confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from these
transactions.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate subprime
residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.  For details regarding Moody's approach to
estimating losses on subprime pools originated in 2005, 2006, and
2007, refer to the methodology publication "Subprime RMBS Loss
Projection Update: February 2010" available on Moodys.com.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-A

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-B

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-C

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-A

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-B

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-C

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-D

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-E

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GLIMCHER REALTY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Redeemable Stocks
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' rating to
the 8.125% series G cumulative redeemable preferred stock issued
by Glimcher Realty Trust after the company's $75.3 million add-on.

Glimcher reopened an existing series G preferred issuance dated
Feb. 23, 2004, and added the new preferred stock to it.  The newly
issued shares were priced at $21.51 ($25 liquidation value),
equating to a 9.5% yield.

The company will use net proceeds from the new preferred stock to
reduce borrowings under its $320 million secured credit facility
that matures in 2012 (including all extension options).  As of
March 31, 2010, the credit facility had $226 million outstanding.
Glimcher has reduced credit-facility borrowings by $120 million
since the end of 2009, using cash on hand, the recent sale of a
60% interest in two retail properties, and excess proceeds
generated from two mortgage refinancings.  The higher cost of the
newly issued preferred stock, compared with the 5.5% cost on
revolver borrowings, will weaken coverage measures, but S&P
estimates that fixed-charge coverage will remain above S&P's 1.4x
threshold for the current rating.

Glimcher's recent first quarter results were mixed.  Same-store
net operating income slipped 2.1%, but remained within S&P's
expectations.  Average store sales within the company's portfolio
of malls edged down 1.4%, but improved sequentially by 2.4%.
Occupancy held steady at 92.6%, and leasing activity was brisk
with over 300,000 sq. ft. of leases signed during the quarter,
with positive re-leasing spreads of 11% on in-line space stores.

S&P's ratings on Glimcher reflect its view that Glimcher's
financial risk profile is aggressive and that its smaller, less
competitively positioned portfolio still faces headwinds within
the competitive U.S. retail sector.  However, Glimcher's portfolio
is well occupied, and coverage of fixed charges remains steady,
albeit at low levels.  S&P also acknowledge that the company's
operating cash flow currently covers all obligations, including
dividends.

The outlook is negative.  S&P believes the company's operating and
financial metrics will remain pressured given unsteady operating
conditions and Glimcher's smaller, less competitively positioned
portfolio.  S&P will lower its ratings if the company's FCC
weakens below 1.40x for a prolonged period.  Rating improvement is
unlikely in the near term given the uncertain retail environment,
as well as the REIT's weak FCC and smaller, less-productive
portfolio.

                           Ratings List

                       Glimcher Realty Trust

      Corporate credit                         B+/Negative/--
      Preferred                                CCC+

                          Rating Affirmed

                      Glimcher Realty Trust

          $225.3 mil. 8.125% Series G Pfd.          CCC+


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2007-RR2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Certificates
issued by Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-RR2 due
to deterioration credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate since last
review.  The rating actions are the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

GCCFC 2007-RR2 is a CRE CDO transaction backed by 100% commercial
mortgage backed securities collateral, 99% of which is
concentrated in 2006 and 2007.  As of the April 21, 2010 Trustee
Report, the aggregate Certificate balance including the first loss
Certificate (Class S) is $529 million, the same as that at
issuance.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 5,609 compared to 2,847 at last review.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Baa1-
Baa3 (2.8% compared to 4.2% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.3%
compared to 22.1% at last review), B1-B3 (32.8% compared to 64.6%
at last review), and Caa1-C (47.1% compared to 9.1% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 7.0 years, compared to 8.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 3.9%, compared to 6.3% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100% compared to 46.5% at last review.
The high MAC is due to the concentration of the collateral ratings
distribution into very-high risk categories within a small number
of collateral names.

Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1 FL, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 6,
     2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- Class A-1 FX, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 6,
     2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class X*, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  * Notional Class

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 6, 2009.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2006-FL4 Certs. to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates to 'D'
from Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2006-FL4.

The downgrades of S&P's ratings on eight classes to 'D' reflect
recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amounts and special servicing
fees associated with the five specially serviced assets in the
trust.  According to the April 7, 2010, trustee remittance report,
these eight classes did not receive their full interest
distribution and have been experiencing interest shortfalls for
various time periods (at least six months).

Details of the five specially serviced assets, in order of their
pool balances, are:

The Greenwich Residential loan has a $25.9 million senior trust
balance (5.6% of the pooled trust balance) and a $40.9 million
whole-loan balance.  The special servicer for this loan, Situs
Asset Management, indicated that the borrower is currently making
debt service payments on the senior trust balance only.  This
loan, which is a matured balloon, is secured by a 31-unit
condominium conversion complex in Greenwich, Conn.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 22, 2009, due to
imminent maturity default.  The loan had an Aug. 1, 2009, maturity
with three remaining six-month extension options.  The extension
option under the terms of the loan agreement required a
$20.0 million principal paydown.  At its first extension option,
the borrower did not fund this amount, which resulted in an event
of default under the loan agreement.  According to Situs, the
borrower reported positive net operating income for the 11 months
ended Nov. 30, 2009.  Although Situs is currently discussing loan
workout options with the borrower, it has also filed for
foreclosure.  An appraisal reduction amount of $17.3 million is in
effect on the whole-loan balance based on the Aug. 11, 2009,
appraisal value of $26.8 million.

The Northwest Plaza Shopping Center asset, which became real
estate owned on Sept. 1, 2009, has a whole-loan exposure of
$31.7 million that includes a $24.7 million senior pooled
component ($5.3% of the pooled trust balance) and a $4.6 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the "NW"
certificates (not rated).  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A., has advanced $1.5 million to date on the asset.  The
property includes a 1.7 million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall and an
attached 12-story, 152,600-sq.-ft. class B office building in St.
Ann, Mo., that is currently 29.0% and 48.7% occupied,
respectively.  Wells Fargo is also the special servicer for this
asset.  This asset was transferred to Wells Fargo on Sept. 8,
2008, due to imminent default.  It is S&P's understanding that the
borrower had planned to redevelop and reposition the mall but was
unable to fund the development.  A $24.3 million ARA is in effect
on the whole-loan exposure, which is based on a Jan. 26, 2010,
appraisal value of $13.0 million.  According to the April 2010
trustee remittance report, the related March ASER amount for this
asset was $53,951.  Well Fargo indicated that the property is
under contract for sale for $13.0 million to the City of St. Ann
in lieu of a condemnation lawsuit.  Wells Fargo expects to close
the transaction this year.

The Mondrian-Scottsdale asset, which became REO on March 16, 2010,
has a $27.8 million whole-loan exposure that consists of a
$23.4 million senior pooled component (5.1% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $2.6 million subordinate nonpooled component that
provides the sole source of cash flow for the "MON" raked
certificates.  According to Wells Fargo, it has advanced
$1.8 million to date on this asset.  The 194-room full-service
boutique hotel in Scottsdale, Ariz., was transferred to the
special servicer, Wells Fargo, on May 20, 2009, due to imminent
maturity default.  Wells Fargo reported that the current cash flow
at the property is not sufficient to cover debt service and
occupancy was 40.9% as of January 2010.  An $8.3 million ARA is in
effect on the whole-loan exposure, which is based on a July 8,
2009, appraisal value of $21.7 million.  As per the April 2010
trustee remittance report, the related March ASER amount for this
asset was $8,528.  Wells Fargo indicated that the property is
currently operating as the Hotel Theodore.  Wells Fargo plans to
market the property for sale.

The 2600 West Olive Avenue loan has a $36.6 million whole-loan
balance that consists of a $15.7 million senior pooled component
(3.4% of the pooled trust balance), a $6.4 million subordinate
nonpooled component that supports the "2600" raked certificates
(not rated), and a $14.5 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  This loan, which is a matured balloon, secured by a
148,300-sq.-ft. class A office building in Burbank, Calif., was
transferred to the special servicer on March 25, 2009, due to
imminent default after the borrower submitted a proposal to modify
the loan, which included a request for a $10.0 million principal
charge-off and a five-year term extension.  The special servicer,
Situs, stated that a modification agreement extending the loan's
maturity to Feb. 28, 2012, has been executed and became effective
yesterday, April 26, 2010.  It is S&P's understanding from Situs
that the master servicer will apply new capital contributed by the
borrower to bring the loan current.  An ARA of $8.9 million is in
effect on the loan, based on the Dec. 31, 2009, $30.0 million
appraisal value of the property.  According to the April 2010
trustee remittance report, the related March ASER amount for this
asset was $2,089.

The Galleria Sheraton-Metairie asset, which became REO on Feb. 4,
2010, has a whole-loan exposure of $10.9 million that includes an
$8.5 million senior pooled component (1.8% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $2.0 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the "GSM" raked certificates.  The master servicer has
advanced approximately $426,500 to date on the asset.  The seven-
story, 182-room hotel in Metairie, La., was transferred to the
special servicer on June 2, 2009, after the borrower failed to pay
off the loan upon its June 1, 2009, maturity.  The reported
occupancy was 64.8% for the year ended Dec. 31, 2009.  The special
servicer, Situs, is marketing the property for sale.  A
$3.1 million ARA is in effect on the whole-loan exposure, based on
an Aug. 27, 2009, appraisal value of $9.1 million.  According to
the April 2010 trustee remittance report, the related March ASER
amount for this asset was $2,641.

                         Ratings Lowered

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL4

                                    Rating
                                    ------
             Class          To                  From
             -----          --                  ----
             D              D                   B-
             E              D                   CCC-
             F              D                   CCC-
             G              D                   CCC-
             N-MON          D                   CCC-
             O-MON          D                   CCC-
             N-GSM          D                   CCC-
             O-GSM          D                   CCC-


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N-SO Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
N-SO commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2004-FL2.  Concurrently,
S&P raised its ratings on the class J and K certificates and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where
S&P placed them on Dec. 14, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class G and H certificates and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.

The rating actions follow S&P's discussions with the master
servicer and trustee regarding the treatment of the legal expenses
relating to the Mervyn's Portfolio loan that prompted interest
shortfalls in prior trustee remittance report periods.  S&P
upgraded and affirmed classes G, H, J, and K because the interest
shortfalls S&P had anticipated did not occur as of the most recent
remittance report period.  The rating actions on all five classes
also follow S&P's review of the transaction waterfall, as well as
its analysis that included a re-valuation of the collateral
underlying the two remaining loans in the pool, the Southfield
Town Center and Aviation Mall loans.

Based on earlier discussions with the master servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., S&P had lowered its ratings on the class J and K
certificates and placed them on CreditWatch negative on Dec. 14,
2009, due to interest shortfalls S&P had anticipated in
association with legal expenses on the Mervyn's Portfolio loan.
At the same time, S&P had placed its ratings on the class G and H
certificates on CreditWatch negative due to its assessment that
these classes each had a heightened susceptibility to interest
shortfalls from future legal expenses.

Wells Fargo has recently informed us that the bankruptcy court
issued an order on March 12, 2010, granting the motion to dismiss
the trust from litigation surrounding the Mervyn's Portfolio loan,
which was paid off in full on Dec. 6, 2005.  According to Wells
Fargo, legal expenses that had incurred as of March 31, 2010,
regarding the Mervyn's Portfolio loan totaled $453,716.  The
trustee, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, initially passed $90,244
of the legal fees relating to the Mervyn's Portfolio loan through
the trust, which resulted in interest shortfalls (according to the
April 7, 2010, trustee remittance report).  However, it is S&P's
understanding from the trustee that after further review of the
transaction's pooling and servicing agreement dated Nov. 23, 2004,
legal expenses would be characterized as principal losses.  As a
result, $342,231 of legal expenses were passed through to the
trust as principal losses affecting class L according to the April
2010 trustee remittance report.  Wells Fargo has yet to receive
the invoices for $21,241 of the legal expenses.

S&P's analysis of the two loans is based, in part, on a review of
the borrower's operating statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2009, the borrower's rent rolls as of Dec. 31, 2009, and the
borrower's 2010 budgets.

The Southfield Town Center loan is the larger of the two remaining
loans in the pool.  This loan has a whole-loan balance of
$227.7 million that consists of a $159.9 million senior note and a
$67.8 million nontrust junior subordinate note.  The senior note
is further divided into a $152.1 million senior pooled trust
component (84.8% of the pooled trust balance as of the April 7,
2010, trustee remittance report) and a $7.8 million junior
nonpooled trust component that provides the sole source of cash
flow for the class N-SO raked certificate.  In addition, there is
a $25.0 million mezzanine loan held outside the trust.  The
Southfield Town Center loan is secured by a five-building, class A
office complex totaling 2.16 million sq. ft. in Southfield, Mich.
Wells Fargo reported a debt service coverage of 6.03x for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2009.  S&P's adjusted net cash flow is 4.3%
below the levels that S&P assessed in its last review dated
July 21, 2009, and reflects declines in occupancy (74.9% as of
Dec. 31, 2009, from 77.9% in S&P's last review) and other related
income.  S&P's current adjusted valuation yielded a loan-to-value
ratio of 81.1% on the trust balance.

The Southfield Town Center loan was transferred back to the master
servicer after being modified last year.  According to Wells
Fargo, the modification terms include, among other items,
extending the loan's final maturity date to July 1, 2011, from
July 1, 2009, with one 12-month extension option, and converting
the interest-only loan to an amortizing loan.

The remaining loan in the pool, the Aviation Mall loan, has a
whole-loan balance of $36.1 million that consists of a
$27.3 million senior participation interest that makes up 15.2% of
the pooled trust balance and an $8.8 million junior participation
interest that is held outside the trust.  This loan is secured by
514,900 sq. ft. of a 640,900-sq.-ft. retail center in Queensbury,
N.Y.  Wells Fargo reported a DSC of 7.03x for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2009, and 95.8% occupancy as of Dec. 31, 2009.
S&P's adjusted NCF has increased by 10.3% from its last review
primarily due to lower operating expenses.  S&P's adjusted
valuation yielded a LTV ratio of 77.2% on the trust balance.

The Aviation Mall loan was transferred back to the master servicer
after being modified last year.  According to Wells Fargo, the
modification terms included extending the final maturity date of
July 1, 2009, to July 1, 2011.

                          Rating Lowered

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-FL2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                 Class    To                From
                 -----    --                ----
                 N-SO     B+                BB-

       Ratings Raised And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-FL2

                             Rating
                             ------
             Class    To                From
             -----    --                ----
             J        BB                B-/Watch Neg
             K        B+                CCC-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-FL2

                             Rating
                             ------
             Class    To                From
             -----    --                ----
             G        AA                AA/Watch Neg
             H        A-                A-/Watch Neg


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007- EOP Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and revised the Rating
Outlooks to Negative from Stable on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from GS Mortgage Securities
Corp. II, Series 2007- EOP.

Fitch has completed its review of December 2009 servicer reported
information, as well as the Feruary 2010 rent rolls.  As of the
April 7, 2010 distribution date, the total collateral balance has
been reduced to approximately $4.94 billion from $6.87 billion at
issuance.  The additional pay down since the last review included
the release of approximately four properties, including Redwood
Business Park I, II and V and Parkpoint Business Center, which
were backed by cash flow pledges and were not wholly owned
properties.

The downgrades to classes J, K and L reflect the approximately 10%
deterioration in comparable Fitch net cash flow since issuance,
and the overall decline in occupancy of the portfolio.

The Negative Outlooks for classes F through L reflect the
increased vacancy combined with the large lease rollover in the
next three years, in addition to the increased allocated debt
attributed to markets in California, Boston and New York due to
property releases.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of rating changes over the next one to two years.

The certificates are collateralized by a single $4.9 billion
nonrecourse floating-rate loan secured by approximately 237
buildings and 98 office properties, down from approximately 135
properties at issuance.  The loan is interest only and has an
interest rate of LIBOR plus 0.9966%.  The floating-rate loan
matures Feb. 1, 2011, and has one remaining extension option.  The
collateral consists of mortgages, equity pledges in joint ventures
and cash flow pledges.  In addition, there is approximately
$2.3 billion of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.

The largest property in the pool (11%) is the Verizon Building
located across from Bryant Park in mid-town Manhattan.  The
property was undergoing major interior and exterior renovations at
issuance.  With building renovations completed and tenants
completing their build outs, occupancy has stabilized.  As of the
Feb. 21, 2010 rent roll, the Verizon Building was approximately
82.6% leased compared to approximately 82% a year ago.

The pool remains diverse, with approximately 98 office properties
located in nine different states.  Excluding the Verizon Building,
the top 10 properties account for approximately 24% of the
allocated loan amount, with no single property comprising more
than 4% of the collateral.  The average occupancy for the
portfolio as of Feb. 28, 2010 declined to approximately 82.7%
compared to 91% at issuance.  In addition, the portfolio faces
approximately 40.4% of the leaseable area expiring through May
2012.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $395 million class J to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $213.6 million class K to 'BB' from 'BBB-; Outlook Negative;
  -- $534 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms and revises the Outlook for these classes:

  -- $214.7 million class F at 'A'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $142.4 million class G at 'A-'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $142.4 million class H at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $844.6 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $584.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $606.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $370.3 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $432.3 million class C at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $220 million class D at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $237.9 million class E at 'A+'; Outlook Stable.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on the remaining
two classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II 1998-GL II
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrade is the result of a significant decline in
performance of the one remaining loan in the pool, the JW Marriott
Desert Springs Resort & Spa.  The 2009 actual net operating income
debt service coverage ratio for the loan, which is secured by an
884-room golf and spa resort hotel, was 0.86 times, as reported by
the servicer, down from 1.90x for 2008.  Revenue per available
room declined from approximately $126 to $96 over the same period.
The loan has an anticipated repayment date in June 2010, and the
sponsor has already indicated they will not be able to refinance
the loan by this date.  However, the loan does remain current as
of the April 2010 remittance date, and has amortized down by 26%
since issuance.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction
of any rating changes over the next one to two years.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
principal balance has paid down by 94.6% to $75.7 million from
$1.41 billion at issuance.  There were originally 10 loans in the
transaction, each of which, excluding the remaining loan, has paid
off in full.

Fitch has affirmed this class:

  -- $47.5 million class F at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has downgraded and revised the Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- $28.2 million class G to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and X have paid in full.


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 328 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 328
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 24 tranches, and upgraded the
ratings of two tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by prime
jumbo loans, issued by GSR Mortgage Loan Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 3.535%.

If the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3F

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Confirmed at A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-5, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2 \
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-6, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-8, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-9, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-10, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-11, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-13, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-14, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-15, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-16, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- Cl. 1A-17, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-7, Confirmed at A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-10, Confirmed at A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-11, Confirmed at A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-12, Confirmed at A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-13, Confirmed at A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-19, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-6, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-5, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-8, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-9, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-10, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-13, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-15, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-16, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-17, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-18, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-19, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-20, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AP, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-7F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR2

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 14, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 1B4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-13, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-15, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-17, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-19, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-20, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-21, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Confirmed at B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3 \
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-10, Confirmed at B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3F

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HESPERIA REDEVELOPMENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Tax Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2 the rating on Hesperia
Redevelopment Agency Series 2005B Housing Tax Allocation Bonds,
and 2007 Series A (Tax-Exempt) and Series B (Taxable) TABs.  At
the same time, Moody's has also downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 the
rating on the Agency's Series 2005A TABs.  The downgrades
primarily reflect the relatively thin -- and significantly
narrower than previously expected -- debt service coverage levels
reasonably anticipated over the next several years.  Coverage of
the Agency's debt secured by its pledge of incremental revenues
dedicated to low and moderate income housing projects will likely
be particularly weak, which accounts for the one-notch lower
rating on these bonds compared to the Agency's other debt.  The
Series 2005B housing bonds are secured solely by the housing set-
aside incremental revenue generated from two of the Agency's
redevelopment project areas.  The 2007 Series A and B TABs are
secured by a mix of housing set-aside and non-housing incremental
revenue from these same project areas.  The Agency's 2005A TABs
are secured solely by the Agency's non-housing incremental
revenues.  The project areas have suffered significant reductions
in assessed values brought upon by the collapse of residential
property values.  The negative outlook assignment reflects the
significant possibility that further AV declines may occur,
placing additional pressure on bond holder security.

          Debt Service Coverage Narrowing to Thin Levels

Debt service coverage levels have thinned to much weaker levels,
particularly on the Agency's housing-related TAB debt, and remain
challenged by on-going stress in the region's residential real
estate market and low increment to total AV ratio.  The Ba1-rated
and Baa3-rated TABs are first lien, fixed rate bonds.  Moody's
estimates that maximum annual debt service coverage on the
Agency's outstanding Housing TABs by projected fiscal 2010 tax
increment revenues will be very thin at 1.08x, a result of the
recent precipitous reduction in assessed valuation.  Based on
stress tests Moody's performed, an Assessed Value reduction of 5%
in 2011 would result in slightly below sum sufficient coverage
(0.98x) of combined debt service on the Housing TABs and housing
loans underlying the 2007 TABs.  An AV reduction of this magnitude
is quite possible based on the high likelihood of additional
Proposition 8 reductions and successful AV appeals.  Moody's does
not anticipate AV will decline by much more than 5% given the
aggressive Prop. 8 reductions initiated to date by the County
Assessor's office.  Assessed valuations on residential properties
within the project areas have been rolled back to January 2001
market prices.  The current median sale price of residential
properties in Hesperia is near this market price level, so Moody's
believe it unlikely that further property turnover, assessment
appeals, or Prop. 8 reductions would result in another large AV
reduction.  In 2010 the project areas experienced a combined 19.4%
AV reduction.  Owing to the project areas' low increment-to-total
AV ratio, this decline resulted in a substantially larger, 29%
reduction in incremental revenues.

Debt service coverage levels on the non-housing secured TABs and
loans are likely to remain higher and notably above sum sufficient
even in moderate stress scenarios.  Moody's estimates that maximum
annual debt service coverage on the Agency's outstanding non-
housing TABs by projected fiscal 2010 tax increment revenues will
be 1.25x.  A 5% AV reduction would result in a coverage decline to
1.14x.  Even at a 10% AV loss, debt service coverage would remain
above sum sufficient coverage at 1.03x.

Moody's notes that a sizable portion of the proceeds from the
Series 2007A and 2007B TABs are in escrow, with debt service being
paid from interest earnings.  The Agency has indicated it will
most likely release these escrowed proceeds to fund projects in
2011 and 2012.  Moody's projected debt service coverage scenarios
assume the full release of these proceeds.  Should the Agency
decide to call outstanding TAB debt instead, upward rating
pressure would likely result owing to the higher debt service
coverage, though the magnitude of that pressure would depend on
stabilization in the housing market.

        Healthy Liquidity A Key Short-Term Credit Strength

An important factor in the current rating is the agency's
maintenance of an above average unrestricted reserve position.
Audited fiscal 2009 figures show unrestricted cash and investments
of $41.2 million.  The agency is required to shift to the state an
estimated $8.2 million this fiscal year.  This shift has been
challenged in court.  Even if the agency is required to make the
payment, Moody's believe it would still have a substantial cash
cushion remaining, particularly in relation to any likely
shortfall in pledged revenues.  This is an important source of
liquidity in the event that tax increment revenue does continue to
decline due to additional AV decreases.

        Collapse of Residential Real Estate Market Results
                     In Significant Av Decline

The City of Hesperia is located in San Bernardino County, 35 miles
north of the City of San Bernardino.  Project area one, which
includes an amendment area established in 1999, is extremely large
at 22,112 acres.  Project area two is also relatively large at
2,508 acres.  Both project areas are primarily residential and
diverse, with top ten taxpayers on a combined basis representing
just 5.9% of incremental AV.  The city is in California's Inland
Empire, one of the areas most heavily impacted by the residential
real estate market downturn.  The project areas also have large
exposure to vacant residential land (18% of combined 2010 total
parcels), and this type of land use is particularly vulnerable to
the current real estate market weakness.  From its high of
$4.8 billion in fiscal 2009, AV in both project areas fell by
19.4% to $3.9 billion in fiscal 2010.  Moody's notes the County
Assessor's office was particularly aggressive using Proposition 8
and rolled back valuations on residential properties and vacant
land located in the city to January 2001 price levels.  Some
stabilization in the housing market has been seen in recent
months, likely limiting future declines to a manageable level.
However, given the year-to-date decline in residential properties
and vacant land sale prices, and that several hundred recently
purchased homes did not undergo Proposition 8 AV reductions, the
possibility for significant, additional AV reductions in 2011
cannot be ruled out.  A further large reduction in AV in 2011 in
both project areas would likely result in downward pressure on the
rating, given current thin debt service coverage levels on the
TABs.  The low 2010 ratio of increment to total AV of 0.65
compounds the problem of declining AV within the two project
areas.

                          Key Statistics

* Total size: 24,620 acres

* Average annual growth of incremental AV., FY 2005-2010: 22.5%

* Incremental Value decline between 2009 and 2010: 29.4%

* Largest taxpayer as % of incremental AV., FY 2010: 1.1%

* Ten largest taxpayers as % of incremental AV, FY 2010: 5.9%

* Additional Bonds Test: 1.25x

* Non-Housing Bonds:

  -- Peak total debt service coverage, FY 2010, est.: 1.25x

* Housing Bonds:

  -- Peak total debt service coverage, FY 2010, est.: 1.08x

The last rating action with respect to Hesperia RDA was in
December 2009 when the rating for its TABs were downgraded to Baa2
and placed on Watchlist for possible downgrade.

The ratings assigned to Hesperia RDA's TABs were issued on Moody's
global rating scale.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.


HIGHLAND PARK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from Highland Park CDO I Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction, and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-'
ratings on two other classes and removed them from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of its
rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the 10 underlying loan assets
($91.4 million, 15.5% of the collateral pool) reported as
defaulted on the March trustee report.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the current credit characteristics of all of the
underlying collateral assets, as well as the transaction's
liability structure.

The downgrades also reflect S&P's assessment of increased risks
and credit stability considerations regarding certain subordinate
note cancellations S&P determined occurred prior to their
repayment through the transaction's payment waterfall.

According to the March 31, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* 35 commercial mortgage-backed securities tranches
  ($173.9 million, 29.6%);

* 12 subordinate interest loans ($170.9 million, 29.1%);

* 15 real estate bank loans ($114.7 million, 19.5%);

* Six whole loans ($72.9 million, 12.4%);

* Five CDO tranches ($29.9 million, 5.1%); and

* One synthetic security ($20.4 million, 3.5%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on S&P's
adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral servicer, Highland
Capital Management L.P., and the trustee, Bank of New York Mellon
Trust Co. N.A., as well as market and valuation data from third-
party providers.

The March 31, 2010, trustee report notes lowered principal
balances of approximately $6.0 million for the class C notes and
$1.3 million for the class D notes due to note cancellations as
confirmed by the trustee.

To assess the increased risks and credit stability considerations
regarding certain subordinate note cancellations, S&P applied
these stresses:

S&P generated cash flow analysis using two scenarios.  The first
scenario utilized the current balances of the notes, including any
note cancellations, when modeling the interest or principal
diversion mechanisms.  In the second scenario, S&P only recognized
the balance of the senior notes in the calculation of any interest
or principal diversion mechanisms.

S&P then applied the lower of the rating levels indicated by the
cash flow analysis under the two scenarios described above as the
starting point for S&P's rating analysis for each class of notes.

Finally, S&P reviewed the level of cushion relative to its credit
stability criteria and made further adjustments to the ratings
that S&P believed were appropriate.

According to the March trustee report, the transaction includes 18
defaulted assets: 10 loan assets ($91.4 million, 15.5%) and eight
CMBS and CDO tranches ($44.4 million, 7.6%).  Based on information
provided by the collateral servicer, special servicer, and third-
party market data providers, Standard & Poor's estimated that
there would be no recovery upon the ultimate resolution of the
defaulted loan assets.

The defaulted loan assets are:

* The Spirit Finance Corp's real estate bank loan ($20.0 million,
  3.4%);

* The EDC Denver LLC real estate bank loan ($15.1 million, 2.6%);

* The Ginn-LA Conduit Lender's real estate bank loan
  ($12.9 million, 2.2%);

* The Rhodes Cos. LLC real estate bank loan ($9.5 million, 1.6%);

* The South Edge LLC real estate bank loan ($9.5 million, 1.6%);

* The Kyle Acquisition Group LLC real estate bank loan
  ($8.5 million, 1.5%);

* The Metro Flag BP LLC real estate bank loan ($7.0 million,
  1.2%);

* The HE Capital Asante LLC whole loan ($5.0 million, 0.9%);

* The Yellowstone Mountain Club real estate bank loan
  ($2.0 million, 0.3%); and

* The November 2005 Land Investors LLC real estate bank loan
  ($1.7 million, 0.3%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing all
three overcollateralization tests but is passing all interest
coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class     To                   From
           -----     --                   ----
           A-1       BB+                  A/Watch Neg
           A-2       CCC+                 BBB/Watch Neg
           B         CCC-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
           C         CCC-                 BB/Watch Neg
           D         CCC-                 CCC+/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     Highland Park CDO I Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class     To                   From
           -----     --                   ----
           E         CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           F         CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg


HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Recovery Ratings, and removes
from Rating Watch these classes of Hometown Commercial Capital
Trust 2006-1 as indicated:

  -- $100.7 million class A to 'CC/RR4' from 'BB', removed from
     Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $3.4 million class B to 'C/RR6' from 'B+', removed from
     Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $1.7 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'B-', removed from
     Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $3.2 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR5'.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a
Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $4.3 million class E at 'C/RR6';
  -- $1.5 million class F at 'C/RR6';
  -- $1.9 million class G at 'C/RR6';
  -- $1.1 million class H at 'C/RR6';
  -- $560,000 class J at 'C/RR6';
  -- $746,000 class K at C/RR6';
  -- $372,000 class L at 'C/RR6';
  -- $560,000 class M at 'C/RR6';
  -- $559,000 class N at C/RR6'.

The $830,550 class O is not rated by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed-
rate commercial mortgage-backed securities analysis.

Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 33.9% of the
current transaction balance.  Of the $41.1 million in Fitch
expected losses, $25.9 million is attributed to specially serviced
loans and $15.2 million is the result of losses from loans that do
not pass Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 18.7% to $121.3 million from $149.2 million
at issuance.  There are 37 of the original 45 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently seven specially serviced
loans (29.3%) in the deal.  To date, the transaction has incurred
$2.9 million in losses, representing 1.9% of the original
transaction.

Fitch reviewed the workout status of the specially serviced loans
and applied a haircut to the most recent property valuations based
on the type and age of the valuations and conversations with the
special servicer.  For those loans that do not have recent
valuations and are delinquent, Fitch assumed a 70% loss.  The
average loss severity of small balance loans exceeds traditional
CMBS and a 70% loss reflects recent dispositions of loans with
similar characteristics.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-liquidated loans
by applying a 20% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate of 9% to determine
the value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage fixed
rate CMBS transactions, each loan also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a
debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were
considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced
loans, 17 loans did not meet Fitch's refinance test and incurred a
loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Recovery Ratings, and removes
from Rating Watch Negative these classes of Hometown Commercial
Trust 2007-1 as indicated:

  -- $109.7 million class A to 'C/RR3 from 'BB'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $1.6 million class B to 'D/RR6' from 'B'; removed from Rating
     Watch Negative;

  -- Class C to 'D/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6'.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a
Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms these classes, which have been reduced to zero as a
result of realized losses:

  -- Class D at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class E at 'D/RR6';.
  -- Class F at D/RR6';
  -- Class G at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class H at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class J at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class K at D/RR6';
  -- Class L at 'D/RR6';
  -- Class M at 'D/RR6'.

Class N is not rated by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed-
rate CMBS analysis.

Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 19.3% of the
current transaction balance.  Of the $21.4 million in Fitch
expected losses, $17.2 million is attributed to specially serviced
loans and $4.2 million is the result of losses from loans that do
not pass Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 24.6% to $111.3 million from $147.5 million
at issuance.  There are 44 of the original 51 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently eleven specially serviced
loans (30.7%) in the deal.  To date, the transaction has incurred
$20.9 million in losses, representing 14.2% of the original
transaction.

Fitch reviewed the workout status of the specially serviced loans
and applied a haircut to the most recent property valuations based
on the type and age of the valuations and conversations with the
special servicer.  For those loans that do not have recent
valuations and are delinquent, Fitch assumed a 70% loss.  The
average loss severity of small balance loans exceeds traditional
CMBS and a 70% loss reflects recent dispositions of loans with
similar characteristics.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-liquidated loans
by applying a 20% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate of 9% to determine
the value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage fixed-
rate CMBS transactions, each loan also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a
debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were
considered to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced
loans, 12 loans did not meet Fitch's refinance test and incurred a
loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


HOMETOWN COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B and C commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Hometown Commercial Trust 2007-1 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrades follow principal losses sustained by the classes on
the April 12, 2010 remittance report.  Class C experienced a 100%
loss of its $4.6 million opening balance.  Class B sustained a 51%
loss of its $3.3 million opening balance.

As of the April 12, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 44 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$111.3 million, down from 51 assets totaling $147.5 million at
issuance.  There are nine assets totaling $29.5 million (26.5%)
with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc. To date, the
trust has experienced losses on five loans totaling $20.6 million,
and the loans that have incurred losses have an average loss
severity calculated from the April 2010 remittance report of
approximately 73.2%.

                         Ratings Lowered

                 Hometown Commercial Trust 2007-1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Ratings
                  -------
    Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
    -----       --          ----             ------------------
    B           D           CCC-                            N/A
    C           D           CCC-                            N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1999-C7 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to J.P. Morgan Commercial Finance Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1999-C7.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
to the remaining Fitch rated classes following Fitch's prospective
review of potential stressed and expected losses associated with
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of 9.9%, or
$2.5 million from loans in special servicing and loans that cannot
refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance.  These losses
will be absorbed by the unrated class NR.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 96.9% to $24.7 million from $801.4 million
at issuance.  Of the remaining 20 loans, none have defeased.

There are two specially serviced loans in the pool (7.2%); one is
non-performing matured, and the other is current.

The largest specially serviced asset (14.2%) is a 114 unit limited
service hotel located in Coon Rapids, MN, a north Minneapolis
suburb.  The loan transferred in September 2008 due to maturity
default.  The borrower was making monthly payments past maturity
but is now due for March 2009 and the special servicer is working
with the borrower to cure the default.

The other specially serviced asset (4.1%) is a 39,891 sf medical
office property in Omaha, NE.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2009 after the borrower requested relief.  As of
October 2009, the property was 55% occupied with a 0.75 times NOI
(net operating income) DSCR (debt-service coverage ratio).

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, one loan (5% of the
pool) incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes as indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.4 million class G at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Positive;
  -- $4 million class H at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $10.2 million NR class.  Classes A-1, A-2,
B, C, D, E, and F have paid in full.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2004-C3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Loss Severity ratings and
Recovery Ratings, and revises Outlooks to J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2004-C3, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $87.2 million Class A-J to 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Negative from
     'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43.6 million Class B to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.3 million Class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.3 million Class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.2 million Class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.2 million Class F to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.9 million Class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.2 million Class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.9 million Class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.6 million Class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.7 million Class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

  -- $9.5 million Class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1;

  -- $3.8 million Class N to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR1.

In addition, Fitch affirms, maintains the Stable Outlook, and
assigns LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $153.8 million Class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $112.5 million Class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $235.8 million Class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $166.1 million Class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $421.4 million Class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only Class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only Class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also affirms and maintains the Recovery Ratings on these
classes:

  -- $5.7 million Class P at 'C/RR6';
  -- $5.7 million Class Q at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate the $18.4 million class NR.  Class A1 has paid
in full.

The rating downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  Fitch expects losses of 5.1% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $71 million.  The majority of the Fitch's
total expected losses (73%) are associated with loans currently in
special servicing with the largest specially serviced loan
representing 36% of Fitch's total expected loss.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
8.5% to $1.39 billion from $1.52 billion at issuance.  There are
142 of the original 152 loans remaining in the transaction, nine
of which have defeased (12.4% of the current transaction balance).
Fifteen loans (13.9%) are currently in special servicing.  Fitch
expects losses from loans currently in special servicing to
deplete classes L thru N and impact class K significantly.

The largest specially serviced loan (4.2%) is secured by a
portfolio of eight industrial/flex properties located in the
greater Boston metropolitan statistical area.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 due to imminent
default.  There is also a lien on the property for an unpaid
leasing commission.  The loan went into maturity default in
January 2010.  The special servicer was successful in getting a
receiver appointed on the portfolio in March 2010.  The special
servicer expects the receiver to appoint a new property manager
shortly.  As of January 2010, the portfolio was 71% occupied.
Fitch made adjustments to August 2009 appraisal and recent Brokers
Opinion of Value in deriving an expected loss.

The second largest specially serviced loan (2%) is secured by a
multifamily property located in Tampa, FL.  The loan transferred
to the special servicer in December 2009.  The borrower is
currently remitting the interest portion of the principal and
interest due on the loan at this time and is requesting a
modification of the loan to extend the interest-only period.  The
special servicer is in the process of reviewing the operating data
for the property.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
19 loans (13.8% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2003-PM1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-PM1 and
removed 11 of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from
the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
mezzanine and subordinate classes also reflect credit support
erosion S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of
the transaction's six specially serviced assets.  S&P downgraded
classes L, M, N, and P to 'D' because of recurring interest
shortfalls.  The shortfalls are primarily due to an appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amount on the largest loan in
the pool, which is currently with the special servicer, ORIX
Capital Markets LLC.  The loan is discussed in further detail
below.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls to continue for the
foreseeable future.  Classes L, M, N, and P have experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls of $57,752, $198,417, $119,045, and
$79,372, respectively, as of the April 2010 remittance report.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.74x and a loan-to-value ratio of 73.2%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.37x and an LTV ratio of 89.3%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
28.3% and 37.6%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude 14 ($186.1 million, 21.4%)
defeased loans, one ($2.0 million, 0.2%) loan backed by a
cooperative property, and the transaction's six ($75.1 million,
8.6%) specially serviced assets.  S&P separately estimated losses
for the six specially serviced assets and included them in S&P's
'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the April 2010 remittance report, six ($75.1 million, 8.6%)
assets in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the specially serviced assets is: one ($6.1 million,
0.7%) is real estate owned, one ($1.1 million, 0.1%) is in
foreclosure, two ($62.5 million, 7.2%) are 90-plus-days
delinquent, one ($1.6 million, 0.2%) is 60 days delinquent, and
one ($3.8 million, 0.4%) is in its grace period.  Three of the
specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $46.0 million.

The Palm Beach Mall loan ($54.3 million total exposure, 6.2%) is
the largest exposure in the pool and is currently with the special
servicer.  The loan is secured by approximately 702,000 sq. ft. of
an approximately 1,085,000-sq.-ft. regional mall in West Palm
Beach, Fla.  The property was built in 1967.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 10, 2009, and ORIX
has indicated that the asset was foreclosed upon on March 4, 2010.
As of December 2008, the reported DSC was 0.63x, down
significantly from 1.51x at issuance.  As of April 2010, the
property is largely vacant, as only four tenants remain in
occupancy.  According to the special servicer, the borrower
stopped renewing leases in an effort to empty the property and
convert it to an open-air mall, without the approval of the
lender.  ORIX has filed suit against the borrower, guarantor,
and related parties to recover the deficiency.  There is a
$45.2 million ARA in effect.  S&P currently anticipate a loss in
excess of 90% of the outstanding principal balance of the loan.
It is possible that a nonrecoverable advance determination or
litigation expenses could prompt increased interest shortfalls to
the trust, which S&P considered in S&P's current rating actions.

The Woodlands Office Park loan ($13.1 million total exposure,
1.5%) is the second-largest loan with the special servicer.  The
loan is secured by a 127,676-sq.-ft. office property in Hauppauge,
N.Y.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Sept. 16, 2009.  As of December 2008, the reported DSC was 0.55x,
compared with 1.39x at issuance.  ORIX has indicated that the
asset is headed for foreclosure.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Hills Apartment Homes asset ($9.4 million total exposure,
1.1%) is the third-largest asset with the special servicer.  The
exposure is secured by a 264-unit multifamily property in Fort
Worth, Texas.  The asset was transferred to the special servicer
on Dec. 5, 2005, and is classified as REO.  Recent financial
performance data was not available for the asset.  The master
servicer has made a nonrecoverable advance determination in
connection with this asset.  S&P expects a significant loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The three ($6.5 million, 0.8%) remaining specially serviced assets
have balances that individually represent less than 0.5% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for all three of these
assets, resulting in a weighted average loss severity of 27.9%.

One loan ($4.0 million, 0.3%) was previously with the special
servicer and has since been returned to the master servicer.
Pursuant to the transaction documents, if the loan continues to
perform and remains with the master servicer, the special servicer
is entitled to a workout fee equal to 1.0% of all future principal
and interest payments on the loan.

The pool contains one ($2.7 million, 0.3%) nondefeased loan with a
final maturity in 2010 (June 1, 2010).

                       Transaction Summary

As of the April 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $869.5 million, down from $1.16 billion
at issuance.  The pool includes 136 assets, down from 148 at
issuance.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.,
provided full-year 2008, interim 2009, or full-year 2009 financial
information for 97.7% of the nondefeased assets in the pool.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.64x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio were 1.74x
and 73.2%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude 14 ($186.1 million, 21.4%) defeased loans, one
($2.0 million, 0.2%) loan backed by a cooperative property, and
the transaction's six ($75.1 million, 8.6%) specially serviced
assets.  S&P separately estimated losses for the six specially
serviced assets.  Servicer-reported financial information was
available for four of these assets, and based on this information,
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 0.61x for these
exposures.  The master servicer reported a watchlist of 25
($138.8 million, 16.0%) loans, including two of the top 10 loan
exposures.  Eighteen ($167.3 million, 19.2%) assets in the pool
have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 10 ($103.0 million,
11.9%) assets have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                 Summary Of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $229.0 million (26.3%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.33x for the top 10 real estate assets.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV ratio for the top 10 exposures are 1.47x and 84.4%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the Palm
Beach Mall loan ($54.3 million total exposure, 6.2%), which is
with the special servicer (S&P discussed the loan above).  This
asset has a servicer-reported DSC of 0.63x and, if S&P include it
in S&P's calculation, its adjusted DSC for the top 10 exposures is
1.30x.

The Tanglewood Court Apartments loan ($30.0 million, 3.5%) is the
second-largest real estate asset in the pool, and the largest loan
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is collateralized by
a 634-unit multifamily property in Houston, Texas.  The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist for low DSC, which was
1.06x as of October 2009, down from 1.43x at issuance.  Occupancy
was 83.6% as of November 2009, compared with 93.9% at issuance.

The Villas at Cheyenne Apartments loan ($17.9 million, 2.1%) is
the seventh-largest real estate asset in the pool and the second-
largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is
collateralized by a 368-unit multifamily property in North Las
Vegas, Nev.  The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist
for low DSC, which was 0.88x as of December 2009, down from 1.43x
at issuance.  Occupancy was 65.9% as of the same period, down from
92.7% at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     D          AA-     AA/Watch Neg                    13.25
     E          A       AA-/Watch Neg                   11.76
     F          BBB     A/Watch Neg                      9.93
     G          B+      BBB+/Watch Neg                   8.43
     H          CCC-    BBB/Watch Neg                    6.27
     J          CCC-    BB+/Watch Neg                    4.44
     K          CCC-    BB/Watch Neg                     3.61
     L          D       B+/Watch Neg                     2.62
     M          D       B-/Watch Neg                     1.79
     N          D       CCC/Watch Neg                    1.29
     P          D       CCC-/Watch Neg                   0.95

                          Ratings Lowered

     JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     B          AA+     AAA                             17.91
     C          AA      AAA                             16.41

                         Ratings Affirmed

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-PM1

     Class        Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----        ------               ----------------------
     A-1A         AAA                                   21.73
     A-2          AAA                                   21.73
     A-3          AAA                                   21.73
     A-4          AAA                                   21.73
     X-1          AAA                                     N/A
     X-2          AAA                                     N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2001-C7 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes and
downgraded five classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-
C7, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-C7.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
watchlisted loans.  The affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage and the Herfindahl Index remaining
within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 34%
to $800.8 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 84 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 37% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans with
investment grade underlying ratings, representing 21% of the pool.
Twenty-eight loans, representing 46% of the outstanding balance,
have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 38% of the
pool.

Eighteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the trust, resulting in an
aggregate $4.7 million realized loss (38% loss severity on
average).  There are four loans, representing 1.4% of the pool,
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is The Pavilion Senior Residences Loan ($4.5 million - 0.6%
of the pool), which is secured by a 99-bed assisted living
facility located in Catskill, New York.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in December 2008 due to monetary payment
default and matured in March 2010.  An October 2009 appraisal
valued the property at $3.8 million compared to $8.0 million at
securitization.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by two
multifamily properties and a retail center.  Moody's estimates a
$5.3 million aggregate loss for all of the specially serviced
loans (47% expected loss on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on eight loans,
representing 6% of the pool.  These loans mature within the next
24 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.
Moody's has estimated a $9.2 million aggregate loss on these loans
(21% weighted average expected loss based on a weighted average
61% default probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 91% and 89%, respectively, of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio, excluding the specially
serviced and troubled loans, is 81% compared to 86% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.30X and 1.42X, respectively, compared to
1.38X and 1.46X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 20 compared to 47 at last review.  The decline
in Herf has been partially offset by increased subordination due
to loan payoffs and amortization.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Fashion Centre
at Pentagon City Loan ($148.4 million -- 18.5% of the pool), which
is secured by the borrower's interest in an 820,000 square foot
regional mall located in Arlington, Virginia.  The center is
anchored by Nordstrom and Macy's, which each own their respective
improvements.  The center is a dominant mall in the D.C.  metro
area and has been virtually 100% leased since securitization.  The
loan has amortized 5% since last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.59X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 1.79X at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Connell Corporate
Center I Loan ($19.1 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 415,000 square foot Class A suburban office building
located in Berkeley Heights, New Jersey.  The property is 100%
leased to two tenants -- American Home Assurance (86% of the net
rentable area; lease expiration in June 2018) and EMC Corporation
(14% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2013).  The loan fully
amortizes over its 11.75-year term, maturing in June 2013, and has
amortized by approximately 28% since last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.81X,
respectively, compared to Aa2 and 1.97X at last review.

The top three conduit exposures represent 8% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest conduit exposure consists of the
Torrance Executive Plaza East and West Loans ($30.9 million --
3.9% of the pool), two cross collateralized loans secured by two
office properties located in Torrance, California.  The properties
total 345,000 square feet and were 82% leased as of October 2009
compared to 93% at last review.  Property performance has remained
stable; however, Moody's analysis incorporates a stressed cash
flow due to increased vacancy.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
98% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.19X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Meadows Corporate Park Loan
($15.9 million - 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 165,000
square foot Class A office complex located in Silver Spring,
Maryland.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist due to low debt service coverage.  As of December 2009,
the property was 95% leased compared to 88% in December 2006.
Despite the increased occupancy, financial performance has
declined since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
102% and 1.00X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.03X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Court Tower Office Building
Loan ($15.4 million - 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
132,000 square foot Class A office property located in Towson,
Maryland.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist due to the near-term lease expirations of major tenants.
The property was 62% leased as of November 2009 compared to 93% at
securitization.  Moody's analysis incorporates a stressed cash
flow due to concerns regarding the building's high vacancy and
tenant rollover exposure.  The loan has an anticipated repayment
date in August 2011.  Because of the vacancy exposure, Moody's has
assumed a high probability of default at maturity.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 144% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to
87% and 1.24X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-3, $31,235,049, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/18/2001

  -- Class A-4, $15,764,954, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/18/2001

  -- Class A-5, $540,708,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/18/2001

  -- Class X-CL, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/18/2001

  -- Class X-CP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/18/2001

  -- Class B, $49,909,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 05/25/2005

  -- Class C, $16,636,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 01/11/2006

  -- Class D, $39,300,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from A1 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class E, $12,100,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded to
     Aa2 from A2 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class F, $12,120,000, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
     A1 from A3 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class G, $12,099,000, affirmed at A3; previously upgraded to
     A3 from Baa1 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class H, $10,587,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously upgraded
     to Baa2 from Baa3 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class J, $10,587,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously upgraded
     to Baa3 from Ba1 on 04/12/2007

  -- Class K, $15,124,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously assigned
     Ba2 on 12/18/2001

  -- Class L, $6,049,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     assigned Ba3 on 12/18/2001

  -- Class M, $7,562,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     assigned B1 on 12/18/2001

  -- Class N, $4,537,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     assigned B2 on 12/18/2001

  -- Class P, $3,025,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     assigned B3 on 12/18/2001

  -- Class Q, $3,025,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     assigned Caa2 on 12/18/2001


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006-C1 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
P commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 to 'D' from 'CCC'.  At the same
time, S&P lowered its ratings on four additional classes from the
same transaction.

The downgrade of the class P certificates follows principal losses
the class sustained as reported in the April 16, 2010, remittance
report.  The downgrades of classes K, L, M, and N reflect credit
support erosion that resulted from principal losses totaling
$25.8 million.  The class P certificate reported a loss of 46.3%
of its opening certificate balance ($6.14 million).  The class Q
($6.14 million) and class S ($6.14 million) certificates lost 100%
of their respective opening balances.  S&P downgraded these
classes to 'D' on June 24, 2009.  The class T certificate, which
Standard & Poor's does not rate, lost 100% of its $10.8 million
opening balance.

The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of two assets
that were with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  Details of
the two liquidated assets are:

The Highwoods II Portfolio asset had a total exposure of
$43.8 million.  The portfolio consisted of 10 office buildings
totaling 798,984 sq. ft. in Tampa, Fla., and Atlanta, Ga.  The
portfolio was transferred to LNR on Nov. 17, 2009, due to imminent
monetary default.  The trust incurred a $21.7 million realized
loss when the asset was liquidated on March 25, 2010, which was
reflected in the most recent remittance report.

The Woodland Arms Apartments asset had a total exposure of
$4.7 million.  The asset consisted of a 164-unit multifamily
property in Detroit, Mich., and was transferred to LNR on Aug. 3,
2007, due to imminent monetary default.  The trust incurred a
$4.1 million realized loss when the asset was liquidated on
March 15, 2010, which was reflected in the most recent remittance
report.

As of the April 16, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 141 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.34 billion, down from 145 assets totaling $2.48 million at
issuance.  There are 10 assets totaling $165.9 million (7.1%) with
the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses
on five loans totaling $36.9 million.  Based on the April 2010
remittance report, the average loss severity was approximately
61.0%.

                          Ratings Lowered

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
       Class   To       From          Credit enhancement (%)
       -----   --       ----          ----------------------
       K       CCC+     B                              1.45
       L       CCC      B-                             0.93
       M       CCC-     B-                             0.53
       N       CCC-     CCC+                           0.14
       P       D        CCC                             N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-CCL-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigns Rating Outlooks to Lehman Brothers Floating Rate
Commercial Mortgage commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2006-CCL-C2.

The rating affirmations are due to the maturity extension and the
continued paydown of the only remaining loan in the pool, the
Charlottesville Portfolio.  While Fitch expects the principal
balance of the remaining class to be paid in full, there will
continue to be interest shortfalls due to special servicing fees.

The Positive Outlook reflects the high likelihood of the
shortfalls to class M being fully recovered.  Per the loan
documents, prior to any paydown of the B-Note, all of the
previously paid monthly special servicing fees, liquidation fees,
and workout fees that were paid through the trust must be
reimbursed.  Once the principal balance of the trust is paid in
full, funds will next be directed to paying the balance of the
interest shortfalls.

As of the April 2010 remittance date, the transaction's principal
balance had decreased by 99.9% to $1.76 million from
$932.9 million at issuance.  Fifteen of the original 16 loans have
paid in full.  The remaining loan is secured by a multifamily
rental property that was converted to condominiums.

The Charlottesville Portfolio was transferred to special servicing
in February 2008 due to the depletion of the interest reserve as
well as the continued lack of sales.  The loan is secured by two
former multifamily properties located in Charlottesville, VA --
Walker Square and Riverbend -- that were converted to
condominiums.  The loan matured Sept. 16, 2008, with no additional
extension options.  The loan has paid down by 95.3% since
issuance.  The sale of one unit closed in April 2010 bringing the
number of unsold units to 133.  The special servicer has modified
the loan and extended the maturity to Sept. 16, 2010, with an
additional one year extension option.  The loan was transferred
back to the master servicer in April 2010.  Due to the small
remaining balance of the trust and the limited number of condo
sales needed to payoff the balance, a full recovery is likely.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $20.7 million class M at 'BB+'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, X-FLP, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, ASH-1 and
ASH-2 have paid in full.

Fitch does not rate these classes: BRD, GRS, ZPH, PPL, MTH, PRM,
PKT-1, PKT-2, PKT-3, CGR, RGB-1, RGB-2, or RGB-3.


LODESTONE RE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class A 2010-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned 'BB+' and
'BB' ratings to the Series 2010-1 Class A and Class B notes
respectively, to be issued by Lodestone Re Ltd.

The notes are exposed to losses from U.S. hurricanes and
earthquakes in the covered area.  Lodestone Re is a special-
purpose insurer formed pursuant to the Bermuda Insurance Act,
1978, as amended, and owned by a purpose trust.  Lodestone Re was
incorporated under the laws of Bermuda on April 8, 2010.

Chartis, formerly known as AIU Holdings, has a long tradition of
providing innovative coverages in situations in which highly
specialized risks reach industry capacity.  The largest general
insurance business is Chartis U.S., which provides almost all
types of commercial insurance coverage in the U.S. One of the
leading companies within Chartis U.S. is National Union Fire
Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (A+/Negative/A-1), which is the
cedent in this transaction.

The initial probability of attachment for the Class A notes will
be 1.14% and for the Class B notes, 1.99%.  The initial modeled
expected loss and probability of exhaustion for the Class A notes
are 0.96% and 0.80%, respectively; and for the Class B notes,
1.66% and 1.38%.  Upon the annual reset, the probability of
attachment and expected loss percentages will be equal to or less
than the initial percentages.  These percentages are based on the
medium-term forward-looking view of Atlantic Basin activity rates
that is the standard view of risk in the model for hurricane, and
a time-dependent analysis for earthquake.  The probability of
attachment using the standard long-term average rates for
hurricane and a time-dependent analysis for earthquake is 1.01%
for the Class A notes and 1.76% for the Class B notes.

When rating catastrophe bonds linked to hurricanes, Standard &
Poor's looks at the sensitivity analysis -- that is, the warm sea
surface temperature conditioned catalogue, which in this model
incorporates the impact of elevated sea surface temperatures on
hurricane activity and looks at the last 15 years to generate the
stochastic hurricane event set and compare it to the long term
base case analysis.  When rating catastrophe bonds linked to
earthquakes, Standard & Poor's looks at the time-dependent and
time-independent analyses.  When analyzing these results, Standard
& Poor's typically relies on the most conservative output, that
is, the result with the highest probability of attachment.  The
probabilities of attachment that Standard & Poor's is using for
purposes of the determining these ratings, which, in this case,
incorporates the effect of warm seas surface temperatures for
hurricane and the time-independent analysis for earthquake, are
1.16% for the Class A notes and 2.01% for the Class B notes.

                           Ratings List

                           New ratings

                         Lodestone Re Ltd.

          Series 2010-1 Class A notes               BB+
          Series 2010-1 Class B notes               BB


LOUISIANA LOCAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on 2002A Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 rating for
Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facility and Community
Development Authority Multifamily Housing Revenue bonds (Park East
/ Bellemont Victoria / Bellemont Victoria II Apartments) Senior
Series 2002A and the Ba3 rating for Subordinate Series 2002C
bonds.  The rating outlook for the Senior and Subordinate bonds
has been affirmed at stable.  This rating action is based on
review of unaudited 2009 operating statements for the Park East,
Bellemont Victoria, and Bellemont Victoria II Apartments, coupled
with Moody's review of MBIA Inc. and MBIA Insurance Corporation
(currently rated Ba3/ NEG and B3 / NEG, respectively), which hold
the debt service reserve fund of the Projects in a Guaranteed
Investment Contract.  Non-performance of the GIC provider is a
risk to bondholders in transactions where bond payments rely
wholly or partially on a GIC.

The Park East project was built in 1972 and consists of 188 units
in 25 two-story buildings.  Bellemont Victoria is a 195 unit
project of 4 two-story buildings and the Bellemont Victoria II
facility is made up of 27 buildings with 198 units.  All three
properties enjoy a high physical occupancy at 97% for Park East,
99% for Bellemont Victoria, and 98% for Bellemont Victoria II as
of January 2010.  The FY2009 unaudited operating statements
demonstrate projects' operating performance in line with the prior
year.  The properties have also accumulated a sizable surplus
reserve fund, with current operating reserves of $2,461.09 and
excess reserves of $484,310.95, which acts as a cushion for the
projects.

                              Outlook

The rating outlook for the Senior and Subordinate bonds has been
affirmed at stable, given the stable debt service coverage ratio
and high occupancy rates at the three projects.

                 What Could Change the Rating UP:

  -- Several reporting periods that show consistent revenue growth
     and continued strong occupancy

  -- Replacement of the debt service reserve fund with a highly
     rated provider

                What Could Change the Rating DOWN:

  -- Any erosion of current occupancy levels or increases in
     expenses that affect debt service coverage

The rating assigned to the Series 2002A and Series 2002C bonds was
issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced
its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global
scale and therefore, upon implementation of the methodology
published in conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be
recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to other credits
with a similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view
the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but
rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating
scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in
credit quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated
municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action was on July 20, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded to Ba3 ratings with on the Series 2002A and 2002C
bonds.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its rating outlook to
stable from negative and affirmed its 'BB-' long-term rating on
Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority's
$82 million series 1992B, 1998D, and 2003E bonds issued for Jordan
Hospital.

The outlook revision reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of the
hospital's considerably reduced operating loss in fiscal year
2009.

The 'BB-' rating reflects Standard & Poor's view of Jordan's
continued volatility in volume with growth during fiscal year 2009
and declines year to date in 2010 and a stressed balance sheet
with light liquidity and high leverage.  These credit concerns are
partially offset by Jordan's solid market position in Plymouth,
Mass., which has a growing population with limited competition.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's assessment of Jordan's improved
operating results compared with 2008 levels, said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Cynthia Keller Macdonald.  "S&P believes the
hospital should be on more stable financial footing given its
advantageous market position; however, historically these
advantages have not been translated into earnings."

Standard & Poor's believes that the efforts of Jordan's new
management have been largely successful, although Standard &
Poor's requires continued increased progress because the balance
sheet has no room for further liquidity reductions or additional
debt at this rating level.  While Standard & Poor's expects some
volatility at this rating level because of the hospital's thin
cushion, should operations revert to significant deficits a
downgrade or return to a negative outlook is likely.
Jordan Hospital operates a 155-bed acute-care facility in
Plymouth, Mass.


MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 60
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche and confirmed the
ratings of 12 tranches from three RMBS transactions, backed by
prime jumbo loans, issued by MASTR Asset Securitization Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranche 1-A-3 issued by MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2005-2 is
wrapped by Assured Guaranty Corp (rated Aa3).  For securities
insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is
the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and
(ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of
the guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-A-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Confirmed at B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-29, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-30, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-31, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-32, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-33, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-34, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-35, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


MERITAGE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches from three RMBS transactions issued by Meritage Mortgage
Loan Trust.  Moody's also confirmed the rating of one tranche from
Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1.  The collateral backing each
of the affected deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 13, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2005-LC1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-LC1 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing and highly
leveraged watchlisted loans and concerns about refinancing risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse lending
environment.  Eleven loans, representing 18% of the pool, mature
with the next three years.  Four of these loans (3.4%) have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.00X.

This rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased 6% to $1.45 billion from
$1.55 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 139 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37%
of the pool.  Two loans, representing 1% of the pool, have
defeased and are now collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since last review,
resulting in a $1.25 million loss (69% loss severity).  Seven
loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loans are a mixture of multi-
family, industrial, self storage and anchored and unanchored
retail properties.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and troubled loans

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class AJ, $94,708,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class B, $32,858,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aa2 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class C, $15,463,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aa3 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class D, $28,992,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned A2 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class E, $15,463,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned A3 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class F, $25,126,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa1 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class G, $19,329,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class H, $21,261,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa3 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class J, $7,731,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class K, $5,798,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba2 on 1/12/2006;

  -- Class L, $5,799,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba3 on 1/12/2006;


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 2001-IQ Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-IQ:

  -- $6.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.3 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.3 million class G at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.3 million class H at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.7 million class J at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.6 million class K at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.8 million class L at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.3 million class M at 'B/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.8 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The $1.7 million class O is not rated by Fitch.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have been paid in full.

The affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance and
minimal future expected losses following Fitch's prospective
review of potential stresses to the transaction.  As of the April
2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has paid
down 85.6% to $102.6 million from $713 million at issuance.

There are 19 of the original 91 loans remaining in transaction.
The transaction has experienced $3.6 million in losses to date
(0.51% of original balance) and Fitch's analysis resulted in
expected cumulative losses to reach 1.0%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Sixteen loans did not payoff at maturity with six
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1998-XL1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and revised the Recovery Rating of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trusts commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-XL1:

  -- $27.8 million class H to 'C'/RR5' from 'CCC/RR3'.

Fitch also affirms following classes and Rating Outlooks:

  -- $19.5 million class D at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.3 million class E at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.7 million class F at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30 million class G to 'AA'; Outlook Stable.
  -- interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The $13.9 million class J remains at 'C' and Fitch has lowered the
RR to 'RR6' from 'RR5'.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B and C have paid in full.

The downgrade of class H is due to an increase in Fitch expected
losses for the Charlestowne Mall asset (28.7%) and the expectation
that the asset will be liquidated in the near term.  The Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.  The transaction balance has been
reduced 84% to $149.1 million from $925.8 million at issuance.

The Charlestowne Mall transferred to special servicing when it
failed to secure new financing at its anticipated maturity date in
April 2005.  The Charlestowne Mall is located in St. Charles, IL,
and is real estate owned.  Fitch expected losses upon liquidation
of the asset to fully deplete class J and a significant portion of
class H.

The Center America loan is collateralized by a pool of 42 retail
assets located in Houston and Dallas, TX, and remains current.
The portfolio was acquired by an entity related to the Centro
Properties Group.  The loan had an Anticipated Repayment Date
(ARD) of June 1, 2008, and did not pay off.  Additional interest
is accruing and will be deferred until the loan refinances or pays
in full.  The final maturity date for the Center America loan is
June 1, 2028.  The weighted average occupancy in the pool has
improved slightly from 83.7% as of year end 2008 to 84.7% as of
October 2009.  The YE 2008 servicer reported debt service coverage
ratio was 2.66 times, an increased from 1.37x at issuance, largely
due to an increase in rents.  The loan has a Fitch stressed loan
to value of 41% based on a Fitch stressed cap rate of 9.75%.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Series 1999-FNV1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades, assigns a Loss Severity rating, and
revises the Rating Outlook of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-FNV1:

  -- $12.6 million class G to 'AA'/LS3' from 'A-'; Outlook to
     Stable from Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $7.9 million class H at 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Positive;
  -- $9.5 million class J at 'BB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.9 million class K at 'CCC/RR1'.
  -- Interest only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Classes L, M, and, N remain 'D/RR6' due to losses incurred.

The upgrade of class G is the result of sufficient credit
enhancement to the class relative to Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 11.21% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $4.8 million, the majority of which are from loans
that cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's stressed
refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 93.2% to $42.9 million from $632.1 million
at issuance.  Of the 10 remaining loans in the transaction, one
loan is defeased (7.31%).

As of April 2010, there are five specially serviced loans (38.5%).
The largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 182-room hotel
located in San Diego, CA.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2009 due to maturity default.  The special
servicer is currently pursuing foreclose and is expected to take
title at the end of the month.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Two loans are not expected to pay off at maturity
with one loan incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed
value.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on $3 Mil. Notes to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Morgan
Stanley ACES SPC's $3 million class A-8 secured fixed-rate notes
series 2006-8 to 'B-' from 'B'.

The rating on the class A-8 notes is dependent on the lowest of
the ratings on the reference obligation, Dynegy Holdings Inc.'s
$500 million 6.875% notes due April 1, 2011 ('B-'); the rating on
Morgan Stanley ('A'), which acts as the swap payments guarantor;
and the rating on the underlying security, BA Master Credit Card
Trust II's class A floating-rate asset-backed certificates series
2001-B due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA').

The rating action follows the April 12, 2010, lowering of S&P's
rating on Dynegy Holdings Inc.'s $500 million 6.875% notes due
April 1, 2011, to 'B-' from 'B'.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 115 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 115
tranches from 8 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-11AR

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2AR

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-P, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-P, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9AR

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


N-STAR REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 7 classes of Notes issued by
N-Star Real Estate CDO IX, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, a decrease in the
weighted average recovery rate, and an increase in defaulted
assets since last review.  The rating action, which concludes
Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

N-Star Real Estate CDO IX, Ltd., is a revolving CRE CDO with a
reinvestment end date of 6/7/2012.  The pool contains a 46%
concentration in commercial mortgage back securities of which
approximately 88% was issued between 2005 and 2007.  The remaining
collateral includes CRE CDO's (29%), CMBS rake bonds (9%), REIT
debt (5%), and Real Estate Loans (10%).

As of the 4/2/2010 trustee statement, the outstanding note balance
was $800 million, the same as at securitization.  However, the
current collateral par balance has increased to over $942 million
dollars from $857 million at last review.  The increase in
overcollateralization is the result of the collateral manager
purchasing CUSIP collateral at discount.  Additionally, the pool
contains 15 assets totaling $155 million that are listed as
defaulted assets.  Moody's modeled the deal excluding defaulted
assets, essentially, negating the positive effects of
overcollateralization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.  The
current bottom-dollar WARF is 3,728 compared to 2,583 at last
review.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,087, which is
the WARF excluding defaulted collateral.  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates (including defaulted assets)
is: Aaa-Aa3 (7.4% compared to 3.4% at last review), A1-A3 (8.5%
compared to 6.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (12.3% compared to
31.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (25.4% compared to 19.4% at last
review), B1-B3 (12.6% compared to 16.6% at last review), and Caa1-
C (33.8% compared to 23.1% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the covenant WAL 7.0 years, the
same as at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled to the
covenant a fixed WARR of 20.0%, the same as at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC (excluding defaulted collateral) of 11.2% compared
to 15.6% at last review.  The low MAC reflects the relatively high
diversity within the ratings distribution and diverse mix of asset
types and vintages.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

For non-CUSIP collateral (treated in CDOROM v2.5 as secured
corporate debt), the updated asset correlations are approximately
30% compared to 15% previously.  The updated asset correlations
for non-CUSIP collateral reflect a reduction in the maximum over-
concentration stress by half in CDOROM v2.5 due to the diversity
of tenants, property types and geographic locations inherent in
the collateral pools.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


N-STAR REL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from N-Star REL CDO IV Ltd. series 2005-1 and N-Star REL
CDO VI Ltd. series 2006-1, which are both commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on seven classes from these transactions
and removed all 19 ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's assessment of
increased risks and credit stability considerations regarding
certain subordinate note cancellations S&P determined occurred
prior to the notes' repayment through the transactions' payment
waterfalls.

The list below indicates the notes from each transaction that S&P
believes were cancelled without payment, according to the
March 31, 2010, trustee reports for both transactions and notices
S&P received from the trustee, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

                                                Amount
    Transaction name                Tranche     cancelled (US$)
    ----------------                -------     ---------------
    N-Star CDO IV                   C           13,500,000
    N-Star CDO IV                   D           4,000,000
    N-Star CDO VI                   C           1,050,000
    N-Star CDO VI                   D           3,950,000
    N-Star CDO VI                   G           3,000,000

To assess the increased risks and credit stability considerations
for the transactions with respect to certain subordinate note
cancellations, S&P applied these stresses that S&P deemed
appropriate:

S&P generated a cash flow analysis using two scenarios.  The first
scenario utilized the current balances of the notes, including any
note cancellations, when modeling the interest or principal
diversion mechanisms.  In the second scenario, S&P recognized only
the balance of the senior notes in the calculation of any interest
or principal diversion mechanisms.

S&P then applied the lower of the rating levels indicated by the
cash flow analysis under the two scenarios described above as the
starting point for its rating analysis for each class of notes.
Finally, S&P reviewed the level of cushion relative to its credit
stability criteria and made further adjustments to the ratings
that S&P believed were appropriate.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transactions and their underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      N-Star REL CDO IV Ltd.
           Collateralized debt obligations series 2005-1

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          B         BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
          C         BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
          D         BB-                  BB+/Watch Neg
          E         B+                   BB/Watch Neg
          F         B                    B+/Watch Neg
          G         CCC+                 B-/Watch Neg

                      N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd.
           Collateralized debt obligations series 2006-1

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          D         BB                   BB+/Watch Neg
          E         BB-                  BB/Watch Neg
          F         B+                   BB/Watch Neg
          G         B+                   BB-/Watch Neg
          J         B-                   B/Watch Neg
          K         CCC+                 B-/Watch Neg

       Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      N-Star REL CDO IV Ltd.
          Collateralized debt obligations series 2005-1

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A         BBB+                 BBB+/Watch Neg

                      N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd.
          Collateralized debt obligations series 2006-1

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A1        BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
          AR        BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
          A2        BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
          B         BB+                  BB+/Watch Neg
          C         BB+                  BB+/Watch Neg
          H         B+                   B+/Watch Neg


POLLUTION CONTROL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1991A Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Pollution Control
Financing Authority Camden County, New Jersey series 1991A bonds
as part of its continuous surveillance effort:

  -- Approximately $24.3 million system disposal and resource
     recovery system revenue bonds, series 1991A affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch has removed the Stable Rating Outlook.  Fitch does not
assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The 'C' rating portends the imminent default on the bonds if
     a viable restructuring or refinancing is not undertaken or if
     the state does not provide a debt service subsidy to
     supplement internally generated monies in amounts sufficient
     to make the final principal and interest payment due Dec. 1,
     2010.

  -- Despite stable management waste declines from the loss of
     legal flow control, competition from lower priced disposal
     options in Pennsylvania and high expense structure under the
     resource recovery facility operating contracts led to
     structural operating shortfalls exacerbated by the recession
     requiring state subsidy to make debt service payments
     following depletion of reserves.

  -- Continued state support for debt service is not assured as
     the authority must re-qualify for each state debt service
     subsidy.  The authority has sufficient funds on hand for the
     June 1, 2010 interest payment.

Key Rating Driver:

  -- Receipt of outside assistance to pay debt service or
     restructure bonds prior to final maturity on Dec. 1, 2010.

Security:

The bonds are secured by a first lien on the trust estate
including tipping fees, energy sales.  .

Credit Summary:

The 'C' rating reflects the authority's inability to pay debt
service from its own operations or reserves.  As such, Fitch
expects there to be a payment default on the $25.2 million final
maturity principal and interest payment on Dec. 1, 2010, unless
the State of New Jersey (state) or some other entity provides
assistance to pay debt service or facilitate a bond restructuring.
The authority does have funds on hand for the June 1, 2010
interest payment.  The debt service reserve fund has been depleted
since 1999.  Camden County is not liable for the bonds of the
authority.

Financial operations of the authority have been strained since the
loss of legal flow control coupled with a high expense structure
and competition from disposal options in nearby Pennsylvania.  The
authority has also experienced a reduction in tonnage delivered to
its facilities due to the overall economic downturn.

The authority has in the past requested funds from the state prior
to each semi-annual debt service payment, and while there is no
legal requirement to provide payment or notice of non-payment of
the state subsidy, the state has provided subsidies to the
authority since 1999.  These, combined with authority revenues,
have allowed the authority to continue operations and meet debt
service requirements.  State subsidy payments of $6 million in
each of fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009 were reduced from prior
years.  The authority has budgeted a state subsidy of
$20.4 million in fiscal 2010 to subsidize operations and fully pay
debt service, although the state has not committed to this and it
is uncertain as to the amount the authority will receive.


PPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Ratings on $25 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on PPLUS
Trust Series LTD-1's $25 million class A and B certificates to
'BB' from 'BB-'.

S&P's ratings on the class A and B certificates are dependent
on S&P's rating on the underlying security, Limited Brands'
$350 million 6.95% debentures due March 1, 2033 ('BB').

The rating actions reflect the April 20, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  S&P may
take subsequent rating actions on the class A and B certificates
due to changes in its rating assigned to the underlying security.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on QWS-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed on review
for upgrade these certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust
Series QWS-1:

  -- US $40,000,000 PREFERREDPLUS 7.75% Trust Certificates; B1,
     Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on December 19, 2006
     Upgraded to B1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are $40,000,000 7.75%
Notes due 2031 issued by Qwest Capital Funding, Inc., which were
placed on review for upgrade by Moody's on April 22, 2010.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on QWS-2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed on review
for upgrade these certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust
Series QWS-2:

  -- $38,750,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.00% Trust Certificates; B1,
     Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on December 13, 2006
     Upgraded to B1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the underlying securities which are $40,000,000 7.75%
Notes due 2031 issued by Qwest Capital Funding, Inc., which were
placed on review for upgrade by Moody's on April 22, 2010.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on Positive Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B+' rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series QWS-2's 8.00% trust certificates on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P's rating on PreferredPLUS Trust Series QWS-2's 8.00% trust
certificates is dependent solely on S&P's rating on the underlying
security, Qwest Capital Funding Inc.'s 7.75% notes due Feb. 15,
2031 ('B+/Watch Pos').

The rating action reflects the April 22, 2010, placement of S&P's
rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with positive
implications.


PROTECTIVE FINANCE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-PL Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, revises Rating Outlooks and assigns Loss
Severity ratings to Protective Finance Corporation REMIC 2007-PL
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, as indicated:

  -- $8.9 million class K to 'BB/LS' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.1 million class L to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.5 million class M to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.5 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2.5 million class O to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.8 million class P to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Outlooks and
LS ratings, as indicated:

  -- $98.0 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $152.3 million class A-2 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $113.1 million class A-3 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $132.9 billion class A-4 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $94.6 million class A-1A 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $101.6 million class A-M 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $102.9 million class A-J 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class IO 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.1 million class B 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class C 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.4 million class D 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.6 million class E 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.4 million class F 'A/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class G 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.6 million class H 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.6 million class J 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.5 million class Q 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $13.9 million class S.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of approximately $13 million (1.5% of the remaining
pool balance).

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 12.3% to $891.3 million from $1.02 billion
at issuance.

As of March 2010, there are three specially serviced loans (4%).
The largest specially serviced loan (1.8%) is secured by a 201,388
square foot retail building located in Coachella, CA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to
insufficient cash flow caused by a decline in occupancy.
According to the servicer, the property is currently 52% occupied.

The second and third specially serviced loans (2.2%) are with the
same borrower and are secured by two apartment complexes in
Portland, TX.  The properties experienced a decline in occupancy
during the latter half of 2009.  While many of the units have been
re-leased, cash flow at the property remains insufficient to cover
debt service.  The loans transferred to the special servicer in
February 2010.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Sixteen loans did not payoff at maturity with six
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


RADIAN ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 25
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates insured by Radian
Asset Assurance Inc. and Radian Insurance Inc. from 24 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions with
underlying collateral from various asset categories.  At the same
time, S&P removed 24 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The rating actions follow the Dec. 22, 2009, lowering of S&P's
insurer financial strength ratings on Radian.  S&P lowered its
rating on Radian Asset Assurance Inc. to 'BB-' from 'BB' and
removed it from CreditWatch negative, where S&P had placed it on
Dec. 5, 2008.  S&P lowered its rating on Radian Insurance Inc. to
'B+' from 'BB-' and removed it from CreditWatch negative, where
S&P had placed it on Dec. 5, 2008.

S&P's current ratings on the insured classes reflect the higher of
its rating on (i) the respective bond insurer and (ii) Standard &
Poor's underlying rating on the securities.  Standard & Poor's
will continue to monitor its ratings on all U.S. RMBS classes that
Radian insures and take rating actions as S&P deems appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                 ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
                         Series    2003-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M          000759DG2     BB-                  BB

                     ABSC NIMs Trust 2007-HE1
                        Series    2007-HE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          00082VAA0     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-21N
                        Series    2006-21N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      12667QAB7     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-22N
                        Series    2006-22N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      12667WAB4     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-23N
                       Series    2006-23N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      12667RAB5     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

              Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2006-26N
                       Series    2006-26N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      12667UAB8     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2007-1N
                        Series    2007-1N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      222393AB6     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2007-2N
                         Series    2007-2N

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Note       222395AA3     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                     Fremont NIM Trust 2006-B
                         Series    2006-B

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      357524AA5     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                  IndyMac NIM Trust INABS 2006-D
                        Series    2006-D

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      45661UAA6     BB-                  BB/Watch Neg

                  IndyMac NIM Trust INABS 2007-A
                         Series    2007-A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Notes      45669CAA8     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

           Long Beach Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-WL2
                        Series    2006-WL2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N-2        54240KAB8     B+                   BB-/Watch Neg

               MASTR Alternative Loan NIM 2007-HF1
                        Series    2007-HF1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          55291LAA3     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                           MASTR CI-13
                       Series    2006-FRE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N2         57644RAB8     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

             Option One Woodbridge Loan Trust 2003-2
                         Series    2003-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M          68401NAC5     BB-                  BB/Watch Neg

             Option One Woodbridge Loan Trust 2004-1
                         Series    2004-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M          68401NAE1     BB-                  BB/Watch Neg

                     Park Place NIM 2005-WHQN2
                       Series    2005-WHQN2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    B          70070AAB1     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                     SASCO NIMS Trust 2007-WF1
                        Series    2007-WF1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          80385XAA2     B+                   BB-/Watch Neg

                WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-10
                        Series    2006-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    N-2 Notes  929306AB4     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2006-11
                         Series    2006-11

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N-2 Notes  92933KAB0     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2007-WM1
                        Series    2007-WM1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N-2 Notes  92933UAB8     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

               WM Asset Holdings Corp. CI 2007-WM2
                        Series    2007-WM2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N-1 Notes  92933VAA8     B+                   BB/Watch Neg
    N-3 Notes  92933VAC4     B+                   BB/Watch Neg

                WM Asset Holdings Trust 2007-WM3B
                       Series    2007-WM3B

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N-1 Notes  92933XAA4     B+                   BB-/Watch Neg

                WM Asset Holdings Trust 2007-WM4
                        Series    2007-WM4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N1         92934LAA9     B+                   BB/Watch Neg


SADDLE MOUNTAIN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on $13.1 Million Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Saddle Mountain Unified
School District No. 90, Arizona as part of its continuous
surveillance efforts:

  -- approximately $13.1 million school improvement bonds, series
     2003A upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook remains Positive.

Fitch will recalibrate the underlying ratings on the above
reference bonds on April 30, 2010.  At that time, the ratings will
be revised:

  -- The rating on the series 2003A school improvement bonds will
     be revised to 'BBB+' with a Positive Outlook.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The upgrade reflects the district's projected near term exit
     from state receivership and two consecutive years of positive
     financial results.

  -- Improvement in the district's finances has been facilitated
     by management's implementation of a multi-year financial
     recovery model and more conservative fiscal practices.

  -- Unlike many other Arizona districts, voters recently approved
     extension of an operating override that provides an
     additional property tax revenue source and a bond
     authorization.

  -- Taxpayer concentration, comprised mainly of a nuclear power
     plant, is very high, somewhat offset by the plant's role as a
     major power provider for the southwestern U.S.

  -- Despite recent taxable value declines that primarily reflect
     the area's weakened housing market, the district's tax base
     remains relatively stable.

  -- Debt levels are modest; the district maintains a very rapid
     pace of debt amortization.

What Would Trigger An Upgrade?

  -- Management's evidenced ability to sustain healthy fund
     balance levels over the near term, especially in light of
     possible further state spending cuts and likely lower levels
     of enrollment growth.

Security:

The bonds are secured by an unlimited ad valorem tax levied
against all taxable property within the district.

Credit Summary:

The district was placed under state receivership in June 2007 due
to substantially weak financial operations resulting in a trend of
negative general fund balances and budgetary overspending dating
back to fiscal 2005.  However, in light of the district's progress
since 2007, management has been notified that the removal of state
receivership is currently underway; the district expects to exit
state receivership within the next few months.

Generating a solid operating surplus in fiscal 2009, the district
reversed its multi-year, negative general fund balance position,
maintaining approximately $2.3 million at year's end or roughly
26% of spending in reserves on an audited basis.  This was in
contrast to the district's fiscal 2008 negative general fund
balance of $430,000.  In addition, the fiscal 2009 debt service
fund balance was again positive for the second year and remained
adequate at $67,000, up from a low of a negative $291,000 fund
balance position in fiscal 2006.  The ongoing improvement in the
district's financial position has been assisted by management's
implementation of the multi-year financial recovery model and more
conservative fiscal practices that significantly reduced
expenditures while increasing operational efficiencies.  These
results occurred despite an approximately $200,000 annual
operating budgetary reduction required by the state for prior
overspending.  Further modest reductions of the district's
operating and capital budgets will be required annually over time
until repayment of the $3.5 million in prior years' operating
over-expenditures and $178,000 in capital over-expenditures has
been made.

On a budget basis, the district carried forward the maximum 4% of
its revenue control limit as allowed by the state or approximately
$420,000 to begin fiscal 2010.  Management currently expects to
close the year with about $4 million as a general fund balance on
a cash basis and a lower although still adequate level of carry
forward of 2% into fiscal 2011.  Positive general fund balance
levels are projected for fiscal 2011 and 2012, although Fitch
anticipates the district will experience some financial pressure
over the near term if there are additional, significant enrollment
declines and/or further state funding cuts.  Nonetheless, the
district will maintain some financial flexibility with the recent
renewal of its 10% operating tax rate override approved by voters
in November 2009.

The district receives no state aid because of its property rich
tax base.  Nearly 80% of the district's assessed valuation (AV) is
concentrated in the owners of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station.  Although still a credit concern, the district's
concentration risk is somewhat offset by the utility's role as a
major power provider for the southwestern region of the U.S.
Anchored by the power plant, the district's tax base remains
relatively stable, despite recent AV declines that primarily
reflect the area's weakened housing market.  The district expects
an AV decline of 11% in fiscal 2011.

The district has $15.1 million in outstanding general obligation
debt, which is equal to low 0.3% of market value due to its
wealthy tax base.  Debt levels are higher on a per capita basis.
In addition to the operating override, voters also approved a $12
million bond authorization in November 2009, primarily for
renovations to an existing elementary school facility.  The
district recently issued $2 million of the authorization (not
rated by Fitch) and management anticipates that the bulk of the
remaining authorization may be issued as soon as the summer of
2010.  Very rapid amortization remains a credit positive with 100%
of the district's tax-supported debt retired in less than 10
years.  The district will seek a renewal of its existing capital
override with voters in November 2010, which would provide
continued, although lowered, levels of funding for capital
spending due to recent state legislative changes that impact all
Arizona school districts.

Saddle Mountain US$ No. 90 encompasses 550 square miles in the
west-central portion of Maricopa County and has approximately
8,500 residents.  The district consists of most of the undeveloped
land in the western valley of the Phoenix-Mesa Metropolitan
Statistical Area, the unincorporated areas Tonopah and Wintersburg
and a portion of the Town of Buckeye.


SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class N Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
N commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Salomon Bros.
Mortgage Securities VII Inc.'s series 2000-C1 to 'D' from 'CCC+'
and removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrade follows principal losses sustained by the class as
reported on the April 19, 2010, remittance report.  The class N
certificates reported a loss of 17.0% of its opening certificate
balance ($7.1 million).  The class P certificate, which Standard &
Poor's does not rate, lost 100% of its $3,797,071 opening balance.

The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of three assets
that were with the special servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage
LLC.  The related loans shared a common borrower, but were not
cross-collateralized or cross-defaulted.  Details of the three
liquidated assets are:

The Holiday Inn University had a total exposure of $5.1 million.
The asset consisted of a 143-unit full-service hotel in Vestal,
N.Y.  The asset was transferred to Berkadia on March 3, 2009, due
to imminent monetary default and pending maturity default.  The
trust incurred a $2.9 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on April 2, 2010, which was reflected in the most
recent remittance report.

The Holiday Inn Arena had a total exposure of $6.0 million.  The
asset consisted of a 241-unit full-service hotel in Binghamton,
N.Y.  The asset was transferred to Berkadia on March 3, 2009, due
to imminent monetary default and pending maturity default.  The
trust incurred a $1.1 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on April 2, 2010, which was reflected in the most
recent remittance report.

The Holiday Inn Kennedy Space Center had a total exposure of
$3.0 million.  The asset consisted of a 118-unit full-service
hotel in Titusville, Fla.  The asset was transferred to Berkadia
on March 3, 2009, due to imminent monetary default and pending
maturity default.  The trust incurred a $1.0 million realized loss
when the asset was liquidated on April 2, 2010, which was
reflected in the most recent remittance report.

As of the April 19, 2010, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 34 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$99.3 million, down from 266 assets totaling $713.3 million at
issuance.  Sixteen assets, totaling $46.1 million (46.4%), are
with the special servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced
losses on five loans totaling $17.0 million.  Based on the April
2010 remittance report, the average loss was approximately 50.3%.

Standard & Poor's rates 11 additional classes from this
transaction.  S&P's ratings on seven of the 11 classes are
currently on CreditWatch with negative implications.

                          Rating Lowered

            Salomon Bros. Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1

                           Rating
                           ------
                 Class   To       From
                 -----   --       ----
                 N       D        CCC+/Watch Neg


SANDSTONE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Sandstone CDO Ltd.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$9,400,000 Class C Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$18,700,000 Class D Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2039 (current balance of
     $15,730,239), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3.

Sandstone CDO Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed primarily by a portfolio of subprime residential mortgage-
backed securities originated in 2003 and 2004.  RMBS comprise
approximately 79% of the underlying portfolio, of which the
majority are currently on review for possible downgrade by
Moody's.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  The dollar amount
of defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, has increased
from $9.9 million in February 2009 to $22.1 million in March 2010.
During the same time, the Class C Overcollateralization ratio
decreased from 214.85% to 168.38% and the Class D
Overcollateralization ratio decreased from 126.58% to 76.05%.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.


SANKATY HIGH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded its
ratings of these notes of Sankaty High Yield Partners III, L.P.:

  -- US$29,500,000 Class B Third Senior Secured Fixed Rate Note
     Due 2011, Upgraded to B1; previously on October 24, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca; and

  -- US$11,000,000 Class B Third Senior Secured Floating Rate Note
     Due 2011, Upgraded to B1; previously on October 24, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the above notes
are mainly a result of the Class B noteholders becoming the
controlling class of the transaction and the significant
overcollateralization for the Class B Note.  Following a
redemption in full of the Class A-2 notes and Second Senior Loans,
the Class B noteholders have gained control over the timing of the
sale of the collateral and consequently have the option to delay
the wind down process.  Meanwhile, as of the last trustee report,
dated March 25, 2010, the Class B over-collateralization level was
at 173%; the outstanding principal amount of the Class B notes was
$41,016,587 and the Class B Advance Amount plus Net Accruals was
$70,886,217.

Moody's also notes that the transaction's legal final maturity is
April 30, 2011, and the transactions needs to have sufficient
funds to redeem in full the Class B notes by that date.  The
failure to make such payment constitutes a Final Maturity Payment
Default under the indenture.  If it happens, Moody's will assess
these ratings according to its methodology report, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default."

Sankaty High Yield Partners III, L.P., is a market value
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by bank loans,
high yield bonds and mezzanine investments.  The Sakaty notes and
loans have been accelerated following the occurrence of an event
of default caused by the failure of the transaction to comply with
certain over-collateralization tests in 2008.


SATURNS TRUST: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Series 2003-8 Units
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'CCC+' ratings on
SATURNS Trust No. 2003-8's $25 million class A and B units on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P's ratings on the class A and B units are dependent on its
rating on the underlying security, Hertz Corp.'s 7.625% debentures
due June 1, 2012 ('CCC+/Watch Pos').

The rating actions reflect the April 26, 2010, placement of S&P's
'CCC+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the class A and B units due to changes in S&P's rating assigned to
the underlying security.


SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio of referenced obligations as evidenced
by a deterioration in the weighted average rating factor since
last review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Seawall 2006-1, Ltd., is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities reference
obligations (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized in 2004.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5 compared to 1 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa1 (96.7% compared to 100% at last review), and A1-A3
(3.3% compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 3.9 years
compared to 5 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 75%, compared to 77% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 62.5% compared to 76.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Class C-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Class C-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated January 30, 2009.


SOLAR INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Solar Investment Grade
CBO I, Ltd.

Solar I is a collateralized bond obligation that closed in August
2000 and matures in September 2012.  Solar I's $90 million
performing portfolio is currently composed of 24 securities and is
managed by Sun Capital Advisers, Inc. Additionally, 90.9% of the
portfolio is corporate bonds and 9.1% is structured finance
securities, including 8.9% real estate investment trusts from the
pre-2002 vintage.  Fitch considers 67.5% of the portfolio to have
credit quality in the 'A' or 'BBB' rating categories while 4.6% of
the portfolio is considered in the distressed rating categories of
'CCC' or lower.

The class I-A and I-B notes maintain their rating as they continue
to benefit from a failing senior coverage test along with
significant principal paydowns.  On the previous two semi-annual
payment dates they received a total of $72.8 million in principal.

Classes I-A and I-B were also assigned Loss Severity ratings
indicating each tranche's potential loss severity given default,
as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for
the collateral under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be
considered in conjunction with probability of default indicated by
a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks
or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

The class II-A and II-B notes received full interest payments as
of the March 2010 payment date, although some principal proceeds
were used to pay the class II interest as a result of limited
interest proceeds available for distribution.  Fitch expects the
class II notes to continue to receive future interest payments,
but future principal payments may be adversely affected by the
performance of 'CCC' and lower rated collateral.

The transaction's ability to repay the class III-A and III-B notes
(together, class III) is highly dependant upon the recoveries on
defaulted collateral.  It is unlikely that the class III notes
will receive any future principal proceeds as the principal
waterfall diverts principal proceeds first to the class I notes,
then to the class II notes until paid in full.  The mezzanine par
value test is currently failing at 79.1% compared to the 103.2%
trigger as of the March 2010 trustee report.

Classes II and III were assigned Recovery Ratings which provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted securities.  Recovery Ratings are calculated using
Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's current 'B' stress
expectation for default and recovery rates.  All modeled
distributions are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value
and compared to the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery
Rating.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $37,177,116 class I-A at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2,799,482 class I-B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25,000,000 class II-A at 'CCC/RR2';
  -- $22,000,000 class II-B at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $29,345,621 class III-A at 'C/RR6';
  -- $10,989,329 class III-B at 'C/RR6'.


SOLAR INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four and downgraded two classes of
Solar Investment Grade CBO II, Ltd.

Solar II is a collateralized bond obligation that closed in July
2001 and matures in July 2013.  Solar II's $223.2 million
performing portfolio is currently composed of 63 securities and is
managed by Sun Capital Advisers, Inc. In addition, 88.1% of the
portfolio is corporate bonds and 11.9% is structured finance
securities, including 8.4% real estate investment trusts.  Fitch
considers 66.0% of the portfolio to have credit quality in the
investment-grade rating categories while 9.3% of the portfolio is
considered to be in the distressed rating categories of 'CCC' or
lower.

The class I notes maintain their rating as they continue to
benefit from a failing senior coverage test along with significant
principal paydowns.  On the previous two semi-annual payment dates
they received a total of $65.8 million in principal.

Class I was also assigned a Loss Severity rating indicating the
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class's
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

The class II-A and II-B notes (together, class II) received full
interest payments as of the March 2010 payment date, although
principal proceeds were used to pay the entire amount due to class
II as a result of limited interest proceeds available for
distribution.  Fitch expects the class II notes to continue to
receive future interest payments, but future principal payments
may be adversely affected by the performance of 'CCC' and lower
rated collateral.

The transaction's ability to repay the class III-A and III-B notes
(together, class III) is highly dependent upon the recoveries on
defaulted and distressed collateral.  It is unlikely that the
class III notes will receive any future principal proceeds as the
principal waterfall diverts principal proceeds first to the class
I notes, then to the class II notes until paid in full.  The class
III par value test is currently failing at 100.2% compared to the
100.8% trigger as of the March 2010 trustee report.
Classes II and III were assigned Recovery Ratings which provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted securities.  Recovery Ratings are calculated using
Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's current 'B' stress
expectation for default and recovery rates.  All modeled
distributions are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value
and compared to the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery
Rating.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $176,317,833 class I at 'AA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19,000,000 class II-A at 'CCC/RR3';
  -- $13,000,000 class II-B at 'CCC/RR2';
  -- $14,189,691 preferred shares at 'C/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded and assigned RR ratings to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $7,114,511 class III-A to 'C/RR6' from 'CC';
  -- $20,787,900 class III-B to 'C/RR6' from 'CC'.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Puts 'CCC+' Rating on Two 2003-15 Units
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'CCC+' ratings on
Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings (SATURNS) The Hertz Corp.
Debenture-Backed Series 2003-15's $25 million class A and B units
on CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P's ratings on the class A and B units are dependent on S&P's
rating on the underlying security, Hertz Corp.'s 7.625% debentures
due June 1, 2012 ('CCC+/Watch Pos').

The rating actions reflect the April 26, 2010, placement of S&P's
'CCC+' rating on the underlying security on CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S&P may take subsequent rating actions on
the class A and B units due to changes in S&P's rating assigned to
the underlying security.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Raises Rating on Series 2005-3 Units to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Structured
Asset Trust Unit Repackagings (SATURNS) Limited Brands Inc.
Debenture Backed Series 2005-3's $25 million callable units to
'BB' from 'BB-'.

S&P's rating on the callable units is dependent on the rating on
the underlying security, Limited Brands' 6.95% debentures due
March 1, 2033 ('BB').

The rating action reflects the April 20, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  S&P may
take subsequent rating actions on the callable units due to
changes in its rating assigned to the underlying security.


TEXAS PUBLIC: S&P Raises Rating on 2004 Revenue Bonds to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised the rating on the Texas
Public Finance Authority Charter School Finance Corp.'s revenue
bonds, series 2004, issued for School of Excellence In Education,
to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

"The upgrade reflects S&P's view of the school's stable demand and
sufficient financial performance," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst James Breeding.

The rating reflects the general credit risk associated with all
charter schools that are subject to charter renewal, as well as
S&P's assessment of the school's:

* Potentially aggressive expansion plans with a goal to increase
  enrollment to about 5,000, though the timing for such an
  increase remains uncertain;

* Recent turnover at the senior management level; and

* Small wait list.

In S&P's view, offsetting these credit concerns, in part, are the
school's:

* Stable operating history, resulting in one successful renewal of
  the school's charter through 2013;

* Adequate facilities with capacity of up to 2,700 students with
  current enrollment about 2,200;

* Minimal competition in the school's service area, though new
  schools have opened recently;

* Adequate debt service coverage, though liquidity is relatively
  low; and

* Very low debt burden of about 3% of operations, due to slow debt
  service amortization with final maturity in 2034.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the school will
maintain its financial stability while enrollment and demand for
services remain high.  A higher rating is precluded due to
uncertainty regarding the school's potentially aggressive
expansion plans and a relatively low cash reserve level.


TIMES SQUARE: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'BB' Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Times
Square Hotel Trust's mortgage and lease amortizing certificates to
positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB'
rating on the certificates.

The action follows the April 22, 2010, outlook revision of the
corporate credit rating on Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide
Inc. (BB/Positive/--).

The rating on the Times Square Hotel Trust transaction is based on
the payments and obligations made by Starwood pursuant to a
triple-net-lease for the W New York - Times Square Hotel on
Broadway at 47th Street in Manhattan.


TUCKAHOE CREDIT: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on 2001-CTL1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB' rating on the
credit lease-backed pass-through certificates from Tuckahoe Credit
Lease Trust 2001-CTL1 on CreditWatch with positive implications.
The rating previously had a negative outlook.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the April 22, 2010, CreditWatch
placement of Qwest Communications International Inc.  The rating
on Tuckahoe Credit Lease Trust 2001-CTL1 is dependent on the
rating assigned to Qwest (BB/Watch Positive/B-1).

Tuckahoe Credit Lease Trust 2001-CTL1 credit lease-backed
certificates are collateralized by a first mortgage and assignment
of lease encumbering a condominium interest in a two-story
industrial building in Yonkers, N.Y.  The entire property is
leased to Qwest Communications Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of
Qwest, on a triple-net basis, with QCC responsible for all
operating and maintenance costs.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2003-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms, assigns Loss Severity ratings and revises
Rating Outlooks for Washington Mutual Asset Securities Corporation
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C1, as
indicated:

  -- $45.2 million class A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.4 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.7 million class G at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class H at 'AA+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.7 million class J at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.3 million class K at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.4 million class L at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class M at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class N at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $1.4 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $5.7 million class P certificates.

Affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance and minimal
future expected losses following Fitch's prospective review of
potential stresses to the transaction.  Fitch expects potential
losses of 2.4% of the remaining pooled balance, approximately
$2.7 million, from the loans in special servicing and the loans
that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 18% to $1.13 billion from $1.38 billion at
issuance.  The loans have a weighted average seasoning of
approximately nine years.  There are three specially serviced
loans (7%).

The largest specially serviced loan (3.3%) is secured by an
industrial property located in Richmond, CA.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in November 2009 and remains
vacant.

The second largest specially serviced loan (2.4%) transferred to
special servicing in late March 2010 after the borrower requested
payment relief.  The loan is secured by a multifamily property
located in Houston, TX.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with both loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


WAVELAND INGOTS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed two classes of
notes issued by WAVELAND - INGOTS, LTD., and assigned Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings as indicated.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria'.  Cash flow and
portfolio default modeling were conducted in accordance with
Fitch's 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs -
Amended', 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs', 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs' and 'Criteria for
Interest Rate Stresses in Structured Finance Transactions'.  LS
ratings were assigned in compliance with Fitch's 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  Recovery Ratings were
assigned in compliance with Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Recovery Ratings'.

The affirmation of the class A-1 and A-2 notes are the result of
greater credit enhancement available to the notes as a result of
ongoing redemptions.  Since the last rating review, the class A
notes have amortized by $87.9 million.  The increase in credit
enhancement to the class A notes is due to portfolio amortization
and the application of excess spread triggered by the subordinated
principal replenishment amount.  The SPRA is a structural feature
designed to maintain a minimum amount of asset coverage to the
class A, B and C notes.  If the SPRA is not satisfied after the
reinvestment period, excess spread that would otherwise be
available to the class C notes is diverted to repay the notes in
order of priority.  Since Fitch's last review, approximately
$4 million of excess spread was diverted to the class A notes to
satisfy the SPRA.  Excess interest proceeds are expected to
continue to be diverted to redeem the class A notes until the SPRA
is satisfied.  The ratings of the class A notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive full and timely payments of
interest per the transaction's governing documents, as well as the
stated balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.

The class B-1 and B-2 (class B) and class C-1 and C-2 notes are
downgraded due to negative portfolio migration and realized losses
experienced since the last review.  Although the credit
enhancement of the class B notes has improved with the
amortization of the class A notes, this was offset by a portfolio
with a weaker credit profile.  Based on Fitch's analysis
approximately 28.2% of the portfolio is now considered to be rated
'CCC+' or lower, compared to 9.7% at the last review.  Exposure to
defaults also rose to 4% from 2% at last review.  In the periods
between the last review and the March 2010 trustee report,
defaults increased to approximately 9.5% of the total portfolio
balance.  Some of these defaults were sold below par or replaced
with new term loans, which translated into a realized loss of
approximately $4.2 million.  Additionally, 4.4% and 27.6% of the
portfolio is on Rating Watch Negative or has a Negative Outlook,
respectively, by at least one rating agency, indicating the
potential for further negative rating migration in the future.
The ratings of the class B notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive ultimate and compensating interest payments
per the transaction's governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.

On a pro-rata basis, the class C notes are due to receive Basic
Interest, Mezzanine Interest, Additional Interest and Contingent
Interest from the interest waterfall.  All but Basic Interest is
used to satisfy the rated principal balance.  Mezzanine Interest,
Additional Interest and Contingent Interest payments have not been
made since the September 2008 payment date and are not expected to
be made until the SPRA is satisfied.  Fitch does not expect the
SPRA to be satisfied in the near term.  Since closing, the class
C-1 and C-2 notes have received approximately $6.6 million and
$486,000, respectively, of interest distributions in excess of the
Basic Interest amount, reducing the rated principal balances to
$34.1 million and $2.5 million.  The class C notes are currently
under-collateralized and default is probable at their stated
maturity date.  The ratings of the class C notes address the
ultimate payment of Basic Interest while the rated principal
balance is outstanding and the ultimate repayment of principal by
the stated maturity date.

In its review, Fitch conducted cash flow modeling to measure the
breakeven default rates relative to the cumulative default rates
associated with the current ratings of the note liabilities.  The
cash flow model incorporates the transaction's structural
features.  In addition, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity
to reduced U.S. corporate recoveries.  To accomplish this, in one
scenario Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for
each asset type by 30%, where explicit Recovery Ratings were not
available.  The class A notes displayed relatively limited
sensitivity to lower recovery rate assumptions, so Fitch maintains
a Stable Rating Outlook on these notes.  The class B notes
displayed a higher degree of sensitivity to lower recovery rates.
This sensitivity, in addition to the sizeable portion of portfolio
credits with Negative Outlooks, prompted Fitch to maintain a
Negative Outlook on the class B notes.  Fitch does not assign
Rating Outlooks to classes with long-term credit ratings of 'CCC'
or below.

The class A and B notes were assigned LS ratings.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating.

The class C notes were assigned Recovery Ratings in this rating
review based on the total discounted future cash flows of
approximately $8.4 million and $621,000, respectively, projected
to be available to these bonds in a base-case default scenario.
These discounted cash flows yield ultimate recovery projections of
50% and 45%, respectively, which is representative of an 'RR4' on
Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.  Recovery Ratings are designed to
provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently
distressed or defaulted structured finance securities rated 'CCC'
or below.  For further detail on Recovery Ratings, please see
Fitch's reports 'Global Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs'
and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

Waveland is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation, which
closed on June 24, 2003 and is managed by Pacific Investment
Management Company LLC.  The five-year reinvestment period ended
in June 2008.  The portfolio is comprised of 96.8% senior secured
loans and 3.2% senior unsecured collateral.  The stated maturity
of the transaction is in June 2015.

Fitch has affirmed, downgraded and assigned LS and RR ratings to
these notes as indicated:

  -- $22,858,992 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $57,647,521 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $14,500,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'BBB/LS3' from 'A';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $10,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'BBB/LS3' from 'A';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $34,148,681class C-1 notes downgraded to 'C/RR4' from CCC';

  -- $2,514,201class C-2 notes downgraded to 'C/RR4' from CCC'.


WELLS FARGO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche from one RMBS
transaction, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Wells Fargo
Mortgage-Backed Securities 2007-17.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed, prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

List of actions:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-17 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 186 Bonds From 136 RMBS Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 186 bonds in 136 residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds being
downgraded to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated
'CCC', 'CC' or 'C' indicating that a default was expected.  The
action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.

Of the 136 transactions impacted by these downgrades 68 are Alt-A
and 65 are Prime.  The remaining three transactions are other
product types.  Ninety-seven percent were previously rated 'C'.

Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the ongoing surveillance
process and will continue to monitor these transactions for
additional defaults.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Ratings to the transactions.  The Recovery Rating scale is based
upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Ratings are designed
to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis while taking
into account the time value of money.  The methodology used to
assign Recovery Ratings is described in Fitch's Dec. 16, 2009
report 'U.S. RMBS Criteria for Recovery Ratings'.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Diversified SF CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions as detailed at the
end of this press release for classes of notes issued by several
diversified structured finance collateralized debt obligations
that closed in 2005 with exposure to structured finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Due
to the extent of collateral deterioration within the portfolios,
Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all the classes
in the 13 transactions can be assessed without using the
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model or performing cash flow
model analysis under the framework described in the 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Of the 13 transactions, two have entered an Event of Default: one
due to failing collateralization coverage requirements and one due
to default in the payment of accrued interest to non-deferrable
classes.  One of those transactions have accelerated their
maturities.

Due to the writedowns in the underlying collateral portfolios, the
total collateral balances in the portfolios of C-BASS CBO XIV,
Ltd./Corp. and TORO ABS CDO I, LTD./LLC are already lower than the
outstanding balances of their respective senior tranches,
indicating that default is inevitable for the entire capital
structure.  The highest rating on the classes in these
transactions is 'C'.

The remaining 11 transactions maintain positive credit enhancement
levels for at least their senior rated tranches, when the CE
levels are computed based off the sum of the total collateral
balance and cash in the principal collection accounts.  However,
losses expected from the distressed assets in these portfolios are
likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement levels even
for the most senior classes of notes in these transactions.

In two transactions, non deferrable classes of notes which have
missed their full interest payment were downgraded to 'D'.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

ABSpoke 2005-1, Ltd.

  -- $25,000,000 ABSpoke 2005-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
May 19, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$65.4 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $9.6 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of residential mortgage-backed
securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed
securities, and CDOs, primarily from 2003 and 2004 vintage
transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-IVA, Ltd.

  -- $95,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-IVA is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
April 21, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$71.5 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $113.5 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, CMBS, and CDOs, primarily from
2003 and 2004 vintage transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-VA, Ltd.

  -- $20,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-VA is a static synthetic CDO CDO that closed on
May 5, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$20.4 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $33.1 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the April 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and CMBS primarily from 2003
and 2004 vintage transactions.

ABSpoke 2005-XA, Ltd.

  -- $30,000,000 variable floating-rate notes to 'C' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-XA, Ltd., is a static synthetic CDO that closed on
Oct. 27, 2005.  To date, write-down credit events total
$67.1 million, eroding the first loss tranche to $7.9 million.
Fitch projects additional losses to exceed the remaining balance
of the first loss tranche.  As of the March 17, 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS primarily from 2004 and
2005 vintage transactions.

Blue Heron Funding VI, Ltd.

  -- $868,213,454 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $25,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- EUR89,936,000 (US$ equivalent $105,000,000) class B notes
     affirmed at 'C';

  -- EUR89,936,000 (US$ equivalent $105,000,000) class B
     additional interest notes affirmed at 'C' (interest only);

  -- $6,250,000 certificates affirmed at 'AAA' (principal only).

Blue Heron VI CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on Dec. 21,
2005, and is managed by Brightwater Capital Management.  The
rating assigned to the certificates is based on the rating of the
certificate protection asset, which is comprised of U.S.
government-backed Resolution Funding Corp. zero-coupon bonds.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2003 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.

  -- $229,256 class A-1V notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $325,314,157 class A-1NVA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $444,756,494 class A-1NVB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $81,650,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $41,304,634 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $25,191,681 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Broderick CDO 1 Ltd. is a static cash flow CDO that closed in
December 2005 with a portfolio selected by SCM Advisors LLC.  As
of the March 25, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised
of primarily RMBS and CDOs from 2004 to 2006 vintage transactions.

C-BASS CBO XIV, Ltd./Corp

  -- $278,179,706 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $29,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $30,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $17,060,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

C-Bass CBO XIV, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on Sept. 22, 2005,
and is managed by C-BASS Investment Management LLC.  As of the
March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of CMBS,
RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2003 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Duke Funding High Grade III, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $413,143,898 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $1,217,074,415 class A-1B1 notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $1,217,074,415 class A-1B2 (IO) notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $102,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $8,000,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';

  -- $8,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';

  -- $46,846,186 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $47,035,233 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $13,505,052 class D notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $19,151,849 subordinated notes affirmed at 'C'.

Duke Funding High Grade III, Ltd./Inc., is a cash flow CDO that
closed on Aug. 3, 2005, and is managed by Duke Funding Management,
LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ellington Management Group, LLC.
Duke III declared an Event of Default Dec. 12, 2008, due to the
class A notes being undercollateralized.  The required majority of
the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity of the
transaction on Jan. 28, 2009.  As of the March 30, 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of primarily RMBS from 2004 to
2007 vintage transactions.

Duke Funding IX, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $143,750,000 class A1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC';
  -- $8,000,000 class A2F notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $292,000,000 class A2V notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $11,342,850 class A3F notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $176,140,960 class A3V notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $86,539,363 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.

Duke Funding IX, Ltd./Corp., is a hybrid SF CDO that closed on
Nov. 9, 2005, and is managed by Duke Funding Management, LLC, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Ellington Management Group, LLC.  Duke
IX declared an Event of Default on Aug. 13, 2009, due to default
in the payment of accrued interest on the class A2 notes.  To
date, the majority of the controlling class of noteholders has not
voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction.  As of the
March 9, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
primarily RMBS from 2004 to 2007 vintage transactions.

Fort Sheridan ABS CDO, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $679,128,755 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $34,589,996 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $44,966,995 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,182,633 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $1,970,858 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $4,644,350 class C-3 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fort Sheridan ABS CDO, Ltd./Inc., is a cash CDO that closed on
Mar. 30, 2005 and is managed by Vanderbilt Capital Advisors LLC.
As of the February 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised
of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2007
vintage transactions.

Jupiter High Grade CDO III, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $1,121,746,956 class A-1 NV notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $215,762 class A-1VA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $345,219,298 class A-1VB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $74,339,803 class A-2A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $65,050,000 class A-2B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $83,632,278 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $43,605,507 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Jupiter High Grade CDO III, Ltd./Inc., is a cash CDO that closed
on Aug. 10, 2005, and is managed by Maxim Advisory LLC.  As of the
March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS,
ABS, and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2006 vintage
transactions.

Orient Point CDO, Ltd/Inc.

  -- $625,474,503 class A-1NVA notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $628,131,985 class A-1NVB notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $241,589 class A-1V notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $99,250,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $47,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,953,821 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,650,284 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $16,138,685 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

Orient Point CDO, Ltd/Inc., is a cash CDO that closed on Oct. 25,
2005, and is managed by Fortis Investment Management USA, Inc.  As
of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
RMBS and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2006 vintage
transactions.

TORO ABS CDO I, LTD./LLC

  -- $804,747,407 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $73,433,128 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,881,893 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Toro ABS CDO I, Ltd./LLC., is a cash CDO that closed on June 30,
2005.  The initial portfolio was selected by Merrill Lynch
Investment Managers and is currently managed by BlackRock Inc.  As
of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
RMBS and CDOs, primarily from 2004 through 2006 vintage
transactions.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Tranches From Four REIT Trusts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 14 tranches across four REIT Trust
Preferred CDOs.  REIT TRUP CDOs are backed by pools of assets that
consist of trust preferred securities or subordinated debt issued
by real estate investment trusts, real estate operating companies,
homebuilders, commercial mortgage backed securities, and real
estate related loans which are still underperforming.

Moody's indicated that these rating actions are driven by an
increase in the amount of defaulted and deferring securities in
the collateral, further deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying pool, significant payment to the hedge counterparty,
interest shortfalls that have resulted in failure to pay interest
on the senior notes and the triggering of an Event of Default in
three of these transactions and, in one case, the high likelihood
of declaration of an Event of Default (EOD) in the near future.
In addition, Moody's notices an increase in the magnitude or
likelihood of interest payment default on the most senior tranches
of these transactions.  In determining the ratings, Moody's gave
consideration to the rating methodology for structured finance
securities in default published in November 2009.

In addition, the transactions are negatively affected by a large
pay-fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap since payments to
the hedge counterparty are absorbing much of the interest proceeds
in the deal.  These significant payments have dramatically
decreased or exhausted interest proceeds available to pay interest
on the senior notes, and are expected to result in actual payment
defaults for transactions that are currently not in default.

The magnitude of the impact of these substantial payments to the
hedge counterparty is demonstrated in the interest coverage tests
of these transactions.  The senior interest coverage ratio for
Taberna III is 57%, for Taberna IV the ratio is 63%, for Taberna
Preferred Funding VI the ratio is 23%, for Taberna VII the ratio
is -70%, as reported by the Trustee.  These values indicate a
severe interest undercollateralization for all these transactions.
Moody's anticipates that the burden of making payments to the
hedge counterparty over the remaining life of the hedge schedule
will significantly reduce the amount of cash available to pay
senior notes and put the ultimate payments of principal on these
notes at significant risk.

In addition, Moody's notes that most of the transactions mentioned
above have declared an Event of Default due to failure to pay
interest to non-pikable tranches, with the exception of Taberna
Preferred Funding VII, Ltd. With its current interest coverage,
Moody's believe this transaction has a high likelihood of
declaring an Event of Default in the near future.

Most of the notes in the affected transactions were placed on
watch for possible downgrade in March 2010 as a result of the
continued weak economic conditions in the real estate sector,
increased expectations of asset defaults and interest deferrals,
and reduced recovery prospects for mortgage REITs.  Since then,
the credit fundamentals for the REITs sector continue to be
challenging and Moody's expects that it will remain so at least
for the remainder of the year.

The rating actions are:

Taberna Preferred Funding III, Ltd.

  * Current Assumed WARF [1]: 4054

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount [2]: $290,531,000

  -- US$188,500,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
     $369,273,590), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 11,
     2010 Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$210,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $0),
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 11, 2010 Downgraded
     to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1C First Priority Senior Secured
     Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
     $9,266,589), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 11, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$38,500,000 Class A-2A Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2036, Downgraded to Caa3; previously
     on Mar 11, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

Taberna Preferred Funding Iv, Ltd.

  * Current Assumed WARF [1]: 3986

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount [2]: $291,150,000

  -- US$313,350,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
     $292,363,212), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 11,
     2010 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$81,450,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2036, Downgraded to C; previously on April 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2036, Downgraded to C; previously on April 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca.

Taberna Preferred Funding VI, Ltd.

  * Current Assumed WARF [1]: 4310

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount [2]: $240,344,000

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
     $42,312,979), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 11,
     2010 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$305,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
     $258,109,173), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 11,
     2010 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$97,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2036, Downgraded to C; previously on April 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca.

Taberna Preferred Funding VII, Ltd.

  * Current Assumed WARF [1]: 4269

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount [2]: $137,000,000

  -- US$350,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037 (current balance of $256,012,747), Downgraded to B3;
     previously on November 19, 2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037 , Downgraded to Caa2; previously on April 9, 2009
     Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2LA Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2LB Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     February 2037 (current balance of $50,300,727), Downgraded to
     C; previously on April 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Eight RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from eight U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions from 2003-
2007.  In addition, S&P placed six additional classes on
CreditWatch with negative implications from three additional
transactions.

All of the downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of interest
shortfalls on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  S&P's ratings reflect the magnitude of the deficiencies
on interest payments that each class has accumulated to date when
matched against its remaining principal balance owed and the
likelihood of these deficiencies being reimbursed to the
certificate holders, as well as the related transaction's
delinquency performance.

Approximately 70.59% of the ratings S&P lowered or put on
CreditWatch were from transactions backed by Alternative-A or
prime jumbo mortgage loan collateral.  The classes consisted of
these:

* Eleven were from prime jumbo transactions (64.71% of all
  shortfalls);

* Three were from subprime transactions (17.65% of all
  shortfalls);

* One class was from an Alt-A transaction (5.88%);

* One was from a closed-end second-lien transaction (5.88%); and

* One was from a seasoned transaction (5.88%).

S&P lowered approximately 52.94% of the total affected ratings
from the 'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories, approximately 23.60%
from an investment-grade category, and approximately 76.47% from a
speculative-grade category.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience interest shortfalls, and S&P will
adjust the ratings as S&P determine appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

    ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-SL1
                       Series      2005-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        004421RV7     D                    AA

               Banc of America Funding 2005-5 Trust
                        Series      2005-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        05946XG56     D                    CC
        B-4        05946XG64     D                    CC

           MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1
                        Series      2004-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-4        576433JW7     D                    CC

           MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2006-1
                        Series      2006-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        57643MMY7     CC                   CCC

           MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-1
                        Series      2005-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        HY-B-3     55265WCX9     D                    CCC

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-WMC2
                      Series      2006-WMC2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2B       59020U6K6     CC                   CCC
        A-2C       59020U6L4     CC                   CCC
        A-2D       59020U6M2     CC                   CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2004-B
                    Series      MLCC 2004-B

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        59020UCF0     BB/Watch Neg         BB

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-1        590219AA9     B/Watch Neg          B

                    RALI Series 2003-QS7 Trust
                       Series      2003-QS7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-1        76110HBX6     D                    CC

                    RFMSI Series 2003-S9 Trust
                       Series      2003-S9

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-2        76111J2C7     AAA/Watch Neg        AAA
        M-3        76111J2D5     AA+/Watch Neg        AA+
        B-1        76111J2E3     BBB/Watch Neg        BBB
        B-2        76111J2F0     B-/Watch Neg         B-

                   Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-1
                        Series      2007-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        4-A1       81744HAH6     CCC                  B


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes From Six RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes from six residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime and scratch-and-dent loan
collateral issued between 2004 and 2007.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 21 classes from the downgraded
transactions and three additional transactions.

The collateral backing some of these transactions originally
consisted predominantly of subprime, reperforming and outside-the-
guidelines first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate residential
mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's current and
projected losses, which S&P based on the dollar amounts of loans
currently in the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real
estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's projection of future
defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative losses to date in its
analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using its criteria listed in the
"Related Research" section below.  As part of its analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while its outlook for housing-price declines
and the health of the housing market influence its loss severity
assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss expectations for
each deal based on upward trends in delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

For transactions backed by nonperforming loans, S&P calculated its
projected defaults by evaluating the current pipeline of
delinquent loans.  S&P incorporated the available liquidation data
to arrive at its opinion of the potential loss severity and the
extent of defaults.  S&P used this information in conjunction with
its rating-specific assumptions to project cash flows and assess
whether the outstanding ratings on the classes were appropriate,
in S&P's view.  Based on S&P's view of the timing and amount of
cash flow available for a security, S&P adjusted its ratings
accordingly.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                    RAAC Series 2006-SP4 Trust
                       Series      2006-SP4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        74919VAB2     CCC                  A
        A-3        74919VAC0     CCC                  BBB
        M-1        74919VAG1     CC                   B
        M-2        74919VAH9     CC                   CCC
        M-3        74919VAJ5     CC                   CCC

                    RAAC Series 2007-SP1 Trust
                       Series      2007-SP1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        74978AAA8     A+                   AAA
        A-2        74978AAB6     BBB-                 A
        A-3        74978AAC4     BBB-                 A
        M-1        74978AAD2     CCC                  B

                    RAMP Series 2006-EFC1 Trust
                      Series      2006-EFC1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76112BV72     A+                   AA+
        M-2        76112BV80     B                    AA+
        M-3        76112BV98     CCC                  BB
        M-4        76112BW22     CCC                  B
        M-5        76112BW30     CC                   CCC

                    RASC Series 2004-KS10 Trust
                      Series      2004-KS10

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76110WG34     A+                   AA+
        M-2        76110WG42     B-                   BB
        M-3        76110WG59     CCC                  B-
        M-4        76110WG67     CC                   CCC

                    RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust
                      Series      2004-KS12

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76110WK88     A+                   AA

                    RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
                      Series      2006-KS3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-4        76113ABP5     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    RAAC Series 2006-SP4 Trust
                       Series      2006-SP4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        74919VAA4     AAA

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP1 Trust
                       Series      2007-RP1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          74977YAA7     B
                 M-1        74977YAB5     CCC

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP2 Trust
                       Series      2007-RP2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          74919WAA2     B

                    RAAC Series 2007-SP1 Trust
                       Series      2007-SP1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        74978AAE0     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2004-RS11 Trust
                      Series      2004-RS11

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        76112BFH8     AA
                 M-2        76112BFJ4     BB
                 M-3        76112BFK1     CCC
                 M-4        76112BFL9     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2006-EFC1 Trust
                      Series      2006-EFC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        76112BV56     AAA
                 A-3        76112BV64     AAA

                    RASC Series 2004-KS10 Trust
                      Series      2004-KS10

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-I-3      76110WF84     AAA
                 A-II-1     76110WF92     AAA
                 A-II-2     76110WG26     AAA

                    RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust
                      Series      2004-KS12

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        76110WK96     CCC

                    RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
                      Series      2006-KS3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-I-3      76113ABH3     BBB+
                 A-I-4      76113ABJ9     BBB-
                 A-II       76113ABK6     AA
                 M-1        76113ABL4     B-
                 M-2        76113ABM2     CCC
                 M-3        76113ABN0     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 48 Tranches From 12 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 48
tranches from 12 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $4.667 billion.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine tranches from
six transactions and removed three of them from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades on 13 classes from seven transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.  S&P's analysis incorporated the asset
recovery assumptions in its new CDO criteria.  To provide
additional transparency into the assumptions S&P used in its
analysis, S&P is providing the tiered recovery rate S&P assumed
for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA' liability rating for
each transaction.

         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

         Transaction                     Recovery rate (%)
         -----------                     -----------------
         Ares VII                                     39.7
         Black Diamond International Funding          48.9
         CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust          35.6
         CHGO Loan Funding Ltd.                       44.7
         CRAFT 2007-1                                 46.2
         Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund 2005            42.5
         Field Point IV                               33.8
         Kingsland II                                 42.1
         Marylebone Road CBO 3 BV                      9.7
         Marquette US/European CLO PLC                43.8
         NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1         44.6
         NewStar Trust 2005-1                         44.4

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
  Transaction                     Class      To     From
  -----------                     -----      --     ----
  Ares VII                        A-1a       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VII                        A-1b       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VII                        B          BB+    A/Watch Neg
  Ares VII                        Comp Secs  CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
  Black Diamond International     SrVar Fnd  AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Funding
  Black Diamond International     Cl2005-A   AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Funding                         MTN
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan   A          BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Trust
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan   B          BB+    AA/Watch Neg
   Trust
  CHGO Loan Funding Ltd.          A          BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg
  CRAFT 2007-1                    D          CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
  CRAFT 2007-1                    E          CC     BB/Watch Neg
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    A-1        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    A-2Euro    AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    B-1        A-     A/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    B-2Euro    A-     A/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    B-3Euro    A-     A/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    DollarFun  BB     BB/Watch Neg
   2005
  Dryden IX - Senior Loan Fund    EuroFun    BB     BB/Watch Neg
   2005
  Field Point IV                  A-1        BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland II                    A-1c       A-     AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland II                    A-2        BBB+   AA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland II                    B          BB-    A/Watch Neg
  Kingsland II                    C          CCC-   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Kingsland II                    D          CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Marylebone Road CBO 3 BV        A-1        CC     B/Watch Neg
  Marylebone Road CBO 3 BV        A-2        CC     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   A-1A       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   A-1B       A+     AAA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   A-2        A+     AAA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   B-1        A-     AA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   B-2        A-     AA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   C-1        BB+    A/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   C-2        BB+    A/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   D-1        B+     BBB/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   D-2        B+     BBB/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   E-1        CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   E-2        CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   F          CCC-   AA/Watch Neg
  Marquette US/European CLO PLC   G          CCC-   A/Watch Neg
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   A-1        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   A-2        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   B          AA     AA/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   C          BBB+   A/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   D          CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Commercial Loan Trust   E          CCC-   BBB-/Watch Neg
   2006-1
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            A-1        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            A-2        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            B          A+     AA/Watch Neg
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            C          B+     A/Watch Neg
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            D          CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
  NewStar Trust 2005-1            E          CCC-   BB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

        Transaction                     Class      Rating
        -----------                     -----      ------
        Ares VII                        Rmkd Certs AAA
        Field Point IV                  A-2        AAA
        Field Point IV                  B-1        AAA
        Kingsland II                    A-1a       AAA
        Kingsland II                    A-1b       AAA
        Marylebone Road CBO 3 BV        A-3        CC



* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 182 Classes From 21 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 182
classes from 21 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. seasoned mortgage loan collateral
issued between 2002 and 2007.  S&P removed 19 of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 80 classes from 19 of these
transactions and removed one of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether a class could withstand approximately
127% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 155% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of its
base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered the ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls or write-downs in the final period of
particular cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have
experienced any principal shortfalls or write-downs in any of the
prior periods of the particular stress scenario; however, the
structural mechanics of the transactions created circumstances in
which one or more classes within a transaction may have relied on
principal proceeds to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier
periods, thus resulting in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group, or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance
that is insufficient to cover the necessary interest obligations
of the related liabilities.

Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, the available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final payment period, a situation may occur in which
available funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and
principal requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as
principal in prior periods was used to satisfy interest
obligations.  Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior
certificates can be exposed to this risk due to the fact that
structures may pay principal pro rata with senior support classes.
Although the senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any
of the prior periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. seasoned mortgage loans secured
by first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

            Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A1
                        Series      2007-A1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A2       161630AB4     B+                   BBB-
        1-A6       161630AF5     B+                   BBB-
        2-A4       161630AK4     B+                   BBB-
        3-A1       161630AL2     A-                   AAA
        3-A2       161630AM0     B+                   BBB-
        4-A2       161630AP3     B+                   BBB-
        5-A1       161630AQ1     A                    AA
        5-A2       161630AR9     B+                   BBB-
        6-A2       161630AT5     B+                   AAA
        7-A2       161630AV0     B+                   BBB-
        8-A2       161630AX6     B+                   BBB-
        9-A2       161630AZ1     B+                   AAA
        10-A1      161630BA5     A-                   AA
        10-A2      161630BB3     B+                   BBB-
        I-M        161630CP1     CC                   CCC

                       GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA
                       Series      2003-SEA

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        36228FVH6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        36228FVJ2     BB+                  A
    B-1        36228FVK9     BB-                  BBB+
    B-2        36228FVL7     B                    BB
    B-3        36228FVM5     B-                   B

                       GSAMP Trust 2004-SEA1
                       Series      2004-SEA1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        36228FP26     AA-                  AAA
        M-1        36228FL61     B+                   AA
        M-2        36228FL79     B-                   A
        B-1        36228FL87     CCC                  BB+
        B-2        36228FL95     CC                   BB
        B-3        36228FM29     CC                   BB-

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A1
                        Series      2007-A1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A-1      46630GAC9     B-                   BBB
        2-A-2      46630GAD7     BB+                  AAA
        3-A-2      46630GAH8     B-                   BB
        4-A-1      46630GAM7     B+                   AAA
        4-A-2      46630GAN5     A+                   AAA
        5-A-1      46630GAR6     BB-                  A
        5-A-2      46630GAS4     AA                   AAA
        6-A-1      46630GAX3     B+                   AA
        7-A-1      46630GBB0     B-                   BBB
        7-A-2      46630GBC8     B-                   BBB
        7-A-3      46630GBD6     B-                   BBB
        7-A-3S     46630GBF1     B-                   AA

            MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2004-1
                        Series      2004-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        30-B-1     55265WBM4     CC                   BB-
        15-B-2     55265WBK8     BBB                  A
        30-B-2     55265WBN2     CC                   B-
        HY-B-2     55265WBR3     CC                   CCC
        15-B-3     55265WBL6     B                    BBB-
        30-B-3     55265WBP7     CC                   CCC
        HY-B-3     55265WBS1     CC                   CCC
        15-B-4     55265WBT9     CC                   B
        15-B-5     55265WBU6     CC                   CCC

            MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-1
                         Series      2005-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      55265WCF8     BBB                  AAA
        3-A-1      55265WCJ0     A                    AAA
        4-A-2      55265WCL5     AA                   AAA
        30-B-1     55265WCS0     CC                   BB
        HY-B-1     55265WCV3     CC                   BB
        30-B-2     55265WCT8     CC                   B
        HY-B-2     55265WCW1     CC                   B
        30-B-3     55265WCU5     CC                   CCC
        HY-B-3     55265WCX9     CC                   CCC

            MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-2
                        Series      2005-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      55265WDB6     BB-                  AAA
        1-A-2      55265WDC4     BB-                  AAA
        1-A-4      55265WDE0     BB-                  AAA
        2-A-1      55265WDF7     BB-                  AAA
        2-A-2      55265WDG5     BB-                  AAA
        30-A-X     55265WDH3     BB-                  AAA
        3-A-1      55265WDJ9     BBB+                 AAA
        3-A-2      55265WDK6     BB-                  AAA
        4-A-1      55265WDM2     BB-                  AAA
        5-A-1      55265WDN0     BBB-                 AAA
        30-PO      55265WDR1     BB-                  AAA
        15-PO      55265WDS9     BB-                  AAA
        15-A-X     55265WDT7     BBB+                 AAA
        B-1        55265WDU4     CC                   AA
        B-2        55265WDV2     CC                   BB
        B-3        55265WDW0     CC                   CCC
        B-4        55265WDX8     CC                   CCC

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL1
                       Series      2004-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        S          59020UEK7     BBB-                 AAA

                   Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-2
                        Series      2005-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-A-1     74160MHU9     BBB                  AAA
        II-X       74160MHV7     BBB                  AAA
        II-B-1     74160MHX3     B                    AA
        II-XB      74160MJA1     CC                   AA
        II-B-2     74160MHY1     CC                   A
        II-B-3     74160MHZ8     CC                   BBB
        II-B-4     74160MJE3     CC                   B
        II-B-5     74160MJF0     CC                   CCC

                   Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-A-1      74160MLQ3     B-                   AAA
        I-A-2      74160MLR1     B-                   AAA
        I-A-3      74160MLS9     B-                   AAA
        I-PO       74160MLT7     B-                   AAA
        I-X        74160MLU4     B-                   AAA
        II-A-1     74160MLV2     AA-                  AAA
        II-A-4     74160MMS8     A+                   AAA
        II-PO      74160MLW0     A+                   AAA
        I-B-1      74160MLZ3     CC                   AA
        II-B-1     74160MMG4     B+                   AA
        I-B-2      74160MMA7     CC                   BBB
        II-B-2     74160MMH2     CCC                  A
        I-B-3      74160MMB5     D                    B
        II-B-3     74160MMJ8     CC                   BBB
        II-B-4     74160MMK5     CC                   BB
        II-B-5     74160MML3     CC                   B
        I-XB       74160MMP4     CC                   AA
        II-A-2     74160MMQ2     A+                   AAA

                    RAAC Series 2004-SP2 Trust
                       Series      2004-SP2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-II-1     7609857P0     BBB                  AAA
        A-II-2     7609857Q8     BBB-                 AAA
        A-II-IO    7609857R6     BBB                  AAA
        A-II-PO    7609857S4     BBB-                 AAA
        M-1        7609857T2     B+                   AA
        M-2        7609857U9     CCC                  A
        M-3        7609857V7     CC                   B
        B-1        7609857W5     CC                   CCC

                    RAMP Series 2002-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2002-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-I-2      760985LL3     A-                   A
        M-I-3      760985LM1     BB-                  BBB

                    RAMP Series 2003-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2003-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        760985F63     CCC                  AA+
        M-2        760985F71     CC                   A
        M-3        760985F89     CC                   BB
        B-1        760985F97     CC                   CCC

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2004-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-II       760985W31     CCC                  AAA
        A-III      760985W49     A+                   AAA
        A-IV       760985W56     A+                   AAA
        A-V        760985W64     AA                   AAA
        A-VI       760985W72     CCC                  AAA
        A-VII      760985W80     A                    AAA
        A-IX       760985X22     BBB-                 AAA
        A-PO       7609852H3     BBB-                 AAA
        A-IO-1     7609852J9     AA                   AAA
        A-IO-2     7609852K6     AA-                  AAA
        M-I-4      760985Z79     BBB+                 A-
        M-I-5      760985Z87     BBB-                 BBB+
        M-I-6      760985Z95     BB-                  BBB
        M-I-7      7609852A8     B                    BBB-
        M-II-1     760985X30     CC                   AA
        M-II-2     760985X48     CC                   A
        M-II-3     760985X55     CC                   BBB
        B-II-1     7609852L4     CC                   BB
        B-II-2     7609852M2     CC                   B
        A-VIII     760985W98     AA-                  AAA

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL2 Trust
                       Series      2004-SL2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-II       7609856B2     BBB+                 AAA
        A-III      7609856C0     BBB+                 AAA
        A-IV       7609856D8     BB                   AAA
        A-IO       7609856G1     BBB+                 AAA
        A-PO       7609856H9     BB                   AAA
        M-1        7609856L0     CCC                  AA+
        M-2        7609856M8     CC                   AA
        M-3        7609856N6     CC                   A+

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL3 Trust
                        Series      2004-SL3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I        76112BBP4     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II       76112BBQ2     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-III      76112BBR0     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IV       76112BBS8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-I-IO     76112BBT6     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-I-PO     76112BBU3     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IO       76112BBV1     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-PO       76112BBW9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76112BBZ2     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL4 Trust
                       Series      2004-SL4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-I        76112BGK0     BB+                  AAA
        A-II       76112BGL8     BB+                  AAA
        A-III      76112BGM6     BB+                  AAA
        A-IV       76112BGN4     CCC                  AAA
        A-V        76112BGP9     CCC                  AAA
        A-IO       76112BGQ7     BB+                  AAA
        M-1        76112BGU8     CCC                  AA
        M-2        76112BGV6     CC                   B

                    RAMP Series 2005-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2005-SL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-I        76112BML1     BBB+                 AAA
        A-II       76112BMM9     BBB                  AAA
        A-III      76112BMN7     BB                   AAA
        A-IV       76112BMP2     BBB                  AAA
        A-V        76112BMQ0     BBB-                 AAA
        A-VI       76112BMR8     BB+                  AAA
        A-VII      76112BMS6     BB                   AAA
        A-IO       76112BMT4     BBB+                 AAA
        A-PO       76112BMU1     BBB                  AAA

                    RAMP Series 2005-SL2 Trust
                       Series      2005-SL2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I        76112BUV0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II       76112BUW8     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-III      76112BUX6     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IV       76112BUY4     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-V        76112BUZ1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IO       76112BVA5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A-PO       76112BVB3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76112BVE7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        76112BVF4     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    M-3        76112BVG2     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                 Structured Asset Securities Corp.
                       Series      2004-SC1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A          86359BYT2     BBB+                 AAA
        B1         86359BYV7     B-                   AA
        B2         86359BYW5     CC                   A
        B3         86359BYX3     D                    BB

     Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                       Series      2004-RA2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        C-B-1      939336S20     CC                   BB

                          Ratings Affirmed

           Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A1
                        Series      2007-A1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A1       161630AA6     AAA
                  1-A3       161630AC2     AAA
                  1-A4       161630AD0     AAA
                  1-A5       161630AE8     AAA
                  2-A1       161630AG3     AAA
                  2-A2       161630AH1     AAA
                  2-A3       161630AJ7     AAA
                  4-A1       161630AN8     AAA
                  6-A1       161630AS7     AAA
                  7-A1       161630AU2     AAA
                  8-A1       161630AW8     AAA
                  9-A1       161630AY4     AAA

                      GSAMP Trust 2004-SEA1
                      Series      2004-SEA1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1B       36228FL53     AAA

                  JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A1
                       Series      2007-A1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A-1      46630GAA3     AAA
                  1-A-2      46630GAB1     CCC
                  2-A-3      46630GAE5     CCC
                  2-A-4      46630GAF2     CCC
                  3-A-1      46630GAG0     CCC
                  3-A-3      46630GAJ4     AAA
                  3-A-4      46630GAK1     CCC
                  3-A-5      46630GAL9     CCC
                  4-A-3      46630GAP0     CCC
                  4-A-4      46630GAQ8     CCC
                  5-A-3      46630GAT2     CCC
                  5-A-4      46630GAU9     CCC
                  5-A-5      46630GAV7     AAA
                  5-A-6      46630GAW5     CCC
                  6-A-2      46630GAY1     CCC
                  7-A-4      46630GBG9     CCC

            MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2004-1
                        Series      2004-1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1-A-1      55265WAV5     AAA
                  A-X        55265WBF9     AAA
                  2-A-1      55265WAW3     AAA
                  2-A-2      55265WAX1     AAA
                  2-A-3      55265WAY9     AAA
                  2-A-4      55265WAZ6     AAA
                  2-A-6      55265WBB8     AAA
                  PO         55265WBZ5     AAA
                  3-A-1      55265WBC6     BBB
                  4-A-1      55265WBD4     A
                  15-B-1     55265WBJ1     AA
                  HY-B-1     55265WBQ5     B
                  4-A-2      55265WBE2     BBB

            MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-1
                        Series      2005-1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  2-A-1      55265WCH4     AAA
                  4-A-1      55265WCK7     AAA
                  15-B-1     55265WCP6     BB
                  15-B-2     55265WCQ4     B
                  15-B-3     55265WCR2     CCC

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL1
                       Series      2004-SL1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  B-2        59020UEP6     BBB-

                    Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  II-A-3     74160MMR0     AAA
                  II-X       74160MLX8     AAA

                    RAAC Series 2004-SP2 Trust
                       Series      2004-SP2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I        7609857N5     AAA

                    RAMP Series 2002-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2002-SL1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-3      760985LC3     AAA
                  A-I-IO     760985LD1     AAA
                  M-I-1      760985LK5     AAA
                  A-II-1     760985LF6     AAA
                  A-II-2     760985LG4     AAA
                  A-II-3     760985LH2     AAA
                  A-II-4     760985LJ8     AAA

                    RAMP Series 2003-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2003-SL1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-1      760985E49     AAA
                  A-II-1     760985E56     AAA
                  A-III-1    760985E64     AAA
                  A-IV-1     760985E72     AAA
                  A-I-IO     760985E80     AAA
                  A-I-PO     760985E98     AAA
                  A-IO       760985F22     AAA
                  A-PO       760985F30     AAA

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL1 Trust
                       Series      2004-SL1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I-2      7609852G5     AAA
                  M-I-1      760985Z46     AA
                  M-I-2      760985Z53     A+
                  M-I-3      760985Z61     A

                    RAMP Series 2004-SL2 Trust
                       Series      2004-SL2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-I        7609856A4     AAA
                  A-I-IO     7609856E6     AAA
                  A-I-PO     7609856F3     AAA

      Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
                       Series      2004-RA2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A        939336R47     AAA
                  II-A       939336R54     AAA
                  I-X        939336R62     AAA
                  II-X       939336R70     AAA
                  I-P        939336R88     AAA
                  II-P       939336R96     AAA



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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