TCR_Public/100425.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 25, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 113

                            Headlines

1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns Ratings on $90 Mil. Asset-Backed Notes
ABACUS 2005-2: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'
ALLIANCE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class B to 'D/RR6'
AMBAC ASSURANCE: Moody's Corrects Ratings on 14 Tranches
AMBAC ASSURANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Wrapped Securities

AMBAC ASSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
AMBAC ASSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Certs.
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-BIX1 Certs.

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 202 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-C1 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Puts Ratings on All Classes on Negative Watch
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2004-PWR5 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of RMBS

CABCO TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $52.65 Mil. Certs. to 'BB+'
CBRE REALTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of CRE CDO Deals
CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-2 Notes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 108 Tranches
CHYPS CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

CORPORATE-BACKED CALLABLE: S&P Raises Ratings on Certs. to 'BB+'
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Rating on Series 2003-CPN1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 20 2007-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2002-CKS4 Securities

CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
DELAWARE HEALTH: S&P Junks Rating on Hospital Revenue Bonds
DLJ MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1996-CF1 Certificates
EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2001-3 Certs.

FIRSTPLUS HOME: Moody's Cuts Ratings to 'Caa1'; Reviews 30 Ratings
FORD MOTOR: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 Tranches for Upgrade
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2002-3 Certificates
GEMINI PLC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1997-C1 Certs.

GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Tranches
GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches
GRAMERCY REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2006-GG7 Notes
GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes

HAMPTON ROADS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Bonds
HARBORPLACE MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2000-C5C Certs.
HEDGED MUTUAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
HOUSE OF EUROPE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A Notes
HOUSTON: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Revenue Bonds

IBIS RE: S&P Rates Series 2010-1 Class A Variable Notes at 'BB'
INDYMAC INDA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
JOHNSTON RE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Two Series 2010-1 Notes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2003-ML1 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-C2 Securities

JUNIPER CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Four Classes of Notes
JUNIPER CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2007-C6 Certs.

LEASE INVESTMENT: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
MARATHON REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'Ba3'
MASTR ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 149 Tranches
MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches

MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-BPC1 Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-1 Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-5 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-6 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-10 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-11 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-15 Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class IB Notes
MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Classes
NORTEL NETWORKS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Certs.
NORTH COVE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
NOVA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

NY MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches
PARCS-R MASTER: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2007-8 to 'CC'
PETRA CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
PONTIAC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Sewer Bonds

PONTIAC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tax Bonds
PRADO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2003-RZ5 Tranche
RESOURCE REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes

REVE SPC: S&P Corrects Ratings on $2.062 Mil. Notes to 'BB+'
RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 77 Tranches
SATURNS TRUST: S&P Puts 'BB' Ratings on CreditWatch Positive
SCRANTON: S&P Raises Rating on GO Debt From 'BB'
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches

SKY LAKES: Fitch Takes Rating Action on Oregon's Bonds
SPRINGHILL/COURTLAND HEIGHTS: S&P Junks Ratings on 1999A Bonds
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Raises Rating on Two Units to 'BB+'
STUDENT LOAN: S&P Cuts Rating on Series 2007-2 Certs. to 'B-'

STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2004-NP2 Certificates
STUDENT LOAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Certs.
VERTICAL CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of CMBS
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-ESH Certs. to 'D'
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-C8 Certs.

* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Diversified SF CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Classes From Two RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 70 Tranches From 32 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 552 Classes From 431 RMBS to 'D'



                            *********



1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns Ratings on $90 Mil. Asset-Backed Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to 1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II's
$90 million asset-backed notes series 2010-B.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 20,
2010.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

* S&P's view that the credit support for each class of notes is
  sufficient to withstand the simultaneous stresses S&P apply, for
  each preliminary rating category, to S&P's 9.5%-11.5% base-case
  loss rate assumption, 7.0%-9.0% base-case payment rate
  assumption, 17.0%-19.0% base-case yield assumption, and 0.0%-
  1.5% purchase rate assumption.  In addition, S&P use stressed
  excess spread and note interest rate assumptions to determine if
  sufficient credit support is available for each preliminary
  rating category.  All of the stress assumptions outlined above
  are based on S&P's current criteria and assumptions;

* S&P's view of the credit risk inherent in the collateral loan
  pool based on its economic forecast, the trust portfolio's
  historical performance, the collateral characteristics, and
  vintage performance data;

* 1st Financial Bank USA's servicing experience; and S&P's opinion
  of the quality and consistency of its account origination,
  underwriting, account management, collections, and general
  operational practices;

* S&P's expectation of the timely interest and ultimate principal
  payments by July 17, 2017, the legal final maturity date, based
  on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios using assumptions that
  S&P believes are commensurate with the assigned preliminary
  rating categories; and

* The series 2010-B notes' underlying payment structure, cash flow
  mechanics, and legal structure.

                   Preliminary Ratings Assigned

   1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II Series 2010-B


                                       Amount    Interest     Credit
  Class                   Rating       (mil. $)  rate         support (%)
  -----                   ------       --------  --------     -----------
  A                         AAA          59.175    TBD           41.25
  B                         AA           11.250    TBD           28.75
  C                         A             8.100    TBD           19.75
  D                         BBB-         11.475    TBD            7.00
  Senior CCA loan(i)        BBpNRi(ii)    2.925    N/A            3.75
  Intermediate CCA loan(i)  BB-pNRi(ii)   1.125    N/A            2.50
  Subordinate CCA loan      N/A           2.250    N/A             N/A

(i) Loans made by CCA lenders to fund CCAs that support classes A,
    B, C, and D.

(ii) The 'p' subscript indicates that the rating addresses only
     the principal portion of the obligation.  CCA Cash collateral
     account.

                      N/A - Not applicable.
                     TBD - To be determined.


ABACUS 2005-2: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
C notes issued by ABACUS 2005-2 Ltd., a synthetic collateralized
debt obligation.

The downgrade follows a number of recent defaults within the
transaction's underlying portfolio.  Specifically, write-downs in
the underlying reference portfolio have caused the class C notes
to incur a partial principal loss.

                          Rating Lowered

                        ABACUS 2005-2 Ltd.

                                       Rating
                                       ------
          Class                 To                 From
          -----                 --                 ----
          C                     CC                 CCC-


ALLIANCE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class B to 'D/RR6'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on the
remaining class of notes from Alliance Capital Funding, LLC, a
collateralized bond obligation managed by Alliance Bernstein, L.P.

The downgrade reflects the issuer's failure to redeem the full
principal amounts due to the notes at the stated maturity date in
February 2010.  At the maturity date, the class B notes received
their scheduled interest and a partial principal payment of just
$42,000.  Since Fitch's last review in March 2009, discounted
total proceeds to the class B notes represented approximately 6%
of their outstanding principal amount, consistent with Fitch's
'RR6' Recovery Rating.  Additional distributions to the class B
notes may occur after the maturity date, but any distributions
would be minimal and would not affect Fitch's ratings.

Fitch subsequently withdraws the ratings of the class B notes
since the notes have matured.

Fitch has taken this rating action:

  -- $33,186,257 class B notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6'
     and withdrawn.


AMBAC ASSURANCE: Moody's Corrects Ratings on 14 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has corrected the ratings on 14 tranches wrapped by Ambac
Assurance Corp. On January 13th Moody's had placed these tranches
on review for possible downgrade.  It is Moody's policy to rate
bonds insured by a financial guarantor the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  Because the ratings on these tranches are driven by
Ambac's rating (Caa2, on review for possible upgrade), the ratings
were not affected by the review for downgrade of subprime RMBS
announced on January 13th.  As a result Moody's has removed the
review for possible downgrade.

Complete list of affected tranches:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-16

  -- Cl. 2-AF-3, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AF-4, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-17

  -- Cl. 1-AF-3, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-4, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-11

  -- Cl. 1-AF-3, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-4, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-5, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-6, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-13

  -- Cl. 1-AF-3, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-4, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-5, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AF-6, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-3, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1

  -- Cl. III-A-5, rated Caa2; previously on Jan 13, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


AMBAC ASSURANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Two Wrapped Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed two Ambac
Assurance Corporation wrapped securities issued by Maine
Educational Loan Marketing Corporation on review with direction
uncertain.  The review status reflects the uncertainty about
whether these securities have been allocated to Ambac's segregated
account or the general account.  These actions are a result of the
March 26, 2010 rating action on Ambac Assurance Corporation
placing Ambac's insurance financial strength rating of Caa2 on
watch for possible upgrade.  See Moody's March 26, 2010
announcement "Moody's downgrades Ambac debt to C and reviews Caa2
insurance rating for upgrade" for more details.

The Ambac rating action was prompted by Ambac's announced
restructuring.  Ambac established a segregated account, containing
its most risky exposures such as RMBS and Las Vegas Monorail.
Moody's believes that policies allocated to the segregated account
are no longer appropriately considered to be senior policyholder
obligations of Ambac and that, consequently, Moody's insurance
financial strength rating for Ambac would apply to exposures in
the general account only.  Securities in the segregated account
are now rated at their underlying rating absent consideration of
Ambac's guaranty.  The ratings of wrapped transactions in Ambac's
general account have been positioned according to the criteria
noted below.

Moody's ratings on securities that are guaranteed or "wrapped" by
a financial guarantor are generally maintained at a level equal to
the higher of a) the IFSR of the guarantor (if rated at the
investment grade level) or b) the published or unpublished
underlying rating.  Moody's withdraws the ratings on structured
finance securities insured by guarantors with IFSR below Baa3
(that is non-investment grade) if Moody's is unable to determine
an underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty)
on the security or the issuer has requested that the guaranty
constitute the sole credit consideration.

List of rating actions is:

Issuer: Maine Educational Loan Marketing Corporation

  -- Ser. 1999 Cl. A-3, Caa2 Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain; previously on Aug 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Ser. 1996 Cl. A-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review Direction
     Uncertain; previously on Aug 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2


AMBAC ASSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's lowered its ratings on 10 classes of notes from
four U.S. corporate securitizations and removed them from
CreditWatch negative because of S&P's view of Ambac Assurance
Corp., the monoline insurer and controlling party in these
transactions.  The affected transactions are DB Master Finance LLC
series 2006-1, Sonic Capital LLC series 2006-1, Local Insight
Media Finance LLC series 2007-1, and Local Insight Media Finance
LLC series 2008-1.  Additionally, S&P's rating actions on the five
classes of notes from Local Insight Media's series 2007-1 and
2008-1 were further driven by performance deterioration.

S&P lowered its financial strength rating on Ambac to 'R' on
March 25, 2010, following a regulatory directive by the
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Wisconsin.

Additionally, S&P's rating actions on the notes from Local Insight
Media's series 2007-1 and 2008-1 were also driven by weakened
performance in the directory publishing sector.  These
transactions derive cash flow from published yellow page
directories, contracts, intellectual property, and associated
rights/contracts.

Because of Ambac's role as the controlling party within the four
transactions and S&P's view that servicer transfer risk may
increase given Ambac's financial standing, S&P took a series of
rating actions on the company and S&P's corporate securitizations
over the past year.

Under S&P's current methodology for rating U.S. corporate
securitizations, the degree to which S&P can raise the rating on a
transaction above the corporate credit rating of the
seller/servicer depends on, among other factors, the structural
and legal enhancements available to support the transaction and
the availability of a satisfactory backup servicer/manager.  In
cases where S&P believes that the factors that support a higher
rating than the rating on the seller/servicer have weakened, S&P
may lower the transaction's rating to a level closer to the CCR of
the seller/servicer.

In S&P's analysis of U.S. corporate securitization transactions,
S&P believes a sponsor bankruptcy filing could yield a number of
outcomes.  In certain situations, the sponsor might take the
opportunity to reorganize rather than liquidate.  In S&P's
opinion, a whole business securitization's reliance on the control
party's transactional obligations would likely be most pronounced
during the period leading up to and just after a sponsor's
bankruptcy filing.  During these periods, the control party would
likely anticipate and manage performance deterioration and
initiate a servicer transfer if needed to maintain the continuity
of the cash flows to the transaction.  As such, S&P's ratings on
whole business securitizations reflect in part S&P's view of the
control party's ability to actively meet their obligations,
including issuing early warnings of performance deterioration,
effectively managing a potential servicer transition, and
providing liquidity as needed.

Given S&P's current 'R' rating on Ambac, S&P believes the company
may not be able to fully meet all of its transactional obligations
for the duration of the affected transactions, both as a liquidity
provider and control party.  Further, if the regulatory directive
triggered a bankruptcy event and/or insurer default under the
transaction documents, Ambac's role as control party within the
transactions could be terminated, which S&P believes could
heighten servicer transition risk.

After evaluating the potential scenarios given Ambac's role as
control party for these transactions, S&P lowered its ratings on
DB Master Finance LLC series 2006-1, Sonic Capital LLC series
2006-1, Local Insight Media LLC series 2007-1, and Local Insight
Media LLC series 2008-1.  S&P lowered the ratings by one notch,
except those on Local Insight Media Finance's series 2007-1 and
2008-1, which S&P lowered by three notches to also reflect
performance deterioration due to the negative business environment
within the directory publishing industry.

S&P will continue to monitor S&P's rated corporate securitization
transactions and take rating actions as S&P deem appropriate.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      DB Master Finance LLC
   US$ 1,700 million senior and subordinated notes series 2006-1

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
          A-2       BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
          M-1       BB-                  BB

                        Sonic Capital LLC
      US$ 800 million fixed rate series 2006-1 senior notes

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
          A-2       BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg

          Local Insight Media Finance LLC series 2007-1
     US$ 673 million fixed rate senior and subordinated notes

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
          A-2       BB                   BBB/Watch Neg

           Local Insight Media Finance LLC series 2008-1
     US$ 673 million fixed rate senior and subordinated notes

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
          A-2       BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
          B         B                    BB/Watch Neg


AMBAC ASSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from four U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions insured by
Ambac Assurance Corp.

S&P lowered three of these ratings to 'CC'.  At the same time, S&P
lowered the remaining two ratings to 'D' due to S&P's assessment
of the principal write-downs incurred by the certificates.

The downgrades follow S&P's revision of the financial strength
rating on Ambac to 'R' from 'CC' on March 25, 2010, which could
lead to a cessation of claims payments.  The revision followed a
regulatory directive for a rehabilitation plan of segregated
accounts for certain insured exposure.

S&P's ratings on insured classes usually reflect the higher of (i)
the rating on the bond insurer, and (ii) Standard & Poor's
underlying rating on the securities.  Since Ambac is rated 'R',
the ratings on the insured classes, including those S&P lowered,
now reflect the underlying credit enhancement for the affected
classes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on all U.S.
RMBS classes Ambac insures and take rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                         Ratings Lowered

           Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR2
                        Series    2006-AR2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-A-2     07401AAY3     D                    CC

            GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR3
                        Series    2006-AR3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-A-2     39538WHB7     D                    CC

               Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-3        43718UAC0     CC                   CCC

                   Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6
                         Series    2005-6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      45254NQG5     CC                   CCC
        1-A-2      45254NQW0     CC                   CCC


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings on 4 tranches issued by
American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-SD1 (Group I).  The
junior most bond in the Group I structure is currently being
written down from principal losses, while the other Group I
subordinate bonds are expected to be written off or take losses in
the near term.  The Group I senior tranche is not expected to take
loss in the near term, however diminished credit support resulting
from the anticipated write downs will leave this bond exposed to
future performance deterioration.  As such, the Cl. I-A1 has been
left on review for further downgrade.

Moody's evaluated the each tranche's subordination relative to the
near-term losses projected from the delinquency pipeline in
determining these rating actions.  This pipeline loss amount is
calculated by multiplying assumed 12 month roll rates with each
delinquency bucket.  This assumption of defaulted loans is
multiplied by the average recent loss severity to calculate the
pipeline loss amount.  In evaluating the ratings of the most
senior bond, Moody's considered its strength relative to potential
growth in delinquencies by comparing its enhancement to two-times
the 12-month pipeline loss described above.

Complete rating actions are

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-SD1

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 7, 2008 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. I-M1, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 7, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. I-M2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 7, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. I-M3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 7, 2008
     Downgraded to Ba2


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Securities, series 2004-1, as indicated:

  -- $29.9 million class D to 'AA/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.3 million class E to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.3 million class F to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11.6 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.9 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.6 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.6 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.3 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns and revises
Outlooks, LS ratings, and Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $230.7 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $521.9 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-P at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $31.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.3 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.6 million class M at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $10.8 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $16.8 million class O to 'CC/RR6' from 'CC/RR2'.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $15.2 million
class P certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 3% of the remaining pool balance, approximately
$31.1 million, the majority of which are from loans currently in
special servicing.

As of the March 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 21.2% to $1.05 billion from $1.3 billion at
issuance.  Nine of the remaining loans have defeased (7.4%).

As of March 2010, there are six specially serviced loans (5.7%).
The largest specially serviced loan (1.6%) is secured by a 94,725
square foot retail building located in Tracy, CA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2010 for imminent
default due to declining cash flow as a result of tenant vacancy
triggering reductions in rent for other tenants.  A lease has been
signed for the vacant space with rent commencing September 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan (1.3%) is secured by an
181,596 square foot office building in Glendale, AZ.  The property
is fully vacant after losing the single tenant.  The property has
been real estate owned as of June 12, 2009 and the special
servicer is marketing the property for both lease and sale.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
(3%) is a 396 unit multifamily property located in Atlanta, GA.
Cash flow at the property declined during 2009 due to market
conditions resulting in large concessions being offered combined
with increased operating expenses.  According to the servicer
concessions decreased during the first quarter of 2010.  As of
September 2009, the property was 96% occupied and had a servicer
reported DSCR of 1.0 times.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Thirty-two loans did not payoff at maturity with 11
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-BIX1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The text of the rating action omitted class K-CA, $941,439,
downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously on February 17, 2010
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Revised press release is:

Moody's Investors Service downgraded six non-pooled, or rake,
classes of Banc of America Large Loan Inc. Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-BIX1.  Moody's is taking
this action due to the deterioration in the performance of the
properties securing the CarrAmerica -- Pool 3 (National Portfolio)
Loan and the CarAmerica -- Pool 2 (CAR Portfolio) Loan.  Moody's
placed the six rake classes on review for possible downgrade on
February 17, 2010.  This action concludes Moody's review.  The
rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

There are 11 loans remaining in the pool.  The CarrAmerica -- Pool
3 (National Portfolio) Loan and the CarrAmerica Pool 2 (CAR
Portfolio) Loan represent 32.8% and 4.3% of the pooled debt
balance, respectively.  There is currently one loan in special
servicing, the Ballantyne Village Loan (6.7%).  The loan was not
extended since the last maturity date of January 15, 2010 and the
borrower has been provided with a Default Letter dated January 26,
2010 based on maturity default.

The CarrAmerica -- Pool 3 (National Portfolio) Loan
($153.6 million -- 32.8% of the pooled debt balance) is the 40.0%
portion of a pari passu split loan structure.  There is also
$20.4 million of rake trust debt (classes J-CP, K-CP and L-CP), a
$179 million non-trust junior secured loan component, and
$166 million in mezzanine debt.  The loan is secured by 30
suburban office and office and R&D properties.  The portfolio
contains approximately 8.7 million square feet, of which
6.0 million square feet represents the loan sponsor's wholly-owned
interests and its partially-owned interests in joint venture
properties.  Of the 6.0 million square feet, approximately
4.9 million square feet (22 properties) is secured by first
mortgage liens and 1.1 million square feet (eight properties) is
secured by a pledge of refinance and sale proceeds.  The pledged
properties represent approximately 8.4% of the total allocated
trust balance.  The outstanding trust balance has decreased by
72.3% since securitization from the payment of loan collateral
release premiums.  The portfolio has geographic concentration in
the San Jose, California metro area, with 61.4% of the mortgage
collateral by net rentable area (16 properties) located in San
Jose, Santa Clara, Palo Alto and Sunnyvale.  The suburban San Jose
office market has a Fourth Quarter 2009 Moody's Red-Yellow-
Green(R) score of Red (6).

As of September 2009, the loan collateral secured by first
mortgage liens had a weighted average occupancy rate of 78%,
compared to 85% for the current portfolio at Moody's last full
review and 87% at securitization.  The market fundamentals within
the Silicon Valley market have deteriorated significantly.  The
San Jose Class A office market posted a 31% vacancy rate as of the
4th quarter of 2009, along with an 11% decline in market rents
during 2009 with an additional 11% decline projected for 2010
according to CB Richard Ellis.  The San Jose R&D market vacancy
rate was 18% with a market rent decline of 15% in 2009 and a
further 4% decline projected through 2011.  It is anticipated that
portfolio revenue will decrease as current leases expire and new
leases are signed at lower rents.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt
is 94.8%, based on mortgage collateral only and Moody's stressed
DSCR is 1.12X.  Moody's underlying rating for the pooled balance
is Baa3, compared to A1 at Moody's last full review.

The CarAmerica -- Pool 2 (CAR Portfolio) Loan ($20.3 million --
4.3%) is the 40.0% portion of a pari passu split loan structure.
There is also $3.4 million of rake debt (classes J-CA, K-CA, and
L-CA).  The loan is secured by four office properties located in
San Mateo, California, Mountain View, California and Austin, Texas
(two properties).  The portfolio contains 719,025 square feet,
compared to 2.1 million square feet in 11 properties at
securitization.  The outstanding trust balance has decreased by
74% since securitization from the payment of loan collateral
release premiums.  As of September 2009, the portfolio had a
weighted average occupancy of 76%, compared to 97% at Moody's last
full review.

San Mateo Center, San Mateo, California is a Class A office
building containing 216,691 square feet of net rentable area
(NRA).  As of September 2009, the property was 56% leased to 26
tenants.  No one tenant occupied more than 5% of the total NRA.
The Redwood - Foster Cities submarket has a Class A office market
vacancy of 14% with a market rent decline of 23% in 2009 according
to CB Richard Ellis.  Approximately 32% of the leased NRA in San
Mateo Center will expire by the end of 2011.

Mountain View Gateway Center, Mountain View, California is a Class
A office building containing 236,402 square feet of NRA.  As of
September 2009, the property was 100% leased to two tenants, KPMG
Peat Marwick (57% of NRA) and Netscape (43% of NRA).  Lease
expirations for KPMG and Netscape are June 2013 and September
2010, respectively.  Mountain View has a market vacancy rate of
11% with a market rent decline of 14% in 2009 and a further
decline of 8% projected during 2010 according to CB Richard Ellis.

The two Class A office properties located in Austin are The
Setting, containing 137,216 square feet and the adjacent City View
Center I, containing 128,716 square feet.  The buildings are 62.3%
and 100% leased, respectively.  The Setting is leased to 15
tenants with no tenant occupying more than 11% of the NRA.  City
View Center I is leased to one tenant, Level 3 Communications,
through December 2013.  The Southwest Austin submarket has a
market vacancy rate of 20% with a market rent decline of 6% in
2009 and a small additional decline projected in 2010 according to
CB Richard Ellis.

It is anticipated that portfolio revenue will decrease as current
leases expire and new leases are signed at lower rents.  Moody's
LTV for the trust debt is 75.1%, and Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.38X.  Moody's underlying rating for the pooled balance is Baa2,
compared to A1 at Moody's last full review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class J-CP, $3,791,944, downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     on February 17, 2010 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class K-CP, $5,622,109, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1;
     previously on February 17, 2010 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L-CP, $11,024,802, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3;
     previously on February 17, 2010 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J-CA, $1,374,209, downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     on February 17, 2009 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class K-CA, $941,439, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously
     on February 17, 2009 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class L-CA, $1,094,686, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2;
     previously on February 17, 2009 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 202 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 202
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 14 tranches from ten RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Banc of
America.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranche A-1 issued by Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-12 is wrapped by
Assured Guaranty Corp (rated Aa3).  For securities insured by a
financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of
(i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-4 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-27, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-28, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-29, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-30, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-1 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-19, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2005-3 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-21, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-22, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-23, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-24, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-25, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-26, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-27, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-28, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-29, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-30, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-31, Confirmed at A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-32, Confirmed at Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2006-1 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2006-2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-27, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-28, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-29, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-30, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-32, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-33, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-34, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-35, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2006-3 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2007-2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-12

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1, Current Rating at Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jun 2,
     2009 Assigned Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
     Outlook Negative on 12/18/2009)

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1998-C1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-C1:

  -- $2.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.7 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.2 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.2 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.5 million class F at 'A/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.4 million class H at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate classes G or I.  Classes J and K have been
reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Class A-1 has paid in
full.

Affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance and minimal
future expected losses following Fitch's prospective review of
potential stresses to the transaction.  As of the March 2010
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down
77.7% to $158.7 million from $714.8 billion at issuance.

There are 29 of the original 149 loans remaining in transaction,
nine of which have defeased (27.6% of the current transaction
balance).  There is one specially serviced loans which is real
estate owned.  The loan is secured by a 296,000 sf shopping center
in Lincoln Park, MI.  The property lost several tenants resulting
in a servicer reported occupancy of 15% as of Jan. 31, 2010.
Fitch expects losses from loans currently in special servicing to
be absorbed by the unrated class I.

Fitch expects losses of 4% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $6.4 million, increasing the cumulative transaction
loss to 2.5%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Sixteen loans did not pay off at maturity with six
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Puts Ratings on All Classes on Negative Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed all seven classes of Bear Stearns Small
Balance Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1 on Rating Watch Negative:

Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Class A (07400SAB5) rated 'AAA'; and placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class AIO (07400SAA7) rated 'AAA'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class M1 (07400SAC3) rated 'AA'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class M2 (07400SAD1) rated 'A'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class M3 (07400SAE9) rated 'BBB'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class M4 (07400SAF6) rated 'BBB-'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- Class B (07400SAG4) rated 'BB'; placed on Rating Watch
     Negative.

Distributions of principal and interest are made on the 25th of
each month and commenced in December 2006.  Per the transaction
documents, principal and interest are distributed sequentially.
The Class A bond is the only bond to have received principal
payments and the factor on this bond is currently 58% of the
original balance.

At origination the collateral pool consisted of 73 small balance
commercial loans with an outstanding balance of $107 million.
These loans were mainly concentrated in hospitality properties;
88.6% of this pool consisted of limited service hotels.  The
mortgage loans were originated by Community South Bank which was
formed in the state of Tennessee.  CSB's Small Business Lending
Division was formed in July of 2003 for the purpose of originating
and selling small balance commercial mortgage loans.  Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. services this transaction and is rated 'CSS3+' as a
special servicer by Fitch.

As of March 2010, the pool consists of 50 loans with an
outstanding balance of $74 million.  The pool has experienced a
sharp increase in serious delinquencies over the past year.  The
percentage of loans more than 60 days delinquent has increased
from 5.79% in April 2009 to 25.47% in March 2010.  Due to the
increase in serious delinquencies and the high loss severities
experienced on similar properties Fitch has placed all classes of
Bear Stearns Small Balance Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1 on Rating
Watch Negative as a full analysis of the expected losses and
structural features of the transaction are completed.

After determining each underlying pools' projected base-case and
stressed scenario loss assumptions, Fitch will perform cash flow
analysis to ascertain the amount of collateral loss that the
transaction takes in the 'AAA-B' rating stresses.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2004-PWR5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of nine classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-PWR5 on review for
possible downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and poorly performing watchlisted loans.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 31, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 16% to
$1.04 billion from $1.23 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 120 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  The pool contains ten loans,
representing 19% of the pool, that have defeased and are secured
by U.S. Government bonds.

Eighteen loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including two of the top ten loans in the
pool.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.3 million (55% loss severity on
average).  Two loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest loan in special servicing is
the Reistertown Plaza Loan ($48.8 million -- 4.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a 791,661 square foot anchored retail center
located in Baltimore, Maryland.  The loan transferred into special
servicing on August 12, 2009 due to imminent maturity default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 623 Stewart
Avenue Loan ($6.7 million -- .6% of the pool), which is secured by
a 51,000 square foot retail center located in Garden City, New
York.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2009 due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class F, $15,416,000, currently rated Baa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa1 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class G, $9,250,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class H, $18,500,000, currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa3 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class J, $4,625,000, currently rated Ba1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class K, $4,625,000, currently rated Ba2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba2 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class L, $6,167,000, currently rated Ba3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba3 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class M, $4,625,000, currently rated B1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B1 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class N, $4,625,000, currently rated B2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B2 on 11/8/2004

  -- Class P, $3,083,000, currently rated B3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned B3 on 11/8/2004


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5, a U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities transaction backed by U.S. prime jumbo
mortgage loan collateral issued in 2003.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on seven classes from this transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  For
mortgage pools that continue to report increasing delinquencies,
S&P increased its cash flow stresses to account for potential
increases in monthly losses.  In order to maintain a 'B' rating on
a class, S&P assessed whether, in its view, a class could absorb
the base-case loss assumptions S&P used in its analysis.  In order
to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the
class could withstand losses exceeding its base-case loss
assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating category, up
to 235% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 127% of its
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of its base-case loss
assumptions under its analysis.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for this transaction.  The
underlying collateral for this deal consists of fixed- and
adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans secured by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5
                           Series 2003-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-B-2      07384MWL2     BB                   AA-
        I-B-3      07384MWM0     CC                   BBB
        I-B-4      07384MXN7     CC                   B
        II-B-1     07384MWP3     BBB                  AA+
        II-B-2     07384MWQ1     B                    A+
        II-B-3     07384MWR9     CC                   BBB+
        II-B-4     07384MXR8     CC                   BB+
        II-B-5     07384MXS6     CC                   B

                        Ratings Affirmed

                   Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-5
                          Series 2003-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      07384MWF5     AAA
                 I-A-2      07384MWG3     AAA
                 1-A-3      07384MWH1     AAA
                 I-X        07384MWJ7     AAA
                 II-A-1     07384MWN8     AAA
                 II-X       07384MXM9     AAA
                 I-B-1      07384MWK4     AA+


CABCO TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $52.65 Mil. Certs. to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on CABCO
Trust For JC Penney Debentures' $52.65 million series 1999-1 trust
certificates to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on the
underlying securities, J.C. Penney Co. Inc.'s 7.625% debentures
due March 1, 2097 ('BB+').

The rating action follows the April 7, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying securities to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


CBRE REALTY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of CRE CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes from CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1 Ltd., a commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation transaction (also known
as RFC CDO 2006-1 Ltd.).  At the same time, S&P removed all of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of
S&P's rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the three underlying loan assets
($85.0 million, 16.0% of the collateral pool) reported as
defaulted.  S&P's analysis included a review of the current credit
characteristics of all of the underlying collateral assets, as
well as the transaction's liability structure.

According to the March 19, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* Thirteen whole loans and senior-interest loans ($272.1 million,
  51.1%);

* Eight subordinate interest loans ($152.0 million, 28.5%); and

* Twenty-four commercial mortgage-backed securities tranches
  ($103.7 million, 19.5%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the nondefaulted loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its
adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral manager, Realty Finance
Corp., and the trustee, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, as well as
market and valuation data from third-party providers.  Based upon
its analysis, Standard & Poor's weighted average credit estimate
for these assets is 'b'.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes 19
defaulted assets: three loan assets ($85.0 million, 16.0%) and 16
commercial mortgage-backed securities tranches ($60.1 million,
11.3%).  Based on information provided by the collateral manager,
special servicer, and third-party market data providers, Standard
& Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates for the loan
assets reported as defaulted ranging from 0% to 68.3%.

The defaulted loan assets are:

* The Night Hotel senior interest loan ($35.0 million, 6.6%);

* The Ironhorse at Tramonto senior interest loan ($31.8 million,
  6.0%); and

* The Belle Island Village subordinated loan ($18.2 million,
  3.4%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing all
five overcollateralization but passing all interest coverage
tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
          A-2       BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
          B         BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
          C         BB                   A+/Watch Neg
          D         BB-                  A-/Watch Neg
          E         B+                   BBB+/Watch Neg
          F         B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
          G         B-                   BBB-/Watch Neg
          H         CCC+                 BB+/Watch Neg
          J         CCC-                 B+/Watch Neg
          K         CCC-                 CCC+/Watch Neg


CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series 1998-2:

  -- $6.2 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $72.9 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $19 million class E at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $57.1 million class F at 'A+/LS1'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $12.7 million class G at 'A-/LS2'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $22.2 million class H at 'B+/LS2'; Outlook Stable ;

  -- $9.5 million class I at 'B-/LS1'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- Interest-Only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable ;.

Fitch does not rate the $12.3 million class J.

The affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance and low
future expected losses following Fitch's prospective review of
potential stresses to the transaction.  As of the April 2010
distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has paid down
83.3% to $211.8 million from $1.3 billion at issuance.

There are 16 of the original 98 loans remaining in the
transaction.  There is one specially serviced loan as of the April
2010 remittance report, which accounts for 2.6% of the pool.
Fitch expects losses of approximately 1% of the remaining pool
balance.  These losses are expected to be absorbed by the non-
rated class J.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Three loans did
not pay off at maturity, but no loans incurred a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 108 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 108
tranches and confirmed the rating on 1 tranche from 12 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide in
2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB1

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3A, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1C, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWABS Trust 2005-HYB9

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-IO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-IO, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-IO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-IO, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CHYPS CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on the four
remaining classes of notes from CHYPS CBO 1997-1 Ltd./Corp., a
collateralized bond obligation managed by Delaware Investment
Advisers.

The downgrades reflect the issuer's failure to redeem the full
principal amounts due to the notes at the stated maturity date in
January 2010.  At the maturity date, the class B notes received
their scheduled interest and a partial principal payment of
approximately $6 million from a letter of credit originally
provided by Dresdner Bank AG, which was integrated into
Commerzbank AG (rated 'A+/F1+' by Fitch) in September 2008.  No
other class of notes received any principal payments at the
maturity date.  Class A-2A was the only other class to receive any
interest proceeds.  Since Fitch's last review in May 2009,
discounted total proceeds to the class A-2A, A-2B, and A-3 notes
represented between 0-10% of their outstanding principal amounts,
consistent with Fitch's 'RR6' Recovery Rating.  The class B notes
received approximately 17% of their outstanding principal amount,
consistent with Fitch's 'RR5' Recovery Rating.  Additional
distributions to the notes may occur after the maturity date, but
any distributions would be minimal and would not affect Fitch's
ratings.

Fitch subsequently withdraws the ratings of all classes of notes
since the notes have matured.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $13,983,013 class A-2A notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from
     'C/RR6' and withdrawn;

  -- $2,024,797 class A-2B notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from
     'C/RR6' and withdrawn;

  -- $57,100,000 class A-3 notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from
     'C/RR6' and withdrawn;

  -- $36,406,187 class B notes downgraded to 'D/RR5' from 'C/RR6'
     and withdrawn.


CORPORATE-BACKED CALLABLE: S&P Raises Ratings on Certs. to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on
Corporate-Backed Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney
Debenture-Backed Series 2007-1 Trust's class A-1 and A-2
certificates to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

S&P's ratings on the certificates are dependent on S&P's rating on
the underlying securities, J.C. Penney Co. Inc.'s 7.625%
debentures due March 1, 2097 ('BB+').

The rating actions follow the April 7, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying securities to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes and
downgraded six classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-CK3.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and concerns about refinancing risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Twenty-four loans, representing 16% of the pool,
mature within the next two years and have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio below 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage and the Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable
ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 30%
to $789.3 million from $1.13 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 146 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top 10 loans representing
36% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan, representing 6% of
the pool, with an investment grade underlying rating.  At last
review, a second loan representing 6% of the pool also had an
underlying rating.  However, because of a decline in performance
resulting in an increase in leverage, the loan is now analyzed as
part of the conduit pool.  Thirty-seven loans, representing 41% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 39%
of the pool.

Thirty-one loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the trust resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $35.8 million (48% loss
severity on average).  There are ten loans currently in special
servicing, representing 6% of the pool.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the Four Seasons Apartments Loan ($14.4 million -
1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 244-unit apartment
complex located in Raleigh, North Carolina.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in May 2009 due to imminent
default and is current.  A discounted payoff has been approved and
the borrower is attempting to refinance the property.  The loan
matures in April 2011.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 222 Bloomingdale
Road Loan ($10.2 million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by
a 142,000 square foot Class A office building located in White
Plains, New York.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in July 2009 due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days
delinquent.  A September 2009 appraisal valued the property at
$6.6 million (compared to $19.0 million at securitization).

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of office, multifamily, retail, and industrial properties.
Moody's estimates a $14.8 million aggregate loss for all of the
specially serviced loans (34% loss severity on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 16 loans,
representing 11% of the pool.  These loans mature within the next
24 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.
Moody's has estimated a $18.0 million aggregate loss on these
loans (22% loss severity on average based on a overall 50%
probability of default).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 77% and 74%, respectively, of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio, excluding the specially
serviced and troubled loans, is 73% compared to 90% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.42X and 1.54X, respectively, compared to
1.25X and 1.51X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 56 at last review.  The decline
in Herf has been partially offset by increased subordination due
to loan payoffs and amortization as well as improved performance
of the conduit portion of the pool.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Atrium Mall Loan
($43.6 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 214,800
square foot enclosed shopping center located approximately nine
miles west of downtown Boston in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.  As
of December 2009, the center was 85% occupied compared to 93% at
last review and 92% at securitization.  Despite a recent decrease
in occupancy, property performance remains in line with last
review.  The loan sponsor is the Simon Property Group.  The loan
has amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.55X, respectively, compared
to A1 and 1.60X at last review.

The loan that previously had an underlying rating is the Almaden
Plaza Loan ($43.5 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 545,000 square feet retail center located in San Jose,
California.  The property was 84% occupied as of September 2009
compared to 98% at last review.  The increase in vacancy is
largely attributable to two tenants, which occupied 14% of the net
rentable area (NRA), that have vacated the property since last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.53X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 7.0% of the outstanding pool
balance.  The largest conduit loan is the 4434 - 4444 El Camino
Real Loan ($26.5 million - 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by
a 96,600 square foot office building located approximately 10
miles northwest of San Jose in Los Altos, California.  The
property was built in 2000 and is 100% leased to Rambus, Inc.
through December 2010.  Rambus recently announced that it is
vacating at lease expiration.  The loan matures in April 2011.
Although property performance has been stable, Moody's valuation
reflects current market conditions due to the 100% rollover
exposure.  Moody's is concerned about refinance risk of this loan
and has assumed a a high probability of default at maturity.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 197% and 0.52X, respectively,
compared to 122% and 0.84X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Peninsula Marketplace Loan
($14.5 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000
square foot community shopping center located in Huntington Beach,
California.  The center is anchored by Ralph's Grocery (54% of the
NRA; lease expiration September 2020).  As of January 2010, the
property was 100% leased, the same as last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 89%
and 1.18X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is The Crossroads Loan
($14.1 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 83-unit
multifamily building located on the Lower East Side of New York
City.  The property is 95% leased compared to 90% at last review.
Despite the improved occupancy, property performance has declined
since last review due to lower rental income caused by a decrease
in rental rates and an increase in concessions.  The loan is on
master servicer's watchlist due to the decline in performance.
The loan matures in May 2011.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
106% and .90X, respectively, compared to 79% and 1.20X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-4, $ 564,412,005, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 08/10/2001

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 06/12/2001

  -- Class B, $42,262,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 06/29/2005

  -- Class C, $56,348,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa3 on 07/21/2006

  -- Class D, $11,268,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 07/09/2007

  -- Class E, $14,088,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa3 on 09/06/2007

  -- Class F, $25,357,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2; previously
     upgraded to Aa2 from A3 on 09/06/2007

  -- Class G-1, $8,000,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2; previously
     upgraded to A2 from Baa2 on 09/06/2007

  -- Class G-2, $11,722,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2;
     previously upgraded to A2 from Baa2 on 09/06/2007

  -- Class H, $14,088,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba1; previously
     assigned Ba1 on 06/12/2001

  -- Class J, $24,793,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 06/12/2001

  -- Class K, $9,016,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from B2 on 11/06/2008


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Confirms Rating on Series 2003-CPN1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of one class,
affirmed six classes and downgraded 12 classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-CPN1.  The downgrades are due higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and watchlisted loans
and concerns about loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Loans representing 20% of the pool mature within the
next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio less than 1.0X.

The confirmation and the affirmations are primarily due to key
rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed
DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

On April 8, 2010, Moody's placed 13 classes on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool.  This action
concludes the review of the transaction.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 23% to
$780.3 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 158 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool.  The pool contains 71 loans,
representing 13% of the pool, that are secured by residential
cooperative properties primarily located in New York City.  These
loans have a Aaa underlying rating, the same as at last review.
Twenty-two loans, representing 22% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at
last review represented 20% of the pool.

Twenty-one loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Five loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in a
$12.6 million aggregate loss (62% loss severity on average).  Five
loans, representing 16% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Northgate
Mall Loan ($74.4 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 716,000 square foot mall located in
Cincinnati, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in August 2009 for imminent default.  A number of tenants have
vacated the property since securitization, including JC Penney,
Dillards and Northgate Cinema.  The property's performance has
declined as a result of increased vacancy.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Michigan
Equities C Portfolio ($27.0 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is
secured by 16 office properties located in Michigan and totaling
369,000 square feet.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in June 2008 due to a non-monetary default and is now
90+ days delinquent.  The remaining three specially serviced loans
are secured by a mix of retail and multifamily properties.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $52 million loss (41% loss severity
on average) from the loans in special servicing.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on three poorly
performing loans, representing 1% of the pool, due to refinancing
risk.  Moody's estimates a $3.3 million aggregate loss for these
troubled loans (41% loss severity on average based on 75%
probability of default).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 78% and 56%, respectively, of the pool.
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio, excluding the specially
serviced and troubled loans, is 82% compared to 90% at last
review.

Excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR are 1.48X and 1.30X, respectively,
compared to 1.38X and 1.38X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 23 compared to 25 at
last review.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 9% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Fairfax Building Loan
($26.1 million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 210,000
square foot Class B office building located in Tyson's Corner,
Virginia.  The property has a diverse tenant roster with no tenant
occupying more 8% of the net rentable area.  The largest tenant is
Fitness 1st (8% of the NRA; lease expiration in March 2013).  As
of September 2009, the property was 83% leased compared to 90% at
last review.  The property's performance has declined since last
review due to higher vacancies and operating expenses.  The
decline in performance has been partially offset by amortization.
The loan has amortized 3% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 83% and
1.24X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Willoughby Commons Loan
($25.2 million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 335,408
SF anchored retail center located in Willoughby, Ohio.  The center
is shadow anchored by Target and the collateral's largest tenant
is BJ's Wholesale Club (33% of the NRA; lease expiration in March
2020).  As of December 2009, the property was 100% leased,
essentially the same as at last review.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.17X ,
respectively, compared to 88% and 1.17X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the East Windsor Village Loan
($19 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a 249,000 SF
anchored shopping center located in East Windsor, New Jersey.  The
largest tenant is Target (51% of the NRA; lease expiration in
January 2027).  As of October 2009, the property was 100%
economically leased and 76% physically occupied compared 78% at
last review.  Safeway (21% of the NRA; lease expiration in July
2026) has vacated the property but continues paying its rental
obligations.  The loan sponsor is Kimco Realty (Moody's unsecured
rating Baa1; negative outlook).  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
117% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 123% and 0.79X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $59,603,353, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2003

  -- Class A-2, $533,863,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2003

  -- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/13/2003

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/13/2003

  -- Class A-Y, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/13/2003

  -- Class B, $30,192,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on12/6/2008

  -- Class C, $10,064,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class D, $30,191,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class E, $10,064,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class F, $10,064,000, downgraded to A3 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class G, $17,612,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class H, $10,064,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class J, $20,127,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class K, $15,096,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class L, $7,548,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class M, $7,548,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class N, $6,290,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class O, $5,032,000, downgraded to C from Caa2 previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class P, $6,950,293, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on4/8/2010


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 20 2007-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of 20 classes of
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans.

Moody's has included Classes A-AB, A-3 and A-1A in the review
because these classes have the longest weighted average life among
the super senior Aaa classes with 30% initial credit support.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement cushion for the super senior classes is likely to be
eroded, creating a potential differential in expected loss between
those super senior classes benefiting first from paydowns and
those classes receiving paydowns last.  Although Moody's believe
that it is unlikely that Classes A-AB, A-3 and A-1A will actually
experience losses, the expected level of credit enhancement and
their priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $3.3 billion
from $3.4 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 254 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 30%
of the pool.

Eighty-five loans, representing 45% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including five of the top ten loans in the
pool.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14.5 million (46% loss severity on
average).  Thirty loans, representing 18% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest loan in special
servicing is the CVI Multifamily Apartment Portfolio Loan
($177.6 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by 20
multifamily properties totaling 2,990 units.  The properties are
located in seven markets, with the largest concentrations in
Austin, Texas and Sacramento, California.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing on April 17, 2009, due to
imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.

The second largest loan is the Mansions Portfolio Loan
($160.0 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured by four
multifamily properties totaling 1,417 units located in Austin and
Round Rock, Texas.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
on March 6, 2009, for imminent default and is currently 90+ days
delinquent.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$9.2 million, affecting Classes T through G.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and
extraordinary trust expenses.  Appraisal reductions totaling
$217.3 million have been recognized for 28 of the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's expects interest shortfalls to increase
due to the pool's high exposure to specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans and loans on
the watchlist.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-AB, $98,301,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 4/3/2007

  -- Class A-3, $758,000,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 4/3/2007

  -- Class A-1-A, $1,320,717,691, currently rated Aaa; on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 4/3/2007

  -- Class A-M, $212,148,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously confirmed at Aaa on 8/6/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $125,000,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously confirmed at Aaa on 8/6/2009

  -- Class A-J, $286,576,000, currently rated A3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from A2 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class B, $25,286,000, currently rated Baa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from A3 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class C, $37,929,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class D, $33,715,000, currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2
     on 8/6/2009

  -- Class E, $21,071,000, currently rated Ba1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class F, $29,501,000, currently rated Ba2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class G, $33,715,000, currently rated B2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Ba3 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class H, $37,929,000, currently rated Caa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from B2 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class J, $33,714,000, currently rated Caa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from B3 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class K, $37,930,000, currently rated Caa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1
     on 8/6/2009

  -- Class L, $8,428,000, currently rated Caa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2
     on 8/6/2009

  -- Class M, $12,643,000, currently rated Ca; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class N, $8,429,000, currently rated Ca; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class O, $8,429,000, currently rated Ca; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa3 on
     8/6/2009

  -- Class P, $8,428,000, currently rated Ca; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa3 on
     8/6/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2002-CKS4 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
pooled classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CKS4 and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  Concurrently, S&P raised its rating on the class
APM raked certificates from the same transaction.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on six other pooled classes from the same
transaction and removed one of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual
resolution of 15 of the 16 specially serviced assets and two loans
that S&P has determined to be credit-impaired.  In addition,
interest shortfalls, primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and special servicing fees, and principal
losses prompted us to lower S&P's ratings on classes O and P to
'D'.  As of the March 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, the
class P certificates had incurred a principal loss due to the
liquidation of the 1650 Arch Street loan in late March 2010.  S&P
expects interest shortfalls to class O to continue for the
foreseeable future.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.44x and a loan-to-value ratio of 75.4%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.23x and an LTV ratio of 94.4%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
27.3% and 30.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations noted
above exclude 27 defeased loans ($208.3 million, 20.8%), 15
specially serviced assets ($103.4 million, 10.3%), and two credit-
impaired loans ($10.9 million, 1.1%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for the 17 specially serviced and credit-impaired assets
and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

S&P raised its rating on the class APM raked certificates
following its analysis of the Arbor Place Mall loan.  The Arbor
Place Mall loan is the second-largest nondefeased loan in the pool
with a whole-loan balance of $68.6 million.  The whole-loan
balance consists of a $64.4 million senior pooled component that
makes up 6.8% of the pooled trust balance and a $4.2 million
subordinate nonpooled component.  Class APM derives 100% of its
cash flow from the subordinate nonpooled component of the Arbor
Place Mall loan.  The raised rating on class APM reflects steady
property performance and significant deleveraging of the loan from
amortization.

The affirmations of the ratings on the pooled principal and
interest certificates reflect subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating
on the class A-X interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, 16 assets
($107.1 million, 10.7%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: three are in their grace periods
($13.7 million, 1.4%); one is 60-plus days delinquent
($2.9 million, 0.3%); four are 90-plus days delinquent
($33.5 million, 3.3%); six are in foreclosure ($26.4 million,
2.6%); and two are real estate owned ($30.6 million, 3.1%).
Twelve of the specially serviced assets ($69.5 million, 6.9%) have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $19.2 million.  The
related monthly ASER amount on the March 2010 trustee remittance
report for these ARAs was $59,710.

Two ($44.2 million, 4.4%) of the 16 specially serviced assets are
among the top 10 real estate exposures, which S&P discuss in
detail below.

The McDonald Investment Center, a 23-story, 535,000-sq.-ft. office
building in Cleveland, is the fifth-largest real estate exposure
in the pool with a total exposure of $27.0 million (2.7%) and the
largest asset with the special servicer.  The property was 66.3%
occupied as of September 2009 and became REO on Feb. 1, 2010.  The
reported DSC was 1.29x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009.
LNR stated that it plans to stabilize the property before
marketing it for sale.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
eventual resolution of this asset.

The Redwood Business Park - Loan 2 ($17.1 million, 1.7%), the
second-largest asset with LNR, is the 10th-largest real estate
exposure in the pool and is secured by a 169,500-sq.-ft. suburban
office building in Petaluma, Calif.  The loan, which is 90-plus
days delinquent, was transferred to LNR on Oct. 16, 2009, due to
payment default.  The reported DSC for the six months ended
June 30, 2009, was 0.1x.  LNR is pursuing a deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The remaining 14 specially serviced assets ($62.9 million, 6.3%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.8% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for 13 ($59.3 million,
5.9%) of these specially serviced assets.  The weighted average
loss severity for these 13 assets was 31.8%.  The borrower is
operating under a forbearance agreement for the remaining
specially serviced asset ($3.7 million, 0.4%).

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined two
loans ($10.9 million, 1.1%) to be credit-impaired.  These two
loans are secured by multifamily properties in Florida and Texas.
One of the two loans has a reported DSC of 0.42x for the year-end
2009, while the other loan has a reported year-end 2009 cash flow
that was insufficient to cover operating expenses.  As a result,
S&P view these loans to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.

Two loans totaling $23.1 million (1.9%) were previously with the
special servicer and have since been returned to the master
servicer.  Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is one percent of all
future principal and interest payments.  One of the loans is a top
10 exposure, and the collection of the fee could, in S&P's
opinion, prompt sizeable shortfalls if the loan is paid off at
maturity.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 17, 2010, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool balance was $1.00 billion, which is 81.7% of the
balance at issuance.  The pool includes 134 loans and two REO
assets, down from 156 loans at issuance.  The master servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital, provided financial information for
98.3% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, a majority of which
was full-year 2008, interim-2009 data, or full-year 2009 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.41x for the pool based
on the servicer-reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.44x and 75.4%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude 27 defeased loans ($208.3 million, 20.8%), 15 specially
serviced assets ($103.4 million, 10.3%), and two credit-impaired
loans ($10.9 million, 1.1%).  S&P separately estimated losses for
the 17 specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  If S&P
include the specially serviced and credit-impaired assets in S&P's
calculation, its adjusted DSC would be 1.39x.  The transaction has
experienced $17.9 million in principal losses to date.  Seventeen
loans ($117.7 million, 11.7%) in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Twenty loans ($141.0 million, 14.1%) have a
reported DSC below 1.10x, 18 of which ($116.2 million, 11.6%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

              Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $361.0 million (36.4%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.48x for the
top 10 real estate exposures.  Two of the top 10 exposures
($41.5 million, 4.1%) appear on the master servicer's watchlist,
while two other top 10 real estate exposures ($44.2 million, 4.4%)
are with the special servicer.  S&P also discusses one additional
top 10 exposure due to its link to the class APM raked
certificates.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 exposures
are 1.43x and 77.8%, respectively.

The Arbor Place Mall loan ($64.4 million, 6.8%), the second-
largest real estate exposure in the pool, is secured by 473,450
sq. ft. of a 1.0 million-sq.-ft. enclosed regional mall in
Douglasville, Ga.  S&P based its analysis of this loan on the
borrower's operating statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2009,
and the borrower's rent rolls as of Dec. 31, 2009.  When deriving
S&P's adjusted net cash flow for the property, S&P also considered
the property's submarket rental rate and occupancy using market
data from Torto Wheaton Research and CoStar Realty Information
Inc.  The reported occupancy and DSC for the 12 months ended
Dec. 31, 2009, were 98.7% and 2.02x, respectively.  Using a cap
rate of 9.0%, S&P's adjusted valuation yielded a stressed LTV
ratio of 54.1%.

The Village at Chandler Crossings loan ($21.0 million, 2.1%), the
seventh-largest nondefeased exposure in the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The loan is secured by a
252-unit student housing complex in East Lansing, Mich.  The
reported DSC and occupancy for year-end 2009 were 0.56x and 81.7%,
respectively.  The borrower has indicated that it is attempting to
improve management and occupancy at the property.

The Forum at Gateways loan ($20.5 million, 2.0%), the eighth-
largest nondefeased exposure in the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The loan is secured by a
258,300-sq.-ft. anchored-retail-strip center in Sterling Heights,
Mich.  The reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2009, were 0.85x and 89.1%, respectively.  The borrower
has indicated that it is attempting to improve occupancy at the
property.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion and property evaluation criteria.  The
analysis is consistent with S&P's lowered, raised, and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    E         AA-         AA/Watch Neg                    12.16
    F         A           A+/Watch Neg                    10.17
    G         BBB+        A/Watch Neg                      8.63
    H         BBB-        A-/Watch Neg                     7.26
    J         CCC+        BBB/Watch Neg                    4.65
    K         CCC         BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.58
    L         CCC-        BB+/Watch Neg                    2.82
    M         CCC-        B/Watch Neg                      1.59
    N         CCC-        B-/Watch Neg                     0.98
    O         D           CCC/Watch Neg                    0.37
    P         D           CCC-/Watch Neg                   0.00

                           Rating Raised

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    APM       AA          A+                                N/A

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    D         AA+         AA+/Watch Neg                   13.84

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

    Class     Rating                     Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     ------                     ----------------------
    A-1       AAA                                         23.33
    A-2       AAA                                         23.33
    B         AAA                                         18.74
    C         AAA                                         16.90
    A-X       AAA                                           N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on three
tranches and put on watch for downgrade five tranches issued by
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR25.

The ratings are based on the methodology applied to all
transactions with small pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool
factor deals as those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the
outstanding collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the
pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50
loans remaining.

Moody's uses this methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals:

First, gross defaults are determined by applying lifetime roll-
rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current.  The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier.

The estimated defaults are subject to a floor (a minimum number of
defaults).  The minimum default floor is also based on the number
loans remaining in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool the higher the minimum default since each
loan represents a higher percentage of the pool.  The final
default number is then multiplied by expected loss severity to
arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.

Moody's is updating its approach for low pool factor deals.
Ratings on the senior certificates will be updated once an
approach is finalized.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR25 (Loans Remaining: Group 1&2 - 25 loans)

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Current Balance $1,466,767, Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Current Balance $817,006, Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 18, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Current Balance $2,621,599, Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 18, 2002
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-X, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-X, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Current Balance $913,378, Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on May
     9, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Current Balance $446,239, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Current Balance $300,184, Downgraded to C;
     previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to A3


DELAWARE HEALTH: S&P Junks Rating on Hospital Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Delaware Health Facilities Authority's hospital revenue bonds
series 2004 and 2005A, issued for Beebe Medical Center, to 'CCC'
from 'BBB+'.  S&P also lowered the underlying rating on the
authority's hospital variable-rate demand obligation series 2005B
bonds, also issued for Beebe Medical Center, to 'CCC' from BBB+'.
In addition, S&P placed the ratings on CreditWatch with developing
implications.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's lowered its
rating on the authority's series 2005B bonds to `A+/A-1' from
`AAA/A-1' due to the lowered SPUR.  The rating on the series 2005B
bonds is based on the application of joint criteria (assuming low
correlation), whereby the long-term component of the rating is
based jointly on Beebe Medical Center's long-term rating and PNC
Bank N.A.'s `A+' long-term rating.  The short-term component of
the rating is based on PNC's 'A-1' short-term rating.  PNC Bank
N.A. provides a letter of credit for the series 2005B bonds, which
expires on Sept. 21, 2012.  The series 2002 bonds, also supported
by a PNC LOC, are not rated by Standard & Poor's.

The downgrade reflects risk related to numerous lawsuits filed
against Beebe that have grown out of the arrest of a physician,
Dr.  Earl Bradley, a member of Beebe's medical staff, for sexual
abuse of over 100 patients in his private pediatric practice in
Lewes, Del.  The lawsuits allege Beebe admitted an incompetent
physician to the staff and failed to conduct competent oversight
of Dr. Bradley, and numerous other related complaints.  These
lawsuits leave Beebe exposed to potential liabilities that S&P
believes could force Beebe into bankruptcy.

As a result of this litigation, Beebe's management has indicated
that its malpractice and general liability insurers are denying
coverage of these allegations, leaving Beebe exposed to potential
large settlements if the insurers' position proves valid.  S&P
also do not know if insurance proceeds would be sufficient given
the nature of the claims and the number of victims, although to
date, the complaints in the lawsuits do not request any specific
dollar amount in damages.  In addition, S&P cannot project whether
an event of default will occur under the reimbursement agreement,
which would result in a mandatory tender on the bonds paid for by
PNC, with Beebe then required to repay PNC on an accelerated time
frame and higher rate of interest.  In the meantime, the bonds
have heightened remarketing risk, in S&P's opinion, which would
also leave Beebe in a position to repay PNC on an accelerated time
frame.  While S&P understand that Beebe has sufficient funds to
pay off the VRDOs, such action would reduce liquidity, and it is
not clear if Beebe will choose to do that given the lawsuits it is
facing.

Although S&P cannot predict the potential outcome of litigation,
S&P believes that even with a favorable court decision or out-of-
court settlement, Beebe's operating performance will be hampered
by significant costs for legal counsel and other staffing costs
related to the case, and Beebe also faces other risks to its
business base as a result of negative publicity.  In a worst case
scenario, Beebe may file itself into bankruptcy.  The placement of
the ratings on CreditWatch with developing implications reflects
that the ratings could be raised if, in S&P's view, Beebe
experiences positive developments, including a judicial finding
that Beebe does not have material culpability, a favorable
resolution with Beebe's insurers of the coverage issue coupled
with S&P's estimates that claims in excess of coverage will likely
be manageable, or a settlement of the claims that avoids Beebe's
bankruptcy.  Alternatively, the rating could be lowered if Beebe
files for bankruptcy or experiences financial decline such that
S&P believes payment of debt service is uncertain.

S&P notes that, in its view, Beebe continues to perform adequately
from a financial perspective and that patient volumes have been
maintained through Feb. 28, 2010, the latest date for which S&P
has received data.


DLJ MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 1996-CF1 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1996-CF1,
and assigns Loss Severity Ratings:

  -- $1.6 million class B-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.3 million class B-4 at 'BB+/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1A through B-2 have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
the $2.8 million class C certificates.

The affirmations are due to minimal Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and the
concentrated nature of the transaction with only three loans
remaining.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
94.3% to $26.4 million from $470.1 million at issuance.

There are currently three loans remaining in the pool, which
mature between February 2011 and January 2016.  Two of the
remaining loans are fully amortizing.  The loans are out of their
respective lockout periods and can prepay, provided a flat
percentage prepayment penalty or yield maintenance is paid.  The
weighted average interest rate is 8.31%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating income and
applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to
determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  All of the remaining loans passed Fitch's refinance
test.


EMBARCADERO AIRCRAFT: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings withdraws the ratings on these classes of
Embarcadero Aircraft Securitization Trust due to a lack of
sufficient information to maintain the ratings:

  -- Class A-1 notes 'B-/DR1';
  -- Class A-2 notes 'B/DR1';
  -- Class B, C, and D notes 'C/DR6'.


FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 2001-3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings to First Union National Bank - Bank
of America, N.A. Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2001-3, as indicated:

  -- $14.2 million class N to 'B/LS4' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.7 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';
  -- $5.7 million class P to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Outlooks and
LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $601.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $49.4 million class A-2F at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $42.6 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.2 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.1 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.1 million class G at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.2 million class H at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.2 million class J at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.8 million class K at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.5 million class L at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.5 million class M at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Class A-1 has paid-in-full.  Fitch does not rate the $13.7 million
class Q or the subordinate component class V-1, V-2, V-3, V-4, and
V-5 certificates.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 1.5% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $16.8 million.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 21.8% to $890.3 million from $1.1 billion at
issuance.  Thirty-eight of the remaining 119 loans have defeased
(34.7%).

As of April 2010, there are five specially serviced loans (4.5%).
The largest specially serviced loan is secured by a 158,248 square
foot office building located in Atlanta, GA.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in December 2009 due to the borrowers request
for relief.  The property is now in foreclosure.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Nineteen loans did not payoff at maturity with two
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


FIRSTPLUS HOME: Moody's Cuts Ratings to 'Caa1'; Reviews 30 Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 and placed on the
review for further possible downgrade the ratings of 30 tranches
from seven second lien RMBS transactions issued by FirstPlus Home
Loan Owner Trust, Keystone Owner Trust and Empire Funding Home
Loan Owner Trust.  Moody's has also downgraded to Ba1 and placed
on the review for further possible downgrade the ratings of three
tranches from one RMBS transaction issued by United National Home
Loan Owner Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of seasoned high LTV closed end second lien.

The actions are a due to the ongoing legal actions against the
trusts in the states of Arkansas and Missouri and due to the
related suspension of payments of the principal and interest to
the bondholders in the majority of these deals by the trustee
(U.S. Bank National Association).  At this time, total costs to
the trusts associated with paying judgments and legal fees and
resulting writedowns are unknown.  Moody's may take further
actions on these trusts as more information becomes available.

The RMBS trusts listed below are defendants in class action
lawsuits in the states of Arkansas and Missouri, which claim that
certain Arkansas and Missouri mortgage loans held by the Trusts
violate state usury laws.  In March 2010, the Arkansas circuit
court entered a judgment against some of the trusts for damages in
the amount of two times the amount of interest paid to the trusts
by the affected borrowers, additional prejudgment interest, and
forgiveness of the entire principal balance on three of the loans
that exceeded interest rates of 17%.  The Arkansas judgment also
held the trusts to be liable for legal fees of the plaintiffs.
The Missouri case is ongoing after a federal circuit court
reversed a lower court in August 2009 holding that the usury
claims may continue.

With the exception of United National Home Loan Owner Trust 1991-
1, bondholders in these deals are not currently receiving any
distributions of principal and interest.  The trustee suspended
these payments in order to preserve funds for payment of
judgments, legal fees and other costs.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Empire funding Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-1

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FIRSTPLUS Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-2

  -- A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FIRSTPLUS Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-3

  -- A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FIRSTPLUS Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4

  -- A-8, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: FIRSTPLUS Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-5

  -- A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Keystone Owner Trust 1998-2

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Keystone Owner Trust 1998-P1

  -- A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to Caa1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: United National Home Loan Owner Trust 1999-1

  -- A, Downgraded to Ba1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade


FORD MOTOR: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 Tranches for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade seventeen
tranches from ten auto loan securitizations sponsored by Ford
Motor Credit Company during 2007 and 2008.  The actions are a
result of updated lower lifetime loss expectations as well as
build up in credit enhancement relative to remaining losses due to
the non-declining reserve accounts and sequential payment
structure of the transactions.  Although most of the affected
transactions are performing weaker than Moody's original loss
expectations, the build-up of credit enhancement has more than
offset increases in lifetime cumulative loss projections.

Moody's current lifetime cumulative net loss projections for the
affected transactions ranges between 2.50% and 3.00% of the
original pool balance.  This is up from the original range (at the
time of closing) of 1.25%.  to 1.35% for the 2007, and 1.50% to
3.00% for the 2008 transactions.  During its review period,
Moody's will continue to refine its assessment of the pool
performance relative to the available credit enhancement levels.

For 2007 transactions, total hard credit enhancement (excluding
available excess spread and yield supplement overcollateralization
(YSOC)) for Class C tranches ranges from approximately 8.50% to
11.00% of the outstanding collateral pool balances adjusted for
YSOC.  Hard credit enhancement for Class D tranches is
approximately 1.90%.  The YSOC compensates for the lower APR on
the subvened loans, and declines each month based on a fixed
schedule.  Currently, YSOC for these transactions range between
approximately 7.65% to 8.50%.

For 2008 transactions, total hard credit enhancement for Class B
tranches ranges from approximately 10.00% to 17.50% of the
outstanding collateral pool balances adjusted for YSOC.  Hard
credit enhancement for Class C tranches ranges from approximately
5.65% to 7.40%.  YSOC for these transactions range between
approximately 7.75% to 9.10%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. C, Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec 23, 2009 Upgraded to Aa1

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec 23, 2009 Upgraded to Aa3

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec 23, 2009 Upgraded to Aa3

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec 23, 2009 Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. D, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 28, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-B

  -- Cl. C, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec 23, 2009 Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. D, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Oct 24, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2008-1

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jan 25, 2008 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jan 25, 2008 Assigned A2

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2008-2

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on May 22, 2008 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on May 22, 2008 Assigned A2

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2008-A

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jan 30, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Mar 3, 2009 Downgraded to A3

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2008-B

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Apr 25, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Apr 25, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned A3

Issuer: Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2008-C

  -- Cl. B, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 2, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. C, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 2, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned A2


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2002-3 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity
ratings to GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2002-3.

The affirmations are due to stable performance and defeasance,
along with limited Fitch expected losses upon disposition of
specially serviced assets along with expected losses from Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses.  Fitch expects losses of
approximately 1.6%, or $14.3 million from loans in special
servicing and loans that cannot refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance.  These losses will be absorbed by the class not
rated by Fitch.  The majority of Fitch's expected losses are
associated with loans currently in special servicing.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 25.1% to $876.4 million from $1.2 billion at
issuance.  Of the remaining 109 loans, 24 (23.1%) have defeased.

There are three specially serviced loans in the pool (5.1%).  Two
of the loans have foreclosed and one is real estate owned.

The two largest specially serviced assets (4.7%) are cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans owned by the same
borrower secured by two multifamily buildings located in downtown
Denver, CO.  The loans transferred in July 2009 for imminent
default.  There was a holdback reserve and that money was used to
pay down principal.

The third largest specially serviced asset (0.4%) is a 72,357
square foot retail building located in Jackson, TN.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2009 for monetary
default.  The building became REO in October 2009.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
eight loans (6.9% of the pool) incurred a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- $90.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $553.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.3 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.6 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.2 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.6 million class G at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.7 million class H at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27.8 million class J at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.2 million class K at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.8 million class L at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10.2 million class M at 'BB/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.8 million class N at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.9 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $17.6 million class P certificates.


GEMINI PLC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Gemini plc's five classes of CMBS
notes, due July 2016:

  -- GBP569.15m class A due July 2016 (XS0273575107): downgraded
     to 'CCC' from 'BBB-'; assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) of
     'RR3'

  -- GBP27.76m class B due July 2016 (XS0273576289): downgraded to
     'CCC' from 'BB'; assigned 'RR6'

  -- GBP101.8m class C due July 2016 (XS0273576446): downgraded to
     'CC' from 'CCC'; Recovery Rating revised to 'RR6' from 'RR5'

  -- GBP81.4m class D due July 2016 (XS0273576792) affirmed at
     'CC'; 'RR6'

  -- GBP70.21m class E due July 2016 (XS0273576958): affirmed at
     'CC'; 'RR6'

There has been a fall in net operating income by some 19% since
the January 2009 IPD (interest payment date).  Fitch estimates a
fall in property value of around 40% since the portfolio was last
valued in September 2008.  Note collateral consists of a GBP850.4m
interest-only senior loan originated in November 2006 by Barclays
Bank PLC ('AA'/Stable/'F1+').  The collateral is secured, along
with a GBP105.8m junior loan, on 34 generally secondary quality
properties.

The vacancy rate has risen to 13.1% from 7.8% of the estimated
rental value since the January 2009 IPD, due to a combination of
lease roll-offs and tenant administrations.  As a consequence, in
the last two IPDs, NOI generated by the portfolio has fallen below
the level needed to service interest on the senior loan.  As of
the January IPD, GBP2.44m had been drawn down under a GBP64m
liquidity facility in order to top-up senior loan interest,
increasing note leverage.  The servicer, CBRE, anticipates that
senior interest shortfalls will continue in the order of GBP2.5m
to GBP2.8m for the next three IPDs, further increasing transaction
leverage.  Moreover, an additional 10% of income will roll-off by
2012 unless tenants on leases due to break or expire elect to
renew.  The risk of continued falls in income may force the
servicer to bring forward the liquidation date.

However, there are senior and junior borrower-level interest rate
swaps in place.  The senior swap matures in July 2026, ten years
after loan maturity and seven years after bond legal maturity.
Potential swap breakage costs, currently estimated by the servicer
on 24 March 2010 at GBP127.7m, would rank senior to loan
principal.  Although the mark-to-market value of the swaps should
decline over time along with the swaps' duration, the long-
datedness of the senior swap exposes the bonds to added costs
unless interest rates rise.  This might discourage the servicer
from liquidating early, in favour of accruing unpaid interest on
the loan, although this will continue to be in the balance for
some time, and will depend on the servicer's ability to reverse
the declines in income.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the transaction.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1997-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.'s
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1997-C1:

  -- $84.8 million class G to 'BB/LS2' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings to these classes as
indicated:

  -- Interest-only class X certificates at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $25.5 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $55.4 million class H.  Classes A-1, A-2,
A-3, B, C, D and E have paid in full.

The downgrade is due to interest shortfalls caused from the loans
currently in special servicing and the master servicers recoup of
prior advances.  Fitch expects class G will be susceptible to
shortfalls going forward.  In addition, Fitch expects losses of
approximately 7.3%, or $10.9 million from loans in special
servicing and loans that cannot refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance.  These losses will be absorbed by the class not
rated by Fitch.  The majority of Fitch's expected losses are
associated with loans currently in special servicing.  As of the
April 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has
paid down 91.1% to $150.8 million from $1.7 billion at issuance.
Of the remaining 39 loans, 1 (17.3%) has defeased.

There are six specially serviced loans in the pool (9.5%).  One
loan is current, one is delinquent and four are REO.  Five of the
specially serviced assets (8.5%) are single tenant retail stores
that were formerly occupied by Circuit City which vacated when the
company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in November
2008 and four of which are REO.  Based on the current Fitch
valuation, losses are expected.

The other specially serviced loan (0.9%) is secured by a 52,419
square foot office building located in Plantation, FL.  The loan
transferred to special servicing due to pending litigation over
several code enforcement violations and amongst two shareholders
of the borrower.  The loan remains current.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, no loans incurred a loss
when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 15
tranches from 2 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by GMACM.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AA1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AF1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40
tranches and upgraded the rating on one tranche from five RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by GMACM
Mortgage Loan Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


GRAMERCY REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Gramercy Real Estate
CDO 2007-1 Ltd./LLC reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 18.3%.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.

The transaction is collateralized primarily by commercial mortgage
backed securities and both senior and subordinate commercial real
estate debt: 74.5% are CMBS, 7.8% are either whole loans or A-
notes and 17.7% are either B-notes or mezzanine loans.  Fitch
expects significant losses upon default for the subordinate
positions since they are generally highly leveraged debt classes.
Two loans (5.9%) are currently defaulted while one loan (5.4%) is
considered a Fitch Loan of Concern.  Fitch expects full losses on
the defaulted assets.

Gramercy 2007-1 is a $1.1 billion CRE collateralized debt
obligation managed by GKK Manager LLC, an affiliate of Gramercy
Capital Corp. The transaction has a five-year reinvestment period
which ends in August 2012.

As of the March 2010 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations,
the CDO was substantially invested: CMBS, primarily A-J bonds,
(74.5%), CRE whole loans/A-notes (7.8%), mezzanine loans (12.2%),
and B-notes (5.5%).  All principal coverage tests are now failing,
meaning that beginning with the next payment period, all interest
(after class B) and principal proceeds will be redirected to
redeem the class A-1 notes.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 25.5% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline for the CRE loan assets is 14% from the most
recent available cash flows (generally third or fourth quarter
2009).  Fitch estimates that recoveries will average 28.3% in the
base case.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
defaulted mezzanine loan (4%) secured by ownership interests in a
multifamily property located in New York, NY.  The property
contains over 11,000 residential units and approximately 120,000
square feet of office and retail space.  The sponsors' plan was to
convert the majority of rent controlled units to market rates;
however, the plan has faced significant economic and legal
hurdles.  The loan became delinquent in January 2010, and the
special servicer is attempting to gain control of the property via
judicial foreclosure.  Fitch modeled no recovery on this highly
leveraged mezzanine position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a defaulted B-note (1.9%) secured by a jewelry show room
building located in Los Angeles, CA.  While occupancy was above
90% as of September 2009, the sponsor had granted lease
concessions to the tenants in light of recessionary pressures.
The loan is currently 90+ days delinquent and the special servicer
has initiated foreclosure.  Fitch modeled a full loss in the base
case.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan secured by a full service hotel located in
Anaheim, CA.  The property has experienced steep cash flow
declines as a result of the deterioration in group and leisure
travel.  Fitch modeled a term default with a partial loss in its
base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to 'Surveillance Criteria
for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs,' which, for the CRE
loan assets, applies stresses to property cash flows and uses debt
service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels.
Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term
capitalization rates.  For the CMBS assets, the analysis uses the
Portfolio Credit Model to project portfolio default levels.
Recoveries are based on the tranche thickness and seniority of
each security.  The blended default levels were then compared to
the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model under
the various default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as
described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in
CDOs.' Based on this analysis, the credit characteristics of
classes A-1 are generally consistent with the 'BB' rating
category.  The credit characteristics of A-2 are generally
consistent with the 'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes A-3 through J are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement.

Based on this analysis, classes A-3 through C-FL/C-FX are
consistent with the 'CCC' rating category, meaning default is a
real possibility.  Fitch's base case loss expectation of 18.3%
exceeds these classes' respective current credit enhancement
levels.  The ratings for classes D through F are deemed to be
consistent with the 'CC' rating category, meaning default appears
probable given that these classes' credit enhancement levels are
below the total losses expected from the currently defaulted
assets and Loans of Concern in the pool.  The ratings for classes
G-FL/G-FX through J are deemed to be consistent with the 'C'
rating category, meaning default appears inevitable given that
these classes' credit enhancement levels are below the total
losses expected from the currently defaulted assets.

Classes A-1 and A-2 were assigned a Negative Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation of further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.  These classes were also assigned Loss
Severity ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS4' indicating each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes A-3 through J were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(25.5% and 28.3%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.

The assignment of 'RR3' to class A-3 reflects modeled recoveries
of 50%-70% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery
proceeds are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($47 million);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($34.6 million);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($81.5 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($146.4 million).

The assignment of 'RR4' to class B-FL reflects modeled recoveries
of 30%-50% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery
proceeds are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($0);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($10.1 million);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($10.1 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($15.8 million).

The assignment of 'RR4' to class B-FX reflects modeled recoveries
of 30%-50% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery
proceeds are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($0);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($6.8 million);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($6.8 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($10.2 million).

Classes C-FL/C-FX through J are assigned a Recovery Rating of
'RR6' as the present value of the recoveries in each case is less
than 10% of each class' principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned Outlooks, LS and RR ratings to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $701,920,398 class A-1 notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $121,000,000 class A-2 notes to 'B/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $116,600,000 class A-3 notes to 'CCC/RR3' from 'BB';

  -- $29,500,000 class B-FL notes to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B';

  -- $20,000,000 class B-FX notes to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B';

  -- $20,150,000 class C-FL notes to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $3,500,000 class C-FX notes to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $4,400,000 class D notes to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $4,950,000 class E notes to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $9,350,000 class F notes to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $2,950,000 class G-FL notes to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $2,000,000 class G-FX notes to C/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $2,000,000 class H-FL notes to 'C/RR6' from 'CC';

  -- $5,150,000 class H-FX notes to 'C/RR6' from 'CC';

  -- $13,750,000 class J notes to 'C/RR6' from 'CC'.

Additionally, classes A-1 through C are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2006-GG7 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes and
downgraded 13 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp. Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-GG7.  The downgrades
are due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans and
concerns about refinancing risk for loans approaching maturity in
an adverse environment.  Eleven loans, representing 7% of the
pool, mature within the next 24 months.  Nine of these loans,
representing 5% of the pool, have a Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio less than 1.00X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

On February 3, 2010 Moody's placed 13 classes of this transaction
on review for possible downgrade due to potential losses from
specially serviced and other poorly performing loans.  This action
concludes Moody's review of this transaction.  The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $3.45 billion
from $3.61 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 132 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 46%
of the pool.  At last review the pool included one loan,
representing 6% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  However, because of a decline in performance and
increased leverage this loan is now analyzed as part of the
conduit pool.

Thirty-three loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $82.0 million realized loss (95% loss severity on
average).  Sixteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Pacific Center Loan ($121.2 million -- 3.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 439,000 square foot office property
located in San Diego, California.  The borrower is an affiliate of
Maguire Properties.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in October 2009 for imminent default.  The property was 79% leased
as of September 2009 and the property's net operating income has
declined 24% since securitization.  Of the remaining specially
serviced loans, 11 loans are either 90+days delinquent, real
estate owned or in the process of foreclosure.  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $49.2 million appraisal reduction for nine
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$135.2 million loss for all specially serviced loans (46% loss
severity on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on four poorly
performing loans, representing 3% of the pool, due to refinancing
risk.  Moody's estimates a $27.6 million aggregate loss for these
troubled loans (30% loss severity on average based on 75%
probability of default).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and partial year 2009
operating results for 95% and 53% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV ratio is 110% compared to 153% at Moody's prior review
in February 2009.  Moody's prior review was part of the first
quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2009 vintage conduit and fusion
CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.28X and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
1.02X and 0.84X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 36, compared to 37 at last review.

The loan that previously had an underlying rating is the One New
York Plaza Loan ($196.0 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 2,417,000 square foot Class A office building located
in downtown Manhattan.  The property was 100% leased as of
December 2009, essentially the same as at last review.  Major
tenants include Wachovia Securities (54% of the net rentable area;
lease expiration December 2014), The Goldman Sachs Group (23% of
the NRA; lease expiration December 2010) and Fried Frank Harris
(16% of the NRA; lease expiration February 2024).  Although
performance has been stable since last review, Moody's is
concerned about the property's high rollover exposure at the end
of 2010.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 80% and 1.21X at last full review.

The top three conduit loans represent 18% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Investcorp Retail Portfolio Loan
($248.4 million - 7.2% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $260.1 million loan.  The loan is secured by 23
shopping centers located in three Texas MSA's (Dallas, Houston and
San Antonio).  Since securitization, six properties have been
released from the loan collateral reducing total net rentable area
to 2.2 million square feet from 2.8 million square feet at
securitization.  As of March 2009, the portfolio was 89% leased
compared to 84% at year end 2008 and 93% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 139% and 0.74X, respectively,
compared to 142% and 0.75X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 55 Corporate Drive Loan
($190.0 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a three-
building, 669,700 square foot office complex located in
Bridgewater, New Jersey.  The property is 100% leased to Aventis
Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating of parent, Sanofi-Avenis, is
A1, stable outlook) through November 2023.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 133% and 0.71X, respectively, compared to 205%
and 0.49X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the J.P. Morgan International
Plaza I & II Loan ($184.4 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is
secured by two office buildings located in Farmers Branch, Texas
and totaling 756,900 square feet.  The buildings are 100% leased
to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (Moody's senior unsecured rating is
Aa1, negative outlook) through February 2018.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 224%
and 0.39X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $17,366,562, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-2, $ 260,782,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-3 $101,915,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-AB, $125,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-4, $1,845,339,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-1-A, $94,593,517, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 8/16/2006

  -- Class A-M, $361,165,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade 2/3/2010

  -- Class A-J, $261,845,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     2/3/2010

  -- Class B, $27,088,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class C, $54,175,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class D, $27,087,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class E, $22,573,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class F, $45,146,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class G, $31,602,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class H, $45,145,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class J, $40,632,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class K, $36,116,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class L, $13,544,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class M, $18,058,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 2/3/2010

  -- Class N, $17,322,250, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to
     C from Caa3 on 2/3/2010

  -- Class O, $0, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to C from
     Ca on 2/3/2010

  -- Class P, $0, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to C from
     Ca on 2/3/2010

  -- Class Q, $0, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to C from
     Ca on 2/3/2010


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2
Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transaction, and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed three other ratings from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
updated U.S. CRE CDO criteria, which was the primary driver of
S&P's rating actions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's estimated
asset-specific recovery rates for the three underlying loan assets
($39.9 million, 16.2% of the collateral pool) reported as
impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of the current credit
characteristics of all of the underlying collateral assets, as
well as the transaction's liability structure.

According to the March 18, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* Eight subordinate interest loans ($127.8 million, 51.9%);

* Three commercial mortgage-backed securities tranches
  ($65.5 million, 26.7%); and

* Three whole loans and senior-interest loans ($52.5 million,
  21.4%).

Standard & Poor's reviewed and updated credit estimates for all of
the nonimpaired loan assets.  S&P based the analyses on its
adjusted net cash flows, which S&P derived from the most recent
financial data provided by the collateral manager, Guggenheim
Structured Real Estate Advisors LLC, and the trustee, Bank of
America Merrill Lynch, as well as market and valuation data from
third-party providers.

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes four
impaired assets: three loan assets ($39.9 million, 16.2%) and one
CMBS tranche ($26.0 million, 10.6%).  Based on information
provided by the collateral manager, special servicer, and third-
party market data providers, Standard & Poor's estimated asset-
specific recovery rates for the loan assets reported as impaired
ranging from 0% to 28.9%.  The impaired loan assets are:

* The Universal Boulevard Orlando senior interest loan
  ($15.2 million, 6.2%);

* The Steeplegate Mall subordinated loan ($14.3 million, 5.8%);
  and

* The Resorts International subordinated loan ($10.3 million,
  4.2%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing three
overcollateralization tests but passing all interest coverage
tests.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 Ltd.
                   Commercial real estate notes

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class    To                    From
          -----    --                    ----
          A        BBB-                  AA+/Watch Neg
          B        BB+                   A-/Watch Neg
          C        B                     BB+/Watch Neg
          D        CCC-                  CCC+/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 Ltd.
                   Commercial real estate notes

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class    To                    From
          -----    --                    ----
          E         CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg
          F         CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg
          S         AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg


HAMPTON ROADS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded these classes of Hampton Roads PPV,
LLC military housing taxable revenue bonds (Hampton Roads
Unaccompanied Housing Project), 2007 series A:

  -- Approximately $210 million class I downgraded to 'A-' from
     'AA';

  -- Approximately $58 million class II downgraded to 'BB+' from
     'A';

  -- Approximately $9 million class III downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BBB'.

The bonds remain on Rating Watch Negative.  Fitch first assigned a
Negative Outlook to the bonds on May 1, 2009, and placed the
ratings on Rating Watch Negative on April 1, 2010.

Rating Rationale:

  -- This rating action is based on Fitch's receipt of additional
     data that was not made available to Fitch when the ratings
     were affirmed on Feb. 16, 2010.  This data revises the
     schedule of the delivery of units to reflect construction
     delays and demonstrates higher project vacancy rates.  The
     rating action also incorporates revised developer pro forma
     cash flows which demonstrate projected debt service coverage
     ratios which are below original projections and reflects the
     presence of a weak surety bond provider satisfying the debt
     service reserve fund requirement.  The revised projections
     reflect these:

  -- A four-month delay in delivering units for the remaining
     portion of the project;

  -- Increased vacancy rates;

  -- Higher than anticipated project operating expenses;

  -- Reduced interest income due to the cancellation of the AIG
     guaranteed investment contract and the reinvestment of
     proceeds in lower yielding instruments.

The revised delivery dates for the remaining project units as
described in the developer updates are largely due to weather
conditions in the fall of 2009 and were further compounded by
severe storms in January and February 2010.  The delay in the
delivery of 385 units (770 beds) from the original expected date
of March 2010 to the revised dates of April 2010 and July 2010
will have a negative impact on the project's revenue and net
operating income pledged to bondholders.  The developer reports
that the NOI shortfall will be addressed through the use of excess
project operating reserves, and the developer does not anticipate
a need to tap debt service reserve funds for the upcoming June 1,
2010 debt service payment.  However, revised developer debt
service coverage projections which incorporate a 12% vacancy
assumption (up from the 5% assumption used in the analysis when
the initial bond ratings were assigned) demonstrate these reduced
coverage for 2010:

  -- Class I bonds: 1.38
  -- Class II bonds: 1.06
  -- Class III bonds: 1.02

Once the Fitch stress assumption of 20% vacancy is applied, the
debt service coverage levels drop to 1.22, 0.94 and 0.9,
respectively.  Fitch applied a higher vacancy assumption to
account for these: 1) the current project vacancy (10.6%
reflecting January 2010 through March 2010); 2) the large number
of units that are planned to come on line which will need to be
absorbed in July 2010; and 3) the amount of bad debt the project
has experienced to date.

The downgraded ratings also reflect a weak debt service reserve
fund given that AMBAC serves as the surety bond provider.  Fitch
does not assign any value to the AMBAC surety bonds and does not
rely on their presence in the event of project financial
deterioration.

The bonds remain on Rating Watch Negative as Fitch awaits the
delivery and absorption of the remaining units in July 2010 under
the revised construction schedule.  In addition to monitoring the
remaining construction delivery and lease-up of the units, Fitch
will also continue to monitor project operating expenses and BAH
levels for 2011.


HARBORPLACE MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2000-C5C Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirms two classes and downgrades one
class from Gallery at Harborplace Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C5C.  These
classes were initially watchlisted in April 2009 following the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of General Growth Properties and
affiliates on April 16, 2009, due to Moody's concerns about
potential non-reimbursed interest shortfalls.  In November 2009,
GGP reached agreement on new loan terms with lenders and special
servicers that would allow for the transfer of CMBS affected loans
back to the respective master servicers.  This action concludes
Moody's review of the transaction.  The rating action is a result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

This transaction is supported by a B note secured by the
borrower's interest in Gallery at Harborplace, a 404,000 square
foot office and retail mixed use complex located within the Inner
Harbor development in Baltimore, Maryland.  The property was
developed in 1987 by The Rouse Company which was acquired by GGP
in 2004.  The A note was securitized in the LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2000-C5 transaction.

Following discussions with the special servicer regarding the loan
modification terms and the payment priorities stipulated within
the inter-creditor agreement, Moody's have concluded that interest
shortfalls will continue to be incurred on these classes due to
reimbursement of advancing by the special servicer and a 1% work-
out fee being charged by the special servicer.  This fee is
assessed on monthly interest and principal payment as well as any
balloon payment on both the A and B notes, and will be borne by
the B note.  However, Moody's expect that partial reimbursement of
these shortfalls will occur at loan maturity in June 2014.  While
classes B-1 and B-2 should fully recover their interest
shortfalls, a non-recoverable balance will result in an expected
recovery rate on the class B-3 which is not commensurate with the
existing rating level.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B-1, $3,200,000, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on
     3/25/2010 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-2, $5,100,000, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     3/25/2010 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-3, $2,200,000, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     3/25/2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HEDGED MUTUAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust's series 2005-2 and 2007-1
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on six classes from six
other Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust transactions and removed them
from CreditWatch negative.  S&P also affirmed four 'AA' ratings on
four transactions issued in 2004 that were not on CreditWatch.

The downgrades of the notes from series 2005-2 and 2007-1 reflect
S&P's view of several factors, including delays in these
transactions' receipt of residuals from Hedged Mutual Fund Fee
Trust transactions issued in 2003 resulting from volatility in the
financial markets in 2008 and 2009.  The cash flows for these
transactions come from securitized mutual fund 12b-1 fees and
contingent deferred sales charges, both of which generally are
sensitive to fluctuations in the net asset value of each
associated mutual fund.

Mutual fund fee securitizations generally expose investors to the
risk that the anticipated cash flows from future collections of
12b-1 fees and CDSCs could be insufficient to cover the timely
payment of interest and ultimate return of principal.  Because
these fees are calculated at a fixed rate that is based on the NAV
of the mutual fund, the NAV of the underlying funds becomes the
primary driver of bond performance.  In S&P's view, the financial
risk of these securitizations typically centers on the fact that
the path of the NAV could produce insufficient collections to
support the timely payment of interest and the ultimate return of
principal on the securitizations.

In assessing the overall credit quality of these securitizations,
Standard & Poor's analyzed a number of credit statistics,
including default frequency, net present value coverage, and
principal paydown ratios.  The default frequency metric assesses
the probability that total collections will not be sufficient to
fully repay noteholders.  The NPV coverage ratio is akin to
overcollateralization and is the ratio of the NPV of excess cash
flow to the current principal amount of the notes.  Principal
paydown ratios are derived by calculating the rate at which
principal is paid down on a month-to-month basis and the overall
percentage of principal retired to date.  Because these mutual
fund fee securitizations typically utilize pass-through and
sequential-pay structures, they typically use collections that
remain after trust expenses and noteholder interest are paid to
pay down the principal of the rated notes, in accordance with the
transaction documents.

Early-redemption fees generally provide a high rate of collection
and therefore could have the potential to reduce the outstanding
liabilities more quickly.  A reduction in the outstanding mutual
funds' investment shares generally reduces future 12b-1
collections.  Therefore, S&P believes that the timing of
redemptions could have a beneficial or harmful effect on a
securitization, depending on the current lump sum collections,
loss of future collections, and changes to the outstanding fund
NAVs.

Most of the rated Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust securitizations
have index put options from Citibank N.A.  These hedging
mechanisms (which were fully funded on or before the closing dates
of the transactions) were incorporated into these transactions to
mitigate investor concerns about the inherent market volatility
that could reduce the 12b-1 collections.  The put options are
structured as cash settlement contracts and have notional
references to equity market indexes.

If the hedges are "in the money" (when the option's strike price
is above the market price of the underlying index) on each strike
date, the trust will receive the difference between the strike
value of the put and the level of the index, multiplied by the
number of contracts, multiplied by $100.  While the probability of
default, or the default frequency, decreases due to the embedded
hedges, the principal goal of the hedge mechanism (from the
issuer's standpoint) is to lower the magnitude, or severity, of
capital losses if a default occurs.

S&P affirmed its ratings on six classes from six transactions and
removed them from CreditWatch negative because S&P believes the
default frequencies and loss severities have been consistently
improving.  These securitizations have class factors--or
percentages of the original balance that remain outstanding--
ranging from 0.62% to 44%.

The downgraded series 2005-2 and 2007-1 securitizations have class
factors of 44% and 48%, respectively.  These deals were structured
with a reliance on the residuals from older 12b-1 securitizations.
The 2007-1 trust, for instance, has the right to receive a portion
of the fees from the 2003-1 and 2003-2 trust receivables; the
2005-2 trust has the right to receive a portion of the fees from
series 2003-3 receivables.  Since the 2003-1, 2003-2, and 2003-3
trusts amortized more slowly than initially projected due to
market volatility and declining NAVs, the subsequent receivables
were passed on to the 2005-2 and 2007-1 trusts later than
anticipated.  This yielded a smaller percentage of fees and slowed
the amortization schedule of the 2005-2 and 2007-1 series.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2005-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2005-1 Fltg      BBB             BBB/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2005-2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2005-2 Fltg      CCC             B/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2005-3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2005-3           BB              BB/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2006-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2006-1 Fl        BB+             BB+/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2006-2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2006-2           BBB-            BBB-/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2006-3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2006-3           BBB             BBB/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2006-4

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2006-4           BBB             BBB/Watch Neg

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2007-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To              From
          -----            --              ----
          2007-1           BB-             BB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2004-1

                        Class       Rating
                        -----       ------
                        2004-1      AA

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2004-2

                        Class       Rating
                        -----       ------
                        2004-2      AA

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2004-3

                        Class       Rating
                        -----       ------
                        2004-3      AA

                Hedged Mutual Fund Fee Trust 2004-4

                        Class       Rating
                        -----       ------
                        2004-4      AA


HOUSE OF EUROPE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by House of Europe Funding II
PLC.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- EUR870,000,000 Class A House of Europe Funding II Floating
     Rate Notes due 2044 (current balance of EUR 756,582,240),
     Downgraded to B3; previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2.

House of Europe Funding II PLC is a high-grade collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of euro-
denominated structured finance securities such as CMBS, RMBS, and
CDOs of ABS.  The majority of these securities were originated in
2005 and 2006.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), and failure of the coverage tests.  The weighted average
rating factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased from 319
in March 2009 to 611 in March 2010.  During the same time, the
Class A/B Overcollateralization ratio decreased from 91.46% to
85.44% and the coverage test is failing.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


HOUSTON: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'B-' rating to the city of Houston,
Texas's $323.5 million airport system special facilities revenue
bonds (Continental Airlines Inc. Terminal E Project) series 2001.
The series 2001 bonds are fixed-rate revenue bonds with a final
maturity in 2029.  The Rating Outlook on the special facilities
bonds is Stable.

The rating reflects the underlying financial strength of
Continental Airlines, Inc., which currently has a Fitch Issuer
Default Rating of 'B-'.  The Continental Terminal E Project bonds
financed the construction and development of Terminal E at George
Bush Intercontinental Airport, which Continental uses as an
international connection hub and Latin American gateway.  Special
facilities rent paid by Continental secures the Continental
Terminal E Project bonds and bondholders have no access to
liquidity or structural enhancements to avoid default if
Continental fails to provide timely debt service payments.
Terminal E was built in two phases and fully opened in January
2005.

Intercontinental serves as the primary commercial airport for the
metropolitan area, and Houston-based Continental operates its
largest hub at the airport, accounting for nearly 87% of enplaned
passengers in fiscal 2009.  Terminal E is a 600,000 square-foot
facility with 23 gates that can handle both domestic and
international passenger traffic.  The terminal is an essential
facility for the airport itself as well as for Continental's
international operations.  Terminal E handles about 33% of total
airport traffic while international traffic of 3.85 million
enplanements in 2009 represented nearly 20% of total enplaned
passengers.  In recent years, international traffic has increased
at a faster rate versus domestic, rising by a compounded growth
rate of 4.6% since 2002.  With traffic declines and service
cutbacks across the aviation industry, international traffic at
Intercontinental dropped by 3.9% over the course of fiscal year
2009 while overall enplanements at this airport fell by 8.2% over
the same period the prior year.  However, monthly data in the
current fiscal year show a positive increase of 1.8% in total
airport traffic through February 2010, indicating signs a recovery
is underway.

The IDR for CAL reflects the airline's high lease-adjusted
leverage, weak and volatile cash flow, as well as the airline
industry's ongoing vulnerability to air travel demand and fuel
price shocks.  CAL's ability to access the capital markets, while
pulling down scheduled capacity by 5% in 2009, allowed the carrier
to maintain an adequate liquidity position throughout the
downturn.  The carrier ended the March quarter with $3.15 billion
in unrestricted cash and investments.  A stronger relative cash
position puts CAL in a good position to fund expected maturities
of $982 million in 2010.  While new debt financing for Boeing
aircraft deliveries this year will limit the amount of debt
reduction by the end of the year, stronger margins this year
should allow CAL to de-lever its balance sheet modestly in the
early months of the recovery.

Entry into the Star Alliance, in management's view, will likely
contribute to a notable upturn in international revenue
performance as network feed from United and the other Star members
helps boost CAL's revenue per available seat mile (RASM).  First-
quarter RASM results lagged those of United, but March's estimated
mainline unit revenue growth of 15.5% to 16.5% was quite strong.
Full-year RASM growth approaching 10% for 2010 is certainly not
out of the question, particularly if CAL maintains its historical
unit revenue premium to the industry at a time when performance at
its Newark, NJ, and Houston, TX, hubs appears to be improving
steadily.  On the cost side, management expects only moderate non-
fuel cost per available seat mile inflation this year (1% to 2%).
Still, a surge in energy prices later in the year could hurt CAL
more than its large legacy carrier rivals.  As of late March, CAL
had approximately 23% of full-year 2010 fuel consumption hedged
through a combination of jet fuel and crude oil swaps and call
options.


IBIS RE: S&P Rates Series 2010-1 Class A Variable Notes at 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has rated Ibis Re
Ltd.'s Series 2010-1 Class A and Class B Variable-Rate Notes 'BB'
and 'B+', respectively.

Ibis Re is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted company
licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands.  All of its
issued and outstanding share capital will be held in trust for
charitable purposes by Wilmington Trust (Cayman) Ltd. This
transaction is a second issuance from the original shelf program
established in 2009.  The ceding company established the shelf
program anticipating periodic access to collateralized reinsurance
protection.  The notes are exposed solely to U.S. hurricane risk.

Three operating subsidiaries of Assurant Inc. will be ceding
exposure to Ibis Re.  Two of them, American Security Insurance Co.
of Florida and American Bankers Insurance Co.--are rated A-
/Negative/-- by Standard & Poor's.  Standard & Poor's does not
rate the third: Standard Guaranty Insurance Co.  At least one of
the rated companies will be responsible for the entire quarterly
payment due to Ibis Re from the various cedents.

The risk modeling is based on Risk Management Solutions model
RiskLink Version 9.0 RMS U.S. Hurricane Model, including its 2009
industry exposure database.  The model will be escrowed for the
length of the transaction, and the industry exposure database will
be subject to update upon each annual reset.  The current payout
factors are based upon RMS's 2009 industry exposure database and
chosen by Assurant to represent their underlying Hurricane
exposure.


INDYMAC INDA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from one RMBS
transaction, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by IndyMac INDA
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: IndyMac INDA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


JOHNSTON RE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Two Series 2010-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'BB-'
rating to the Series 2010-1 Class A and B notes to be issued by
Johnston Re Ltd.

Johnston Re is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted company
licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands.  HSBC Bank
(Cayman) Ltd., as share trustee, holds all of Johnston Re's issued
and outstanding shares in trust for charitable or similar
purposes.

The cedent will be Munich Reinsurance America Inc. (AA-/Stable/
--).  Munich Re America Inc. will be responsible for the premium
payments due under the retrocession agreement in place between it
and Johnston Re.  Covered losses will not be directly linked to
Munich Re America Inc.'s exposure in the covered area (North
Carolina); rather, they will be based on the losses of the North
Carolina Joint Underwriters Association and the North Carolina
Insurance Underwriters Association.  (Standard & Poor's does not
maintain an interactive rating on, nor does it have a rating
relationship with, either NCJUA or NCIUA.) Ultimate net losses
will be calculated on a per-occurrence basis and will reflect the
actual paid losses (including loss reserves if applicable and a
loss-adjustment expense factor of 6.5% of the NC JUA/IUA.

Johnston Re will cover losses on a per-occurrence basis due to
hurricanes in North Carolina.  The risk modeling is based on AIR
Worldwide Corp. (AIR) model CLASIC/2 version 12.0 and reflects
business in force with the reinsured as of Jan. 1, 2010.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2003-ML1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2003-ML1.

The affirmations are due to stable performance and defeasance,
along with limited Fitch expected losses upon disposition of
specially serviced assets along with expected losses from Fitch's
prospective review of potential stresses.  Fitch expects losses of
approximately 1%, or $5.5 million from loans in special servicing
and loans that cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance.  These losses will be absorbed by the class not rated
by Fitch.  The majority of Fitch's expected losses are associated
with loans currently in special servicing.

As of the March 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 28.9% to $661.2 million from $929.8 million
at issuance.  Of the remaining 106 loans, 17 (24.7%) have
defeased.

There are four specially serviced loans in the pool (2.1%).  One
loan is current, two are delinquent and one non-performing
matures.

The largest specially serviced asset (0.9%) is a 108,244 square
foot retail shopping center located in Brunswick, GA.  The loan
transferred in September 2008 and is currently 30 days delinquent.
The property is anchored by a Winn-Dixie and is currently 95.1%
occupied.  The borrower is currently attempting to sell the
property.

The second largest specially serviced asset (0.6%) is a 121,163 sf
industrial building located in Stallings, MI.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2010 and matured
April 1, 2010.  As of year-end 2009 net operating income debt
service coverage ratio was 1.60 times with an occupancy of 87%.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, three loans (1.3% of the
pool) incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- $106 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $387.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only classes X-1 and X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.7 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.5 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23.2 million class F at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class G at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.3 million class H at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.5 million class J at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.8 million class K at 'BB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.8 million class L at 'B+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.0 million class M at 'B/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class N at 'B-/LS4'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $12.3 million class NR.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-C2 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2004-C2:

  -- $24.6 million class D to 'BBB/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class E to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11.6 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.8 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11.6 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.5 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.2 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded and revised Recovery Ratings as
indicated:

  -- $2.6 million class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $3.9 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3'.

Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $87 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $431.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $236.9 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $24.6 million class B at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10.4 million class C at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.4 million class RP-1 at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.2 million class RP-2 at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.4 million class RP-3 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.8 million class RP-4 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.3 million class RP-5 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable.

The $5.2 million class M remains at 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch does not rate the $12.4 million class NR.  The RP
certificates represent an interest in a subordinate note secured
by the Republic Plaza property.  Class A-1 has been paid in full.

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  A significant portion of the total expected losses
are associated with loans currently in special servicing.  Fitch
expects losses of 3% of the remaining pooled balance,
approximately $27 million, from the loans in special servicing and
loans that cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance
test.  The Negative Outlooks reflect the increase in Fitch Loans
of Concern.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate principal balance had decreased by 13.8% to
$916.7 million from $1.06 billion at issuance.  Eleven loans are
fully defeased (6.7%), and the third largest loan (10.3%) in the
pool is partially defeased.

Fitch has identified 29 Loans of Concern (19.8%), including five
loans in special servicing (8.5%).  The largest specially serviced
asset (4.6%) is a 332,608 square foot office building located in
Portland, OR.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2010 due to the borrower entity, an affiliate of Rubicon
U.S. REIT, filing for bankruptcy.  The reported occupancy at the
office property was 95% as of year-end 2009.

The second largest specially serviced asset (2.0%) is a 100,320 sf
office building located south of San Diego in Chula Vista, CA.
The asset transferred to special servicing in January 2010 for
imminent default.  The reported occupancy was approximately 60% as
of September 2009.

The third largest specially serviced asset (1.3%) is a 312 unit
multifamily property located in Fort Worth, TX.  The real-estate
owned property transferred to special servicing in January 2009.

The collateral for the Republic Plaza loan is a 1.3 million sf
office building located in Denver, CO.  The whole loan consists of
two A-note pieces, one of which is the $107 million trust balance
and the other is comprised of $28 million in non-pooled RP
certificates.  At issuance, there was a $35 million B-note held
outside of the trust.  Occupancy has stabilized, with a reported
YE 2009 occupancy of 95.8%.  Brookfield Properties is the loan
sponsor.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal YE net operating income
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to
determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Twenty-eight loans did not payoff at maturity with
seven loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed
value.


JUNIPER CBO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all four remaining classes of notes
issued by Juniper CBO 2000-1, Ltd./Corp.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs', 'Global Surveillance Criteria
for Corporate CDOs', 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss
Severity Ratings' and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery
Ratings'.

The performance of Juniper 2000-1 has been relatively stable since
the last rating review.  The portfolio continues to amortize
translating into ongoing redemption of the class A-3 notes.  Since
2003, Juniper 2000-1 has operated under an Event of Default due to
the issuer's failure to maintain an over-collateralization ratio
of at least 90% of its minimum over-collateralization test level.

The pari passu class A-3L and A-3 notes, collectively the class A-
3 notes, are the senior-most class outstanding and have priority
for all interest and principal collections.  At the next payment
date, the class A-3 notes will be partially redeemed by principal
cash proceeds held in the collection account, currently
$5.2 million.  The remaining balance of the class A-3 notes are
supported by performing assets rated in the 'B' category and
higher from an expected return perspective.  The affirmation of
the class A-3 notes reflects their first priority position and the
relative stability of the underlying portfolio.

The class A-4L and A-4 notes, collectively the class A-4 notes,
are subordinate to the class A-3 notes and remain distressed.  The
expected return from the performing assets will not be sufficient
to pay the class A-4 notes in full at the stated maturity in April
2012.  Further diminishing their principal coverage is the
application of principal proceeds to make-up the interest
shortfall to the class A-4 notes.

A Loss Severity rating has been assigned to the class A-3 notes.
The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.
The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
notes' long-term credit rating.

The Recovery Ratings assigned to the class A-4 notes are based on
the total discounted future cash flows of approximately
$17.7 million projected to be available to these bonds in a base-
case default scenario.  These discounted cash flows yield ultimate
recovery projections of approximately 40%, which is representative
of an 'RR4' on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.  Recovery Ratings
are designed to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries
on currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities
rated 'CCC' or below.

Juniper CBO 2000-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
that closed on April 4, 2000.  The portfolio of Juniper CBO 2000-1
was originally selected and monitored by Wellington Management
Company, LLP.  The transaction's stated maturity date is April 15,
2012.

Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes as
indicated:

  -- $7,466,311 class A-3L notes affirm at 'B/LS3', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $11,199,466 class A-3 notes affirm at 'B/LS3', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class A-4L notes affirm at 'C/RR4';

  -- $20,000,000 class A-4 notes affirm at 'C/RR4'.


JUNIPER CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of notes issued by
Juniper CBO 1999-1, Ltd./Corp.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs', 'Global Surveillance Criteria
for Corporate CDOs', and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery
Ratings'.

The downgrade is the result of an interest shortfall on the most
recent payment date, Oct. 15, 2009.  Of the $551,946 and $246,283
interest due to the class A-3A and A-3B notes, respectively,
$48,977 and $21,591 remained unpaid due to a lack of available
proceeds.  According to the indenture, failure to pay timely
interest to the class A-3A and A-3B notes on any payment date
constitutes a payment default under the Events of Default.  This
payment default follows an outstanding technical default by the
issuer due to the issuer's failure to maintain an over-
collateralization ratio of at least 90% of its minimum over-
collateralization test level since 2002.

As of the March 2, 2010 trustee report, there are two performing
bonds remaining in the portfolio totaling $2.2 million of par.  In
addition, there are four defaulted assets, which Fitch expects to
recover approximately $100,000, principal cash of $24,785, and
equity positions, for which Fitch assigns no value in its
analysis.  The class A-3A and A-3B notes have over $24 million of
principal outstanding indicating a sizeable principal loss at
maturity.

Fitch maintains a 'RR6' Recovery Rating on the class A-3A and A-3B
notes based on the limited remaining value of the portfolio and
the projected proceeds available to the notes.  The total
discounted future cash flows of approximately $2.1 million are
projected to be available to the class A-3 bonds in a base-case
default scenario.  These discounted cash flows yield ultimate
recovery projections of less than 10%, which is representative of
an 'RR6' on Fitch's Recovery Rating scale.  Recovery Ratings are
designed to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities
rated 'CCC' or below.

Juniper CBO 1999-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
that closed on March 23, 1999.  The portfolio of Juniper CBO 1999-
1was originally selected and monitored by Wellington Management
Company, LLP.  The transaction's stated maturity date is April 15,
2011.

Fitch downgrades these classes:

  -- $14,601,744 class A-3A notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC/RR6';
  -- $9,734,496 class A-3B notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.


KKR FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of these notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., under
review for possible upgrade:

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2017, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on August 18, 2009 Upgraded to B2;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on August 18, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the overcollateralization of the
notes, a significant reduction in the exposure to defaulted
assets, and stabililzation in the credit quality of the collateral
since the last rating action in August 2009.  The actions also
consider the implications of a recent agreement announced by KKR
Financial Holdings LLC which stipulates that -- subject to certain
conditions -- KKR Financial Holdings LLC will not undertake any
future cancellation of mezzanine and junior notes issued to it by
KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd.

Moody's observes that the transaction's overcollateralization
ratios have improved steadily since July 2009.  Based on the March
2010 trustee report, the senior overcollateralization ratio is
133.97% compared to a level of 129.02% as of July 2009.  The Class
C/D overcollateralization ratio is 123.35% compared to 118.79% as
of July 2009.  The Class E overcollateralization ratio is 118.93%
compared to 114.53% as of July 2009.  The dollar amount of
defaulted assets currently held by the deal is also reported to
have decreased from $37.9 million in July 2009 to $2.2 million in
March 2010.

On July 10, 2009, KKR Financial Holdings LLC surrendered for
cancellation $64 million of the principal amount of the Class D
Notes, without receiving any payment in exchange.  The surrendered
notes were cancelled upon receipt by the trustee, and the related
debt was extinguished by the issuer.  On August 18, 2009, in
consideration of the impact of this note cancellation on the
operation of the overcolateralization tests and the related cash
flow re-diversion throughout the entire capital structure of KKR
Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., Moody's upgraded the Class E notes and
the Class F notes.  Moody's' also noted that the senior notes were
negatively impacted by the note cancellation, resulting in a
downgrade of the Class A-1 notes and the Class A-2 notes.  In
November 2009, KKR Financial Holdings LLC announced that it had
agreed not to undertake a comparable surrender for cancellation of
any mezzanine notes or junior notes issued to it by KKR Financial
CLO 2005-1, Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., KKR Financial
CLO 2006-1, Ltd., KKR Financial CLO 2007-1, Ltd., or KKR Financial
2007-A, Ltd. without consideration in the future, for so long as
no challenge is brought to the company's prior surrender of CLO
notes by the controlling class note holders of KKR Financial CLO
2005-2, Ltd.  Moody's views this development as beneficial to
maintaining the predictability of future cash flow diversion based
on overcollateralization tests that were put in place at the
deal's closing.

KKR Financial CLO 2005-2, Ltd., issued in 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded 13 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
C8 due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from
anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged
watchlisted loans and concerns about refinancing risk associated
with loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Over
25% of the pool, comprised of 47 loans, matures over the next 36
months.  Thirty-nine of these loans, or 18% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan-to-value ratio, stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl
Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  The pool has benefited
from increased loan diversity as measured by a higher Herf as well
as increased subordination due to amortization and loan payoffs.

Moody's placed 13 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 18, 2010 due to anticipated losses
from specially serviced and watchlisted loans, interest shortfalls
and concerns about refinancing risk.  This rating action concludes
that review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the March 17, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 20% to $1.045 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The 82 mortgage loans that
collateralize these Certificates range in size from less than 1%
to 10% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 32% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans,
representing 17% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings.  A third loan, representing 2% of the pool, had an
investment grade rating at last review, but due to a decline in
performance and increased LTV, the loan is now analyzed as part of
the conduit pool.  U.S. Government securities secure three loans
or 20% of the pool due to defeasance.  At last review defeasance
represented 19% of the pool.

Sixteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

To date, two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate $48,648 loss (less than 1% loss severity on
average).  Twenty-two loans, representing 25% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
exposure is the Lembi Portfolio ($113 million, 10.6% of the pool)
which consists of nine loans secured by 29 multifamily properties
containing 795 apartments and 27 ground floor retail units in San
Francisco, California.  The loan remains current under the terms
of a recent extension and modification agreement that extends the
maturity date from November 2009 to November 2011 and also
requires substantial principal reduction payments over the next 13
months.

The second largest specially serviced exposure is the Houston
Apartments Portfolio ($40.0 million, 3.7% of the pool) which is
secured by 1,151 units in three separate garden style apartment
complexes located in different submarkets of Houston, Texas.  The
portfolio was transferred to special servicing in November 2008
and is real estate owned.  To date, appraisal reductions totaling
$10.4 million have been recognized for this portfolio.

The third largest specially serviced loan portfolio is the Hunt
Retail Portfolio ($33.3 million, 2.7% of the pool) which is
secured by a portfolio of 11 retail properties totaling 225,614
square feet in Florida, Georgia, Texas, Oklahoma and South
Carolina.  The portfolio was transferred to special servicing in
October 2008 and is now REO.  To date, appraisal reductions
totaling $11.3 million have been recognized for this retail
portfolio.

For the 22 specially serviced loans, Moody's estimates an
aggregate $81.3 million loss which represents an average 30% loss
severity.  The servicer has recognized an aggregate $41.5 million
appraisal reduction for 13 of the specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 10 poorly
performing loans, representing 7% of the pool, due to refinancing
risk.  All of these loans are on the watchlist.  Moody's estimates
an $18.4 million aggregate loss for these troubled loans (24% loss
severity on average based on 75% probability of default).  Moody's
rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing
and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating results for 100% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average
LTV for the conduit pool, excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, is 90% compared to 109% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.63X and 1.35X, respectively, compared to
1.28X and 0.94X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure loan size diversity,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 36 compared to 17 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is The Grace Building
Loan ($112.9 million -- 10.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
1.5 million square foot Class A office building located in New
York City.  The loan represents a 33.3% pari-passu interest in a
$339.1 million loan.  There is also a subordinate B Note of
$28.9 million held outside the trust.  Currently 12% of the
premises are available for lease due to recent and near-term
tenant lease expirations compared to 13% availability at last
review.  Property performance has declined slightly since last
review due to increased operating expenses and leasing challenges
under current office market conditions in Midtown Manhattan.  The
loan sponsor is Brookfield Properties and Swig Investment Company.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.87X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.89X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the 757 Third
Avenue Loan ($60.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 459,000 square foot Class A office building located in New
York City.  There is also a subordinate B Note of $66.0 million
held outside the trust.  The property was 95% leased as of year-
end 2009; essentially the same as at last review.  Property
performance has remained stable due to recent leasing activity
despite increased operating expenses.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.48X, respectively, compared
to A2 and 1.45X at last review.

The loan that formerly had an underlying rating is the Westfield
Shoppingtown Meriden Loan ($18.2 million -- 1.7% of the pool),
which is a subordinate B Note secured by the borrower's interest
in a 913,625 square foot mall located in Meriden, Connecticut.
The center is anchored by Macy's, JCPenney and Sears.  The mall
was 92% leased as of third quarter 2009 compared to 97% as of
year-end 2008.  Performance has declined as a result of the
decline in occupancy.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are
81% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.25X at last
review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 8% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Gehr Florida Portfolio Loan
($37.8 million, 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by two drug
and grocery anchored retail centers and one Class B office
building.  The portfolio was 67% leased as of September 2009; the
same as at last review.  Each property was damaged by Hurricane
Wilma in 2005.  The loan is on the master servicer's watch list.
Although property performance has been stable, Moody's analysis of
this loan incorporates a stressed cash flow due to concerns about
sustained property performance given the portfolio's low occupancy
levels.  The loan matures mid-November 2014.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 160% and 0.63X, respectively, compared to 156%
and 0.64X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Northhaven Pavilion Loan
($24.9 million, 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 98%
leased 273,500 square foot community shopping center shadow
anchored by Target.  The center is located in Northhaven,
Connecticut and has very good freeway access and visibility from
I-91.  The property has displayed stable operating performance in
recent years.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 111% and 0.88X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Parkridge Six Aurora Loan
($22.7 million, 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 161,218
square foot multi-story suburban office building located in
Littleton, Colorado southwest of Denver.  The property is 100%
leased to Aurora Loan Services through July 2016.  Although the
property's performance has been stable, Moody's analysis
incorporates a stressed cash flow due to high vacancy rates in the
suburban Denver office market and concerns regarding future
releasing risk given the building's single tenant occupancy.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.93X, respectively,
compared to 100% and 1.03X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $195,232,808, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/7/04;

  -- Class A-3, $44,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/7/04;

  -- Class A-4, $150,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/7/04;

  -- Class A-5, $36,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/7/04;

  -- Class A-6, $383,027,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/7/04;

  -- Class XCL, $1,070,501,318, notional, affirmed AAA, previously
     assigned AAA on 12/02/2004;

  -- Class XCP, $605,241, notional, affirmed AAA, previously
     assigned AAA on 12/02/2004;

  -- Class A-J, $85,232,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     3/18/10;

  -- Class B, $19,669,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class C, $19,669,000, downgraded to A3 from Aa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class D, $14,752,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Aa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class E, $14,752,000, downgraded to B3 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class F, $16,391,000, downgraded to Caa3 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class G, $11,473,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class H, $13,113,000, downgraded to C from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class J, $9,838,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class K, $16,391,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class L, $6,556,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class M, $4,918,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;

  -- Class N, $4,917,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/18/10;


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2007-C6 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of 14 classes of LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C6 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly performing
watchlisted loans.

Moody's has included Classes A-4 and A-1A in the review because
these classes have the longest weighted average life among the
super senior Aaa classes with 30% initial credit support.
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans the credit
enhancement cushion for the super senior classes is likely to be
eroded, creating a potential differential in expected loss between
those super senior classes benefiting first from paydowns and
those classes receiving paydowns last.  Although Moody's believes
that it is unlikely that Classes A-4 and A-1A will actually
experience losses, the expected level of credit enhancement and
their priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $2.95 billion
from $2.98 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 180 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
58% of the pool.

Eighty-two loans, representing 52% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including six of the top ten loans in the
pool.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.1 million (80% loss severity).  Ten
loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Five of the specially serviced loans, representing 2%
of the pool, are currently 90+ days delinquent.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and watchlisted
loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-4, $910,408,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-1A, $421,179,499, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-M, $227,893,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-MFL, $70,000,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/11/2007

  -- Class A-J, $156,395,000, currently rated A1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class B, $33,513,000 currently rated A2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class C, $37,237,000, currently rated A3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class D, $33,513,000, currently rated Baa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class E, $29,789,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class F, $29,790,000, currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class G, $33,513,000, currently rated Ba1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class H, $37,236,000, currently rated Ba3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Ba3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class J, $40,961,000, currently rated B1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class K, $29,789,000, currently rated B3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/10/2009


LEASE INVESTMENT: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings withdraws the ratings on these classes of Lease
Investment Flight Trust due to a lack of sufficient information to
maintain the ratings:

  -- Class A-1 and A-2 notes rated 'B';
  -- Class A-3 notes rated 'BB';
  -- Class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes rated 'C/DR6'.


MARATHON REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Marathon Real Estate
CDO 2006-1, Ltd./LLC reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 30.9%.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.

The transaction is collateralized by both senior and subordinate
commercial real estate debt: 39.9% are either whole loans or A-
notes, 34.5% are either B-notes or mezzanine loans, and 24.8% are
rated securities.  Fitch expects significant losses upon default
for the subordinate positions, since they are generally highly
leveraged debt classes.  Further, five loans (8.0%) are currently
defaulted while two loans (9.5%) are considered Fitch Loans of
Concern.  Fitch expects significant losses on the delinquent
assets and Loans of Concern.

Marathon 2006-1 is a $1 billion CRE collateralized debt obligation
managed by Marathon Asset Management, LLC.  The transaction has a
five-year reinvestment period during which principal proceeds may
be used to invest in substitute collateral.  The reinvestment
period ends in May 2011.

As of the March 2010 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations,
the CDO was substantially invested: CRE whole loans/A-notes
(39.9%), B-notes (24.4%), commercial mortgage backed securities
(15.5%), CRE mezzanine loans (10.1%), CRE CDOs (7.3%), other
structured finance securities (2.0%, including a trust preferred
CDO, residential mortgage backed securities, and asset backed
securities).  All overcollateralization and interest coverage
ratios have remained above their covenants as of the March 2010
trustee report.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 48.5% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 12.0% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally fourth quarter 2009).  Fitch estimates that
recoveries will average 36.2% in the base case.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
whole loan (6.1%) secured by a 363-key limited service hotel
located on Manhattan's Upper West Side.  The sponsor has been
converting the property's single-occupancy rooms into traditional
rooms on an ongoing basis, and further planned an extensive
property improvement plan in order to convert the hotel into a
full-service hotel to be operated under a major flag.  This plan
has stalled amid the recent economic downturn and the hotel's
performance has struggled.  Fitch modeled a term default with a
partial loss.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (2.3%) secured by ownership interests in a 31-
building, 2,146-unit multifamily portfolio located throughout
Queens, New York.  A majority of the portfolio, which was
constructed between 1927 and 1962, is comprised of rent-stabilized
units, and the sponsor's initial plan was to convert these units
to market rates.  This plan has met significant resistance, and
the portfolio's current cash flow is not sufficient to cover debt
service.  As such, Fitch modeled a term default with a substantial
loss due to the loan's highly leveraged position.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (1.8%) secured by ownership interests in two
Midtown Manhattan office properties totaling over 532,000 square
feet.  The portfolio was 84% occupied as of December 2009;
however, it faces lease rollover risk in the near future.  Fitch
modeled a term default with a substantial loss as a result of the
loan's highly leveraged position.

This transaction was analyzed according to 'Surveillance Criteria
for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs,' which applies stresses
to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage ratio tests
to project future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term
capitalization rates.  The default levels were then compared to
the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the
CDO under the various default timing and interest rate stress
scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash
Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based on this analysis, the credit
characteristics of classes A-1 and A-2 are generally consistent
with the 'BBB' rating category.  The credit characteristics of
class B are generally consistent with the 'BB' rating category,
and the credit characteristics of classes C through E are
generally consistent with the 'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes F through K are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class's credit enhancement.  Based on this analysis, classes
F through K are consistent with the 'CCC' rating category, meaning
default is a real possibility.  Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 30.9% exceeds these classes' respective current credit
enhancement levels.  However, these credit enhancement levels
still provide cushion to the total losses expected from the
currently defaulted assets and Loans of Concern in the pool.

Classes A through E were assigned a Negative Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation of further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.  These classes were also assigned Loss
Severity ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS5' indicating each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class's
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes F through K were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(48.5% and 36.2%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class's tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class F reflects modeled recoveries of
20% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($2.8 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($1.9 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($4.7 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($20.1 million).

Classes G through K are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class's principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $520,000,000 class A-1 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $50,000,000 class A-2 to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $99,000,000 class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $51,500,000 class C to 'B/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,000,000 class D to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $14,000,000 class E to 'B/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $23,500,000 class F to 'CCC/RR5' from 'BBB+';

  -- $15,500,000 class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $26,000,000 class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $56,300,000 class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $26,700,000 class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B'.

Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.


MARICOPA COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1 the
rating on approximately $10.3 million Maricopa County (AZ)
Industrial Development Authority, Multifamily Housing Revenue
Bonds (Sun King Apartments Project), Series 2000 A & B.  The
outlook has been revised to Negative from Stable.  The Series
2000B have been retired in June of 2001.  Additionally,
approximately $3.6 million in outstanding Multifamily Housing
Revenue Bonds (Sun King Apartments Project) Subordinate Series
2000C are unrated by Moody's.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by revenues derived from
operations of the Sun King and Casa Castillo projects, 375
affordable units in total, located in Scottsdale and Phoenix,
Arizona.  The bonds are further secured by other funds pledged
under the indenture.

Strengths:

  -- Strong owner/management support and oversight

  -- Fully funded debt service reserve funds and renewal and
     replacement fund

  -- Satisfactory condition of the property though roof
     replacement may be need in the near future which could result
     in depletion of renewal and replacement fund

Challenges:

  -- Weakened financial performance due to weak and volatile local
     rental market

  -- Increase in vacancy and concessions has negatively impacted
     coverage

  -- Competition from a large inventory of housing in the
     Phoenix/Scottsdale markets is likely to continue to depress
     rental revenue

  -- The project is a stand-alone housing development that can be
     affected quickly and severely by significant changes in
     economic conditions

Recent Developments:

While fiscal year ending June 30, 2009 coverage was 1.3x and 0.92x
for senior and subordinate debt, respectively, unaudited debt
service coverage for calendar year 2010 has dropped below 1x for
both classes of debt.  Trustee fund balances show sufficient
monies to pay May 15, 2010 debt service and occupancy which
dropped to 83% in December 2009 increased to 86% in March 2010 but
remains below historic levels.  To maintain occupancy level,
management has been offering rent concessions to prospective
tenants and reducing rent levels to generate leasing traffic.
This in turn negatively impacted rental revenue and contributed to
the decline in net operating income.  The decline in NOI along
with increase in the cap rate has negatively impacted the
property's loan-to-value.  According to CB Richard Ellis research,
local rental market is not expected to show signs of improvement
until 2012.

The property benefits from the oversight and support of the owner
and manager, an affiliate of Christian Relief Services Charities,
Inc., which advanced monies to the project and unconditionally
waived its right to demand payment of all related payroll,
benefits, management fees and other expenses until July 1, 2010.
Management indicated that if the situation does not improve, the
waiver may be extended for another 12 months, beyond the July 1,
2010 date.  Further, a fully funded debt service reserve fund
provides additional security for bondholders.

                             Outlook

The outlook on the bonds has been revised from Stable to Negative
due to projected volatility for the Phoenix / Scottsdale housing
markets and possible further project performance deterioration.

What could change the rating -- UP?

  -- Significant increase in debt service coverage ratio and
     occupancy rate

What could change the rating -- DOWN?

  -- Significant increase in expenses or volatility in revenue
     that leads to a deterioration of the debt service coverage
     level.

  -- Tapping of debt service reserve fund

        Recalibration Of Rating To The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The rating assigned to Sun King Apartments Project was issued on
Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans
to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.


MASTR ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 149 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 149
tranches from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by MASTR Alternative Loan Trust and MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgage
Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 10-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Oct 23, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-A-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 20-A-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Seasoned Securitization Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 30-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-A-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 15-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MASTR ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 4
tranches, confirmed the rating on one tranche, and upgraded the
ratings on 2 tranches from the MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust
2005-AB1 transaction.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

The previous action on the deal (on Feb 20, 2009) did not give
credit to additional enhancement that benefits some of the senior
tranches in the deal as a result of the payment waterfall.  The
current ratings reflect not only the updated deal performance but
also incorporate the additional credit support offered to these
senior tranches by other senior tranches that are lower in the
payment waterfall.  The upgrade of the Class A-3A and A-3B, and
the confirmation of Class A-4 are primarily the result of this
additional support.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Tranches A-3A and A-5A are wrapped by Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company (rating Withdrawn).  Typically, for securities insured by
a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher
of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the
current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the
guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.  Given that Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company is no longer rated by Moody's, the public rating on the
two wrapped tranches is based on their underlying rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-AB1

  -- Cl. A-3A, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 21, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured rating withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to A1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5A, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured rating withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-BPC1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-BPC1:

  -- $15.5 million class H to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.2 million class J to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.2 million class L to 'B/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.7 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.1 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings
and Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $142.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $171.3 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48.8 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $397.2 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $94.8 million class AJ at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.4 million class B at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.4 million class C at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.6 million class D at 'A+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class E at 'A'/LS5' Outlook Negative;
  -- $15.5 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10.9 million class G at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.7 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.1 million class P at 'B-/LS5' Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $17.1 million class Q certificates.  Class
A-1 has been paid in full.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 2% of the remaining pooled balance,
approximately $20.3 million, the majority of which are from loans
that cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's stressed
refinance test.

As of the March 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 16.5% to $1.04 billion from $1.24 billion at
issuance.  Three loans have defeased (3.2%).

As of the March 2010 distribution date, there are seven specially
serviced loans (7.4%).  One specially serviced asset (0.5%), a
multifamily property located in Ft.  Worth, TX, is real-estate
owned, and five loans (5.5%) did not refinance at their scheduled
maturity date.

The two largest specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily properties located in Tallahassee, FL.  The loans
transferred to special servicing in October and November 2009,
respectively.  The borrowers, tenant-in-common entities, have
requested extensions.

The third largest specially serviced loan (1.3%) is secured by a
multifamily property located in San Antonio, TX.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2009 for imminent default
and has since been modified by the special servicer.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Thirty loans did not payoff at maturity with seven
loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 55 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 55
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from eight RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Merrill
Lynch.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A10

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. M-IO, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-F1

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A6, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-IO, Downgraded to A3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-IO, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-A

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2005-B

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI Series 2005-A4

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings on 4 tranches issued by 2
subprime RMBS deals issued by Merrill Lynch.  The junior most
bonds of each transaction are currently being written down from
principal losses and are expected to be written off completely in
the near term.  The other 2 downgraded bonds are also at risk of
significant writedown and have been left on review for further
downgrade.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC3
  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 8, 2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2004-WMC3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Apr 8, 2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 18 classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4.  The
downgrades are due to higher losses for the pool resulting from
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly
leveraged watchlisted loans, interest shortfalls, and refinancing
risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Sixteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, mature
within 36 months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 17 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 4, 2010, due to higher expected
losses.  On March 15, 2010, ratings were assigned to newly created
Classes A2-FX and AJ-FX.  These classes were created through a
partial termination of the Class A-2FL and AJ-FL Swap Agreements
along with an amendment of the Pooling & Servicing Agreement in
order to separately certificate a portion of the Class A-2FL
Certificate Balance to the successor Class A-2FX Certificate and a
portion of the Class AJ-FL Certificate Balance to the successor
Class AJ-FX Certificate.  Class A2-FX was assigned a rating of Aaa
and Class AJ-FX was assigned a rating of Aa1, on review for
possible downgrade.

This action concludes Moody's review of the transaction.  The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $4.70 billion
from $4.72 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 280 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool.  The pool contains one loan, representing 1% of the
pool, which has an investment grade underlying rating.

Seventy five loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

There have been no losses to the pool since securitization.  There
are 32 loans, representing 10% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is Konover Hotel
Portfolio ($65.3 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured by
a portfolio of 15 hotels located throughout Kansas, Indiana, and
Michigan.  The loan transferred to special servicer in October
2009 due to imminent default and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The servicer has recognized a $16.3 million appraisal reduction
for this loan.

The remaining 31 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, retail, multifamily and hotel properties.  Moody's
estimates a $190 million aggregate loss for the specially serviced
loans (46% loss severity on average).  The servicer has recognized
an aggregate $89.4 million appraisal reduction for 20 of the
specially serviced loans.

In addition to assuming losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on nine loans
representing approximately 4% of the pool.  These loans mature
within the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $119.8 million loss
from these loans based on a 63% overall default probability and a
68% loss severity.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of losses from these
troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through
S have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$5.0 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 88%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 118% compared to 140% at last
review.  Moody's last review was part of the first quarter 2009
ratings sweep of 2006-2009 vintage conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.26X and 0.9X, respectively, compared to
1.09X and 0.77X at Moody's last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 46, similar to last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the White Oaks Mall Loan
($50.0 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 834,000
square foot retail center located in Springfield, Illinois.  The
property was 88% occupied as of December 2009 compared to 85% at
securitization.  The center is anchored by Sears, Macy's and
Bergner's.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.17X,
respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.76X at securitization.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 19% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Park La Brea Apartments
Loan ($387.5 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which represents a pari
pasu interest in a $775.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan
is secured by a 4,238-unit multifamily complex located in
Hollywood, California.  The property was 98% occupied as of
January 2010, essentially the same as at securitization.  Although
property performance has improved since securitization, the
property has not achieved the increased cash flow anticipated in
Moody's initial analysis.  The loan is interest-only for the
entire term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and 0.84X,
respectively, compared to 116% and 0.89X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Beacon Office Portfolio Loan
($225.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by the two
adjacent Class B office properties located in Chicago, Illinois.
The properties were 92% leased as of December 2009 compared to 88%
at securitization.  The three largest tenants are CDW, which
leases 13% of the net rentable area through May 2021; Zurich
American, which leases 8% of the NRA through April 2017 and
Amstein & Lehr, which leases 7% of the NRA through March 2018.
The loan matures in November, 2011.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 126% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to 160% and 0.63X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the YPI Transwestern Portfolio Loan
($224.4 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a four
Class A and B office properties located in Chicago, Illinois and
Dallas, Texas.  The properties were 83% leased as of December
2009, essentially the same as at securitization.  The loan is the
master servicer's watchlist due to low debt service.  The loan
previously transferred to special servicer for imminent default.
The loan matures in October, 2011.  Moody's is concerned about
refinance risk associated with this loan and has assumed a high
probability of default at maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 130% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 187% and 0.58X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $25,118,627, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class A-2, 336,666,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class A-2FL, $544,475,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class A-2FX, $20,525,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 3/15/2010

  -- Class A-3, $1,283,828,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class A-1A, $784,302,627, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class A-SB, $119,014,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 1/03/2007

  -- Class XP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 1/03/2007

  -- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 1/03/2007

  -- Class AM, $452,271,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     3/4/2010

  -- Class AJ, $198,777,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     3/4/2010

  -- Class AJ-FL, $160,000,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     3/15/2010

  -- Class AJ-FX, $20,000,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A1;
     previously assigned A1 and placed on review for possible
     downgrade on 3/15/2010

  -- Class B, $11,306,000, downgraded to Ba2 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class C, $79,148,000, downgraded to B1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class D, $33,920,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class E, $67,841,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class F, $39,574,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class G, $50,880,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class H, $45,227,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class J, $62,187,000, downgraded to C from B3;previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class K, $16,961,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class L, $5,653,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class M, $22,613,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class N, $5,654,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class P, $16,960,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010

  -- Class Q, $5,653,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/4/2010


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-1, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating actions are:

  -- US$45,000,000 Class IA Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- EUR7,500,000 Class IC Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$40,000,000 Class IIIA Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$5,000,000 Class IVA Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$100,000,000 Class ID Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which resulted in or will lead to losses that are higher than what
are implied by the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted
average rating factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward
looking measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating
action to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current
portfolio of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the
subordination of the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit
events on Aiful Corporation, CIT Group, Inc., Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association,
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank
TuranAlem, Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc., Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora
Guarantee, Inc. These credit events have lead to approximately
7.6% reduction in the subordination of the tranches.  Depending on
the final recovery rates, the subordination of the tranches will
further decrease due to the recent credit event on Ambac Assurance
Corporation triggered on March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also
exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc., which indicated in its
Form 8K filing it may consider, among other things, a prepackaged
bankruptcy proceeding or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a
credit event may be imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of
possible recovery rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's
ratings.  The portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in
Insurance (14%), Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%)
and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-5, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating actions are:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class IIIA Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class IV SrB Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class IV SrD Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- US$100,000,000 Class VA Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Nov 14, 2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class V SrB Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Nov 14, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class III SrB Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- US$21,700,000 Class IIIF Secured Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$15,000,000 Class IIIH Secured Fixed Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- SGD15,300,000 Class IIII Secured Fixed Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- AUD13,000,000 Class IIIJ Secured Fixed Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class IV SrF Secured Fixed Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- JPY1,000,000,000 Class V SrC Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Nov 14, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking
measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating action
to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio
of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of
the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on Aiful
Corporation, CIT Group, Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, Financial
Guaranty Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank TuranAlem,
Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora Guarantee,
Inc.  These credit events have lead to approximately 7.6%
reduction in the subordination of the tranches.  Depending on the
final recovery rates, the subordination of the tranches will
further decrease due to the credit event on Ambac Assurance
Corporation triggered on March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also
exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc., which indicated in its
Form 8K filing it may consider, among other things, a prepackaged
bankruptcy proceeding or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a
credit event may be imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of
possible recovery rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's
ratings.  The portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in
Insurance (14%), Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%)
and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-6 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-6, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

  -- JPY100,000,000 Class I SrB Secured Fixed Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- JPY300,000,000 Class IV SrB Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009
      Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking
measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating action
to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio
of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of
the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on Aiful
Corporation, CIT Group, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
Federal National Mortgage Association, Financial Guaranty
Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank TuranAlem, Kaupthing
Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.,
Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora Guarantee, Inc. These credit
events have lead to approximately 7.6% reduction in the
subordination of the tranches.  Depending on the final recovery
rates, the subordination of the tranches will further decrease due
to the credit event on Ambac Assurance Corporation triggered on
March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also exposed to Ambac Financial
Group, Inc., which indicated in its Form 8K filing it may
consider, among other things, a prepackaged bankruptcy proceeding
or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a credit event may be
imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of possible recovery
rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's ratings.  The portfolio
has the highest industry concentrations in Insurance (14%),
Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%) and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-10 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-10, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

* US$50,000,000 Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2014 Notes,
  Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating action taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking
measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating action
to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio
of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of
the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on Aiful
Corporation, CIT Group, Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, Financial
Guaranty Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank TuranAlem,
Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora Guarantee,
Inc.  These credit events have lead to approximately 7.6%
reduction in the subordination of the tranches.  Depending on the
final recovery rates, the subordination of the tranches will
further decrease due to the credit event on Ambac Assurance
Corporation triggered on March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also
exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc., which indicated in its
Form 8K filing it may consider, among other things, a prepackaged
bankruptcy proceeding or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a
credit event may be imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of
possible recovery rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's
ratings.  The portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in
Insurance (14%), Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%)
and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-11 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-11, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

* US$21,000,000 Class IIIA Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
  Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking
measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating action
to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio
of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of
the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on Aiful
Corporation, CIT Group, Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, Financial
Guaranty Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank TuranAlem,
Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora Guarantee,
Inc.  These credit events have lead to approximately 7.6%
reduction in the subordination of the tranches.  Depending on the
final recovery rates, the subordination of the tranches will
further decrease due to the credit event on Ambac Assurance
Corporation triggered on March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also
exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc. which indicated in its Form
8K filing it may consider, among other things, a prepackaged
bankruptcy proceeding or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a
credit event may be imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of
possible recovery rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's
ratings.  The portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in
Insurance (14%), Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%)
and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2007-15 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC AB SCDO
Series 2007-15, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

* US$10,000,000 Class IIIA Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
  Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio
which will lead to losses that are higher than what are implied by
the previous Ca ratings.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking
measures, has deteriorated from 1,647 from the last rating action
to 2,647, equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio
of B2.  Since inception of the transaction, the subordination of
the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on Aiful
Corporation, CIT Group, Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, Financial
Guaranty Insurance Company, Glitnir Banki hf, Bank TuranAlem,
Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Washington Mutual, Inc, and Syncora Guarantee,
Inc.  These credit events have lead to approximately 7.6%
reduction in the subordination of the tranches.  Depending on the
final recovery rates, the subordination of the tranches will
further decrease due to the credit event on Ambac Assurance
Corporation triggered on March 24, 2010.  The portfolio is also
exposed to Ambac Financial Group, Inc. which indicated in its Form
8K filing it may consider, among other things, a prepackaged
bankruptcy proceeding or may seek bankruptcy protection implying a
credit event may be imminent.  Moody's has assessed the range of
possible recovery rates for AAC and AFG to determine Moody's
ratings.  The portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in
Insurance (14%), Sovereign & Public Finance (10%), Finance (9%)
and Banking (9%).


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class IB Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
class IB notes from Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC's series 2007-
14, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.  The rating was previously on CreditWatch
negative.

The rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption and
cancellation of the notes.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                 Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2007-14

               Rating                    Balance (mil.)
               ------                    --------------
    Class     To      From             Current      Previous
    -----     --      ----             -------      --------
    IB        NR      B/WatchNeg         0.000      1000.000

                         NR - Not rated.


MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of these notes issued by Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd.,
under review for possible upgrade:

  -- US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April
     2019, A1 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously on
     July 29, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Funding Floating Rate
     Notes Due April 2019, A1 Placed Under Review for Upgrade;
     previously on July 29, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously on July 29,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa2;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously on July 29,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa2;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously
     on July 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously
     on July 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$19,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously
     on July 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Ca Placed Under Review for Upgrade; previously on
     July 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio, an increase in the overcollateralization of the notes,
and reduction in the exposure to second lien loans and defaulted
assets since the last rating action on July 29, 2009.  These
positive developments coincide with reinvestment of principal
repayments and sale proceeds into substitute assets with higher
par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through improvement
in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor).  In particular, as of the latest trustee report
dated March 3, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is 2686
compared to 2722 in July 2009.  Additionally, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to about $9.1MM from
approximately $13.6MM in July 2009.  Moody's also took into
consideration a decrease in the proportion of securities with
negative outlook and a reduction in the exposure to the second
lien loans.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key
assumptions referenced in the latest Moody's CLO methodology, key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last
rating action in July 2009.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D, and
Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 119.05%,
112.04%, 106.72%, and 103.32%, respectively, versus July 2009
levels of 117.32%, 110.39%, 105.13%, and 101.73%, respectively,
and all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  Moody's notes that the Class E notes are no longer
deferring interest and all deferred interest has been repaid.

Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.  On July 29, 2009, Moody's downgraded all
the rated notes as a result of the application of revised and
updated key modeling assumptions as well as the deterioration in
the credit quality of the transaction's underlying portfolio.


NORTEL NETWORKS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of Nortel Networks
Lease Pass-Through Trust, Pass-Through Trust Certificates, Series
2001-1 due to the payment default on the Certificates resulting
from Nortel Networks Inc. (Nortel) rejecting the leases supporting
the transaction.  Nortel filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on
January 14, 2009, and rejected the leases on March 31, 2010.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

This Credit Tenant Lease transaction is supported by a mortgage on
two office buildings situated in Raleigh, North Carolina which
were 100% leased to Nortel under two leases.  Each lease had an
initial 15-year term expiring on July 31, 2016, subject to four
five-year renewal options.

The final distribution date of the Certificates is August 9, 2016.
Based on Nortel's scheduled lease payments during the initial
lease term, there is a $75 million balloon payment due at the
maturity of the Certificates.  To mitigate this balloon risk, the
transaction was structured with a surety bond issued by ZC
Specialty Insurance Company (financial strength rating A2, stable
outlook) to provide the principal balloon payment.

Due to the bankruptcy filing of Nortel, a special servicer was
appointed to the trust in February 2009.  The special servicer has
appointed a receiver to manage the properties and is currently
exploring workout options.  With the rejection of the leases, no
principal or interest payments are currently available to
bondholders and the master servicer has no obligation to advance
principal and interest to the certificateholders.  Further, the
surety bond is subject to several conditions and it is unclear
what funds will be available to pay down the Certificates.  The
office/R&D market in Raleigh has weakened since securitization and
based on the current loan balance relative to the value of the
collateral assuming the existing tenant is no longer in occupancy
(the dark value), the bonds could experience a significant
principal loss.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cusip 65656MAA9, $114,934,621, downgraded to C from Ca;
     previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on 01/16/2009

The ratings on the notes were assigned by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the notes,
such as: i) the nature, sufficiency and quality of historical
performance information regarding the asset class as well as for
the transaction sponsor; ii) an analysis of the collateral being
securitized; iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and
alignment of interests of the key parties to the transaction, most
notably the originator and the servicer; iv) an analysis of the
transaction's governance and legal structure; and vi) a comparison
of these attributes against those of other similar transactions.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its CTL financing rating
methodology.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant, usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the
real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit
rating is the key factor in determining the probability of default
on the underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which
means it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the
trust through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to
pay in full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased
property should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
borrower, which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of
rents to the securitization trust.  The dark value of the
collateral, which assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is
then examined; the dark value must be sufficient, assuming a
bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of the lease, to support
the expected loss consistent with the certificates' rating.  The
certificates' rating will change as the senior unsecured debt
rating (or the corporate family rating) of the tenant may change.
Moody's also considers the overall structure and legal integrity
of the transaction.


NORTH COVE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on five
classes of notes issued by North Cove CDO II Ltd./LLC.

These rating actions are a result of the sale and liquidation of
North Cove II's portfolio following an additional termination
event on March 10, 2010.  The additional termination event was
triggered due to the aggregate par value of the delivery
obligations declining below the supersenior funded amount.  The
early termination date was March 22, 2010, and the mandatory
redemption date was April 12, 2010.  Proceeds from the liquidation
were insufficient to pay the entire swap termination payment, and
the noteholders did not receive any interest or principal
distributions.

North Cove II was a static synthetic collateralized debt
obligation with cashflow waterfall features that closed on
March 2, 2006.  The portfolio referenced residential mortgage-
backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn these ratings:

  -- $49,868,493 class A notes to 'D' from 'CCC';
  -- $62,562,291 class B notes to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $16,320,598 class C notes to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $17,756,494 class D notes to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $19,300,537 class E notes to 'D' from 'CC'.


NOVA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Nova CDO 2001, Ltd:

  -- US$3,500,000 Class C-1 Fixed Rate Third Priority Senior
     Secured Notes due April 10, 2013 (current balance of
     $3,651,544), Downgraded to C; previously on August 15, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$9,700,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Third Priority Senior
     Secured Notes due April 10, 2013 (current balance of
     $9,606,274), Downgraded to C; previously on August 15, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca.

Nova CDO 2001, issued in May 31, 2001, is a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
high yield corporate bonds and bank loans.  An event of default
occurred on August 24, 2009, due to a default in the payment of
accrued interest on the Class B notes.  The trustee notified
Moody's of the acceleration and the liquidation of the transaction
on January 8, 2010.  The portfolio was liquidated and all the
proceeds were used to pay down the notes on February 18, 2010.
Based on the last note valuation report, dated February 18, 2010,
the Class B notes' principal and accrued interest was paid in
full, but the Class C notes suffered a default in failing to
receive full payment of principal and accrued interest.

The rating actions taken reflect the severity of loss experienced
by the defaulted Class C-1 and Class C-2 notes after the final
liquidation distribution.  Moody's will withdraw the ratings of
all the rated notes following the rating action.


NY MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 7 tranches
from one RMBS transaction, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by
New York Mortgage Trust.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed rate prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: New York Mortgage Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 28 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 28
tranches and confirmed the rating on 3 tranches from 3 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Opteum in 2005.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II-2, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PT, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PARCS-R MASTER: S&P Downgrades Rating on Series 2007-8 to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the trust
unit issued by PARCS-R Master Trust's series 2007-8, a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation, and removed it from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The downgrade follows additional negative credit migration in the
underlying reference portfolio, as well as an increase in the
number of defaulted reference entities.

      Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                       PARCS-R Master Trust
                           Series 2007-8

                                  Rating
                                  ------
     Class                 To                 From
     -----                 --                 ----
     Trust Unit            CC                 CCC-/Watch Neg


PETRA CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Petra CRE CDO 2007-1
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 48.4%.  Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.

Petra 2007-1 is collateralized by both senior and subordinate
commercial real estate debt: 60.6% is either whole loans or A-
notes, and 25.5% is either B-notes, mezzanine loans, or equity
participations.  Fitch expects significant losses upon default for
the subordinate positions since they are generally highly
leveraged debt classes.  Further, Fitch considers 16 loans (41.1%)
defaulted or delinquent, while another eight assets (15.7%) are
Fitch Loans of Concern.  Of the defaulted assets, 10 are non-
performing matured balloons (22.2%), four are considered
performing matured balloons (14.3%), one is more than 90 days
delinquent (3.2%), and another is real estate owned (1.5%).  Fitch
expects partial losses on the defaulted assets and Loans of
Concern.

Petra 2007-1 is a revolving CRE collateralized debt obligation
managed by Petra Capital Management LLC.  The CDO was issued as
$1 billion in notes with a six-year reinvestment period.  In
February 2010, the manager purchased $40 million of Petra CRE CDO
2007-1 class A-1 notes with $20 million of the portfolio's
principal proceeds.  Petra immediately cancelled the notes,
reducing the outstanding A-1 note balance to $360 million from
$400 million.

As of the March 2010 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations,
the CDO was substantially invested: CRE whole loans/A-notes
(60.6%), mezzanine loans (19.2%), real estate investment trust
debt (4.6%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS: 4.2%),
CRE collateralized debt obligations (4.2%), B-notes (3.9%), equity
participations (2.3%), and cash (0.9%).

Although the transaction is passing all of its
overcollateralization and interest coverage tests as of the
March 2010 trustee report, there is only 0.1% cushion
(approximately $65,000) to the class F/G/H IC test.  OC and IC
test failures cause principal and interest proceeds to be
redirected from the classes junior to the test to redeem the
senior-most notes.  Despite still passing the F/G/H IC test, there
are currently interest shortfalls to classes J and K, suggesting
there is currently not enough excess interest to meaningfully de-
lever the transaction if and when the test fails.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 72.5% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 11.4% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally third or fourth quarter 2009).  Fitch estimates
that recoveries will average 33.3%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is the
Petra REIT debt (4.6%).  The asset is primarily supported by
interest proceeds to class J and K notes and preference shares of
this CDO.  The interest shortfalls to the junior CDO classes and
preferred shares add significant stress to the asset.  Fitch
assumed 100% loss in its modeling of this asset.

The next largest component to Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (6.2%) secured by a 99,000 square foot condo
conversion located in New York City.  Through the worsening
economy the borrower tried to adapt its business plan to
alternative uses, which interrupted progress on the renovation.
The project is only approximately 60%-70% complete, and the loan
is non-performing.  Fitch modeled a significant loss to the loan
in its analysis.

The third largest component to Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (6%) secured by a four-story office property
located in New York City.  The borrower's business plan included
vacating the existing tenants in anticipation of replacing the
existing structure with an 86,000 sf office tower.  The borrower
has been unable to source construction financing to move forward
with its business plan and repay the loan.  The loan is a
performing matured balloon.  Fitch modeled a significant loss to
the loan in its analysis.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs,' which applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The default levels were
then compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash
flow model of the CDO under the various default timing and
interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based on this analysis,
the credit characteristics for class A-1 are generally consistent
with the 'BBB' rating category.  The credit characteristics for
class A-2 are generally consistent with the 'BB' rating category.
The credit characteristics for class B are generally consistent
with the 'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes C through K are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted and delinquent
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement.

Based on this analysis, class C is consistent with the 'CCC'
rating category, meaning default is a real possibility.  Fitch's
base case loss expectation of 48.4% exceeds this class's current
credit enhancement levels.  The ratings for classes D through H
are deemed to be consistent with the 'CC' rating category, meaning
default appears probable given the lack of cushion between the
classes' respective credit enhancements and the losses expected on
the currently defaulted assets and Loans of Concern in the pool.
The ratings for classes J and K are deemed to be consistent with
the 'C' rating category, meaning Fitch considers default to be
inevitable.  Fitch's base case expected losses from current
defaulted assets exceeds these classes' respective credit
enhancement levels.

Classes A-1 through B were assigned a Negative Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation of further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.  These classes were also assigned Loss
Severity ratings ranging from 'LS4' to 'LS5' indicating each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes C through K were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(72.5% and 33.3%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class C reflects modeled recoveries of
14.3% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($2.6 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($5.6 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($8.2 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($19 million).

Classes D through K are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class's principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $360,000,000 class A-1 to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $133,750,000 class A-2 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $76,750,000 class B to 'B/LS5' from BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $57,500,000 class C to 'CCC/RR5' from 'B';

  -- $25,500,000 class D to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $22,000,000 class E to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $33,000,000 class F to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $20,000,000 class G to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $26,500,000 class H to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $42,500,000 class J to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $32,500,000 class K to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC'.

Additionally, classes A-1 through K are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.


PONTIAC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Sewer Bonds
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Pontiac, Michigan's
water and sewer revenue bonds as part of its continuous
surveillance effort:

  -- Approximately $2.4 million water revenue bonds, series 1995
     and 2002, upgraded to 'B' from 'B-';

  -- Approximately $3.5 million sewer revenue bonds, series 2002,
     upgraded to 'B' from 'B-'.

The ratings have been removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Stable Outlook.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The upgrade and Stable Outlook reflect the additional
     revenues anticipated from the recent rate increases that are
     expected to bring revenues and expenditures into balance as
     well as the emergency financial manager's ability to further
     raise rates.

  -- Water and sewer systems operational and financial flexibility
     remains severely limited.

  -- The city's financial condition is marginal and in the past,
     transfers from the water and sewer fund were required to
     support the city's general fund.  However, at the end of
     fiscal 2009, all outstanding advances from the general fund
     had been repaid.

  -- Usage has declined and the weakened customer base is
     concentrated in General Motors (GM) and related suppliers and
     their employees.  The GM truck plant closed in late 2009.

  -- Implementation of rates sizable increases on Dec. 1, 2009
     are projected to support the recent borrowing from the state
     revolving funds needed to comply with mandated system
     rehabilitation and upgrades.  However, given the city's
     stressed economic conditions and extremely high unemployment,
     the impact of these rate hikes on revenues collections is
     unclear.

  -- The state appointed an EFM to the city in 2009, who has
     significant fiscal and operational control over the city,
     including the water and sewer funds, and is focused on
     improving the financial condition of the city.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Collection of revenues anticipated from the recently
     implemented rate increases is critical to bringing structural
     balance to each fund.

  -- Maintenance of the policy in the last year to limit transfers
     from the water and sewer funds to the general fund should
     rebuild the financial position of the funds is also an
     important credit consideration.

  -- Further departure, or downsizing, of GM facilities, may
     adversely impact the systems' financial results and exert
     negative rating pressure.

  -- The city is exploring the potential regionalization of one of
     its wastewater treatment plants in order to increase revenues
     by selling it unused capacity in the facility.  Although very
     preliminary, this could provide additional revenues to the
     city.

Security:

The water revenue bonds are secured net revenues of the city's
water system.  The sewer revenue bonds are secured by net revenues
of the city's sewer system.

Credit Summary:

The city has experienced significant financial pressure for a
number of years.  The crisis prompted the state to appoint an EFM
in 2009 in conjunction with the governor's declaration of a local
fiscal emergency.  Since this time, the past practice of using the
water and sewer systems to support general fund operations appears
to have been discontinued.  However, Fitch continues to view the
credit quality of the water and sewer systems to be very closely
tied to that of the city's overall financial health.  A number of
steps have been taken to address the city's overall financial
situation.  For additional information on the City of Pontiac (GOs
rated 'CCC'), see Fitch's release, 'Fitch Upgrades Pontiac,
Michigan's GO and TIFA bonds to 'B'; Outlook Revised to Stable',
dated April 16, 2010.

One of the steps taken by the EFM was the implementation of rate
increases for both systems.  The ability of the EFM to implement
rates increases is viewed positively by Fitch.  The rate increases
(9% for the water system and 30% for the sewer system) became
effective on Dec. 1, 2009, and are the first increases since 2005.
The rate increases will be effective for seven months of the
fiscal year 2010 and are expected to generate sufficient revenues
to cover expenditures in each of the funds.  Reserves in both
funds have been depleted and revenues do not appear to be
sufficient to replenish them in fiscal 2010.  While Fitch views
the implementation of these rate hikes as important to restoring
financial stability to both funds, there is some concern about the
impact of such increases, particularly for sewer customers, on
current collections given the city's very high unemployment rates,
which stood at 31.8% for February 2010.

Debt service coverage is projected to be at least 1.0 times,
although may not be above the city's 1.1x rate covenant required
for each system.  The sewer fund has violated its rate covenant in
the last two fiscal years with -0.46x debt service coverage in
fiscal 2009 and 1.03x in fiscal 2008.  The water fund had stronger
debt service coverage of 1.8x in fiscal 2009.  Liquidity levels in
both funds are minimal with days operating cash at 26 days and
seven days for the water and sewer funds, respectively.

Revenues generated by the rate increases will be needed to support
the additional debt borrowed by the systems via loans from the
state revolving funds.  In 2009, the water fund borrowed
$3.4 million from the state drinking water revolving fund and the
sewer fund borrowed $16 million from state revolving fund.  Both
loans allowed the city to take advantage of fund provided by the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that provide 40% principal
forgiveness on the loan amounts.  Proceeds were needed, despite
the dire financial condition of the city, to comply with
regulatory requirements for both systems, certain of which were
mandated by the state.


PONTIAC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tax Bonds
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Pontiac, Michigan's
general obligation and tax increment financing authority bonds as
part of its continuous surveillance effort:

  -- Approximately $8 million Pontiac General Building Authority
     limited tax GO bonds, series 2002, upgraded to 'B' from
     'CCC'.

  -- Approximately $4 million Pontiac TIFA development area no. 2
     bonds, series 2002, and approximately $25 million development
     area no. 3 bonds, series 2002, upgraded to 'B' from 'CCC'.

The ratings have been removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Stable Outlook.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The upgrade and Stable Outlook reflect the oversight of the
     state-appointed emergency financial manager (EFM) and the
     resulting improvement in financial management in addition to
     the successful implementation of personnel cost savings.  The
     quality of disclosure and the responsiveness of the
     management team have improved markedly with the EFM and gains
     have been made in adjusting spending to operating revenues.

  -- The general fund position remains exceedingly weak, with a
     sizeable accumulated deficit of nearly 13% of spending,
     though the accumulated deficit declined in fiscal 2009 and is
     expected to improve modestly in fiscal 2010.

  -- Revenues are likely to weaken with the continuing reduction
     in General Motors Corp's presence, the city's largest
     employer and taxpayer.  GM is appealing its property tax
     assessments statewide and has already closed several Pontiac
     plants, posing challenges to property tax receipts, and
     continues to layoff employees, which has already
     significantly reduced income tax receipts.

  -- The city has made headway with significant spending cuts,
     including long needed adjustments to personnel expenditures.
     More cuts will likely be necessary to improve its financial
     position.

  -- The economy is extremely weak and the city has one of the
     highest unemployment rates in the nation, topping 30%, as it
     has absorbed the loss of over 10,000 GM jobs in the past five
     years.  After these adjustments in the GM workforce, the
     existing employment base exposure to GM is now modest, but
     high unemployment rates will likely persist.

  -- The city's debt profile is a relative strength, as pensions
     are overfunded and the debt burden is moderate with average
     debt amortization, though retiree health care liabilities are
     very sizeable.

  -- The 'B' rating category indicates that the city's bond rating
     is highly speculative and material default risk is present,
     though a very limited margin of bondholder safety remains as
     financial obligations, including debt service payments, are
     currently being met.  The ratings for the city's GO and TIFA
     bonds are highly intertwined since from a practical
     perspective, all of the city's debt including general
     obligation debt is paid through its TIFA, and much of the
     land area of the city is within its tax increment district.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Continued improvement in the accumulated deficit and progress
     in general fund performance, including the reduced reliance
     on advances from other funds.

  -- Stabilization of local economic conditions, though the city
     is expected to remain severely stressed in the near to medium
     term.

  -- Continued viability of TIFA funds, including the ability for
     annual tax receipts to meet ongoing debt obligations.

Security:

The building authority bonds constitute general obligations of the
city, secured by its full faith and credit pledge, subject to
statutory limitations.  The TIFA bonds are secured by pledged
gross tax increment revenues and a debt reserve fund.

Credit Summary:

Located in the Detroit metropolitan area with about 66,000
residents, Pontiac has been very hard hit by the travails of the
auto industry.  At one time with over 15,000 GM employees residing
in Pontiac, GM employment has shrunk to just 3,000 after the
closure of both its truck and assembly plants in 2009: the
prospects for remaining facilities are uncertain.  Other local
employers include hospitals and local governments, but all
employment sectors have continued to contract in 2010.  The city's
unemployment rate has hovered near 30% for the last year, with the
February 2010 rate equal to 31.8% compared to the state's 14.6%.

The city's property tax base contracted nearly 7% in 2009 and is
expected to contract about 10% in 2010, figures that are typical
for the Detroit metropolitan area.  Though subprime exposure is
high at twice the national rate, some data show foreclosure rates
have begun to stabilize; however, GM's recent cuts in employment
are likely to have a lagging effect on the area's housing market
and Fitch expects the Pontiac housing market is likely to be
extremely pressured for the near-term.  Wealth and income
indicators for the city are very low, as median household incomes
equal just 65% of the state average.

The city's financial position has been very weak since 2002, when
the city's general fund declined to a negative balance.  In fiscal
2006, the city borrowed deficit bonds whose proceeds were
deposited into its general fund.  Also, since fiscal 2005, the
city's other funds, such as its water and sewer fund and its
internal service funds, have made sizeable advances to the general
fund for cash flow needs and to supplement operating revenues.  In
fiscal 2008 (June 30 year end), the city's accumulated deficit in
its general fund reached a negative $7.1 million, or 14% of
spending, and the state was obliged to intervene.

In March 2009 the state appointed an EFM to oversee and manage the
city's challenged fiscal position.  The EFM process is employed
infrequently by the state to restructure the financial accounts of
the most severely challenged communities; his purview extends to
labor negotiations, hiring, spending, and most other financial
concerns.  At the time of Fitch's last review in 2009, the city
was negotiating with several of its bargaining units and
concessions were clearly crucial to aligning spending with
weakening revenues; a portion of the city's contracts have been
settled with substantial cost savings achieved.

Fiscal 2009 ended with a sizeable surplus in the general fund due
to a one-time revenue gain and significant spending cuts, reducing
the accumulated surplus to a negative $5.6 million or a negative
12.5% of spending.  Fiscal 2010 is expected to produce a more
modest surplus as labor concessions were not timely enough to
benefit fiscal 2010 to a great degree and asset sales did not
materialize as expected; in particular, the Silverdome sale
garnered a relatively low sum, although the sale eliminated the
city's tax subsidy to the venue.  Additionally, income taxes are
projected to decline by 18% and property tax revenue is expected
to contract 10%.  The fiscal 2011 budget process is currently
underway, and management plans to incorporate reasonable
assumptions which will not depend on further asset sales and will
incorporate sizeable losses in all major revenue sources.  Further
cuts and labor concessions will be critical to the success of the
plan, and Fitch expects the accumulated deficit may persist until
fiscal 2012 or beyond.  The EFM's management of financial affairs
will continue until a number of state-developed fiscal metrics are
met; Fitch believes that EFM and thus state oversight is a key
credit consideration for Pontiac, at least until the city's
financial position has become sustainable and fiscal integrity
restored.

The TIFA bonds continue to make all debt service payments without
any draws on their respective debt service reserve funds, and
coverage on both development area no. 2 bonds and area no. 3 bonds
remains adequate.  Nonetheless, as more limited subsections of the
city, the bonds remain vulnerable to the compounding effects of GM
and economic weakening.  TIFA area no. 2 has a greater industrial
and commercial component and remains dominated by GM facilities.
GM has continued to pay all of its property taxes on its existing
and shuttered facilities, but any further loss of GM facilities
could affect the bonds in the medium term should property tax
payments decline or the valuation of the property itself erode
with the statewide appeal.  Historically, area no. 3 has financed
heavy investment in the development area, but revenue declines
have made any capital spending unfeasible and debt service
payments have consumed all available resources.  Fiscal 2010
projections show an 11% decline in revenues.  Though revenues have
weakened considerably in the past four years, TIFA area no. 3
continues to adequately finance its own revenue bonds as well as a
portion of the city's general obligation debt; with 2010 projected
tax revenues, TIFA area no. 3 covers debt service of revenue and
GO bonds by 1.1 times; using its available fund balance and
operating revenues, coverage is slightly over 1.6x.  Fitch
believes the TIFA should be able to continue to finance debt
service payments well in excess of the 2002 revenue bonds for at
least the medium term without drawing on its debt service reserve,
but notes that any significant loss to GM property tax receipts
would jeopardize the TIFA's ability to support GO bonds.

TIFA area no. 2, while of a similar size, is more residential in
composition than area no. 3 and has had slightly more stable
revenues in the past several years.  Nonetheless, fiscal 2010
revenues declined about 8% compared to fiscal 2009.  Debt service
coverage of TIFA revenue debt and a portion of GO debt from tax
receipts equals 1.1x in 2010; using available fund balance and
operating revenues, coverage is an adequate 1.5x.  For both TIFAs,
city management expects revenues to decline a further 15% in
fiscal 2011, still providing for adequate debt service coverage,
as well as continued support for GO bonds.

In addition, Fitch withdraws its 'CCC' long-term rating on certain
maturities for this bond because they have been pre-refunded:

  -- Pontiac General Building Authority GO ltd tax bonds series
     2002.


PRADO CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and left
under review for possible further upgrade the ratings of these
notes issued by Prado CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$200,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due November 17,
     2014 (current balance of $61,990,923.75), Upgraded to Baa1
     and left under review for possible further upgrade;
     previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due November 17,
     2014, Upgraded to Ba2 and left under review for possible
     further upgrade; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class X Deferrable Amortizing Notes Due
     November 17, 2014 (current balance of $7,361,907.25),
     Upgraded to Caa1 and left under review for possible further
     upgrade; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     November 17, 2014 (current balance of $15,642,729.70),
     Upgraded to Caa3 and left under review for possible further
     upgrade; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to C.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the delevering of the Class A notes, which have
been paid down by approximately $37.6 MM, accounting for roughly
38% of delevering of the total Class A outstanding balance
reported in May 2009.  The notes are being left under review for
possible further upgrade because Moody's expects delevering to
continue, the impact of which requires further analysis, as a
result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period as well as
breach of the overcollateralization tests.  In addition to
principal pay downs, excess spread is being diverted to pay down
Class A notes as a result of the failure.  The
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last rating
action in May 2009.  The Class A/B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 131.7% and 111.6%,
respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 116.5% and 104.0%,
respectively.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.
In particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $13 million from approximately $29 million in
May 2009.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key
assumptions referenced in the latest Moody's CLO methodology, key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Prado CDO Ltd. issued in November 2003 is a collateralized bond
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
bonds.  On May 15, 2009, Moody's downgraded 5 classes of notes as
a result of the application of revised and updated key modeling
assumptions as well as the deterioration in the credit quality of
the transaction's underlying portfolio as well as the credit
deterioration of the portfolio.


RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 20
tranches from 2 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued
by RFC.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The actions
are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of Alt-A
pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that remain
under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-SL1 Trust

  -- Cl. A-I, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IV, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-III, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-V, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-VI, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-VII, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2005-SL2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-I, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-III, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IV, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-V, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 2003-RZ5 Tranche
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the rating on one tranche issued by RAMP
Series 2003-RZ5 Trust.  The collateral backing this transaction
primarily consists of high loan-to-value subprime residential
mortgages.

This downgrade is the result of Moody's analysis of the balance of
delinquent loans relative to credit support provided by
subordination and excess spread.  The junior-most bond of this
transaction has incurred writedows as a result of principal losses
and is expected to see substantial further writedowns in the near
term.

Moody's evaluated the each tranche's credit enhancement relative
to the near-term losses projected from the delinquency pipeline in
determining these rating actions.  This pipeline loss amount is
calculated by multiplying assumed 12 month roll rates with each
delinquency bucket.  This assumption of defaulted loans is
multiplied by the average recent loss severity to calculate the
pipeline loss amount.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2003-RZ5 Trust

* M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 8, 2010 B1 Placed Under
  Review for Possible Downgrade


RESOURCE REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Resource Real Estate
Funding CDO 2007-1 Ltd./LLC reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 35.9%.  Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.

RRE 2007-1 is collateralized by both senior and subordinate
commercial real estate debt: 59.6% are either whole loans or A-
notes and 23.0% are either B-notes or mezzanine loans.  Fitch
expects significant losses upon default for the subordinate
positions, since they are generally highly leveraged debt classes.
Further, one loan (1.5%) is currently defaulted while six loans
(21.4%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern.  Fitch expects
partial losses on the defaulted asset and Loans of Concern.

RRE 2007-1 is a $500 million CRE collateralized debt obligation
managed by Resource Real Estate, Inc.  The transaction has a five-
year reinvestment period during which principal proceeds may be
used to invest in substitute collateral.  The reinvestment period
ends in June 2012.

As of the March 2010 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations,
the CDO was substantially invested: CRE whole loans/A-notes
(59.6%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS: 15.9%), B-
notes (12.5%), mezzanine loans (10.5%), and cash (1.5%).  All
overcollateralization and interest coverage ratios remained above
their covenants as of the March 2010 trustee report.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 70.2% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 10.9% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally third or fourth quarter 2009).  Fitch estimates
that recoveries will average 48.8%.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
mezzanine loan (4.0%) secured by interests in a Midtown Manhattan
office complex totaling 1.2 million square feet.  Cash flow from
the property is not sufficient to support debt service.  Fitch
modeled a term default with a full loss in its base case scenario
on this highly leveraged mezzanine position.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (6.1%) secured by a 244-key hotel property located
in Tucson, Arizona.  Despite a recent loan modification to remove
the interest rate floor, the current property cash flow is
insufficient to cover debt service and the borrower is covering
the debt service shortfall out of pocket.  Fitch modeled a term
default with a partial loss in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (6.2%) secured by a 260-unit multifamily property
located in Renton, Washington.  While the borrower renovated many
of the units at the property, rents have remained significantly
below market.  The loan was recently modified to reduce the
interest rate floor.  Nevertheless, current cash flow from the
property is still insufficient to support debt service.  Further,
Fitch is concerned that the interest reserve will become depleted
prior to loan maturity.  Fitch modeled a term default with a
partial loss in its base case scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs,' which applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  The default levels were
then compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash
flow model of the CDO under the various default timing and
interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based on this analysis,
the credit characteristics for classes A-1 and A-R are generally
consistent with the 'BBB' rating category.  The credit
characteristics for class A-2 are generally consistent with the
'BB' rating category.  The credit characteristics for class B and
C are generally consistent with the 'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes D through M are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted and delinquent
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class' credit enhancement.

Based on this analysis, classes D through L are consistent with
the 'CCC' rating category, meaning default is a real possibility.
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 35.9% exceeds these classes'
respective current credit enhancement levels.  The rating for
class M is deemed to be consistent with the 'CC' rating category,
meaning default appears probable given the lack of cushion between
the class's credit enhancement and the losses expected on the
currently defaulted asset and Loans of Concern in the pool.

Classes A through C were assigned a Negative Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation of further negative credit migration of the
underlying collateral.  These classes were also assigned Loss
Severity ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS5' indicating each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral
under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class's
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes D through M were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(70.2% and 48.8%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class's tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.

The assignment of 'RR2' to class D reflects modeled recoveries of
79% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($12.3 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($9 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($21.3 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($40.3 million).

The assignment of 'RR3' to class E reflects modeled recoveries of
62% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($4.5 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($2.8 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($7.3 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($17.2 million).

The assignment of 'RR5' to class F reflects modeled recoveries of
12% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($0.3 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($1.1 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($1.4 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($2.9 million).

Classes G through M are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class's principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS and RR ratings and Outlooks to
these classes as indicated:

  -- $180,000,000 class A-1 to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $50,000,000 class A-R to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $57,500,000 class A-2 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22,500,000 class B to 'B/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7,000,000 class C to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26,750,000 class D to 'CCC/RR2' from 'AA-'

  -- $11,875,000 class E to 'CCC/RR3' from 'A+';

  -- $11,875,000 class F to 'CCC/RR5' from 'A';

  -- $11,250,000 class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'A-';

  -- $11,250,000 class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';

  -- $11,250,000 class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $10,000,000 class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $18,750,000 class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $28,750,000 class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'B.

Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.


REVE SPC: S&P Corrects Ratings on $2.062 Mil. Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on REVE
SPC's series 2006-MB1 $2.062 million class A and B notes by
raising them to 'BB+' from 'BB' and placing them on CreditWatch
with positive implications.

The ratings on the class A and B notes are dependent on the rating
on the underlying security, ELM B.V.'s class A floating-rate notes
due June 20, 2013 ('BB+/Watch Pos').

On Feb. 19, 2010, S&P placed its 'BB' rating on the underlying
security on CreditWatch with positive implications.  On Feb. 26,
2010, S&P raised its rating on the underlying security to 'BB+'
and removed it from CreditWatch with positive implications.  On
April 15, 2010, S&P again placed the rating on the underlying
security on CreditWatch positive.  Due to an error, the rating
actions on the series 2006-MB1 notes did not occur
contemporaneously with the rating actions on the underlying
security.


RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 77 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 77
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 11 tranches from 32 RMBS
transactions issued by RFMSII Home Loan Trust.  The collateral
backing this deal primarily consists of high LTV closed end second
lien mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured Rating Withdrawn
3/25/2009) .  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's
guaranty.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2000-HI4

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance) 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2000-HI5

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance) 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2001-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance) 11%

  -- A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2001-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2001-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2001-HI4

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- A-7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2002-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2002-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2003-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 11%

  -- A-II, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- A-I-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2004-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 16%

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2004-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 17%

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2005-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 19%

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 35%

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 A1 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 38%

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Baa2 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI4

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 45%

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba2 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI5

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 43%

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba2 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2007-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 47%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ba2 Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII, Inc. Home Loan Trust 2002-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Secuirities II, Inc. Home
Loan-Backed Notes, Series 1999-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- A-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. , Series
1999-HI4

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- A-7, Downgraded to A3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. Home
Loan-Backed Notes, Series 1999-HI8

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- CL. A-I-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. Series
2000-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc. Series
2000-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc., Series
1999-HI6

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- CL. A-I-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Inc., Series
2000-HI3

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-I-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Home Loan Trust 2002-HI5

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2002-HI4

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10%

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Certificate (Component B), Downgraded to B2; previously on
     Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2003-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 11%

  -- A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2003-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 12%

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl B, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2004-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 13%

  -- A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-5, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2005-HI2

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 21%

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI1

* Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 31%

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SATURNS TRUST: S&P Puts 'BB' Ratings on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB' ratings on
SATURNS Trust No. 2003-7's $25 million class A and B units on
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The ratings on SATURNS Trust No. 2003-7's class A and B units are
based solely on the rating assigned to Macy's Retail Holdings
Inc.'s 6.90% debentures due Jan. 15, 2032.

The CreditWatch placements reflect the April 7, 2010 placement of
the rating on Macy's Retail Holdings Inc.'s 6.90% debentures due
Jan. 15, 2032 ('BB/Watch Pos') on CreditWatch with positive
implications.


SCRANTON: S&P Raises Rating on GO Debt From 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has raised its underlying
rating on Scranton, Pennsylvania's general obligation debt to
'BBB-' from 'BB' based on its view of the city's continued modest
progress toward structurally balanced general fund operations, an
improved cash position, and strengthened revenue collection
procedures.  The outlook is stable.

In addition, the rating reflects Standard & Poor's opinion of the
city's:

* Vulnerable management policies, with no formal reserve policy or
  multiyear tracking of operating revenues and expenditures;

* Limited economy with adequate, although below-average, income
  indicators; and

* High direct debt levels as a percentage of market value.

The above rating weaknesses are partially mitigated, in Standard &
Poor's opinion, by the city's:

* Strong unreserved general fund balances, which have been
  bolstered by deficit financings and some one-time revenues; and

* Limited future capital needs, which reduces the need for
  additional long-term borrowings.

"The stable outlook reflects the city's improved financial
performance and enhanced revenue collection procedures, which
contributed to its slightly lower receivables balance," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Le T. Quach.  "S&P expects the
city's receivables balance to further decrease as it strengthens
its collections and revenue monitoring," she added.  The outlook
also reflects the assistance of the commonwealth with respect to
the administration of the city's recovery plan.

The city's full faith and credit pledge secures its GO debt.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 27
tranches, upgraded the ratings of four tranches, and confirmed the
rating of one tranche from six RMBS transactions, backed by prime
jumbo loans, issued by Sequoia Mortgage Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

List of actions:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on May 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-XA, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-3

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-XA, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2007-4, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-4

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-XA, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SKY LAKES: Fitch Takes Rating Action on Oregon's Bonds
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this rating action on Sky Lakes Medical
Center, Oregon as part of its continuous surveillance:

  -- Approximately $39.3 million Klamath Falls Intercommunity
     Hospital Authority (Oregon) revenue and refunding bonds
     (Merle West Medical Center Project), series 2006, affirmed at
     'BB';

  -- Approximately $13.5 million Klamath Falls Intercommunity
     Hospital Authority (Oregon) revenue and refunding bonds
     (Merle West Medical Center Project), series 2002, affirmed at
     'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The Outlook revision to Stable from Negative reflects the
     quick and sizable improvement in Sky Lakes' operating
     profitability.  In fiscal year 2009, Sky Lakes posted a
     $1.9 million operating income (1.3% operating margin)
     following a $4.6 million operating loss in fiscal 2008 (-
     3.1%).  The turnaround in profitability is a result of
     several initiatives began by a consultant group (FTI Cambio)
     and implemented by a new CFO at Sky Lakes.

  -- Sky Lakes balance sheet is best characterized as adequate for
     the rating category though at fiscal year-end 2009 Sky Lakes
     has violated its liquidity covenant as calculated by the bond
     insurer.  The liquidity violation stems from the inclusion of
     bad debt in the days cash on hand calculation, as required by
     bond insurance documents.

  -- Indicative of the strong turnaround in profitability, Sky
     Lakes did not violate its debt service coverage in FY 2009
     (unlike FY 2008).

  -- Sky Lakes adopted a new investment policy that restricts Sky
     Lakes' investment portfolio allocation in equities to 50%.
     Previously, Sky Lakes' investment portfolio was in equities
     alone.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Sustained improvement to Sky Lakes operating profitability
     and liquidity.

  -- Ability to meet bond insurer liquidity covenant.

Security:

Debt payments are secured by a pledge of the gross revenues of the
Sky Lakes, a mortgage, and a debt service reserve fund.

Credit Summary:

The rating is supported by Sky Lakes' improving financial and
operational profile.  The improving profile is attributed to
strong remediation actions implemented by management (Fitch notes
that a new CFO has taken the helm at Sky Lakes in early 2009).  As
Fitch has reported in its last rating action, Sky Lakes violated
both liquidity and debt service coverage covenants in FY 2008,
which compelled Sky Lakes to retain the services of a consultant
whose recommendations included strong expense control, revenue
cycle improvements, and several productivity and efficiency
initiatives.  As a result, Sky Lakes posted a $1.9 million
operating income (1.3% operating margin) following a $4.6 million
operating loss in fiscal 2008 (-3.1%).  Through the three-month
interim period, Sky Lakes reported $1 million operating income
(2.4%) Sky Lakes' liquidity metrics have also rebounded from large
investment losses in 2008, which led to the aforementioned
liquidity covenant violation.  Contributing to the large losses is
Sky Lakes' failure to diversity its investment portfolio, which
was invested solely in equities.  A new investment policy adopted
by the board limits Sky Lakes' investment portfolio's exposure to
equities markets to no more than 50%, which should buffer Sky
Lakes investment losses in the future.  Nonetheless, at fiscal
year-end 2009, Sky Lakes violated its bond insurer liquidity
covenant of 75 days solely due to the inclusion of bad debt in
DCOH calculation as required by bond insurance document; however,
the bond insurer waived its right to call the bonds.  At fiscal
year end 2009, Fitch measures Sky Lakes DCOH at 78.4 days.
Lastly, unlike FY 2008, Sky Lakes did not violate its debt service
coverage covenant as it posted strong cash flow generation.  At
fiscal year end 2009, maximum annual debt service coverage by
EBITDA was measured at a very good 2.6 times.

Key rating drivers reflect Sky Lakes' ability to maintain current
profitability trend, enhance its balance sheet, and meet bond
insurer liquidity covenant.  Fitch notes that should Sky Lakes
achieve its budget targets over the next two fiscal years, then
positive rating pressures and a rating upgrade are likely to
occur.  Management is targeting a 4% operating margin and a 100
DCOH over the medium term.

Sky Lakes Medical Center (formerly Merle West Medical Center) is
located in Klamath Falls, Oregon, and operates a 100 staffed-bed
general acute-care community hospital and several clinics.  In
fiscal 2009, Sky Lakes generated approximately $148.6 million in
total operating revenues.  Sky Lakes covenants to provide annual
and quarterly disclosure through the Municipal Rule Making Board's
EMMA system.


SPRINGHILL/COURTLAND HEIGHTS: S&P Junks Ratings on 1999A Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Springhill/Courtland Heights Public Facility Corp., Texas'
$6.91 million senior-lien multifamily housing revenue bonds
(Springhill I and II, Courtland Heights Project) series 1999A to
'CCC' from 'B-'.  The outlook remains negative.

The lowered rating reflects a draw on the project's debt service
reserve fund to fund its December 2009 debt service payment;
negative debt service coverage (DSC) in the fiscal 2009 year, the
fifth consecutive annual decline in DSC; sharp increase in
expenses coupled with declining rental revenues; and low occupancy
levels at the property.

"The negative outlook reflects the continued deterioration in the
financial performance of the property," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Mikiyon Alexander.

The project contains a total of 505 units in different submarkets
within the city of San Antonio.  Springhill I and II contain a
total of 449 units in 84 buildings.  Courtland Heights contains 56
units in four two-story buildings.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on
classes A, M-1, M-2, and B from Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NP2 by raising them.

On Feb. 1, 2010, S&P incorrectly lowered the ratings on these
classes.  The raised ratings reflect the application of S&P's
current criteria and its view of the transaction's performance.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of loans
guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration and Veteran
Administration.

                        Ratings Corrected

  Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NP2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class  CUSIP       Current     Feb. 1      Pre-Feb. 1
      -----  -----       -------     ------      ----------
      A      86359BQ79   BBB         B           AAA
      M-1    86359BQ87   BB          CCC         AA
      M-2    86359BQ95   B           CCC         A
      B      86359BR29   CCC         CC          BBB


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Raises Rating on Two Units to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on
Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackaging J.C. Penney Co. series
2007-1's debenture-backed class A and B units to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

The ratings on the certificates are dependent on the rating on the
underlying securities, J.C. Penney Co. Inc.'s 7.625% debentures
due March 1, 2097 ('BB+').

The rating actions follow the April 7, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying securities to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


STUDENT LOAN: S&P Cuts Rating on Series 2007-2 Certs. to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Student
Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-2's interest-only
certificates to 'B-' from 'AA+' and removed it from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

S&P's rating on the interest-only certificates is dependent on the
lowest rating on the seven underlying securities, Student Loan ABS
Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1's class 1-A-IO ('AAA'), 2-A-IO
('AAA'), 3-A-IO ('B-'), 4-A-IO ('B-'), 5-A-IO ('BB'), 6-A-IO
('AA+/Watch Neg'), and 7-A-IO ('AAA') certificates.

The rating action reflects the April 15, 2010, lowering of S&P's
ratings on two of the underlying securities, the class 3-A-IO and
4-A-IO certificates, to 'B-' from 'AAA' and their removal from
CreditWatch with negative implications.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2004-NP2 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on
classes A, M-1, M-2, and B from Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NP2 by raising them.

On Feb. 1, 2010, S&P incorrectly lowered the ratings on these
classes.  The raised ratings reflect the application of S&P's
current criteria and S&P's view of the transaction's performance.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of loans
guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration and Veteran
Administration.

                         Ratings Corrected

  Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NP2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
      Class  CUSIP       Current     Feb. 1      Pre-Feb. 1
      -----  -----       -------     ------      ----------
      A      86359BQ79   BBB         B           AAA
      M-1    86359BQ87   BB          CCC         AA
      M-2    86359BQ95   B           CCC         A
      B      86359BR29   CCC         CC          BBB

STUDENT LOAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1 and
removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
negative implications.

The ratings on the class 3-A-1 and 3-A-IO certificates are
dependent on (i) the short-term rating on Deutsche Bank AG ('A-
1'), which provides an interest rate swap on the certificates; and
(ii) the higher of the rating on the underlying securities,
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1's class A-7 and A-IO
notes ('B-'), and the rating on Ambac Assurance Corp. ('R'), which
provides a financial guarantee insurance policy on the underlying
securities.

The ratings on the class 4-A-1 and 4-A-IO certificates are
dependent on (i) the short-term rating on Deutsche Bank AG ('A-
1'), which provides an interest rate swap on the certificates; and
(ii) the higher of  the rating on the underlying securities, NCF
Grantor Trust 2004-1's class A-1, A-2, and A-IO-2 grantor trust
certificates ('B-'), and the rating on Ambac Assurance Corp.
('R'), which provides a financial guarantee insurance policy on
the underlying securities.

The ratings on the class 5-A-1 and 5-A-IO certificates are
dependent on (i)the short-term rating on Deutsche Bank AG ('A-1'),
which provides an interest rate swap on the certificates; and (ii)
the higher of the rating on the underlying securities, NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-1's class A-5-1 and A-5-2 certificates ('BB'), and the
rating on Ambac Assurance Corp. ('R'), which provides a financial
guarantee insurance policy on the underlying securities.

The rating actions reflect the March 31, 2010, lowering of S&P's
ratings on the underlying securities and their removal from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

         Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1

                            Rating
                            ------
                Class      To      From
                -----      --      ----
                3-A-1      B-      AAA/Watch Neg
                3-A-IO     B-      AAA/Watch Neg
                4-A-1      B-      AAA/Watch Neg
                4-A-IO     B-      AAA/Watch Neg
                5-A-1      BB      AA+/Watch Neg
                5-A-IO     BB      AA+/Watch Neg


VERTICAL CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes issued by Vertical CRE
CDO 2006-1 Ltd./Corp. as a result of negative credit migration of
the commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral.

On the Sept. 22, 2009 payment date, the Overcollateralization
Default Trigger fell below 105% which resulted in an Event of
Default.  On Oct. 8, 2009, the Holder of a majority in Aggregate
Principal Amount of the class A notes and the class B notes,
voting together as a single class, declared the principal of the
notes to be immediately due and payable.  As a result of the
acceleration, the class B notes have missed their interest payment
since the Oct. 22, 2009 payment date.  Fitch rates the class B
notes to the timely receipt of interest and has therefore
downgraded this class to 'D'.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Further, in its review, Fitch
analyzed the structure's sensitivity to the default of the
distressed collateral ('CCC' category and lower).  Approximately
65% of the collateral is rated below investment grade, with 36.1%
of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating in the 'CCC' category
or lower.  The class A notes are downgraded to 'CCC' given its
seniority in the capital structure; however, the poor credit
quality of the portfolio implies that default is a real
possibility.

Fitch's loss expectation exceeds the credit enhancement available
to classes C and below.  Given the high probability of default of
the underlying assets and the expected limited recovery prospects
upon default, classes C through H have been downgraded to 'C',
indicating that default is inevitable at maturity.  Further, 28.2%
of the portfolio is considered defaulted per the transaction
documents as of the March 16, 2010 trustee report.

Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
issued in May 2006.  The portfolio is composed of 62.6% CMBS
assets, 18.3% of structured finance CDOs, 17.9% of commercial real
estate loans, and 1.1% of real estate operating company debt.  In
general, Fitch treats CMBS Rake bonds and single-borrower CMBS as
CREL.  There are 52 assets from 35 obligors.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $185,574,866 class A notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BB';
     removed from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $29,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'B'; removed
     from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $10,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B-';
     removed from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $4,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B-'; removed
     from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $12,000,000 class E notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $5,000,000 class F notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $10,500,000 class G notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $4,000,000 class H notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-ESH Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
14 classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-ESH, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on four other classes from the same
transaction and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades to 'D' of the class A-4FL, A-4FX, and B through M
certificates reflect recurring interest shortfalls.  Wells Fargo
Bank N.A., the master servicer, is advancing debt service
payments, subject to an appraisal reduction amount of
$1.64 billion (as of the April 15, 2010, trustee remittance
report).  The ARA is based on a revised August 2009 appraisal
value for the portfolio of $2.81 billion.  A related $7.24 million
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amount is causing
interest shortfalls to all classes subordinate to the class A-3
certificates.  None of the classes that experienced interest
shortfalls have received any of their monthly accrued certificate
interest for the last six months, except for the A-4FX class,
which received 42.2% of its accrued certificate interest this
month, according to the April 2010 trustee remittance report.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on the class A-1, A-2FL, and A-2FX
certificates based on its revised valuations of the Extended Stay
Hotels (ESH) portfolio securing the single mortgage loan that
serves as collateral for the trust.  S&P's analysis was based, in
part, on a review of the borrowers' portfolio operating statements
for the 12 months ended Jan. 31, 2010.  Based on S&P's portfolio
valuations, which ranged between $2.55 billion and $2.85 billion,
S&P derived a loan-to-value ratio on the cumulative A-2FX and A-
2FL certificates' balances ranging between 33.6% and 37.6%.  S&P's
affirmations also reflect the low cumulative loan balance per room
of $13,057 on the A-2FL and A-2FX certificates.

The affirmed 'B' rating on the class A-3 certificate reflects
S&P's opinion that this class has a heightened susceptibility to
future liquidity interruptions given its position in the capital
stack, particularly since all of the classes subordinate to class
A-3 are currently experiencing interest shortfalls.

As of the April 15, 2010, trustee remittance report, the
transaction's certificates are collateralized by a single
$4.06 billion ESH mortgage loan secured by 664 extended-stay
hotels, one office building that serves as headquarters for
Extended Stay Hotels Inc., and one vacant land parcel.  The hotel
properties, which have 73,422 total rooms, are located in 44
states and two Canadian provinces.  The mortgage loan has fixed-
and floating-rate components: the fixed-rate components mature in
June 2012 and the floating-rate components have an initial
maturity of June 2009, with three consecutive one-year extension
options.  In addition to the mortgage loan, there are 10 floating-
rate mezzanine loans totaling $3.29 billion that are held outside
the trust.  The mortgage loan was transferred to the special
servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors, on June 16, 2009, after
the borrowers, Extended Stay Inc., Homestead Village LLC, and
their affiliates filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 15, 2009.

It is S&P's understanding that the borrowers are making adequate
protection payments with respect to the ESH mortgage loan in
accordance with a cash collateral order of the bankruptcy court.
In addition, according to the Oct. 9, 2009, officer's certificate
notice from Wells Fargo, "the cash collateral order further
provides that, if the mortgage position is determined by the
bankruptcy court to be undersecured, such payments may be
reapplied as the bankruptcy court shall order."  The notice
further states that "it is possible that the bankruptcy court may
determine at some point during the bankruptcy case that the
adequate protection payments should be recharacterized and treated
as principal payments on the mortgage loan."  The notice follows
that, "accordingly, in order to minimize the risk of distributing
adequate protection payments to certificateholders in a manner
inconsistent with such possible determination by the bankruptcy
court, TriMont Real Estate Advisors Inc., as the special servicer,
after consultation with the servicer, has determined and advised
the servicer to hold the adequate protection payments in an
adequate protection reserve at this time pending the further
evolution of this issue in the bankruptcy case."  According to
Wells Fargo, the adequate protection reserve totals $123.0 million
to date.  If the bankruptcy court recharacterizes the adequate
protection payments as principal payments on the mortgage loan,
based on S&P's conversations with the servicers, S&P would expect
a large portion of the master servicer's advances to be paid
first, followed by principal payments, which would render any
potential recovery of accumulated interest shortfalls unlikely.

Wells Fargo is making interest and principal advances, up to the
$1.64 billion ARA, in accordance with the trust and servicing
agreement dated Aug. 1, 2007.  The related ASER amount, which
totaled $7.24 million as of the April 2010 trustee remittance
report, prompted interest shortfalls to classes subordinate to the
A-3 certificates.  It is S&P's understanding that additional trust
expenses, such as third-party expenses (except $2.29 million
relating to appraisal expenses, master servicer's legal fees, and
miscellaneous expenses, according to Wells Fargo), special
servicing fees, and special servicer's legal fees, are currently
being paid from excess cash flow generated by the properties.
According to Wells Fargo, it has advanced approximately
$115.4 million to date.  There appears to be some uncertainty
surrounding the resolution of the mortgage loan, likely due to the
complexity of the bankruptcy proceedings.  It is possible that
further changes to the loan terms could occur as part of the
bankruptcy proceeding, which may cause additional payment
interruptions and/or losses to the trust.  If such changes occur,
S&P will evaluate the effect on the trust and adjust S&P's ratings
further, as appropriate.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-ESH

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class      To                From
           -----      --                ----
           A-4FL      D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           A-4FX      D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           B          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           CFL        D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           CFX        D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           D          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           E          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           F          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           G          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           H          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           J          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           K          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           L          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           M          D                 CCC-/Watch Neg

       Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-ESH

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class      To                From
           -----      --                ----
           A-1        AAA               AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2FL      AAA               AAA/Watch Neg
           A-2FX      AAA               AAA/Watch Neg
           A-3        B                 B/Watch Neg


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2003-C8 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2003-C8 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on 10 other classes from the same
transaction and removed five of them from CreditWatch negative.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.77x
and a loan-to-value ratio of 89.9%.  S&P further stressed the
loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.36x and an LTV of 121.5%.  The implied defaults
and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 27.1% and 41.7%,
respectively.  S&P's weighted average DSC and LTV calculations
exclude one specially serviced loan ($33.3 million; 4.6%).  S&P
separately estimated a loss for this loan, which S&P included in
its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XP
and XC interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 17, 2010, remittance report, three loans
($206.5 million; 28.5%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC.  Following the
remittance date, the largest loan in the pool was transferred back
to the master servicer ($114.0 million; 15.7%), and an additional
loan was transferred to the special servicer ($12.9 million;
1.8%).  The payment status of the three loans currently with the
special servicer ($105.4 million; 14.6%) is: one is in bankruptcy
($33.3 million; 4.6%), one is 30 days delinquent ($12.9 million;
1.8%), and one is current ($59.2 million; 8.2%).  S&P separately
estimated a loss for one of the specially serviced loans
($33.3 million; 4.6%), which equates to a 10% loss severity.  All
three loans currently with ING are:

The Park City Center loan ($59.2 million trust balance; 8.2%) is
the fourth-largest loan in the pool and has a $149.4 million
whole-loan balance.  In addition to the note contributed to this
transaction, a $59.2 million pari passu note was contributed to
the WBCMT 2003-C9 transaction and a $31.1 million B note is held
outside of the trust.  The whole loan is secured by approximately
1.1 million sq. ft. of a roughly 1.4 million-sq.-ft. enclosed
regional mall built in 1970 and renovated in 1997 in Lancaster,
Pa.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 27,
2009, following General Growth Properties' chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing on April 16, 2009.  For year-end 2008, the reported
occupancy and DSC were 97% and 2.27x, respectively.  Pursuant to
the bankruptcy plan, the maturity date for this loan was extended
to April, 1, 2014, and ING expects to transfer this loan back to
the master servicer next month.  S&P will continue to monitor
developments related to this loan and will take rating actions on
this transaction as S&P determine necessary.   The Hai Portfolio
loan ($33.3 million; 4.6%), the ninth-largest loan in the pool,
consists of two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted notes.
One note is secured by a 96,607-sq.-ft. office building built in
2001 in Richmond, Va., which is 100% occupied by the FBI pursuant
to a lease expiring in January 2011.  The second note is secured
by a 131,453-sq.-ft. office building built in 1996 and 1997 in
Boise, Idaho, which is 100% occupied by the Natural Resource
Center pursuant to a lease expiring in October 2011.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 2, 2010, due to the
bankruptcy of the two special purpose entity (SPE) borrowers and
the borrower's sponsor.  For year-end 2009, the reported DSC was
1.49x.  S&P determined a minimal loss may occur upon the eventual
resolution of this loan related to potential fees and the
sponsor's bankruptcy.

The Shiloh Square loan ($12.9 million; 1.8%) is secured by a
139,720-sq.-ft. anchored retail center, built in 1996, 1999, and
2003, in Kennesaw, Ga.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on March 30, 2010, due to imminent default and, as of the
March 17, 2010, remittance date, the loan is 30 days delinquent.
For the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported DSC was
1.20x.  The occupancy at year-end 2009 was 84%.  S&P understand
the borrower has indicated that it does not intend to make further
debt service payments and has submitted loan restructuring
proposals to the special servicer.  As S&P noted above, the
special servicer expects to return the Park City Center loan
($59.2 million, 8.2%), a GGP-sponsored loan, to the master
servicer next month.  In addition, the Tucson Mall loan
($114.  million; 15.8%) and the Regency Square Mall loan
($45.8 million; 6.3%), which are both GGP-sponsored loans, were
transferred back to the master servicer on March 19, 2010, and
March 8, 2010, respectively.  Pursuant to the transaction
documents, the special servicer is entitled to a workout fee that
is 1.0% of all future principal and interest payments, provided
the loans are returned to the master servicer and continue to
perform.  These three loans are top 10 loans, and the collection
of the fee could, in S&P's opinion, prompt sizeable shortfalls at
maturity.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 17, 2010, remittance report, the transaction had
an aggregate trust balance of $723.9 million (45 loans), compared
with $974.2 million (54 loans) at issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A.,
the master servicer, provided financial information for 97.5% of
the loans in the pool.  All but one percent of the servicer-
provided financial information was full-year 2008, partial-year
2009, or full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.78x for the loans in the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.77x and 89.9%,
respectively, and exclude one specially serviced loan
($33.3 million; 4.6%).  S&P separately estimated a loss for this
loan.  The trust has not experienced principal losses to date.
Twelve loans are on the master servicer's watchlist
($146.6 million; 20.2%).  Five loans ($78.5 million, 10.8%) have a
reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and one loan ($49.8 million,
6.9%) has a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$524.1 million (72.4%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.88x.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.87x and 93.7%,
respectively.  These calculations exclude one specially serviced
loan ($33.3 million; 4.6%), for which S&P separately estimated a
loss as discussed above.  Two of the top 10 loans are with the
special servicer and were discussed above, two of the top 10 loans
are on the master servicer's watchlist, and one of the top 10
loans matures in 2010.  S&P discussed three top 10 loans, two on
the watchlist and the one maturing in 2010, below.

The Four Seasons Hotel - Chicago loan ($49.8 million; 6.9%) is the
fourth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 343-room full-
service luxury hotel at 900 North Michigan Avenue in downtown
Chicago.  The property was built in 1989 as part of a 2.7 million-
sq.-ft., 66-story mixed-use development that includes the hotel,
retail, office, residential, and parking components.  The hotel is
approximately 434,310 sq. ft. and includes a ground floor lobby
and guestrooms on floors 30 through 46.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For the 12 months ended
Sept. 30, 2009, the occupancy, average daily rate, and DSC were
55%, $338, and 0.29x, respectively.  The loan is current, and the
master servicer reports that the borrower has not indicated that
it will curtail payments on the loan at this time.

The Rivertowne Commons loan ($39.3 million; 5.4%) is the seventh-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 387,339-sq.-ft.
anchored  retail center built in 1987 in Oxon Hill, Md., across
the Potomac River from Alexandria, Va.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  For the nine months ended
Sept. 30, 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were 80% and 0.98x,
respectively.

The Parkdale Mall loan ($48.2 million; 6.7%), the fifth-largest
loan in the pool, has a near-term maturity.  It is secured by
663,465 sq. ft. of a 1,134,754-sq.-ft. regional mall built in 1973
and renovated in 2003 in Beaumont, Texas.  For year-end 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 91% and 2.14x, respectively.  The
loan matures on Sept. 11, 2010, and the master servicer did not
disclose a pending loan repayment.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C8

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----             ----------------------
    G          BBB     BBB+/Watch Neg                     7.74
    H          BB+     BBB-/Watch Neg                     5.55
    J          BB      BB+/Watch Neg                      4.54
    K          BB-     BB/Watch Neg                       3.70
    L          B+      BB-/Watch Neg                      3.03
    M          B       B+/Watch Neg                       2.69
    N          B-      B/Watch Neg                        2.02
    O          CCC+    B-/Watch Neg                       1.68

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C8

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----             ----------------------
    B          AA+     AA+/Watch Neg                     19.18
    C          AA      AA/Watch Neg                      17.33
    D          AA-     AA-/Watch Neg                     13.46
    E          A+      A+/Watch Neg                      11.61
    F          A-      A-/Watch Neg                       9.42

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C8

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-2      AAA                       23.22
             A-3      AAA                       23.22
             A-4      AAA                       23.22
             XP       AAA                         N/A
             XC       AAA                         N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Diversified SF CDO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the rating actions for classes of notes
issued by several diversified structured finance collateralized
debt obligations that closed in 2006 with exposure to structured
finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Due
to the extent of collateral deterioration within the portfolios,
Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all the classes
in the 21 transactions can be assessed without using the
Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model or performing cash flow
model analysis under the framework described in the 'Global
Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Of the 21 transactions, 12 have entered an Event of Default either
due to failing collateralization coverage requirements or default
in the payment of accrued interest to non-deferrable classes.
Seven of those transactions have accelerated their maturities.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m, Ltd./Corp., Kleros Preferred Funding II,
Ltd./LLC., and Monterey CDO, Ltd./LLC maintain positive credit
enhancement levels for at least their senior rated tranches, when
the CE levels are computed based off the sum of the total
collateral balance and principal collection accounts.  However,
losses expected from the distressed assets in these portfolios are
likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement levels even
for the most senior classes of notes in these transactions.

Due to the writedowns in the underlying collateral portfolios, the
total collateral balances in the portfolios of the remaining 18
transactions are already lower than the outstanding balances of
their respective senior tranches, indicating that default is
inevitable for the entire capital structure.  The highest rating
on the classes in these transactions is 'C'.

In all 21 transactions, non deferrable classes of notes which have
missed their full interest payment in at least one period are
downgraded to or affirmed at 'D'.

Fitch is taking these rating actions:

C-BASS CBO XV, Ltd./Corp:

  -- $524,624,321 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $39,100,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $44,800,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $18,284,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

C-BASS CBO XV, Ltd, is a cash CDO that closed on Feb.16, 2006, and
is managed by C-BASS Investment Management LLC.  As of the March
2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS primarily
from 2005 to 2006 vintage transactions.

C-BASS CBO XVI, Ltd./Corp:

  -- $297,672,269 class A notes affirmed at 'D';
  -- $22,500,000 class B notes affirmed at 'D';
  -- $26,500,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $9,125,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

C-BASS CBO XVI, Ltd, is a cash CDO that closed on June 1, 2006,
and is managed by C-BASS Investment Management LLC.  On Jan. 11,
2009, C-BASS XVII entered an Event of Default due to failure to
pay interest to the class A and B notes.  To date, the majority of
the controlling class of noteholders has not accelerated the
transaction.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS primarily from 2005 to 2006 vintage
transactions.

C-BASS CBO XVII, Ltd.:

  -- $333,612,466 class A notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC';
  -- $26,500,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $29,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,180,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

C-BASS CBO XVII, Ltd is a cash CDO that closed on Nov. 17, 2006,
and is managed by C-BASS Investment Management LLC.  On Jan. 9,
2009, C-BASS XVII entered an Event of Default due to failure to
pay interest to the class A and B notes.  To date the majority of
the controlling class of noteholders has not accelerated the
transaction.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS and ABS primarily from 2005 to 2006 vintage
transactions.

Duke Funding X CDO, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $72,000,000 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $105,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $84,733,992 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,435,739 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $21,270,442 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Duke Funding X CDO, Ltd./Corp., is a hybrid SF CDO that closed on
April 12, 2006, and is managed by Duke Funding Management, LLC.
Duke X declared an Event of Default on Oct. 9, 2009, due to
default in the payment of the accrued senior swap premium amount
and the senior swap interest.  To date, a majority of the
controlling class has not voted to accelerate the maturity of the
transaction.  As of the March 9, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of prime and subprime RMBS from 2005 to
2007 vintage transactions.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c, Ltd./Corp:
  -- $54,000,000 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $40,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $26,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $19,771,667 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c, Ltd./Corp., is a hybrid SF CDO that closed on
March 31, 2006, and is managed by GSCP (NJ), L.P.  GSC ABS 2006-1c
triggered an Event of Default on Oct. 8, 2008, due to the senior
swap and class A-1 notes being undercollateralized.  To date, a
majority of the controlling class has not voted to accelerate the
maturity of the transaction.  As of the March 5, 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and CMBS primarily from
2004 to 2007 vintage transactions.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $118,848,458 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $125,000,000 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $13,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $56,500,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $14,500,000 class C notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $22,500,000 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $21,000,000 class E notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $4,652,423 class F notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $4,652,423 class G notes affirmed at 'C'.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m, Ltd./Corp., is a cashflow SF CDO with hybrid
features that closed on May 31, 2006, and is managed by GSCP (NJ),
L.P.  GSC ABS 2006-2m declared an Event of Default on June 11,
2009 due to a default in the payment of accrued interest on the
class B and class C notes.  A majority of the controlling class
voted to accelerate the transaction on June 23, 2009.  As of the
March 26, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS,
SF CDOs and CMBS primarily from 2004 to 2006 vintage transactions.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-4u, Ltd/Corp.:

  -- $254,895,143 class A-S1VF notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CC/DR5';

  -- $85,000,000 class A1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/DR6';

  -- $45,000,000 class A2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/DR6';

  -- $45,000,000 class A3 notes affirmed to 'C' from 'C/DR6';

  -- $33,000,000 class B notes affirmed to 'C' from 'C/DR6';

  -- $10,000,000 class C notes affirmed to 'C' from 'C/DR6'.

GSC ABS CDO 2006-4u, Ltd/Corp., is a hybrid SF CDO that closed on
Oct. 6, 2006, and is managed by GSCP (NJ), L.P.  GSC ABS 2006-4u
triggered an Event of Default on Oct. 31, 2007, due to the class
A-S1VF and A1 notes being undercollateralized.  A majority of the
controlling class voted to accelerate the transaction on Nov. 5,
2007.  As of the March 24, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, SF CDOs and CMBS primarily from 2005 and 2006
vintage transactions.

Independence VII CDO, Ltd./Inc.:

  -- $336,524,914 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $56,087,486 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $30,600,000 class A-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $60,000,000 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $28,500,000 class C affirmed at 'C';
  -- $16,633,664 class D affirmed at 'C';
  -- $27,002,978 class E affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,947,716 class F affirmed at 'C'.

Independence VII CDO, Ltd./Inc, is a cash CDO that closed on
March 28, 2006, and is managed by Declaration Management &
Research LLC.  On April 9, 2008, Independence VII entered an Event
of Default due to collateral balance failing to be at least equal
to the aggregate outstanding amount of the class A, B, and C
notes.  On April 22, 2008, the majority of controlling class of
noteholders voted to accelerate the transaction.  As of the April
2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed
securities, and CDOs, primarily from 2005 and 2006 vintage
transactions.

Ipswich Street CDO, Ltd./LLC:

  -- $1,519,372,752 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $60,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $62,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $27,084,198 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $10,693,581 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $9,768,281 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

Ipswich Street CDO, Ltd./LLC, is a SF CDO that closed on June 27,
2006, and is managed by Massachusetts Financial Services Company.
Ipswich Street declared an Event of Default on Nov. 21, 2008, due
to a default in the payment of all accrued interest on the class B
notes.  A majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate
the transaction on Nov. 26, 2008.  As of the March 30, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and SF CDOs
from 2005 to 2007 vintage transactions.

Kleros Preferred Funding II, Ltd./LLC:

  -- $714522014 class A-1NV notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $205381 class A-1V notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $58429929 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $33110293 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $7790657 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $10182907 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11820048 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

Kleros Preferred Funding II, Ltd., is a static CDO which closed in
January 2006 with a portfolio selected by Strategos Capital
Management, LLC.  As of the March 1, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of RMBS and SF CDOs primarily from the 2005
vintage transactions.

Libertas Preferred Funding I, Ltd./LLC:

  -- $351,071,150 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $66,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $32,400,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $5,400,000 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $24,824,167 class D notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $14,113,493 class E notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $12,512,107 class F notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $9,767,016 class G notes affirmed at 'C'.

Libertas Preferred Funding I, Ltd./LLC, is a SF CDO that closed on
May 25, 2006, and is managed by Strategos Capital Management, LLC.
As of the March 26, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, SF CDOs and CMBS primarily from 2004 to 2006
vintage transactions.

Maxim High Grade CDO I, Ltd./LLC:

  -- $1,199,523,637 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $249,928,544 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $249,928,544 class A-3 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $99,971,417 class A-4 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $99,971,417 class A-5 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $33,990,282 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $20,380,676 class C notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $15,438,733 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $22,856,637 class E-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $1,781,751 class E-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Maxim High Grade CDO I, Ltd., is a static high grade cash flow SF
CDO that closed on Dec. 21, 2006, and is managed by Maxim Capital
Management, LLC.  Maxim I declared an Event of Default on April 7,
2008 due to a default in the payment of accrued interest on the
class A-3, A-4, A-5, B, and class C notes.  A majority of the
controlling class voted to accelerate the transaction on Dec. 19,
2008.  As of the Feb. 26, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS and SF CDOs primarily from the 2006 vintage
transactions.

Monterey CDO, Ltd./LLC:

  -- $218,177,468 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $509,080,760 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $77,961,611 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $49,700,527 class A-3 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $33,133,685 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $6,821,641 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $10,561,043 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11,058,276 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

Monterey CDO, Ltd./LLC, is a static SF CDO which closed on
March 30, 2006, with a portfolio selected by Dynamic Credit
Partners, LLC.  As of the Feb. 26, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of primarily RMBS and SF CDOs from 2005 and
2006 vintage transactions.

Orion 2006-1, Ltd/LLC:

  -- $98,500,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $81,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $77,135,832 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $31,078,496 class D notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

Orion 2006-1, Ltd./LLC, is a hybrid cash and synthetic CDO that
closed on May 25, 2006, and is managed by NIBC Credit Management
Inc.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS primarily from 2005 and 2006 vintage
transactions.

Orion 2006-2, Ltd/LLC:

  -- $851,975,006 class A-1A variable funding notes downgraded to
     'D' from 'CCC';

  -- $40,000,000 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $30,150,000 class S notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $195,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $87,500,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $40,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $58,000,000 class C-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $31,000,000 class C-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $50,028,228 class D-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $13,000,000 class D-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $10,500,000 class E notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $21,371,051 class X notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

Orion 2002-6, Ltd./LLC, is a hybrid cash and synthetic CDO that
closed on Dec. 7, 2006, and is managed by NIBC Credit Management
Inc.  Orion 2002-6 declared an Event of Default as of Nov. 6,
2007, due to the ratio of collateral balance and outstanding class
A notes being less than 100%.  On Dec. 6, 2007, the majority of
the controlling class of noteholders voted to accelerate the
transaction.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio
is comprised of RMBS primarily from 2005 and 2006 vintage
transactions.

Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd 2006-1:

  -- $180000000 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $113500000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $93500000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $90260658 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $35078021 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $39806388 class X notes affirmed at 'C'.

Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd 2006-1 is a hybrid SF CDO that closed on
Oct. 3, 2006, and is managed by Putnam Advisory Company, LLC.
Pyxis 2006-1 declared an Event of Default on Dec. 4, 2008, due to
the senior swap, class A-1 and class A-2 notes being
undercollateralized.  A majority of the controlling class voted to
accelerate the transaction on July 2, 2009.  As of the April 6,
2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and SF
CDOs from 2005 and 2006 vintage transactions.

SHARPS CDO I, Ltd/Corp:

  -- $238275543 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $8825020 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $25077674 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $13801136 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $13127910 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6900568 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

SHARPS CDO I, Ltd/Corp., is a static cash flow CDO that closed on
Dec. 15, 2006, and has no trading flexibility and no asset
manager.  Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas is the trustee for
this transaction.  As of the March 31, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of RMBS from 2005 and 2006 vintage
transactions.

TORO ABS CDO II, LTD./LLC:

  -- $863,678,679 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $55,899,748 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $23,957,035 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $6,987,469 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $9,723,751 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11,249,663 class E notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $4,928,249 class F notes affirmed at 'C'.

Toro ABS CDO II, Ltd./LLC, is a SF CDO that closed on April 27,
2006.  The initial portfolio was selected by Merrill Lynch
Investment Managers and is currently managed by BlackRock Inc.
Toro's substitution period ended in June 2009.  As of the March 5,
2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS and SF
CDOs from 2005 and 2006 vintage transactions.

Vertical ABS CDO 2006-1, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $367,275,144 class A-S1VF notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $56,000,000 class A1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $108,500,000 class A2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $33,760,353 class A3 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $32,966,764 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.

Vertical ABS CDO 2006-1, Ltd./Corp., is a hybrid SF CDO that
closed on April 25, 2006, and is managed by Vertical Capital, LLC.
As of the March 4, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised
of RMBS and SF CDOs from 2004 to 2007 vintage transactions.

Vertical ABS CDO 2006-2, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $231,735,099 class A-S1VF notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $52,000,000 class A1 notes affirmed at 'D';
  -- $41,000,000 class A2 notes affirmed at 'D';
  -- $28,187,152 class A3 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $23,659,658 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,086,517 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Vertical ABS CDO 2006-2, Ltd./Corp., is a SF CDO that closed on
June 20, 2006, and is monitored by Vertical Capital, LLC.
Vertical ABS 2006-2 declared an Event of Default on Nov. 9, 2009,
due to the default in payment of accrued interest on the class A1
and class A2 notes.  To date, the transaction has not been
accelerated.  As of the March 4, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of RMBS and SF CDOs from 2004 to 2007
vintage transactions.

West Trade Funding CDO I, Ltd./ LLC:

  -- $1,297,596,039 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $58,823,322 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $50,869,143 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $14,343,266 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11,992,820 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $7,263,623 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.

West Trade Funding CDO I, Ltd./LLC, is a cash CDO that closed on
April 26, 2006, and is managed by NIR Capital Management, LLC.  As
of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
RMBS and CDOs primarily from 2005 and 2006 vintage transactions.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Classes From Two RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 63
classes from two U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo collateral and one RMBS
deal backed by both U.S. prime and seasoned mortgage collateral.
Concurrently, S&P removed 58 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 31 classes from these transactions and removed 30
of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.

For the two prime jumbo transactions, in order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding the base-case assumption at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for a
'AAA' rating.  For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-case
loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 154% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 235% of its base-case loss assumptions under S&P's
analysis.

The remaining transaction is collateralized by two pools of
mortgage loans: mortgage pool I and mortgage pool II.  At the time
S&P rated this transaction in 2007, the loans in pool I were 45
months seasoned, and the mortgage loans in pool II were not
seasoned.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans that
are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

               Banc of America Funding 2006-3 Trust
                        Series      2006-3

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1-A-1      058931AB2     B                    BBB+/Watch Neg
   1-A-2      058931AC0     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2-A-1      058931AD8     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
   2-A-2      058931AE6     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   3-A-1      058931AF3     BB+                  A+/Watch Neg
   3-A-2      058931AG1     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-1      058931AH9     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-2      058931AJ5     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-3      058931AK2     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-4      058931AL0     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-5      058931AM8     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-6      058931AN6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-7      058931AP1     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-8      058931AQ9     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-9      058931AR7     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-10     058931AS5     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-11     058931AT3     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-12     058931AU0     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-13     058931AV8     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-14     058931AW6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-15     058931AX4     A-                   AA+/Watch Neg
   4-A-16     058931AY2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-17     058931AZ9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-18     058931BA3     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-19     058931BB1     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   4-A-20     058931BC9     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-1      058931BD7     BBB                  A/Watch Neg
   5-A-2      058931BE5     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-3      058931BF2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-4      058931BG0     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-5      058931BH8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-6      058931BJ4     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-7      058931BK1     BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
   5-A-8      058931BL9     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5-A-9      058931BM7     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   X-IO       058931BP0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   X-PO       058931BQ8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   6-A-1      058931BN5     BB                   BB/Watch Neg

           Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-A2
                       Series      2007-A2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1-A1       16163LAA0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   1-A2       16163LAB8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   1-A3       16163LAC6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A1       16163LAD4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A2       16163LAE2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A3       16163LAF9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A4       16163LBT8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A5       16163LBU5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A6       16163LBV3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A1       16163LAG7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A2       16163LAH5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A3       16163LBG6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A1       16163LAJ1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A2       16163LAK8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A3       16163LBL5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5-A1       16163LAL6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5-A2       16163LAM4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5-A3       16163LBM3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-M        16163LAU6     BB                   AA/Watch Neg
   I-B1       16163LAW2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   I-B2       16163LAX0     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   I-B3       16163LAY8     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
   I-B4       16163LAZ5     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   6-A1       16163LAN2     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   6-A2       16163LAP7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   6-A3       16163LBN1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   6-A4       16163LBP6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   6-A5       16163LBQ4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A1       16163LAQ5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A2       16163LAR3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A3       16163LAS1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A4       16163LBR2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A5       16163LBS0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-M       16163LAV4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
   II-B1      16163LBB7     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
   II-B2      16163LBC5     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   II-B3      16163LBD3     CC                   CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3
                       Series      2005-AR3

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1A1        36242D4R1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2A1        36242D4S9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   X          36242D5B5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3A1        36242D4T7     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   3A2        362341AL3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   4A1        36242D4U4     B+                   BB/Watch Neg
   5A1        36242D4V2     B+                   BB/Watch Neg
   6A1        36242D4W0     BB                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   6A2        36242D4X8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   7A1        36242D4Y6     B+                   BB/Watch Neg
   8A1        36242D4Z3     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
   8A2        36242D5A7     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2B1        36242D5F6     CC                   CCC
   1B1        36242D5C3     B+                   BBB-/Watch Neg
   2B2        36242D5G4     CC                   CCC
   1B2        36242D5D1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
   1B3        36242D5E9     CC                   CCC
   1B4        36242D5M1     CC                   CCC

                          Rating Affirmed

               Banc of America Funding 2006-3 Trust
                        Series      2006-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M          058931BR6     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 70 Tranches From 32 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 70
tranches from 32 U.S. collateralized debt obligation transactions
and removed 46 of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The downgraded notes had an initial issuance amount
of $17.920 billion.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
116 classes from 30 transactions and removed four of them from
CreditWatch negative.  S&P also withdrew one rating from one
transaction.

Twenty-three of these 33 transactions are mezzanine structured
finance CDOs of asset-backed securities, which are collateralized
in large part by mezzanine tranches of residential mortgage-backed
securities and other SF securities.  Nine of the 33 transactions
are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were collateralized at
origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated tranches of RMBS
and other SF securities.  The other transaction is a retranching
of other CDO tranches.

S&P lowered 28 ratings from nine of the transactions to 'D'
because these non-payment-in-kind tranches did not receive
interest payments when due.  The downgrades to 'D' reflect the
implementation of S&P's criteria for ratings on CDO transactions
that have triggered an event of default and may be subject to
acceleration or liquidation.  The remaining downgrades reflect
credit deterioration in these transactions.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to S&P's updated criteria.

                           Rating Actions

                                           Rating
                                           ------
  Transaction                  Class      To    From
  -----------                  -----      --    ----
  Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1     A-2        D     B-/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1     B          D     CCC
  Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1     C          CC    CCC-
  Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1     S          D     B-/Watch Neg
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     A-1        D     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     A-2        D     CC
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     A-3        D     CC
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     A-4        D     CC
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     B          D     CC
  Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     C          D     CC
  Bleecker Structured Asset    A-1        CC    B-/Watch Neg
   Funding
  Bleecker Structured Asset    A-2        CC    B-/Watch Neg
   Funding
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   A-1A      CC    CCC+/Watch Neg
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   A-1B      CC    CCC+/Watch Neg
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   A-1C      D     CCC+/Watch Neg
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   A-1D      D     CCC+/Watch Neg
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   A-2       D     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Brigantine High Grade Fndg.   B         D     CC
  Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         A-1AD      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         A-1AT      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1    A-1LB      CC    B-/Watch Neg
  Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1    A-2L       CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       A1-VF      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    B          D     CC
  CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    S          CCC-  CCC-/Watch Neg
  Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. A-1M       CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. A-1Q       CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Duke Funding IV Ltd.         A-1        CC    CCC/Watch Neg
  Duke Funding IV Ltd.         A-2        CC    CCC/Watch Neg
  E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      A-1B-1     CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-1R       CC    B/Watch Neg
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-1T1      CC    B/Watch Neg
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-1T2      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-2        D     CC
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-3        D     CC
  ESP Funding I Ltd.           A-4        D     CC
  FAB US 2006-1 PLC            A1         CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  FAB US 2006-1 PLC            A2         D     CC
  FAB US 2006-1 PLC            A3         D     CC
  FAB US 2006-1 PLC            A4         D     CC
  FAB US 2006-1 PLC            S          CCC-  CCC-/Watch Neg
  Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     A-1LA Inv  CC    B/Watch Neg
  Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c Ltd.     A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     A1A        CC    B-/Watch Neg
  Hamilton Gardens CDO Ltd.    A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  HarbourView CDO III Ltd.     A          CC    CCC/Watch Neg
  IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          X          CCC-  CCC/Watch Neg
  Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   X          B+    B+/Watch Neg
  Monterey CDO Ltd.            A-1A       CC    B/Watch Neg
  Monterey CDO Ltd.            A-1B       CC    B/Watch Neg
  Monterey CDO Ltd.            A-2        CC    CCC-
  Porter Square CDO III Ltd.   A-1        CC    B/Watch Neg
  Porter Square CDO III Ltd.   A-2        D     CC
  Porter Square CDO III Ltd.   B          D     CC
  Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    UnfunSuper CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Soter 2007-CRN3 Ltd.         Notes      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  STAtic ResidenTial CDO       A-1        CC    B/Watch Neg
   2005-B
  STAtic ResidenTial CDO       A-2        CC    CCC
   2005-B
  STAtic ResidenTial CDO       A-1        CC    B/Watch Neg
   2005-C
  Stockton CDO Ltd.            A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     A-1LA      CCsrp CCC-srp/Watch Neg
  Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     A-1LB      D     CC
  Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     X          D     CCC-/Watch Neg
  Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  A-1        CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Term CDO 2007-1 Ltd.         A-1LA      CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Toro ABS CDO I Ltd.          A          CC    B/Watch Neg
  Toro ABS CDO I Ltd.          B          CC    CCC-/Watch Neg
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      A-1a       CCC-  CCC-/Watch Neg
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      A-1b       D     CC
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      A-2 FLT    D     CC
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      A-2 FXD    D     CC
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      B-1        D     CC
  Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      PrncPtdNts NR    AA-

                         Ratings Affirmed

          Transaction                  Class      Rating
          -----------                  -----      ------
          Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1     D          CC
          Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     D          CC
          Biltmore CDO 2007-1 Ltd.     E          CC
          Brigantine High Grade Fndg.  C          CC
          Brigantine High Grade Fndg.  D          CC
          Brigantine High Grade Fndg.  Income Nts CC
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         C          CC
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         D          CC
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         E          CC
          Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1    A-3L       CC
          Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1    B-1L       CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       C1         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       C2         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       C3         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       D1         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       D2         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       D3         CC
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       E          CC
          CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    A-2        CC
          CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    C          CC
          CEAGO ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd.    D          CC
          Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. B          CC
          Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. C          CC
          Duke Funding IV Ltd.         B          CC
          Duke Funding IV Ltd.         C          CC
          Duke Funding IV Ltd.         Comp Sec   CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      A-1A       CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      A-1B-2     CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      A-2        CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      B          CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      C          CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      D          CC
          E*Trade ABS CDO IV Ltd.      Pref Shrs  CC
          ESP Funding I Ltd.           B          CC
          ESP Funding I Ltd.           C          CC
          FAB US 2006-1 PLC            B          CC
          FAB US 2006-1 PLC            C          CC
          Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     A-3L       CC
          Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     B-1L       CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         A-2        CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         A-3        CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         B          CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         C          CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         D          CC
          Gemstone CDO IV Ltd.         E          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c Ltd.     A-2        CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c Ltd.     B          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-1c Ltd.     C          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     D          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     E          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     F          CC
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     G          CC
          Hamilton Gardens CDO Ltd.    A-2        CC
          Hamilton Gardens CDO Ltd.    B          CC
          Hamilton Gardens CDO Ltd.    C          CC
          Hamilton Gardens CDO Ltd.    D          CC
          IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          A-1LB      CC
          IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          A-2L       CC
          IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          A-3L       CC
          IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          B-1L       CC
          IXIS ABS CDO 1 Ltd.          B-2L       CC
          Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   A-1L       CC
          Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   A-2L       CC
          Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   A-3L       CC
          Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   B-1E       CC
          Mill Reef SCDO 2005-1 Ltd.   B-1L       CC
          Monterey CDO Ltd.            A-3        CC
          Monterey CDO Ltd.            B          CC
          Monterey CDO Ltd.             C          CC
          Monterey CDO Ltd.            D          CC
          Monterey CDO Ltd.            E          CC
          Porter Square CDO III Ltd.   C          CC
          Porter Square CDO III Ltd.   D          CC
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    A-1        CC
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    A-2        CC
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    C          CC
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    D          CC
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    X          CC
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       B          CC
           2005-B
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       C          CC
           2005-B
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       D          CC
           2005-B
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       A-2        CC
           2005-C
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       B          CC
           2005-C
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       C          CC
           2005-C
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       D          CC
           2005-C
          STAtic ResidenTial CDO       E          CC
           2005-C
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            B          CC
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            C          CC
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            D-1        CC
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            D-2        CC
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            D-3        CC
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            E          CC
          Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     A-2L       CC
          Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     A-3L       CC
          Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     A-4L       CC
          Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     B-1L       CC
          Stone Tower CDO III Ltd.     B-2L       CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  A-2        CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  D          CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  E          CC
          Term CDO 2007-1 Ltd.         A-1LB      CC
          Term CDO 2007-1 Ltd.         A-3L       CC
          Term CDO 2007-1 Ltd.         B-1L       CC
          Toro ABS CDO I Ltd.          C          CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      B-2        CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      C          CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      Combo Nts  CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      D-1        CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      D-2 FLT    CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      D-2 HYB    CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      D-3        CC
          Tourmaline CDO III Ltd.      E          CC

                    Other Ratings Outstanding

          Transaction                  Class      Rating
          -----------                  -----      ------
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         A-1B       D
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         A-2        D
          Broderick CDO 2 Ltd.         B          D
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       A2A        D
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       A2B        D
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       B1         D
          Cairn Mezz ABS CDO III       B2         D
          Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. A-2        D
          Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. A-3        D
          Diversey Harbor ABS CDO Ltd. A-4        D
          Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     A-1LB      D
          Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     A-2L       D
          Fort Dearborn CDO I Ltd.     X          D
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     A1B        D
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     A-2        D
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     B          D
          GSC ABS CDO 2006-2m Ltd.     C          D
          Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.    B          D
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            A-2        D
          Stockton CDO Ltd.            A-3        D
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  A-3        D
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  B          D
          Tazlina Funding CDO II Ltd.  C          D
          Term CDO 2007-1 Ltd.         A-2L       D


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 552 Classes From 431 RMBS to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
552 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 431 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions from 2001-
2008.  Four of the ratings on the defaulted classes were
previously on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, the ratings on
116 additional classes from four of the affected transactions
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.

Approximately 82.79% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A or subprime mortgage loan
collateral.  The 552 defaulted classes consisted of these:

* 344 classes were from Alt-A transactions (62.32% of all
  defaults);

* 113 were from subprime transactions (20.47% of all defaults);

* 74 were from prime jumbo transactions;

* Six were from reperforming transactions;

* Five were from closed-end second-lien transactions;

* Four were from an outside-the-guidelines transaction;

* Four were from resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
  conduit transactions;

* One was from a first-lien high loan-to-value transaction;
  and

* One was from a home equity line of credit transaction.

The 552 downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of principal
write-downs on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  Six of the defaulted ratings affect classes that are
bond insured by either Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. (currently
rated 'NR') or Ambac Assurance Corp. (currently rated 'R').
Although these classes are wrapped by insurance, the losses were
still allocated to the respective classes.  The CreditWatch
placements reflect the fact that the affected classes are within a
group that includes a class that defaulted from a 'B-' rating or
higher.  S&P lowered approximately 99.09% of the ratings from the
'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories, and S&P lowered 99.82% from a
speculative-grade category.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements affecting these
transactions after S&P complete its reviews of the underlying
credit enhancement.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor
its ratings on securities that experience principal write-downs,
and S&P will adjust the ratings as S&P determine appropriate.



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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