TCR_Public/100404.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, April 4, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 92

                            Headlines

ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2006-13: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
ABACUS 2006-17: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
ABACUS 2006-NS2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Note Classes

ABSPOKE 2005-IA: Fitch Junks Ratings on $39 Mil. Notes From 'B'
ABSPOKE 2005-VIA: Fitch Junks Rating on Class A Notes From 'B'
ALTIUS IV: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1F Notes to 'Caa3'
ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Securities
ASSOCIATES MANUFACTURED: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Certificates

BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Affirms Ratings on 18 Classes of CMBS
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
BILOXI HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Outstanding Bonds
BUSINESS LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on All Certificates
CASCADE FUNDING: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes

CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various 2008-R2 Notes
CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2008-R3 RMBS
CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
COLORADO EDUCATIONAL: Moody's Raises 2007A Bond Rating From 'BB'
COMM 2008-RS3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes

CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
CORPORATE BACKED TRUST: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
CORTS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Certs. to 'B3'
CORTS TRUST II: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certificates to 'B3'
DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Kenosha School Bond Ratings on Watchlist

DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Kimberly School Bond Ratings on Watchlist
DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Waukesha School Bond Ratings on Watchlist
DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Ratings on West Allis Bonds on Watchlist
DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Whitefish Bay Bond Ratings on Watchlist
DILLON READ: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes

FRONTIER LEASING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-C3 Certs.
GREEN TREE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Note Classes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-RR2 Certs.
GREYWOLF CLO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-RR3 Notes
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2006-RR3 Securities
GWR OPERATING: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating on $225 Mil. Notes
ILLINOIS FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006A Bonds to 'BB+'
INDEPENDENCE I: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes

JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Affirms 'C' Rating on Various Revenue Bonds
JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Keeps 'B' Rating on Outstanding GO Warrants
KLEROS PREFERRED: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 From 'B2'
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Rating on 2006-MF2 Certs.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-MF4 Certs.

LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-MF3 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 21 2003-C7 CMBS
LIBRA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Swap Agreement
MADISON PARK: Moody's Reviews 'Ca; Ratings on Class D Notes
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: Fitch Cuts Rating on $26.7 Mil. Bonds to 'B'

MAX CMBS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
MCG COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-MCP1 Securities
MIDWEST FAMILY: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on Various Bonds

MILLSTONE FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
MKP VELA: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Swap Transaction
NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Puts 9 Notes on Rating Watch Negative
NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Puts 16 Note on Rating Negative Watch
NORTHEAST HOUSING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $355 Mil. Bonds

OFFUTT AFB: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Taxable 2005 Bonds
ORLANDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Tax Revenue Bonds
PARCS-R MASTER: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-19 Units to 'CC'
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certificates to 'B3'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certs. to 'B3'

PUBLIC STEERS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A to 'B3'
SAINT BARNABAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Rating on $882 Mil. Bonds
SATURNS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 2003-5 Units to 'B3'
STONEY LANE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
TARRANT COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Revenue Bonds

TRUST CERTIFICATES: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
TW HOTEL: S&P Puts Ratings on 13 Certs. on CreditWatch Developing
VALLEY HEALTH: Fitch Downgrades Rating on $45.5 Mil. Bonds to 'D'
VALLEY VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $7.7 Mil. Bonds From 'Ba1'
WEINSTEIN PORTFOLIO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Funding Loans

* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 26 Classes in 11 RMBS Transactions
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 268 Bonds From 217 RMBS Deals to 'D'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Synthetic SF CDO Deals
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 61 Tranches From 13 RMBS Deals
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 86 Tranches From 12 RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches From Seven CLO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Tranches From Nine CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 58 Tranches From 11 CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches From 11 CLO Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 81 Tranches From 17 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 292 Classes From 70 Subprime RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes From Five CMBS to 'D'



                            *********



ABACUS 2006-10: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded ten classes of Notes issued
by Abacus 2006-10, LTD., due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate since last
review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's current
review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Abacus 2006-10, LTD., is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial
mortgage backed securities debt (100% of the pool balance).  All
of the CMBS reference obligations were securitized between 2004
and 2005.  As of the February 22, 2010 Trustee report, the
aggregate par amount of reference obligations is $3.75 billion,
the same as at securitization; the aggregate issued Note balance
of the transaction has decreased to $487 million from $750 million
at securitization.  The paydown was due to the Optional
Redemptions.

As of the February 22, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in asset backed securities (79%) and residential mortgage
backed securities (21%).  The Abacus transactions feature a
mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an Additional
Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the "Affected
Party") to terminate their obligations to provide support for the
term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism suggests that it
is limited to an Event of Default on the underlying term asset to
the extent that these assets have such provisions.  It is Moody's
opinion that this excludes any RMBS term assets which lack
underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest rating of the current
ABS term assets is A3, Moody's did not add any additional expected
loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to monitor the term asset
holdings as part of its on-going surveillance of CRE CDO
transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 356 compared to 154 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (1%, same as last review), A1-A3 (46%
compared to 71% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (43% compared to 28% at
last review), Ba1-Ba3 (8% compared to 0% at last review), and B1-
B3 (2% compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 5.2 years compared to 6.4 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 25.7% compared to a mean of 26.1% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 44% compared to 57% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to greater diversity in the ratings distribution
of the reference obligations.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to B3; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B3; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to B3; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on February 26, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


ABACUS 2006-13: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eleven classes of Notes
issued by Abacus 2006-13, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
a decrease in the weighted average recovery rate since last
review.  The rating action, which concludes Moody's current
review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Abacus 2006-13, Ltd., is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial
mortgage backed securities (100% of the pool balance).  All of the
reference obligations were securitized between 2002 and 2006.  As
of the February 22,2010 Trustee report, the aggregate par amount
of the reference obligations is $795 million, the same as that at
securitization; the aggregate issued Note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $271 million from $326 million at
securitization.  The decrease in the Note balance was due to the
Optional Redemption of Notes.

As of the February 22, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in 79% collateralized debt obligations and 21% residential
mortgage backed securities assets.  The Abacus transactions
feature a mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an
Additional Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the
"Affected Party") to terminate their obligations to provide
support for the term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism
suggests that it is limited to an Event of Default on the
underlying term asset to the extent that these assets have such
provisions.  It is Moody's opinion that this excludes any RMBS
term assets which lack underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest
rating of the current CDO term assets is A3, Moody's did not add
any additional expected loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to
monitor the term asset holdings as part of its on-going
surveillance of CRE CDO transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are
typically modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as
covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,026 compared to 1,448 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (32% compared to 63% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (13% compared to 4% at last review), B1-B3 (21% compared to
32% at last review) and Caa1-C (34% compared to 0.6% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 6 years, the same as that at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 8.9% compared to a mean of 20.4% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 18% compared to 40% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to the higher WARF and greater diversity in
ratings distribution of the reference obligations pool.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


ABACUS 2006-17: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded seven classes of Notes issued
by Abacus 2006-17, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as evidenced
by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and a
decrease in the weighted average recovery rate since last review.
The rating action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Abacus 2006-17, Ltd. is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial
mortgage backed securities debt (90% of the pool balance) and CRE
CDO debt (10%).  All of the CMBS reference obligations were
securitized between 2004 and 2006.  As of the January 21, 2010
Trustee report, the aggregate par amount of reference obligations
is $600 million, the same as at securitization; the aggregate
issued Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$193 million from $264 million at securitization.  The paydown was
due to the Optional Redemptions.

As of the January 21, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in asset backed securities (59%) and residential mortgage
backed securities (41%).  The Abacus transactions feature a
mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an Additional
Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the "Affected
Party") to terminate their obligations to provide support for the
term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism suggests that it
is limited to an Event of Default on the underlying term asset to
the extent that these assets have such provisions.  It is Moody's
opinion that this excludes any RMBS term assets which lack
underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest rating of the current
ABS term assets is Aa3, Moody's did not add any additional
expected loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to monitor the
term asset holdings as part of its on-going surveillance of CRE
CDO transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are
typically modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as
covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,788 compared to 2,387 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Baa1-Baa3 (6% compared to 36% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (9% compared to 24% at last review), B1-B3 (39% compared to
26% at last review), and Caa1-C (46% compared to 14% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 6.8 years compared to 7.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the reference obligations in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 4.0% compared to a mean of 16.0% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the reference obligations pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 29% compared to 36% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to the greater diversity within the ratings
distribution in the reference obligations.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


ABACUS 2006-NS1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded ten classes of Notes issued
by Abacus 2006-NS1, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as measured by deterioration
in the weighted average rating factor.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Abacus 2006-NS1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
collateral (82.9% of the pool) and CRE CDO collateral (17.1% of
the pool).  As of February 22, 2010, the aggregate Notes balance
of the transaction has decreased to $204.3 million from $225.8
million at issuance, due to Optional Redemption in the amount of
approximately $21.4 million to the Class A, J and K Notes.

As of the February 22, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in collateralized debt obligations (85%) and residential
mortgage backed securities (15%).  The Abacus transactions feature
a mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an
Additional Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the
"Affected Party") to terminate their obligations to provide
support for the term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism
suggests that it is limited to an Event of Default on the
underlying term asset to the extent that these assets have such
provisions.  It is Moody's opinion that this excludes any RMBS
term assets which lack underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest
rating of the current CDO term assets is Aa2, Moody's did not add
any additional expected loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to
monitor the term asset holdings as part of its on-going
surveillance of CRE CDO transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the entire
pool and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3,923 compared to 2,553 at last review.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of six and a
half years compared to eight years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 6.7% compared to 14.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 23.7% compared to 24.8% at last review.

Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 26, 2010
     B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 6, 2009.


ABACUS 2006-NS2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of Notes issued
by Abacus 2006-NS2, Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as measured by deterioration
in the weighted average rating factor.  As the reference
obligations backing the Notes is crossed with Abacus 2006-NS1,
Ltd. of which action was taken on March 26, 2010, Moody's are
taking appropriate action on this transaction.  This rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Abacus 2006-NS2, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
collateral (82.9% of the pool) and CRE CDO collateral (17.1% of
the pool).  As of February 22, 2010, the aggregate Notes balance
of the transaction has decreased to $44.3 million from
$54.3 million at issuance, due to a decrease in the balance of
Class FL in the amount of $10.0 million resulting from a credit
event associated with the implied writedown of a reference
obligation, CW Capital Cobalt I, Ltd., Class F.

As of the February 22, 2010 Trustee report, all term assets which
provide principal support for the funded credit linked notes are
held in collateralized debt obligations (85%) and residential
mortgage backed securities (15%).  The Abacus transactions feature
a mechanism which, in certain circumstances stated as an
Additional Termination Event, may allow the counterparty (the
"Affected Party") to terminate their obligations to provide
support for the term assets.  Moody's analysis of such mechanism
suggests that it is limited to an Event of Default on the
underlying term asset to the extent that these assets have such
provisions.  It is Moody's opinion that this excludes any RMBS
term assets which lack underlying EOD provisions.  As the lowest
rating of the current CDO term assets is Aa2, Moody's did not add
any additional expected loss to the CDO.  Moody's will continue to
monitor the term asset holdings as part of its on-going
surveillance of CRE CDO transactions.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the entire
pool and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3,923 compared to 2,553 at last review.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of six and a
half years compared to eight years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 6.7% compared to 14.9% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 23.7% compared to 24.8% at last review.

Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class L, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class N, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class O, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class P, Downgraded to C; previously on February 26, 2010
     Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class Q, Downgraded to C; previously February 26, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated January 11, 2009.


ABSPOKE 2005-IA: Fitch Junks Ratings on $39 Mil. Notes From 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the sole class of notes issued by
ABSpoke 2005-IA, Ltd as a result of continued credit deterioration
in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009.
The details of the rating action follow at the end of this press
release.

The reference portfolio as of February 2010 is $159,125,126.
Approximately 73.9% of the portfolio has been downgraded since
last review.  The percentage of the portfolio rated below
investment grade has increased to 82.4% from 72.2% at last review.
In addition, writedown credit events in the amount of
$37.7 million in par has further eroded credit enhancement levels
for the notes to 31.3% of the referenced portfolio par from 39.5%
at last review.  The addition of these credit events have resulted
in the subordination available to the notes being reduced by a
total of $64.1 million.  The first loss tranche balance has
decreased to $49,864,313 from $114,000,000 at closing.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' Due to
the magnitude of the collateral deterioration, Fitch believes that
the likelihood of default for all classes of notes can be assessed
without using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF
PCM).

Fitch projects additional losses on bonds that have already
experienced writedown credit events.  Furthermore, Fitch
anticipates new credit events based the amount of underlying
assets considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower).  These
assets have a high probability of default and low expected
recoveries upon default.  The notes have a credit enhancement
level of 31.3% compared to the 68.5% of the portfolio considered
distressed.  Therefore, these notes have been downgraded to 'C' to
indicate Fitch's belief that default is inevitable at or prior to
maturity.

ABSpoke 2005-IA is a static synthetic CDO that closed on May 19,
2005.  The reference portfolio is composed of residential
mortgage-backed securities (67.1%), asset-backed securities
(17.6%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (10.6%), and SF
CDOs (4.7%).

Fitch has downgraded this rating as indicated:

  -- $39,000,000 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B'.

The Rating Outlook was stable prior to the downgrade.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.


ABSPOKE 2005-VIA: Fitch Junks Rating on Class A Notes From 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the sole class of notes issued by
ABSpoke 2005-VIA, Ltd, as a result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
January 2009.

The reference portfolio as of February 2010 is $444,619,728.
Approximately 69.6% of the portfolio has been downgraded since
last review.  The percentage of the portfolio rated below
investment grade has increased to 83.9% from 69.9% at last review.
In addition, writedown credit events in the amount of
$96.7 million in par has further eroded credit enhancement levels
for the notes to 28.8% of the referenced portfolio par from 38.2%
at last review.  The addition of these credit events have resulted
in the subordination available to the notes being reduced by a
total of $164.5 million.  The first loss tranche balance has
decreased to $127,857,213 from $292,307,692 at closing.

Fitch projects additional losses on bonds that have already
experienced writedown credit events.  Furthermore, Fitch
anticipates new credit events based the amount of underlying
assets considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower).  These
assets have a high probability of default and low expected
recoveries upon default.  The class A notes have a credit
enhancement level of 28.8% compared to the 69% of the portfolio
considered distressed.  Therefore, these notes have been
downgraded to 'C' to indicate Fitch's belief that default is
inevitable at or prior to maturity.

ABSpoke 2005-VIA is a static synthetic CDO that closed on July 12,
2005.  The reference portfolio is composed of residential
mortgage-backed securities (67.3%), asset-backed securities
(16.1%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (12.3%), and SF
CDOs (4.3%).

Fitch has downgraded this rating:

  -- $100,000,000 class A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B'.

The Rating Outlook was Stable prior to the rating action.  Fitch
does not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.


ALTIUS IV: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1F Notes to 'Caa3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of one class of notes issued by Altius IV Funding, Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

* US$644,850,000 Class A-1F Floating Rate Notes due 2042 (current
  balance of $599,279,060.83), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
  12/11/2008 Downgraded to B2 and Placed On Review for Possible
  Downgrade;

Altius IV Funding, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities with the majority originated in 2006 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline portfolio's performing par and failure of the
coverage tests.  The performing portfolio, as reported by the
trustee, has decreased from approximately $916 million in April
2009 to $733 million in March 2010, only a portion of which is
accounted for by the amortization of the Class A-1 Notes.  In
addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is currently
failing all principal and interest coverage tests.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections and features in each transaction, recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment and specific documentation features.  All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


ARCAP 2005-RR5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Securities
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from ARCap 2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc., a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction,
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on two other classes from
the same transaction and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' from 'CCC-' on classes C through G
to reflect interest shortfalls that S&P expects to continue for
the foreseeable future.  The downgrades of classes A-1, A-2, A-3,
and B reflect its view that these securities may be susceptible to
future interest shortfalls because all of the classes subordinate
to class B are currently experiencing shortfalls.

According to the March 24, 2010, trustee report, classes C through
K experienced interest shortfalls totaling $368,335 during that
payment period.  The accumulated interest shortfalls reported for
these certificates totaled $5.9 million.  ARCap 2005-RR5 is
collateralized by 16 CMBS classes ($120.5 million, 68.3%) from 13
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2005.  ARCap 2005-
RR5 is also collateralized by five classes ($55.8 million, 31.7%)
from ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc., a re-REMIC transaction.

Sixty-five percent of ARCap 2005-RR5's collateral by balance
consists of first-loss CMBS or re-REMIC classes.  According to the
trustee report, the trust has incurred $4.5 million in principal
losses this month and has incurred $130.1 million in lifetime
losses; as a result, classes K through O have experienced a 100%
loss of their original principal balance.  S&P previously lowered
its ratings on classes H through N to 'D'.

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2005-RR5 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis
supports the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                ARCap 2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              B                BBB-/Watch Neg
         A-2              CCC-             B-/Watch Neg
         C                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         D                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         E                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         F                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         G                D                CCC-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affrimed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               ARCap 2005-RR5 Resecuritization Inc.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-3              CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         B                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg


ASSOCIATES MANUFACTURED: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised two ratings, lowered one
rating, and affirmed seven other ratings on four Associates
Manufactured Housing Contract Pass-Through Certificates
transactions issued in 1996 and 1997.  S&P raised its ratings on
classes B-1 and M from series 1996-2 and 1997-1, respectively.
S&P also lowered its rating on the class M note from series 1997-
2.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven other
classes from series 1996-1, 1997-1, and 1997-2.

The upgrades reflect S&P's view that total credit enhancement
available is adequate for each of the upgraded classes in relation
to its revised remaining net loss expectations.  Based on S&P's
analysis of each transaction's performance to date and its
expectation for their future performance, S&P increased its loss
expectations for all four transactions.

The downgrade of class M class from series 1997-2 reflects S&P's
revised loss expectation to 24%-25% from 20%-21%.  The increase in
losses has reduced credit enhancement as the junior classes in the
capital structure become further undercollateralized.

The affirmation of the rating on class A-6 from series 1997-2
reflects S&P's view that there is adequate credit enhancement
through subordination provided by the class M and B-1 securities.
In addition, because the transaction breached its cumulative net
loss trigger, principal is being paid sequentially and class A-6
is currently receiving all distributions of principal.  S&P
expects the sequential payments to continue throughout the life of
the transaction.  The remaining affirmations on the class B-1 and
B-2 notes from series 1996-1, 1997-1, and 1997-2 reflect S&P's
view of the guarantees on the timely payment of interest and
ultimate principal provided by Citigroup Inc. (A/Negative/--).

All four transactions are experiencing higher cumulative net
losses than S&P originally anticipated.  The increase in losses
can be attributed to increases in both default frequencies and
loss severities as current recoveries are in the 20%-30% range.
In addition, the number of loans delinquent more than 90 days
remains elevated.

                              Table 1

                     Collateral Performance (%)
               As of February 2010 performance month

                     Pool    Current  90+ day   Lifetime
       Series   Mo.  factor  CNL      delinq.   CNL exp.(i)
       ------   ---  ------  -------  -------   -----------
       1996-1   162   8.50   13.52    2.38      14.90-15.00
       1996-2   160   8.26   11.24    1.48      12.50-13.00
       1997-1   156  10.47   13.15    3.64      15.50-16.50
       1997-2   149  16.00   19.53    2.96      24.00-25.00

                    CNL -- cumulative net loss.

(i) Lifetime CNL expectations based on current performance data.

All four transactions have breached their cumulative net loss
triggers, which is causing principal to be paid sequentially.
Prior to this breach, the transactions would have paid pro rata
among the senior and class B notes after an initial lockout period
for the subordinate tranches.  Current credit enhancement in these
transactions is provided by subordination and excess spread for
the senior classes and only excess spread for the junior classes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of
these transactions to assess whether the credit enhancement
remains adequate, in S&P's view, to support the ratings on each
class under various stress scenarios.

                          Ratings Raised

Associates Manufactured Housing Contract Pass-Through Certificates

                                      Rating
                                      ------
               Series   Class    To            From
               ------   -----    --            ----
               1996-2   B-1      BBB-          BB+
               1997-1   M        AAA           AA

                          Rating Lowered

Associates Manufactured Housing Contract Pass-Through Certificates

                                      Rating
                                      ------
               Series   Class    To            From
               ------   -----    --            ----
               1997-2   M        BB+           AA

                         Ratings Affirmed

Associates Manufactured Housing Contract Pass-Through Certificates

                    Series   Class    Rating
                    ------   -----    ------
                    1996-1   B-1      A
                    1996-1   B-2      A
                    1997-1   B-1      A
                    1997-1   B-2      A
                    1997-2   A-6      AAA
                    1997-2   B-1      A
                    1997-2   B-2      A


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Affirms Ratings on 18 Classes of CMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 18
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-2 and removed 13 of
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.75x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 73.6%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.31x and an LTV ratio of 93.1%.  The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 28.7% and 14.1%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 13 defeased loans ($161.8 million, 20.1%), as well as
three additional loans that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($24.0 million, 3.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
three credit-impaired assets and included them in its 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
P and X-C interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its
criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 2010 remittance report, one asset ($2.8 million,
0.3%) in the pool was 90-plus-days delinquent and with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services.  The Citrus Park Shops loan,
which has a total exposure of $2.8 million (0.3%), is the only
loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 15,800-
sq.-ft. shadow-anchored strip retail center in Tampa, Fl.  As of
Oct. 31, 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.04x and 51.1%,
respectively.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
Oct. 6, 2009, due to imminent default.  It is S&P's understanding
that the borrower has requested a loan modification, and Midland
has issued and signed a prenegotiation letter.  This loan has an
appraisal reduction amount in effect totaling $812,160.

In addition to the specially serviced asset, S&P determined three
loans ($24.0 million; 3.0%) to be credit-impaired.  The largest
credit-impaired loan, the Colony Mill Marketplace and Center at
Keene loan ($11.6 million; 1.4%), is secured by a roll-up of two
retail properties totaling 192,926 sq. ft. in Keene, N.H.; the
properties were built in 1810 and 1866, and renovated in 1984.
For the year ended Dec. 30, 2008, the reported occupancy and DSC
were 71.9% and 0.53x, respectively.  The master servicer, Banc of
America N.A., reported that the borrower has failed to respond or
comply with requests for financial statements and rent rolls for
the first three quarters of 2009.  BofA assessed penalty fees for
the borrower's noncompliance of its financial reporting, according
to the loan documents.  The two additional credit-impaired loans
($12.4 million, 1.5%) are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
and secured by two office properties in Somerville, N.J.  One
reported occupancy below 65%, and both reported DSCs below 0.80x
as of September 2009.  Due to the low occupancy and DSCs, Standard
& Poor's considers these loans to be at an increased risk of
default and loss.

Four loans totaling $161.8 million (20.1%) were previously with
the special servicer and have since been returned to the master
servicer.  Pursuant to the transaction documents, the special
servicer is entitled to a workout fee that is a percentage of all
future principal and interest payments.  Three of the loans, with
balances in excess of $20.0 million, have a 0.75% fee.  The fourth
loan, with a balance below $20.0 million, has a 1.00% fee.  Three
of the loans are top 10 loans, and the collection of the fee
could, in S&P's opinion, prompt sizeable shortfalls if the loans
are paid off at maturity.  Midland has indicated that it will be
waiving the corrected-loan fee for the Eden Prairie Mall loan and
the Prince Kuhio Plaza loan, two General Growth Properties assets
($115.2 million, 14.3%).

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $804.9 million, which is 70.7% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 58 loans, down from 95 loans at
issuance.  As of the March 2010 remittance report, BofA provided
financial information for 100% of the nondefeased pool, and 100%
of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008, interim-
2009, or full-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.74x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV, which exclude 13 defeased loans
($161.8 million, 20.1%) and three credit-impaired loans
($24.0 million; 3.0%), were 1.75x and 73.6%, respectively.  S&P
estimated losses separately for the three credit-impaired loans,
and S&P's adjusted DSC, including these loans, is 1.72x.  Five
loans ($27.5 million, 3.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist
and have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and three of these loans
($24.0 million, 3.0%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$420.0 million (52.2%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.76x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.73x and
75.4%, respectively.  None of the top 10 loans appear on the
watchlist, and none are with the special servicer at this time.

Two of the top 10 loans are secured by retail malls owned by
General Growth Properties ($115.2 million, 14.3%).  Both loans
were transferred to the special servicer in April 2009 following
the bankruptcy filing of GGP on April 16, 2009.  On Dec. 15, 2009,
the bankruptcy court confirmed a modification plan for 85 GGP
loans, including these two loans.  According to Midland, the loan
modifications have been finalized and both of these loans have
been returned to the master servicer.  Details of the loans are:

The Eden Prairie Mall loan ($78.3 million, 9.7%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool.  The loan is secured by 387,377 sq. ft.
and the leasehold interest in a 150,000-sq.-ft. Von Maur store of
a 1.1 million-sq.-ft. retail mall in Eden Prairie, Minn.  Midland
has confirmed that it extended the maturity date of this loan to
September 2014, and it returned the loan to the master servicer on
Feb. 25, 2010.  As of year-end 2008, the reported DSC was 2.09x
and occupancy was 99.2%, compared with 1.69x and 95.0% at
issuance.

The Prince Kuhio Plaza loan ($36.9 million, 4.6%) is the fourth-
largest loan in the pool.  The loan is secured by 355,630 sq. ft.
of a 504,628-sq.-ft. retail mall in Hilo, Hawaii.  Midland has
confirmed that it extended the maturity date of this loan to
January 2014, and it returned the loan to the master servicer on
March 2, 2010.  As of year-end 2008, the reported DSC was 2.50x
and occupancy was 85.5%, compared with 2.07x and 89.0% at
issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-2

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----           ----------------------
      B         AA+     AA+/Watch Neg              16.80
      C         AA      AA/Watch Neg               15.21
      D         A+      A+/Watch Neg               12.20
      E         A       A/Watch Neg                10.79
      F         A-      A-/Watch Neg                8.84
      G         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg              7.60
      H         BBB-    BBB-/Watch Neg              5.66
      J         BB+     BB+/Watch Neg               5.13
      K         BB      BB/Watch Neg                4.42
      L         BB-     BB-/Watch Neg               3.71
      M         B+      B+/Watch Neg                2.83
      N         B       B/Watch Neg                 2.48
      O         B-      B-/Watch Neg                2.12

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-2

           Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----     ------      ----------------------
           A-3       AAA                          20.16
           A-4       AAA                          20.16
           A-5       AAA                          20.16
           X-P       AAA                            N/A
           X-C       AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2004-6 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 17 additional classes from the same
transaction and removed nine of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of its rating actions.  S&P's analysis included a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.62x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 93.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.11x and an LTV
ratio of 116.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 54.6% and 24.6%, respectively.  The DSC and
LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude four defeased loans
($62.9 million, 7.8%), and two ($15.4 million, 1.9%) of the three
specially serviced loans.  S&P separately estimated losses for
these two loans and included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XC
and XP interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.
S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalizes its criteria
review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 2010 remittance report, three loans
($17.0 million, 2.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland).  One of the loans is 90-
plus-days delinquent ($5.2 million, 0.6%), one is a matured
balloon ($10.2 million, 1.3%), and one is current ($1.6 million,
0.2%).  Two of the specially serviced loans have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect totaling $2.9 million.

The largest loan with the special servicer, the Lexington Hill
Apartments loan, has a total exposure of $10.3 million (1.3%) and
is secured by a 168-unit multifamily property in Eagan, Minn.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 16, 2009,
because of imminent maturity default and matured on Oct. 1, 2009.
Extension talks between the borrower and the special servicer have
ceased, and Midland is pursuing foreclosure on the property.  The
master servicer, Bank of America N.A., reported a DSC of 1.24x for
the full-year ended Feb. 28, 2009, and the property was 80%
occupied as of Dec. 31, 2009.  S&P expects a minor loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

The two remaining specially serviced assets that were listed in
the March 2010 remittance report have balances that individually
represent less than 0.7% of the total pool balance.  One loan is
90-plus-days delinquent.  S&P estimated a 39.0% loss upon the
eventual resolution of the asset.  The second loan ($1.6 million,
0.2%) has been modified with a maturity date extension and was
sent back to the master servicer after the March 2010 remittance
report date.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $810.1 million, which is 84.7% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 68 loans, down from 78 at issuance.
As of the March 2010 remittance report, the master servicer
provided financial information for 100% of the pool, and 71.1% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2009 or interim-
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the
nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.62x and 93.4%, respectively,
which excludes four defeased loans ($62.9 million, 7.8%) and two
($15.4 million, 1.9%) of the three specially serviced loans.  S&P
estimated losses separately for these two specially serviced
loans.  Eighteen loans ($239.2 million, 29.5%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including two of the top 10 loans.  Eleven
loans ($117.2 million, 14.5%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and
seven of these loans ($34.7 million, 4.3%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.  The transaction has experienced one principal
loss to date for $542,592.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$405.2 million (50.0%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.75x for the top 10 loans.
As of the March 2010 remittance report, two of the top 10 loans
appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.69x and 88.1%, respectively.

The Post Oak Central loan ($97.5 million, 12.0%) is the largest
loan in the pool and appears on the servicer's watchlist.  The
loan is secured by three class A office buildings totaling
1,280,248 sq. ft. in Houston, Texas.  The loan is on the watchlist
due to damage that was incurred from Hurricane Ike.  The borrower
has reported that the majority of the repair work has been
completed and expects final completion in August 2010.  The
reported year-end 2009 DSC and occupancy were 2.31x and 85%,
respectively.

The Simon ? Upper Valley Mall loan ($47.5 million, 5.9%) is the
third-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by 496,895 sq. ft. of a
750,377 sq. ft. regional mall in Springfield, Ohio.  The loan is
on the watchlist due to low DSC.  The low DSC is attributed to a
slight drop in occupancy, primarily resulting from the departure
of Steve & Barry's in the first quarter of 2009.  The reported
year-end 2009 DSC was 1.09x, down from 1.25x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-6

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----            ----------------------
      H         BB+     BBB-/Watch Neg                    5.10
      J         BB      BB+/Watch Neg                     4.36
      K         BB-     BB/Watch Neg                      3.77
      L         B+      BB-/Watch Neg                     3.18

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-6

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----            ----------------------
      B         AA+     AA+/Watch Neg                    14.25
      C         AA      AA/Watch Neg                     13.07
      D         A       A/Watch Neg                      10.86
      E         A-      A-/Watch Neg                      9.67
      F         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                    7.90
      G         BBB     BBB/Watch Neg                     6.72
      M         B+      B+/Watch Neg                      2.74
      N         B       B/Watch Neg                       2.29
      O         B-      B-/Watch Neg                      1.70

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-6

           Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----     ------      ----------------------
           A-2       AAA                          23.55
           A-3       AAA                          23.55
           A-4       AAA                          23.55
           A-AB      AAA                          23.55
           A-5       AAA                          23.55
           A-J       AAA                          16.61
           XC        AAA                            N/A
           XP        AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BILOXI HOUSING: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Outstanding Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 rating on
$3,775,000 of outstanding Biloxi Housing Authority, Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (Beauvoir Manor Apartments), Series 2001B.
The negative outlook has also been affirmed.  The rating is based
primarily upon a continued decline in the debt service coverage
ratio, stemming from increased insurance costs.

Legal Security:

The bonds are secured by revenues derived from operations of
Beauvoir Manor Apartments, a 150-unit multifamily rental facility,
constructed in 1972 and substantially rehabilitated in 1986.
Pledged revenues include payments received from a Housing
Assistance Payment Contract with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.

Strengths:

Rent levels: Beauvior Manor rent levels are substantially less
than the Fair Market Rent levels of the Biloxi area for each
apartment type available at the property.  On average, the
property's rent levels are 40% below FMR.  Moody's views this as a
credit strength because the property is eligible for annual rental
rate increases under current HUD regulations, as well as the
possibility of petitioning HUD for a larger, one-time rate
increase to bring the property rent levels back in line with FMRs.
Petitioning HUD for such an increase is at the option of the
property manager.

Occupancy: Property management reports that the physical occupancy
of Beauvior Manor is approximately 91%.  Unaudited financial
statements show that economic occupancy (defined as vacancy
expense as a percentage of gross potential rent) was approximately
92% in 2009.  While occupancy has declined since Moody's last
review of the property, this occupancy rate is in line with other
Moody's-rated subsidized properties at the Ba3 rating level.

Reserve Funds: Funds held for the benefit of bondholders and the
property are adequately funded.  Fund balances provided by the
Trustee show that the Debt Service Reserve Fund remains untapped
and fully-funded, an important characteristic at this rating
level.  In addition, the reports show that the Replacement Reserve
Fund has an ample amount available for capital expenses.
Maintaining the property's physical condition is important to
support occupancy levels and remain eligible for the Section 8
subsidy.  The current HUD REAC score for the property is 80c.

Challenges:

Erosion of debt service coverage: While revenue increased
marginally over the past two years, and future increases are
limited to HUD-approved HAP contract increases, total expenses
(including insurance costs), have grown.  From fiscal year 2006
through fiscal year 2007, operating expenses increased by 21.6%,
and from FY07 to FY08 expenses increased by an additional 11.3%.
Unaudited operating statements show that operating expenses have
declined by 3.6% in FY09, but these large expense increases have
led to an erosion of debt service coverage from 1.21x in FY07 to
0.98x in FY08.  Operating statements for 2009 have also been
reviewed, and continue to show debt service coverage
deterioration.

Small size leads to vulnerability: The small size of this project
makes it vulnerable to sudden shocks.  Small reductions to revenue
or increases in expenses lead to large debt service coverage
changes.  The project does not generate enough margin to cover
unexpected changes to its financial position.

                             Outlook

The outlook on the bonds is negative.  As coverage ratios continue
to decline, Moody's does not expect significant improvement to the
project's financial position in the near term.

                What could change the rating -- UP?

  -- Several periods of substantial debt service coverage growth.

               What could change the rating -- DOWN?

  -- Increase in expenses or any reduction in revenue that leads
     to a further deterioration of the debt service coverage
     level.

  -- Using Debt Service Reserve Fund moneys to pay debt service

       Recalibration Of Rating To The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The rating assigned to Biloxi Housing Authority, Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds, Series 2001B was issued on Moody's
municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to
recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.

The last rating action was taken on July 16, 2008, when the rating
on the bonds was downgraded to Ba3 from A3 and the outlook was
revised to negative from stable.


BUSINESS LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on All Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded all rated classes of
certificates issued in three securitizations of small business
loans sponsored by Business Loan Express, currently known as Ciena
Capital, LLC.  The loans are secured primarily by commercial real
estate.

Approximately 25% of the pools is 60 days or more delinquent
across the three deals.  Moody's estimates life-time losses of
7.4%, 6.7% and 10.3% for the 2002-1, 2003-2 and 2005-A deals,
respectively.  Because the pools have a small number of remaining
loans, Moody's reviewed each loan in order to determine its
likelihood to default.  Moody's assumed that almost all the loans
which are currently either delinquent or in foreclosure/REO will
eventually default with an average severity of 50%.  In addition,
Moody's assumed that some of the not delinquent loans will
eventually default with the same average severity level over the
remaining life of the deal.  Moody's concluded that the overall
credit enhancement (consisting of cash reserves,
overcollateralization, and subordination) is not sufficient to
maintain the current ratings.  Moody's also took into account the
excess spread, which provides additional enhancement to the
certificates.

The factors driving the Aaa credit enhancement proxy for the deal
include the credit quality of the collateral pool, industrial and
geographical concentrations, top loan percentages, the historical
variability in losses experienced by the issuer, the servicer
quality, and the structural features employed in the deal.  Once
the expected loss and Aaa proxy were established, the adequacy of
the available credit enhancement is assessed using a cash flow
model.  The model incorporates a set of assumptions about the
collateral's performance -- including but not limited to the
timing and level of loan losses, the level of prepayments, and the
level of interest rates -- to assess whether the rated notes are
paid back in full under the assumptions and given the proposed
capital structure and collateral pool.  Moody's benchmarks the Aaa
proxy to obtain the levels for other ratings using a lognormal
distribution of losses.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Business Loan Express Business Loan Trust 2005-A

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Feb 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 6, 2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to B3; previously on Jan 6, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Jan 6, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 6, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Business Loan Express SBA Loan Trust 2003-2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Jan 6, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Jan 6, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CASCADE FUNDING: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed one class of
notes issued by Cascade Funding I, Ltd., as a result of continued
credit deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating
action in February 2009.

Cascade I entered an event of default as of Dec. 8, 2008 due to an
interest shortfall to the class B notes (not Fitch rated).  Fitch
received a notice of the acceleration of maturity on Jan. 26,
2009.  As a result of the acceleration, all interest and principal
proceeds have been diverted to redeem class A-1 principal after
paying senior fees and class A-1 accrued interest.  The rest of
the capital structure will not receive further payments until the
class A-1 notes are paid in full.

As of the Feb. 25, 2010 trustee report, the current balance of the
portfolio is approximately $222.7 million.  Approximately 62.6% of
the portfolio has been downgraded since February 2009, resulting
in 52.9% of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 46.1% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or below, compared to 31.2% and 26.1%, respectively, at
last review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  Due
to the extent of collateral deterioration and the sequential pay
structure following the acceleration of maturity, Fitch believes
that the likelihood of default for all classes of notes can be
assessed without using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model (SF PCM) or performing cash flow model analysis under the
framework described in the 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis
in CDOs - Amended' report.

Based on the credit quality of the remaining portfolio, Fitch
believes default is inevitable for the class A-1 notes.  The
Feb. 25, 2010 trustee report shows that $58.1 million, or 38.2%,
of the portfolio is considered defaulted by the transaction's
governing documents, leaving $137.6 million of non-defaulted
assets.  Expected recoveries on the defaulted portion of the
portfolio are low, resulting in the class A-1 notes being
undercollateralized.  While there is excess spread being used to
redeem the class A-1 balance due to the acceleration, the amount
will not be sufficient to compensate for the principal shortfall.

The class A-2 notes are rated to the timely receipt of interest.
Due to the acceleration of maturity, the class has defaulted on
the payment of interest and is therefore downgraded to 'D'.  The
class A-2 and C notes are not expected to receive any interest or
principal distributions going forward.

Cascade I is a structured finance collateralized debt obligation
that closed on July 26, 2004.  The portfolio was initially
selected by Terwin Asset Management, and is currently managed by
Aventine Hill Capital.  The portfolio is composed of residential
mortgage-backed securities (60.5%), and SF CDOs (39.5%).

Fitch has taken these rating actions on Cascade I:

  -- $151,608,769 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $46,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $6,514,449 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.


CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various 2008-R2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on classes
I-A-1, II-A-1, and II-A-2 from CMO Holdings III Ltd. 2008-R2, a
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
This performance deterioration is so severe that the credit
enhancement for CMO III 2008-R2 is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings on the re-REMIC classes.

CMO III 2008-R2, which closed in February 2008, is collateralized
by three underlying classes that support two independent groups
within the re-REMIC.  Certain classes within the re-REMIC groups
also benefit from additional credit support provided by applicable
support classes.  The loans securing the underlying classes
consist predominantly of fixed-rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

Class I-A-1 from CMO III 2008-R2 is supported by class A-1 from
First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA5
(currently rated 'CC') and class I-A-1 from First Horizon
Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2008-AA8 (currently rated
'CC').  Classes II-A-1 and II-A-2 are supported by class 2-A-1
from Alternative Loan Trust 2007-HY4 (currently rated 'CCC').

The performance of the loans securing class A-1 from First Horizon
Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA5 has declined
precipitously in recent months.  As of the February 2010
distribution date, this pool had experienced losses amounting to
8.35% of the original pool balance, and delinquent loans amounted
to approximately 41% of the current pool balance.  Based on the
losses to date, the pool factor of 0.5132 (51.32%), which
represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the
original balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, its
current projected loss for this pool is 28.45%.

The performance of the loans securing class I-A-1 from First
Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-AA8 has
declined significantly in recent months.  As of the February 2010
distribution date, this pool had experienced losses of 7.70% and
had approximately 43% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to
date, the pool factor of 0.5153 (51.53%), and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
23.57%.

The performance of the loans securing class 2-A-1 from Alternative
Loan Trust 2007-HY4 has declined precipitously in recent months.
As of the February 2010 distribution date, this pool had
experienced losses of 4.98% and had approximately 44% in
delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the pool factor of
0.7630 (76.30%), and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's
current projected loss for this pool is 24.72%.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the housing
market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                          Rating Actions

                   CMO Holdings III Ltd. 2008-R2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-A-1      12587PFK1     CCC                  AAA
        II-A-1     12587PFM7     B-                   AAA
        II-A-2     12587PFN5     CC                   AAA


CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four 2008-R3 RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from CMO Holdings III Ltd.'s series 2008-R3, a U.S. real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction.  S&P lowered its rating to 'D' on class I-
A-2.

The 'D' rating reflects realized losses on class I-A-2 during
recent remittance periods.  The downgrades reflect S&P's projected
losses for the underlying collateral.  S&P believes these losses,
under certain rating stresses, will negatively affect some of the
particular underlying certificates from the re-REMIC.  Losses were
passed through from one of the underlying certificates (class II-
2-A-1 from American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-3) that
incurred recent losses, which caused class I-A-2 to default.

The underlying certificates in this re-REMIC (see table 1) are
backed by Alt-A mortgage loans secured by first liens on one- to
four-family residential properties.  In addition, the I-A-2 and
II-A-2 classes provide protection to the I-A-1 and II-A-1 classes,
respectively.  The performance of the underlying mortgage loans
securing the underlying certificates have declined significantly
in recent months.  Table 2 shows the February 2010 pool statistics
for the transactions that contain the underlying classes.

                              Table 1

             American Home Mortgage Investment Trust

                    Series
                    ------
                    2006-3(Grp 2) - II2A1 (D)

                    Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust

Series
------
2005-5(Grp 1) - IA1 (AAA)

2006-3(Grp 12) - II2A1 (CC)

2006-3(Grp 13) - III4A1 (CCC)

2006-4(Grp 11)** - II2A2 (D), II3A3 (CC), II3A4 (CC), II3A5 (D)

2006-4(Grp 12)** - III1A2 (CC), III2A2 (CC), III3A2 (CC), III3A3
                   (CC), III3A4 (CC)

2006-5(Grp 2)** - IIB1 (D)

                     Bear Stearns ARM Trust

                        Series
                        ------
                        2006-4 - IA1 (CCC)

                 IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust

                      Series
                      ------
                      2006-AR27 - 2A2 (CCC)

              Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Trust

                        Series
                        ------
                        2006-1 - IAPT (CC)

                           RALI Trust

                      Series
                      ------
                      2005-QA7 - AII1 (CCC)

                Wells Fargo Alternative Loan Trust

                        Series
                        ------
                        2007-PA4- IA1 (CC)

                             Table 2

                    Losses and Delinquencies*

              American Home Mortgage Investment Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2006-3(Grp 2)       48.82           10.42          42.86         24.69

                    Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2005-5(Grp 1)       25.41            3.70          32.01          8.80
2006-3(Grp 12)      40.36           11.08          47.63         22.15
2006-3(Grp 13)      56.09            5.39          37.66         23.74
2006-4(Grp 11)**    48.96           12.13          49.92         27.91
2006-4(Grp 12)**    57.75            6.57          46.64         33.10
2006-5(Grp 2)**     56.84            6.13          43.81         26.91

                      Bear Stearns ARM Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2006-4              62.37            2.71          26.38         12.00

                 IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2006-AR27           58.04            8.74          39.70         28.47

              Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2006-1              54.79            8.78          28.80         23.67

                            RALI Trust

  Series     Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
  ------     --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2005-QA7            39.04            3.74          24.06         7.74

                Wells Fargo Alternative Loan Trust

Series       Pool factor (%) Cum. losses (%) Total del. (%) Pub Loss. (%)
------       --------------- --------------- -------------- -------------
2007-PA4            67.78            6.16          37.94         28.81

* Cumulative losses represent the percentage of the original pool
  balance, and total delinquencies represent the percentage of the
  current pool balance.

** Following groups represent the Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2006-
   R1, which represents one of the underlying child deals in CMO
   Holdings III Ltd. Series 2008-R3

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance.  The performance
deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the
market's expectation.

                          Ratings Lowered

                       CMO Holdings III Ltd.
                        Series      2008-R3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-A-1      12587PFP0     CCC                  AAA
        I-A-2      12587PFQ8     D                    AAA
        II-A-1     12587PFR6     BBB                  AAA
        II-A-2     12587PFS4     CC                   AAA


CMO HOLDINGS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on classes
I-A-2, II-A-1, and II-A-2 from CMO Holdings III Ltd.'s series
2006-14, a U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on class I-A-1.

The downgrades reflect the performance of the loans backing the
underlying certificates.  The affirmations reflect S&P's opinion
that the credit enhancement within CMO 2006-14 is sufficient to
maintain the rating on class I-A-1, which is supported by classes
I-A-2, II-A-1, and II-A-2.

CMO 2006-14, which closed July 2006, is collateralized by 19
underlying classes that support two independent groups within the
re-REMIC.  Certain classes within the re-REMIC groups also benefit
from additional credit support provided by applicable support
classes.  The loans securing the underlying classes consist
predominantly of fixed- and adjustable-rate Alternative-A mortgage
loans.

Classes I-A-1 and I-A-2 from CMO 2006-14 are supported by class
1X1 (currently rated 'CCC') and class 1B5 (currently rated 'D')
from Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-AR7.  The
performance of the loans securing this trust has declined
precipitously in recent months.  As of the February 2010
distribution date, this pool had experienced losses of 4.85% of
the original pool balance, and it had approximately 46% in
delinquent loans as a percentage of the current pool balance.
Based on the losses to date, the pool factor of 0.7601 (76.01%),
which represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of
the original balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's
current projected loss for this pool is 9.91%, which exceeds the
level of credit enhancement available to cover the losses to
classes 1X1 and 1B5.

The underlying certificates shown in table 1 support classes II-A-
1 and II-A-2 from CMO 2006-14.

                              Table 1

  Trust              Class (Current rating)
  -----              ----------------------
  BSAA 2005-10       II4X1 (CCC), II5X1 (CC), and IIXP (NR)
  BSAA 2006-1        II1X1, II1X2 ,and II2X1 (CCC)
  BSAA 2006-2        II2X1, II3X1, and II4X1 (CC), and IIXP (NR)
  BSAA 2006-3        II1X1 (CCC), II2X1, and II3X1 (CC)
  INX 2006-A11       2X (CC)
  SAMI 2006-AR3      IIX, II2X, II3X, and II4X (CCC)

    BSAA - Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust.
    INX - IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust.
    SAMI - Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust.

The performance of the loans securing the underlying certificates
has generally deteriorated.  Table 2 shows the pool statistics for
the transactions that contain the underlying classes as of
February 2010.

                             Table 2

                   Str    Pool      Cum.                  Proj lifetime
    Trust          group  factor(%) losses (%) Delinq (%) losses (%)
    -----          -----  --------- ---------- ---------- -------------
    BSAA 2005-10   II     39.18     10.14      41.95      18.54
    BSAA 2006-1    II     49.16     9.51       39.42      20.19
    BSAA 2006-2    II     52.56     11.94      47.27      21.84
    BSAA 2006-3    II     49.18     10.55      44.73      22.15
    INX 2006-A11   II     58.52     12.21      44.54      35.31
    SAMI 2006-AR3  II     16.23     4.84       64.23      12.04

      BSAA - Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust.
      INX - IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust.
      SAMI - Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust.

Over the past two years, S&P revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the housing
market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Rating Actions

                       CMO Holdings III Ltd.
                          Series 2006-14

                                        Rating
                                        ------
       Class       CUSIP         To                   From
       -----       -----         --                   ----
       I-A-2       125879SU1     B-                   BB
       II-A-1      125879SV9     CCC                  BBB
       II-A-2      125879SW7     CCC                  BB

                         Rating Affirmed

                       CMO Holdings III Ltd.
                          Series 2006-14

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-1      125879ST4     BBB


COLORADO EDUCATIONAL: Moody's Raises 2007A Bond Rating From 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term rating two
notches to 'BBB-' from 'BB' on the Colorado Educational and
Cultural Facilities Authority's series 2007A charter school
revenue bonds, supported by Monument Academy Building Corp.,
issued for the Monument Academy Charter School.  The outlook is
stable.

The bonds are secured by lease revenues from the Monument Academy
charter school.

"The upgrade reflects the successful move into a new location and
subsequent increase in enrollment that has enabled the school to
budget sufficient net revenues in fiscal 2010 to pay future annual
debt service from the current year's budgeted operating revenues,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst David Hitchcock.

The school also has already accepted additional students for the
2010-2011 academic year, which should provide additional net
revenues to the school in fiscal 2011.

The rating on the series 2007A bonds reflects what S&P view as:

* A successful move into bond-financed a newly constructed school
  facility, and a rebound in enrollment following an earlier
  decline because of the elimination of high school grades and the
  move to a new location; already accepted students for fiscal
  2011 that will raise school full-time equivalent enrollment;

* A budgeted annual debt service payment in fiscal 2010, to be
  paid from net operating revenues, that is nearly the same as
  future maximum annual debt service;

* Positive audited financial performance in fiscal 2009, and
  adequate unrestricted cash and investments at fiscal year-end
  June 30, 2009; Low class sizes, that might indicate some
  flexibility to cut costs, if needed;

* The ability of charter schools in Colorado to appeal nonrenewal
  decisions to the state (the school must renew its charter next
  year, and is considering the option of changing its charter
  authorizer to the state itself);

* Good relations with the current charter authorizer, the Lewis-
  Palmer School District No. 38, and one successful charter
  renewal in 2006, with the current charter expiring on June 30,
  2011;

* Good student test scores that are above that of the sponsoring
  district;

* and No current additional debt plans or needs.

Offsetting factors, in S&P's opinion, include:

* The school's charter will need multiple renewals before final
  bond maturity, with the current charter expiring June 30, 2011;

* The need to continue to enroll a sufficient number of students
  to generate adequate revenues under the state's per pupil
  funding formula;

* A relatively modest student wait list;

* The last audited year (fiscal 2009) showed positive financial
  performance better than budget, but not enough to fully cover
  future MADS from operations alone; and

* A high debt service carrying charge of about 22% of operations
  based on the school's fiscal 2010 budget.

Charter school lease payments, subject to annual appropriation by
the charter school board, secure the bonds.  A mortgage and
security interest on Monument Academy's facilities provides
bondholder security.  S&P believes nonappropriation risk is
mitigated due to the leased facility being the school's only
building and site.

The school issued series 2007 bonds and series 2008 completion
bonds to purchase 15.3 acres and construct a 75,000-square-foot
school facility, located about one mile from its previous school
site.  The new school building has the capacity to house up to 956
students, greater than its current enrollment.  The school moved
into the new facility in 2008.

Monument Academy is in the town of Monument, Colo., about 20 miles
north of Colorado Springs, Colo., and 50 miles south of Denver.
Monument is primarily a residential community that is experiencing
steady residential growth.


COMM 2008-RS3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eleven classes of
Certificates issued by COMM 2008-RS3 Commercial Mortgage Related
Securities, Series 2008-RS3 due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by deterioration
in the weighted average rating factor.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

COMM 2008-RS3 is a direct pass-through of Class A-2A, Class A-2B,
Class X-W, Class X-B, Class C, Class E, Class F, Class G, Class H,
Class J and Class K (together the Underlying Classes) of the Max
CMBS I Ltd., Series 2008-1 transaction (Max Series 2008-1).  As of
the March 17, 2010 Trustee Report issued for Max Series 2008-1,
the aggregate balance of the Underlying Classes was $379 million,
the same as that at securitization.  This rating action, which
concludes Moody's review, is a result of the downgrade of
Underlying Classes on March 26, 2010.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A-2A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X-W*, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X-B*, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 19, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 19, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 19, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Notional Class

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 19, 2009.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Ford Motor Co. Debenture-
Backed Series 2001-36 Trust:

* 2,340,040 Class A-1 Certificates; Upgraded to B3 and Placed on
  review for upgrade; Previously on November 10, 2009 Upgraded to
  Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.70% Debentures due May 15, 2097, issued by Ford
Motor Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


CORPORATE BACKED TRUST: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Ford Motor Company Note-
Backed Series 2003-6 Trust:

* 1,000,000 Class A-1 Certificates due July 16, 2031; Upgraded to
  B3 and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on November 10,
  2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.45% GlobLS due July 16, 2031, issued by Ford Motor
Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for upgrade
by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


CORTS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Certs. to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by CorTS
Trust for Ford Debentures:

* 12,000,000 7.40% Corporate-Backed Trust Securites Certificates;
  Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on
  November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Debentures and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 7.40% Debentures due November 1, 2046, issued by Ford
Motor Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


CORTS TRUST II: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certificates to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by CorTS
Trust II for Ford Notes:

* 8,783,363 8.00% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities Certificates;
  Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on
  November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Notes and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.45% Global Landmark Securities due July 16, 2031,
issued by Ford Motor Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed
on review for upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Kenosha School Bond Ratings on Watchlist
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is placing on Watchlist for possible downgrade the ratings
on Kenosha School District's general obligation bonds (rated A1),
reflecting uncertainty about the district's willingness and
ability to meet the obligations of the Kenosha Unified School
District Post Employment Benefits Trust.

In 2006, the Trust issued $28.4 million in asset-backed notes,
purchased by Depfa Bank (bank financial strength rated E+), in
order to finance its investment in a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.  Concurrently, in a moral obligation agreement, the
district covenanted to pay to the Indenture Trustee, subject to
appropriation, such amount as necessary to cure deficiency in the
Trust's asset ratio (defined by the value of the investment as
compared to the outstanding principal amount on the asset-backed
notes).  Earnings on the investment were expected to be sufficient
to pay the interest on the asset-backed notes and surplus revenues
would be used to fund the district's OPEB liability.  However, as
market conditions deteriorated, particularly affecting structured
investments, the market value of the investment dropped.  In early
2008, the Indenture Trustee requested the district step up to its
moral obligation as the asset ratio had fallen below 101%.  The
district did not act to restore the deficiency which trigged a
technical event of default.  Until recently no remedy per the
indenture had been pursued by the majority noteholder (Depfa).  On
March 9, 2010, Depfa accelerated payment under the terms of the
Indenture by sending notice declaring the principal and any
interest due immediately.  To date, neither the Kenosha School
District nor the Kenosha Unified School District Post Employment
Benefits Trust has fulfilled Depfa's demand.  Among other
concerns, Moody's is looking to clarify how the district plans to
respond to Depfa's request and any potential impact on the
district's credit quality.

Moody's believes that involvement in the synthetic CDO investment
is limited to five Wisconsin school districts and therefore has
negligible potential impact for other municipal entities in
Wisconsin.  Also, the district has filed a lawsuit seeking
rescission of the CDO transaction as well as compensation for
other damages; the litigation is currently pending.

        Recalibration of Rating to The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The current long-term rating assigned to Kenosha School District
was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has
announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to
its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of the
methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action on Kenosha School District was on
October 14, 2009, when the A1/negative outlook was affirmed.


DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Kimberly School Bond Ratings on Watchlist
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is placing on Watchlist for possible downgrade the ratings
on Kimberly School District's general obligation bonds (rated A1),
reflecting uncertainty about the district's willingness and
ability to meet the obligations of the Kimberly Employment Benefit
Trust Fund.

In 2006, the Trust issued $4.3 million in asset-backed notes,
purchased by Depfa Bank (bank financial strength rated E+), in
order to finance its investment in a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.  Concurrently, in a moral obligation agreement, the
district covenanted to pay to the Indenture Trustee, subject to
appropriation, such amount as necessary to cure deficiency in the
Trust's asset ratio (defined by the value of the investment as
compared to the outstanding principal amount on the asset-backed
notes).  Earnings on the investment were expected to be sufficient
to pay the interest on the asset-backed notes and surplus revenues
would be used to fund the district's OPEB liability.  However, as
market conditions deteriorated, particularly affecting structured
investments, the market value of the investment dropped.  In early
2008, the Indenture Trustee requested the district step up to its
moral obligation as the asset ratio had fallen below 101%.  The
district did not act to restore the deficiency which trigged a
technical event of default.  Until recently no remedy per the
indenture had been pursued by the majority noteholder (Depfa).  On
March 9, 2010, Depfa accelerated payment under the terms of the
Indenture by sending notice declaring the principal and any
interest due immediately.  To date, neither the Kimberly School
District nor the Kimberly Employment Benefit Trust has fulfilled
Depfa's demand.  Among other concerns, Moody's is looking to
clarify how the district plans to respond to Depfa's request and
any potential impact on the district's credit quality.

Moody's believes that involvement in the synthetic CDO investment
is limited to five Wisconsin school districts and therefore has
negligible potential impact for other municipal entities in
Wisconsin.  Also, the district has filed a lawsuit seeking
rescission of the CDO transaction as well as compensation for
other damages; the litigation is currently pending.

        Recalibration of Rating to The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The current long-term rating assigned to Kimberly School District
was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has
announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to
its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of the
methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action on Kimberly School District was on
February 6, 2009, when the A1 rating was confirmed.


DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Waukesha School Bond Ratings on Watchlist
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is placing on Watchlist for possible downgrade the ratings
on Waukesha School District's general obligation bonds (rated A2),
reflecting uncertainty about the district's willingness and
ability to meet the obligations of the School District of Waukesha
Post Employment Benefits Trust.

In 2006, the Trust issued $50.0 million in asset-backed notes,
purchased by Depfa Bank (bank financial strength rated E+), in
order to finance its investment in a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.  Concurrently, in a moral obligation agreement, the
district covenanted to pay to the Indenture Trustee, subject to
appropriation, such amount as necessary to cure deficiency in the
Trust's asset ratio (defined by the value of the investment as
compared to the outstanding principal amount on the asset-backed
notes).  Earnings on the investment were expected to be sufficient
to pay the interest on the asset-backed notes and surplus revenues
would be used to fund the district's OPEB liability.  However, as
market conditions deteriorated, particularly affecting structured
investments, the market value of the investment dropped.  In early
2008, the Indenture Trustee requested the district step up to its
moral obligation as the asset ratio had fallen below 101%.  The
district did not act to restore the deficiency which trigged a
technical event of default.  Until recently no remedy per the
indenture had been pursued by the majority noteholder (Depfa).  On
March 9, 2010, Depfa accelerated payment under the terms of the
Indenture by sending notice declaring the principal and any
interest due immediately.  To date, neither the Waukesha School
District nor the School District of Waukesha Post Employment
Benefits Trust has fulfilled Depfa's demand.  Among other
concerns, Moody's is looking to clarify how the district plans to
respond to Depfa's request and any potential impact on the
district's credit quality.

Moody's believes that involvement in the synthetic CDO investment
is limited to five Wisconsin school districts and therefore has
negligible potential impact for other municipal entities in
Wisconsin.  Also, the district has filed a lawsuit seeking
rescission of the CDO transaction as well as compensation for
other damages; the litigation is currently pending.

       Recalibration of Rating to The Global Rating Scale;
                       Principal Methodology

The current long-term rating assigned to Waukesha School District
was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has
announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to
its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of the
methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action on Waukesha School District was on
February 6, 2009, when the district's rating was downgraded to A2
and the outlook was revised to negative.


DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Ratings on West Allis Bonds on Watchlist
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is placing on Watchlist for possible downgrade the ratings
on West Allis West Milwaukee School District's general obligation
bonds (rated A1), reflecting uncertainty about the district's
willingness and ability to meet the obligations of the School
District of West Allis-West Milwaukee Post Employment Benefit
Trust.

In 2006, the Trust issued $72.4 million in asset-backed notes,
purchased by Depfa Bank (bank financial strength rated E+), in
order to finance its investment in a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.  Concurrently, in a moral obligation agreement, the
district covenanted to pay to the Indenture Trustee, subject to
appropriation, such amount as necessary to cure deficiency in the
Trust's asset ratio (defined by the value of the investment as
compared to the outstanding principal amount on the asset-backed
notes).  Earnings on the investment were expected to be sufficient
to pay the interest on the asset-backed notes and surplus revenues
would be used to fund the district's OPEB liability.  However, as
market conditions deteriorated, particularly affecting structured
investments, the market value of the investment dropped.  In early
2008, the Indenture Trustee requested the district step up to its
moral obligation as the asset ratio had fallen below 101%.  The
district did not act to restore the deficiency which trigged a
technical event of default.  Until recently no remedy per the
indenture had been pursued by the majority noteholder (Depfa).  On
March 9, 2010, Depfa accelerated payment under the terms of the
Indenture by sending notice declaring the principal and any
interest due immediately.  To date, neither the West Allis West
Milwaukee School District nor the School District of West Allis-
West Milwaukee Post Employment Benefit Trust has fulfilled Depfa's
demand.  Among other concerns, Moody's is looking to clarify how
the district plans to respond to Depfa's request and any potential
impact on the district's credit quality.

Moody's believes that involvement in the synthetic CDO investment
is limited to five Wisconsin school districts and therefore has
negligible potential impact for other municipal entities in
Wisconsin.  Also, the district has filed a lawsuit seeking
rescission of the CDO transaction as well as compensation for
other damages; the litigation is currently pending.

       Recalibration of Rating to The Global Rating Scale;
                       Principal Methodology

The current long-term rating assigned to West Allis West Milwaukee
School District was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.
Moody's has announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal
ratings to its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of
the methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action on West Allis West Milwaukee School
District was on February 6, 2009, when the district's rating was
downgraded to A1 and the outlook was revised to negative.


DEPFA BANK: Moody's Puts Whitefish Bay Bond Ratings on Watchlist
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is placing on Watchlist for possible downgrade the ratings
on Whitefish Bay School District's general obligation bonds (rated
Aa2), reflecting uncertainty about the district's willingness and
ability to meet the obligations of the School District of
Whitefish Bay Post Employment Benefits Trust.

In 2006, the Trust issued $9.7 million in asset-backed notes,
obtained from Depfa Bank (bank financial strength rated E+), in
order to finance its investment in a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.  Concurrently, in a moral obligation agreement, should
the need arise the district covenanted to pay to the Indenture
Trustee, subject to appropriation, such amount as necessary to
cure deficiency in the Trust's asset ratio (defined by the value
of the investment as compared to the outstanding principal amount
on the asset-backed notes).  Earnings on the investment were
expected to be sufficient to pay the interest on the asset-backed
notes and surplus revenues would be used to fund the district's
OPEB liability.  However, as market conditions deteriorated,
particularly affecting structured investments, the market value of
the investment dropped.  In early 2008, the Indenture Trustee
requested the district step up to its moral obligation as the
asset ratio had fallen below 101%.  The district did not act to
restore the deficiency which trigged a technical event of default.
Until recently no remedy per the indenture had been pursued by the
majority noteholder (Depfa).  On March 9, 2010, Depfa accelerated
payment under the terms of the Indenture by sending notice
declaring the principal and any interest due immediately.  To
date, neither the Whitefish Bay School District nor the School
District of Whitefish Bay Post Employment Benefits Trust has
fulfilled Depfa's demand.  Among other concerns, Moody's is
looking to clarify how the district plans to respond to Depfa's
request and any potential impact on the district's credit quality.

Moody's believes that involvement in the synthetic CDO investment
is limited to five Wisconsin school districts and therefore has
negligible potential impact for other municipal entities in
Wisconsin.  Also, the district has filed a lawsuit seeking
rescission of the CDO transaction as well as compensation for
other damages; the litigation is currently pending.

       Recalibration of Rating to The Global Rating Scale;
                       Principal Methodology

The current long-term rating assigned to Whitefish Bay School
District was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's
has announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings
to its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of the
methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action on Whitefish Bay School District was on
February 6, 2009, when the rating of Aa2 was confirmed.


DILLON READ: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of all rated
classes of Notes issued by Dillon Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 Ltd. due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of
reference obligations and cash collateral as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor and a decrease in
the weighted average recovery rate since last review.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

On November 13, 2009 Moody's downgraded all rated classes of Notes
issued by Dillon Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 Ltd. and placed Classes A-
S1VF, A1, A2, A3 and A4 on watch for further possible downgrade
due to the potential of an Event of Default triggered by an
increase in haircuts to par value (Haircut Amount).  The Haircut
Amount is a calculation based on the ratings of collateral that
are rated below Baa3, Ba3 and B3.  The Haircut Amount is
subtracted from the Net Outstanding Portfolio Collateral Balance
in the calculation of the Overcollateralization Tests; it is not
subtracted from the Net Outstanding Portfolio Collateral Balance
in the calculation used to test for an EOD, as specified in
Section 5.1(d) of the Indenture.  However, the deal has the risk
of an EOD due to an increase in defaulted securities and deferred
interest payable-in-kind bonds from further deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio.

Dillon Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 Ltd. is a hybrid collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of cash collateral (26.3% of the
pool) and credit default swaps (73.7% of the pool) referencing
commercial mortgage backed securities.  As of the March 1, 2010
trustee report, the Notes are collateralized by 84 classes of CMBS
cash collateral and reference obligations (83.4% of the pool) from
54 separate transactions and 9 classes of CRE CDO cash collateral
(7.0% of the pool) from 6 separate transactions and Real Estate
Investment Trust debt cash collateral (9.6% of the pool) issued
between 2004 and 2007.

Seventeen cash collateral and reference obligations totaling
$144.5 million of (14.3% of the pool) were reported as defaulted
securities or deferred interest PIK bonds compared to
$75.0 million (7.6% of the pool) at last review.  Moody's
currently estimates the rate of recovery from those defaulted
assets is minimal.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are
typically modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as
covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral and reference obligations.  The bottom-
dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability within a
collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a bottom dollar adjusted WARF of
3,736 compared to 2,975 at last review.  The bottom dollar
adjusted WARF factors in potential ratings migration on over 2.5%
of collateral and reference obligations currently placed on review
for possible downgrade by Moody's.  The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: A1-A3 (2.5% compared to 2.5% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (24.3% compared to 33.0% at last review),
Ba1-Ba3 (9.8% compared to 15.3% at last review), B1-B3 (29.9%
compared to 32.4% at last review), Caa1-NR (33.5% compared to
16.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the credit exposure of the collateral pool.
Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 5.9 years, compared to 6.3 at
last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 9.8% compared to 12.5% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations among the instruments within the collateral pool
(i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's modeled a MAC of 20.3%
compared to 28.4% at last review.  The lower MAC is due to an
increase in the ratings distribution of the collateral and
reference obligations.

Moody's will continue to closely monitor the performance of this
transaction and the remedies the Trustee may exercise if an EOD
occurs.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-S1VF, Downgraded to B2; previously on November 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Further
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Further Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class A2, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Further
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A3, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Further
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A4, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Further
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B1, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Class B2, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Class B3, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Class B4, Downgraded to C; previously on November 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available trustee reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated November 13, 2009.


FRONTIER LEASING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of notes in three
securitizations issued by Frontier Leasing Corporation.  The
securitized pools consist of equipment loans, primarily backed by
coin laundry and car wash equipment.  Frontier Leasing Corporation
is the servicer for the Frontier Equipment Receivables Trust 2002-
1 and Frontier Equipment Receivables Trust 2004-1 deals.
LeaseDimensions, Inc, is the successor servicer for Frontier
Funding Company V, LLC.  LeaseDimensions, Inc, began servicing
this deal in May 2009.

The rating actions related to Frontier Equipment Receivables Trust
2002-1 were prompted by the concern that the balloon payments will
not be received before the final legal maturity date of May 20,
2010.  As of the February 2010 payment date, there were six
contracts remaining in the pool.  Four of these contracts have
balloon payments due in the beginning of April and May.  Two
contracts with balloon payments, comprising approximately 34% of
the current pool balance, were 1-30 days past due.  Subordination
of the Class B notes is the only available form of credit
enhancement.

The rating actions related to the Frontier Equipment Receivables
Trust 2004-1 deal were prompted by the fact that the notes are
currently undercollateralized.  As of the February 2010 payment
date, only 22 contracts remained in the pool, which contributes to
the obligor concentration risk.  Five contracts, comprising
approximately 16% of the current pool balance, were 30 days or
more past due.  Because there is no cash left in the reserve
account, and both Class B and C notes have been written down, the
Class A will absorb any future collateral losses.

The rating actions related to Frontier Funding Company V were
prompted by higher than expected delinquencies and defaults.  As
of the February 2010 payment date, approximately 14% of the pool
has defaulted and approximately 12% of the pool balance was 60
days or more past due.  Subordination to the Class A is the only
available form of credit enhancement.  The Class A note is wrapped
by CIFG Assurance N.A.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Frontier Equipment Receivables Trust 2002-1

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 4.6% (as a
    percent of original balance)

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on May 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 11, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3

Issuer: Frontier Equipment Receivables Trust 2004-1

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 7.1% (as a
    percent of original balance)

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on May 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 from Ba1

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 11, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca from Caa2

Issuer: Frontier Funding Company V, LLC

  * Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 15.3% (as a
    percent of original balance)

  -- Cl. A, Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec
     11, 2008 Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 11, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca from B3


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2002-C3 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 12 other classes from the same transaction
and removed seven of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion commercial mortgage-backed securities
criteria.  When lowering its ratings, S&P considered credit
support erosion that S&P anticipates will affect several
subordinate classes upon the eventual resolution of four of the
five specially serviced assets, as well as potential losses
associated with two credit-impaired loans.  S&P also considered
the reduction of subordinate interest on classes H, J, and K
should losses occur, as well as these classes' susceptibility to
future liquidity interruption.  In the case of the junior classes,
some are experiencing interest shortfalls, such as the class O-1
and O-2 certificates.  If the interest shortfalls continue for the
foreseeable future, S&P may lower its ratings on these two classes
to 'D'.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.52x and a loan-to-value ratio of 75.5%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.30x and an LTV ratio of 93.9%.  The
implied defaults and loss severity under S&P's 'AAA' scenario were
23.0% and 31.3%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude 22 defeased loans ($190.0 million, 30.4%),
four specially serviced assets ($18.8 million, 3.0%), and two
credit-impaired loans ($20.4 million, 3.3%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these six specially serviced and credit-
impaired assets and included them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P's analysis also considered that 41
($193.7 million, 30.9%) of the 71 performing loans secured by real
estate ($396.3 million, 63.4%) have maturities within the next 30
months.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-1 interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may
revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings,
including the rating on the IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 10, 2010, trustee remittance report, four assets
($18.8 million, 3.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  Additionally, one loan
($5.2 million, 0.8%) was transferred to special servicing after
the March trustee remittance report was issued.  The payment
status of the specially serviced assets is: one is real estate
owned (REO; $3.7 million, 0.6%), two are 90-plus-days delinquent
($11.8 million, 1.9%), one is in its grace period ($5.2 million,
0.8%), and one is a matured balloon ($3.3 million, 0.5%).  Three
of the specially serviced assets ($15.5 million, 2.5%) have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $6.0 million.  The
related monthly appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amount
on the March 2010 remittance report for these ARAs was $30,012.

The Cherryland Center loan ($7.9 million, 1.3%) is the largest
asset with Berkadia and is secured by a 166,400-sq.-ft. anchored
retail center in Traverse City, Mich.  The loan is 90-plus-days
delinquent and was transferred to the special servicer on Dec. 19,
2008, due to imminent default after the borrower indicated that it
would not be able to make its January 2009 debt service payment.
The property was 82.6% occupied as of December 2009 and had a
reported DSC of 1.02x for the year-ended Dec. 31, 2008.  Berkadia
has stated that it is pursuing foreclosure.  An ARA of
$3.5 million is in effect against the loan.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The remaining four specially serviced assets ($16.2 million, 2.6%)
have balances that individually represent 0.8% or less of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for three of these
assets ($11.0 million, 1.8%).  The special servicer is currently
gathering information and reviewing resolution strategies for the
fourth loan ($5.2 million, 0.8%), which was recently transferred
to special servicing in early March 2010.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined two
loans ($20.4 million, 3.3%) to be credit-impaired.  The Broadmoor
Apartments loan ($11.2 million, 1.8%) is the 10th-largest real
estate exposure in the pool and is secured by a 384-unit
multifamily apartment complex in Tampa.  The property was 87.5%
occupied as of November 2009.  The reported DSC for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 0.96x.  According to the master
servicer, also Berkadia, the property has deferred maintenance,
and the borrower is currently delinquent on its March 2010 debt
service payment.  As a result, S&P view this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss.

The second credit-impaired loan is the Holiday Inn-Select (New
Orleans) loan, which has a balance of $9.2 million (1.5%).
According to Berkadia, the loan is current.  The 170-room hotel
property was 26.0% occupied as of September 2009, and the borrower
reported that cash flow was not sufficient to cover all property
operating expenses.  As a result, S&P view this loan to be at an
increased risk of default and loss.

S&P estimated losses for six ($39.3 million, 6.3%) of the seven
specially serviced and credit-impaired assets.  The weighted
average loss severity for these six assets was 42.1%.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the March 10, 2010, trustee remittance report, the
collateral pool balance was $625.6 million, which is 80.5% of the
issuance balance.  The pool includes 99 loans and one REO asset,
down from 108 loans at issuance.  Berkadia provided financial
information for 95.3% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, the
majority of which was full-year 2008, interim-2009, or full-year
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.50x for the
nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.52x and 75.5%, respectively,
which exclude the 22 defeased loans ($190.0 million, 30.4%), four
specially serviced assets ($18.8 million, 3.0%), and two credit-
impaired loans ($20.4 million, 3.3%).  S&P has estimated losses
separately for the six specially serviced and credit-impaired
assets.  If S&P's DSC calculation included these six specially
serviced and credit-impaired assets that have reported DSCs, S&P's
adjusted DSC would be 1.44x.  The transaction has experienced
$11.3 million of principal losses to date.  Twenty loans in the
pool ($126.5 million, 20.2%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including four of the top 10 real estate exposures.
Seventeen loans in the pool ($104.9 million, 16.8%) have reported
DSC below 1.10x, 11 of which ($74.4 million, 11.9%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

              Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $158.4 million (25.3%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the
top 10 exposures.  Four of the top 10 exposures ($48.5 million,
7.8%) appear on the master servicer's watchlist, including the
Broadmoor Apartments loan discussed above.  S&P discusses the
three remaining top 10 real exposures on the master servicer's
watchlist below.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
exposures are 1.35x and 81.4%, respectively.

The Sea Aire Apartments loan ($13.1 million, 2.1%) is the fifth-
largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by a 336-unit
multifamily apartment complex in Somers Point, N.J.  The loan
appears on Berkadia's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The reported
occupancy and DSC for year-end 2009 were 84.2% and 0.82x,
respectively.  The borrower indicated that the low DSC is mainly
attributable to low occupancy and higher operating expenses, but
expects revenue to increase during the upcoming spring and summer
months.

The Parkway Manor Apartments loan ($12.6 million, 2.0%) is the
seventh-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by a
176-unit multifamily apartment complex in Carson City, Nev.  The
loan is on Berkadia's watchlist due to a low DSC.  The occupancy
and DSC for the three months ended March 31, 2009, were 84.0% and
1.08x, respectively.  The low DSC is attributable to a decline in
occupancy.  Berkadia indicated that occupancy had increased to
93.0% as of February 2010.

The Riverside Business Park loan ($11.6 million, 1.9%) is the
ninth-largest nondefeased loan in the pool and is secured by a
487,300-sq.-ft. industrial property in Riverside, Calif.  The loan
is on Berkadia's watchlist due to low occupancy.  The property was
66.3% occupied as of December 2009, and the reported DSC for the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 1.88x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
        Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    H         BBB+        A-/Watch Neg                     8.29
    J         BB+         BBB/Watch Neg                    5.34
    K         B+          BB+/Watch Neg                    3.94
    L         CCC+        B+/Watch Neg                     3.01
    M         CCC-        CCC+/Watch Neg                   2.23

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
        Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class     To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --          ----           ----------------------
    D         AA+         AA+/Watch Neg                   14.81
    E         AA          AA/Watch Neg                    12.95
    F         AA-         AA-/Watch Neg                   11.40
    G         A           A/Watch Neg                      9.84
    N         CCC-        CCC-/Watch Neg                   1.61
    O-1       CCC-        CCC-/Watch Neg                   1.18
    O-2       CCC-        CCC-/Watch Neg                   0.99

                         Ratings Affirmed

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
        Mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C3

    Class     Rating                     Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     ------                     ----------------------
    A-1       AAA                                         24.29
    A-2       AAA                                         24.29
    B         AAA                                         19.63
    C         AAA                                         17.77
    X-1       AAA                                           N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


GREEN TREE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 and downgraded four classes in seven
Green Tree U.S. Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
transactions.  The reviewed transactions were issued between 1996
and 1998.  The rating actions are listed below.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1996-C

  -- Class HEB1 affirmed at 'AA-'and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class HEB2 remains at 'C' and the Recovery Rating is revised
     from 'DR6' to 'RR2';

  -- Class HIB2 affirmed at 'CCC/RR1'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1996-D

  -- Class HEB1 Affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class HEB2 Downgraded to 'CC/RR2' from 'CCC/DR1';

  -- Class HIB2 Downgraded to 'CC/RR1' from 'CCC/DR1'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1996-F

  -- Class HEB1 affirmed at 'AA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class HEB2 downgraded to 'C/RR1' from 'CCC/DR1';

  -- Class HIB2 remains at 'CCC' and the Recovery Rating is
     revised from 'DR2' to 'RR1'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1997-C

  -- Class HEB1 affirmed at 'AA-'and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class HEB2 Remains at 'C' and the Recovery Rating is revised
     from 'DR6' to 'RR2';

  -- Class HIB2 Affirmed at 'CCC/RR1'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1997-D

  -- Class HEB1 affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class HEB2 Downgraded to 'C/RR2' from 'CCC/DR1';

  -- Class HIB2 Remains at 'C' and the Recovery Rating is revised
     from 'DR6' to 'RR2'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1997-E

  -- Class HEB1 affirmed at 'A' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class HEB2 remains at 'C' and the Recovery Rating is revised
     from 'DR6' to 'RR2';

  -- Class HIB2 affirmed at 'CCC/RR1'.

Green Tree Financial Corp. (HEL & HIL), series 1998-B

  -- Class HEB2 remains at 'C' and the Recovery Rating is revised
     from 'DR6' to 'RR2';

  -- Class HIB2 affirmed at 'CCC/RR1'.

The bonds are primarily collateralized with closed-end first and
second lien home-equity and home-improvement mortgage loans.

To project future defaults, Fitch used the net loss rate average
over the past 12 months adjusted higher or lower for differences
in each pool's current 60+ day delinquencies.  Loss severities on
defaulted loans were assumed to be 100%.  The average expected
loss for the pools reviewed was 22% as a percentage of the
remaining pool balance and 7% as a percentage of the initial pool
balance.

After determining each pool's projected base-case and stressed
scenario loss assumptions, Fitch analyzes each transaction's
credit support, excess spread and payment priority using cash flow
projections in affirming or revising ratings.

On average, the pools reviewed have an outstanding remaining
balance of approximately 2% of the original balance.  Due to the
performance volatility associated with small mortgage pools, bonds
that exceeded their current rating stressed thresholds were
affirmed.

In addition to the long-term ratings Fitch also provides Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings.  Loss Severity ratings are assigned
to classes with long-term ratings of 'B' or higher while Recovery
Ratings are assigned to classes with long-term ratings below 'B'.
Additional information is available on Fitch's website in the
reports 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'
and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-RR2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-RR2, a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit transaction.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following the downgrades of three underlying CMBS certificates
that collateralize GCCMT 2007-RR2.  The downgraded underlying
certificates are from two transactions and total $33.8 million
(6.4% of the total asset balance).  The downgrades also reflect
downward revisions to S&P's credit estimates on all of the CMBS
collateral not rated by Standard & Poor's ($144.9 million, 27.4%).

S&P lowered its ratings on classes D through Q to 'D' from the
'CCC' category due to interest shortfalls that S&P expects will
continue for the foreseeable future.  The classes have experienced
interest shortfalls for at least the past four months.  Cumulative
interest shortfalls to the transaction total $2.1 million,
according to the trustee report dated March 22, 2010.  If the
'CCC-' rated classes A-3, B, and C continue to experience
liquidity interruptions and if S&P determine that these interest
shortfalls will continue for the foreseeable future, S&P may lower
these ratings to 'D'.

The downgrades of classes A-1FX, A-1FL, and X also reflect the
significant reduction in interest payments to the trust.  Sixteen
of the 18 classes that are subordinate to the A-1FX, A-1FL, and X
classes were shorting 100% of their optimal interest as of the
March 22, 2010, trustee report.  The interest shortfalls are
primarily due to special servicing fees, servicers'
nonrecoverability determinations for advances, and appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions from the underlying CMBS
collateral.

According to the March 22, 2010, trustee report, GCCMT 2007-RR2 is
collateralized by 63 CMBS classes ($528.7 million, 100%) from 29
distinct transactions issued between 2005 and 2007.  GCCMT 2007-
RR2 has exposure to the following CMBS transactions that Standard
& Poor's has downgraded:

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 (class H;
  $17 million, 3.2%); and

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR14
  (classes G and H; $16.7 million, 3.2%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed GCCMT 2007-RR2 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-RR2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1FX            BB-              A-/Watch Neg
         A-1FL            BB-              A-/Watch Neg
         A-2              CCC+             BB+/Watch Neg
         A-3              CCC-             B+/Watch Neg
         B                CCC-             B/Watch Neg
         C                CCC-             B-/Watch Neg
         D                D                CCC+/Watch Neg
         E                D                CCC/Watch Neg
         F                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         G                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         H                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         J                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         K                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         L                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         M                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         N                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         O                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         P                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         Q                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         X                BB-              AAA/Watch Neg


GREYWOLF CLO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of these notes issued by Greywolf CLO, Ltd., under review for
possible upgrade:

  -- US$365,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
     balance of $358,368,543), A3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
     June 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     (current balance of $14,253,157), C Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to C.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In
Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of sale proceeds (including higher than previously
anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a decrease
in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an improvement in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), and a decrease in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, as of the
latest trustee report dated February 8, 2010, defaulted securities
total about $19.4MM of the underlying portfolio, compared to
$32.4MM in the May 2009 report.  Additionally, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2836 compared to 3146 in May
2009 and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 7.5%
of the underlying portfolio versus 10.2% in May 2009.

Additionally, the overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes
have increased significantly since the last rating actions in June
2009.  The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 122.18%, 114.66%,
106.77% and 103.38%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of
113.65%, 106.77%, 99.53% and 95.74%, respectively, and are all
currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class E notes have
been paid down by approximately $3.2 million due to the diversion
of excess interest related to the failure of the Class E
overcollateralization test.  Moody's also notes that the Class D
and Class E notes are no longer deferring interest.

Greywolf CLO I, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  On June 9, 2009, Moody's downgraded the Class A, B, C, D
and E notes as a result of the application of revised and updated
key modeling assumptions as well as the deterioration in the
credit quality of the transaction's underlying portfolio.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-RR3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 11 classes of Notes issued by
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR3 due to interest shortfalls
on all Moody's rated classes, and deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in
the weighted average rating factor and a decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate since last review.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

GSMS 2006-RR3 is a static CRE CDO currently backed by portfolio of
commercial mortgage back securities.  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2004 and 2006.

As of the 3/18/2010 trustee statement, all classes are experience
interest shortfalls totaling approximately $1.1 million.  Moody's
rates to the timely payment of interest and ultimately payment of
principle, and further shortfalls in interest payments are
expected due to interest shortfalls on the underlying collateral
portfolio.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are
typically modeled as actual parameters for static deals and as
covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.  The
current bottom-dollar WARF is 3,832 compared to 1,187 at last
review.  Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,959, which is
the WARF excluding defaulted collateral (rated Ca or C by Moody's,
or collateral with interest shortfalls).  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates is: A1-A3 (7.4% compared to
18.3% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (19.3% compared to 29.0% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (26.0% compared to 38.3% at last review), B1-B3
(11.1% compared to 24.4% at last review), and Caa1-C (36.2%
compared to 0.0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL (excluding
defaulted collateral) of 6.1 years compared to 7.3 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR (excluding defaulted collateral) with a mean of 12.6%
compared to a mean of 14.8% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC (excluding defaulted collateral) of 31.3% compared
to 49.3% at last review.  The decrease in MAC is due to greater
divesity in the ratings distribution.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A1-S, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A1-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class O, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X*, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2010 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Notional Amount

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2006-RR3 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on all 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series 2006-
RR3, a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transaction.  S&P lowered nine of the ratings to 'D' and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  Six of the
lowered ratings remain on CreditWatch negative, and S&P placed the
remaining rating on CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades primarily reflect interest shortfalls to all of the
rated classes.  S&P lowered its ratings on classes E through N to
'D' from 'CCC-' due to accumulated interest shortfalls.  S&P
expects these classes will continue to experience interest
shortfalls for the foreseeable future.

Seven ratings on GSMS 2006-RR3 are on CreditWatch negative due to
interest shortfalls indicated on the March 18, 2010, trustee
report and the classes' susceptibility to future liquidity
interruptions.  If the classes with ratings on CreditWatch
negative continue to experience liquidity interruptions, S&P may
lower these ratings further, possibly to 'D'.  Additionally, GSMS
2006-RR3's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch
negative ($28 million, 3.8%) may prompt additional negative rating
actions if the CreditWatch resolutions result in downgrades of the
underlying classes.

The liquidity interruptions to GSMS 2006-RR3 resulted from
interest shortfalls on the underlying CMBS collateral.  The
interest shortfalls were primarily due to special servicing fees,
servicers' nonrecoverability determinations for advances, and
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions.

According to the March 18, 2010, trustee report, GSMS 2006-RR3 is
collateralized by 58 CMBS classes ($727.8 million, 100%) from 34
distinct transactions issued between 2004 and 2006.  GSMS 2006-RR3
has exposure to the following CMBS certificates that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:

* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2004-C3 (class
  D; $11.3 million, 1.6%); and

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2005-C6 (classes G; $1.6 million, 0.2%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed GSMS 2006-RR3 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria, and S&P's analysis
is consistent with the lowered ratings.  S&P's analysis to update
or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on GSMS 2006-RR3
will consider the propensity of the rated classes to experience
future interest shortfalls and will include an analysis of the
underlying CMBS collateral.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                          series 2006-RR3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          A-1              BB/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
          A1-S             BB/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
          A-2              CCC+/Watch Neg   B/Watch Neg
          B                CCC/Watch Neg    B-/Watch Neg
          C                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC+/Watch Neg
          D                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                         series 2006-RR3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          E                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          F                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          G                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          H                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          J                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          K                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          L                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          M                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          N                D                CCC-/Watch Neg

          Ratings Lowered And Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                 GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                         series 2006-RR3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Class            To               From
              -----            --               ----
              X                BB/Watch Neg     AAA


GWR OPERATING: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating on $225 Mil. Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 rating to GWR Operating
Partnership, L.L.L.P.'s proposed $225 million guaranteed first
mortgage notes due 2017.  GWR is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Great Wolf Resorts.  Moody's also assigned GWR a Caa1 Corporate
Family Rating and Probability of Default Rating.  The outlook is
stable.

Proceeds from the proposed note offering will be used to re-
finance existing mortgage debt at three properties.  Ratings are
subject to final documentation.

GWRs' Caa1 CFR reflects the company's very high leverage and very
weak interest coverage.  For the twelve month period ending
December 31 2009, debt to EBITDA was over 9.0 times and EBITDA
minus capital expenditures to interest expense was about 0.3
times.  Other credit concerns include the company's small scale
and narrow business focus, highly complex legal and capital
structure, and a material weakness in connection with the
preparation of its financial reports for the quarter ended
September 30, 2009.  GWR -- a wholly owned subsidiary of Great
Wolf Resorts, Inc. (Great Wolf) -- has only twelve properties each
of which contains an indoor water park which caters to families
with children 4-14 years of age.  Factors supporting the ratings
include its relatively strong brand recognition within this niche
segment of the industry, good asset values supporting the first
mortgage notes, and adequate liquidity.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that the Caa1 CFR
sufficiently captures the credit risk given the expected level of
debt protection measures and liquidity.  Although Moody's expects
debt protection measures to gradually improve over time Moody's
also believe leverage will remain very high and interest coverage
will remain weak due in large part to weak consumer spending -- at
least over the intermediate term.

New ratings assigned:

  -- Corporate Family Rating at Caa1

  -- Probability of Default Rating at Caa1

  -- $225 million guaranteed first mortgage notes due 2017 at B3
     (LGD 3, 33%)

GWR is a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Wolf Resorts, Inc, which
owns, operates, or manages hotel resort properties which contain
an indoor water park.  Annual revenues are approximately
$270 million.


ILLINOIS FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2006A Bonds to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-' rating on Illinois Finance Authority's (Illinois
Finance Authority formerly operated as Illinois Health Facilities
Authority) series 2006A fixed-rate revenue refunding bonds, issued
for Proctor Hospital.

The rating revision reflects three years of declining operations
and light debt service coverage coupled with a weaker balance
sheet and Proctor's overall weaker business position in its
market.  Additionally, in S&P's opinion, there is some risk
related to the hospital's variable-rate debt exposure and renewal
of its letter of credit.

More specifically, the rating reflects Proctor's operating losses
in the past two fiscal years generating weak debt service coverage
of less than 2x and a weak balance sheet with low levels of
unrestricted liquidity, equal to a weak 66 days' cash on hand in
2009 and cash to debt of 56% and moderately high leverage at 48%.
Also underlying the rating are Proctor's declining volume trend
and competitive three-hospital service area with Proctor ranking
third in market share, as well as government funding
vulnerability, especially given a high Medicare payor mix of 56%.

Proctor does, however, maintain good relationships with
physicians, including the location of Peoria, Ill.'s main
cardiology and cardiac surgery group (more than 30 physicians) in
a medical office building on Proctor's campus.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Proctor has
increased flexibility at the 'BB+' rating to work through the
current operating difficulties, incorporate the new Caterpillar-
contract-driven volume, and capitalize on management initiatives,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jessica Goldman.  "However,
concerns remain regarding the significant variable-rate debt
exposure, weak operating results, volume declines, and thin
liquidity," said Ms. Goldman.

There could be additional pressure on the rating if Proctor is not
able to post improved operating results, at least maintain its
balance sheet position, and renew or find an alternative to the
existing LOC, which expires May 2011.

Proctor staffs 162 acute-care beds in Peoria, about 150 miles
southwest of Chicago.  A mortgage pledge and gross revenues of the
parent company, the hospital, and a foundation secure the series
2006A bonds.


INDEPENDENCE I: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class and downgraded one class of
notes issued by Independence I CDO, Ltd. Inc. as a result of
continued credit deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last
rating action in March 2009.

Independence I entered an event of default in September 2004 due
to aggregate portfolio balance declining below the aggregate
outstanding balance of notes.  Due to the event of default, all
junior interest payments could be diverted towards class A
principal paydowns at the direction of over 50% of the class A
note holders.  However, no action has yet been taken to accelerate
the notes.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in Corporate
CDOs - Amended'.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates for
the class A notes are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below.

As of the Feb. 26, 2010 trustee report, the current balance of the
portfolio is approximately $135.9 million.  Approximately 26% of
the portfolio has been downgraded since March 2009, resulting in
40% of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 27.3% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or
below, compared to 35.2% and 26.4%, respectively, at last review.

Since the last review, the class A notes have been amortizing with
both excess spread and principal collections due to failing
overcollateralization tests, which has helped to offset the
negative impact of downgrades in the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, the out-of-the-money interest rate swap expired in
December 2009.  Interest proceeds that would have been needed to
pay the hedge counterparty will now be used to redeem the class A
notes.

Fitch continues to maintain a Negative Outlook on the class A
notes due to the class' sensitivity to upward interest rate
movements.  The class A notes' ability to be paid in full would be
negatively impacted under Fitch's rising interest rate scenarios,
given that the interest rate hedge expired, and 78% of the
portfolio represents fixed rate assets while all of the
liabilities have a floating rate coupon.  A rise in short-term
rates will therefore erode the amount of interest collections used
to pay down the class A balance.

The Loss Severity rating of 'LS3' assigned to the class A notes
indicates the tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches
rated 'CCC' and below.

Based on the credit quality of the remaining portfolio, Fitch
believes default is inevitable for the class B notes.  The
Feb. 26, 2010 trustee report shows that $15.5 million, or 11.5%,
of the portfolio is considered defaulted by the transaction's
governing documents, leaving $120.4 million of non-defaulted
assets.  Expected recoveries on the defaulted portion of the
portfolio are low and, while the class B notes are expected to
receive some principal repayment, they are undercollateralized and
are not expected to pay in full.

Independence I is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 18, 2000 and is managed by
Declaration Management & Research LLC.  The portfolio is composed
of commercial mortgage-backed securities (42.6%), residential
mortgage-backed securities (21.9%), commercial and consumer asset-
backed securities (21.1%), SF CDOs (9.3%), and corporate CDOs
(5.1%).

Fitch has taken these rating actions on Independence I:

  -- $82,797,005 class A notes affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
     assigned 'LS3';

  -- $50,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.


JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Affirms 'C' Rating on Various Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has affirmed its 'C' underlying
rating on Jefferson County, Ala.'s series 1997A, 1997D, 2001A,
2003-B-8, 2003 B-1-A through series 2003 B-1-E, and series 2003 C-
1 through 2003 C-10 sewer system revenue bonds.  S&P has removed
the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where
they had been placed Sept. 16, 2008.  The outlook is negative.

Although the system depleted its cash reserves and a portion of
its surety reserves in late 2008, according to the trustee, there
have been no additional draws against its surety reserves.  The
trustee estimates the system currently has $176 million remaining
in total combined surety reserves with Financial Guaranty
Insurance Co. (not rated), Syncora Guarantee Inc. (D/--/--), and
Financial Security Assurance Inc. (AAA/Negative/--), which can be
applied on a pro rata basis to any parity debt.  Syncora's surety
reserve totals $137.4 million, or 77% of the total surety
reserves.

"Standard & Poor's believes that the volatility associated with
the system's auction rate warrants, increased interest rates in
conjunction with accelerated principal repayments under the
standby warrant purchase agreements, termination events of the
swap agreements, as well as the system's very high debt burden
have placed significant financial pressure on the county's sewer
system," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst James Breeding.

The county did raise sewer rates in 2009 as management suspended
the automatic rate increase mechanism.  Interest payments on the
auction-rate sewer revenue obligations are due on a near-daily
basis throughout the month while interest on the variable-rate
demand warrants is due at the first of each month.  Regularly
scheduled principal payments are due Feb. 1 of each year.  In the
event the system fails to make a principal or interest payment on
the auction-rate bonds when due, S&P expects to lower the SPUR on
the bonds to 'D'.

On April 1, 2008, Standard & Poor's lowered its SPUR on Jefferson
County's variable-rate demand series 2003 B-2 through 2003 B-7
sewer revenue refunding warrants to 'D' from 'CCC' due to the
sewer system's failure to make a principal payment on the bank
warrants when due on April 1, 2008, in accordance with the terms
of the standby warrant purchase agreement.

The negative outlook reflects the potential for further rating
deterioration should debt service expenses continue to outpace
system revenues.  Although numerous forbearance agreements are
currently in place and the county is currently making the required
payments on its fixed rate and auction rate warrants, in S&P's
view, continued high interest rates and mounting deferred payments
related to the accelerated variable rate warrants could increase
the already-significant pressure on the sewer system's financial
position.


JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Keeps 'B' Rating on Outstanding GO Warrants
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has affirmed the 'B' rating on
Jefferson County, Alabama's general obligation warrants
outstanding.  In addition, S&P has affirmed the 'B-' rating on the
Jefferson County Public Building Authority's series 2006 lease-
revenue warrants.  Revenues available for payment of debt service
on the GO warrants include ad valorem, sales, business license and
occupational taxes; however, none of these legally available
revenues is specifically pledged for payment of debt service.

"County officials have indicated that the lease payment related to
the PBA's bonds outstanding will be made on April 1, 2010, as
scheduled," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst James Breeding.

Standard & Poor's affirmed the 'B' rating on Birmingham-Jefferson
Civic Center Authority, Ala.'s special tax bonds series 2002-C and
2005-A special tax bonds.

Standard & Poor's also affirmed the 'BBB' ratings on Jefferson
County's limited obligation school warrants secured by sales tax
revenues.

In addition, Standard & Poor's affirmed the 'B' rating on
Jefferson County's series 2000 limited obligation school warrants
secured by lease payments from the Jefferson County Board of
Education to the county.

S&P has removed all the ratings from CreditWatch, where they were
placed March 6, 2008.  The outlook is developing.

The outlook is developing, reflecting the potential for the rating
to move in either direction.  Should the county not be able to
restructure its sewer warrants outstanding and it proceeds with a
bankruptcy filing, S&P could lower the rating.  However, if the
county is able to negotiate a restructuring of its sewer debt
outstanding, resulting in relative stability and the avoidance of
a bankruptcy filing, then S&P could raise the ratings.


KLEROS PREFERRED: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 From 'B2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Kleros Preferred Funding,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action is:

* US$850,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2041 (current balance of
  $606,746,406), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 10,
  2009 Downgraded to B2.

Kleros Preferred Funding, Ltd., is a collateralized debt
obligation issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of residential
mortgage-backed securities originated in 2004 and 2005, with the
majority originated in 2005.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and failure of the coverage tests.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased
from 340 in January 2009 to 1374 in February 2010.  During the
same time, defaulted securities increased from $58 million to
$121 million, and the Class A/B Overcollateralization ratio
decreased from 93.5% to 75.3%.  In addition, the trustee reports
that the transaction is currently failing the Class A/B and Class
C/D Overcollateralization tests.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of 2005-2007 subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM
RMBS which are currently on review for possible downgrade were
stressed.  For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with
exposure to such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain
projections of the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth
in Moody's press releases dated January 13, 2010, for subprime,
January 14, 2010, for Alt-A, and January 27, 2010, for Option-ARM.
Based on the anticipated ratings impact of the updated cumulative
loss numbers, the stress varied based on vintage, current rating,
and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while currently Caa rated securities were
treated as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while currently Caa rated securities were
treated as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa rated securities were treated as Ca.  For
subprime RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those
currently rated Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and
Baa rated securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those
securities currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3,
while currently B and Caa rated securities were treated as Ca.
For subprime RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those
currently rated Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches,
currently B rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently
Caa rated securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS,
currently Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches,
currently B rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently
Caa rated securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team and are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Rating on 2006-MF2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative four classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., series 2006-MF2.  Fitch has also assigned Recovery Ratings
as noted below.

  -- $300.6 million class A to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AAA';
  -- $8.7 million class B to 'C'/RR6' from 'A';
  -- $12.5 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BB+';
  -- $1.6 million class D to 'D/RR6' from 'BB'.

Fitch has also affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has withdrawn the ratings of classes E through
M due to realized losses incurred to date.  Class N is not rated
by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed-
rate CMBS analysis.

Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 29.41% of the
current transaction balance.  Of the $95.8 million in Fitch
expected losses, $39 million is attributed to specially serviced
loans and $56.8 million is the result of losses from loans that do
not pass Fitch's refinance test.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 35% to $323.5 million from $495.5 million at
issuance.  There are 364 of the original 451 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently 67 specially serviced loans
(20%) in the deal.  To date, the transaction has incurred
$36.3 million in losses, representing 7.3% of the original
transaction.

Fitch reviewed the workout status of the specially serviced loans
and applied a haircut to the most recent property valuations based
on the type and age of the valuations and conversations with the
special servicer.  For those loans that do not have recent
valuations and are delinquent, Fitch assumed a 70% loss.  The
average loss severity of small balance loans exceeds traditional
CMBS and a 70% loss reflects recent dispositions of loans with
similar characteristics.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-liquidated loans
by applying a 20% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate of 9% to determine
the value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage fixed
rate CMBS transactions, each loan also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a
debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were
considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced
loans, 213 loans did not meet Fitch's refinance test and incurred
a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-MF4 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative five classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., series 2006-MF4.  Fitch has also assigned Recovery Ratings
as noted below.

  -- $321.6 million class A to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AA';
  -- $7.9 million class B to 'C'/RR6' from 'A';
  -- $11.8 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB'
  -- $9 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $2.2 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'BB'.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded and lowered the recovery rating
of this class:

  -- $2.5 million class F to 'D/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch has also affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of classes G through M due to realized
losses incurred to date.  Class N is not rated by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed
rate CMBS analysis.

Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 27.67% of the
current transaction balance.  Of the $99.9 million in Fitch
expected losses, $35.2 million is attributed to specially serviced
loans and $64.7 million is the result of losses from loans that do
not pass Fitch's refinance test.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 21% to $355.1 million from $450.9 million at
issuance.  There are 301 of the original 396 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently 47 specially serviced loans
(18.4%) in the deal.  To date, the transaction has incurred
$21.9 million in losses, representing 4.8% of the original
transaction.

Fitch reviewed the workout status of the specially serviced loans
and applied a haircut to the most recent property valuations based
on the type and age of the valuations and conversations with the
special servicer.  For those loans that do not have recent
valuations and are delinquent, Fitch assumed a 70% loss.  The
average loss severity of small balance loans exceeds traditional
CMBS and a 70% loss reflects recent dispositions of loans with
similar characteristics.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-liquidated loans
by applying a 20% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate of 9% to determine
the value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage fixed
rate CMBS transactions, each loan also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a
debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were
considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced
loans, 191 loans did not meet Fitch's refinance test and incurred
a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-MF3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative four classes of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., series 2006-MF3.  Fitch has also assigned Recovery Ratings
as noted below.

  -- $306.8 million class A to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AA';
  -- $8 million class B to 'C'/RR6' from 'A';
  -- $12.9 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';
  -- $285,052 class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BB+'.

Fitch has also affirmed and assigned a Rating Outlook to this
class:

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has withdrawn the ratings of classes E through
M due to realized losses incurred to date.  Class N is not rated
by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following an in-depth review and Fitch's
prospective analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed-
rate CMBS analysis.

Fitch's expected losses for the transaction are 28.42% of the
current transaction balance.  Of the $94.7 million in Fitch
expected losses, $30.8 million is attributed to specially serviced
loans and $63.9 million is the result of losses from loans that do
not pass Fitch's refinance test.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 34% to $328 million from $493.4 million at
issuance.  There are 331 of the original 451 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently 55 specially serviced loans
(17%) in the deal.  To date, the transaction has incurred
$36.8 million in losses, representing 7.4% of the original
transaction.

Fitch reviewed the workout status of the specially serviced loans
and applied a haircut to the most recent property valuations based
on the type and age of the valuation and conversations with the
special servicer.  For those loans that do not have recent
valuations and are delinquent, Fitch assumed a 70% loss.  The
average loss severity of small balance loans exceeds traditional
CMBS and a 70% loss reflects recent dispositions of loans with
similar characteristics.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-liquidated loans
by applying a 20% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate of 9% to determine
the value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage fixed-
rate CMBS transactions, each loan also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a
debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were
considered to payoff at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced
loans, 191 loans did not meet Fitch's refinance test and incurred
a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms Ratings on 21 2003-C7 CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 21
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C7 and removed 14 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
2.09x and a loan-to-value ratio of 74.6%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.45x and an LTV of 96.9%.  The implied defaults
and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 46.4% and 18.5%,
respectively.  These calculations exclude 11 defeased loans
($136.6 million, 14.4%).

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
classes reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  The analysis considered the number of
nondefeased loans that have imminent final maturities in 2010
(five loans, $153.6 million, 16.2%).  S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class X-CL and X-CP interest-only certificates based on
S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                     Specially Serviced Loans

As of the March 2010 remittance report, three assets
($233.4 million, 24.6%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, ING Clarion Capital Loan Servicing LLC.  The special
servicer has since returned two ($133.4 million, 14.0%) of these
assets to the master servicer.  S&P discuss all three assets
below.

The Parklawn Building loan ($100.4 million total exposure, 10.6%)
is the second-largest loan in the pool and the only loan currently
with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a 1,375,229-
sq.-ft. office property in Rockville, Md.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 5, 2010, due to
imminent maturity default.  The U.S. Federal Government, the
General Services Administration tenant that occupied 98% of the
property, had a lease scheduled to expire this coming July.
According to the special servicer, the tenant has recently
extended its lease for an additional five years.  The new lease
downsized the GSA's occupancy to 62% of total net rentable area
(NRA), but its total rent amount has increased.  As of September
2009, the reported DSC was 2.09x, down from 2.51x at issuance.
Standard & Poor's projected DSC is higher than 2.09x based on the
increase in the GSA's total rent amount.  The special servicer has
indicated that it is evaluating resolution strategies.

The formerly second- and third-largest loans with the special
servicer ($133.4 million, 14.0%) are top 10 loans, which have
General Growth Properties as the borrowing entity.  These loans
were transferred to the special servicer in April 2009 following
GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  On Dec. 31, 2009, the
special servicer and the borrower completed a reorganization and
modification plan.  According to ING, both loans were recently
returned to the master servicer.  Details of the two loans are:

The Valley Plaza Shopping Center loan, which has a total exposure
of $93.6 million (9.9%), is the third-largest loan in the pool.
The loan is secured by a 1,154,768-sq.-ft. super-regional mall in
Bakersfield, Calif.  ING has confirmed that the loan no longer has
an anticipated repayment date of July 11, 2012, and that the final
maturity date of the loan is now Jan. 11, 2016.  DSC was 2.80x,
2.77x, and 2.15x as of September 2009, December 2007, and
issuance, respectively.  Occupancy was 98.3%, 87.4%, and 96.0%, as
of the same periods, respectively.

The Visalia Mall loan, which has a total exposure of $40.5 million
(4.3%), is the sixth-largest loan in the pool.  The property is a
439,833-sq.-ft. regional mall in Visalia, Calif.  ING has
confirmed that the loan no longer has an ARD (which was Jan. 11,
2010), and that the final maturity date of the loan is now Jan.
11, 2014.  DSC was 2.20x, 2.51x, and 2.05x as of September 2009,
December 2007, and issuance, respectively.  Occupancy was 95.7%,
97.9%, and 98.0%, as of the same periods, respectively.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the March 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $950.6 million, down from $1.46 billion
at issuance.  The pool includes 47 assets, down from 68 at
issuance.  The master servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., provided full-
year 2008, interim 2009, or full-year 2009 financial information
for 99.4% of the nondefeased assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 2.19x for the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 2.09x and 74.6%,
respectively.  The master servicer reported a watchlist of six
loans ($64.0 million, 6.7%), including one of the top 10 loan
exposures, which S&P discuss below.  Two assets ($18.4 million,
1.9%) in the pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding trust
balance of $682.2 million (71.8%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.33x for the
top 10 loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are
2.21x and 72.2%, respectively.  The Shops at Gainey Village loan,
which is the seventh-largest loan in the pool, is the only top 10
loan exposure on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has a
trust balance of $36.4 million (3.8%) and is secured by a 138,342-
sq.-ft. retail property in Scottsdale, Ariz.  The asset appears on
the watchlist due to low DSC.  According to the March 2010
watchlist report comments, the main reason for the decline in
performance was the fall in base rents as the borrower tried to
retain tenants.  Reported DSC and occupancy were 0.92x and 86.0%,
respectively, as of September 2009.  These compare with September
2008 DSC and occupancy figures of 1.44x and 85.8%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class     To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----           ----------------------
      C         AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                   18.51
      D         AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                   16.79
      E         AA+     AA+/Watch Neg                   15.06
      F         AA      AA/Watch Neg                    13.72
      G         AA-     AA-/Watch Neg                   11.23
      H         A       A/Watch Neg                      8.94
      J         BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                   7.40
      K         BBB     BBB/Watch Neg                    5.87
      L         BB+     BB+/Watch Neg                    4.53
      M         BB      BB/Watch Neg                     3.77
      N         BB-     BB-/Watch Neg                    3.38
      P         B+      B+/Watch Neg                     3.00
      Q         B       B/Watch Neg                      2.62
      S         B-      B-/Watch Neg                     2.23

                          Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

      Class     Rating                 Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     ------                 ----------------------
      A-2       AAA                                     22.72
      A-3       AAA                                     22.72
      A-4       AAA                                     22.72
      A-1b      AAA                                     22.72
      B         AAA                                     20.81
      X-CL      AAA                                       N/A
      X-CP      AAA                                       N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LIBRA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Swap Agreement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating on the senior swap transaction entered into by Libra CDO
Limited:

  -- US$1,050,000,000 Senior Swap Agreement dated as of
     October 17, 2006 (remaining unfunded notional amount of
     $894,020,234), Downgraded to Caa2 and Remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on June 9, 2008 Downgraded to
     B2 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

Libra CDO Limited is a hybrid collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage-
backed securities originated in 2005 and 2006.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing acts as a credit default swap
counterparty in the transaction.  Its obligations as such are
guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as credit support
provider under the swap agreement.  LBSF and LBHI each filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2008.  As per the Trustee notice dated as
of June 19, 2009, an additional event of default occurred under
the Credit Default Swap Agreement as a result of LBSF and LBHI
filing for bankruptcy protection, and the failure by LBSF to pay
the Fixed Payment (as defined in the Credit Default Swap
Agreement) to the Issuer.  On October 10, 2008, the Trustee, at
the direction of the Senior Swap Counterparty, delivered a notice
of termination of the Credit Default Swap Agreement to LBSF
establishing October 10, 2008, as the "Early Termination Date"
under the Credit Default Swap Agreement.

Moody's received a notice from the Trustee, dated as of June 19,
2009, that LBSF filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief (the "LBSF Complaint") on February 3, 2009, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the
"Bankruptcy Court") seeking judicial determination that the
termination of the Credit Default Swap Agreement is invalid.  The
Issuer responded to the LBSF Complaint by filing a Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (the "Libra Complaint") seeking
judicial determination that the termination of the Credit Default
Swap Agreement is valid.

According to Moody's, the rating action reflects the increased
risk and uncertainties as to the enforceability of rated
structures designed to insulate investors from counterparty credit
risk.  These uncertainties stem from not only the possible outcome
of the LBSF Complaint, which if successful would have a
significant effect on the expected losses associated with the
Senior Swap, but also following a recent Bankruptcy Court
decision, LBSFI v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.,
January 25, 2010 (the "Dante Ruling").  The Bankruptcy Court in
the Dante Ruling held that certain assumptions relating to the
subordination of swap termination payments owed to a swap
counterparty subject to U.S. bankruptcy law following its
bankruptcy are unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The resolution of the rating on the Senior Swap will depend on,
among other factors, the future development of litigation with
regard to the LBSF Complaint, the Libra Complaint, and the Dante
Ruling which is expected to be appealed by BNY Corporate Trustee
Services Ltd.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


MADISON PARK: Moody's Reviews 'Ca; Ratings on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of these notes issued by Madison Park Funding III, Ltd., under
review for possible upgrade:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on August 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes since the last rating action in August 2009.  In Moody's
view, these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of
sale proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated
recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into substitute
assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a decrease
in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an improvement in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), and a decrease in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, as of the
latest trustee report dated February 10, 2010, defaulted
securities total about $21MM of the underlying portfolio compared
to approximately $60MM in the June 2009 report.  Additionally, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2740 compared to 2899
in June 2009 and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up
approximately 7% of the underlying portfolio versus 11% in June
2009.

The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last
rating action in August 2009.  The Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 114.1%, 109.4% and
105.5%, respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 111.8%, 107.1%
and 103.3%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.

Madison Park Funding III Ltd., issued in 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  On August 4, 2009, Moody's confirmed the Class B and Class
C notes and downgraded the Class A-1, A-2a, A-2b, A3, D and Q
notes as a result of the application of revised and updated key
modeling assumptions as well as the deterioration in the credit
quality of the transaction's underlying portfolio.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: Fitch Cuts Rating on $26.7 Mil. Bonds to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades $26.7 million of Massachusetts Health and
Educational Facilities Authority (Northern Berkshire Healthcare;
NBH) revenue bonds, series 2004 to 'B' from 'BB'.  Fitch removed
the rating from Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Negative
Outlook.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade is based on worsening operating losses, a
     deteriorating cash position, and continued delay in the sale
     of its underperforming senior care businesses.

  -- Since Fitch downgraded NBH to 'BB' from 'BB+' on Oct. 1,
     2009, operating losses continue, with NBH producing a
     $3.34 million operating loss (negative 9.6% margin) during
     the first five months of fiscal year 2010.  Losses continue
     due to lower inpatient volumes, occupancy challenges at its
     senior care businesses, increased physician practice costs
     from newly hired doctors, and higher employee benefit
     expenses.  Moreover, NBH incurred $325,000 in onetime costs
     due to a threatened work stoppage from one of the unions that
     represent workers at its hospital.

  -- Unrestricted cash and investments dropped to $6.2 million as
     of Feb. 28, 2010, from $10.1 million as of June 30, 2009.
     This level of cash represents only 26 days operating expenses
     or 11.8% of long-term debt.

  -- Fitch expects poor operating performance to persist until the
     disposition of NBH's Sweet Brook Care Center and
     Sweetwood Continuing Care Retirement Community.

  -- The 'B' rating also reflects the likelihood that the asset
     sale proceeds will not be sufficient to redeem outstanding
     debt relating to SBCC and SCCRC.  Additionally, the net sale
     proceeds may not be adequate enough to fund working capital
     requirements and necessary capital expenses, as well as
     rebuild unrestricted cash balances.  As a result, even after
     the asset sale, NBH could be highly leveraged with modest
     cash balances.

  -- Management has also indicated that they are in negotiations
     with other healthcare providers to develop an affiliation
     that could result in the formation of a consolidated health
     system.  The 'B' rating and Negative Outlook do not reflect
     the affect of any potential affiliation arrangement.

                  What Could Trigger A Downgrade?

  -- Continued profitability deterioration that causes further
     liquidity reductions.

  -- The inability to improve acute care and physician group
     practice operations.

  -- The failure to divest its senior care businesses.


MAX CMBS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded fourteen classes of Notes
issued by Max CMBS I Ltd. due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by and increase
in the weighted average rating factor and decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate.  Two transactions are affected: Max CMBS I
Ltd. (Series 2007-1) and Max CBMS I Ltd., Series 2008-1.  The
rating action, which concludes Moody's review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

Series 2007-1 and Series 2008-1 are cross-collateralized static
cash CRE CDO transactions backed by a portfolio of commercial
mortgage backed securities (100% of the pool balance).  All of the
CMBS collateral was securitized between 2004 and 2007.  As of the
March 17, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate collateral par amount
was $7.89 billion, the same as that at securitization; the
aggregate Note balance of the Series 2007-1 transaction was
$2.097 billion, the same as that at securitization; the aggregate
Note balance of the Series 2008-1 transaction was $5.782 billion,
the same as that at securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled
a bottom-dollar WARF of 178 compared to 50 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(57% compared to 59% at last review), A1-A3 (25% compared to 39%),
Baa1-Baa3 (12% compared to 2%), Ba1-Ba3 (5% compared to 0%), B1-
B3(1% compared to 0%).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 7 years
compared to 8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 56%
compared to a mean of 59% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 35% compared to 50% at last review.  The lower
MAC is due to the greater diversity in ratings distribution of the
collateral.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating action is:

                          Max CMBS I Ltd.

         $2.097 Billion of Structured Securities Affected

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to A1, previously on March 19, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                  Max CMBS I Ltd., Series 2008-1

         $5.782 Billion of Structured Securities Affected

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to A1, previously on March 19, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X-W*, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X-B*, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X-C*, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 19, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 19, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 19, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 19, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  * Notional Class

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 19, 2009.


MCG COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by MCG Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1.
The ratings of the notes remained on review for possible
downgrade.

  -- US$106,250,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Notes due
     2018, Downgraded to Aa3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on October 29, 2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Notes due 2018
     (currently unfunded), Downgraded to Aa3 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on October 29, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$85,000,000 Class A-3 First Priority Senior Delayed Draw
     Notes due 2018, Downgraded to Aa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on October 29, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$58,750,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes due 2018,
     Downgraded to Baa1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on October 29, 2009 Downgraded to A1
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Subordinate
     Deferrable Notes due 20 18, Downgraded to Ba2 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     downgrade;

  -- US$47,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Junior Subordinate
     Deferrable Notes due 2018, Downgraded to B2 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from credit deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and a decrease in the overcollateralization
of the rated notes since the last rating action in October 2009.
Deterioration in the credit quality is observed through a decline
in the average credit rating (as measured through the weighted
average rating factor) and a decrease in the average recovery rate
of the underlying portfolio.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased from 3651 as of the September 2009
servicer report to 4253 as of the last servicer report, dated
February 11, 2010.  Based on the same report, Moody's weighted
average recovery rate has come down to 35.5% from 39.1% reported
in September 2009.  Additionally, overcollateralization of the
rated notes has decreased since the last rating action in October
2009.  As of the February 2010 servicer report, the Class B, Class
C, and Class D overcollateralization test levels are reported at
170.38%, 144.39%, and 124.36%, respectively, versus September 2009
levels of 178.09%, 150.92%, and 129.99 %, respectively.  Moody's
also observes that currently C-Basket Securities make up
approximately 52% of the underlying portfolio and the reported
diversity score is 20 versus a test level of 25.

In addition, Moody's notes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of second lien and mezzanine loans which
make up approximately 50% of the underlying portfolio as of the
latest servicer report.  Moody's analysis reflects the expectation
that recoveries for second lien and mezzanine loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research (see
Moody's Special Comment titled "Strong Loan Issuance in Recent
Years Signals Low Recovery Prospects for Loans and Bonds of
Defaulted U.S. Corporate Issuers," dated June 2008).

MCG Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1, issued on April 18, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
middle market issuers.  On October 29, 2009, Moody's downgraded
the Class B Notes and placed under review for possible downgrade
all the Notes issued by MCG Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1 as a
result of the application of revised and updated key modeling
assumptions, the deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction's underlying portfolio, and the significant exposure
to securities whose default probabilities were assessed through
Moody's credit estimates more than twelve months ago.  According
to Moody's, all of the rated notes remain on review for possible
downgrade because the transaction continues to be exposed to such
securities which currently account for approximately 22% of the
collateral balance.  These credit estimates remain subject to
updates intended to reflect changes in credit market conditions
that have occurred since the time of the last updates.  Resolution
of the review status will likely be impacted by the forthcoming
credit estimate updates, or in the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, by any default probability stresses Moody's
may assume in lieu of updated credit estimates.


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of U.S. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.'s series 1999-C1.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its rating on one other class from the
same transaction.

S&P lowered its rating on class F to 'D' due to recurring interest
shortfalls to the class that S&P expects will continue.  S&P
downgraded the class IO interest-only certificate to 'BB+' due to
the significant reduction in interest payments to the subordinate
classes.  S&P believes that these reductions have increased the
susceptibility of the IO class to liquidity interruptions at some
point in the future, given the transaction's relatively low
remaining loan count and the fact that seven of the nine remaining
assets are with the special servicer.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC' rating on class E following the repayment
of all accumulated interest shortfalls that were previously
outstanding on this class, according to the February 2010
remittance reports.

There are seven specially serviced assets in the pool, which
represent 77.0% of the aggregate outstanding balance and include
the largest loan ($14.6 million, 34.4%) in the pool.  According to
the March 2010 remittance report, classes K, J, H, G, and F have
accumulated outstanding interest shortfalls totaling
$22.02 million.  A significant portion of the accumulated interest
shortfalls resulted from the recovery of $15.4 million of advances
by the master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital.  The advance
recoveries were related to the Arlington Apartments asset, which
is the second-largest exposure ($6.2 million, 14.6%) with the
special servicer.

Class F has experienced interest shortfalls for the past nine
months, and the outstanding accumulated interest shortfalls
affecting this class totaled $447,614 as of the March 2010
remittance.  S&P expects that the interest shortfalls to the class
will continue for the foreseeable future.

Although class E experienced interest shortfalls from July 2009
through January 2010, the $968,328 in outstanding accumulated
interest shortfalls on the class were repaid in February 2010,
according to the trustee remittance reports.  The class had
received all interest due as of the March 2010 remittance report.

The collateral pool for the transaction consists of nine exposures
with an aggregate trust balance of $51.5 million.  In addition to
the seven assets ($32.7 million, 77.0%) with the special servicer,
ORIX Capital Markets LLC, the collateral pool includes one
defeased loan ($7.0 million, 16.6%) and one loan ($2.7 million,
6.4%) that had an anticipated repayment date of Oct. 1, 2009, and
is current according to the March 2010 remittance report.  Of the
seven assets with the special servicer, two are in foreclosure
($3.6 million, 8.6%), three are 90-plus-days delinquent
($10.1 million, 23.8%), and two are current ($19.0 million,
44.7%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

                          Ratings Lowered

               Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                      Class    To       From
                      -----    --       ----
                      F        D        CCC-
                      IO       BB+      AAA

                          Rating Affirmed

               Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C1

                         Class    Rating
                         -----    ------
                         E        CCC


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-MCP1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1 and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on eight classes from the same transaction and removed one of them
from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
and mezzanine classes also reflect credit support erosion that S&P
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of eight
specially serviced assets ($92.0 million; 5.7%), as well as
expected losses associated with one asset S&P determined to be
credit-impaired($3.0 million; 0.2%).

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.71x and a loan-to-value ratio of 92.3%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.09x and an LTV of 120.9%.  The implied defaults
and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 62.8% and 33.1%,
respectively.  The weighted average DSC and LTV calculations
exclude eight specially serviced assets ($92.0 million; 5.7%), one
credit-impaired loan ($3.0 million; 0.2%), and four defeased loans
($63.6 million, 4.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
nine specially serviced and credit-impaired assets, which S&P
included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss severity
figures.

The downgrades of classes M, N, and P to 'D' primarily reflect
interest shortfalls to these classes from appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts related to seven assets currently
with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc., as well as
special servicing fees.  The classes have experienced interest
shortfalls for at least the past seven months, and S&P expects the
interest shortfalls to continue in the foreseeable future.  The
downgrade of class P also reflects principal losses the class
incurred in March 2010 totaling $3.6 million following a principal
write-down of the HSA Industrial Portfolio I loan in December
2009.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XP and
XC interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009.  Once S&P finalizes the criteria review,
S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the XP and XC
certificates S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the March 12, 2010, remittance report, 10 loans
($152.0 million; 9.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The payment status of the specially serviced loans is: one is in
foreclosure ($4.2 million; 0.3%), five are 90-plus-days delinquent
($72.1 million, 4.4%), two are less than 30 days delinquent
($37.5 million, 2.3%), one is late but within its grace period
($26.7 million; 1.7%), and one is current ($11.5 million, 0.7%).
Seven of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect totaling $29.2 million.  S&P separately
estimated losses for eight of the 10 specially serviced assets
($92.0 million; 5.7%) and one loan S&P determined to be credit-
impaired ($3.0 million; 0.2%).  S&P's expected losses for eight of
the nine assets ranged from 10% to 75%, and the weighted average
loss severity was 34%.  S&P estimate significant losses in excess
of 75% for the ninth asset ($4.2 million; 0.3%).  S&P discusses
below the three largest specially serviced assets ($95.9 million;
6.0%), two of which are top 10 loans ($69.2 million; 4.3%).

The Mansions at Canyon Springs Country Club Apartments loan
($35.9 million; 2.2%) is the largest loan with the special
servicer and the eighth-largest loan in the pool secured by real
estate.  The loan is 90-plus-days delinquent and the total
exposure is $40.2 million, including advancing and interest
thereon.  The loan is secured by a 360-unit class A garden
apartment community built in 2001 in San Antonio, Texas.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing on Oct. 1, 2008, due to
imminent default.  S&P understands the property's income has
suffered due to ongoing concessions.  The concessions are being
offered to help the property compete with newer apartments in the
area, as well as single-family homes available for rent.  For
year-end 2008, the reported occupancy and DSC were 44% and 0.21x,
respectively.  For year-end 2009, the special servicer reports a
77% occupancy and that cash flow was not sufficient to cover
expenses.  A $10.5 million ARA is in effect for this loan.  S&P
estimated a moderate loss upon the ultimate resolution of this
loan.

The Villas of Sage Creek Apartments loan ($33.3 million; 2.1%) is
the second-largest loan with the special servicer and the ninth-
largest real estate exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by
a 450-unit garden apartment complex built in 2003 in Austin,
Texas, which was transferred to the special servicer on July 2,
2009, due to imminent default.  The special servicer has modified
the loan.  The modified terms call for interest-only payments and
a 0.54% reduction in the interest rate to 4.75% for the next three
years.  For the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported
occupancy was 94% and the DSC was 0.71x.  Standard & Poor's
estimated a DSC of 1.06x based on the modified loan terms.  The
loan will be returned to the master servicer pending receipt of
the March 2010 debt service payment.

The HSA Industrial Portfolio I loan ($26.7 million; 1.7%) is the
third-largest loan with the special servicer and was originally
secured by 10 cross-defaulted and cross-collateralized
warehouse/distribution facilities with 2,270,205 aggregate sq. ft.
in Columbus, Ohio (eight properties), Cincinnati, Ohio (one
property), and Hebron, Ky. (one property).  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on June 11, 2008, due to a
payment default and in 2009, two of the properties were sold and
the loan was paid down.  The loan was subsequently modified as
part of the collateral property's sale to a new borrower at the
end of 2009.  The modification included a principal reduction to
$31.6 million, comprising a write-down of approximately
$25 million, which prompted realized losses on the class P and Q
certificates.  These losses were partially reflected on the
December 2009 trustee remittance report and fully reflected on the
subsequent March 2010 report.  Debt service payments were also
converted to interest-only payments for the next two years as part
of the modification.  Subsequently, the Hebron, Ky., property was
sold on Feb. 16, 2010, and the loan was further paid down to the
current principal balance of $26.7 million.  S&P estimates a
current DSC of 1.22x based on the loan's modified terms and the
current leasing status.  The loan will be returned to the master
servicer once three consecutive debt service payments are made.

The seven remaining specially serviced assets ($56.1 million;
3.5%) have balances that individually represent less than 0.8% of
the total pool balance.  S&P separately estimated losses for all
seven of these assets.  Losses for six of these assets ranged from
10% to 75% with a weighted average loss severity of 37%.  The
seventh asset ($4.2 million; 0.3%) is secured by a hotel that has
negative cash flow; S&P estimate significant losses in excess of
75% for this loan.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined one
loan to be credit-impaired.  The Fairfield Inn by Marriott -
Savannah Airport loan ($3.0 million; 0.2%) is secured by an 80-
room limited service hotel built in 1999 in Savannah, Ga.  While
the reported DSC was 1.40x for year-end 2008, S&P's estimated DSC
for the trailing 12-months ending Sept. 30, 2009, was
significantly below 1.0x.  As a result, S&P view this loan to be
at an increased risk of default and loss.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the March 12, 2010, remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $1.61 billion (108 loans) compared with $1.74 billion
(111 loans) at issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction,
also Midland, reported financial information for 98.5% of the
nondefeased loans by balance.  Sixty-six percent of the financial
information was either full-year 2008 or partial-year 2009 data,
and 32% was full-year 2009 data.

S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.68x for the pool based
on the master servicer's reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV were 1.71x and 92.3%, respectively, which exclude seven
specially serviced assets ($87.8 million; 5.5%), one credit-
impaired loan ($3.0 million; 0.2%), and four defeased loans
($63.6 million, 4.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
eight specially serviced and credit-impaired loans, which had a
weighted average reported DSC of 0.46x.  The trust has incurred
$25.3 million of principal losses to date.  Twenty-seven loans
were on the master servicer's watchlist ($183.8 million; 11.4%) as
of the March 2010 remittance date.  Eight loans ($48.1 million,
3.0%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 21 loans
($220.9 million, 13.7%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $743.5 million (46.2%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.97x for these loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the
top 10 real estate exposure were 1.95x and 90.4%, respectively.
These calculations exclude the specially serviced Mansions at
Canyon Springs Country Club Apartments loan for which S&P
separately estimated losses as discussed above.  In addition, two
of the top 10 real estate exposures have near-term maturities and
are discussed below.

The Westchester loan, the largest real estate exposure in the
pool, has a $200.0 million trust balance (12.4%) and a
$500.0 million whole-loan balance.  The whole loan consists of the
$200.0 million A1 note held in the trust and a pari-passu
$100.0 million A2 note contributed to the Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust's series 2005-CIP1 deal (not rated by Standard & Poor's).
The whole loan also consists of subordinate notes totaling an
additional $200 million held outside the trust.  The loan is
secured by a regional mall in White Plains, N.Y., which was built
in 1995.  The collateral is the fee interest in 482,448 sq. ft. of
the in-line mall space, as well as the fee interest in land leased
to two noncollateral anchors.  For year-end 2008, the reported
occupancy and DSC were 97% and 3.03x, respectively.  The loan
matures on June 1, 2010, and S&P understands that the sponsor, The
Simon Property Group, is currently working on refinancing the
loan.

The Queen Ka'ahumanu Center loan ($92.0 million, 5.7%), the third-
largest real estate exposure in the pool, is secured by a regional
mall in Maui, Hawaii, which was built in 1972 and renovated in
2005.  The collateral consists of approximately 245,000 sq. ft. of
in-line mall space, theatre and office tenants (44,402 aggregate
sq. ft.), and the land leased to four noncollateral anchor
tenants.  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC were
95% and 2.02x, respectively.  The loan matures on June 12, 2010,
and S&P understand that the sponsor, Somera Capital Management, is
currently working on refinancing the loan.  However, the sponsor
has indicated that it may not be able to refinance the loan before
its maturity and has commenced discussions with Midland about a
possible maturity extension.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with its lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class      To      From          Credit enhancement (%)
      -----      --      ----          ----------------------
      A-J        A-      AAA/Watch Neg                  12.87
      B          BBB+    AA/Watch Neg                   10.57
      C          BBB     AA-/Watch Neg                   9.63
      D          BB+     A/Watch Neg                     7.61
      E          BB      A-/Watch Neg                    6.39
      F          B+      BBB+/Watch Neg                  4.64
      G          B-      BBB/Watch Neg                   3.56
      H          CCC     BBB-/Watch Neg                  2.21
      J          CCC-    BB+/Watch Neg                   1.80
      K          CCC-    BB/Watch Neg                    1.26
      L          CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                   0.86
      M          D       B/Watch Neg                     0.59
      N          D       B-/Watch Neg                    0.32
      P          D       CCC+/Watch Neg                  0.00

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class      To      From          Credit enhancement (%)
      -----      --      ----          ----------------------
      A-M       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                   20.02

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-2       AAA                      30.81
             A-3       AAA                      30.81
             A-SB      AAA                      30.81
             A-4       AAA                      30.81
             A-1A      AAA                      30.81
             X-P       AAA                        N/A
             X-C       AAA                        N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


MIDWEST FAMILY: Moody's Affirms Low-B Ratings on Various Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgrades to Baa3 from Baa2 the rating assigned to the
Midwest Family Housing LLC Military Housing Taxable Revenue Bonds
(Navy Midwest Housing Privatization Project) 2006 Series A Class I
and affirms the ratings on the 2006 Series A Class II at Ba3;
Class III at B3; & Class IV at B3.

The downgrade on the Class I Bonds reflects the withdrawal of the
rating of the provider of the debt service reserve surety policy
and bond insurance provider CIFG Assurance North America, Inc..
Moody's considers the Debt Service Reserve Fund to be an important
component of support for the Bonds and therefore a key factor in
the rating.  The affirmation on the Class II, Class III and Class
IV Bonds, reflect the improving performance of the overall
project.

The Bonds were placed on review for possible downgrade on
August 24, 2009, in order to provide the issuer and other
interested parties time to take action to provide alternate
funding of the Debt Service Reserve Fund consistent with the
ratings.

                            Strengths

  -- The Project has shown growth in occupancy.

  -- Funds in the Construction Fund are available to pay debt
     service through the end of IDP.

                            Challenges

  -- The deterioration of the credit quality of the debt service
     reserve fund provided by mean of surety has diminished
     management ability to potentially address unforeseen problems
     such as decline in net operating income in periods of
     economic downturns, increased competition from outside of the
     gate housing or as a result of military deployments or
     restructurings.

                             Outlook

The outlook on the Bonds is negative.

                  What Could Change The Rating Up

  -- Increases in the project revenue that result in higher debt
     service coverage levels over a period of several years.

  -- Replacement of the debt service reserve surety bond with cash
     or an appropriate rated surety provider.

                What Could Change The Rating Down

  -- Further declines in debt service coverage resulting from
     reductions in occupancy or increases in expenses.

  -- Uncertainty of future financial performance

        Recalibration Of Rating To The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The rating assigned to the Bonds was issued on Moody's municipal
rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans to recalibrate all
U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and therefore, upon
implementation of the methodology published in conjunction with
this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated to a global scale
rating comparable to other credits with a similar risk profile.
Market participants should not view the recalibration of municipal
ratings as rating upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the
ratings to a different rating scale.  This recalibration does not
reflect an improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's
credit opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action was on October 21, 2009, when the ratings
were placed on review for possible downgrade.


MILLSTONE FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and subsequently withdrawn ratings on
all classes of notes issued by Millstone Funding, Ltd.

In November 2009, Millstone completed collateral liquidation
following an event of default in August 2009 and subsequent
direction by the requisite noteholders in September 2009 to
liquidate the collateral.

On the last distribution date, investors in funding notes received
approximately $1 million in interest and $388.6 million in
principal payments.  No distributions were made to other classes
of notes.

Principal payment received on the last distribution date amounted
to 48% of the then outstanding balance of funding notes, which
stood at $804.3 million immediately prior to the distribution.

Millstone is a cash flow CDO which closed in February 2004.  The
transaction exited the reinvestment period in March 2009.  In
February 2009, Stone Tower Debt Advisors, LLC, replaced Church
Tavern Advisors, LLC as the manager of this transaction.
Millstone's portfolio was comprised of primarily RMBS and SF CDO
bonds.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $415,733,370 funding notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC' and
     subsequently withdrawn;

  -- $37,117,622 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC' and
     subsequently withdrawn;

  -- $10,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC' and
     subsequently withdrawn;

  -- $65,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
     subsequently withdrawn.


MKP VELA: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Senior Swap Transaction
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating on the senior swap transaction entered into by MKP Vela
CBO, Ltd.:

  -- US$1,012,500,000 Senior Swap Agreement dated as of
     November 16, 2006 (remaining unfunded notional amount of
     $926,127,916), Downgraded to Caa2 and Remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on June 2, 2008 Downgraded to
     B3 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

MKP Vela CBO, Ltd., is a hybrid collateralized debt obligation
issuance that at closing was backed primarily by a portfolio of
residential mortgage-backed securities originated in 2005 and
2006.  The transaction experienced an Event of Default as reported
by the Trustee in a written notice dated May 2, 2008.  On
October 27, 2008, the Trustee provided written notice that it had
disposed of all Collateral following an earlier direction to
dispose of the Collateral that it had received.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing acts as a credit default swap
counterparty in the transaction.  Its obligations as such are
guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as credit support
provider under the swap agreement.  LBSF and LBHI each filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2008.

Moody's received a notice from the Trustee, dated as of March 27,
2009, that the Trustee was contacted by LBSF, who challenged the
Trustee's authority to Dispose of the Collateral, particularly to
terminate the Credit Default Swap Agreement.  According to the
Trustee notice, the merit of the claims and issues raised by LBSF
are being examined by relevant parties, and as a result, no
distribution of any proceeds from the disposition of the
Collateral, or any other funds currently on hand, will be made
until the issues addressed in the LBSF Challenge are resolved.

According to Moody's, the rating action reflects the increased
risk and uncertainties as to the enforceability of rated
structures designed to insulate investors from counterparty credit
risk.  These uncertainties stem not only from the possible outcome
of the LBSF Challenge, which will have a significant effect on the
expected losses associated with the Senior Swap, but also
following a recent Bankruptcy Court decision, LBSFI v. BNY
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd., January 25, 2010 (the "Dante
Ruling").  The Bankruptcy Court in the Dante Ruling held that
certain assumptions relating to the subordination of swap
termination payments owed to a swap counterparty subject to U.S.
bankruptcy law following its bankruptcy are unenforceable under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The resolution of the rating on the Senior Swap will depend on,
among other factors, the resolution of the LBSF Challenge, and the
Dante Ruling which is expected to be appealed by BNY Corporate
Trustee Services Ltd.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Puts 9 Notes on Rating Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed all notes from NextStudent Master Trust I
auction-rate student loan-backed notes, series 2006-1, on Rating
Watch Negative.

The Rating Watch Negative is due to the trust's inability to build
parity.  Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Criteria to
review the transaction.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, senior parity
decreased from 101.62% to 100.57% and total parity decreased from
97.12% to 95.61% as of the February 2010 servicer report.

The notes are 100% taxable auction-rate securities which are
currently earning interest at the maximum interest rate.  The
collateral supporting the bonds consists entirely of federally
guaranteed loans originated under the FFELP (Federal Family
Education Loan Program).  FFELP loans are guaranteed by an
eligible guarantor and reinsured by the U.S. Department of
Education to at least 97% of principal and accrued interest.  The
loans in the trust are serviced by ACS Education Services, Inc.
and Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.

Fitch has placed these notes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- Series 2006A-1 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-2 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-3 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-4 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-5 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-6 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-7 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006A-8 'BBB';
  -- Series 2006B-1 'B'.


NEXTSTUDENT MASTER: Fitch Puts 16 Note on Rating Negative Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed all notes from NextStudent Master Trust I
auction-rate student loan-backed notes, series 2007-1, on Rating
Watch Negative.

The Rating Watch Negative is due to the trust's inability to build
parity.  Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Criteria to
review the transaction.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, senior parity
decreased from 101.62% to 100.57% and total parity decreased from
97.12% to 95.61% as of the February 2010 servicer report.

The notes are 100% taxable auction-rate securities which are
currently earning interest at the maximum interest rate.  The
collateral supporting the bonds consists entirely of federally
guaranteed loans originated under the FFELP (Federal Family
Education Loan Program).  FFELP loans are guaranteed by an
eligible guarantor and reinsured by the U.S. Department of
Education to at least 97% of principal and accrued interest.  The
loans in the trust are serviced by ACS Education Services, Inc.
and Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.

Fitch has placed these notes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- Series 2007A-1 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-2 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-3 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-4 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-5 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-6 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-7 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-8 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-9 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-10 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-11 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-12 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-13 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-14 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007A-15 'BBB'.
  -- Series 2007B-1 'B'.


NORTHEAST HOUSING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $355 Mil. Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings for Northeast
Housing, LLC's $355 million of outstanding Taxable Military
Housing Revenue Refunding Bonds (Navy Northeast Family Housing
Privatization Project), Series 2007.  The ratings on the three
series of Bonds are:

  -- Series 2007 A-1 (Class I) in the amount of $259 million, from
     Baa2 to Ba1

  -- Series 2007 A-2 (Class I) in the amount of $25 million, from
     Baa2 to Ba1; and

  -- Series 2007 B (Class II) in the amount of $71 million, from
     Baa3 to Ba3.

The outlook on the ratings is negative.  This rating action
removes the bonds from Watchlist for possible downgrade.

This rating action reflects (i) the deteriorated credit quality of
the debt service reserve surety policy provided by Ambac Assurance
Corporation, which has been downgraded to Caa2 and (ii) lower than
expected occupancy rates at the projects that has resulted in
weaker financial performance than initially projected.

Credit Strengths:

* All units of new construction have been delivered, while
  renovation and demolition work is 90% complete, on budget, and
  scheduled to be completed by the end of the initial development
  period in October 2010.

* The project received an overall increase in the basic allowance
  for housing of 3.4% in December 2009.

* Balfour Beatty, as developer and property manager, has
  significant experience in privatized military housing, which is
  further enhanced by their actual presence and active management
  of the property over the past several years.

Credit Weaknesses:

* The debt service reserve fund is funded by a surety bond from
  Ambac which is currently rated Caa2.  In the event of rental
  income shortfall and insufficient moneys in operating reserve
  accounts, bondholders would rely on the credit strength of Ambac
  for debt service payment.  For further information on the effect
  of surety bond provider downgrades on the underlying ratings of
  military housing transactions, please see Moody's Methodology
  Update, Downgrade of Surety Bond Provider Could Result in Review
  of Underlying Military Housing Ratings, April 2008 (108687).

* The aggregate occupancy rate for the 7 bases making up the Navy
  Northeast Region averaged 84% for 2009.  The lower than expected
  occupancy rate was driven by weak demand at Naval Station
  Newport, which represents 22% of end-state units.  Occupancy
  averaged 75% for 2009 at this base and continued to drop to 68%
  for the first quarter 2010.  Although the tenant waterfall has
  been opened up to civilians throughout 2008 and 2009, Naval
  Station Newport has had difficult increasing occupancy due to
  soft market conditions in the local real estate market.

* Financial performance of the project has weakened due to high
  vacancy rates and declining interest earnings for 2009.  Based
  on year-end financial statements for 2009, debt service coverage
  was approximately 1.43x on the 2007A (Class I Bonds) and 1.14x
  on the 2007B (Class II Bonds).  Debt service on both classes of
  bonds will increase in 2011 after the interest-only period ends
  at the end of the initial development period.  Debt service
  coverage of maximum annual debt service for 2009 is
  approximately 1.31x on the 2007A (Class I Bonds) and 1.05x on
  the 2007B (Class II Bonds).

                              Outlook

The outlook is negative due to occupancy rates significantly lower
than anticipated, which has impacted the financial performance of
the project.  The decrease in net operating income over the past
year, together with the absence of a debt service reserve fund,
increases the project's vulnerability to short-term operating
risks.

                 What Could Change The Rating Up

  -- Improvement of financial performance and achievement of high
     occupancy levels for several reporting periods.

  -- Cash funding of debt service reserve fund, replacement of the
     surety provider or an upgrade of the current surety bond
     provider while maintaining strong financial performance.

                What Could Change The Rating Down

  -- Significant decline in BAH or continued stressed occupancy
     levels that result in a decline in debt service coverage.

  -- Downsizing or closure of any of the seven naval installations
     that support the housing units.

        Recalibration Of Rating To The Global Rating Scale;
                      Principal Methodology

The rating assigned to Northeast Housing, LLC, was issued on
Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its plans
to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global scale and
therefore, upon implementation of the methodology published in
conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be recalibrated
to a global scale rating comparable to other credits with a
similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view the
recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but rather
as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating scale.
This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated municipal
debt issuers.


OFFUTT AFB: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Taxable 2005 Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 rating on Offutt
AFB America First Communities, LLC Military Taxable Housing
Revenue Bonds Series 2005 Class I bonds; and the B1 rating on
Series 2005 Class II bonds.  The rating is reflective of a debt
service reserve surety policy provided by Syncora Holdings Ltd.
(formerly XL Capital Assurance), and recent project performance.

Interest Rate Derivitives: None

                            Strengths

  -- Occupancy has steadily improved to 93%.

  -- Debt service coverage for 2009 is 1.51x for Class I and 1.21x
     for Class II.

  -- Construction is nearly complete, over 2 years ahead of
     schedule.

                            Challenges

  -- The debt service reserves are surety polices provided by
     Syncora Holdings Ltd. (formerly XL Capital Assurance) which
     is rated Ca with a developing outlook, as of the release of
     this opinion.

  -- Occupancy is below 95% (full occupancy) of end-state units; a
     substantial number of occupants are unaccompanied soldiers
     with BAH levels below that of accompanied soldiers.

  -- Maximum annual debt service coverage is 1.29x for Class I and
     1.03x for Class II; debt service begins to escalate in 2013.

  -- The near term debt service coverage of the government direct
     loan will likely be below 1.0x.

                        Recent Developments

The properties are currently in the fifth year of an eight-year
Initial Development Period.  Construction is well ahead of
schedule.  America First expects new construction will be complete
in April 2010, and the remaining few renovations will be complete
in summer, rather than the original projected completion date of
March 2013.

Occupancy continues to be lower than 95%, but has improved
substantially.  March 2010 occupancy is 93% of end-state units,
substantially above the 81% experienced in 2008.  However, 289 of
the 1,508 tenants were unaccompanied soldiers, which have BAHs
below that of accompanied soldiers, which are the intended
tenants.

Weighted average BAH growth based on end-state units rank mix was
strong in 2009 at 6.96%.  Debt service coverage derived from 2009
audited financial statements is 1.51x for Class I and 1.21 Class
II.  MADS coverage is 1.29x for Class I and 1.03x for Class II.
Moody's believes 2010 debt service coverage will likely decline as
2010 BAH increased by only .08%.  However, the low BAH growth
could be offset if occupancy increases.

                              Outlook

The rating is stable due to the improved performance of the
project and near completion of IDP.

                 What Could Change The Rating Up

  -- Higher than forecasted debt service coverage

  -- Substantial BAH and occupancy increases

  -- Replacement of the debt service reserve with cash or an
     appropriate rated surety provider

                 What Could Change The Rating Down

  -- BAH levels decreasing or a long period of no growth
  -- Declining debt service coverage
  -- Downsizing or closure of military facilities
  -- Substantial or prolonged declines in occupancy

The rating assigned to Offutt AFB America First Communities LLC
was issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has
announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to
its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of the
methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.


ORLANDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Tax Revenue Bonds
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded these outstanding tourist development
tax revenue bonds for Orlando, Florida (the city):

  -- $190.3 million sixth cent TDT senior lien revenue bonds,
     series 2008A, to 'BB+' from 'BBB+';

  -- $33.4 million sixth cent TDT second lien revenue bonds,
     series 2008B, to 'B' from 'BBB-'.

Fitch has also revised the Rating Outlook for series 2008A to
Stable from Negative.  The Rating Outlook on series 2008B remains
Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrades are based on the recent sizable declines in
     pledged revenues leading to erosion in debt service coverage
     requiring the use of reserves to meet debt service
     obligations in fiscal 2011;

  -- Assuming tourism tax stabilization, Fitch expects pledged
     revenue in combination with the liquidity reserve to be
     sufficient for debt service payments on series 2008A bonds
     for the foreseeable future;

  -- Without improvement in pledged revenue, both the liquidity
     reserve and debt service reserve fund (DSRF) for the series
     2008B bonds will be depleted, leading to a payment default as
     early as on Nov. 1, 2012;

  -- The ratings reflect the high leverage of the revenue stream;
     Fitch believes the long-term profile of Orange County's
     tourism industry to be positive.

Rating Driver:

  -- Further declines in TDT revenue in the near term or the lack
     of meaningful recovery of the pledged revenue stream over the
     next two years is likely to result on further negative action
     on both series of bonds.

Possible Downgrade Trigger For Series 2008B:

  -- Further declines in pledged revenue, which would increase the
     risk of near to medium-term default.  The bonds are insured
     by Assured.

Security:

The bonds are limited obligations of the city secured by the
discrete trust estate, including pledged funds, for each
respective series of bonds.  Pledged funds include contract sixth
cent revenues collected countywide and remitted to the city from
Orange County according to an interlocal agreement resulting in
50% of annual sixth cent TDT revenues, a one-cent tax levied
county-wide on hotel stays, plus a fixed installment amount being
distributed to the city through fiscal 2018, based on prior year's
sixth TDT revenues according to an interlocal agreement.  Pledged
funds are allocated to each trust estate according to a flow of
funds with revenues distributed to each trust estate according to
the seniority of the series.  Legal provisions include a liquidity
reserve and debt service reserve fund for each series with each
established at 50% of respective MADS.

Credit Summary:

The downgrade on the series 2008 and B bonds reflects significant
declines in pledged revenue over the last two fiscal years; annual
sixth cent TDT revenues decreased 15.5% for fiscal 2009 and are
down 5.9% year to date for fiscal 2010.  Since installment
payments are fixed, the decrease in total pledged revenues is
slightly less at 4.9% year to date.  The first principal payment
for series 2008A bonds is due on November 1, 2010.  The
combination of declining revenues and rising debt service
requirements is expected to lead to a sizable decrease in coverage
for the current fiscal year.  Assuming pledged revenues remain
flat from year-to-date results, series 2008B debt service payments
are projected to rely on that series' liquidity reserve for the
Nov. 1, 2010 debt service payment, while series 2009A bonds are
expected to require a portion of liquidity reserves to meet debt
service payments on Nov. 1, 2011.  While series 2008A payments are
expected to be made through a combination of current year revenues
and liquidity reserves for the foreseeable future, series 2008B
payments are projected to begin requiring draws on the DSRF during
fiscal 2011 and may exhaust the DSRF as early as fiscal 2012.
Legal provisions include a cross-default clause creating a
technical default for all series of bonds (series 2008A, 2008B and
2008C) if any of the three have an event of default.  In the event
of technical default, the flow of funds allows for bond payments
to continue ensuring senior bonds would still be paid.

Located in central Florida, the city's economy is broad and
diverse, having expanded from its traditional tourism base to
include professional and business services, education, health
care, and biotech while remaining a world-class tourism
destination.  Unemployment rates have increased with the current
economic downturn to 11.6% for December 2009 from 7.5% a year
prior.  Although Walt Disney World has a major impact on the
city's economy, it is not located within city limits and is not
part of the tax base.  Universal Studios' property, the city's
largest taxpayer, continues to expand with the 'Wizarding World of
Harry Potter' scheduled to open this spring.  The city reports
hotel occupancy rates for the region fell 7.9% during calendar
year 2009.  Foreclosure rates are also well above the national
average, although consistent with that of the state.  Over the
long-term Fitch expects that Orlando's economy will continue to
grow and attract a wide variety of residents and businesses.

General Government:

The city has a well-established history of strong financial
management, which has enabled it to grow sizeable fund balances.
The city's combined unreserved general fund and utilities services
fund balance position remains solid at $105.5 million or 28.5% of
general fund and utilities services fund expenditures and
transfers out based on unaudited fiscal 2009 results.  The city
also remains within its target of maintaining general and
utilities services fund unreserved balances equal to at least 25%
of the subsequent year's budget.  Roughly 23% of general fund
revenue and other funding sources is derived from the Orlando
Utilities Commission (OUC; revenue bonds rated 'AA' by Fitch).
The OUC pays the city an annual franchise fee as well as a
dividend payment.  OUC revenue has been stable, although a change
in either the formula or OUC's revenue could put pressure on the
city's finances.  Based on fiscal 2010 year to date results, the
city expects to end the year with a small general fund surplus.

Debt levels are high for the current rating level with below
average amortization and moderate variable rate exposure..
Capital needs appear manageable with a fiscal 2010-2014 capital
improvement plan totaling $348.9 million, excluding the city's
general government funding for the public venues, which will be
fulfilled this year, and future obligations from the recently
approved regional commuter rail system, Sunrail.  Sunrail
obligations are currently expected to be limited to a
$13.7 million capital contribution made this fiscal year and
approximately $1 million in annual operating expenses beginning
seven years after completion of the first phase of the project.
If current state funding plans are not achieved, the city may also
be responsible for a portion of state debt service, although the
impact is expected to be limited to roughly $1 million annually
also beginning seven years after completion of the first phase of
the project.


PARCS-R MASTER: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-19 Units to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the trust
units from PARCS-R Master Trust's series 2007-19 to 'CC' from
'CCC'.

The transaction is directly linked to the rating on the M-2 notes
from ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2007-HE5
(a residential mortgage-backed securities subprime transaction),
which Standard & Poor's lowered to 'CC' on March 2, 2010.


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certificates to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by PPLUS
Trust Series FMC-1:

* 1,600,000 PPLUS Trust Series FMC-1 8.25% Trust Certificates;
  Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on
  November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.45% Notes due July 16, 2031, issued by Ford Motor
Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for upgrade
by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Certs. to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by
PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series FRD-1:

* 2,000,000 PREFERREDPLUS 7.40% Trust Certificates; Upgraded to B3
  and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on November 10,
  2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.40% Debentures due November 1, 2046, issued by
Ford Motor Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review
for upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


PUBLIC STEERS: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by Public
Steers Series 1998 F-Z4 Trust:

* US$106,903,000 Initial Principal Amount Class A Trust
  Certificates; Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade;
  Previously on November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

* US$125,000,000 Principal Amount at Maturity Class B Trust
  Certificates; Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade;
  Previously on November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction.  The rating actions are a result of the change of
the rating of 7.70% Debentures due May 15, 2097 issued by Ford
Motor Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


SAINT BARNABAS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Rating on $882 Mil. Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 rating assigned to
Saint Barnabas Health Care System's $882 million of outstanding
bonds issued through New Jersey Health Care Facilities Financing
Authority and New Jersey Economic Development Authority.  At this
time Moody's are removing the rating from Watchlist for possible
downgrade where it was placed on October 29, 2009.  The rating
outlook is positive.  The rating confirmation and the positive
outlook reflect the strong improvement in financial results and
liquidity based on unaudited results for FY 2009 and Moody's
belief that the new financial management team is capable of
achieving sustained improvement in cash flow.  However, the
Forbearance Agreement with Wachovia for the $107.6 million line of
credit remains unresolved and expires April 7, 2010; the line of
credit remains a credit issue as Wachovia can demand immediate
repayment at the expiration date.  While liquidity has improved,
it still remains below average for this $2.2 billion system.
Management has developed a repayment plan to reduce its exposure
to Wachovia and is seeking approval from all of the creditors.
The positive outlook reflects the potential for an upgrade over
the next 18 to 24 months and will be contingent upon further
financial improvement, liquidity growth and resolution of the
Forbearance Agreement.

Legal Security: Gross revenue pledge of the obligated group;
mortgage on Saint Barnabas Medical Center, Monmouth Medical
Center, Clara Mass Medical Center, Community Medical Center,
Kimball Medical Center and Newark Beth Israel Medical Center.
During the forbearance period, the liquidity covenant has been
reduced to 30 days on hand at the obligated group and 1.0 times
debt service coverage ratio as of December 31, 2009; management
fully expects to meet these covenants.  When not in a forbearance
period, the covenants will return to a "warning level" of 75 days
(consultant is required) and 60 days for an event of default; 1.25
times debt service coverage test (consultant required) and 1.0
times for event of default; both are measured semiannually.  The
364-day credit agreement with Wachovia Bank is parity to the
outstanding bonds.

Interest Rate Derivatives: none

Strengths:

* Improved financial performance and debt coverage measures in
  (unaudited) FY 2009 following a challenging FY 2008

* Growth in liquidity due to better performance, transfer of funds
  from the off-short captive division and the foundation (all
  approvals received), sale of four nursing homes and a reduction
  in capital spending; recent decision by the board to freeze the
  pension benefit plan is viewed favorably as well

* Financial improvement at each of the system's six hospitals,
  although losses are still incurred at Kimball and Community
  Medical Center while the other four hospitals reported positive
  income following losses in FY 2008

* Restructuring of the Department of Justice obligation that will
  lower the payments due in FY 2010 and FY 2011 and should
  temporarily relieve some of the pressure on liquidity; the
  deferred payments will be tacked on to the last two years (2012
  and 2013)

* Settlement of the nursing union contracts

* A nearly all fixed-rate bonded-debt structure with no interest
  rate derivate products

Challenges:

* Ongoing negotiations with lenders and the unresolved issues
  surrounding the plan to de-leverage the system remains the
  primary credit issue at this time; in particular the
  $107.6 million outstanding on the Wachovia credit agreement
  whose re-extended Forbearance Agreement expires on April 7, 2010
  remains a credit issue; until the repayment terms are agreed-
  upon by all parties, Wachovia maintains the right to terminate
  the credit agreement which is a risk to the system as endeavors
  to rebuild its liquidity

* Anemic capital spending and the use of expensive operating
  leases ($100 million on a net present value basis based on FY
  2008 results) to fund capital remains a credit concern as nearly
  all of the hospitals operate in competitive local markets;
  average age of plant (14 years in FY 2009) is unfavorable to
  national median (9.8 years)

* Material volume declines continue at Kimball and continued
  financial losses at this facility are a concern

* Some erosion in the payer mix with a reduction in commercial
  business and shift to Medicare and Medicaid managed care plans
  which do not pay as well as the tradition government programs

                   Recent Developments/Results

The confirmation of the Ba1 rating and the assignment of a
positive outlook reflects the strong improvement financial
performance in FY 2009.  After material losses in FY 2008 of over
$160 million, Saint Barnabas posted a gain of $12 million for a
better, although still thin 0.7% operating margin (Moody's
excludes approximately $9 million of investment income, includes
consulting fees and interest expense of the DOJ settlement).  FY
2009 absolute operating cash flow increased materially to
$175.6 million producing a better 7.5% operating cash flow margin,
much improved from negative cash flow in FY 2008 and favorable to
the FY 2009 budget.  The improvement follows numerous wide-
sweeping expense reductions throughout the system while revenue
growth reflected volume gains and better revenue cycle management.
As a result, maximum annual debt service coverage was a stronger
3.55 times, up from negative coverage in the prior year.  Annual
debt service coverage is weaker, 1.70 times, due to the annual
payment on the Department of Justice settlement.  Management
expects that the system will meet all covenant requirements and
expects no material adjustments from these unaudited results to
the final audit.

It appears that efforts to centralize many of the business and
financial functions and outsourcing for various services, under
the direction of new financial leadership, are benefiting the
system with the improving financial picture.  Moody's note with
favor that each hospital has a CFO who reports to the system CFO;
some of the hospitals had vacant positions at the time of Moody's
last review.  Each of the hospitals showed improved financial
results in FY 2009: four of the hospitals reached profitability
from a loss position in FY 2008.  While improved, Community and
Kimball continue to post losses.  Management has decided to keep
Kimball as part of the system after considering various options
for this facility.

Liquidity has improved to $459 million or 75 days, up from
$183 million or 28 days at the end of FY 2008.  Improved cash
flow, reduction in capital spending ($38.2 million or very low
0.39 capital spending ratio), asset sales and transfer of funds
from the offshore insurance division and foundation ($115 million
in total) were the factors for the increase.  Cash to debt is
still low at 47% although much improved over 16% in the prior
year.  Moody's cash computation includes the proceeds from the
sale of the four nursing homes ($30.5 million) but removes
$107.6 million which is the amount drawn on the line of credit.

Capital spending has been anemic and is a credit concern.
Management is budgeting $80 million of spending in FY 2010, nearly
on par with depreciation expense.  Average age of plant is higher
than the national median (9.8 years) at 13.9 years in FY 2009.  On
a debt equivalent basis, the system has just over $100 million in
operating leases.  The lack of spending on the facilities places
them at a competitive disadvantage as competing facilities,
particularly near Saint Barnabas Medical Center, have been
renovating their facilities.

We note favorably that Saint Barnabas was able to restructure the
DOJ settlement, reducing FY 2010's payment to $10 million (from
$32 million) and to $20 million in FY 2011 (from $32 million).
The balance will be tacked on in FY 2012 and FY 2013 (which
represents a 1.5 year extension to the repayment schedule)
providing Saint Barnabas with $34 million in cash flow relief over
the next two years.

Another factor that is critical to Moody's analysis is the
resolution of the outstanding Forbearance Agreement with Wachovia
Bank on the $107.6 million line of credit.  The Forbearance
Agreement was extended to April 7, 2010.  All of the lenders must
approve the proposed terms to reduce the line of credit by
$55 million during FY 2010; there may be additional debt repayment
as well.  Management is endeavoring to resolve this remaining
issue; it also needs to issue the audit before May 31, 2010, to be
in compliance with its reporting requirements and is actively
working to receive all approvals.  Until this is resolved, the
potential repayment of the entire Wachovia line remains a credit
concern.

                             Outlook

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Saint
Barnabas' financial profile will show continued improvement over
the next two years and provide improved debt service coverage.

                 What could change the rating -- UP

Continued improvement in financial performance; increased capital
spending as liquidity grows; successful resolution of the Wachovia
line of credit; no decrease in market share in its local markets

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

Departure from current results; unexpected negative year-end
adjustments; erosion of liquidity; inability to resolve the
Forbearance Agreement

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Saint Barnabas Health Care
     System

  -- First number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2008

  -- Second number reflects unaudited year end December 31, 2009

  -- $59 million of investments and other-than-temporary losses
     have been restated as non-operating income in FY 2008;
     $9 million of investment gains have been restated as non-
     operating income in FY 2009

  -- $108.6 million of the credit agreement has been deducted from
     unrestricted cash and investments (FY 2008); $107.6 million
     deducted as of December 31, 2009

  -- $132.8 million of self-insurance funds have been deducted
     from unrestricted cash and investments (FY 2008);
     $29.4 million deducted in FY 2009

  -- $19.3 million of supplemental retirement benefits have been
     deducted from unrestricted cash and investments in FY 2008

  -- $7.3 million of foundation funds deducted from unrestricted
     cash and investments in FY 2009

  -- Interest expense on DOJ settlement is included in interest
     expense

  -- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

  -- FY 2009 expenses include consulting fees

* Total operating revenues: $2.285 million; $2.355 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  -$12.5 million; $205.1 million

* Total debt outstanding: $1.115 billion; $1.081 billion

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $57.7 million; $57.7 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: -1.87 times; 3.53
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: -0.22 times, 3.55 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: -17.6 times; 7.70 times

* Days cash on hand: 28.3 days; 74.7 days

* Cash-to-debt: 16%; 47%

* Operating margin: -7.1%; 0.5%

* Operating cash flow margin: -1.0%; 7.5%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of December 31, 2009; all debt is
fixed rate unless stated otherwise):

* Series 2006A: 63.1 million; Ba1 rating

* Series 2006B: $139.4 million; Ba1 rating

* Series 2001A: $33.1 million outstanding; Aa2/VMIG1 with LOC from
  JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; expiration date of January 3, 2011

* Series 2001B: $66.6 million; Ba1 underlying (also FSA insured)

* Series 1998 (Community Medical Center/Kimball Medical Center,
  Kensington Manor Care Center): $25.8 million, Ba1 underlying
  (also FSA insured)

* Series 1998A (Saint Barnabas/West Hudson Hospital),
  $32.4 million, Ba1 underlying, (also MBIA insured)

* Series 1998B: $381.7 million, Ba1 underlying (also MBIA insured)

* Series 1998C: $10.1 million, Ba1 underlying (also MBIA insured)

* Series 1997: (Shoreline) $11.9 million outstanding, Ba1
  underlying, (also MBIA insured)

* Series 1997A: (NJ Economic Development Authority):
  $69.8 million, Ba1 underlying, (also MBIA insured)

* Series 1996C (NJ Economic Development Authority - Clara Maas):
  $36.6 million outstanding, Ba1 underlying (also FSA insured)

The rating assigned to Saint Barnabas Health Care System was
issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced
its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global
scale and therefore, upon implementation of the methodology
published in conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be
recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to other credits
with a similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view
the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but
rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating
scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in
credit quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated
municipal debt issuers.

Moody's last report date on Saint Barnabas Health Care System was
October 29, 2009, when the rating was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2
and placed on Watchlist for further possible downgrade.


SATURNS TRUST: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 2003-5 Units to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these units issued by SATURNS Trust
No. 2003-5:

* 3,001,107 SATURNS Trust No. 2003-5 Callable Units Due 2031;
  Upgraded to B3 and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on
  November 10, 2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.45% Debentures due July 16, 2031, issued by Ford
Motor Company, which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for
upgrade by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


STONEY LANE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has placed the ratings
of these notes issued by Stoney Lane Funding I Ltd. under review
for possible upgrade:

* US$25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2022, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
  previously on June 19, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1;

* US$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due 2022, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
  previously on June 19, 2009 Confirmed at B1;

* US$18,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
  2022 (current balance of $15,769,410), Ca Placed Under Review
  for Possible Upgrade; previously on June 19, 2009 Downgraded to
  Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes results
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes since the last rating action in June 2009.  In Moody's view,
these positive developments coincide with reinvestment of sale
proceeds (including higher than previously anticipated recoveries
realized on defaulted securities) into substitute assets with
higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a decrease
in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an improvement in
the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), and a decrease in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, as of the
latest trustee report dated March 5, 2010, defaulted securities
total about $14.5MM of the underlying portfolio compared to
$28.3MM in the May 2009 report.  Additionally, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2678 compared to 2969 in May
2009 and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately
10.1% of the underlying portfolio versus 16.9% in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the last
rating action in June 2009.  The Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 113.25%, 106.78% and
103.07%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 107.66%, 101.52%
and 97.54%, respectively, and all related overcollateralization
tests are currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class D
Coverage Ratio has increased due to the diversion of excess
interest to delever the Class D notes in the event of a Class D
Coverage Test failure, including on the October 2009 payment date,
when $2.1MM of interest proceeds reduced the outstanding balance
of the Class D notes by 11%.  Moody's also notes that the Class C
and Class D notes are no longer deferring interest.

Stoney Lane Funding Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.  On June 19, 2009, Moody's confirmed the
Class B and Class C notes and downgraded the Class A-1, A-2, and D
notes as a result of the application of revised and updated key
modeling assumptions as well as the deterioration in the credit q


TARRANT COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Revenue Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor's Service has affirmed the underlying Ca rating
on Tarrant County Housing Finance Corporation's Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (Crossroads Apartment Project d/b/a The
Brentwood Apartments) Senior Series 2001A.  The senior series
bonds continue to be insured by National Public Finance Guarantee
Corporation.  Moody's also affirms the C rating on the Subordinate
Series 2001C bonds.  The outlook on both series of debt remains
stable.

Legal Security:

Special obligation of the issuer; bonds are secured by rental
revenue and any funds pledged to bondholders under the trust
indenture.

Recent Developments:

The property owner, PWA Coalition of Dallas, the property manager,
Pacific West Management, and the senior series bond insurer,
National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, continue to work to
revive the property.  Fiscal year 2008 financial statements
indicate an improvement in debt service coverage from prior years.
In 2008, coverage on the Series 2001A bonds was 0.24x, as compared
to 0.064x in fiscal year 2007.  Coverage on the Series 2001C bonds
was 0.21x, as compared to 0.056x in fiscal year 2007.  Property
management has provided Moody's with unaudited operating
statements for the 2009 fiscal year.  The debt service coverage on
the Series 2001A bonds improved to 0.63x, and the coverage on the
Series 2001C bonds improved to 0.56x.  Despite the improvement in
the operating performance of the property, the Series 2001C bonds
remain in default and Series 2001A bondholders are dependent on
National Public Finance Guarantee for continuing debt service
payments.  The Debt Service Reserve Fund for both series of bonds
remains unfunded.

                              Outlook

The outlook on the bonds remains stable.

                 What could change the rating -- UP

* Sustained and significant improvement in debt service coverage
  ratio

* Replenishing the Debt Service Reserve Funds and Replacement
  Reserve Fund

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

* n/a

The ratings assigned to Tarrant County Housing Finance
Corporation's Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds, Series 2001A and
Series 2001C were issued on Moody's municipal rating scale.
Moody's has announced its plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal
ratings to its global scale and therefore, upon implementation of
the methodology published in conjunction with this initiative, the
rating will be recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to
other credits with a similar risk profile.  Market participants
should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating
upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a
different rating scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an
improvement in credit quality or a change in Moody's credit
opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action was taken on October 23, 2009, when the
ratings and outlook on Tarrant County Housing Finance
Corporation's Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds, Series 2001A and
Series 2001C were affirmed.


TRUST CERTIFICATES: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-1 to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded and
placed on review for upgrade these certificates issued by Trust
Certificates Series 2002-1 Trust:

* 1,280,000 7.70% Class A-1 Certificates due 2097; Upgraded to B3
  and Placed on review for upgrade; Previously on November 10,
  2009 Upgraded to Caa1

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of the 7.70% Debentures due 2097 issued by Ford Motor
Company which were upgraded to B3 and placed on review for upgrade
by Moody's on March 17, 2010.


TW HOTEL: S&P Puts Ratings on 13 Certs. on CreditWatch Developing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from TW
Hotel Funding 2005 LLC's series 2005-LUX on CreditWatch with
developing implications.

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's preliminary analysis of a
pending loan modification.  The terms of the modification have yet
to be finalized, but may include a partial paydown of the loan and
a maturity extension.  The loan's sponsor may also provide
additional collateral in the form of a property.  Once the terms
are finalized, S&P will evaluate the rating impact, if any, and
issue a CreditWatch update and/or initiate a ratings change.

As of the March 2010 remittance report, the Ty Warner Hotel &
Resorts Loan had a trust and whole-loan balance of $344.6 million.
In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the collateral
properties secure a $155.0 million mezzanine loan.  The value of
the loan has declined 44% since issuance; however, the loan's
performance has been stable since S&P's last review.

             Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Developing

                    TW Hotel Funding 2005 LLC
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LUX

                                  Rating
                                  ------
               Class      To                   From
               -----      --                   ----
               A-2        A/Watch Dev          A
               B          BBB+/Watch Dev       BBB+
               C          BBB-/Watch Dev       BBB-
               D          BB+/Watch Dev        BB+
               E          BB/Watch Dev         BB
               F          B/Watch Dev          B
               G          B-/Watch Dev         B-
               H          CCC+/Watch Dev       CCC+
               J          CCC/Watch Dev        CCC
               K          CCC-/Watch Dev       CCC-
               L          CCC-/Watch Dev       CCC-
               M          CCC-/Watch Dev       CCC-
               N          CCC-/Watch Dev       CCC-


VALLEY HEALTH: Fitch Downgrades Rating on $45.5 Mil. Bonds to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded to 'D' from 'C' the rating on
approximately $45.5 million of bonds issued by Valley Health
System, California.

Fitch's 'D' rating indicates default on payments to bondholders.
Bond trustee for the VHS' outstanding bonds did not make the
Nov. 15, 2009 interest-only payments to bondholder due to
insufficient debt service reserve funds.

As Fitch has reported in its recent rating actions, VHS remains
under Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection (since 2007) while it
attempts to implement several ongoing turnaround initiatives.  On
July 27, 2009, Valley Health System's board of directors voted to
enter into an exclusive 90-day agreement with Physicians for
Healthy Hospitals (a group of local doctors) for the potential
sale of the district's assets, including its two hospitals Hemet
Valley Medical Center and Menifee Valley Medical Center.

On Nov. 2, 2009, VHS filed its Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of
Valley Health System with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Central District of California.  Upon confirmation by the court,
the Plan provides for the sale of substantially all of the VHS'
assets to PHH and, upon closing of the sale, VHS will transfer to
the Trustee a sum sufficient to fully satisfy all outstanding
principal and accrued interest on the bonds.

Fitch will closely monitor the outcome of these negotiations and
will update the market accordingly.

VHS has this outstanding debt:

  -- $4.9 million Valley Health System hospital revenue bonds
     (refunding and improvements project), 1996 series A.

  -- $40.6 million Valley Health System certificates of
     participation (refunding project), series 1993.


VALLEY VIEW: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $7.7 Mil. Bonds From 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term bond rating
to Baa3 from Ba1 assigned to Valley View Hospital Authority's
$7.7 million of Series 1996 outstanding bonds (as of September 30,
2009).  The outlook is revised to stable from negative at the
higher rating level.  The upgrade to Baa3 reflects the noted
improvement in the hospital's financial performance and balance
sheet metrics which alleviates some of the risks of any non-
repayment by the jointly secured Series 1996 bonds.

Legal Security: The Series 1996 bonds are secured by a 1% sales
tax levied by the City of Ada, Oklahoma and a gross revenue pledge
of the hospital.  Revenue derived from the sales tax, which is
deposited to a lock-box and not intermingled with hospital
revenues, is solely dedicated to the payment of principal and
interest related to the Series 1996 bonds, and has been sufficient
to satisfy debt service since 2001.  Any excess sales tax remains
in the lockbox; as of January 2010, the surplus stands at
$3.1 million.  There is also a debt service fund balance of
approximately $3.3 million.

* Interest Rate Derivatives: none

                            Strengths

* The Series 1996 bonds are secured by and payable from an
  irrevocable and voter authorized 1% sales tax levied until the
  bonds are defeased, which alone provides for 1.52 times coverage
  of debt service in FY 2009; sales tax revenues are held in a
  lockbox by the bond trustee and not co-mingled with hospital
  revenues.  Moreover, $6.5 million of debt service reserve funds
  and surplus sales tax revenues held by the trustee provides for
  84% collateralization of remaining bonded debt outstanding, and
  provides a cushion in the event that sales tax receipts decline.
  The debt has a final maturity date of 2013 with a maximum annual
  debt service payment (MADS) in fiscal 2012.  Fiscal 2009 sales
  tax receipts provide for 1.35 times MADS.

* Much improved financial performance in FY 2009 with a 2.7%
  operating margin and 8.6% operating cash flow margin, up from -
  12.5% and -7.7%, respectively, in FY 2008, due to cost reduction
  measures and revenue enhancement strategies

* Very low debt burden (14.4% debt to revenue) with no plans for
  additional bonds; during FY 2009 management chose to redeem a
  portion of the Series 1996 bonds with the excess sale tax
  receipts in the lock box; VVHA expects to redeem all of the
  remaining bonds ($7.7 million) by December 31, 2010

* Balance sheet improvement with $6.8 million (31.0 days cash on
  hand) in unrestricted cash and investments at the end of FY
  2009, up from $4.1 million (15.3 days cash on hand) at the end
  of FY 2008 and low point of $2.0 million in February 2009

* Management agreement with Mercy Health System in Oklahoma City
  (part of Aa3 rated Sisters of Mercy Health System headquartered
  in St. Louis) brings greater management resources and
  experienced leadership to VVHA

* Valley View Regional Hospital (VVRH) is a 501c3 organization
  that leases the hospital assets from VVHA, which is a component
  unit of the City of Ada, Oklahoma.  VVRH and VVHA have identical
  12-member boards appointed by the city council; Moody's believe
  VVRH benefits from its status as a publicly affiliated entity

* Dominant market position with the nearest competitor located 65
  miles away in Norman, Oklahoma

                            Challenges

* While there are no other hospitals in Ada, Oklahoma, the absence
  of certificate of need regulation in Oklahoma provides no
  barriers to entry for other hospitals or surgery centers that
  could offer similar services

* Small hospital as measured by beds (136 maintained beds) and
  revenues ($89.5 million) which can make VVHA vulnerable to
  reimbursement changes or unexpected financial changes

                             Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's belief that financial
performance should remain on par with the turnaround exhibited in
FY 2009 and that sale tax receipts will be adequate to fund debt
service

                 What could change the rating -- Up

Much improved financial performance that is sustainable; growth in
liquidity

                What could change the rating -- Down

Departure from current financial performance; decline in
liquidity; sudden decline in sale tax receipts

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Valley View Regional
     Hospital

  -- First number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended September 30, 2009

  -- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 5,458; 5,260

* Total operating revenues: $89.7 million; $86.3 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  -$6.3 million; $10.9 million

* Total debt outstanding: $16.5 million; $12.9 million (includes
  bonds, note payables and capital leases)

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $2.8 million; $2.5 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: -2.58 times; 4.31
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: -2.20 times; 4.22 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: -2.21 times; 1.33 times

* Days cash on hand: 15.3 days; 31.0 days

* Cash-to-debt: 24.8%; 52.8%

* Operating margin: -12.5%; 2.7%

* Operating cash flow margin: -7.7%; 8.6%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of September 30, 2009):

* Series 1996 fixed rate bonds ($7.735 million outstanding); Baa3
  rating

The rating assigned to Valley View Hospital Authority was issued
on Moody's municipal rating scale.  Moody's has announced its
plans to recalibrate all U.S. municipal ratings to its global
scale and therefore, upon implementation of the methodology
published in conjunction with this initiative, the rating will be
recalibrated to a global scale rating comparable to other credits
with a similar risk profile.  Market participants should not view
the recalibration of municipal ratings as rating upgrades, but
rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a different rating
scale.  This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in
credit quality or a change in Moody's credit opinion for rated
municipal debt issuers.

The last rating action was on March 17, 2009, when the Ba1 rating
of VVHA was confirmed and removed from Watchlist and a negative
outlook was assigned.


WEINSTEIN PORTFOLIO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Funding Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has concluded its review and downgraded
the variable funding loans advanced by lenders to The Weinstein
Portfolio Funding Company LLC, as borrower under the Credit and
Security Agreement dated as of December 23, 2005.  The loans,
backed by film receivables and maturing in January 2016, are
insured under a financial guarantee insurance policy issued by
Ambac Assurance Corporation.  Based on the cash flows expected to
be generated by the film assets collateralizing the loans (the
ultimates), the debt is not likely to be paid in full by its
maturity date.

The erosion in the transaction's collateral base is largely a
function of continued weakness in the home video sector, which
prompted a downward revision of the ultimates earlier this year.
While according to the transaction structure the sponsor has the
obligation to contribute additional collateral in support of the
transaction, the extent and timing of future contributions remains
uncertain.

The Caa2 rating on the loans reflects the guarantor's financial
strength rating, consistently with Moody's practice of rating
insured debt at the higher of (1) the guarantor's insurance
financial strength rating and (2) the underlying rating, based on
Moody's modified approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors.  The underlying rating reflects
the intrinsic credit quality of the rated debt in the absence of
the guarantee.

Moody's utilizes a discounted cash flow analysis approach to rate
this transaction.  Under this approach, the expected lifetime cash
flows for each asset are projected using a timing curve reflective
of behavior for a typical film asset.  The ratings are a function
of the ability to meet the required payments on the rated debt
under certain stresses to the expected cash flows and given the
transaction's structure and terms.  Specifically, the assigned
ratings are based on an ultimate recovery expectation.

The complete rating action is:

* $463,000,000 variable funding loans, downgraded to Caa2 from B3;
  previously, on December 3, 2009, downgraded to B3 and placed
  under review for possible downgrade


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 26 Classes in 11 RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 26 classes in 11 U.S. High Loan-to-
Value Residential Mortgage Backed Securities transactions.  The
rating actions are listed below.

125 Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1998-1

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class M-1 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class M-2 affirmed at 'AA+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4'.

Firstplus Asset-Backed Certificate Series 1995-2

  -- Class B affirmed at 'BB' and assigned a Loss Severity rating
     of 'LS2'.

Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Class IIM1 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class IIM2 affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class IIB1 affirmed at 'BBB+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4'.

MEGO Mortgage Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1997-3

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS5';

  -- Class M-1 affirmed at 'AA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3'.

MEGO Mortgage Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1997-4

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4'.

Money Store Trust Series 1998-B

  -- Class BH affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity rating
     of 'LS3'.

PSB Lending Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1997-4

  -- Class B-1 affirmed at 'BBB' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class B-2 affirmed at 'BB' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4'.

Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II, Series 1998-HI2

  -- Class M1 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class M2 affirmed at 'AA+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS4';

  -- Class B1 affirmed at 'A+' and assigned a Loss Severity rating
     of 'LS4';

  -- Class B2 affirmed at 'BBB+' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS5'.

Empire Funding Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1997-4

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3'.

Empire Funding Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1999-1

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class M1 affirmed at 'AA' and assigned a Loss Severity rating
     of 'LS3';

  -- Class M2 affirmed at 'A' and assigned a Loss Severity rating
     of 'LS4';

  -- Class B1 affirmed at 'BBB' and assigned a Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS4'.

Empire Funding Home Loan Owner Trust, Series 1997-5

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS3';

  -- Class A-4IO affirmed at 'AAA';

  -- Class M-1 affirmed at 'AA' and assigned a Loss Severity
     rating of 'LS5'.

The mortgage pools collateralizing the bonds primarily consist of
closed-end second lien loans with combined loan-to-values above
100% at origination.  The reviewed transactions were issued
between 1995 and 2002.

To project future defaults, Fitch used the net loss rate average
over the past 12 months adjusted higher or lower for differences
in each pool's current 60+ day delinquencies.  Loss severities on
defaulted loans were assumed to be 100%.  The average expected
loss for the pools reviewed was 22% as a percentage of the
remaining pool balance and 10% as a percentage of the initial pool
balance.

After determining each pool's projected base-case and stressed
scenario loss assumptions, Fitch analyzes each transaction's
credit support, excess spread and payment priority using cash flow
projections in affirming or revising ratings.

On average, the pools reviewed have an outstanding remaining
balance of approximately 1% of the original balance.  Due to the
performance volatility associated with small mortgage pools, bonds
with credit support that exceeded their current rating stressed
thresholds were affirmed.

In addition to the long-term ratings Fitch also provides Loss
Severity and Recovery Ratings.  Loss Severity ratings are assigned
to classes with long-term ratings of 'B' or higher while Recovery
Ratings are assigned to classes with long-term ratings below 'B'.
Additional information is available on Fitch's website in the
reports 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'
and 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

Fitch will continue to closely monitor these transactions.


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 268 Bonds From 217 RMBS Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 268 bonds in 217 residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the
bond has incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds being
downgraded to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated
'CC' or 'C' indicating that a default was expected.  The action is
limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The remaining bonds
in these transactions have not been analyzed as part of this
review.

Of the 217 transactions impacted by these downgrades 84 are Prime,
72 are Alt-A, and 47 are Sub-prime.  The remaining 16 bonds are in
other transaction types.  Ninety-six percent were previously rated
'C'.

Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the ongoing surveillance
process and will continue to monitor these transactions for
additional defaults.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Ratings to the transactions.  The Recovery Rating scale is based
upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Ratings are designed
to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis while taking
into account the time value of money.  The methodology used to
assign Recovery Ratings is described in Fitch's Dec. 16, 2009
report 'U.S. RMBS Criteria for Recovery Ratings'.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Synthetic SF CDO Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the rating actions detailed at the end of
this press release for classes of notes issued by several
synthetic diversified structured finance collateralized debt
obligations with exposure to structured finance assets.

Rated notes in all but three transactions have experienced partial
or complete writedowns of principal balances.

For all of the classes rated 'D' below, Fitch does not expect that
future reversals, if any, of principal writedowns will be of a
magnitude sufficient to ensure that these classes will be paid in
full at or prior to maturity.

Fitch withdraws the ratings on classes of notes issued by CDOs
where all rated classes have been written down to zero.

Abacus 2005-CB1, Ltd.:

  -- $112,480,920 class A-1 notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class A-2 notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C' ;
  -- $0 class B notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C' ;
  -- $0 class C notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class D notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class E-1 notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class E-2 notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C';
  -- $0 class F notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C'.

Abacus 2005-CB1, Ltd. is a partially funded synthetic CDO
transaction with the portfolio comprised primarily of subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-
backed securities bonds.  All but class A-1 notes balances have
been written down to zero, and class A-1 notes are currently
taking writedowns.

ABSpoke 2005-1C, Ltd.:

  -- $15,321,717 ABSpoke 2005-1C notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-1C, Ltd. is a static synthetic CDO with the reference
portfolio comprised primarily of RMBS, asset-backed securities,
CMBS and CDO bonds.  The rated class of notes is currently
experiencing writedowns.

ABSpoke 2005-1C2, Ltd.:

  -- $3,053,865 ABSpoke 2005-1C2 notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC'.

ABSpoke 2005-1C2, Ltd. is a static synthetic CDO with the
reference portfolio comprised primarily of RMBS, ABS, CMBS, and
CDO bonds.  The rated class of notes is currently experiencing
writedowns.

Benazzi CDO 2005-1, Ltd.

  -- $0 class A notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the
     rating;

  -- $0 class B notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the
     rating;

  -- $0 class C notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the
     rating.

Benazzi CDO 2005-1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CDO with a
portfolio comprised primarily of RMBS and CDO bonds.  All rated
classes of notes have been written down to zero.

Cloverie Plc 2006-1:

  -- $10,000,000 class A notes downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Cloverie Plc 2006-1 is a partially funded static synthetic CDO
that closed in January 2006 with the reference portfolio comprised
primarily of RMBS bonds.  While settled credit losses to date
remained below the credit enhancement level of the class, expected
future losses from the defaulted assets currently in the portfolio
are expected to exceed the class A credit enhancement level,
rendering class A default inevitable.

Corvus Investments Ltd./LLC.

  -- $260,595,037 class A-1 notes downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $100,518,914 class A-2 notes downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Corvus Investments Ltd./LLC. is a synthetic CDO with cashflow
features, such as overcollateralization triggers, that closed on
June 30, 2000.  The reference portfolio is primarily comprised of
CDO, CMBS, RMBS, and ABS bonds.  Fitch expects that future losses
in the portfolio will exceed credit enhancement to class A-1 and
class A-2 notes and excess spread available to pay down these
classes of notes.  Therefore, Fitch believes that default is
inevitable for these classes.

COUNTS Trust, Series 2004-1.

  -- $50,000,000 trust certificates downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC'.

COUNTS 2004-1 is a credit linked note with the reference portfolio
comprised primarily of RMBS and CDO bonds.

Dunloe 2005-1, Ltd.:

  -- $35,000,000 class A notes downgrade to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $24,110,864 class B notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $0 class C notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C'.

Dunloe 2005-1, Ltd. is a synthetic CDO with the reference
portfolio comprised of RMBS, ABS, CMBS, and CDO bonds.  Class C
notes have been written down to zero, while class B notes are
currently experiencing writedowns.  Class A notes' are expected to
experience some level of losses given Fitch's expectation that
further credit losses will exceed credit enhancement levels for
that class.

Magnolia Finance II Plc.:

  -- $0 series 2006-5A ABS portfolio variable rate notes downgrade
     to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the ratings;

  -- $0 series 2006-5B ABS portfolio variable rate notes downgrade
     to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the ratings;

  -- $0 series 2006-5CU ABS portfolio variable rate notes
     downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the ratings;

  -- EUR0 series 2006-5CE ABS portfolio variable rate notes
     downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the ratings;

  -- GBP0 series 2006-5CG ABS portfolio variable rate notes
     downgrade to 'D' from 'CC' and withdraw the ratings.

Magnolia Finance II Plc. is a static synthetic structured finance
CDO with a reference portfolio comprised of RMBS bonds.  To date,
all rated classes of notes have been written down to zero.

Nerva Ltd. Series I:

  -- $202,649,848 class A notes affirm at 'C' and withdraw the
     'RR6' rating.

Nerva Ltd. Series I is a synthetic CDO with cashflow features,
such as OC triggers, that closed on June 30, 2000.  The reference
portfolio is primarily comprised of CMBS, RMBS, CDO, ABS bonds and
corporate debt.  Settled credit events already significantly
exceed credit enhancement levels for the class A notes, however,
the implied writedowns are expected to be reflected in the
outstanding class balance only at maturity of the CDO.  The
recovery rating is withdrawn because Fitch is currently not
assigning RRs to structured finance CDO bonds.

North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2002-4 Ltd.:

  -- $352,749,200 class A floating rate notes downgrade to 'D'
     from 'CCC';

  -- $0 class B floating rate notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $0 class C floating rate notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $0 class D floating rate notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC'';

  -- $0 class E floating rate notes downgrade to 'D' from 'CC';

  -- $0 fixed rate income notes downgrade to 'D' from 'C'.

North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2002-4 Ltd. is a partially
funded synthetic structured finance CDO that closed on March 15,
2002.  The reference portfolio is composed of CDO, RMBS, CMBS,
ABS, and corporate bonds.  All rated classes of notes have been
written down to zero and class A is currently experiencing
writedowns.

Salisbury International Investments Ltd., Series 2005-14:

  -- $0 class D credit linked note withdraw the rating 'D/RR6'.

Salisbury International Investments Ltd., Series 2005-14 is a
partially funded, static synthetic CDO that closed on Dec. 8,
2005.  The reference portfolio is comprised primarily of RMBS
bonds.  Since last review in September 2009, the notes have been
written down to zero.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 61 Tranches From 13 RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 61
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches from 13 RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by Thornburg
Mortgage Securities Trust from 2005 to 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools issued from 2005 to
2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of sixloss levels, four loss timing curves
and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses experienced
by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the underlying
mortgage pool is taken into consideration when assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-2.  Mortgage Loan
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on May 1, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-C, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-C, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Confirmed at B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 86 Tranches From 12 RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 86
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from 12 RMBS
transactions, backed by prime jumbo loans, issued by First Horizon
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust from 2005 to 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, prime jumbo residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of jumbo pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on prime jumbo pools
issued from 2005 to 2008.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
prime jumbo RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety
of scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This
individual pool level analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances
of the tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Jumbo RMBS Loss Projection Update:
January 2010" is adjusted to estimate losses on pools left with a
small number of loans.  To project losses on pools with fewer than
100 loans, Moody's first estimates a "baseline" average rate of
new delinquencies for the pool that is dependent on the vintage of
loan origination (3.5%, 6.5% and 7.5% for the 2005, 2006 and 2007
vintage respectively).  This baseline rate is higher than the
average rate of new delinquencies for the vintage to account for
the volatile nature of small pools.  Even if a few loans in a
small pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in
the overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.  The fewer the number of
loans remaining in the pool, the higher the volatility and hence
the stress applied.  Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75,
the rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less
than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74 loans from the 2005
vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.535%.  If
the current delinquency level in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 1.8 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Tr 2007-4

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-16, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-17, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Jun 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 17, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Dec 17, 2009
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes from five U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent mortgage loan
collateral issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  Additionally, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 21 classes from the downgraded
transactions, as well as two additional transactions.

The "scratch-and-dent" collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of reperforming and outside-
the-guidelines first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate residential
mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

The downgrades and affirmations incorporate its current and
projected losses, which S&P based on the dollar amounts of loans
currently in the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real
estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's projection of future
defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative losses to date in its
analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using its criteria listed in the
"Related Criteria And Research" section below.  As part of S&P's
analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the underlying
mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For
example, the risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools
influences S&P's default projections, while its outlook for
housing-price declines and the health of the housing market
influence its loss severity assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P
adjusted its loss expectations for each deal based on upward
trends in delinquencies.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.  For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given its current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP3 Trust
                        Series    2007-RP3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A          74978BAA6     CCC                  B

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP4 Trust
                        Series    2007-RP4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A          74919LAD0     B-                   B

                    RAMP Series 2005-RS6 Trust
                        Series    2005-RS6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-3        76112BTU4     A-                   AA-
        M-4        76112BTV2     B-                   BBB
        M-5        76112BTW0     B-                   BB

                    RAMP Series 2005-RS8 Trust
                        Series    2005-RS8

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        76112BZJ2     BBB-                 AA+
        M-2        76112BZK9     CCC                  A
        M-3        76112BZL7     CCC                  BB
        M-4        76112BZM5     CC                   B
        M-5        76112BZN3     CC                   CCC

                    RAMP Series 2007-RS1 Trust
                        Series    2007-RS1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-3        74923RAC3     CCC                  B

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust
                        Series    2005-RP3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        76112BP79     AAA
                 M-1        76112BP87     A
                 M-2        76112BP95     CCC

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP3 Trust
                        Series    2007-RP3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        74978BAB4     CCC

                    RAAC Series 2007-RP4 Trust
                        Series    2007-RP4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        74919LAE8     CCC

                    RAAC Series 2007-SP2 Trust
                        Series    2007-SP2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        74919XAD4     B+
                 A-2        74919XAE2     CCC
                 A-3        74919XAF9     CCC
                 M-1        74919XAG7     CCC
                 M-2        74919XAH5     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2005-RS6 Trust
                        Series    2005-RS6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-I-3      76112BTP5     AAA
                 A-II-1     76112BTQ3     AAA
                 A-II-2     76112BTR1     AAA
                 M-1        76112BTS9     AA+
                 M-2        76112BTT7     AA
                 M-6        76112BTX8     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2005-RS8 Trust
                        Series    2005-RS8

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        76112BZF0     AAA
                 A-3        76112BZG8     AAA

                    RAMP Series 2007-RS1 Trust
                        Series    2007-RS1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        74923RAA7     AAA
                 A-2        74923RAB5     AAA
                 A-4        74923RAD1     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 36 Tranches From Seven CLO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 36
tranches from seven U.S. collateralized loan obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The affected tranches have a total issuance amount
of 3.062 billion.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
10 tranches from four transactions and removed eight of them from
CreditWatch negative.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on three
tranches from two transactions following the complete redemption
of the notes.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of 17 classes from six transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
updated CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions used in the analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate assumed for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA'
liability rating for each transaction.

         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

       Transaction                      Recovery rate (%)
       -----------                      -----------------
       ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1  31.1
       ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2  28.5
       Armstrong Loan Funding           42.8
       Field Point I                    38.0
       Fortress Credit Investments I    44.6
       Kingsland III                    42.5
       Northwoods Capital IV            43.2
       Ocean Trails CLO I               43.3

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO criteria
update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
   Transaction                     Class     To    From
   -----------                     -----     --    ----
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1 A         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1 B         AA    AA/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1 C         BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2 A         A+    AAA/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2 B         BBB+  AA/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2 C         CCC+  A/Watch Neg
   ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-2 D         CCC-  BBB/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          A         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          B         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          C         AA    AA/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          D         A     A/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          E         BBB   BBB/Watch Neg
   Armstrong Loan Funding          F         BB    BB/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-1NwRev  A+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-1NwTrm  A+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-1Revolv A+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-1 Term  A+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-2       A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   A-2NwTrm  A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   B         BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Fortress Credit Investments I   B NwTrm   BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   A-1       AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   A-2       AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   A-3       A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   B         BB+   A/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   C-1       CCC+  BBB-/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   C-2       CCC+  BBB-/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   D-1       CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Kingsland III                   D-2       CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           A-1a      AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           A-1b      AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           A-2       A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           B         BB+   A/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           C-1       CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           C-2       CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           C-3       CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           Type I    NR    BBB+/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           Type II   CCC-  BB+/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           Type III  NR    BB+/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital IV           Type IV   CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              A-1       AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              A-2       A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              B         BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              C         BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              ComboNt1  BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              ComboNt2  NR    B+/Watch Neg
   Ocean Trails CLO I              D         CCC+  BB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Transaction                     Class     Rating
         -----------                     -----     ------
         Field Point I                   A-1       AAA
         Field Point I                   A-2       AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Tranches From Nine CLO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 37
tranches from nine U.S. collateralized loan obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The affected tranches have a total issuance amount
of $2.877 billion.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
22 tranches from seven transactions and removed 21 of them from
CreditWatch negative.  S&P also withdrew its rating on one tranche
from Carlyle High Yield Partners VI following the consolidation of
the notes.  Lastly, S&P withdrew its rating on one tranche from
GSC Partners CDO Fund V following its full redemption.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of five classes from four transactions resulted
from S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which
is one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of
its criteria update.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
updated CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions S&P used in its analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate S&P assumed for the cash flows generated for the
'AAA' liability rating for each transaction.

         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

    Transaction                               Recovery rate (%)
    -----------                               -----------------
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2                      44.4
    Battalion CLO 2007-1                      44.1
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V          45.5
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI            45.3
    DFR Middle Market CLO                     38.4
    Dryden XXI Leveraged Loan CDO             49.2
    FriedbergMilstein Private Capital Fund I  38.3
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V                   44.1
    LightPoint CLO IV                         46.3
    Moselle CLO S.A.                           43.4

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO criteria
update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                             Rating
                                             ------
    Transaction                      Class  To    From
    -----------                      -----  --    ----
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2             A      AA    AAA/Watch Neg
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2             B      A+    AA/Watch Neg
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2             C      BBB+  A/Watch Neg
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2             D      BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
    Ballyrock CLO 2006-2             E      CCC+  BB/Watch Neg
    Battalion CLO 2007-1             A      AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
    Battalion CLO 2007-1             B      AA    AA/Watch Neg
    Battalion CLO 2007-1             C      A-    A/Watch Neg
    Battalion CLO 2007-1             D      BBB-  BBB/Watch Neg
    Battalion CLO 2007-1             E      B+    BB/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V A-1    A+    AAA/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V A-2a   AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V A-2b   A+    AAA/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V A-3    A+    AAA/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V B      A-    AA/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V C      BBB-  A/Watch Neg
    BlackRock Senior Income Series V D      CCC-  BBB-/Watch Neg
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI   A-1    AA    AAA/Watch Neg
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI   A-2    NR    AAA/Watch Neg
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI   A-3    AA    AAA/Watch Neg
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI   B      A+    A+/Watch Neg
    Carlyle High Yield Partners VI   C      BB+   BB+/Watch Neg
    DFR Middle Market CLO            A-1A   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    DFR Middle Market CLO            A-1B   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    DFR Middle Market CLO            B      AA    AA/Watch Neg
    DFR Middle Market CLO            C      A     A/Watch Neg
    DFR Middle Market CLO            D      BBB   BBB/Watch Neg
    Dryden XXI Leveraged Loan CDO    A      AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
    Dryden XXI Leveraged Loan CDO    B      AA    AA/Watch Neg
    Dryden XXI Leveraged Loan CDO    C      A     A/Watch Neg
    Dryden XXI Leveraged Loan CDO    D      BBB   BBB/Watch Neg
    FriedbergMilstein Private        A      AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        B-1    AA    AA/Watch Neg
     Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        B-2    AA   AA/Watch Neg
     Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        C-1    BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
      Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        C-2    BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
     Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        D-1    B+   BB+/Watch Neg
     Capital Fund I
    FriedbergMilstein Private        D-2    B+   BB+/Watch Neg
    Capital Fund I
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          A-1    AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          A-2    AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          B      BBB+ A/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          C-1    BB+  BBB/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          C-2    BB+  BBB/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          Class2 BB+  BBB-/Watch Neg
    GSC Partners CDO Fund V          Class3 NR   BBB/Watch Neg
    LightPoint CLO IV                A-1    AA   AAA/Watch Neg
    LightPoint CLO IV                A-2A   AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    LightPoint CLO IV                A-2B   AA   AAA/Watch Neg
    LightPoint CLO IV                B      A-   A/Watch Neg
    LightPoint CLO IV                C      BB+  BBB/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A1E    AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A-1L   AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A-1LE  AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A-1LU  AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A2E    AA   AA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A2L    AA   AA/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A3E    A    A/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  A3L    A    A/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  B1E    BB+  BBB/Watch Neg
    Moselle CLO S.A.                  B1L    BB+  BBB/Watch Neg

                          Rating Affirmed

          Transaction                      Class  Rating
          -----------                      -----  ------
          Moselle CLO S.A.                 C1CN   AAA


                          NR - Not rated.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 58 Tranches From 11 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 58
tranches from 11 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $3.329 billion.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 20 tranches from
seven transactions and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of nine classes from five transactions resulted
from S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which
is one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of
S&P's criteria update.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
updated CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions S&P used in its analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate S&P assumed for the cash flows generated for the
'AAA' liability rating for each transaction.

          Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

  Transaction                                  Recovery rate (%)
  -----------                                  -----------------
  Ares VIII CLO                                40.4
  Ballyrock CLO II                             45.5
  CoLTS 2005-1                                 24.8
  Gillespie CLO PLC                            44.5
  GoldenTree Capital Solutions Fund Financing  36.2
  Kennecott Funding                            37.6
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1                     34.1
  Longhorn CDO (Cayman)                        41.6
  Madison Park Funding I                       43.7
  Mountain Capital CLO III                     42.2
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV                  48.1
  Octagon Investment Partners X                42.6
  TCW Select Loan Fund                         47.5
  Vinacasa CLO                                 43.1

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
  Transaction                          Class To    From
  -----------                          ----- --    ----
  Ares VIII CLO                        A-1A  AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        A-1B  AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        A-2   AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        A-3   AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        B-1   A-    A/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        B-2   A-    A/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        C-1   BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        C-2   BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        D-1   BB-   BB/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        D-2   BB-   BB/Watch Neg
  Ares VIII CLO                        D-3   BB-   BB/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO II                     A     AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO II                     B     AA    AA/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO II                     C     BBB+  A/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO II                     D-1   BB-   BBB/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO II                     D-2   BB-   BBB/Watch Neg
  CoLTS 2005-1                         D     B+    BBB/Watch Neg
  CoLTS 2005-1                         E     CCC   BB+/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    A-1   AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    A-2   AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    A-3   AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    B     A-    AA/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    C     BBB-  A/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    D     B+    BBB-/Watch Neg
  Gillespie CLO PLC                    E     CC    BB-/Watch Neg
  GoldenTree Capital Solutions Fund    LnFac AA    AA/Watch Neg
   Financing
  Kennecott Funding                    A-1   AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    A-2A  AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    A-2B  AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    B     A+    AA/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    C     BBB+  A/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    D-1   BB-   BBB/Watch Neg
  Kennecott Funding                    D-2   BB-   BBB/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             A     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             B     AA    AA/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             C     A     A/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             D     BBB-  BBB-/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             E     BB-   BB-/Watch Neg
  KKR Financial CLO 2007-1             F     B-    B-/Watch Neg
  Longhorn CDO (Cayman)                A-2   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Longhorn CDO (Cayman)                A-3   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               A-T   AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               A-VF  AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               B     A+    AA/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               C     BBB   A/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               D     BB    BBB/Watch Neg
  Madison Park Funding I               E     CCC+  BB/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             A-1La AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             A-1Lb AA    AAA/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             A-2L  A-    AA/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             A-3F  BB+   A-/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             A-3L  BB+   A-/Watch Neg
  Mountain Capital CLO III             B-1L  CCC-  BBB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          A-1a  AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          A-1b  AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          A-2a  AA    AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          A-2b  AA    AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          B-1   A     A/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          B-2   A     A/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          C-1   B+    BBB-/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          C-2   B+    BBB-/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners IV          C-3   B+    BBB-/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        A-1   AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        A-1R  AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        B     A+    AA/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        C     BBB+  A/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        D     BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Octagon Investment Partners X        E     CCC+  BB/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 A-2   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 B     AA+   AA+/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 C     A     A/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 Comp  CCC+  BB-/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 D-1   CCC+  BB-/Watch Neg
  TCW Select Loan Fund                 D-2   CCC+  BB-/Watch Neg
  Vinacasa CLO                         A1    AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Vinacasa CLO                         A2    A+    AA/Watch Neg
  Vinacasa CLO                         B     BBB   A/Watch Neg
  Vinacasa CLO                         C     B+    BBB/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 63 Tranches From 11 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 63
tranches from 11 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $4.836 billion.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 17 tranches from
five transactions and removed 16 of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on two
tranches from Highland Legacy Ltd. and one tranche from Navigator
CDO 2003 following the full redemption of the notes.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of 10 classes from five transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
updated CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions used in the analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate assumed for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA'
liability rating for each transaction.

         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

        Transaction                       Recovery rate (%)
        -----------                       -----------------
        ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1   24.5
        Ares X CLO                        41.5
        Ballyrock CLO 2006-1              46.5
        CapitalSource Commercial Loan     39.4
         Trust 2006-2
        CSAM Funding III                  41.6
        Galaxy III CLO                    44.2
        Highland Legacy                   48.4
        Kingsland I                       43.0
        Kingsland V                       41.9
        Navigator CDO 2003                47.0
        Oak Hill Credit Partners III      48.6
        Venture VII CDO                   43.4

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO criteria
update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
  Transaction                      Class      To   From
  -----------                      -----      --   ----
  ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1  A-1        AA-  AAA/Watch Neg
  ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1  A-2A       AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1  A-2B       AA-  AAA/Watch Neg
  ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1  B          A    AA/Watch Neg
  ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1  C          B+   A/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       A-1        AA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       A-2        AA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       A-3        AA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       B          A+   AA/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       C-1        BBB- A-/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       C-2        BBB- A-/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       D-1        CCC- BB+/Watch Neg
  Ares X CLO                       D-2        CCC- BB+/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO 2006-1             A          AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO 2006-1             B          A+   AA/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO 2006-1             C          BBB+ A/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO 2006-1             D          B+   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Ballyrock CLO 2006-1             E          CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    A-1A       AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    A-1B       AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    A-PT       AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
   Trust2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    B          AA   AA/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    C          BBB+ A/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    D          CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CapitalSource Commercial Loan    E          CCC- BB/Watch Neg
   Trust 2006-2
  CSAM Funding III                 A-1        AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  CSAM Funding III                 A-2        A+   AA/Watch Neg
  CSAM Funding III                 B          BBB- A-/Watch Neg
  CSAM Funding III                 C          B+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   A-1        AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   A-2        AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   B          AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   C          A+   AA/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   D          BB+  A/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   E-1        CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   E-2        CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
  Galaxy III CLO                   E-3        CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
  Highland Legacy                  B Fixed    NR   AA+/Watch Neg
  Highland Legacy                  B Floating NR   AA+/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      A-1a       AA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      A-1b       AA   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      A-2        A+   AA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      B-1        BB+  A/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      B-2        BB+  A/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      C-1        CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      C-2        CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
  Kingsland I                      D          CCC- BB/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      A-1        A+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      A-2B       A+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      A-2R       AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      B          BBB+ AA/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      C          BB+  A/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      D-1        B+   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      D-2        B+   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Kingsland V                      E          CCC- B+/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               A-2        AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               A-3A       AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               A-3B       AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               B          AA-  AA-/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               C-1        B+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               C-2        B+   BBB/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               D          CCC- BB/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               Q-1        CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
  Navigator CDO 2003               Q-2        NR   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     A-1a       AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     A-1b       AAA  AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     A-2        AA   AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     B-1        A    A/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     B-2        A    A/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     C-1        BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     C-2        BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     D          BB   BB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     Type1CMP   A-   A-/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners III     Type3CMP   BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  A-1A       AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  A-1AR      AA+  AAA/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  A-1B       A+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  A-2        A+   AAA/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  B          A    AA/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  C          BBB+ A/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  D          BB+  BBB/Watch Neg
  Venture VII CDO                  E          B+   BB/Watch Neg

                          Rating Affirmed

        Transaction                      Class      Rating
        -----------                      -----      ------
        Navigator CDO 2003               A-1        AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 81 Tranches From 17 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 81
tranches from 17 U.S. corporate collateralized debt obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 23
tranches from seven transactions and removed 22 of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of 12 classes from five transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

The 81 downgraded U.S. corporate CDO tranches have a total
issuance amount of $5.346 billion.  Sixteen of the 17 affected
transactions are collateralized loan obligation transactions.  The
other is a collateralized bond obligation transaction.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.

S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
new CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions S&P used in its analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate S&P assumed for the cash flows generated for the
'AAA' liability rating for each transaction.

          Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

    Transaction                               Recovery rate (%)
    -----------                               -----------------
    Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy II       41.1
    Ares IIIR/IVR CLO                               37.1
    Ares IIR CLO                                    38.9
    ARES VIR CLO                                    40.1
    Ares XII CLO                                    42.0
    Babson Mid-Market 2007-II                       42.9
    First Dominion Funding III                      23.0
    Galaxy CLO 2003-1                               45.6
    GSC Partners CDO Fund IV                        38.5
    GSC Partners CDO Fund VI                        46.9
    Kingsland IV                                    42.2
    Lafayette Square CDO                            31.6
    Latitude CLO III                                38.8
    Signature 7 L.P.                                 30.5
    Trimaran CLO VII                                42.0
    Wind River CLO I                                37.6
    Wind River CLO II Tate Investors Ltd.           38.9

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
     Transaction                Class     To     From
     -----------                -----     --     ----
     Ares Enhanced Loan         A-1       AA     AAA/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares Enhanced Loan         A-2       AA     AAA/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares Enhanced Loan         B-1       BBB+   A/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares Enhanced Loan         B-2       BBB+   A/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares Enhanced Loan         C-1       BB+    BBB-/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares Enhanced Loan         C-2       BB+    BBB-/Watch Neg
      Investment Strategy II
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          A-1       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          A-2       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          B         A      AA/Watch Neg
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          C         BBB+   A/Watch Neg
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          D         BB-    BBB/Watch Neg
     Ares IIIR/IVR CLO          E         CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
     Ares IIR CLO               A         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Ares IIR CLO               B         A+     AA/Watch Neg
     Ares IIR CLO               C         BBB+   A/Watch Neg
     Ares IIR CLO               D-1       BB     BBB-/Watch Neg
     Ares IIR CLO               D-2       BB     BBB-/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               A-1-A     AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               A-1-B     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               A-1-C     AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               A-2       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               B         A+     AA/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               C-1       BBB+   A/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               C-2       BBB+   A/Watch Neg
     ARES VIR CLO               D         BB+    BBB/Watch Neg
     Ares XII CLO               A         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Ares XII CLO               B         AA     AA/Watch Neg
     Ares XII CLO               C         A      A/Watch Neg
     Ares XII CLO               D         BBB-   BBB/Watch Neg
     Ares XII CLO               E         BB     BB/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  A-1       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  A-2B      AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  A-2R      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  B         AA     AA/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  C         A      A/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  D         BBB    BBB/Watch Neg
     Babson Mid-Market 2007-II  E         BB     BB/Watch Neg
     First Dominion Funding III B-1       A+     AAA/Watch Neg
     First Dominion Funding III B-2       A+     AAA/Watch Neg
     Galaxy CLO 2003-1          A         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Galaxy CLO 2003-1          B         A      A/Watch Neg
     Galaxy CLO 2003-1          C-1       B+     BBB/Watch Neg
     Galaxy CLO 2003-1          C-2       B+     BBB/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund IV   A-2       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund IV   A-3       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund IV   B         A      A+/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   A-1       AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   A-2       AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   B         A      A/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   C-1       BBB    BBB/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   C-2       BBB    BBB/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   Combo     BBB    BBB/Watch Neg
     GSC Partners CDO Fund VI   D         CCC+   BB/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               A-1       A+     AAA/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               A-1R      A+     AAA/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               B         A      AA/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               C         BB+    A/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               D         CCC+   BBB-/Watch Neg
     Kingsland IV               E         CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       A-1A      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       A-1B      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       A-2       AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       A-3       AA     AA/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       B1        A      A/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       B2        A      A/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       C1        BBB-   BBB/Watch Neg
     Lafayette Square CDO       C2        BBB-   BBB/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           A         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           B         AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           C         A      AA/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           D         BBB    A/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           E         BB     BBB/Watch Neg
     Latitude CLO III           F         B+     BB/Watch Neg
     Signature 7 L.P.            A         A-     AAA/Watch Neg
     Signature 7 L.P.            B         BB-    AA-/Watch Neg
     Signature 7 L.P.            C         CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           A-1L      AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           A-1LR     AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           A-2L      A+     AA/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           A-3L      BBB+   A/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           B-1L      B+     BBB/Watch Neg
     Trimaran CLO VII           B-2L      CCC+   BB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           A-1       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           A-2       A+     AA/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           ComOb III CCC-   BBB+/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           ComObl II CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           ComObl IV CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           ComObl V  CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Defer B-1 BBB-   A/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Defer B-2 BBB-   A/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Defer C-1 CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Defer C-2 CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Defer D   CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO I           Zero C-3  CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
     Wind River CLO II          A-1       AA-    AAA/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          A-2       A+     AA/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          B-1       BBB-   A/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          B-2       BBB-   A/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          C         CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          D-1       CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          D-2       CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          Type 1 Cp CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.
     Wind River CLO II          Type IICp CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
      Tate Investors Ltd.

                         Rating Affirmed

           Transaction                Class     Rating
           -----------                -----     ------
           GSC Partners CDO Fund IV   A-1       AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 292 Classes From 70 Subprime RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 292
classes from 70 U.S. subprime and two Alternative-A residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions issued from 2005-2007 and
removed 162 of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 480 classes from these
transactions, as well as 23 additional subprime transactions and
one additional Alt-A deal.  S&P removed 154 of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

Standard & Poor's has established revised loss projections for
each transaction rated between 2005 and 2007.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses, due to increased
delinquencies.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  For subprime and Alt-A transactions, in order to
maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether a class
could withstand losses exceeding its base-case loss assumptions at
a percentage specific to each rating category, up to 150% for an
'AAA' rating.  For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 110% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 120% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess
interest.  The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions
consists primarily of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime and
Alt-A loans that are secured by first and second liens on one- to
four-family residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

    Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-CW1
                        Series    2006-CW1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2B       00441QAC3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE1
                        Series    2006-HE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       004421WJ8     B                    B/Watch Neg
    A-1B1      004421WK5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-2        004421WS8     CC                   CCC

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
                        Series    2006-OP1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       00442PAA8     BBB+                 BBB+/Watch Neg
    A-1B       00442PAB6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       00442PAD2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       00442PAE0     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-2D       00442PAF7     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-1        00442PAG5     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-4        00442PAK6     CC                   CCC

   Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP2
                        Series    2006-OP2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        00441YAA0     BBB+                 A-/Watch Neg
    A-2A       00441YAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       00441YAC6     BBB                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    A-2C       00441YAD4     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-2D       00441YAE2     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-1        00441YAF9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-3        00441YAH5     CC                   CCC

     ACE Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-D1
                        Series    2007-D1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        00083BAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        00083BAB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        00083BAC9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        00083BAD7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-6        00083BAL9     CC                   CCC
    M-7        00083BAM7     CC                   CCC
    M-8        00083BAU9     CC                   CCC

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                      Series    RFC 2007-HE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1A        04544RAR6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A1B        04544RAS4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A2         04544RAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         04544RAB1     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         04544RAC9     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A5         04544RAD7     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M1         04544RAE5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M2         04544RAF2     CC                   B-/Watch Neg

      Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE7
                        Series    2006-HE7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-1A-1    07388HAN9     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A2         055682AB4     BBB                  AAA

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                        Series    2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A2         055683AB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         055683AC0     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A2         05569GAB2     BBB-                 AA+/Watch Neg
    A3         05569GAC0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A2         05568QAB1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         05568QAC9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M3         05568QAH8     CC                   CCC

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A3         05570GAC7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A3A        05570GAV5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A3B        05570GAW3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M3         05570GAG8     CC                   CCC
    M3A        05570GBD4     CC                   CCC
    M3B        05570GBE2     CC                   CCC
    M4         05570GAH6     CC                   CCC
    M4A        05570GBF9     CC                   CCC
    M4B        05570GBG7     CC                   CCC

                      C-BASS 2006-CB7 Trust
                        Series    2006-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        12479DAA6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-2        12479DAB4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        12479DAC2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        12479DAD0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        12479DAG3     CC                   CCC

                       C-BASS 2007-CB4 Trust
                        Series    2007-CB4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       1248MEAA7     B-                   BBB-/Watch Neg
    A-2A       1248MEAD1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       1248MEAE9     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-2C       1248MEAF6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    A-2D       1248MEAG4     CCC                  BB-/Watch Neg
    M-2        1248MEAJ8     CC                   CCC
    M-3        1248MEAK5     CC                   CCC

        Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-3        17310EAC2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        17310EAD0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-5        17310EAE8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-6        17310EAF5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        17310EAG3     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        17310EAH1     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        17310EAJ7     AA-                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        17310EAK4     A+                   A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        17310EAL2     A                    A/Watch Neg
    M-6        17310EAM0     A-                   A-/Watch Neg
    M-7        17310EAN8     BBB+                 BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-8        17310EAP3     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-9        17310EAQ1     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4
                       Series    2006-WFHE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        17309SAB6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        17309SAC4     B                    B/Watch Neg
    A-4        17309SAD2     B                    B/Watch Neg
    M-4        17309SAH3     CC                   CCC
    M-5        17309SAJ9     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL2
                       Series    2007-AHL2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        17312TAA1     BB-                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-2        17312TAB9     BB-                  AA+/Watch Neg
    A-3A       17312TAH6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3B       17312TAJ2     BB-                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-3C       17312TAK9     BB-                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        17312TAL7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        17312TAM5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-8        17312TAE3     CC                   CCC
    M-9        17312TAF0     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1
                       Series    2007-WFHE1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        17311CAB7     BBB                  AAA
        M-5        17311CAH4     CC                   CCC
        M-6        17311CAJ0     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4
                      Series    2007-WFHE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        17313JAB0     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-2A       17313JAC8     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       17313JAD6     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-2C       17313JAE4     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-9        17313JAS3     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2006-22
                        Series    2006-22

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A         12666BAA3     BB                   BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      12666BAB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      12666BAC9     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      12666BAD7     B+                   A/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      12666BAE5     B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-1        12666BAF2     B-                   B/Watch Neg
    M-2        12666BAG0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-6        12666BAL9     CC                   CCC
    M-7        12666BAM7     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-11
                        Series    2006-11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-AF-1     12666TAA4     CC                   CCC
        MV-2       12666TAM8     CC                   CCC
        MV-3       12666TAN6     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-13
                        Series    2006-13

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-AF-1     23242EAA7     CC                   B/Watch Neg

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-3
                         Series    2006-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        126670VW5     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      126670VY1     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      126670VZ8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      126670WA2     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      126670WB0     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        126670WC8     B+                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        126670WD6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        126670WE4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-4        126670WF1     CCC                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    M-5        126670WG9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-6        126670WH7     CC                   CCC
    M-7        126670WJ3     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC5
                        Series    2006-BC5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        12666SAA6     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      12666SAB4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      12666SAC2     B+                   A-/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      12666SAD0     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      12666SAE8     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
    M-1        12666SAF5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-4        12666SAJ7     CC                   CCC
    M-5        12666SAK4     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        12668NAA5     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      12668NAB3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      12668NAC1     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      12668NAD9     B-                   A+/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      12668NAE7     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    M-1        12668NAF4     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        12668NAG2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-7        12668NAM9     CC                   CCC
    M-8        12668NAN7     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-4W       12668WAD9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-5W       12668WAU1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-6W       12668WAV9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

       Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust, Series 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        31659YAA2     B+                   A-/Watch Neg
    2-A1       31659YAB0     B+                   BBB+/Watch Neg
    2-A2       31659YAC8     B-                   BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A3       31659YAD6     B-                   BBB/Watch Neg

           First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF10
                       Series    2006-FF10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         32028HAA1     BB+                  A/Watch Neg
    A3         32028HAC7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         32028HAD5     A+                   AA/Watch Neg
    A5         32028HAE3     BB+                  A/Watch Neg
    A6         32028HAF0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A7         32028HAG8     A+                   AA/Watch Neg
    M1         32028HAH6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M2         32028HAJ2     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M3         32028HAK9     CC                   CCC

           First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF12
                       Series    2006-FF12

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         32027GAA4     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A2         32027GAB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         32027GAC0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         32027GAD8     A                    A/Watch Neg
    A5         32027GAE6     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    M1         32027GAF3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M2         32027GAG1     CC                   CCC

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      35729PPU8     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     35729PPW4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     35729PPX2     BB+                  BB+/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     35729PPY0     BB+                  BB+/Watch Neg
    M-3        35729PQB9     CC                   CCC

                      GSAMP Trust 2007-HSBC1
                       Series    2007-HSBC1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-4        362429AE2     B                    BB
        M-8        362429AJ1     CC                   CCC

           Home equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust
                         Series    2007-B

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2A-1       43710EAC4     BBB-                 A+
        M-2        43710EAH3     CC                   CCC
        M-3        43710EAJ9     CC                   CCC

               Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        43718UAB2     B                    B/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        40430WAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        40430WAB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430WAC9     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430WAD7     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        40430YAA9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        40430YAB7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430YAC5     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430YAD3     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-3
                         Series    2006-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2F       40430XAC7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2V       40430XAD5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3F       40430XAE3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3V       40430XAF0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        40430XAG8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430XAH6     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430XAJ2     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2006-4
                         Series    2006-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2F       40430VAC1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2V       40430VAD9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3F       40430VAE7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3V       40430VAF4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        40430VAG2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430VAH0     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430VAJ6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-S        40431FAA9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-M        40431FAB7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1F       40431FAC5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1V       40431FAD3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2F       40431FAE1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2V       40431FAF8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3F       40431FAG6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3V       40431FAH4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        40431FAJ0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40431FAK7     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40431FAL5     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-S        40431MAA4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-M        40431MAB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1F       40431MAC0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1V       40431MAD8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2F       40431MAE6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2V       40431MAF3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3F       40431MAG1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3V       40431MAH9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        40431MAJ5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40431MAK2     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40431MAL0     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

             HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust (USA) 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-PT       40431XAA0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1        40431XAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        40431XAC6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        40431XAD4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        40431XAE2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40431XAF9     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40431XAG7     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1
                         Series    2005-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          40430GAA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M          40430GAB6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2
                         Series    2005-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        40430GAC4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        40430GAD2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430GAE0     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430GAF7     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3
                         Series    2005-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        40430GAG5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        40430GAH3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        40430GAJ9     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        40430GAK6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                  Impac CMB Trust Series 2007-A
                         Series    2007-A

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          452550AA4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        452550AB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-2        452550AC0     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-3        452550AD8     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-4        452550AE6     CC                   CCC

                Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    2-A        452570AE4     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg

    IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Grantor Trust 2006-AR14 1-A3B
                        Series    2006-AR14

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A3B      45668GAE2     CC                   CCC

          JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2
                       Series    2006-NC2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       46629HAA4     B+                   BBB+/Watch Neg
    A-1B       46629HAB2     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-3        46629FAB6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-3        46629FAG5     CC                   CCC

           JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2
                        Series    2007-CH2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AF-1A      46630MAA0     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-1B      46630MAB8     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       46630MAC6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    MF-4       46630MAL6     CC                   CCC
    MF-5       46630MAM4     CC                   CCC
    MF-6       46630MAN2     CC                   CCC
    AV-1       46630MAS1     B                    BB-/Watch Neg
    AV-2       46630MAT9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-3       46630MAU6     B                    BB+/Watch Neg
    AV-4       46630MAV4     B-                   BB-/Watch Neg
    AV-5       46630MAW2     B-                   BB-/Watch Neg
    MV-1       46630MAX0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    MV-7       46630MBD3     CC                   CCC
    MV-8       46630MBE1     CC                   CCC

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-7
                         Series    2007-7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        4-A2       52519BAY6     CC                   CCC
        4-A5       52519BBB5     CC                   CCC
        4-A6       52519BBC3     CC                   CCC
        4-A7       52519BBD1     CC                   CCC
        5-A2       52519BBJ8     CC                   CCC
        5-A3       52519BBK5     CC                   CCC
        5-A6       52519BBN9     CC                   CCC
        5-A7       52519BBP4     CC                   CCC

           MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM2
                        Series    2006-AM2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        57645FAB3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M-3        57645FAF4     CC                   CCC

          MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-NCW
                        Series    2007-NCW

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        576456AA5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        576456AB3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        576456AC1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg

  Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-5
                         Series    2007-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A1       59025RAT4     A                    AAA
        M-4        59025RAJ6     CC                   CCC
        M-5        59025RAK3     CC                   CCC
        M-6        59025RAL1     CC                   CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-AR1
                        Series    2006-AR1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2B       59020VAU7     BB+                  AA+/Watch Neg

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-HE5
                        Series    2006-HE5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2A       59022QAB8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59022QAF9     CC                   CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-MLN1
                        Series    2006-MLN1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2A       59023AAB2     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59023AAF3     CC                   CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-RM1
                        Series    2006-RM1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        59020U5B7     CC                   CCC
        A-2B       59020U5D3     D                    CCC
        A-2C       59020U5E1     D                    CCC
        A-2D       59020U5F8     D                    CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc Trust 2006-HE5
                        Series    2006 HE5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        61749NAA5     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-2b       61749NAC1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2c       61749NAD9     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-2d       61749NAE7     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        61749NAG2     CC                   CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE7
                        Series    2007-HE7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        61756YAA1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-2a       61756YAB9     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2b       61756YAC7     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    A-2c       61756YAD5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC4
                        Series    2007-NC4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        61755EAA6     CC                   CCC
        A-2a       61755EAB4     CC                   CCC
        A-2b       61755EAC2     CC                   CCC
        A-2c       61755EAD0     CC                   CCC
        A-2d       61755EAE8     CC                   CCC

            New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        64352VQP9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2b       64352VQR5     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2c       64352VQS3     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        64352VQT1     B-                   AA-/Watch Neg
    M-2        64352VQU8     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
    M-3        64352VQV6     CC                   B+/Watch Neg
    M-4        64352VQW4     CC                   CCC

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68401TAA6     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68401TAB4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    68401TAC2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    68401TAD0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    68401TAE8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        68401TAG3     CC                   CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-A-1     68402BAB2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68403FAA4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68403FAB2     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     68403FAC0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     68403FAD8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     68403FAE6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        68403FAG1     CC                   CCC
    M-3        68403FAH9     CC                   CCC

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5
                         Series    2007-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68403HAA0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68403HAB8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     68403HAC6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     68403HAD4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     68403HAE2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        68403HAG7     CC                   CCC
    M-3        68403HAH5     CC                   CCC

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6
                         Series    2007-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68403KAQ8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68403KAA3     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     68403KAB1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     68403KAC9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     68403KAD7     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-3        68403KAG0     CC                   CCC
    M-4        68403KAH8     CC                   CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1
                        Series    2007-FDX1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    III-A-1    68402VAC6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    68402VAD4     A                    A/Watch Neg
    III-A-3    68402VAE2     B                    B/Watch Neg

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2
                       Series    2007-FXD2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68403BAA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68403BAB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     68403BAC9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     68403BAD7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     68403BAE5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     68403BAF2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     68403BAG0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-3        68403BAK1     CC                   CCC
    M-4        68403BAL9     CC                   CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1
                        Series    2007-HL1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-A-1     68402SAB5     A                    A/Watch Neg

             Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-3
                         Series    2006-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        69121PDU4     AA-                  AA-/Watch Neg
    A-2B       69121PDW0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       69121PDX8     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-2D       69121PDY6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-3        69121PEB5     CC                   CCC

                    RASC Series 2006-EMX5 Trust
                       Series    2006-EMX5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        74924QAB6     BBB+                 AA+/Watch Neg
    M-1        74924QAE0     CC                   CCC

                    RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
                        Series    2006-KS3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I-3      76113ABH3     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-I-4      76113ABJ9     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    A-II       76113ABK6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76113ABL4     B-                   B-/Watch Neg

                    RASC Series 2007-KS3 Trust
                        Series    2007-KS3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I-1      74924YAA1     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-I-2      74924YAB9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-I-3      74924YAC7     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-I-4      74924YAD5     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    A-II       74924YAE3     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-3S       74924YAH6     CC                   CCC

            Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        AV-2       759676AB5     BB-                  AAA
        AV-3       759676AC3     B                    B+
        AF-2       759676AE9     B                    BBB-
        AF-3       759676AF6     B-                   B
        AF-4       759676AG4     B-                   B
        AF-5       759676AH2     B-                   B
        AF-6       759676AJ8     B-                   B
        M-4        759676AN9     CC                   CCC
        M-5        759676AP4     CC                   CCC

            Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4
                         Series    2006-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    N Notes    75970HAV2     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
    AV-1       75970HAA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-2       75970HAB6     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    AV-3       75970HAC4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    AF-1       75970HAD2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       75970HAE0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-3        75970HAM2     CC                   CCC
    M-4        75970HAN0     CC                   CCC

               Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2a       80556BAB1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-2        80556BAG0     CC                   CCC
    M-3        80556BAH8     CC                   CCC
    M-4        80556BAJ4     CC                   CCC

                Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4
                       Series    2006-OPT4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      83611YAA0     B                    B/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     83611YAC6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     83611YAD4     B                    B/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     83611YAE2     B-                   B/Watch Neg
    M-1        83611YAF9     CC                   CCC

               Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-WMC1
                       Series    2007-WMC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-A-1     83612NAB1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    83612NAC9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-1        83612NAG0     CC                   CCC
    M-2        83612NAH8     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-AM1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A3         86359XAC7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M2         86359XAG8     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-BC4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A3         86359RAC0     BBB-                 AA
    M1         86359RAF3     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-EQ1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M2         86360RAG8     CC                   CCC

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-BC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A2         86362PAB1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         86362PAC9     BBB-                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    M2         86362PAH8     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-BC3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       86363WAA7     BBB-                 AAA
    2-A1       86363WAE9     BBB-                 AAA
    1-M2       86363WAL3     CC                   CCC
    2-M2       86363WAM1     CC                   CCC
    1-M3       86363WAN9     CC                   CCC
    2-M3       86363WAP4     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-BC4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A3         86365DAC3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M5         86365DAR0     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                       Series    2007-MLN1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         863613AA3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A2         863613AB1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         863613AC9     BBB-                 A+/Watch Neg
    A4         863613AD7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A5         863613AE5     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M3         863613AH8     CC                   CCC
    M4         863613AJ4     CC                   CCC
    M5         863613AK1     CC                   CCC
    M6         863613AL9     CC                   CCC

                   Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5
                         Series    2006-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      8815612S2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2b     8815612F0     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2c     8815612G8     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-M-1      8815612H6     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    I-M-3      8815612K9     CC                   CCC
    II-A-2     881561Z56     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     881561Z64     CC                   CCC

                  Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-4HE
                        Series    2007-4HE

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        88157QAA6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                 Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-6ALT
                       Series    2007-6ALT

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        88157VAA5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        88157VAB3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        88157VAC1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

          Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2005-14HE
                        Series    2005-14HE

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AF-2       881561XJ8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-3       881561XK5     A                    A/Watch Neg
    AF-4       881561XL3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-5       881561XM1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-2       881561XP4     BBB                  A/Watch Neg
    AV-3       881561XQ2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
    M-1        881561XR0     CC                   CCC

    WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates WaMu Series 2007-HE4 Trust
                        Series    2007-HE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    II-A1      93363XAB9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A2      93363XAC7     B-                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-2        93363XAG8     CC                   CCC
    M-3        93363XAH6     CC                   CCC

        Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates WMABS
                       Series    2006-HE3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    2-A-1      93934MAB3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      93934MAC1     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-1        93934MAF4     CC                   CCC
    M-2        93934MAG2     CC                   CCC

                          Ratings Affirmed

    Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2006-CW1
                        Series    2006-CW1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        00441QAA7     CCC
                 A-2C       00441QAD1     CCC
                 A-2D       00441QAE9     CCC
                 M-1        00441QAF6     CCC
                 M-2        00441QAG4     CCC
                 M-3        00441QAH2     CCC
                 M-4        00441QAJ8     CCC

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE1
                        Series    2006-HE1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1B2      004421WL3     CCC
                 A-2C       004421WP4     CCC
                 A-2D       004421WQ2     CCC
                 M-1        004421WR0     CCC

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
                        Series    2006-OP1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        00442PAH3     CCC
                 M-3        00442PAJ9     CCC

   Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP2
                        Series    2006-OP2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        00441YAG7     CCC

     ACE Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-D1
                         Series    2007-D1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-M        00083BAE5     CCC
                 M-1        00083BAF2     CCC
                 M-2        00083BAG0     CCC
                 M-3        00083BAH8     CCC
                 M-4        00083BAJ4     CCC
                 M-5        00083BAK1     CCC

       Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE4
                        Series    2006-HE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-2      07388AAB0     CCC
                 I-A-3      07388AAC8     CCC
                 II-A       07388AAD6     CCC

       Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE7
                        Series    2006-HE7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 II-1A-2    07388HAP4     CCC
                 II-1A-3    07388HAQ2     CCC
                 II-2A      07388HAR0     CCC
                 II-M-1     07388HAS8     CCC

                 BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         055682AA6     CCC
                 A3         055682AC2     CCC
                 A4         055682AD0     CCC

                 BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         055683AA4     CCC
                 A4         055683AD8     CCC
                 A5         055683AE6     CCC

                 BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        05569GAA4     CCC
                 A4         05569GAD8     CCC
                 A5         05569GAE6     CCC
                 M1         05569GAF3     CCC

                 BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         05568QAA3     CCC
                 A4         05568QAD7     CCC
                 A5         05568QAE5     CCC
                 M1         05568QAF2     CCC
                 M2         05568QAG0     CCC

                 BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         05570GAA1     CCC
                 A2         05570GAB9     CCC
                 A2A        05570GBN2     CCC
                 A2B        05570GBP7     CCC
                 A4         05570GAD5     CCC
                 A4A        05570GAX1     CCC
                 A4B        05570GAY9     CCC
                 M1         05570GAE3     CCC
                 M1A        05570GAZ6     CCC
                 M1B        05570GBA0     CCC
                 M2         05570GAF0     CCC
                 M2A        05570GBB8     CCC
                 M2B        05570GBC6     CCC

                      C-BASS 2006-CB7 Trust
                        Series    2006-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-5        12479DAE8     CCC
                 M-1        12479DAF5     CCC

                       C-BASS 2007-CB4 Trust
                        Series    2007-CB4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1B       1248MEAB5     CCC
                 A-1C       1248MEAC3     CCC
                 M-1        1248MEAH2     CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4
                      Series    2006-WFHE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        17309SAE0     CCC
                 M-2        17309SAF7     CCC
                 M-3        17309SAG5     CCC

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL2
                       Series    2007-AHL2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        17312TAN3     CCC
                 M-4        17312TAP8     CCC
                 M-5        17312TAQ6     CCC
                 M-6        17312TAC7     CCC
                 M-7        17312TAD5     CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1
                       Series    2007-WFHE1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-3        17311CAC5     B
                 A-4        17311CAU5     B-
                 M-1        17311CAD3     CCC
                 M-2        17311CAE1     CCC
                 M-3        17311CAF8     CCC
                 M-4        17311CAG6     CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4
                       Series    2007-WFHE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        17313JAF1     CCC
                 M-2        17313JAJ3     CCC
                 M-3A       17313JAK0     CCC
                 M-3B       17313JAL8     CCC
                 M-4        17313JAM6     CCC
                 M-5        17313JAN4     CCC
                 M-6        17313JAP9     CCC
                 M-7        17313JAQ7     CCC
                 M-8        17313JAR5     CCC

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2006-22
                         Series    2006-22

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        12666BAH8     CCC
                 M-4        12666BAJ4     CCC
                 M-5        12666BAK1     CCC

           CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2007-13
                        Series    2007-13

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A        126698AA7     CCC
                 2-A-1      126698AC3     AAA
                 2-A-2      126698AD1     AAA
                 2-A-2M     126698AB5     AAA
                 1-M-1      126698AG4     CCC
                 2-M-1      126698AH2     CCC
                 1-M-2      126698AJ8     CCC
                 2-M-2      126698AK5     CCC
                 1-M-3      126698AL3     CCC
                 2-M-3      126698AM1     CCC
                 1-M-4      126698AN9     CCC
                 2-M-4      126698AP4     CCC
                 1-M-5      126698AE9     CCC
                 2-M-5      126698AF6     CCC
                 M-6        126698AQ2     CCC
                 M-7        126698AR0     CCC
                 M-8        126698AS8     CCC
                 M-9        126698AT6     CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-11
                         Series    2006-11

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-AV       12666TAG1     CCC
                 3-AV-2     12666TAJ5     CCC
                 3-AV-3     12666TAK2     CCC
                 MV-1       12666TAL0     CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-13
                         Series    2006-13

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-AV       23242EAG4     CCC
                 3-AV-2     23242EAJ8     CCC
                 MV-1       23242EAL3     CCC
                 MV-2       23242EAM1     CCC
                 MV-3       23242EAN9     CCC
                 MV-4       23242EAP4     CCC
                 3-AV-3     23242EAK5     CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-BC5
                        Series    2006-BC5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        12666SAG3     CCC
                 M-3        12666SAH1     CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        12668NAH0     CCC
                 M-4        12668NAJ6     CCC
                 M-5        12668NAK3     CCC
                 M-6        12668NAL1     CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1A       12668WAA5     CCC
                 A-1B       12668WAT4     CCC
                 A-2        12668WAB3     CCC
                 A-3        12668WAC1     CCC
                 A-5        12668WAE7     CCC
                 A-6        12668WAF4     CCC
                 M-1        12668WAR8     CCC
                 M-2        12668WAS6     CCC
                 M-3        12668WAG2     CCC
                 M-4        12668WAH0     CCC

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        35729PPZ7     CCC
                 M-2        35729PQA1     CCC

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-B
                         Series    2006-B

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A        35729QAA6     CCC
                 2-A-2      35729QAC2     CCC
                 2-A-3      35729QAD0     CCC
                 2-A-4      35729QAE8     CCC

                      GSAMP Trust 2007-HSBC1
                       Series    2007-HSBC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        362429AA0     AAA
                 M-1        362429AB8     AA
                 M-2        362429AC6     A
                 M-3        362429AD4     BBB
                 M-5        362429AF9     CCC
                 M-6        362429AG7     CCC
                 M-7        362429AH5     CCC

Home equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust, Series INABS 2007-B
                         Series    2007-B

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1A-1       43710EAA8     CCC
                 1A-2       43710EAB6     CCC
                 2A-2       43710EAD2     CCC
                 2A-3       43710EAE0     CCC
                 2A-4       43710EAF7     CCC
                 M-1        43710EAG5     CCC

               Home Loan Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                         Series    2006-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-3        43718UAC0     CCC

                Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A1-A     452570AA2     CCC
                 1-A1-B     452570AB0     CCC
                 1-A1-C     452570AC8     CCC

                Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1-A       45257VAA4     CCC
                 A1-B       45257VAB2     CCC
                 A1-C       45257VAC0     CCC

           JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2
                       Series    2006-NC2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-4        46629FAC4     CCC
                 A-5        46629FAD2     CCC
                 M-1        46629FAE0     CCC
                 M-2        46629FAF7     CCC

            JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH2
                        Series    2007-CH2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AF-3       46630MAD4     CCC
                 AF-4       46630MAE2     CCC
                 AF-5       46630MAF9     CCC
                 AF-6       46630MAG7     CCC
                 MF-1       46630MAH5     CCC
                 MF-2       46630MAJ1     CCC
                 MF-3       46630MAK8     CCC
                 MV-2       46630MAY8     CCC
                 MV-3       46630MAZ5     CCC
                 MV-4       46630MBA9     CCC
                 MV-5       46630MBB7     CCC
                 MV-6       46630MBC5     CCC

                  Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-7
                         Series    2007-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AX1        52519BAA8     CCC
                 AP1        52519BAB6     CCC
                 1-A1       52519BAC4     CCC
                 1-A2       52519BAD2     CCC
                 1-A3       52519BAE0     CCC
                 1-A4       52519BAF7     CCC
                 1-A5       52519BAG5     CCC
                 1-A6       52519BAH3     CCC
                 2-A1       52519BAJ9     CCC
                 2-A2       52519BAK6     CCC
                 2-A3       52519BAL4     CCC
                 2-A4       52519BAM2     CCC
                 2-A5       52519BAN0     CCC
                 2-A6       52519BAP5     CCC
                 2-A7       52519BAQ3     CCC
                 2-A8       52519BAR1     CCC
                 2-A9       52519BAS9     CCC
                 2-A10      52519BAT7     CCC
                 3-A1       52519BAW0     CCC
                 4-A1       52519BAX8     CCC
                 5-A1       52519BBH2     CCC
                 AX2        52519BBW9     CCC

                     Lehman XS Trust 2007-17H
                        Series    2007-17H

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         52525PAA9     CCC
                 AIO        52525PAC5     CCC

           MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM2
                        Series    2006-AM2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-3        57645FAC1     CCC
                 A-4        57645FAQ0     CCC
                 M-1        57645FAD9     CCC
                 M-2        57645FAE7     CCC

           MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-NCW
                        Series    2007-NCW

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        576456AD9     CCC
                 M-3        576456AE7     CCC
                 M-4        576456AF4     CCC
                 M-5        576456AG2     CCC
                 M-6        576456AH0     CCC
                 M-7        576456AJ6     CCC
                 M-8        576456AK3     CCC
                 M-9        576456AL1     CCC
                 M-10       576456AM9     CCC

  Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-5
                         Series    2007-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A        59025RAW7     CCC
                 2-A2       59025RAU1     CCC
                 2-A3       59025RAV9     CCC
                 M-1        59025RAG2     CCC
                 M-2        59025RAX5     CCC
                 M-3        59025RAH0     CCC

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE4
                        Series    2006-HE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        59023EAA6     CCC
                 A-2B       59023EAC2     CCC
                 A-2C       59023EAD0     CCC
                 A-2D       59023EAE8     CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-AR1
                        Series    2006-AR1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        59020VAS2     CCC
                 A-2C       59020VAV5     CCC
                 A-2D       59020VAW3     CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-HE5
                        Series    2006-HE5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        59022QAA0     CCC
                 A-2B       59022QAC6     CCC
                 A-2C       59022QAD4     CCC
                 A-2D       59022QAE2     CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-MLN1
                       Series    2006-MLN1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        59023AAA4     CCC
                 A-2B       59023AAC0     CCC
                 A-2C       59023AAD8     CCC
                 A-2D       59023AAE6     CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc Trust 2006-HE5
                        Series    2006 HE5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        61749NAF4     CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE7
                        Series    2007-HE7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        61756YAE3     CCC
                 M-2        61756YAF0     CCC
                 M-3        61756YAG8     CCC
                 M-4        61756YAH6     CCC
                 M-5        61756YAJ2     CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
                         Series    2007-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        68401TAF5     CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                         Series    2007-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      68402BAA4     CCC
                 II-A-2     68402BAC0     CCC
                 II-A-3     68402BAD8     CCC
                 II-A-4     68402BAE6     CCC
                 M-1        68402BAF3     CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4
                         Series    2007-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        68403FAF3     CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5
                         Series    2007-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        68403HAF9     CCC

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6
                         Series    2007-6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        68403KAE5     CCC
                 M-2        68403KAF2     CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1
                       Series    2007-FDX1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 III-A-4    68402VAF9     CCC
                 III-A-5    68402VAG7     CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2
                       Series    2007-FXD2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        68403BAH8     CCC
                 M-2        68403BAJ4     CCC

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1
                        Series    2007-HL1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      68402SAA7     CCC
                 II-A-2     68402SAC3     CCC
                 II-A-3     68402SAD1     CCC
                 II-A-4     68402SAE9     CCC

             Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-3
                         Series    2006-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        69121PDZ3     CCC
                 M-2        69121PEA7     CCC

                   RASC Series 2006-EMX5 Trust
                       Series    2006-EMX5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-3        74924QAC4     CCC
                 A-4        74924QAD2     CCC

                    RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
                       Series    2006-KS3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        76113ABM2     CCC
                 M-3        76113ABN0     CCC
                 M-4        76113ABP5     CCC

                    RASC Series 2007-KS3 Trust
                       Series    2007-KS3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1S       74924YAF0     CCC
                 M-2S       74924YAG8     CCC

            Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2
                         Series    2006-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        759676AK5     CCC
                 M-2        759676AL3     CCC
                 M-3        759676AM1     CCC

             Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4
                         Series    2006-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AF-3       75970HAF7     CCC
                 AF-4       75970HAG5     CCC
                 AF-5       75970HAH3     CCC
                 AF-6       75970HAJ9     CCC
                 M-1        75970HAK6     CCC
                 M-2        75970HAL4     CCC

                Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-1
                         Series    2007-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        80556BAA3     CCC
                 A-2b       80556BAC9     CCC
                 A-2c       80556BAD7     CCC
                 A-2d       80556BAE5     CCC
                 M-1        80556BAF2     CCC

               Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-WMC1
                       Series    2007-WMC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      83612NAA3     CCC
                 III-A-2    83612NAD7     CCC
                 III-A-3    83612NAE5     CCC
                 III-A-4    83612NAF2     CCC

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-AM1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         86359XAA1     CCC
                 A4         86359XAD5     CCC
                 A5         86359XAE3     CCC
                 M1         86359XAF0     CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-BC4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         86359RAA4     CCC
                 A2         86359RAB2     AAA
                 A4         86359RAD8     CCC
                 A5         86359RAE6     CCC

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2006-EQ1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         86360RAA1     CCC
                 A3         86360RAC7     AAA
                 A4         86360RAD5     B
                 A5         86360RAE3     CCC
                 M1         86360RAF0     CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-BC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         86362PAA3     CCC
                 A4         86362PAD7     CCC
                 A5         86362PAE5     CCC
                 A6         86362PAF2     CCC
                 M1         86362PAG0     CCC

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-BC3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A2       86363WAB5     B-
                 1-A3       86363WAC3     CCC
                 1-A4       86363WAD1     CCC
                 2-A2       86363WAF6     B-
                 2-A3       86363WAG4     CCC
                 2-A4       86363WAH2     CCC
                 1-M1       86363WAJ8     CCC
                 2-M1       86363WAK5     CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                       Series    2007-BC4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         86365DAA7     CCC
                 A2         86365DAB5     CCC
                 A4         86365DAD1     CCC
                 M1         86365DAH2     CCC
                 M2         86365DAN9     CCC
                 M3         86365DAP4     CCC
                 M4         86365DAQ2     CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                        Series    2007-MLN1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M1         863613AF2     CCC
                 M2         863613AG0     CCC

                   Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5
                         Series    2006-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-M-2      8815612J2     CCC

                   Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-4HE
                        Series    2007-4HE

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        88157QAK4     CCC

     WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates WaMu Series 2007-HE4 Trust
                        Series    2007-HE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A        93363XAA1     CCC
                 II-A3      93363XAD5     CCC
                 II-A4      93363XAE3     CCC
                 M-1        93363XAF0     CCC

         Washington Mutual Asset-Backed Certificates WMABS
                        Series    2006-HE3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-1      93934MAA5     CCC
                 2-A-3      93934MAD9     CCC
                 2-A-4      93934MAE7     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes From Five CMBS to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of certificates from five separate U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' due to recurring
interest shortfalls that S&P expects to continue in the
foreseeable future.

Five of the downgraded classes have experienced interest
shortfalls for nine or more months.  The recurring interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily due to
one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations, trust expenses, and special
servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due, and
an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P details the five downgraded classes from the five CMBS
transactions below.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ15

S&P lowered its rating on the class O certificates from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust's series 2007-IQ15 due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to one
asset that is currently with the special servicer, Centerline
Servicing Inc.  As of the March 12, 2010, remittance report, an
ARA totaling $24.8 million was in effect for this asset.  The
resulting reported ASER amount was approximately $110,000, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $1,304,168.  Standard & Poor's
considered the ASER, which is derived from an ARA based on a
recent MAI appraisal, as well as current special servicing fees to
determine its ratings actions for this transaction.  Reported
interest shortfalls total $142,334, which prompted interest
shortfalls to the class O certificates.  Class O has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past 11 months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.

The collateral pool for the MSCI 2007-IQ15 transaction consists of
134 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.03 billion.  As of
the March 12, 2010, remittance report, six assets ($195.1 million;
9.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including three
top 10 assets.  The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
one ($65.0 million; 0.3.2%) is real estate owned (REO), two
($66.3 million, 3.3%) are in foreclosure, two ($15.8 million,
1.5%) are 90-plus-days delinquent, and one ($48.0 million, 2.4%)
is 60-plus-days delinquent.

                          COMM 2004-LNB3

S&P lowered its rating on the class O certificates from COMM 2004-
LNB3 due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to three assets that are currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  As of the March 10,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $11.8 million were in
effect for these three assets.  The ARAs are based on recent MAI
appraisals.  The resulting reported ASER amount was $67,749, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $270,396.  Standard &
Poor's considered these three ASERs, as well as current special
servicing fees to determine its ratings actions.  Reported
interest shortfalls total $74,149 and have affected all of the
classes subordinate to class K.  Classes L and M have experienced
interest shortfalls for one month, and class N has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past four months.  The class O
certificate has experienced interest shortfalls for the past 11
months, and S&P sets this class to 'D' because S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.

The collateral pool for the COMM 2004-LNB3 transaction consists of
87 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.13 billion.  As of
the March 10, 2010, remittance report, four assets ($28.4 million;
2.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: one asset ($4.4 million; 0.4%)
is REO, and three ($24.0 million, 2.1%) are in foreclosure

              DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1

S&P lowered its rating on the class B-8 certificates from DLJ
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1 to 'D' due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from an ASER related to
one asset that is currently with the special servicer, CWCapital.
As of the March 10, 2010, remittance report, an ARA totaling
$5.6 million was in effect for this asset.  The ARA is based on a
recent MAI appraisal.  The total reported ASER amount was $37,675,
and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $424,090.  Standard &
Poor's considered this ASER, as well as current special servicing
fees to determine its ratings actions.  Reported interest
shortfalls totaled $156,423 and have affected all of the classes
subordinate to class B-4.  Class B-5 has experienced interest
shortfalls for one month, and classes B-6 and B-7 have experienced
interest shortfalls for the past three months.  Class B-8 has
experienced shortfalls for the past 10 months, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.

The collateral pool for the DLJ 2000-CF1 transaction consists of
28 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $264.7 million.  As of
the March 10, 2010, remittance report, five assets ($52.9 million;
20.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including two
top 10 assets.  The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
one asset ($8.1 million; 3.1%) is REO, and four ($44.8 million,
16.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent.

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
                          Series 2000-WF1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2000-WF1 to
'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to three assets that are currently with the special
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC.  As of the March 15,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $8.4 million were in effect
for these three assets.  The ARAs are based on recent MAI
appraisals.  The resulting reported ASER amount was $75,565, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $491,914.  Standard &
Poor's considered these three ASERs, as well as current special
servicing fees to determine its ratings actions.  An asset
liquidation in March 2010 prompted the repayment of interest
shortfalls totaling $191,198, which caused class K to receive a
partial payback of accumulated interest shortfalls.  The class
experienced shortfalls for eight months prior, however, and S&P
expects it to experience additional shortfalls in the foreseeable
future.

The collateral pool for the BSCMS 2000-WF1 transaction consists of
33 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $91.9 million.  As of
the March 15, 2010, remittance report, nine assets ($39.6 million;
43.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including five
of the top 10 assets.  The payment status of these assets is: two
($20.4 million; 22.3%) are REO, one ($5.3 million, 5.8%) is in
foreclosure, and five ($13.9 million, 15.0%) are more than 90 days
delinquent.

          Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Series 1999-LIFE1

S&P lowered its rating on the class L certificates from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 1999-LIFE1 to 'D' due to recurring
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from an ASER related to
one asset that is currently with the special servicer, Wells Fargo
Bank N.A.  As of the March 15, 2010, remittance report, an ARA
totaling $1.9 million was in effect for this asset.  The resulting
reported ASER amount was $14,983, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was also $14,983.  Standard & Poor's considered this ASER,
which is derived from an ARA based on a recent MAI appraisal, as
well as current special servicing fees to determine its ratings
actions.  Reported interest shortfalls totaled $24,330 and have
reached the class L certificates.  Class L has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past nine months, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.

The collateral pool for the MSCI 1999-LIFE1 transaction consists
of nine loans with an aggregate trust balance of $48.1 million.
As of the March 15, 2010, remittance report, four assets
($11.8 million; 24.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The payment status of the delinquent assets is: three assets
($9.8 million; 20.4%) are more than 90 days delinquent, and one
($2.0 million, 4.2%) is in its grace period.

                         Ratings Lowered

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ15
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class  To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  -----  --  ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  O       D   CCC-            1.26              16,542        179,947

                          COMM 2004-LNB3
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-LNB3

         Rating                          Reported interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                          --------------------------------
  Class  To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  -----  --  ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  O       D   B-               0.12             22,180        179,433

              DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                         --------------------------------
  Class   To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  -----   --  ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  B-8    D   CCC              0.73       51,686        465,857

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1

          Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                         --------------------------------
  Class   To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  -----   --  ----  ---------------------       -------    -----------
  K      D   CCC              4.13            0        265,912

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-LIFE1

          Rating                         Reported interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                         --------------------------------
  Class   To  From  Credit enhancement (%)      Current    Accumulated
  -----   --  ----  ----------------------      -------    -----------
  L      D   B                2.81       16,749        121,524



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
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Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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                  *** End of Transmission ***