TCR_Public/091220.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, December 20, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 351

                            Headlines



ABN AMRO: S&P Raises Rating on $850 Mil. Securities to 'BB'
ACACIA CRE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
ADVANTA BUSINESS: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 12 Securities
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATE: Moody's Amends PR on 2003-A Certs.
AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Deals

ARBOR REALTY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
AUCTION RATE: S&P Raises Ratings on $50 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
AUCTION RATE: S&P Raises Ratings on Class A Certs. to 'BB'
BNY CONVERGEX: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
BRAZOS RIVER: Bond Remarketing Won't Affect Fitch's 'CCC' Rating

CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Six Tranches From Five Deals
CD 2005-CD1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 Classes of Certs.
CLAYTON COUNTY: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Rating on $125 Mil. Bonds
COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three 2001-1 Notes
COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three Classes

COBALTS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Certs. to 'Ba3'
COMM 2007-FL14: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 Certificates
CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2003-17 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2006-C4 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-C5 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2007-C3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2005-C3 Securities
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-C2 Securities
CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Note Classes

DAVIS SQUARE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
DILLON READ: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $65 Mil. Bonds
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1999-CG3 Certs.
DUCHESS VI: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes

DUKE FUNDING: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class X Senior Notes
EMPORIA PREFERRED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
EMPORIA PREFERRED FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 3 Classes
G-FORCE CDO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
G-FORCE CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-1 Securities

GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C1 Certificates
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A1 to 'CC'
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-GG9 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL4 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three2004-FL2 Certs.

GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-RR3 Securities
INDIANA HEALTH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $35 Mil. Bonds
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2006-LDP6 Securities
KIDSPEACE INC: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on $58.2 Mil. Bonds
LAKESIDE RE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class A Notes

LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2006-MF3 Certs.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2006-MF2 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C5 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2008-C1 Securities
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Various Notes

MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M 2006-1 Certs.
MILLSTONE FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 11 Classes
NOMURA CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
PANIOLO CABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series A to 'B1'
PASS-THROUGH AUCTION: S&P Raises Rating on Two Certs. to 'BB'

PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on SPR-1 Certs. to 'Ba3'
PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
PREFERRED PASS-THROUGH: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Certs. to 'BB'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Ratings on LMG-2 Certs. to 'B1'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on LMG-1 Certs.

PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $25 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
RUBY FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'C' Ratings on $50 Mil. Notes
SALT CREEK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-6$L 2005-1 Notes
SAN DIEGO NATURAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on 1998 Certs. From 'B1'
SASCO 2007-BHC1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes

SATURN VENTURES: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
SATURNS SPRINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-2 Certs.
SATURNS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $63 Mil. Units to 'BB'
SIGNUM FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
SOLAR TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2002-1 Certificates

STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on $47.5 Mil. Notes
STRUCTURED REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-2 Certs.
TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
TRIAXX FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B-1 to 'C'

TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1L to 'Caa3'
TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2003-1 Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch
UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-FL1 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Nine 2005-C19 Certs.

* Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine Series of Rental Car Notes
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Structured Note Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Tranches From 15 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 48 Classes From 26 Subprime RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Tranches From 10 CLO Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 65 Tranches From 14 CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches From 15 CLO Transactions



                            *********

ABN AMRO: S&P Raises Rating on $850 Mil. Securities to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on ABN AMRO
North America Holding Preferred Capital Repackaging Trust I's
$850 million fixed- and floating-rate noncumulative trust
securities to 'BB' from 'B'.

The rating on the securities is dependent on the lower of the
issue credit rating assigned to the underlying securities, ABN
AMRO North America Holdings Capital Funding LLC's I through XIV
floating-rate noncumulative perpetual preferred securities ('BB');
and the issuer credit rating assigned to the swap counterparty,
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (A+/Stable/A-1).

The rating actions reflect the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the
underlying securities to 'BB' from 'B'.  Bank of America Corp.
acquired ABN AMRO North America Holding Co. in 2007.  ABN AMRO
North America Holdings Capital Funding LLC's series I through XIV
are indirect subsidiaries of ABN AMRO North America Holding Co.


ACACIA CRE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed six classes of Notes issued by
Acacia CRE CDO 1, Ltd., on review for possible downgrade due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

Acacia CRE CDO 1, Ltd., is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (74% of the
pool), CRE CDO notes (8% of the pool), and residential mortgage
backed securities (18% of the pool).  As of October 30, 2009, the
aggregate Notes balance of the transaction, including the
Subordinate Notes, has decreased to $291.7 million from
$300.2 million at issuance, with the approximately $10 million
pay-down directed to the Class A Notes.  The pay-down was
triggered by the failure of the Class A/B, Class C/D, and Class
E/F Overcollateralization Tests.  Per the Indenture, the failure
of any Overcollateralization Test results in all scheduled
interest and principal payments being directed to pay down the
most senior notes, until the failed Overcollateralization Test is
satisfied.

Twenty-seven assets with a par balance of over $98.3 million (35%
of the pool) were listed as defaulted as of October 30, 2009,
compared to eighteen defaulted assets totaling $56.7 million as of
last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from defaulted
collateral and the key indicators.

The rating action is:

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. B, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. C, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. D, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. E, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. F, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 30, 2009.


ADVANTA BUSINESS: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 12 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of 12 classes
of senior securities issued out of the Advanta Business Card
Master Trust.  These notes are backed by a $2.6 billion revolving
pool of unsecured credit card receivables that were marketed to
small business owners and business professionals.  This rating
action concludes the review process initiated on May 15.

                            Rationale

The decision to confirm the Ba2 rating on the Class A notes is
driven primarily by a greater level of certainty with respect to
collateral performance.  The performance of the trust immediately
following the beginning of the early amortization in May was
initially very volatile, but not altogether unexpected.  In recent
months, however, there have been signs of performance
stabilization.  Moody's believe the Class A notes will be paid in
full even if performance deteriorates marginally from its present
level.  However, the challenges facing small business owners in
the current economic environment are such that material risks to
the future behavior of these cardholders remain.

Six months after the Trust triggered an early amortization event
and following the November payment date, Advanta Class A investors
have been repaid 62.5% of their initial investment.  Although the
pace of repayment has slowed (investors were only paid 5.2% of
their original balance in November) and will likely slow further
in coming months, the payment of almost two thirds of the original
balance is a significant step towards the full payment of the
senior notes.

The trust's collateral performance has shown signs of
stabilization in recent months.  For example, the principal
payment rate, which fell month over month by more than 35% during
the first three months of the early amortization period, has
stabilized at around 4%.  Moody's expect it will remain quite low
as the collateral liquidates since the vast majority of remaining
cardholders are paying at or near the minimum amount required.
This dramatic drop in the PPR followed by an extended period of
low but stable performance was observed under similar
circumstances when the credit card issuer NextCard was forced to
close its accounts and wind down its portfolio in 2002.

Also, based on current delinquency and roll rates, Moody's expect
that the charge-off rate will remain around 35% in the near term
and will not likely exceed 45% in the foreseeable future.
Finally, yield has proved to be resilient through the wind down of
the program and has been particularly stable at an average of
approximately 19%.

In light of the trust performance since early amortization
commenced, Moody's have adjusted Moody's ranges of performance
expectations,: for charge-offs, the new range is 35% to 45 % (down
from 40% to 50%); for the PPR, 2.5% to 4.5% (down from 5% to 8%);
and for yield, 15% to 20% (up from 10% to 14%).  Using these
ranges of expectations and assuming all else being equal, one
could assume all these contemporaneous, although not immediate,
stresses, before senior noteholders would take a first dollar of
loss: charge-offs could rise to 45%, the PPR could fall to 2.5%,
and yield fall to 15%.

                    Bankruptcy Of Advanta Corp.

Advanta Corp. announced on November 8 that it filed a voluntary
petition for reorganization under Chapter 11.  Advanta Corp.'s
wholly owned bank subsidiary, Advanta Bank Corp., is the servicer
for Advanta's credit card trust and was not included in the
filing.  Even so, given that the bank has been below regulatory
capital requirements since September, the holding company's
bankruptcy filing increases the likelihood that the subsidiary
bank will go into receivership and be replaced as servicer.
Advanta does not have a contracted back-up servicing arrangement,
but does operate on a widely used third-party platform, which
should ease the transfer of servicing duties to a third party.  As
a result, Moody's anticipate a higher servicing fee and a
potential further deterioration in performance in Moody's stressed
cash flow assumptions.  The receivership of NextCard's bank, which
precipitated the shut down of their card program and the transfer
of servicing duties to a third party, helped to inform Moody's
assumptions for the Advanta credit.

The complete rating actions are:

Ratngs Confirmed

Issuer: Advanta Business Card Master Trust, AdvantaSeries

  -- $225,000,000 Class A (2005-A2) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $250,000,000 Class A (2006-A3) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $300,000,000 Class A (2006-A4) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class A (2006-A5) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $250,000,000 Class A (2006-A6) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class A (2006-A7) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class A (2007-A1) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $225,000,000 Class A (2007-A2) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class A (2007-A3) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class A (2007-A4) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $400,000,000 Class A (2007-A5) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

  -- $150,000,000 Class A (2008-A3) Asset backed Notes, Ba2
     confirmed; previously downgraded to Ba2 under review for
     possible downgrade from Baa2 on May 15, 2009

Advanta Corp., headquartered in Spring House, PA, reported
approximately $7.7 billion in managed assets as of December 31,
2008.  Advanta Bank Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Advanta,
is a depositary institution subject to regulatory oversight by
both the FDIC and the Utah Department of Financial Institutions.
Advanta has originated and serviced credit card receivables since
1995.


AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATE: Moody's Amends PR on 2003-A Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has revised the second paragraph of its
press release on Notes and Certificates issued by Aircraft
Certificate Owner Trust 2003-A, announcing that it has downgraded
its ratings on the Notes and Certificates.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Aircraft Certificate Owner Trust 2003-A

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 6, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 6, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Certificates, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 6, 2009
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The Aircraft Certificate Owner Trust Notes and Certificates are
backed by debt issued under three Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificate transactions.  The Underlying EETC Debt has been
issued by three separate pass through trusts, the obligations of
which are secured by leases and loans to US Airways on various
Airbus planes.  Each of the Underlying EETC Debt is also supported
by an insurance policy issued by MBIA (rated B3).


AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed five transactions sponsored by AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc., between 2005 and 2006 on review for
possible upgrade.  Although some of the transactions are
performing weaker than originally expected, the cash reserves, due
to their non-declining nature, have increased substantially
relative to remaining expected losses.  A significant portion of
the expected lifetime losses have already been incurred as these
transactions have paid down to approximately 7% to 17% of their
original collateral balances.  The reserve accounts, as a
percentage of the current collateral balances, are expected to
continue increasing as the pools pay down further.

For the transactions that closed during the first half of 2005,
Moody's expects performance to be within initial expectations.
Earlier 2005 transactions are performing stronger than later 2005
and 2006 issuance.  The AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2005-1 and 2005-B-M transactions are expected to incur lifetime
cumulative net losses between 11.25% and 12.50% as compared to
original expectations of 13.25% to 13.75%.  For the transactions
that closed during the latter half of 2005 and first quarter of
2006, Moody's expects the CNL to be between 13.50% and 16.25% as
compared to initial expectations of 12.00% to 12.75%.  During its
review, Moody's will continue to refine its assessment of losses
relative to the credit enhancement available.

Total hard credit enhancement (excluding available excess spread)
for the upgraded transactions ranges from approximately 27% to 71%
of the outstanding collateral pool balances.  The transactions
also benefit from excess spread, which ranged between 9% and 10%
on an annual basis.  Updated remaining expected losses range
between 6% and 14% of the outstanding collateral pool balances.
As stated earlier, these transactions benefit from non-declining
reserve accounts which range from approximately 9% to 28% of the
outstanding pool balances, are expected to continue increasing as
the pools pay down further

Two additional transactions, AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables
Trust 2004-D-F and AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2005-
A-X, were not placed on review for upgrade although they also
performed stronger than initial expectations,.  This is because
the company has elected to purchase the remaining collateral by
exercising the call option on the January 2010 distribution date.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from monoline
bond insurer.  The current ratings on the below notes are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2005-1

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 11.25% to 11.75%
     (as a percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class D

  -- Current Rating: A1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 6/4/2007 Upgraded to A1 from A2

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2005-B-M

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 11.75 to 12.50%
     (as a percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: A1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 1/8/2009 Upgraded to A1 from A3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying rating: A1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 1/8/2009 Upgraded to A1 from A3

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2005-C-F

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 13.50% to 14.75%
     (as a percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Aa3; previously on 11/23/2008 Downgraded to
     Aa3 from Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc (Aa3;
     previously on 11/21/2008 Downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa)

  -- Underlying rating: A2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 1/8/2009 Upgraded to A2 from Baa2

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2005-D-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 14.00 to 15.50%
     (as a percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: A3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 1/8/2009 Upgraded to A3 from Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

  -- Underlying rating: A3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 1/8/2009 Upgraded to A3 from Baa2

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2006-1

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 14.75% to 16.50%
     (as a percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class C

  -- Current Rating: A2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 3/2/2006 Published A2

  -- Description: Class D

  -- Current Rating: Baa2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade,
     previously on 3/2/2006 Published Baa2


ARBOR REALTY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades nine classes of Arbor Realty Mortgage
Securities series 2006-1, Ltd./LLC reflecting Fitch's base case
loss expectation of 21.4%.  Fitch's performance expectation
incorporates prospective views regarding commercial real estate
market value and cash flow declines.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

ARMSS 2006-1 is primarily collateralized by senior commercial real
estate debt (78.7% of total collateral is either whole loans or A-
notes).  Given the seniority of the loans, Fitch expects lower
than average losses upon default for these assets due to the high
concentration of senior loans, which generally experience better
recoveries than subordinate debt.  Three loans (2.9%) are
currently defaulted.  Fitch expects significant to full losses on
these loan interests.

Offsetting these expected losses, the asset manager has purchased
over 20 assets at discounts ranging from 30% to 98.5% of par,
which has resulted in approximately $20 million of par building
for the transaction.  All overcollateralization and interest
coverage ratios are currently in compliance.

ARMSS 2006-1 is a $600 million CRE collateralized debt obligation
managed by Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. The transaction has a five-
year reinvestment period that ends December 2011.  As of the
November 2009 trustee report and per Fitch categorizations, the
CDO was substantially invested: whole loans/A-notes (78.7%), B-
notes (8.5%), CRE mezzanine loans (5.8%), preferred equity
positions (0.3%), CRE CDOs (4.9%), and cash/uninvested proceeds
(1.8%).

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 66.2% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 10.1% from generally either trailing 12 month
(TTM) third quarter 2008, year-end 2008 or TTM first quarter 2009
cash flows.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
67.7%, due to the senior position of many of the assets.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
consists of an A-note secured by a portfolio of San Francisco
multifamily properties.  While a loan modification in mid-2009
extended the loan term an additional four years, replaced the
sponsor with a better-capitalized entity, converted two
subordinate participations into equity, and increased the interest
rate spread while removing the interest rate floor; a default
still seems likely based on the fact that the property cash flow
has not substantially improved.  Fitch modeled a significant loss
on this loan based on the remaining leverage on the property.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan secured by 22.8 acres of waterfront land located
in Jacksonville, Florida.  While conceptual approvals for the
development of three residential towers, a five story parking
deck, a marina, and offices and retail were approved in December
2005; the permitting process has still not been completed.  The
loan was recently extended through January 2010.  An Arbor related
entity is part of the sponsorship.  Fitch assumed a 100%
probability of default; and modeled a significant loss on this
loan.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan secured by an office property located in the
garment district of Manhattan.  The original business plan was to
increase rents by renovating and re-tenanting the property away
from its base of light manufacturing users to office.  However,
under current market conditions, the property has not met
expectations and the sponsor is reconsidering its strategy.  Fitch
modeled a significant loss on this loan.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'U.S. CREL CDO
Surveillance Criteria', which applies stresses to property cash
flows and debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Based on this analysis, the class A notes' breakeven rates are
generally consistent with the 'BBB' rating category; the class B
through D notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the
'BB' rating category and the class E and F notes' breakeven rates
are generally consistent with the 'B' rating category.

Ratings for classes G and H are generally based on a deterministic
analysis because the notes' breakeven rates fall below the 'B'
rating category default levels.  The deterministic analysis
considers the current percentage of defaulted and delinquent
assets and any Fitch loans of concern, as well as the likelihood
for OC tests to fail and/or cure.  Based on this analysis, classes
G and H are consistent with a 'CCC' rating, meaning default is
possible given the credit enhancement to each class falls below
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 21.4%.

The class A through F notes were each assigned a Negative Rating
Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS5'.  The
LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  LS ratings should
always be considered in conjunction with probability of default
indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.

Classes G and H were assigned recovery ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  The recovery ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(66.2% and 67.7%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag to determine the present value
of all future proceeds to that class.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a recovery rating.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class G reflects modeled recoveries of
30.6% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($4.1 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($1.1 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($5.2 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($11.7 million).

The assignment of 'RR6' to class H reflects that the modeled
recovery for this class is less than 10% of its principal balance.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings, RR ratings, and Rating
Outlooks to these classes as indicated:

  -- $230,000,000 class A1A to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $100,000,000 class A1R to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $72,900,000 class A2 to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $41,100,000 class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31,200,000 class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13,350,000 class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $14,250,000 class E to 'B/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,950,000 class G to 'CCC/RR5' from 'B';

  -- $14,100,000 class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B'.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings and Rating Outlooks to
this class:

  -- $13,650,000 class F at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.


AUCTION RATE: S&P Raises Ratings on $50 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Auction
Rate Securities Trust 2007-2's $50 million class A and B trust
certificates to 'BB' from 'B'.

The ratings on the trust certificates are dependent on the credit
rating on the underlying security, Bank of America Corp.'s
noncumulative perpetual floating-rate preferred stock series E
notes.

The rating actions reflect the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the
underlying security to 'BB' from 'B'.


AUCTION RATE: S&P Raises Ratings on Class A Certs. to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Auction
Rate Securities Trust 2007-1's class A auction rate trust
certificates and class B leveraged trust certificates to 'BB' from
'B'.

The ratings on the certificates are dependent on S&P's issue
rating on the underlying security, Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.'s
noncumulative perpetual floating-rate preferred stock series 5
notes.

The upgrades reflect the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the rating on
the underlying security to 'BB' from 'B'.


BNY CONVERGEX: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
ratings on BNY ConvergEx Group LLC, including its 'B+' long-term
counterparty credit rating.  At the same time, S&P assigned a '3'
recovery rating to its first-lien secured credit facility,
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for
lenders in the event of a payment default.  The outlook is stable.

"Our ratings on ConvergEx are based on the company's low-risk,
agency-only business model and good niche positioning," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebnem Caglayan.  The firm's very
aggressive financial profile, particularly its acquisition
strategy; negative tangible equity; weak interest coverage; and
high debt offset the strengths.

ConvergEx was formed in October 2006 in a highly leveraged
transaction.  As a result, the company has since carried a heavy
debt load and had negative tangible equity and weak interest
coverage.  However, the company's financial profile has improved
modestly from both its continued growth and some reduction in
debt.  Interest coverage has improved but remains weak at 2.1x.
In November 2009, the firm completed one and announced two more
acquisitions to be completed by year-end 2009.  In S&P's opinion,
these businesses are fairly low risk; they complement ConvergEx's
service offerings and are relatively modest in size.  However,
financing ofthese acquisitions cumulatively has resulted in lower-
than-expected debt reduction and reflecta more aggressive strategy
and attitude toward debt than S&P had anticipated.

There is substantial negative tangible equity, but because the
balance sheet is not needed for the company's business operations,
this is less of a concern.  ConvergEx's liquidity profile is
adequate for the rating.

S&P views the agency-only broker model as of inherently lower risk
as it involves no proprietary trading or even a securities
inventory.  The majority of ConvergEx's operating revenue (77.7%)
comes from transactional business tied to highly cyclical and
volatile equity and options trading.  The agency-only model and
expense flexibility allow the company to earn stable, relatively
low-risk returns.  This stability helps to alleviate some of S&P's
concern about the company's aggressive financial profile and lack
of tangible equity.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that ConvergEx will
continue to post modest interest coverage, gradually reduce debt,
and maintain prudent liquidity.  If ConvergEx exceeds projected
debt reductions and materially improves its interest coverage, S&P
could raise the ratings.  Conversely, if the liquidity profile or
interest coverage deteriorates, S&P could lower the ratings.


BRAZOS RIVER: Bond Remarketing Won't Affect Fitch's 'CCC' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings' 'CCC' rating with a Negative Outlook on the Brazos
River Authority's (TX) (Texas Competitive Electric Holdings)
pollution control revenue refunding bonds series 1994A is
unchanged following the remarketing of the bond.  The bond is
being reoffered at a new interest rate.

With this remarketing the 1994A bond will receive a new CUSIP:

  -- 106213CK5 (original);
  -- 106213GM7 (remarketed).


CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Six Tranches From Five Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded six tranches from five subprime transactions
sponsored by Capital One Auto Finance, Inc., in 2005 and 2006.
The 2005 and the earliest 2006 subprime transactions are
performing either within or stronger than original expectations.
However, COAF's remaining sponsored subprime transactions, which
all closed in 2007, are performing moderately weaker than Moody's
original expectations.  The stabilizing performance and structural
features such as non-declining cash reserves have resulted in
increases in credit enhancement sufficient for the upgrade.

Moody's expects the Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2005-C, 2005-D,
and 2006-A to incur lifetime cumulative net losses of 9.50% as
compared to original expectations ranging between 9.30% and
13.00%.  For Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-B and 2006-C
transactions, Moody's expects the lifetime CNL to be 11.50% and
11.00%, respectively.  Moody's originally expected these
transactions to perform at 8.75% and 7.25%, respectively.  The
current collateral balance as a percentage of the initial balance
ranges between 13% and 16% for the 2005 deals, and between 18% and
29% for the 2006 deals.

Total hard credit enhancement (excluding available excess spread)
for the upgraded transactions ranges from approximately 17% to 30%
of the outstanding collateral pool balances.  The transactions
also benefit from excess spread, which ranges between
approximately 6% to 8% per annum.  Updated remaining expected
losses range between 5% and 9.50% of the outstanding collateral
pool balances.  As stated earlier, these transactions benefit from
non-declining reserve accounts, ranging from approximately 6% to
16% of the outstanding pool balances, that are expected to
continue to increase as the pools pay down further.  Finally, all
the deals are more than 30 months seasoned, and therefore no
longer eligible for any overcollateralization step-downs.
Therefore, the OC level as a percentage of the outstanding balance
is expected to remain constant.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from monoline
insurance.  The current ratings on the below notes are consistent
with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at the higher
of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and any
underlying rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2005-C

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 9.50% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4-A

  -- Current Rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: FGIC (rating withdrawn; previously rated
     Caa3 on 3/25/2009)

  -- Underlying rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Class Description: Class A-4-B

  -- Current Rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: FGIC (rating withdrawn; previously rated
     Caa3 on 3/25/2009)

  -- Underlying rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2005-D

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 9.50% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying rating: Aaa, previously on 12/3/2009 A2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 9.50% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

  -- Underlying rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed
     on Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-B

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 11.50% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

  -- Underlying rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed
     on Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-C

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 11.00% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed on
     Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: FGIC (rating withdrawn; previously rated
     Caa3 on 3/25/2009)

  -- Underlying rating: Aa2, previously on 12/3/2009 Baa2 Placed
     on Review for Possible Upgrade


CD 2005-CD1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of CD 2005-CD1
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CD1 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from loans in special servicing and increased credit
quality dispersion for the remainder of the pool.  The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the November 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$3.75 billion from $3.88 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 223 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  The pool includes seven loans with
underlying ratings, representing 23% of the pool.

Forty-seven loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$1.7 million realized loss (75% loss severity).  Twelve loans,
representing 7% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
At Moody's last review in April 2008, only one loan, representing
less than 1% of the pool, was in special servicing.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans and other
troubled loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $305,412,000, currently rated Aaa, placed on
     review for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aaa on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class B, $29,087,000, currently rated Aa1, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa1 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class C, $43,630,000, currently rated Aa2 placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa2 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class D, $43,630,000, currently rated Aa3, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aa3 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class E, $58,174,000, currently rated A2, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at A2 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class F, $38,783,000, currently rated A3, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at A3 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class G, $43,630,000, currently rated Baa1, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa1 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class H, $43,630,000, currently rated Baa2, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa2 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class J, $48,478,000, currently rated Baa3, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa3 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class K, $29,087,000, currently rated Ba1, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba1 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class L, $9,696,000, currently rated Ba2 placed on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba2 on 1/13/2006

  -- Class M, $14,543,000, currently rated Ba3, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba3 on
     1/13/2006

  -- Class N, $9,696,000, currently rated B1, placed on review for
     possible downgraded; previously assigned at B1 on 1/13/2006

  -- Class O, $9,695,000, currently rated B2, placed on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at B2 on 1/13/2006

  -- Class P, $9,696,000, currently rated B3, placed on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at B3 on 1/13/2006


CLAYTON COUNTY: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Rating on $125 Mil. Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa1 rating to the planned
combined $125 million issuance of Development Authority of Clayton
County, Georgia Series 2009A and 2009B Special Facilities Airport
Revenue Bonds.  The proceeds of the Airport Bonds will be loaned
to Delta Air Lines, Inc., and will be used to refinance certain
existing debt facilities that funded construction of facilities at
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.  Delta's
obligations under the Loan Agreement with the Development
Authority represent an unsecured obligation of Delta.

The Caa1 rating of the Airport Bonds reflects the application of
Moody's Loss Given Default Rating Methodology.  The large amount
of secured debt obligations in the waterfall result in the
unsecured claims being notched below the B2 corporate family
rating by two notches.  The 79-LGD5 Loss Given Default assessment
indicates that the bondholders could receive substantially less
than a full recovery in the event of a default by Delta.

The B2 corporate family rating of Delta reflects the prospect that
the successful execution of the company's plan to merge its
operations with that of its wholly-owned subsidiary Northwest
Airlines Corporation could allow Delta to improve its credit
metrics profile from the current levels that are weak for the
assigned ratings.  Obtaining a single operating certificate from
the FAA and effecting the legal merger of the two airline
companies with Delta as the surviving entity are the upcoming two
key milestones of the merger plan.  The company's plans anticipate
significant cost synergies and even larger revenue synergies.  The
timely and successful achievement of the plan will be an important
indication of the efficacy of management's strategy for merging
the two airline companies; although the question remains whether
the combined operation will sustain a lower cost structure and
superior credit metrics than those of its smaller legacy carrier
peers.  The potential of weaker than expected recoveries of yields
and execution risks inherent in Delta's merger plan balance the B2
rating as do ongoing vulnerabilities to market risks and event
risk until a sustained economic recovery occurs.  The B2 rating
also considers that Delta maintains sufficient liquidity to fund a
potential investment in Japan Airlines International Co., LTD.
(Caa1, on review for possible downgrade) should the SkyTeam
alliance partners prevail in the current bidding for a tie up with
JAL.

The last rating action was on November 18, 2009 when Moody's
assigned ratings to Delta's Series 2009-1 Enhanced Equipment Trust
Certificates.

Assignments:

Issuer: Clayton County Development Authority, GA

  -- Senior Unsecured Revenue Bonds, Assigned Caa1, LGD5, 79%
  -- Senior Unsecured Revenue Bonds, Assigned Caa1, LGD5, 79%

Delta Air Lines, Inc., headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, is the
world's largest airline, providing scheduled air transportation
for passengers and cargo throughout the U.S. and around the world.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three 2001-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of three classes of notes issued by Coast Investment Grade
2001-1, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: Coast Investment Grade 2001-1, Limited

  -- US$303,400,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     due October 10, 2016 (current balance of $58,527,312.41),
     Confirmed at Baa1; previously on July 21, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$48,700,000 Class B 1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     due October 10, 2016, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on
     July 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5,000,000 Class B 2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
     October 10, 2016, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on July 21,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Coast Investment Grade 2001-1, Limited, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of CBO and CLO assets.  The
majority of the assets were originated in 2001 and 2002.

Moody's explained that the ratings are confirmed as the expected
losses posed to note holders are consistent with the current
ratings.  The rating confirmation reflects the offsetting impact
of principal amortization of certain assets in the underlying
collateral portfolio and deterioration in the overall credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), failure of the coverage tests, among other
measures.  The trustee reports that the WARF of the portfolio is
3823 as of October, 2009 compared to 3093 in July 2009.  In
addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is currently
failing one or more principal coverage tests, including the Class
B Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  However, about 12.5% of the
performing par amortized since the last review.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of 3 classes of notes issued by Coast Investment Grade
2000-1, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: Coast Investment Grade 2000-1, Limited

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     due 2015, Confirmed at A1; previously on August 20, 2009
     Downgraded to A1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes,
     due 2015, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on August 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, due
     2015, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on August 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Coast Investment Grade 2000-1, Limited, is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of CBO and CLO assets.  The
majority of the assets were originated in 2000 and 2001.

Moody's explained that the ratings are confirmed as the expected
losses posed to note holders are consistent with the current
ratings.  The rating confirmation reflects the offsetting impact
of principal amortization of certain assets in the underlying
collateral portfolio and deterioration in the overall credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), failure of the coverage tests, among other
measures.  The trustee reports that the WARF of the portfolio is
4176 as of October 2009 compared to 3616 in July 2009.  In
addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is currently
failing one or more principal and interest coverage tests,
including the Class C coverage tests.  However, about 17% of the
performing par amortized since the last review.


COBALTS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Certs. to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by COBALTS Trust for Sprint
Capital Notes:

  -- 1,000,000 8.125% COBALTS Trust Series Sprint Capital
     Certificates, Series 2002-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
Moody's rating of the Underlying Securities which are $29,686,000
6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint Capital Corporation and
which were downgraded to Ba3 by Moody's on November 20, 2009.


COMM 2007-FL14: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 25
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2007-FL14.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on six
classes from this transaction.  Concurrently, S&P removed all 31
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions reflect S&P's revised valuations of the
commercial real estate properties that serve as collateral for the
remaining loans in the pool.  The pool consists of office, retail,
and lodging properties.  A summary of the valuation declines by
property type are:

Office, which makes up 77% ($749.5 million) of the pooled trust
balance (according to the Nov. 16, 2009, trustee remittance
report), has experienced valuation declines ranging between 9% and
45% below the levels S&P assessed at issuance.  S&P generally
attributes the declines to lower in-place/market rental rates
and/or higher vacancy rates.  Retail, which constitutes 13%
($121.1 million) of the pooled trust balance, has experienced a
valuation decline of 15% since issuance due to lower occupancy.
Lodging, which makes up 10% ($97.1 million) of the pooled trust
balance, has experienced valuation declines ranging between 30%
and 40% below S&P's issuance levels.  S&P's valuations
incorporated actual declines in revenue per available room and its
expectations for future declines.

The affirmations of the class X-2, X-3-DB, X-3-SG, X-5-DB, and X-
5-SG interest-only certificates reflect S&P's current criteria.
S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009 (see "Request For Comment: Methodology
For Rating Interest-Only Certificates," on RatingsDirect).  After
S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the
IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                        Office Collateral

Office properties secure seven loans totaling $749.5 million (77%
of the pooled trust balance).  The largest concentrations are in
New York City (22% of the pooled trust balance), Southern
California (13%), Northern California (11%), suburban Virginia
(10%), and suburban New Jersey (7%).  Most of the office
properties have experienced lower in-place/market rental rates
and/or higher vacancies since issuance.

                       Largest Office Loan

The MSREF/Glenborough Portfolio loan, the largest office loan and
the largest loan in the pool, has a whole-loan balance of
$526.5 million that consists of a $343.7 million senior pooled
component (36% of the pooled trust balance), a $71.8 million
nonpooled subordinate component that supports the 'GLB' raked
certificates, and a $111.0 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  In addition, the equity interests in the borrower of
the whole loan secure mezzanine loans totaling $310.9 million held
outside the trust.  This loan is currently secured by 16 office
properties in various locations totaling 2.84 million sq. ft. The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a combined debt
service coverage of 2.26x on the trust balance for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2008, and 88% occupancy as of September 2009.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 24% since issuance due primarily
to higher vacancies.  S&P's current stressed loan-to-value ratio
on the trust balance is 90%.  This loan matures on Dec. 9, 2010,
and has one one-year extension option remaining.

    Office Loans With Maturities Within The Next Three Months

The remaining 10 loans generally have final maturities in 2011 and
in the first two months of 2012.  Five office loans in the pool
have maturity dates within the next three months.  Details are:

1330 Avenue of the Americas, the second-largest loan in the pool,
has a whole-loan balance of $240.0 million that is divided into a
$187.0 million senior pooled component (19% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $53.0 million subordinate nonpooled component.
This loan provides the sole source of cash flow for the 'AOA'
raked certificate classes.  This loan is secured by a 40-story,
535,600-sq.-ft. class A office tower in Midtown Manhattan.  Wells
Fargo reported a 0.71x DSC on the trust balance for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2008, and 66% occupancy as of October 2009.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 41% since issuance, which
primarily reflects occupancy levels that were lower than its
expectations.  S&P's current stressed LTV ratio on the trust
balance is 124%.  This loan matures on Jan. 9, 2010.  The master
servicer has indicated that the borrower plans to exercise one of
its two remaining one-year extension options.

The New Jersey Office Portfolio loan, the sixth-largest loan in
the pool, has a trust balance of $63.1 million (7% of the pooled
trust balance) and a whole-loan balance of $82.2 million.  This
loan is secured by six suburban office buildings and the Garden
State exhibition center in Franklin Township, N.J., totaling
1.15 million sq. ft. Wells Fargo reported a combined DSC of 1.11x
on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008, and 63%
occupancy as of September 2009.  S&P's adjusted valuation has
fallen 34% since issuance due primarily to lower-than-expected
occupancy.  S&P's current stressed LTV ratio on the trust balance
is 109%.  This loan matures on Jan. 9, 2010.  Wells Fargo has
stated that the borrower plans to exercise its remaining one-year
extension option.  The Rose Orchard Technology Park loan, the
eighth-largest loan in the pool, has a trust balance of
$29.1 million (3% of the pooled trust balance) and a $50.0 million
whole-loan balance.  This loan is secured by a 310,200-sq.-ft.
suburban office complex in San Jose, Calif.  Wells Fargo reported
a 2.30x DSC on the trust balance for the 12 months ended Sept. 30,
2009, and 84% occupancy as of October 2009.  S&P's adjusted
valuation has dropped 15% from S&P's issuance level due primarily
to higher vacancy-related losses.  S&P's current stressed LTV
ratio on the trust balance is 82%.  This loan matures on Jan. 9,
2010, and according to Wells Fargo, the borrower plans to exercise
one of its two remaining one-year extension options.  The 275
Seventh Avenue loan, the second-smallest loan in the pool, has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $25.8 million (3% of the pooled
trust balance).  This loan is secured by a 27-story, 594,500-sq.-
ft. office building in Manhattan.  Wells Fargo reported a 37.0x
DSC on the trust balance for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009,
and 94% occupancy as of October 2009.  S&P's adjusted valuation
has increased 11% since issuance due primarily to higher rental
income.  S&P's current stressed LTV ratio on the trust balance is
27%.  This loan matures on Jan. 9, 2010, and according to Wells
Fargo, the borrower plans to exercise one of its two remaining
one-year extension options.

The Carr California Portfolio loan, the smallest loan in the pool,
has a whole-loan balance of 27.0 million that is split into two
pari passu pieces, $13.5 million of which is included in this
transaction.  The trust balance is divided into an $11.6 million
senior pooled component (1% of the pooled trust balance) and a
$1.9 million subordinate nonpooled component that supports the
'CA' raked certificates (not rated).  The other pari passu piece
is in the Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-
BBA8 transaction.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests in
the properties secure mezzanine loans totaling $18.2 million held
outside the trust.  This loan is currently secured by a 131,600-
sq.-ft. suburban office property in Mountain View, California, and
a 165,500-sq.-ft. suburban office/research and development
property in Sunnyvale, California.  The master servicer reported a
2.58x DSC on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008,
and 48% occupancy as of June 2009.  S&P's adjusted valuation has
fallen 45% since issuance due primarily to lower occupancy.  S&P's
current stressed LTV ratio on the trust balance is 106%.  This
loan matures on Jan. 9, 2010, and according to Wells Fargo, the
borrower plans to exercise one of its two remaining one-year
extension options.

                        Retail Collateral

There is one retail exposure, the Poughkeepsie Galleria loan.
This is the third-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a
two-level, 692,900-sq.-ft. space within a 1.21-million-sq.-ft.
enclosed super-regional mall in Poughkeepsie, N.Y.  The loan has a
whole-loan balance of $176.0 million; the whole-loan balance is
split into a $121.1 million senior pooled component (13% of the
pooled trust balance), a $21.4 million subordinate nonpooled
component that is raked to the 'PG' certificates, and a
$33.5 million nontrust junior participation interest.  Wells Fargo
reported a 2.15x DSC on the trust balance for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2008, and 89% occupancy as of September 2009.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 15% since issuance due primarily
to lower occupancy.  S&P's current stressed LTV ratio on the trust
balance is 79%.  This loan matures on Feb. 9, 2010.  Wells Fargo
has indicated that the borrower plans to exercise one of its two
remaining one-year extension options.

                        Lodging Collateral

Hotel properties secure two loans in the pool totaling
$97.1 million (10% of the pooled trust balance).  S&P based its
hotel analyses, in part, on a review of the available operating
statements from the borrower for year-to-date 2009 and the 12
months ended Dec. 31, 2008, the borrower's 2009 budgets, and the
Smith Travel Research reports, as well as current and expected
local market conditions.  Details on the two lodging loans are:

The San Francisco Parc 55 loan, the fifth-largest loan in the
pool, has a whole-loan balance of $125.0 million that consists of
a $67.5 million senior pooled component (7% of the pooled trust
balance), a $13.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the 'PH' raked certificates, and a $44.0 million
subordinate nontrust junior participation interest, $36.0 million
of which has been funded to date.  In addition, the equity
interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure mezzanine loans
totaling $88.4 million held outside the trust.  This loan is
secured by a 32-story, 1,009-room full-service hotel in downtown
San Francisco, Calif.  Wells Fargo reported a 3.19x DSC on the
trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008, and 88% occupancy
as of September 2009.  S&P's adjusted valuation has fallen 40%
since issuance.  S&P's current stressed LTV ratio on the trust
balance is 102%.  The loan matures on Feb. 9, 2010, and according
to Wells Fargo, the borrower plans to exercise one of its two
remaining one-year extension options.  The Sheraton Austin Hotel
loan, the seventh-largest loan in the pool, has a whole-loan
balance of $67.5 million that is divided into a $29.6 million
senior pooled component (3% of the pooled trust balance), a
$7.9 million subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the
'SA' certificate (not rated), and a $30.0 million subordinate
nontrust junior participation interest.  This loan is secured by a
15-story, 365-room full-service hotel in Austin, Texas.  The
master servicer reported a 1.80x DSC on the trust balance for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2008, and 72% occupancy as of October 2009.
S&P's adjusted valuation has dropped 30% since issuance.  S&P's
current stressed LTV ratio on the trust balance is 105%.  This
loan matures on Feb. 9, 2010.  Wells Fargo has indicated that the
borrower plans to exercise one of its two one-year extension
options.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                         COMM 2007-FL14
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Rating
            ------
   Class  To       From                 Credit enhancement (%)
   -----  --       ----                 ----------------------
   A-J    A+       AAA/Watch Neg                         23.65
   B      BBB+     AAA/Watch Neg                         18.69
   C      BBB-     AA+/Watch Neg                         14.60
   D      BB+      AA/Watch Neg                          11.09
   E      BB       AA-/Watch Neg                          7.59
   F      B+       A/Watch Neg                            4.09
   G      B        A/Watch Neg                            2.92
   H      CCC+     A-/Watch Neg                           1.75
   J      CCC      BBB-/Watch Neg                         1.02
   K      CCC-     BB/Watch Neg                            N/A
   AOA1   CCC-     A/Watch Neg                             N/A
   AOA2   CCC-     BBB+/Watch Neg                          N/A
   AOA3   CCC-     BB+/Watch Neg                           N/A
   AOA4   CCC-     BB-/Watch Neg                           N/A
   GLB1   BB       A/Watch Neg                             N/A
   GLB2   BB-      BBB+/Watch Neg                          N/A
   GLB3   B        BBB-/Watch Neg                          N/A
   GLB4   B-       BB+/Watch Neg                           N/A
   PG1    BB+      A+/Watch Neg                            N/A
   PG2    BB+      A-/Watch Neg                            N/A
   PG3    BB       BBB/Watch Neg                           N/A
   PG4    BB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                          N/A
   PH1    CCC      BBB+/Watch Neg                          N/A
   PH2    CCC-     BBB/Watch Neg                           N/A
   PH3    CCC-     BBB-/Watch Neg                          N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                          COMM 2007-FL14
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Rating
            ------
   Class    To       From               Credit enhancement (%)
   -----    --       ----               ----------------------
   A-1      AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                       68.13
   X-2      AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                         N/A
   X-3-DB   AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                         N/A
   X-3-SG   AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                         N/A
   X-5-DB   AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                         N/A
   X-5-SG   AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2003-17 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by Corporate Backed Trust
Certificates, Sprint Capital Note-Backed Series 2003-17:

  -- US$25,000,000 Principal Amount of 7.00% Class A-1
     Certificates due 2028, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
Moody's rating of the Underlying Securities which are $25,455,000
6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint Capital Corporation and
which were downgraded to Ba3 by Moody's on November 20, 2009.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2006-C4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 17 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C4.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced loans
and poorly performing hotel loans.  Eight loans, representing 3%
of the pool, mature within the next 24 months and have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are primarily due to key rating parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

On August 31, 2009, Moody's placed seventeen classes on review for
possible downgrade due to the bankruptcy of Babcock & Brown, Ltd.,
(Babcock) the sponsor of two loans (5.5% of the pool).  Given the
significant decline in the market value of these assets, Moody's
has increased Moody's expected loss estimate for these loans.
This action concludes that review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the November 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $4.22 billion
from $4.27 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 360 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
47% of the pool.  The pool includes 47 residential cooperative
loans, representing 2.8% of the pool, that have Aaa underlying
ratings.  At last review, the 280 Park Avenue loan (7.1% of the
pool) and the 828-850 Madison Avenue loan (1.4% of the pool) had
investment grade underlying ratings.  However, because of declines
in performance these loans are now analyzed as part of the
conduit.  No loans have defeased.

One hundred and three loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's (CMSA) monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.  Not all loans
on the watchlist are delinquent or have significant issues.

The pool has experienced a $3 million loss since securitization.
Forty-five loans, representing 15% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially-serviced loan is the
Babcock & Brown FX3 Loan ($195.1 million - 4.6% of the pool),
which is secured by 14 multifamily properties located in six
states.  The collateral consists of older vintage Class B
properties and totals 3,719 units.  The largest state
concentrations are Texas (46% of the allocated loan balance) and
Nevada (37% of the allocated loan balance).  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in February 2009 due to the
borrower's request for a loan modification.  The loan is current.

The second largest specially serviced loan is The Dream Hotel loan
($100.0 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
730,000 square foot retail center in Dallas, Texas.  This loan
transferred to special servicing in April 2009.  The decline in
business and tourist travel due to the economic recession has
significantly impacted property performance.  The loan is 90+ days
delinquent.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Harwood Center
loan ($80.7 million -- 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
220 room full-service hotel in midtown Manhattan, New York.  The
property was transferred to special servicing in April 2009 and is
currently 90+ days delinquent.

The remaining 42 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, hotel, office and retail properties.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $228.9 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (38% loss severity on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a higher probability of default on four loans
(8% of the pool) and has estimated aggregate losses of
$90.8 million (49% loss severity on average) from these troubled
loans.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty
around the timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 98%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 118% compared to 139% at
Moody's prior review in February 2009.  Moody's prior review was
part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2008
vintage conduit / fusion transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's stressed
DSCR is 0.88X, compared to 0.80X at last review.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 20, the same as at last review.

The largest loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
280 Park Avenue loan ($300.0 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which
represents a pari passu interest in a $440 million loan.  The loan
is secured by a 1.2 million square foot Class A office building
located in the Plaza District office submarket in New York City.
The loan is also encumbered by a $670 million mezzanine loan.  The
property was 96% leased as of March 2009 compared to 98% at
securitization.  Major tenants include Deutsche Bank Trust
Companies (28% of net rentable area; lease expiration February
2011), the National Football League (17% of NRA; lease expiration
February 2014) and Credit Suisse (8% NRA; lease expiration March
2014).  Performance has declined due to increased expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.06X, respectively,
compared to 71% and 1.26X at Moody's last full review.

The second largest loan that previously had an underlying rating
is the 828-850 Madison Avenue loan ($60.0 million -- 1.4% of the
pool), which represents the senior note of an $80.0 million first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by the retail component of a
high-rise residential condominium located on Madison Avenue
between East 69th and East 70th Streets in New York City.  The
collateral totals 17,300 square feet and is 100% leased.  The
largest tenant is Gucci, which occupies 60% of the NRA.  The three
top tenants, which lease 92% of the NRA, have leases that extend
until at least 2016.  Despite solid occupancy, performance has
declined due to increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 81% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.10X at
Moody's last full review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 26% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the 11 Madison Avenue loan ($806.0 million --
19.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 2.2 million square foot
Class A office building located in the East Midtown South office
submarket in New York City.  The property was virtually 100%
leased as of June 2009.  The building serves as the global
headquarters location for Credit Suisse AG (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Aa1, negative outlook), which leases 86% of the
NRA through May 2017.  The property's performance has declined due
to increased operating expenses.  The loan is interest-only for
the entire term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and
0.69X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.76X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is The Ritz-Carlton South Beach
Resort loan ($181.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool) which is secured
by a 376-room full-service luxury hotel located in Miami Beach,
Florida.  The property has never achieved the performance
originally anticipated at securitization.  The 2008 net operating
income (NOI) was approximately 50% less than at securitization.
Moody's anticipates further performance declines through 2010 due
to continuing declines in tourist and business travel resulting
from the economic recession.  Due to the significant decline in
performance and Moody's outlook for the hotel market, Moody's
utilized a floor value approach in estimating a stressed value for
this property.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 213% and 0.30X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 0.90X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Carlton Hotel on Madison
loan ($99.8 million -- 2.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
334 room full-service hotel located in New York, New York.  The
property has never achieved the performance originally anticipated
at securitization.  The borrower reported a negative NOI for the
first six months of 2009.  Through June 2009, the year-to-date
occupancy and revenue per available room were 65% and $126,
respectively, compared to 80% and $265 at securitization.  Due to
the significant decline in performance and out outlook for the
hotel market, Moody's utilized a floor value approach in
estimating a stressed value for this property.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 180% and 0.55X, respectively, compared to 128%
and 0.91X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $32,246,792, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-1-A, $702,759,150, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-2, $92,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-3, $1,812,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-4FL, $150,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-AB, $156,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-M, $427,309,000, downgraded to A1 from Aaa; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class A-SP, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-Y, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-X, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 10/02/2006

  -- Class A-J, $341,847,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class B, $26,707,000, downgraded to B1 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class C, $64,097,000, downgraded to B3 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class D, $37,389,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class E, $21,366,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class F, $48,072,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class G, $42,731,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class H, $48,072,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class J, $48,072,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class K, $53,414,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class L, $10,683,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class M, $16,024,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class N, $16,024,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class O, $5,341,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class P, $10,683,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class Q, $10,683,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-C5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded 17 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-C5.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The affirmations are primarily due to key rating parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's debt service
coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

On August 31, 2009, Moody's placed 17 classes on review for
possible downgrade due to the bankruptcy of Babcock & Brown, Ltd.,
the sponsor of the largest loan in the pool, representing 5.7% of
the current balance.  Given the significant decline in the
performance of this asset, Moody's has increased its expected loss
estimate for this loan.  This action concludes the review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the November 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $3.39 billion
from $3.43 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 305 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 37%
of the pool.  The pool no longer has any loans with underlying
ratings.  At securitization, the 280 Park Avenue Loan (4.1% of the
pool), W New York-Union Square Loan (3.4% of the pool) and North
Ranch Mall Loan (1.1% of the pool) had investment grade underlying
ratings.  However, declines in property performance have resulted
in increased leverage and these loans are now analyzed as part of
the conduit pool.

Eighty one loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.  Not all loans on the
watchlist are delinquent or have significant issues.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a
$2.5 million loss (39% loss severity).  Twenty-four loans,
representing 15% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially-serviced loan is the Babcock & Brown FX4
Loan ($193.8 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which is secured by 20
multifamily properties located in Texas, South Carolina, and
Georgia.  The collateral consists of older vintage Class B
properties and totals 4,958 units.  The largest geographic
concentrations are Houston, Dallas, and Columbia, South Carolina.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in February 2009 due
to the borrower's request for a loan modification.  Although the
portfolio has maintained a high occupancy level, performance has
declined since securitization due to a decline in rental rates and
increased expenses.

The second largest specially serviced loan is W New York - Union
Square Loan ($115.0 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 270-room full service luxury hotel located in New York City.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in September 2009
due to imminent default.  The hotel's performance has declined
significantly since securitization due to a drop off in tourist
and business travel.  Occupancy and revenue per available room for
the twelve-month period ending June 2009 were 93% and $303,
respectively, compared to 86% and $360 at securitization.

The remaining 22 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, hotel, office and retail properties.  Eleven loans
are either 90 days delinquent, in foreclosure or real estate
owned.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $153.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (39% loss severity on average).

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five loans (7%
of the pool) and has estimated an aggregate loss of $71.2 million
(32% loss severity on average) from these troubled loans.  Moody's
rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing
and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 97%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 111% compared to 131% at
Moody's prior review in February 2009.  Moody's prior review was
part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006 to 2008
vintage conduit / fusion transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.25X and 0.95X, respectively, compared to
1.14X and 0.83X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 52, the same as at last review.

The largest performing loan that previously had an underlying
rating is the 280 Park Avenue Loan ($140.0 million -- 4.1% of the
pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $440 million
loan.  The loan is secured by a 1.2 million square foot Class A
office building located in the Plaza District office submarket in
New York City.  The loan is also encumbered by a $670 million
mezzanine loan.  The property was 96% leased as of March 2009
compared to 99% at securitization.  Major tenants include Deutsche
Bank Trust Companies (28% of net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration February 2011), the National Football League (17% of
NRA; lease expiration February 2014) and Credit Suisse (8% of NRA;
lease expiration March 2014).  Although occupancy has remained
relatively stable, performance has declined due to increased
expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 71% and 1.26X at securitization.

The second largest performing loan that previously had an
underlying rating is the North Ranch Mall Loan ($37.5 million --
1.1% of the pool), which is secured by an 185,000 square foot
retail center located in Westlake Village, California.  The center
is anchored by Ralph's Grocery and Rite Aid.  The center was 95%
leased as of June 2009 compared to 100% at securitization.
Despite relatively stable occupancy, performance has declined due
to lower revenues and higher expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 84% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.23X at
securitization.

The three largest conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Queens Multifamily Portfolio Loan
($192.0 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by 31
multifamily properties located in Queens, New York.  The borrower
purchased the property in 2006 for $277.5 million and planned to
increase its value through a comprehensive capital renovation
program and conversion of rent regulated units to market rents.
Progress has been slower than expected and multifamily market
conditions in the New York City metropolitan area have
deteriorated since securitization.  In addition, operating
expenses are significantly higher than originally projected.  The
biggest contributor to increased expenses is utilities.  At
securitization, a $7.0 million reserve fund was established for
debt service shortfalls; currently, approximately $1.3 million of
this reserve remains.  The loan is interest-only for the entire
term and matures in December 2013.  The loan sponsors are Vantage
Properties and Apollo Real Estate Advisors.  Due to its weaker
than expected performance, Moody's has assumed a high probability
of default for this loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 145%
and 0.60X, respectively, compared to 122% and 0.81X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 720 Fifth Avenue Loan
($165.0 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
121,108 square foot mixed use property located in Manhattan, New
York.  The property was 92% leased as of June 2009 compared to 70%
at securitization.  The largest tenant is Abercrombie & Fitch (54%
of NRA; various lease expirations from 2013 through 2021).
Property performance is inline with Moody's original expectations.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.78X, respectively,
compared to 126% and 0.79X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the HGSI Headquarters Loan
($147.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
635,000 square foot office property located in Rockville,
Maryland.  The property is 100% leased to Human Genome Sciences
Corporation through May 2026 and serves as its corporate
headquarters.  Property performance is inline with Moody's
original projections.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and
0.93X, respectively, compared to 125% and 0.85X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $26,957,795, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-2 $220,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-AB, $149,203,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-3, $1,200,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-1A, $776,590,967, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned at Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-SP, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-X, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 12/22/2006

  -- Class A-MFL, $100,000,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class A-M, $242,977,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class A-J, $287,244,000, downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class B, $12,861,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class C, $60,021,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class D, $38,585,000, downgraded to B2 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class E, $38,585,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class F, $34,298,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/31/2009

  -- Class G, $42,872,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class H, $34,298,000, downgraded to Ca from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class J, $42,872,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class K, $4,287,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class L, $12,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class M, $12,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class N, $8,574,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class O, $4,287,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009

  -- Class P, $12,862,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/31/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2007-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded 18 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
C3.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's debt service coverage ratio
and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 15 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on August 11, 2009 due to anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing.  On November 19, 2009, the review
was continued and three additional classes were placed on review
for possible downgrade due to higher anticipated losses than
originally projected.  This action concludes the review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the November 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$2.67 billion from $2.68 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 241 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 31% of the pool.  At securitization, the Mandarin
Oriental Loan ($135 million -- 5.1% of the pool) had an investment
grade underlying rating.  However, due to a decline in performance
resulting in increased leverage, this loan is now analyzed as part
of the conduit pool.

Forty-four loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a
$1.5 million loss (47% loss severity).  There are 24 loans,
representing 11% of the pool, currently in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is the Koger Center Office Park
Portfolio ($83.0 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is a
portfolio of 15 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted office
properties located in Saint Petersburg, Florida.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing on May 29, 2009 due to imminent
default.

The remaining 23 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
retail (13), multifamily (4), office (3) mixed-use (2) and
hospitality (1) properties.  Moody's has estimated a $165 million
aggregate loss for all of the specially serviced loans (58% loss
severity on average).  The servicer has recognized a $78.3 million
aggregate appraisal reduction for 15 of the specially serviced
loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high probability of default on seven loans
(3% of the pool) and has estimated an aggregate loss of
$31.6 million (41% loss severity on average) from these troubled
loans.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty
around the timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with year-end 2008 and partial year 2009
operating results for 82% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average
LTV for the pool, excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
is 131% compared to 152% at Moody's last review in February 2009.
Moody's prior review was part of the first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep of 2006-2008 vintage conduit and fusion CMBS transactions.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.21X and 0.83X, respectively, compared to
1.05X and 0.71X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 63, essentially the same as last review.

The top three loans represent 15% of the pool.  The largest loan
is the Main Plaza Loan ($160.7 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which
is secured by two 12-story office buildings totaling 583,000
square feet of net rentable area (NRA).  The property is located
in Irvine, California.  At securitization, the property was owned
by Maguire Properties; it was subsequently sold to Shorenstein
Properties in 2008.  Due to softening of the Irvine office market,
current market rents are lower and market vacancy is higher than
at securitization.  As of June 30, 2009, the property was 65%
leased compared to 79% at securitization.  The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist.  The loan is interest-only for its entire
term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 184% and 0.53X,
respectively, compared to 166% and 0.60X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Mandarin Oriental Loan
($135.0 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 248-
key luxury hotel located at Columbus Circle in New York City.  The
loan's performance has declined significantly since securitization
due to a decline in tourist and business travel.  Occupancy and
revenue per available room were 60% and $460, respectively,
compared to 76% and $647 at securitization.  The borrower is
Istithimar Building FZE, which has been funding debt service
shortfalls for approximately one year.  The loan is interest-only
for its entire term and matures in March 2012.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.89X, respectively, compared to 70.4%
and 1.41X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Westwood Complex Loan ($95.0 million
-- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a six building mixed-use
complex located in Bethesda, Maryland.  The six buildings consist
of two apartment buildings, a retail center, a mixed-use space, an
assisted living facility and a bowling alley.  The properties were
99% leased as of June 2009, essentially the same as
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.65X,
respectively, compared to 154% and 0.63X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $14,180,505, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-1-A1, $507,855,441, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-1-A2, $200,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-2, $392,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-3, $48,588,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $61,628,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-4, $643,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 7/30/2007

  -- Class A-M, $268,479,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa, on review for possible downgrade on
     11/19/2009

  -- Class A-J, $201,359,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A1;
     previously A1, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class B, $16,780,000, downgraded to Ba3 from A2; previously
     A2, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class C, $40,272,000, downgraded to B2 from A3; previously
     A3, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class D, $26,847,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa1;
     previously Baa1, on review for possible downgrade on
     11/19/2009

  -- Class E, $20,136,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa2;
     previously Baa2, on review for possible downgrade on
     11/19/2009

  -- Class F, $23,492,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3;
     previously Baa3, on review for possible downgrade on
     11/19/2009

  -- Class G, $30,204,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously
     Ba2, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class H, $33,560,000, downgraded to Ca from B1; previously
     B1, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class J, $30,204,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously B3,
     on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class K, $30,204,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     Caa1, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class L, $10,068,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     Caa2, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class M, $6,712,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     Caa2, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class N, $10,068,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     Caa3, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class O, $6,712,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     Caa3, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class P, $6,712,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     Caa3, on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class Q, $10,068,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously Ca,
     on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009

  -- Class S, $6,712,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously Ca,
     on review for possible downgrade on 11/19/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2005-C3 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-C3 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 classes from the same
transaction and removed two of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
and mezzanine classes also reflect the credit support erosion S&P
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of five
specially serviced loans, as well as S&P's analysis of one loan
that S&P consider credit-impaired.  S&P downgraded the class O
certificates to 'D' following interest shortfalls due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions and special servicing fees
related to the four specially serviced assets.  Class O has
experienced shortfalls for the past six months, and S&P expects
the shortfalls to recur for an extended period of time.  The
cumulative shortfalls to class O amount to $133,600.

Classes K, L, M, and N are currently experiencing interest
shortfalls primarily due to special servicing fees and ASERs.
However, a portion of the related appraisal reduction amounts are
not based on final appraisals and are subject to change.  A change
in the resulting ASERs could affect the future cash flow amounts
available to each class.  S&P will continue to monitor the
shortfalls, and will lower the ratings on these classes to 'D' if
S&P determine that the shortfalls will continue for the
foreseeable future.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics
of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided
financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.54x and a loan-to-value ratio of 102.6%.  S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.97x and an LTV of
132.5%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 60.4% and 32.4%, respectively.  The weighted average
DSC and LTV calculations exclude five specially serviced assets
($83.1 million; 5.3%), one loan that S&P deemed to be credit-
impaired ($13.0 million; 0.8%), 53 cooperative loans
($177.3 million; 11.4%), and nine defeased loans ($103.3 million,
6.7%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the specially serviced
and credit-impaired assets, which were included in S&P's 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss severity figures.  S&P excluded
the cooperative apartment loans, as they did not default under the
'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-X,
A-SP, and A-Y interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  Once S&P finalize the
criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may
affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the A-X, A-
SP, and A-Y certificates that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Nov. 18, 2009, remittance date, seven assets
($192.3 million; 12.4%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR).  The payment status of the
assets is: one is real estate owned (REO) ($6.0 million; 0.4%),
two are in foreclosure ($24.1 million; 1.6%), two are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($53.0 million, 3.4%), one is less than 30 days
delinquent ($0.9 million, 0.1%), and one is current
($107.6 million, 6.9%).  Two of the specially serviced assets are
top 10 loans ($159.8 million; 10.3%), which S&P discuss below, and
four of the specially serviced assets have ARAs in effect totaling
$16.2 million.  S&P separately estimated losses for five of the
seven specially serviced assets ($83.1 million; 5.3%).  For the
five assets, losses ranged from 22% to 64%.

The Southland Center loan, the largest loan in the pool, was
transferred to the special servicer on April 23, 2009, due to
imminent default.  The loan has a $107.6 million trust and whole-
loan balance and is secured by 639,575 sq. ft. of a 931,952-sq.-
ft. regional mall in Taylor, Mich., which is a Detroit suburb.
The property was constructed in 1970 and renovated in 2000.

Approximately 18 months ago, the asset underwent a reconfiguration
and expansion to accommodate a Best Buy (45,000 sq. ft.).  The
expansion is now complete, and the tenant is occupying the space.
For year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 88% and 1.43x,
respectively.  The borrower, General Growth Properties, filed for
bankruptcy on April 16, 2009, and the proposed plan of
reorganization calls for extending the loan from its current
March 5, 2010, maturity date.  S&P will continue to monitor
developments relating to this loan and will take rating actions on
this transaction as necessary.

The Everest MBC Portfolio Tower loan, the second-largest loan in
special servicing and the fifth-largest loan in the pool, was
transferred to the special servicer on May 29, 2009, due a
monetary default and is currently 90-plus-days delinquent.  The
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $52.1 million and
consists of six cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted notes,
which are secured by industrial warehouse, flex, and office
properties in Billerica, Boston, and Chicopee, Mass.  For year-end
2008, the DSC was 1.05x.  Based on June 2009 rent rolls, S&P
estimates, currently, a significant deterioration in DSC.  S&P
expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P deemed one loan,
the Summer Bend Apartments loan ($13.0 million; 0.8%), to be
credit-impaired.  The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to low occupancy and a low DSC.  In S&P's view, the
loan is at increased risk of default over its term.  The payment
status of this loan is less than 30 days delinquent.  The loan is
secured by a 300-unit multifamily property built in 1985 in
Irving, Texas.  For year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 67%
and 0.34x, respectively.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon the
eventual resolution of this loan.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Nov. 18, 2009, remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $1.55 billion (181 loans), which is 95.0% of the
issuance balance.  The pool is secured by 195 assets, down from
198 at issuance.  The two master servicers for the transaction,
Midland Loan Services Inc. and NCB FSB, reported financial
information for over 99% of the nondefeased loans ($103.3 million;
6.6%).  Ninety-four percent of the financial information was
either full-year 2008 or partial-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.60x for the pool based on the master
servicer's reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.54x and 102.6%, respectively.  Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC
and LTV calculations exclude five specially serviced assets
($83.1 million; 5.3%), one loan that S&P deem to be credit-
impaired ($13.0 million; 0.8%), 53 cooperative loans
($177.3 million; 11.4%), and nine defeased loans ($103.3 million,
6.6%).  S&P separately estimated losses for five specially
serviced assets and one credit-impaired asset in S&P's analysis.
Year-end 2008 data was available for five of the six loans, from
which S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 0.9x.  The
transaction has realized two principal losses totaling
$6.2 million to date.  Twenty-four loans are on the master
servicers' watchlist ($147.3 million; 9.5%), including one of the
top 10 loans, which S&P discussed above.  Nine loans
($91.7 million, 5.9%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x,
and 14 loans ($95.0 million, 6.1%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$607.5 million (39.1%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.43x for the top 10 loans,
which excludes the Square-Arch Realty cooperative loan.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.29x and
113.1%, respectively.  Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude the cooperative loan and the specially serviced
Everest MBC Portfolio Tower loan ($52.1 million; 3.4%).  S&P
separately estimated a loss for the specially serviced loan in its
analysis.  One of the top 10 loans appears on the master
servicers' watchlist, and S&P discusses it below.

The Villages at Montpelier loan, the sixth-largest loan in the
pool, has a $42.5 million (2.7% of the pool balance) trust and
whole-loan balance.  Midland placed the loan on the watchlist due
to low DSC.  The loan is secured by a 48-building, 520-unit
garden-style apartment complex built in 1969 and renovated in 2003
in Laurel, Md., equidistant between the Washington, D.C., central
business district and downtown Baltimore.  According to an October
2009 rent roll, the occupancy was 94%, and DSC was 0.97x for year-
end 2008.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's conduit/fusion
criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels support the
lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----      --      ----           ----------------------
      A-J        BBB+    AAA/Watch Neg               11.98
      B          BBB     AA/Watch Neg                 9.74
      C          BBB-    A+/Watch Neg                 8.69
      D          BB+     A/Watch Neg                  7.77
      E          BB      A-/Watch Neg                 6.71
      F          B+      BBB+/Watch Neg               5.40
      G          B       BBB/Watch Neg                4.35
      H          B-      BB/Watch Neg                 3.16
      J          CCC     BB-/Watch Neg                2.77
      K          CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                 2.24
      L          CCC-    CCC+/Watch Neg               1.85
      M          CCC-    CCC/Watch Neg                1.58
      O          D       CCC-/Watch Neg               0.92

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
      Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----      --      ----           ----------------------
      A-M       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                20.66
      N         CCC-    CCC-/Watch Neg                1.32

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-1       AAA                      31.19
             A-2       AAA                      31.19
             A-3       AAA                      31.19
             A-AB      AAA                      31.19
             A-4       AAA                      31.19
             A-1-A     AAA                      31.19
             A-X       AAA                        N/A
             A-SP      AAA                        N/A
             A-Y       AAA                        N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-C2 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-C2 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
lowered six of the ratings to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on eight classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades of classes J, K, L, M, N, and O to 'D' reflect
recurring interest shortfalls resulting primarily from appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amounts related to five assets
currently with the special servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc.  As of
the Nov. 18, 2009, remittance report, the total ASERs were
$155,529, and the outstanding cumulative ASERs were $918,804.  S&P
expects the interest shortfalls to continue for an extended period
of time.

The remaining downgrades are largely due to credit support erosion
S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of seven
specially serviced loans ($329.4 million; 22.0%).  The seven loans
include the largest and third-largest loans in the pool.  S&P
expects losses averaging 56% upon the eventual resolution of these
seven loans.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.41x and a loan-to-value ratio of 98.8%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV of 126.8%.  The implied defaults
and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 72.3% and 37.2%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude seven of the eight specially serviced loans
($329.4 million; 22.0%) and 15 loans that have been defeased
($145.1 million, 9.7%).  S&P separately estimated losses for the
seven specially serviced loans, which S&P included in its implied
default and loss severity figures.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-
X and A-SP interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  Once S&P finalize the
criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may
affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the class X
and A-SP certificates S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the November 2009 remittance report, eight assets
($330.8 million; 22.1%) in the pool were with JER.  The payment
status of these assets is: one is real estate owned ($5.6 million;
0.4%), one is in foreclosure ($106.0 million; 7.1%), four are 90-
plus-days delinquent ($73.8 million, 4.9), one is less than 30
days delinquent ($144.0 million, 9.6%), and one is a matured
balloon loan ($1.3 million; (0.1%).  Three of the specially
serviced assets are top 10 loans ($285.5 million; 19.1%), which
S&P discuss below, and five of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $33.3 million.  S&P
separately estimated losses for seven of the eight specially
serviced assets ($329.4 million; 22.0%).  For these seven assets,
losses ranged from 38% to 65%.  Details of the three top 10 loans
that are with the special servicer are:

The Tri County Mall loan, the largest loan in the pool, has a
$144.0 million (9.6% of the pool balance) trust balance and a
$152.8 million whole-loan balance.  This loan was transferred to
special servicing on Aug. 13, 2009, due to imminent default and is
currently less than 30 days delinquent.  The whole loan consists
of a $144.0 million senior A note that is included in the trust
and an 8.8 million nonpooled junior participation that is not
rated by Standard & Poor's.  The loan is secured by 1,108,087 sq.
ft. of a 1,335,087-sq.-ft. regional mall in Springdale, Ohio,
which is a suburb of Cincinnati.  The subject was constructed in
1960 and 1992.  The special servicer reported that there is
insufficient cash flow to pay property-related expenses, and the
special servicer has made advances to cover these expenses.
According to the special servicer, the borrower is either
unwilling or unable to contribute additional equity.  S&P
estimated a valuation for the property that is significantly less
than the outstanding loan balance.  The estimate considered, among
other things, the subject's leverage per sq. ft., local market
information, and a recent sales comparable.

The Washington Mutual Irvine Campus loan, the third-largest loan
in the pool, has a $106 million (7.1%) trust and whole-loan
balance.  This loan was transferred to special servicing on
May 26, 2009, due to imminent default, and the loan is currently
in foreclosure.  The loan is secured by low-rise office buildings
in a campus-like setting, encompassing 414,597 sq. ft. in four
buildings.  The subject was constructed in phases between 1989 and
2004 in Irvine, Calif., and was originally wholly leased to
Washington Mutual.  For year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were
100% and 1.62x, respectively.  Since year-end 2008, the occupancy
has deteriorated to 40%, and S&P expects it to fall further (to
32%) in February 2010 due to an upcoming lease expiration.  S&P
estimate a DSC of 0.23x based on servicer reporting and leasing
status.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of the loan based on current cash flows, sales
comparables, and current market conditions.

The Indigo on Forest Apartments loan, the seventh-largest loan in
the pool, has a $35.5 million (2.4%) trust and whole-loan balance.
This loan was transferred to special servicing on Dec. 31, 2008,
due to a monetary default and is currently 90-plus-days
delinquent.  The loan is secured by a 1,217-unit apartment complex
built in 1984 and renovated in 1996 in Dallas, Texas.  For year-
end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 74% and 0.80x, respectively.
An appraisal from April 2009 valued the property at $19,000 per
unit.  S&P also expects a substantial loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the November 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $1.50 billion, which is 92.8% of the issuance balance.
The pool is secured by 162 assets, down from 168 at issuance.
KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc., the master servicer,
reported financial information for 99.9% of the nondefeased loans
($145.1 million; 9.7%).  All of the financial information was
either full-year 2008 or partial-year 2009 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.38x for the pool based on the master
servicer's reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.41x and 98.8%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC and LTV calculations exclude seven
specially serviced loans ($329.4 million; 22.0%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these loans in its analysis.  Year-end 2008
data was available for six of these seven loans, from which S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.26x.  The DSCs for the two
largest specially serviced loans have deteriorated significantly
since year-end, however.  The transaction has realized
$4.0 million in principal losses to date.  Forty-three loans
($267.7 million; 17.9%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including three of the top 10 loans.  Eight loans ($27.4 million,
1.8%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 17 loans
($156.3 million, 10.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$675.7 million (45.1%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures were 1.41x and 96.5%, respectively, for the top 10
loans.  These figures exclude the Tri-County Mall ($144.0 million;
9.6%), Washington Mutual Irvine Campus ($106.0 million; 7.1%), and
Indigo on Forest Apartments ($35.5 million; 2.4%) loans, which are
with the special servicer and discussed above.  S&P estimated
losses for these loans separately.  Three of the top 10 loans
appear on the master servicer's watchlist ($80.3 million; 5.36%).

The Spectrum Portfolio loan, the fourth-largest loan in the pool,
has an $83.8 million (5.6%) trust and whole-loan balance.  The
loan consists of six cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
notes.  The master servicer placed the $17.8 million note on the
watchlist due to a decrease in net cash flow.  The note is secured
by a 152,569-sq.-ft. office building in downtown Chicago that was
built in 1919 and renovated in 1998.  S&P's adjusted DSC for the
portfolio is approximately 1.34x.

The Yorktown Apartments-Bluff of Berkshire Apartments loan, the
sixth-largest loan, was placed on the master servicer's watchlist
due to a fire that damaged 15 units at the property (less than 2%
of total units).  Restoration work is currently 85% complete.  The
loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $41.9 million (2.8%)
and is secured by two multifamily housing communities totaling 947
units.  The Yorktown Apartments complex is in Houston, was built
in 1973 and renovated in 1998, and consists of 565 units.  The
Bluffs of Berkshire complex is in Austin, Texas, was built in
1996, and consists of 382 units.  For year-end 2008, the overall
occupancy and DSC were 86.8% and 1.25x, respectively.

The Newport Apartments, Sunchase Apartments, and Benchmark
Apartments loan, the fourth-largest loan in the pool, has a
$28.6 million (1.9%) trust and whole-loan balance.  The loan
consists of three cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted notes.
The master servicer placed two of these notes, which aggregate
$20.5 million (1.4%), on its watchlist due to low DSCs.  The
Newport Apartments note has a balance of $12.3 million and is
secured by a 320-unit apartment complex built in 1985 and
renovated in 1998 in Tampa, Florida.  The Sunchase Apartments note
has a balance of $8.2 million and is secured by a 168-unit
apartment complex built in 1986 and renovated in 2002 in
Bradenton, Florida.  For year-end 2008, the blended occupancy and
DSC for the three notes were 78% and 0.98x, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to its conduit/fusion
criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels support the
lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     A-MFL      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                   21.28
     A-MFX      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                   21.28
     A-J        B       AAA/Watch Neg                   13.87
     B          CCC+    AA/Watch Neg                    11.85
     C          CCC     AA-/Watch Neg                   10.78
     D          CCC-    A/Watch Neg                      8.89
     E          CCC-    A-/Watch Neg                     7.68
     F          CCC-    BBB+/Watch Neg                   6.33
     G          CCC-    BBB/Watch Neg                    5.25
     H          CCC-    BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.91
     J          D       BB+/Watch Neg                    3.37
     K          D       BB/Watch Neg                     2.83
     L          D       B+/Watch Neg                     2.29
     M          D       B/Watch Neg                      2.16
     N          D       B-/Watch Neg                     1.75
     O          D       CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.35

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C2

             Class     Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
             -----     ------  ----------------------
             A-1       AAA                      32.06
             A-2       AAA                      32.06
             A-3       AAA                      32.06
             A-AB      AAA                      32.06
             A-4       AAA                      32.06
             A1-A      AAA                      32.06
             A-X       AAA                        N/A
             A-SP      AAA                        N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of Notes issued by
CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd. on review for possible downgrade due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

CWCapital Cobalt I Ltd. is a revolving CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of whole loan debt (25% of the pool), B-note debt
(1% of the pool), mezzanine debt (4% of the pool), commercial
mortgage backed securities (63% of the pool), and CRE CDOs (7% of
the pool).  As of November 18, 2009, the aggregate Notes balance
of the transaction, including the Preferred Share, has decreased
to $441.4 million from $450.9 million at issuance, with the
approximately $11 million pay-down directed to the Class A1 Notes.
The pay-down was triggered by the failure of the Class A/B, Class
C/D, and Class E/F/G Overcollateralization Tests.  Per the
Indenture, the failure of any Overcollateralization Test results
in all scheduled interest and principal payments being directed to
pay down the most senior notes, until the failed
Overcollateralization Test is satisfied.

Twenty-one assets totaling with a par balance of over
$154.8 million (37% of the pool) were listed as defaulted as of
November 18, 2009, compared to nine defaulted assets totaling
$39.7 million as of last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from defaulted
collateral and the key indicators listed above.

The rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-1, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. A-2, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. B-2, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. C, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. D, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. E-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. E-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. F-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. F-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. G, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 30, 2009.


DAIMLERCHRYSLER AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on All Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of DaimlerChrysler Auto
Trust 2006-D and Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust
2007-A, 2008-A and 2008-B transactions as part of its on going
surveillance process.

Current loss performance for all the transactions is worse than
originally expected and the future, projected performance for the
transactions has been revised accordingly.

Despite higher than expected cumulative net losses and
delinquencies, the cash flows available to service the outstanding
debt in the transactions currently continues to allow credit
enhancement to build on a nominal basis for the transactions.
Fitch analyzed the transactions incorporating stresses of the
revised base case CNL assumptions, the timing of the remaining
losses, and various prepayment assumptions.  Based on the
analysis, Fitch concluded that CE is currently adequate to support
the existing ratings under Fitch's revised assumptions and
therefore affirms all classes of outstanding notes for the
transactions.

The securities are backed by a pool of new and used automobile and
light-duty truck installment loans originated by Chrysler
Financial.

Fitch has affirmed these:

DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust 2006-D

  -- Class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B at 'A+'; Outlook Stable.

Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2007-A

  -- Class A-2a at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2b at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3a at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B at 'A-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-A

  -- Class A-3a at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B at 'A'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative.

Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2008-B

  -- Class A-2a at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2b at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3a at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a at 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class A-4b at 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class C at 'BB'; Outlook Negative.


DAVIS SQUARE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three, affirmed one, and withdrawn
the ratings on several classes of notes issued by Davis Square
Funding II Ltd./Corp. as a result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
March 2009.  Approximately 53.6% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review.  The details of the rating
action follow at the end of this press release.

As of the November 2009 trustee report, the current balance of the
portfolio is $917.7 million.  Defaulted securities, as defined in
the transaction's governing documents, now comprise 23.8% of the
portfolio, compared to 9.4% at last review.  The downgrades to the
portfolio have left approximately 39.9% of the portfolio
(including defaults) with a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 28.6% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or
lower, compared to 23.9% and 14.0%, respectively at last review.

Davis Square II was structured to have three subclasses of class
A-1 notes.  The subclasses are money market, medium term, and
long-term notes.  The class A-1 MT notes and class A-1 MM notes
benefited from a put agreement with Wachovia Bank, NA.  The puts
could be exercised on the remarketing date or put date of any A-1
MT or A-1 MM notes.  Accordingly, the MM and MT ratings were
linked to the short-term and long-term ratings of Wachovia Bank,
NA.

Class A-1 LT notes were to be issued upon the exercise or
termination of the put agreements, under specific conditions.
Fitch has maintained a standby rating on class A-1 LT throughout
the life of the transaction should class A-1 LT be issued.  The
long-term credit rating of such notes is based on the credit
profile of the portfolio and the structure of Davis Square II.

Since the last review, all A-1 MT and A-1 MM classes were
converted into class A-1A LT and A-1B LT (together class A-1 LT).

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Due to the
significant collateral deterioration, credit enhancement levels
available to all classes of notes are exceeded by the 'CCC' rating
loss rate, the lowest rating level loss projected by SF PCM.
Given this, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all
classes of notes in this transaction can be assessed without
performing cash flow model analysis under the framework described
in the 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs' report.

Fitch compared the respective credit enhancement levels for each
rated class of notes with the amount of underlying assets
considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower).  These assets have
a high probability of default and low expected recoveries upon
default.  The class A-1 LT and A-2 notes have the credit
enhancement levels of 9.6% and 5%, respectively, as compared to
the 28.6% of the portfolio considered distressed.  Although both
classes continue to receive timely interest, Fitch believes that
default is inevitable for these classes at or prior to maturity.
The class B notes are not receiving any interest payments and are
not expected to receive any principal.

Davis Square II is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on May 6, 2004 and is monitored by TCW
Asset Management Company.  The portfolio is composed of
residential mortgage-backed securities (63.2%), SF CDOs (21.8%),
corporate CDOs (6.2%), commercial mortgage-backed securities
(5.0%), asset-backed securities (3.5%), and other CDOs (0.3%)

Fitch has downgraded and affirmed these ratings as indicated:

  -- $425,907,936 class A-1A LT notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $404,146,216 class A-1B LT notes downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC';

  -- $41,683,510 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $55,670,525 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.

In addition, the ratings have been withdrawn on these classes of
notes:

  -- $0 class A-1B MM notes;
  -- $0 class A-1C MM notes;
  -- $0 class A-1D MM notes;
  -- $0 class A-1F MM notes;
  -- $0 class A-1C MT notes;
  -- $0 class A-1C MT notes;
  -- $0 class A-1C MT notes;
  -- $0 class A-1E MT notes;
  -- $0 class A-1F MT notes.


DILLON READ: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes issued by Dillon Read
CMBS CDO 2006-1 Ltd./Corp. and removed eight of those classes from
Rating Watch Negative as a result of significant negative credit
migration of the recent vintage commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral within the portfolio.  A complete list of
rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
54.8% of the portfolio has been downgraded, and 60.6% was placed
on Rating Watch Negative.

Approximately 86.8% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 26.7% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 20.1% and 0% at last review.
Further, all overcollateralization tests are failing their
respective triggers.  One asset (1.8%) is experiencing a credit
event whereby the principal of the asset is currently being
written down.  Subsequently, loss protection payments are being
made using proceeds from the Reserve Account.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Fitch's loss expectation
approximates the credit enhancement available to the class A-S1VF
notes, indicating a real possibility for default.  The class A-
S1VF notes have been assigned a 'CCC' rating.

Due to the significant collateral deterioration, Fitch's expected
losses exceeds the credit enhancement available to classes A-1 and
below.  For these classes, Fitch analyzed the classes' sensitivity
to the default of the distressed collateral ('CCC' category and
lower).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
these classes have been assigned a 'C' rating, indicating that
default is inevitable.

The class A-S1VF through A-2 notes are currently receiving timely
interest distributions.  Classes A-3 through B-4 are not receiving
any interest distributions due to the A-2 OC test failure.  All
interest and principal proceeds are being diverted to defease the
unfunded A-S1VF notes by depositing proceeds into the Reserve
Account and writing down the unfunded portion by the corresponding
amount.  The proceeds of the Reserve Account will then be used to
make loss protection payments.  Fitch does not expect classes A-3
through B-4 to receive any further payments due to the expectation
of further collateral deterioration.

Dillon Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 is a hybrid revolving collateralized
debt obligation transaction that combines the use of synthetic and
cash assets, as well as unfunded and funded liabilities.  Dillon
Read CMBS CDO 2006-1 closed on Nov. 2, 2006 and is managed by UBS
Global Asset Management.  The portfolio is composed of 84.9% CMBS
assets from the 2005 and 2006 vintage, 9.6% of real estate
investment debt securities, and the remaining 5.5% are commercial
real estate CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $650,000,000 Class A-S1VF Notes downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BBB-
     ';

  -- $150,000,000 class A-1 notes to 'C' from 'BB+';

  -- $60,000,000 class A-2 notes to 'C' from 'BB';

  -- $41,250,000 class A-3 notes to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $12,500,000 class A-4 notes to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $28,750,000 class B-1 notes to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $11,250,000 class B-2 notes to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $8,750,000 class B-3 notes to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $10,000,000 class B-4 notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.

In addition, classes A-S1VF through B-3 have been removed
from Rating Watch Negative.

The ratings of the class A1 and A2 notes address the likelihood
that investors will receive full and timely payments of interest,
as per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings of the
class A3, A4, B1, B2, B3 and B4 notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive ultimate and compensating interest
payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.


DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $65 Mil. Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirms the B3 bond rating assigned to
$65 million of Series 1994 fixed rate bonds issued by Dimensions
Health Corporation through the Prince George's County, MD.  The
rating outlook remains negative.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a pledge of "receipts"
derived from the health care operations and an assignment of the
lease in the health care facilities.  The actual health care
buildings are owned by Prince George's County, MD and are leased
to DHC through 2042.  The Master Trustee can terminate the lease
by virtue of an event of default by DHC and assign the lease and
operation of the facilities to another operator.  As of
October 31, 2009, a debt service fund in the amount of
$2.4 million and a separate debt service reserve fund in the
amount of $6.6 million for a total of approximately $9.0 million
existed for the protection of the Series 1994 bondholders

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                            Strengths

* Fully funded debt service reserve fund on all fixed rate debt
  outstanding; track-record of making monthly debt service
  payments and semi-annual bond payments in full and on time;
  expected to make next semi-annual bond payment and quarterly
  pension payment in January 2010

* In early January 2010 the independent Prince George's County
  Hospital Authority is expected to make its recommendation at the
  start of the General Assembly session as to who the Authority
  has accepted as the new buyer(s) from the three or four entities
  who submitted binding proposals in September 2009 (from the nine
  entities who expressed interest in May 2009) to purchase all or
  parts of the system.  As mandated by the legislation, the
  Authority before transferring any assets must find buyers for
  all parts of the system

* State of Maryland (Aaa rated) and Prince George's County, MD
  (Aa1 rated) have demonstrated historical support to keep DHC in
  operation by providing operating grants totaling approximately
  $112 million over the last eight years; Under the legislation,
  the State and County has agreed to offer a new owner(s) total of
  $150 million ($75 million each) over five years (FY 2011-FY
  2015); the State also has agreed to provide an additional $24
  million for capital improvements.  To keep the system in
  operation until a new owner(s) is found, the State and County
  also agreed to provide $12 million each in FY 2009 and FY 2010,
  though due to budget constraints, the County has indicated it
  will reduce its financial support to $9 million from $12 million
  in FY 2010

                            Challenges

* In the event a new buyer(s) is not found, State and County
  guaranteed operating grants under the legislation will end after
  June 30, 2010

* Continued very thin liquidity; As of October 31, 2009,
  unrestricted liquidity measured $15.4 million (15 days cash on
  hand)

* $65 million of outstanding fixed rate bonds and $76.7 million
  unfunded defined benefit pension plan as of June 30, 2009; DHC
  is expected to contribute approximately $8.8 million to the
  pension plan in FY 2010 pending response from the IRS on its
  request for a waiver for plan year 2007 contributions

* Continued large operating losses and negative operating cash
  flow; In FY 2009, DHC recorded a larger operating loss of
  $27.7 million (-7.6% margin) and operating cash flow deficit of
  $14.9 million (-4.1% margin) (excluding State, County, and
  Magruder Memorial Hospital Trust operating grants), very weak
  financial performance continues through the first four months of
  FY 2010

* Very modest capital spending over last the last ten years (less
  than one times depreciation expense) resulting in a steadily
  increased 20 years average age of plant as of FY 2009

* Serves a high Medicaid and Self Pay population (measured by 39%
  of gross revenues in FY 2009)

                   Recent Developments/Results

Dimensions Health Corporation, located in Prince George's County,
MD, continues to face significant financial challenges.  Cash
continues to remain very thin.  As of October 31, 2009,
unrestricted liquidity declined to $15.4 million, 15 days cash on
hand, from $18.3 million (17 days cash on hand) at FYE 2009.  DHC
is expected to make its next required $3.3 million semi-annual
bond payment and quarterly pension payment of $1.8 million in
January 2010.  The debt service reserve fund is fully funded.

In early January 2010, the independent Prince George's County
Hospital Authority, formed under the 2008 legislation to find a
new owner(s) for the system, is expected to recommend at the start
of the General Assembly, which entities it has accepted as the new
buyer(s) of the system.  In May 2009, nine organizations expressed
interest to purchase all or part of the systems and in September
2009 three or four of these entities submitted binding proposals
to the Authority.  The legislation mandates the Authority must
find buyer(s) for all parts of the system before any asset
transfer transaction can be completed.  The timing and process
after the Authority's recommendation is submitted to the State for
approval is currently unknown as well management's plans in the
event a new buyer(s) is not found and guaranteed operating grants
from the State and County end after June 30, 2010.

DHC's maintains a large and increased unfunded defined benefit
pension plan (frozen in December 31, 2007).  As of June 30, 2009,
DHC recorded an increased pension liability of $76.7 million.  DHC
is expected to contribute approximately $8.8 million to the
pension plan in FY 2010 ($4.6 million has already been
contributed).  DHC has not received a response from the IRS on its
request for a waiver for plan year 2007 contributions.  As of
June 30, 2009, if the waiver is not granted, DHC faces significant
financial risk in the event the system is expected to contribute
in addition to the FY 2010 contributions, the requested waiver
amount of $14.8 million including potential interest expense for
plan year 2007.

DHC's continues to generate large operating losses excluding
State, County, and Magruder Memorial Hospital Trust Operating
Grants.  At FYE 2009, DHC posted an operating loss of
$27.7 million (-7.6% margin) from an operating loss of
$20.9 million (-5.6% margin) in FY 2008.  Operating cash flow
deficit increased to $14.9 million (-4.1% margin) from a deficit
of $8.8 million (-2.5% margin) in FY 2008; Through the first four-
months of FY 2009, DHC continues to generate an operating loss and
cash flow deficit.  DHC has received through October 31, 2009,
$11.4 million of operating grants.  DHC is expected to receive the
$12 million operating grant agreed upon under the legislation from
the State; however, the County has indicated given budget
constraints it will reduce its financial support from $12 million
to $9 million in FY 2010.  Management is focusing on expenses
controls and reductions to help offset the shortfall in financial
support.

In the absence of finding a new owner(s) and securing government
and other external finding to help support operations, Moody's
believe this will significantly increase the likelihood of DHC's
inability to make future bond and pension payments and maintain
long-term viability.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's concerns with DHC's ability
to meet operating cash needs with continued large operating
losses, increased unfunded pension obligation, and very thin
liquidity coupled with the uncertainties related to successfully
finding a new owner(s) for all parts of the system, management's
plan in the event a new owner(s) is not identified and is unable
to secure permanent external funding to remain financially viable
in the longer-term.

                What could change the rating -- UP

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the short-term; over the longer-
term, a rating upgrade would be considered if DHC secures stable
and permanent external funding, demonstrates and sustains
substantial operating improvement; rebuilds cash to demonstrate
long-term viability

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Inability to find a solution to financial challenges and failure
to secure long-term external funding; further erosion of operating
performance and liquidity; payment default on bonds and pension
plan payments and/or bankruptcy filing

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Dimensions Health
     Corporation and Subsidiaries

  -- First number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2008

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended June 30, 2009

  -- Excludes operating grants from County, State, Federal and
     Magruder Memorial Hospital Trust of $17.3 million FY 2008 and
     $26.6 million in FY 2009

  - Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 20,685; 20,696

* Total operating revenues: $351.6 million; $363.3 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  ($5.9) million; ($12.0) million

* Total debt outstanding: $73.0 million; $71.8 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $7.2 million; $7.2 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: negative

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: negative

* Debt-to-cash flow: negative

* Days cash on hand: 17.6 days; 17.5 days

* Cash-to-debt: 24.0%; 25.0%

* Operating margin: -5.9%; -7.6%

* Operating cash flow margin: -2.5%; -4.1%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of June 30, 2009)

  -- Series 1994 fixed rate ($65.0 million outstanding); rated B3

The last rating action was on December 1, 2008, when the B3 rating
of Dimensions Health Corporation was confirmed and removed from
watchlist for possible downgrade and the outlook was negative.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1999-CG3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded two classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-CG3.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from concerns about refinancing risk associated with
loans approaching maturity, anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans and interest shortfalls.  The affirmations are due
to increased credit subordination resulting from loan payoffs and
principal amortization.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.

As of the October 30, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to
$105.2 million from $899.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 57% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 5.2% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Approximately 79% of the pool has matured or will
mature within the next 24 months.

Three loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

To date, 18 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $22.2 million (24% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes C through
D and a 75% principal loss for Class B-8.  Currently, there are 19
loans, representing 74% of the pool, in special servicing.
Thirteen loans, representing 49% of the pool, were transferred to
special servicing due to imminent maturity default.  Many of these
loans are located in weak markets and have experienced performance
declines since Moody's prior review.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $33.1 million loss for the specially serviced loans (43%
loss severity on average).

The pool has experienced interest shortfalls totaling
$1.01 million which have impacted Classes B-6 through B-8.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B-1, $17,567,820, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded
     to Aaa on 6/19/2008

  -- Class B-2, $15,737,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously upgraded
     to Aa3 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class S, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 10/12/1999

  -- Class B-4, $13,489,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously
     assigned at Ba2 on 10/12/1999

  -- Class B-7, $8,993,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca on 1/3/2006

  -- Class B-8, $2,241679, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to
     C on 1/3/2006


DUCHESS VI: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced these rating actions on notes
issued by Duchess VI:

  -- EUR215,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Aa1; previously
     on August 18, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- EUR125,000,000 Revolving Loan Facility, Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on August 18, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- EUR35,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Baa2; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- EUR25,000,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- EUR32,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on
     March 19, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- EUR15,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on March 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

This transaction is a managed cash leveraged loan collateralized
loan obligation with exposure to predominantly European senior
secured loans, as well as about 17% mezzanine loan exposure.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
diversity score as described in the press release dated
February 4, 2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for
rating CLOs." These revised assumptions have been applied to all
corporate credits in the underlying portfolio, the revised
assumptions for the treatment of ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or with a "Negative
Outlook" being applied to those corporate credits that are
publicly rated.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.  As credit estimates do
not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and outlooks,
a stress of a quarter notch-equivalent assumed downgrade was
applied to each of these estimates.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
This is observed through a decline in the average credit rating as
measured through the portfolio weighted average rating factor
'WARF' (currently 2686), an increase in the amount of defaulted
securities (currently about 7% of the portfolio), an increase in
the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 or CCC+ and
below (currently 11.8% of the portfolio), and a failure of Class E
overcollateralization test.  These measures were taken from the
recent trustee report dated 26 October 2009.  Moody's also
performed a number of sensitivity analyses, including
consideration of a further decline in portfolio WARF quality
combined with a decrease in the expected recovery rates.  Due to
the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.


DUKE FUNDING: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class X Senior Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Duke Funding High Grade VI,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$13,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2014 (current balance of $11,250,000), Downgraded to Caa3,
     previously on December 11, 2008 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Duke Funding High Grade VI, Ltd., issued on November 16, 2007, is
a collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of ABS
Securities.

The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests, among other
measures.  The trustee reports that the WARF of the portfolio is
9782 as of November 6, 2009 and also reports defaulted assets in
the amount of $118 million.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


EMPORIA PREFERRED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four and downgraded three classes of
notes issued by Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd./Corp.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria.' Cash flow and
portfolio default modeling were conducted in accordance with
Fitch's 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended'
and 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

The affirmations are the result of the credit enhancement
available to the classes A, B-1, B-2, and C notes relative to the
observed and expected performance of the underlying loan
portfolio.  Currently there are six defaulted obligors in the
portfolio, one of which remains current on interest.  The
defaulted obligors comprise 3.1% of the portfolio, up from a level
of 1.5% at Fitch's last review in September 2008.  Additionally,
obligors considered 'CCC+' or below now represent about 27% of the
performing portfolio, compared to about 16% at the last review.
Finally, approximately 12.5% of the underlying portfolio ratings
have a Negative Rating Outlook, indicating the possibility of
further negative rating migration.

The deterioration in the loan portfolio has led to prior failures
of the class D overcollateralization test and the class E OC test,
as well as the failure of the interest diversion test.  To date,
failure of these OC tests has led to the application of about
$5.4 million of excess interest to redeem the class A notes to
offset principal losses, while failure of the interest diversion
test has resulted in about $6.2 million of excess interest being
applied toward reinvestment in additional loans.  As of the
Nov. 2, 2009 trustee report, only the interest diversion test was
out of compliance at a level of 102.2% versus a trigger of 104.1%.

Another enhancement to these structural protection features for
the senior notes is the significant amount of excess spread
generated by the portfolio of primarily middle market loans.  If
collateral deterioration persists, the senior notes should
continue to benefit from the diversion of interest proceeds from
either OC or interest diversion test failures.  Fitch believes
that these structural features, in addition to the credit
enhancement provided by note subordination, provide adequate
protection to the classes A, B-1, B-2, and C notes to maintain
their current ratings.

The effect of collateral deterioration, however, has been more
pronounced at the bottom of the capital structure, reducing the
credit quality of the asset coverage to the classes D and E notes.
The recent OC test failures, and the overall decline in the OC
ratios since Fitch's last review, indicate the reduced collateral
coverage available for these notes.  Furthermore, future OC test
failures may result in missed interest payments to these classes
if interest proceeds are diverted earlier in the interest
waterfall to redeem senior notes.  In addition, these notes will
be particularly negatively affected if recovery rates continue to
trail below their longer term historical averages.

In its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity to
ongoing softness in U.S. corporate recoveries.  To accomplish
this, Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for each
asset type by 30% in one sensitivity scenario and by 50% in a
second sensitivity scenario where explicit Recovery Ratings were
not available.  The class A notes displayed solid performance in
both of these scenarios and have therefore been assigned a Stable
Outlook.  The remainder of the capital structure displayed greater
degrees of sensitivity to lower recovery rates.  This sensitivity,
in addition to the sizeable portion of underlying portfolio
credits with Negative Outlooks, has led Fitch to assign Negative
Outlooks to all classes of notes with the exception of the class A
notes.

All classes of notes were assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to
tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

Emporia I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on Oct.  12, 2005 and is managed by Allied Capital
Corporation, which acquired the management contracts from Emporia
Capital Management, LLC in March 2009.  Emporia I has a revolving
portfolio primarily composed of U.S. middle market loans,
approximately 90% of which are senior secured positions and
approximately 10% of which are second lien loans.  The
transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to end in October
2011.

Fitch has taken these rating actions on these notes.  Rating
actions include affirmations, downgrades, assignment of LS ratings
and Rating Outlooks.

  -- $274,713,721 class A notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $36,615,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5,000,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24,360,000 class C notes affirmed at 'A/LS5'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24,360,000 class D notes downgraded to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $8,000,000 class E-1 notes downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BB';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $5,195,000 class E-2 notes downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BB';
     Outlook Negative.


EMPORIA PREFERRED FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 3 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four and downgraded three classes of
notes issued by Emporia Preferred Funding II Ltd./Corp.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria'.  Cash flow and
portfolio default modeling were conducted in accordance with
Fitch's 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended'
and 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.  Recovery Ratings
were assigned in compliance with Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Recovery Ratings' and 'Global Surveillance Criteria for
Corporate CDOs'.

The affirmations are the result of the credit enhancement
available to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3 notes (collectively, the
class A notes), and the class B notes relative to the observed and
expected performance of the underlying loan portfolio.  Currently
there are seven defaulted obligors in the portfolio, one of which
remains current on interest.  The defaulted obligors comprise 4.9%
of the portfolio, up from a level of 1% at Fitch's last review in
September 2008.  Additionally, obligors considered 'CCC+' or below
now represent about 27% of the performing portfolio, compared to
about 19% at the last review.  Finally, approximately 11.4% of the
underlying portfolio ratings have a Negative Rating Outlook,
indicating the possibility of further negative rating migration.

The deterioration in the loan portfolio has led to the failure of
the class D overcollateralization test and the class E OC test, as
well as the failure of the interest diversion test as of the
Nov. 2, 2009 trustee report.  At the last payment date in October
2009, failure of the class D OC test led to the application of
about $3.2 million of excess interest to redeem the class A notes
to offset principal losses.  Additionally, previous failures of
the interest diversion test have resulted in about $4.3 million of
excess interest being applied toward reinvestment in additional
loans.

Another enhancement to these structural protection features for
the senior notes is the significant amount of excess spread
generated by the portfolio of primarily middle market loans.  If
collateral deterioration persists, the senior notes should
continue to benefit from the diversion of interest proceeds from
either OC test or interest diversion test failures.  Fitch
believes that these structural features, in addition to the credit
enhancement provided by note subordination, provide adequate
protection to the classes A and B notes to maintain their current
ratings.

The effect of collateral deterioration, however, has been more
pronounced at the bottom of the capital structure, reducing the
magnitude and credit quality of the asset coverage to the class C,
D, and E notes.  Since the last review, several defaulted loans
have been removed from the portfolio with particularly low
recoveries, while other credit risk loans have been sold at
significant discounts to par.  Further, the total expected
recoveries on the defaulted assets currently in the portfolio are
low, especially for the defaulted second lien loans.  These
factors have all contributed to the decreasing par coverage
available to the junior notes, ultimately leading to the failure
of the class D and class E OC tests.  Because of the failing class
D OC test, the class E notes did not receive their scheduled
interest payment at the October 2009 payment date.  Future credit
deterioration may result in additional OC test failures, which in
turn could result in additional classes deferring interest
payments.

In its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity to
ongoing softness in U.S. corporate recoveries.  To accomplish
this, Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for each
asset type by 30% in one sensitivity scenario and by 50% in a
second sensitivity scenario where explicit Recovery Ratings were
not available.  The class A notes displayed solid performance in
both of these scenarios and have therefore been assigned a Stable
Outlook.  The remainder of the capital structure displayed greater
degrees of sensitivity to lower recovery rates.  This sensitivity,
in addition to the sizeable portion of underlying portfolio
credits with Negative Outlooks, has led Fitch to assign Negative
Outlooks on all classes of notes with the exception of the class A
notes.

All classes of notes, with the exception of the class E notes,
were assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The LS ratings indicate
each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced
by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be
considered in conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.
Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches rated 'CCC' and
below.

The class E notes were assigned a Recovery Rating in this rating
review based on the total expected future cash flows projected to
be available to these bonds in a base case default scenario.
Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a forward-looking
estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or defaulted
structured finance securities.  Distressed securities are defined
as bonds that face a real possibility of default at or prior to
maturity and by definition are rated 'CCC' or below.  For further
detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report 'Global
Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.

Emporia II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on June 21, 2006 and is managed by Allied Capital
Corporation, which acquired the management contracts from Emporia
Capital Management, LLC in March 2009.  Emporia II has a revolving
portfolio primarily composed of U.S. middle market loans,
approximately 89% of which are senior secured positions and
approximately 11% of which are second lien loans.  The
transaction's reinvestment period is scheduled to end in July
2012.

Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on these notes
including affirmations, downgrades, and assignments of Loss
Severity ratings, Recovery Ratings, and Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $89,795,548 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $29,602,928 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $118,411,711 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $30,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $22,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $14,500,000 class E notes downgraded to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BB'.


G-FORCE CDO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of Notes issued by
G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd. under review for possible downgrade due to
an Event of Default caused by the non-payment of interest on a
non-PIKable class, increased interest shortfalls and the
uncertainty surrounding potential collateral liquidation in the
current distressed environment.  The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

On November 30, 2009, a default in the payment of Class E Notes
occurred.  On December 4, 2009, after the default in the payment
of Class E was not cured within four business days, an Event of
Default occurred, pursuant to Section 5.1(a) of the Indenture.

G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
by commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS), CRE CDOs and B-
Notes.  As of the November 30, 2009 payment date, the collateral
par amount is $766.2 million, representing a $112.0 million
decrease since securitization due mostly to $70.2 million in
realized losses to the collateral pool.

As of the November 30, 2009 payment date, interest shortfalls for
the pay period totaled $717,050 compared to $300,919 during the
pay period at last review.  This resulted in the non-payment of
interest to Class E.  Nineteen pieces of collateral are currently
experiencing interest shortfalls.

As provided in Article V of the Indenture, during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, the Controlling Class of
the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities
and the Notes, including liquidation.  Moody's notes that the
transaction is exposed to CMBS and CRE CDO assets, a significant
portion of which have low speculative-grade ratings.  These types
of assets have shown depressed market valuations recently which
could lead to extremely low recovery rates should a liquidation of
the collateral occur.

The action reflects the increased expected loss associated with
classes due to the non-payment of interest and the diminished
credit quality on the underlying portfolio.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Cl. A-2, Aa1, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. A-3, Baa2, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. SSFL, Aaa, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. JRFL, Aa3, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. B, Ba2, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. C, B1, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. D, B2, Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 9, 2009 Downgraded to B2

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


G-FORCE CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-1 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  Five of the lowered
ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, and S&P
removed the remaining three from CreditWatch negative.  In
addition, S&P affirmed two other ratings and removed them from
CreditWatch negative, and three other ratings remain on
CreditWatch negative.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following an event of default resulting from interest shortfalls
to the transaction and its underlying collateral.  Class E, a
nondeferrable interest class, did not receive full interest
according to the trustee remittance report dated Nov. 25, 2009; as
a result, S&P lowered the rating to 'D' in accordance with its
revised criteria for CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD
and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

The ratings remaining on CreditWatch negative primarily reflect
the transaction's exposure to underlying collateral with ratings
on CreditWatch negative (amounting to $210 million, or 27% of the
transaction's collateral balance).

The trustee, Bank of America N.A., delivered an EOD notice on
Dec. 4, 2009, which noted that G-Force 2006-1 had experienced an
EOD under section 5.1 (a) of its indenture.  The notice indicates
that an EOD "shall occur upon a default for four business days in
the payment, when due and payable, of any interest on any class A
note, any class SSFL note, any class JRFL note, any class B note,
any class C note, any class D note, or any class E note.  As of
December 4, 2009, a default in the payment of interest on the
class E note has continued for a period of four business days."

It is S&P's understanding that the liquidity interruption resulted
from the failure of the underlying commercial mortgage-backed
securities and CMBS resecuritization collateral for G-Force 2006-1
to produce sufficient interest proceeds to pay the full interest
amount due to class E.  According to the most recent trustee
remittance report, $2.9 million in interest proceeds was
available.  However, the amount available each period has steadily
declined in each of the past six months (from $3.3 million in
interest proceeds available as of the May 26, 2009, trustee
remittance report).

According to the Nov. 25, 2009, trustee report, the transaction's
current assets included 81 classes ($640.2 million, 83.6%) of CMBS
pass-through certificates from 38 distinct transactions issued
between 1997 and 2006.  The current assets also included seven
classes ($108.9 million, 14.2%) from G-FORCE 2005-RR2 Trust, which
is a CMBS resecuritization, and two commercial real estate loans
($17.2 million, 2.2%).  The aggregate principal balance of the
assets totaled $766.2 million.

In the event that S&P receive a notice indicating that the
controlling noteholders intend to proceed with acceleration or
liquidation of the transaction following the EOD, S&P may lower
all of the ratings on this transaction in accordance with its
aforementioned EOD criteria.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                      G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class    To                   From
           -----    --                   ----
           A-3      AA/Watch Neg         AAA/Watch Neg
           JRFL     AA/Watch Neg         AA+/Watch Neg
           B        BBB+/Watch Neg       A+/Watch Neg
           C        BBB/Watch Neg        A/Watch Neg
           D        BB+/Watch Neg        BBB/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class    To                   From
           -----    --                   ----
           E        D                    BB+/Watch Neg
           F        CCC-                 BB/Watch Neg
           G        CCC-                 B-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class    To                   From
           -----    --                   ----
           H        CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg
           J        CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg

            Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                     G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                     Class    Rating
                     -----    ------
                     A-1      AAA/Watch Neg
                     A-2      AAA/Watch Neg
                     SSFL     AAA/Watch Neg


GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to 24
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-C1.  A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations and its
prospective views regarding cash flow declines and commercial real
estate market values.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of 4.8%
for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.  The
rating actions are based on the full losses of 4.8% as a majority
of loans mature in the next five years.  The bonds with Negative
Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future.

To determine potential defaults for each loan Fitch assumed cash
flow would decline by 10% from year-end 2008, which is consistent
with the analysis used in its review of recent vintage
transactions whereby cash flow was assumed to decline 15% from
year-end 2007 projected over a three-year period.  If the stressed
cash flow would cause the loan to fall below 0.95 times (x), Fitch
assumed the loan would default during the term.  To determine
losses, Fitch used the above stressed cash flow, and applied a
market cap rate, ranging between 7.5% and 11%, for each specific
property type.  If the loan balance at default is less than the
stressed cash flow the loan would realize that loss.

These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 55.1% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
Approximately 95% of the recognized losses were from loans
reviewed in detail.

Approximately 42.5% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 16.8% in 2010, 2.2% in 2011, 5.8% in 2012, 0% in 2013, and
17.7% in 2014.  All losses associated with these loans are fully
recognized in the rating actions.  Approximately 47.1% of the
loans mature in 2015 and beyond.

Fitch identified 24 Loans of Concern (31.2%) within the pool, 12
of which (22.3%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, eight (17.2%) are current.  Of the current loans,
two loans are sponsored by General Growth Properties, Inc. Five
(18.4%) of the specially serviced loans are within the
transaction's top 15 loans (45.8%) by unpaid principal balance.

Four of the loans (7.4%) within the top 15 are expected to default
during the term, with loss severities ranging from 24% to 50%.
The largest contributors to loss are: Washington Mutual Buildings
(2.9%), Folly Hill Apartments (1.4%) and Oak Park Office Center
(1.3%).

The Washington Mutual Buildings are fee and leasehold interest in
a total of 257,336 sf of office space.  The loan transferred to
special servicing September 2009 due to imminent default.  The
properties were 100% leased to Washington Mutual, and a formal
notice of lease rejection was received by the Federal Depository
Insurance Corp. The properties are fully vacant and REO following
the foreclosure sale in September 2009, in which the Trust was the
only bidder.  CB Richard Ellis was named as the new property
manager.

Folly Hill Apartments is a 252 unit multifamily property located
in Beverly, MA.  The property was transferred to special servicing
in October 2009 for imminent default.  The borrower has been
unable to refinance the loan, which matures in January 2010.  The
borrower is seeking an extension of the loan.  As of March 31,
2009 the reported debt service coverage ratio and occupancy were
0.97x and 90.5%, respectively, compared to 1.24x and 90.5% at
issuance, respectively.

Oak Park Office Center is a 173,400 sf office building located in
Houston, TX.  As of June 30, 2009, the reported DSCR and occupancy
were 1.64x and 100%, respectively, compared to 1.37x and 100%
respectively at issuance.  However, approximately 36% of the space
was vacated upon lease expiration of the second largest tenant in
August 2009.  The building in now 64% occupied by Quest
Diagnostics, with a lease expiration in January 2014.  3Q DSCR and
occupancy will be impacted due to the increased vacancy.  The loan
was structured as full interest only and matures in December 2010.
The sponsor is Triple Net Properties, LLC.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks, LS and Recovery Ratings as indicated:

  -- $16.7 million class C to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27.2 million class D to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.6 million class E to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $23 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.6 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.1 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4.2 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $8.4 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $10.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $2.1 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $6.3 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $4.2 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and Rating Outlooks
and assigned LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $371.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $155 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $36.8 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $48.2 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $457.9 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $86.9 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $110.9 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only Class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only Class XP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41.9 million class B at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate this class:

  -- $24.9 million class P.


GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A1 to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
A1 from Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HE3 by raising it
to 'CC' from 'D'.

On Nov. 25, 2009, S&P lowered its rating on class A1 to 'D' as
part of a larger U.S. RMBS default review.  Class A1 is insured by
Ambac Assurance Corp. ('CC'); however, S&P did not take the bond
insurance into account during its earlier review due to an
administrative error.  According to S&P's criteria, the rating on
an insured class is the higher of (i) its rating on the bond
insurer and (ii) Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR) on the
class, which is based on S&P's analysis of the class' stand-alone
credit support.  Therefore, S&P has corrected its rating on class
A1 to 'CC' to reflect the current rating of the insurer.

                         Rating Corrected

            Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HE3

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Class      CUSIP       Current       11/25/09     Pre-11/25/09
  -----      -----       -------       --------     ------------
  A1         39538WCZ9   CC            D            A


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-GG9 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2007-GG9 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of S&P's rating actions.  S&P's analysis included a review
of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.
The downgrades of the mezzanine and subordinate classes also
reflect credit support erosion S&P anticipate will occur upon the
eventual resolution of several of the transaction's specially
serviced assets and loans S&P deem to be credit-impaired.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.37x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 118.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.80x and an LTV
of 166.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 91.4% and 46.1%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude four ($41.4 million, 0.6%) of
the eight specially serviced loans, as well as four credit-
impaired loans ($434.8 million, 6.6%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for these loans, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009 (see "Request For Comment: Methodology
For Rating Interest-Only Certificates," on RatingsDirect).  After
S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the
IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the November 2009 remittance report, eight loans
($169.6 million, 2.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. A breakdown of the specially serviced loans by
payment status is: two are in foreclosure ($21.9 million, 0.33%);
two are 90-plus days delinquent ($6.9 million, 0.11%); one is 60
days delinquent ($16.0 million, 0.24%); two are late, but less
than 30 days delinquent ($85.6 million, 1.31%); and one is current
($39.2 million, 0.6%).

Five of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect totaling $19.5 million.  Three of the specially
serviced loans have balances that represent more than 0.5% of the
total pool balance, and S&P discuss two of these in detail below.

The District II loan ($44.7 million, 0.7%) is the largest loan
with LNR.  The loan is secured by a 171,485-sq.-ft. retail
property constructed in 2006 in Henderson, Nev.  The loan was
transferred to LNR on Oct. 22, 2009, due to imminent default and
is currently late, but less than 30 days delinquent.  It is S&P's
understanding that the borrower is requesting debt service relief.
The DSC was 0.66x as of year-end 2008, and occupancy was 82.3% as
of June 30, 2009.  There is a $13.5 million earnout letter of
credit, originally put in place at issuance because the property
was newly constructed and had not yet stabilized.  S&P has been
informed that the letter of credit is now being applied to the
outstanding loan amount.

The Baybrook Gateway loan ($41.0 million, 0.6%) is the second-
largest loan with LNR.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Dec. 10, 2008, due to imminent default and is
currently late, but less than 30 days delinquent.  The loan is
secured by a 236,854-sq.-ft. retail property in Webster, Texas.
Linens 'N Things and Circuit City were formerly tenants at the
property and had occupied approximately 25% of the net rentable
area.  The borrower has been making payments on the loan, and LNR
has indicated that it is continuing to monitor the situation.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined four
loans ($434.8 million, 6.6%) to be credit-impaired.  The largest
credit-impaired loan, the Schron Industrial Portfolio
($305.0 million, 4.7%), is the third-largest loan in the pool and
the second-largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan is secured by
36 industrial/flex properties with a total of 3.5 million sq. ft.
in Long Island, N.Y.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to a
decline in DSC since issuance.  As of June 30, 2009, the DSC was
0.88x.  At issuance, Standard & Poor's performed a stabilized
analysis with the expectation that occupancy and rents would
improve.  However, conditions have not improved and occupancy had
declined to 86% as of June 30, 2009, from 89% at issuance.  In
addition, expenditures for repairs, maintenance, and advertising
have also increased, which has caused a decline in the property's
net cash flow.  Given the decline in DSC and occupancy, S&P
determined the loan to be credit-impaired due to an increased risk
of default.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the November 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $6.552 billion, which is 99.6% of the aggregate trust
balance at issuance.  The pool consists of 201 loans, which is
unchanged since issuance.  As of the November 2009 remittance
report, the master servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., provided
financial information for 99.6% of the pool, and 98.4% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.37x and 118.9%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude four of the eight specially serviced loans and
four loans that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired.  S&P estimated
losses separately for these loans ($476.2 million, 7.3%).  Seven
of these loans ($461.1 million, 7.0%) had servicer-reported DSC
figures.  The weighted average DSC for these seven loans was
1.01x.  The transaction has not experienced any principal losses
to date.  Forty-six loans ($2.19 billion, 33.5%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans.
Twenty-nine loans ($985.7 million, 15.0%) have a reported DSC
below 1.10x, and 19 of these loans ($486.9 million, 7.4%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$2.69 billion (41.0%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.47x for the top 10 loans.
Three of the top 10 loans ($1.15 billion, 17.6%) appear on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Excluding the credit-impaired loan,
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.41x and
120.0%, respectively.  Apart from the Schron Industrial Portfolio
loan, which S&P determined to be credit-impaired and discuss in
the credit considerations section above, details of the remaining
two top 10 loans that appear on the watchlist are:

The John Hancock Tower & Garage at Clarendon loan is the largest
loan in the pool.  The loan was current in its debt service
payments as of the November 2009 remittance report and has a trust
balance of $640.5 million (9.8%).  The loan is secured by a
1,728,550-sq.-ft., 62-story class A office building and a parking
garage containing 2,013 spaces and 28,024 sq. ft. of retail space
in Boston.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to the October
2009 lease expiration of Deloitte Consulting, which vacated the
76,319 sq. ft. of space it had occupied.  The property is now 79%
occupied, but S&P understand that negotiations are underway for a
tenant to take 28,582 sq. ft. of the former Deloitte Consulting
space.  As of June 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.10x, down from
1.21x as of year-end 2008.  The reported DSC from June 30, 2009,
includes rent from Deloitte Consulting.  With the Deloitte
Consulting rent taken out of the servicer-reported cash flow, the
DSC will likely fall to approximately 1.00x.  The Peachtree Center
loan is the sixth-largest loan in the pool and the third-largest
loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of
$207.6 million (3.2%) and is secured by four class B office
buildings totaling 1.5 million sq. ft., two class A/B office
towers totaling 946,115 sq. ft., three parking garages, and a
134,024-sq.-ft. retail center in Atlanta.  The loan appears on the
watchlist due to a DSC below 1.10x.  For the trailing 12 months
ended March 31, 2009, the DSC was 0.72x.  Occupancy has been
approximately 66% since issuance.  Deloitte Consulting vacated its
127,221-sq.-ft. space prior to its lease expiration in 2012.
However, Deloitte Consulting is obligated to pay rent through its
entire lease term.  SunTrust has executed a lease for 252,822 sq.
ft., and the 10-year lease term will begin Jan. 1, 2011.  There is
a debt service reserve with a current balance of $8.8 million.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG9

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-4       A       AAA/Watch Neg                    30.11
     A-1-A     A       AAA/Watch Neg                    30.11
     A-M       BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.07
     A-MFL     BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.07
     A-J       B+      AAA/Watch Neg                    11.29
     B         B+      AA+/Watch Neg                    10.79
     C         B+      AA/Watch Neg                      9.28
     D         B       AA-/Watch Neg                     8.66
     E         B       A+/Watch Neg                      8.03
     F         B       A/Watch Neg                       7.15
     G         B-      A-/Watch Neg                      6.27
     H         B-      BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.02
     J         CCC+    BBB/Watch Neg                     4.01
     K         CCC     BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.01
     L         CCC-    BB+/Watch Neg                     2.51
     M         CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                     2.26
     N         CCC-    B+/Watch Neg                      1.88
     O         CCC-    B/Watch Neg                       1.63
     P         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      1.38
     Q         CCC-    CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.25

                         Ratings Affirmed

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG9

          Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
          -----      ------      ----------------------
          A-1        AAA                          30.11
          A-2        AAA                          30.11
          A-3        AAA                          30.11
          A-AB       AAA                          30.11
          X          AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2006-FL4 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2006-FL4.  At
the same time, S&P removed the ratings on these five classes from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
Oct. 6, 2009.

The downgrades of the class D, E, F, and G certificates reflect
ongoing interest shortfalls primarily resulting from appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amounts and special servicing
fees associated with three of the five specially serviced assets.
If the interest shortfalls persist for an extended period of time,
S&P may lower the ratings on these classes to 'D'.

S&P lowered the rating on the class C certificate to 'BB+' from
'BBB+' because of the class' heightened susceptibility of
liquidity interruptions.  Almost all of the accrued certificate
interests have not been distributed to the subordinate classes due
to the aforementioned ASER amounts and special servicing fees.

Details of the three specially serviced assets are:
The Northwest Plaza Shopping Center asset, which became real
estate owned on Sept. 1, 2009, has a whole-loan exposure of
$29.3 million that consists of a $24.7 million senior pooled
component and a $4.6 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the "NW" certificates (not rated).  The master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., has advanced $1.4 million to date on
the asset.  The property comprises a 1.7 million-sq.-ft. super-
regional mall and an attached 12-story, 152,600-sq.-ft. class B
office building in St. Ann, Mo., that were 48% and 56% occupied as
of February 2009, respectively.  Wachovia is the special servicer
for this asset.  This asset was transferred to Wachovia on Oct. 8,
2008, due to imminent default.  It is S&P's understanding that the
borrower had planned to redevelop and reposition the mall but was
unable to fund the development.  A $26.8 million appraisal
reduction amount is in effect on the whole-loan exposure, which is
based on a Dec. 16, 2008, appraisal value of $10.0 million.
According to the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee remittance report, the
related December ASER amount for this asset was $64,308.  Wachovia
indicated that it has received an offer for sale from the City of
St. Ann in lieu of a condemnation lawsuit.  Wachovia is currently
negotiating the offer.

The Mondrian-Scottsdale loan has a $26.0 million whole-loan
balance that consists of a $23.4 million senior pooled component
and a $2.6 million subordinate nonpooled component that provides
the sole source of cash flow for the "MON" raked certificates.  In
addition, the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan
secure a $14.0 million mezzanine loan held outside the trust.
This loan, secured by a 194-room full-service boutique hotel in
Scottsdale, Ariz., was transferred to the special servicer on
May 20, 2009, due to imminent maturity default.  The 90-plus-days
delinquent loan did not meet the debt yield test as specified in
the loan documents for the borrower to exercise its June 1, 2009,
maturity extension option, which was one of the two remaining
options available.  The borrower reported negative cash flow at
the property, and 51% occupancy for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008.
An ARA of $7.2 million is in effect on the whole-loan balance,
which is based on a July 8, 2009, appraisal value of
$21.7 million.  As per the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee remittance
report, the related December ASER amount for this asset was
$10,998.  The special servicer, Wachovia, is pursuing receivership
and has filed for foreclosure.  The two 'CCC-' rated "MON" raked
certificates are currently experiencing ongoing interest
shortfalls from ASER amounts and specially servicing fees.  S&P
may lower the ratings on these classes to 'D' if the interest
shortfalls continue for a prolonged time period.

The Galleria Sheraton-Metairie loan has a whole-loan balance of
$17.0 million that consists of an $8.5 million senior pooled
component, a $2.0 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the "GSM" raked certificates, and a $6.5 million nontrust
junior participation interest.  This loan, which is in
foreclosure, is secured by a seven-story, 182-room hotel in
Metairie, La.  This loan was transferred to the special servicer
on June 2, 2009, after the borrower failed to pay off the loan
upon its June 1, 2009, maturity.  The reported DSC was 0.25x and
occupancy was 73% for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008.  The special
servicer for this loan, Situs Asset Management (Situs), is
currently exploring workout options, including pursuing
foreclosure proceedings.  An ARA of $2.6 million is in effect,
which is based on an Aug. 27, 2009, appraisal value of
$9.1 million.  As per the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee remittance report,
the related December ASER amount for this asset was $4,366.  The
two 'CCC-' rated "GSM" raked certificates are currently incurring
ongoing interest shortfalls from ASER amounts and specially
servicing fees.  S&P may lower the ratings on these classes to 'D'
if the interest shortfalls occur for an extended time period.

Details on the two other specially serviced loans in the
transaction are:

The Greenwich Residential loan has a $25.9 million senior trust
balance and a $40.9 million whole-loan balance.  Although a
$1.9 million ARA is in effect, which is based on an Aug. 11, 2009,
appraisal value of $26.8 million, the subordinate junior
participation interest is absorbing the ASER amount since the
borrower is current with payments on the whole loan.  Situs is
currently discussing workout terms with the borrower.

The 2600 West Olive Avenue loan consists of a $15.7 million senior
pooled component, a $6.4 million subordinate nonpooled component
that supports the "2600" raked certificates (not rated), and a
$14.6 million nontrust junior participation interest.  Situs is
currently discussing workout strategies with the borrower on this
90-plus-days delinquent loan.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-FL4

                               Rating
                               ------
        Class          To                  From
        -----          --                  ----
        C              BB+                 BBB+/Watch Neg
        D              B-                  BBB-/Watch Neg
        E              CCC-                BB/Watch Neg
        F              CCC-                BB-/Watch Neg
        G              CCC-                B/Watch Neg


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three2004-FL2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2004-FL2.
Concurrently, S&P placed two of the lowered ratings on CreditWatch
with negative implications, as well as the ratings on two other
classes from this transaction.

The downgrade of class L certificate to 'D' reflects accumulated
interest shortfalls of $63,185 (as of the Dec. 7, 2009, trustee
remittance report) resulting from legal expenses from an ongoing
trust litigation.  S&P does not expect the class to recover the
accumulated interest shortfall amount.

S&P lowered and placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the
class J and K certificates due to anticipated interest shortfalls
associated with additional legal expenses ($128,903 incurred as of
October 2009) that are expected to be passed through to the trust.
The expenses could appear on future trustee remittance reports as
early as on the Jan. 8, 2010, trustee remittance report.

S&P placed its ratings on the class G and H certificates on
CreditWatch negative due to these classes' heightened
susceptibility of liquidity interruption due to additional legal
expenses that may be incurred in future periods.

The trust is involved in litigation surrounding the Mervyn's
Portfolio loan, which was paid off in full on Dec. 6, 2005.
According to a Sept. 14, 2009, notice from the master servicer,
Wachovia Bank N.A., "a fraudulent conveyance action has been filed
in the Mervyn's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.  The lawsuit alleges,
among other things, that Mervyn's real estate assets were
transferred by the company's buyers to newly formed companies
that, in turn, imposed a substantial hike in rents upon the
debtor, contributing to the bankruptcy filing in July 2008." The
trustee, LaSalle Bank N.A., is among the named defendants in this
lawsuit.  Wachovia, as the master servicer, is defending the
Trust's interests.

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch placements upon further
dialogue with Wachovia regarding the litigation and related legal
expenses.  According to Wachovia, a motion to dismiss hearing is
scheduled on Jan. 14, 2010.  S&P will evaluate the potential
impact of these legal expenses on the transaction's payment
waterfall.  S&P's analysis will include an estimation of how long
the rated classes may be affected by interest shortfalls, as well
as the susceptibility of other classes to liquidity interruptions.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-RR3 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of from GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series 2006-RR3,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities re-securitized real
estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.  All of these
ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed one other rating from the same transaction
and removed it from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its downgrades to 20 CMBS certificates that serve as underlying
collateral for GSMS 2006-RR3.  The certificates are from 12
transactions and have a total balance of $260 million (35.8% of
the GSMS 2006-3 pool balance).

The lowered ratings remain on CreditWatch negative due to the
transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on
CreditWatch negative ($187.5 million, 26%).

The affirmation of the rating on the class X interest-only
certificates reflects S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may
revise its current IO criteria, which may affect outstanding
ratings, including the rating on the class X certificates.

According to the Nov. 19, 2009, trustee report, 58 CMBS
certificates ($727.8 million, 100%) from 34 distinct transactions
issued between 2004 and 2006 collateralize GSMS 2006-RR3.  GSMS
2006-RR3 has significant exposure to CMBS certificates that
Standard & Poor's has recently downgraded from these transactions:

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C28
  (classes E through J; $85 million, 11.7%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8
  (classes D and E; $47.5 million, 6.5%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-5 (classes D, E,
  and F; $29.8 million, 4.1%); and

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C23 (class
  G; $24.9 million, 3.4%).

S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
GSMS 2006-RR3's certificates in conjunction with its CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining on Creditwatch Negative

                 GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                         series 2006-RR3

                               Rating
                               ------
        Class            To               From
        -----            --               ----
        A-1              AA+/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
        A-1-S            AA+/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
        A-2              BBB-/Watch Neg   A-/Watch Neg
        B                BB+/Watch Neg    BBB+/Watch Neg
        C                BB/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
        D                BB/Watch Neg     BBB-/Watch Neg
        E                B+/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
        F                B/Watch Neg      BB+/Watch Neg
        G                B/Watch Neg      BB+/Watch Neg
        H                B-/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
        J                CCC/Watch Neg    BB-/Watch Neg
        K                CCC-/Watch Neg   B+/Watch Neg
        L                CCC-/Watch Neg   B/Watch Neg
        M                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC+/Watch Neg
        N                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC/Watch Neg

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
                         series 2006-RR3

                             Rating
                             ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         X                AAA              AAA/Watch Neg


INDIANA HEALTH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $35 Mil. Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed its 'BB+' rating on the approximately
$35 million outstanding Indiana Health Facilities Financing
Authority revenue bonds, series 1998 and 2006A, issued on behalf
of Greenwood Village South.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.  For
the variable rate 2006A bonds, the rating is an underlying rating,
given without consideration of the enhancement provided by a
confirming letter of credit.  Fitch was not asked to provide
ratings based on bank support.

Rating Rationale:

  -- Greenwood Village South continues to improve upon its
     operating performance since the downgrade in 2006 and
     reported its best operating year in 2009.

  -- Improved operations serve to buoy its liquidity position.

  -- Life Care Service Corp. (LCS) is a highly respected
     management company that has been at the helm of GVS since its
     founding in 1981, which Fitch believes is a credit strength.

  -- GVS benefits from a low cost position relative to the
     competition in the market, which is a major factor leading to
     its strong utilization.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Successful renewal or replacement of the confirming letter of
     credit backing the 2006A bonds, which expires in June 2011,
     or conversion of those bonds to a fixed rate mode;

  -- Continued and sustained positive operating performance that
     leads to improved liquidity and stronger debt service
     coverage;

  -- Improvement in GVS' occupancy and utilization metrics;

  -- The combined effects of a prolonged recession, especially the
     impact of a sluggish housing market that may persist over the
     near term, suppressing expected operating gains and thus
     preventing GVS from materially improving its credit standing.

Rating Outlook:

The Stable Outlook is based on Fitch's expectation that GVS will
continue to produce strong operating results over the near term
that should serve to further buoy its liquidity position and debt
service coverage.

Security:

Bondholders are secured by a lien on and security interest in the
gross revenues of the corporation.  In addition, bondholders have
been granted a first mortgage lien on the facility of the
corporation.

Credit Summary:

GVS' credit strengths continue to include solid occupancy in the
independent living units, the presence of a reputable management
company, and GVS' low cost positioning in its market.  Occupancy
rates of the independent living apartments have remained high,
averaging 93.4% over the last four fiscal years.  The presence of
Life Care Service Corp. as the facility's manager allows GVS
access to a unique array of in-depth services that provide a
significant value-added benefit to GVS and a distinct competitive
advantage in the marketplace.  Operating in a market with limited
competition that exhibits sound socioeconomic characteristics,
GVS' positioning as an affordable provider of senior housing lends
support to future occupancy stability.

One of the principle factors contributing to the downgrade in
February 2006 was GVS' weak liquidity relative to expenses (93
days), which has dramatically improved to 196 days as of the
fiscal year ending June 30, 2009.  Fitch notes that at Dec. 31,
2008 GVS was in technical violation of its days cash on hand
covenant under terms of its letter of credit with Santander.  GVS
received a waiver, but the covenant was raised to 200 DCOH as of
Dec. 1, 2010 (tested semiannually).  Additional covenants were
placed on GVS and include an aggregate average occupancy threshold
of 85% that is tested quarterly.  Fitch notes that GVS reported it
was in compliance of all covenants as of June 30, 2009.  GVS'
current debt structure is a credit concern.

Successful renewal or replacement of the confirming letter of
credit backing the 2006A bonds, which expires in June 2011, or
conversion of those bonds to a fixed rate mode will be a critical
rating factor over the near term.  Further, GVS has a fixed payer
swap with a notional amount of $22 million associated with the
2006A bonds that matures in 2019.  As of June 30, 2009, this swap
had a negative valuation of $2.278 million.  There are no
collateral postings required on the swap.

Fitch expects GVS' liquidity indicators will continue to
strengthen especially relative to Fitch's 'BBB' medians.  Weak
capital related ratios present some credit concern and were
especially relevant to the downgrade.  Although still light, GVS'
debt service coverage has improved to 1.4 times (x) at the close
of FY09, which is nearly double the coverage demonstrated in
fiscal 2007.  Fitch expects the coverage to grow stronger over the
near term.  Another concern leading to the downgrade was weaker
occupancy in the skilled nursing facility and assisted living
units.  At June 30, 2009, the occupancy in the SNF improved to
89.1% from 83% in FY 2006.  Furthermore, the occupancy of the
ALU's improved to 87.5% from 67% over the same time period.  The
occupancy in the ILU's has dipped some to 89.2% from 93%.

The combined effects of a prolonged recession, specifically the
effects of a sluggish housing market may persist and therefore
impede the overall strengthening of GVS credit quality in the near
term.  According to Fitch's structured real estate analysts, the
existing negative equity position of many performing borrowers
combined with a further rise in unemployment is expected to
prevent any material improvements in delinquency rates in 2010.
Independent data sources list Indiana ranked near 20th in the
nation for the number of foreclosures, which appears to have
declined slightly in the third quarter of 2009.  Fitch will
continue to monitor the effects of the housing market on
utilization and turnover at GVS and comment accordingly as it
relates to material changes to GVS's credit quality.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2006-LDP6 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6, three of
which S&P set to 'D', and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
nine other classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
and mezzanine classes also reflect credit support erosion S&P
anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of several
specially serviced loans.  S&P lowered its ratings on the class L,
M, and N certificates to 'D' following interest shortfalls due to
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions related to seven
specially serviced assets.  S&P expects the interest shortfalls to
recur for an extended period of time.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.67x and a loan-to-value ratio of 95.4%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 1.05x and an LTV of 130.7%.  The implied defaults
and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 78.5% and 34.8%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 13 ($140.7 million, 6.7%) of the 18 specially serviced
loans and one defeased loan ($2.6 million, 0.1%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced loans, which S&P
included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its
criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the November 2009 remittance report, 18 assets
($196.7 million, 9.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc.  A breakdown of the specially serviced assets by
payment status is: three are current (2.2%); one is in its grace
period (0.6%); two are 60 days delinquent (1.3%); one is 90-plus
days delinquent (0.7%); 10 are in foreclosure (4.3%); and one is
real estate owned (REO; 0.3%).

The largest loan with LNR is the Bigg's Place loan ($29.1 million,
1.4%).  This loan was transferred to the special servicer on
June 29, 2009, due to imminent default.  The loan is secured by a
402,634-sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Cincinnati, Ohio.  LNR
has indicated that it is currently reviewing a deed-in-lieu for
the property.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

The second-largest loan with LNR is the Lake Worth Plaza Shopping
Center loan ($24.7 million, 1.2%).  This loan was transferred to
the special servicer on Jan. 28, 2009, due to payment default and
is in foreclosure.  The loan is secured by a 234,651-sq.-ft.
anchored retail center in Palm Beach, Fla.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

The third-largest loan with LNR is the Richland Centre loan
($19.5 million, 0.9%).  This loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Aug. 11, 2008, due to payment default and is in
foreclosure.  The loan is secured by a 231,455-sq.-ft. anchored
retail center in North Richland Hills, Texas.  LNR has appointed a
receiver to take control of this asset.  S&P expects a significant
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

Each of the remaining 15 specially serviced assets account for
less than 0.9% of the pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for 10
($67.2 million, 3.2%) of these 15 assets, resulting in an average
loss severity of 38.6%.  Of the remaining five assets, one is
undergoing renovations and remains current, two are in discussion
for possible loan modifications, and two are recent transfers.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the November 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool had
an aggregate trust balance of $2.1 billion, which is approximately
98.1% of the balance at issuance.  The pool consists of 162
assets, which is unchanged since issuance.  The master servicers
for the transaction are Midland Loan Services Inc. and Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The master servicers provided financial
information for 97.9% of the pool, excluding one defeased loan
($2.6 million, 0.1%); 90.1% of the financial information was
full-year 2008 data or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.68x for the pool based on the
servicer-reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.67x and 95.4%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted figures exclude
13 of the 18 specially serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses
separately for these loans ($140.7 million, 6.7%), which had a
weighted average servicer-reported DSC of 0.98x.  Thirty-four
loans ($366.4 million, 17.4%) are on the master servicers'
watchlists, including two of the top 10 loans.  Twenty-six loans
($262.0 million, 12.5%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x,
and 19 of these loans ($151.0 million, 7.2%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.0x.  The transaction has not experienced any losses
to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$938.8 million (44.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.97x for the top 10 loans.
Two of the top 10 loans ($142.6 million, 6.8%) appear on the
master servicers' watchlists.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the
top 10 loans are 1.85x and 87.5%, respectively.

The 30 Broad Street loan ($82.7 million, 3.9%) is the fifth-
largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicers' watchlists.  Debt service payments on the loan were
current as of the November 2009 remittance report.  The loan is
secured by a 427,568-sq.-ft., class B, multitenant office building
in downtown New York City.  The loan appears on the watchlist
because a lease expiration (12.9% of the net rentable area,
expiring in October 2010) triggered the springing of a lockbox.
Based on net cash flow, the reported DSC was 1.39x at year-end
2008, up from 1.20x at issuance.

The Millennium Industrial Portfolio loan ($62.9 million, 2.9%) is
the seventh-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan
on the master servicers' watchlists.  Debt service payments on the
loan are current as of the November 2009 remittance report.  The
loan is secured by a cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
portfolio of five industrial properties, totaling 584,044 sq. ft.,
near Los Angeles' LAX, Chicago's O'Hare, and Boston's Logan
Airports.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to increased
vacancies in the portfolio.  Based on net cash flow, the reported
DSC was 1.03x at year-end 2008, down from 1.21x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
     Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --     ----            ----------------------
     A-M       A      AAA/Watch Neg                   20.38
     A-J       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                   12.61
     B         BBB-   AA/Watch Neg                    10.32
     C         BB+    AA-/Watch Neg                    9.43
     D         BB     A/Watch Neg                      7.77
     E         BB-    A-/Watch Neg                     6.75
     F         B      BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.35
     G         B-     BBB/Watch Neg                    4.33
     H         CCC    BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.31
     J         CCC-   BB/Watch Neg                     2.80
     K         CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg                    2.29
     L         D      B+/Watch Neg                     2.04
     M         D      B-/Watch Neg                     1.78
     N         D      CCC/Watch Neg                    1.53

                         Ratings Affirmed

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                        30.57
            A-2       AAA                        30.57
            A-3FL     AAA                        30.57
            A-3B      AAA                        30.57
            A-4       AAA                        30.57
            A-SB      AAA                        30.57
            A-1A      AAA                        30.57
            X-1       AAA                          N/A
            X-2       AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KIDSPEACE INC: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on $58.2 Mil. Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa2 long-term bond
ratings assigned to KidsPeace Inc.'s $58.2 million of Series 1998
and Series 1999 outstanding bonds issued by the Lehigh County
General Purpose Authority, PA.  The rating outlook remains
negative.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a gross revenues pledge
of the obligated group members consisting of KidsPeace Corp,
KidsPeace National Centers for Kids, Inc., KidsPeace National
Centers for Kids of Pennsylvania, Inc., and KidsPeace National
Hospital, Inc. Violation of 1.1 times rate covenant requires a
consultant, and violation of a 1.0 times rate covenant is an event
of default.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None.

                            Strengths

* National human service provider with expanding geographic and
  service line diversification, with operations in twelve states,
  including Maine, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey and
  Minnesota and most recently Nevada

* New strategic focus moving program model away from a behavioral
  focus to a clinical focus, expanding foster care services (41
  offices operating in fiscal year 2009), diversifying programming
  to potentially include some adult services and pursuing services
  that are supported by third party payors

* Changes in senior management following operational issues in
  fiscal year (FY) 2007 and FY 2008; new management has taken
  actions to improve safety, admission criteria, training, and
  best clinical practices

* Operating cash flow margin has improved through 10 months of FY
  2009 (7.2%) to 2007 levels after a steep drop off in FY 2008 (-
  1.9%); improved operating performance due to a hiring freeze,
  pension plan freeze, staff reductions, salary rollbacks and
  reduction of operating costs

                            Challenges

* Strained operational performance in the last two years (FY 2008
  and ten months of FY 2009 ending October 31, 2009) as
  operational revenue declined 22% in FY 2008 and 24% through ten
  months of FY 2009 largely due to payment delays caused by the
  state budget impasse in Pennsylvania budget impasse and county
  holdbacks; highlights dependence on particular revenue streams
  and lack of diversity in revenue sources

* Continued residential census decline and resulting operational
  performance decline in FY 2008 due to the impact of a temporary
  hold on admissions in 2007, and in FY 2009 due to a slowdown in
  residential referrals; temporary hold on admissions highlights
  the increased headline risk facing KidsPeace although strategies
  have been put in place by management to mitigate

* Materially weakened liquidity measures (18 days and 8.7% cash to
  debt) due to continued decline of unrestricted cash and
  investments to $5.7 million through ten months of FY 2009 ending
  October 31, 2009, caused by economic conditions and reduction in
  operations due to program closures

                    Recent Developments/Results

The rating affirmation is attributed to recent turnaround
initiatives in FY 2008 and FY 2009 including a reduction in work
force and freezing of the pension plan that is expected to
generate $4.0 million in cost savings at fiscal year end 2009, as
well as an asset monetization and sale-lease back plan during FY
2008 and FY 20009.  These positive developments are mitigated by
continued operating losses, lower residential census numbers and
continued stress on liquidity measures.

Operating results in FY 2008 reflect a downturn in program
operations following a temporary hold on admissions from a client
incident.  KidsPeace recorded a steep loss from operations of
-$11.6 million (-8.7% margin) and operating cash flow of
-$2.6 million (-1.9% margin) in FY 2008 compared to operating
income of $3.4 million (2.1% margin) and operating cash flow of
$12.7 million (7.7% margin) in FY 2007.  Operations have improved
from the previous year through ten months of FY 2009 ending
October 31, 2009, although at lower than historic levels with
operating income of $7,000 (0% margin) and operating cash flow of
$3.86 million (3.8% margin).  The Human Service Provider industry
is characterized by low margins that make it difficult to generate
and retain operating surpluses.  Operating profitability is
therefore dependent on management's ability to control expenses
and maintain relatively high census numbers.

KidsPeace offers nation-wide treatment programs for children and
adolescents with emotional and behavioral issues through a
combination of hospital, residential, diagnostic, educational,
therapeutic and day treatment services in addition to foster care
services.  KidsPeace generates approximately 48.5% of its revenue
through its residential treatment programs, followed by foster
care which contributes 30.7% to operations.  KidsPeace's broad
array of services and geographic reach is viewed as a credit
strength.

KidsPeace continues to experience census declines in its
residential business and as a result, operational performance
decline.  A 41% year over year decline in census occurred at two
of KidsPeace's residential facilities after a ten-week hold on
admissions imposed by the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare in
2007 and the closure of a dual diagnosis program in March, 2008,
following a client incident, and resulted in a total loss of
$11 million for 2008.  Overall census numbers declined 26% in FY
2008 and 24% through ten months of FY 2009 partly due to lower
number of referrals following the hold on admissions and
management's decision to close some programs and reduce
residential beds (76 in FY 2008 and FY 2009 respectively).
Currently, all Pennsylvania residential programs are now fully
licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare and accredited
by the Joint Commission.  Census decline has since stabilized as
of ten months of FY 2009, despite stagnancy during the summer
months, and growth is difficult due to economic factors facing
governmental customers.

Through ten months of FY 2009, KidsPeace's cash levels thinned to
$5.7 million down from $8.9 million at FYE 2008 due to challenges
with census, county holdbacks and state payors.  Continued
operational challenges and state budget issues in Pennsylvania
will continue to temper liquidity growth although management has
devised a new strategy to diversify programs and payor base that
can alleviate concentration risk.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's belief that KidsPeace's
weakened balance sheet and liquidity, despite operational
turnaround in FY 2009, continues to remain at concerning levels to
meeting debt covenants and obligations.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Future upward rating movement will largely depend on a material
increase in unrestricted liquidity; significant increase in
operating cash flow allowing KidsPeace to grow the balance sheet

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

Operating losses resulting in weakening of balance sheet and
leverage measures; violation of a 1.0 times rate covenant, leading
to further declines in liquidity.

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

-- Based on financial statements for KidsPeace Inc

-- First number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2008

-- Second number reflects ten months FY 2009 annualized

-- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 12,342; 11,232

* Total operating revenues: $133.7 million; $102.1 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $(1.7) million; $8.3 million

* Total debt outstanding: $65.2 million; $65.5 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $6.4 million; $6.4 million

* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: -0.4 times; 1.1
  times

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: -0.3 times; 1.3 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: -11.4 times; 13.7 times

* Days cash on hand: 23.1 days; 17.7 days

* Cash-to-debt: 13.6%; 8.7%

* Operating margin: -8.7%; 0.0%

* Operating cash flow margin: -1.9%; 7.2%

Rated Debt (debt outstanding as of December 31, 2008):

-- Series 1998, 1999 ($62.2 million outstanding) rated Caa2

The last rating action was on December 23, 2008, when the rating
of KidsPeace Inc. was confirmed at Caa2 with a Negative outlook.

KidsPeace's rating was assigned by evaluating factors believed to
be relevant to the credit profile of KidsPeace such as i) the
business risk and competitive position of KidsPeace versus others
within its sector, ii) the capital structure and financial risk of
KidsPeace, iii) the projected performance of KidsPeace over the
near to intermediate term, iv) KidsPeace's history of achieving
consistent operating performance and meeting budget or financial
plan goals, v) the nature of the dedicated revenue stream pledged
to the bonds, vi) the debt service coverage provided by such
revenue stream, vii) the legal structure that documents the
revenue stream and the source of payment, and viii) and
KidsPeace's management and governance structure related to
payment.  These attributes were compared against other issuers
both within and outside of KidsPeace's core peer group and
KidsPeace's ratings are believed to be comparable to ratings
assigned to other issuers of similar credit risk.


LAKESIDE RE: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'BB-'
issue-level rating to the notes exposed to losses from earthquakes
in California to be issued by Lakeside Re II Ltd.

Lakeside Re II is a special-purpose Cayman Islands exempted
company licensed as a Class B insurer in the Cayman Islands.  All
of its issued and outstanding share capital will be held under a
declaration of trust for certain charitable purposes by Wilmington
Trust (Cayman), as share trustee.

Zurich American Insurance Co., Zurich Insurance Co. Ltd., or any
other affiliated entity that might be added as a ceding insurer
from time to time will be the insurance company ceding the covered
risks to Lakeside Re II.

                           Ratings List

                        Lakeside Re II Ltd.

                 Class A Notes                'BB-'


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2006-MF3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eight classes of LaSalle
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-MF3 due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced loans and interest shortfalls.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  The largest loan is $4.2 million, which represents
1.2% of the outstanding pool balance.  Small balance transactions,
which represent approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit /
fusion universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and
losses than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.

As of the November 20, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 28%
to $354 million from $493 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 347 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 10% of the pool.

One hundred and fifty two loans, representing 41% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

To date, 33 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $20.7 million (52% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes H through
N and a 84% principal loss for Class G.  Currently, there are 55
loans, representing 18% of the pool, in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $37.7 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (50% loss severity on average).

The pool has experienced interest shortfalls totaling $356,000
which have impacted Classes D through G.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A, $315,698,291, downgraded to B1 from A2; previously
     on 2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa

  -- Class X, Notional, downgraded to B1 from A2; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa

  -- Class B, $8,019,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa1; previously
     on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2

  -- Class C, $12,953,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba1 from A2

  -- Class D, $8,018,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to B1 from Baa1

  -- Class E, $3,701,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Baa2

  -- Class F, $4,935,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3

  -- Class G, $1,051,801, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
     2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2006-MF2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of LaSalle
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-MF2 due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced loans and interest shortfalls.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.

This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction.  The largest loan is $4.1 million, which represents
1.2% of the outstanding pool balance.  Small balance transactions,
which represent approximately 1% of the Moody's rated conduit /
fusion universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and
losses than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.

As of the November 20, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 32%
to $336 million from $496 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 372 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 9% of the pool.

One hundred and sixteen loans, representing 29% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

To date, 30 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $21.4 million (55% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes F through
N and a 5% principal loss for Class E.  Currently, there are 58
loans, representing 17% of the pool, in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $28 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (50% loss severity on average).

The pool has experienced interest shortfalls totaling
approximately $638,000 which have impacted Classes D and E.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A, $303,294,355, downgraded to Caa3 from A3; previously
     on 2/10/2009 downgraded to A3 from Aaa

  -- Class X, Notional, downgraded to Caa3 from A3; previously on
     2/10/2009 downgraded to A3 from Aaa

  -- Class B, $8,745,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously on
     2/10/2009 downgraded to Ba1 from Aa2

  -- Class C, $12,493,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously on
     2/10/2009 downgraded to Ba2 from A2

  -- Class D, $8,120,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously on
     2/10/2009 downgraded to Caa1 from Baa1

  -- Class E, $3,561,704, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
     2/10/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Baa2


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C5 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various actions on several classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2005-C5.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
6.6% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 6.6%, as a majority of
the loans mature in the next five years.  The bonds with Negative
Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future
should full potential losses be realized.

To determine potential defaults for each loan Fitch assumed cash
flow would decline by 10% from year-end 2008, which is consistent
with the analysis used in its review of recent vintage
transactions whereby cash flow was assumed to decline 15% from YE
2007 projected over a three year period.  If the stressed cash
flow would cause the loan to fall below 0.95 times (x), Fitch
assumed the loan would default during the term.  To determine
losses, Fitch used the above stressed cash flow, and applied a
market cap rate, ranging between 7.5% and 9.5%, to derive a value.
If the loan balance at default is less than Fitch's derived value,
the loan would realize that amount of loss.  These loss estimates
were reviewed in more detail for loans representing 69.4% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.  Loss expectations
attributed to loans reviewed in detail represent approximately 80%
of the recognized losses.

Approximately 91.9% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 10.6% in 2010, 1.5% in 2011, and 79.8% in 2015.

Fitch identified 17 Loans of Concern (12%) within the pool, three
of which (11.8%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, one (11.4%) is current.

Losses are expected on six (27.9%) of the top 15: two are expected
to default during the term, while losses on four (23.2%) are
expected to default at maturity.  Loss severities associated with
these loans range from 5% to 41%.  The largest overall
contributors to deal loss are: Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio
(7.6%), TAG Portfolio (2.3%), and the Palmolive Retail Building
(2.3%).

Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio is comprised of 64 Courtyard by
Marriott limited-service hotel properties consisting of 9,443
rooms located in 29 different states.  Portfolio performance has
decline since issuance due to the current economic stress of the
hotel sector and the declining markets the properties are located
in.  The most recent servicer reported debt service coverage ratio
as of YE 2008 was 1.73x down from 2.09x YE 2007.  As of YE 2008,
the average daily rate has increased to $115.05 from $95.55 at
issuance and revenue per available room has increased to $76.14
from $66.43 at issuance.  Fitch expects that the loan may default
at maturity as cash flow is not expected to increase to a level
that would meet Fitch's refinance criteria.

TAG Portfolio consists of two Class A office buildings located in
Downers Grove, IL and Loudon County.  As of September 2009,
occupancy for the portfolio has declined to 70% from 87% at
issuance.  The decline in the portfolio's performance is mainly
attributed to a decline in occupancy at one of the properties
resulting from tenant vacancies.  The servicer reported DSCR for
the portfolio as of YE 2008 declined to 1.13x from 1.58x at
issuance.  Fitch modeled the loan with a higher probability of
defaulting during the loan term due to the decline in performance
and low portfolio occupancy.

Palmolive Retail Building is a 37-story, 565 million square foot
Art Deco building located at N. Michigan Avenue in Chicago, IL.
As of 2001, the property was undergoing a renovation and expansion
of the retail space and conversion of offices to ultra-luxury
condominiums.  The most recent servicer provided DSCR as of June
2009 is 1.18x.  The servicer was not able to provide an updated
rent roll or condo sales.  Fitch modeled the loan with a higher
probability of defaulting during the loan term due to property
performance not reaching stabilization expectations at issuance.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings:

  -- $187.5 million class A-J to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $20.5 million class B to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $32.2 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29.3 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.4 million class E to 'B/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29.3 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative
     Outlook;

  -- $26.4 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.4 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14.7 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.5 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $8.8 million class L to 'B-LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.9 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.8 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these
classes:

  -- $10.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $347 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $158 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $76 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $809.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $169.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-CL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-CP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $234.4 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $2.9 million class P, $5.9 million class
Q, $5.9 million class S and $23.4 million class T certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2008-C1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on five classes from this transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect credit support erosion S&P anticipates will
occur upon the eventual resolution of several specially serviced
assets.  In addition, interest shortfalls due to an appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction amount related to the
13th-largest asset in the pool, the Best Western - Clearwater
loan, prompted us to downgrade class S to 'D'.  S&P expects the
interest shortfalls to recur for an extended period of time.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.35x and a loan-to-value ratio of 104.4%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.90x and an LTV of 154.3%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 66.3% and
47.8%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude the two ($46.9 million, 4.7%) specially
serviced assets.  S&P separately estimated losses for these two
loans and included them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and
loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
classes reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings through various stress scenarios.  S&P
affirmed its rating on the class IO interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009 (see
"Request For Comment: Methodology For Rating Interest-Only
Certificates," on RatingsDirect).  After S&P finalizes its
criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may
affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the IO
certificates S&P affirmed.

                      Credit Considerations

Two assets ($46.9 million, 4.7%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  A breakdown
of the specially serviced assets by payment status is: one
($19.1 million, 1.9%) asset is more than 90 days delinquent, and
one ($27.8 million, 2.8%) is more than 60 days delinquent.  One of
the specially serviced loans has an appraisal reduction amount in
effect totaling $8.5 million.

The larger specially serviced loan, the Kettering Tower loan
($27.8 million, 2.8%), is a top 10 loan that S&P discuss below in
the top 10 loan section.  The other specially serviced loan is the
Best Western-Clearwater loan.  The Best Western-Clearwater loan
($19.1 million, 1.9%) is secured by a 110-room beachfront hotel in
Clearwater, Fla.  The asset was transferred to CWCapital on
Feb. 19, 2009, due to monetary default and is now 90-plus-days
delinquent.  An ARA totaling $8.5 million is in effect for this
asset based on an appraisal of $12.5 million from April 1, 2009.
The reported monthly ASER amount on the Nov. 18, 2009, remittance
report was $49,648 and the cumulative ASER reported was $333,986.
Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of this asset.

There is also one loan ($11.0 million, 1.1%) that S&P determined
to be credit-impaired.  The Best Western - Harrisburg loan is
secured by an 174-room, six-story, full-service lodging property
in Lower Swatara Township, Pa.  For the 12-month period ended
June 30, 2009, the property reported a DSC of 0.70x, down from
1.04x for the 12-month period ended Dec. 31, 2008.  The loan is
60-plus-days delinquent.  Consequently, S&P has determined this
loan to be at an increased risk of loss.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the November 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool has
an aggregate trust balance of $1.88 billion, which is
approximately 99.5% of the issuance balance.  The collateral pool
consists of 62 loans, which has not changed since issuance.  The
master servicer for the transaction is Wachovia Bank N.A.
Wachovia provided financial information for 94.9% of the loans in
the pool, and 100% of the servicer-provided information was full-
year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.37x for loans based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.35x and 104.4%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude two (4.7%) specially serviced
loans, which S&P stressed separately.  To date, the transaction
has not experienced principal losses.  Nineteen loans
($223.6 million, 22.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including two of the top 10 loans, which S&P discuss below.  Seven
loans ($77.9 million, 7.8%) have reported DSC between 1.0x and
1.10x, and seven loans ($74.3 million, 7.5%) have reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$633.2 million (63.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.38x and 98.9%, respectively, for
the top 10 loans.  One of these loans is with CWCapital, and three
are on Wachovia's watchlist.

The Kettering Tower loan ($27.8 million, 2.8%) is the seventh-
largest loan in the pool and largest loan with the special
servicer.  The loan is secured by a 484,265-sq.-ft. office
property in Dayton, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to CWCapital
on April 15, 2009, due to a violation of the cash management
agreement and is now 60-plus-days delinquent.  The loan reported a
DSC of 1.05x and 68.7% occupancy for the 12-month period ended
Dec. 31, 2008, down from 1.24x and 80.3% at issuance.  A May 2009
appraisal valued the property at $37.00 per sq. ft.

The Westin-Charlotte loan ($74.5 million, 7.5%) is the fourth-
largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the watchlist.
The loan is secured by a 26-story, 700-room, lodging property in
downtown Charlotte.  The loan reported a DSC of 1.10x and 61.5%
occupancy for the 12-month period ended June 30, 2009, down from
1.25x and 72.8%, respectively, at issuance.  The master servicer
has sprung the lockbox and is monitoring the performance.
However, at this time, the borrower does not foresee an issue
making future debt service payments.

The Memphis Retail Portfolio loan ($25.6 million, 2.6%) is the
ninth-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
watchlist.  The loan is secured by five retail properties totaling
145,531-sq.-ft. in Memphis and Collierville, Tenn.  The loan
reported a DSC of 1.08x and 79.4% occupancy for the six-months
ended June 30, 2009, down from 1.26x and 86.7%, respectively, at
year-end 2008.  The decreases are due to declines in base rent and
increased vacancy.  The master servicer is in the process of
reviewing a loan modification request.

The Chicago Hotel Portfolio loan ($24.6 million, 2.5%) is the
10th-largest asset in the pool and the third-largest exposure on
the servicer's watchlist.  The exposure consists of three cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans on three independent
boutique hotels in Chicago with a total of 152 rooms.  The hotels
were built between 1926 and 1929 and renovations were completed on
all three properties in 1999.  The loan is on the watchlist due to
a decline in DSC from 1.26x at issuance.  The reported DSC for the
12 months ended June 30, 2009, was 0.75x and occupancy was 64.7%.
Management has indicated that it is not concerned with making
future debt service payments at this time.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LBUBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
    Class     To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --      ----             ---------------------
    A-M       A     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.20
    A-J       BBB   AAA/Watch Neg                    13.26
    B         BBB-  AA+/Watch Neg                    11.87
    C         BB+   AA/Watch Neg                     10.73
    D         BB    AA-/Watch Neg                     9.97
    E         BB-   A+/Watch Neg                      9.09
    F         B+    A/Watch Neg                       8.33
    G         B+    A-/Watch Neg                      7.20
    H         B+    BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.06
    J         B     BBB/Watch Neg                     4.80
    K         B-    BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.91
    L         CCC   BB+/Watch Neg                     3.03
    M         CCC-  BB/Watch Neg                      2.53
    N         CCC-  BB-/Watch Neg                     2.27
    P         CCC-  B+/Watch Neg                      2.15
    Q         CCC-  B/Watch Neg                       1.89
    S         D     B-/Watch Neg                      1.64

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LBUBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

     Class     Rating                  Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     ------                  ----------------------
     A-1       AAA                                      30.30
     A-AB      AAA                                      30.30
     A-2       AAA                                      30.30
     A-2FL     AAA                                      30.30
     X         AAA                                        N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Various Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the
ratings of notes issued by certain structured notes transactions
listed below that have exposure to Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.
Moody's explained that Lehman Brothers Finance S.A. acts as a
guarantor of principal in the Transactions and the rating assigned
to the Transactions is directly linked to the rating of the Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., the guarantor of Lehman Brothers Finance
S.A.  Moody's ratings assigned to LBHI were withdrawn following a
bankruptcy filing by that entity.

The rating actions are:

Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited Series 20

(1) First Tranche EUR10,000,000 Capital Protected Notes due 2022;
    Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded to C

(2) Second Tranche EUR9,800,000 Capital Protected Notes due 2022;
    Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded to C

(3) Third Tranche EUR15,200,000 Capital Protected Notes due 2022;
    Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited Series 22

(1) Capital Protected Notes due 2018/21 linked to a Portfolio of
    Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited Series 24

(1) Principal Protected Notes due 2015 linked to a Portfolio of
    Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited Series 25

(1) Minimum Redemption Amount Notes due 2019/22 linked to a
    Portfolio of Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008
    downgraded to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited Series 26

(1)Principal Protected Notes due 2023 linked to a Portfolio of
    Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Limited Series 15

(1) Series 15 Principal Protected Bonds due 2013; Withdrawn;
    Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Limited Series 38

(1) Capital Protected Bonds due 2017 linked to a Portfolio of
    Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Limited Series 52;
Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded to C

(1) Principal Protected Bonds due 2017 linked to a Basket of Hedge
    Funds

Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Limited Series 58

(1) Principal Protected Bonds due 2012 linked to a Basket of Hedge
    funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C

Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Series 54

(1) Principal Protected Bonds due 2017 linked to a Basket of Hedge
    Funds; Withdrawn; Previously on December 17, 2008 downgraded
    to C


MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M 2006-1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Merrill Lynch
Floating Trust's series 2006-1.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 16 other classes from the same transaction and
removed all 17 ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrade of the class M certificates primarily reflects S&P's
concerns about the ability to refinance the loans in the pool, all
of which mature in 2011.  The downgrade also reflects S&P's
revised valuations of the remaining loans in the pool.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates also
reflect S&P's revised valuations of the remaining loans in the
pool, as well as increased credit enhancement levels resulting
from loan payoffs and paydowns.  The affirmations of the class X-
1B, X-3A, X-3B, and X-3C interest-only certificates reflect S&P's
current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing
changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize
its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may
affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO
certificates that S&P affirmed.

The two largest loans in the pool ($1.2 billion aggregate pooled
balance) account for 79.8% of the pooled trust balance.  The
largest loan in the pool, the Lord & Taylor Portfolio loan, has a
whole-loan and trust balance of $651.6 million (44.9% of the
pooled trust balance).  In addition, the equity interests in the
borrower of the whole loan secure $225.0 million of mezzanine debt
held outside the trust.  The loan is secured by the fee and
leasehold interests in a pool of 36 Lord & Taylor stores and one
warehouse distribution facility located in eight states and
Washington, D.C., as well as the Lord & Taylor corporate offices,
which are located at the flagship Fifth Avenue store in Manhattan.
The properties are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted with
construction dates between 1915 and 2000.  They range in size from
79,420 sq. ft. to 676,042 sq. ft. and aggregate 5.95 million total
sq. ft.

The master servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a 5.44x debt service
coverage and 100% occupancy for the 12 months ended Aug. 31, 2009.
S&P's adjusted valuation is down 11% since issuance due primarily
to increased operating expenses, resulting in a loan-to-value
ratio of 66.0%.  However, the decline in Standard & Poor's
adjusted value was offset by a $130.3 million reduction in the
whole-loan balance, which occurred in January 2009.  At that time,
reserve funds were released and applied to the principal balance
at the request of the borrower.  The loan matures in October 2010
and has one one-year extension option remaining.

The second-largest loan, the Trizec Portfolio, has a trust balance
of $505.8 million (34.9% of the pooled trust balance) and a whole-
loan balance of $595.0 million.  The whole loan consists of two
pari passu pieces: a $505.8 million component that is included in
this transaction and an $89.2 million component that is part of
the COMM 2007-FL14 transaction.  In addition, the equity interests
in the borrower of the whole loan secure $3.1 billion of mezzanine
debt held outside the trust.  The senior portion of the mezzanine
debt ($470.2 million) secures the nonpooled "TM" raked certificate
classes, which Standard & Poor's does not rate.  The loan is
secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 21 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties totaling
8 million sq. ft. in California, Washington, D.C., New Jersey,
Virginia, and Texas.

The master servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a 5.18x DSC as of
December 2008 and 84% occupancy as of July 2009.  S&P's adjusted
valuation is comparable to its level at issuance and results in an
LTV of 49.8%.  The loan matures in October 2010 and has one one-
year extension option remaining.

According to the November 2009 trustee remittance report, the pool
statistics were:

* There were nine loans in the pool, including senior
  participation interests in five floating-rate mortgage loans and
  four floating-rate whole-mortgage loans;

* There were mortgages on 37 retail properties, 35 office
  properties, 26 hotel properties, and five health-care
  properties; and

* All of the loans were indexed to one-month LIBOR.

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Merrill Lynch Floating Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----              ----------------------
    M          BB-     BB/Watch Neg                         N/A

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Merrill Lynch Floating Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----              ----------------------
    A-1        AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      70.49
    A-2        AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      34.12
    B          AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      30.31
    C          AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      26.94
    D          AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      24.69
    E          AA+     AA+/Watch Neg                      19.50
    F          AA-     AA-/Watch Neg                      16.29
    G          A+      A+/Watch Neg                       13.24
    H          A       A/Watch Neg                        10.44
    J          A-      A-/Watch Neg                        7.96
    K          BBB+    BBB+/Watch Neg                      5.46
    L          BBB     BBB/Watch Neg                       3.32
    X-1B       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    X-3A       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    X-3B       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    X-3C       AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


MILLSTONE FUNDING: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 11 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the
ratings of 11 classes of notes issued 2 SF CDOs that have
completed liquidation of collateral following an Event of Default.
In each case Moody's was notified that the Trustee was directed to
liquidate the collateral as a post-event-of-default remedy.
Moody's has been notified by the respective Trustee that a final
distribution of liquidation proceeds has taken place (except for
retention of a small amount of residual funds).

Issuer: Millstone Funding, Ltd./Millstone Funding Corp.

  -- US$40,000,000 Cl. A-1 Notes, Withdrawn; previously on
     April 24, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$10,000,000 Cl. A-2 Notes, Withdrawn; previously on
     April 24, 2009 Downgraded to C

  -- US$65,000,000 Cl. B Notes, Withdrawn; previously on
     December 22, 2008 Downgraded to C

Issuer: Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-I, Ltd

  -- US$325,000,000 Supersenior Swap Notes, Withdrawn; previously
     on September 23, 2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$70,000,000 Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes, Withdrawn;
     previously on September 23, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$30,000,000 Class III Senior Floating Rate Notes,
     Withdrawn; previously on September 23, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$5,000,000 Class IV Senior Floating Rate Notes, Withdrawn;
     previously on September 23, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$23,000,000 Class V Mezzanine Floating Rate Deferrable
     Notes, Withdrawn; previously on May 7, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$22,500,000 Class VI Mezzanine Floating Rate Deferrable
     Notes, Withdrawn; previously on May 7, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$7,000,000 Class VII Mezzanine Floating Rate Deferrable
     Notes, Withdrawn; previously on May 7, 2008 Downgraded to C

  -- US$10,000,000 Principal Protected Notes, Withdrawn;
     previously on April 2, 2008 Aa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade


NOMURA CRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades all classes of Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 35.8%.  Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  A
detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this
release.

Nomura 2007-2 is primarily collateralized by senior commercial
real estate debt (79% of total collateral is either whole loans or
A-notes).  However, many of these assets are secured by
transitional properties that are lagging behind their original
business plans.  To date, the transaction has an above-average
default rate with eight assets currently defaulted, representing
25.4% of the pool.  Fitch expects significant losses on the
defaulted assets.

Offsetting the par haircuts associated with the defaulted assets,
the asset manager has purchased 10 assets at discounts ranging
from 30% to 98% of par.  These discounted purchases have resulted
in approximately $22 million of par building for the CDO.

Even so, as of the November 2009 trustee report, all
overcollateralization tests have breached their respective
covenants.  As a result, classes D and below are no longer
receiving any proceeds.  All excess interest proceeds (after class
C) and any principal proceeds are currently being redirected to
redeem classes A-1 and A-R.  Given its expectations of further
defaults, Fitch considers it unlikely that classes below the A/B/C
OC test will receive any further proceeds over the life of the
transaction.

Nomura 2007-2 is a $947 million CRE collateralized debt obligation
managed by Centerline Capital Group Inc. The transaction has a
six-year reinvestment period during which principal proceeds may
be used to invest in substitute collateral.  The reinvestment
period ends in February 2013.  As of the November 2009 trustee
report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was substantially
invested: CRE whole loan/A-notes (79.3%), B-notes (10.7%),
mezzanine loans (1.5%), commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS; 4.9%), and CRE CDOs (3.5%).

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 63.4% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 11.9% from third-quarter 2009 trailing-12-
month cash flows.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
low at 43.5%, due to the highly leveraged and transitional nature
of the assets.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
whole loan (11.3%) secured by an eight-property multifamily
portfolio located in Texas, Indiana, Florida, North Carolina, and
Tennessee.  The sponsor defaulted on the original mezzanine
component of the loan in the fourth quarter of 2008, and the
mezzanine lender, which is an affiliate of the collateral manager,
assumed title to the property.  The remaining whole loan matured
in October 2009 and was not repaid.  This multifamily portfolio is
being marketed for sale, and substantial losses are expected.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (10.3%) secured by a retail center located in Los
Angeles, California.  The property underwent a $30 million
renovation; however, leasing of the improved property has been
slower than expected.  The loan's final maturity is in July 2012,
but Fitch assumes this loan defaults before maturity under the
modeled base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is class H (3.1%) of MSC 2007-IQ 14, a $4.8 billion conduit CMBS
transaction.  MSC 2007-IQ 14 is collateralized by 423 commercial
real estate loans; its highest property type concentration is
office at 38.0%, and its highest geographic concentration is
California at 12.8%.  Defaulted loans currently total 7.7% of the
pool.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'U.S. CREL CDO
Surveillance Criteria,' which applies stresses to property cash
flows and uses debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based
on this analysis, the breakeven rates for classes A-1 and A-R are
generally consistent with the 'BB' rating category, and the
breakeven rates for class A-2 are generally consistent with the
'B' rating category.

The ratings for classes B through O are based on a deterministic
analysis which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool and the current percentage of defaulted assets factoring
in anticipated recoveries relative to each class's credit
enhancement, as well as the likelihood for OC tests to cure.
Based on this analysis, classes B and C are consistent with the
'CCC' rating category, meaning default is a real possibility given
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 35.8%, which is higher than
these classes' current credit enhancements.  Ratings for classes D
through F are deemed to be consistent with the 'CC' rating
category, meaning default appears probable given current defaulted
assets of 25.4%, which is higher, but proximate to these classes'
current credit enhancements.  Ratings for classes G through O are
deemed to be consistent with the 'C' rating category, as Fitch
considers a default on these classes to be inevitable.  The
current percentage of defaulted assets, factoring in Fitch's
anticipated recoveries, either exceeds or is close to each of
these classes' respective credit enhancement.

Classes A-1, A-R and A-2 were each assigned a Negative Rating
Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings of 'LS3' for classes A-1 and A-R,
and 'LS5' for class A-2.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Classes B through O were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities.  Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(63.4% and 43.5%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag.  All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class's tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.  The
assumptions for the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-stress scenario are
found in the report, 'Fitch US$ LIBOR Stresses' (July 31, 2009),
available on Fitch's web site at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class B reflects modeled recoveries of
25% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($10.3
     million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($7.2 million);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($17.5 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($36.1 million).

Classes C through O are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
the principal balance of the security.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS and Recovery
ratings to these classes:

  -- $471,131,250 class A-1 to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $75,000,000 class A-R to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $60,681,250 class A-2 to 'B/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $70,537,500 class B to 'CCC/RR5' from 'AA';

  -- $26,600,000 class C to 'CCC/RR6' from 'AA-';

  -- $27,075,000 class D to 'CC/RR6' from 'A+';

  -- $20,425,000 class E to 'CC/RR6' from 'A';

  -- $21,612,500 class F to 'CC/RR6' from 'A-';

  -- $24,937,500 class G to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB+';

  -- $20,187,500 class H to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $25,175,000 class J to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $22,800,000 class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $8,787,500 Class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $5,700,000 Class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $8,075,000 Class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $12,825,000 Class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.


PANIOLO CABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series A to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Baa3 and Ba2 ratings
of Paniolo Cable Company, LLC's Senior Secured Series A and Second
Lien Series B Notes to B1 and B3 respectively.  The ratings remain
under review with direction uncertain.  The downgrades consider
that unless the Federal Communications Commission's reverses the
National Exchange Carrier Association's decision to deny the
request by Sandwich Isles Communications, Inc., the lessee of
Paniolo's fiber optic network, for recovery of costs associated
with the lease, the notes are very likely to default.  Paniolo's
notes are secured by lease payments from SIC as well as a lien on
the network itself.

The uncertain direction of the watchlist reflects the possibility
that the bonds could be upgraded if the FCC ultimately directs
NECA to fulfill SIC's request for cost recovery.  Depending upon
the portion of its costs that SIC is able to recover, the rating
could potentially return to investment grade.  If the FCC upholds
NECA's determination, however, the ratings are likely to be
downgraded by several more notches because of the very high
probability of default that would result and the relatively low
recovery prospects given the high cost of the network coupled with
excess capacity and low level of demand.

Though SIC hopes to be able to let some of the capacity from
Paniolo, it is almost entirely dependent upon reimbursements from
NECA to recover its lease costs.  All of SIC's claims related to
the $15 million in annual Paniolo lease expense have been rejected
by NECA, including those expected to be covered by both Interstate
Access Charges and the Universal Service Fund High Cost Loop
Support.  (NECA continues to reimburse SIC in full for its other
expenses not related to Paniolo and there is no expectation that
it will cease doing so.)

If SIC does not receive reimbursement in full from NECA, it is
likely to have great difficulty fulfilling its obligations to
Paniolo and meeting its other financing obligations in Moody's
view.  SIC's obligations under the Paniolo lease are significantly
larger than all of its other debt obligations combined and the
payments from NECA associated with the lease were expected to
constitute a substantial portion of its total revenues.  As of the
end of 2008, SIC had just $137 million in debt outstanding,
compared to the $214 million in debt associated with the Paniolo
lease.  SIC has limited financial flexibility and resources
available to it and it cannot cancel or reduce its obligation to
Paniolo as a result of the NECA determination.  Even in the
scenario developed by SIC's financial consultant, in which SIC
recovers approximately $10-11 million annually from NECA (based
upon reimburseability rather than cost recovery), SIC's net income
would fall to just $1.4 million in 2010.

NECA formed its operating budget for 2009 based upon requests from
participating RLECs before its tariff was approved for the year.
As a result, the costs associated with Paniolo were included in
the 2009 budget prior to NECA's determination not to support them.
The next debt service payment is due February 20.  NECA reportedly
makes payments to SIC on a quarterly basis.  It is not clear when
the FCC will rule in this case.

Paniolo has a debt service reserve equal to $8 million, or maximum
quarterly debt service (quarterly debt service is currently
approximately $4.2 million), and a business interruption reserve
equal to $4 million.  On their own, the reserves are not quite
sufficient to cover three quarters of debt service on the notes.
This could forestall a default in the event that payments from
NECA are temporarily interrupted pending the FCC's ruling.  If the
FCC delivers an adverse ruling as a result of which SIC is unable
to make its lease payments, however, Moody's believes that both
SIC and Paniolo could potentially file for bankruptcy before the
reserves are exhausted.  Regardless, the reserves will not be
sufficient to prevent a default for long under such a
circumstance.

Paniolo is 100% levered and equity does not get compensated until
the debt has been fully repaid, providing the company's sponsors
little incentive to provide it support.  Regardless, the sponsors
do not appear to have the ability to provide significant support.
Though SIC may have access to current cash balances of its parent,
the Waimana Group, in the event that reimbursements from NECA are
reduced, these total just $14 million.

The two-notch distinction between the ratings assigned to the
senior and subordinated notes reflects the lower recovery
prospects for the subordinated notes in the event of a default.
Beyond rights to their dedicated debt service reserve fund,
subordinated noteholders have no rights in the event of a payment
default.  However, SIC's obligation to Paniolo is to make a single
lease payment, which is intended to be sufficient to service both
the senior and subordinated notes.  As a result, it is unlikely
that Paniolo would default on just the subordinated notes, which
in any case represent a relatively small portion of its capital
structure.

The last rating action on Paniolo was on September 17, 2009, when
ratings on the Senior Secured Series A Notes and the Second Lien
Series B Notes were downgraded to Baa3 and Ba2 respectively from
A3 rating Baa2.

Paniolo's rating was assigned by evaluating factors believed to be
relevant to the credit profile of the issuer.  These attributes
were compared against other issuers both within and outside of
Paniolo's core peer group and Paniolo's rating is believed to be
comparable to ratings assigned to other issuers of similar credit
risk.

Paniolo Cable Company, LLC, is a limited liability company, formed
under the laws of the State of Delaware, specifically to undertake
the Hawaiian submarine telecommunication system project.


PASS-THROUGH AUCTION: S&P Raises Rating on Two Certs. to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Pass-
Through Auction Market Preferred Securities Series 2007-1's class
A and B certificates to 'BB' from 'B'.

The ratings on the notes are dependent on the lower of S&P's issue
ratings on the two underlying securities: (i) the Merrill Lynch &
Co. Inc.'s noncumulative perpetual floating-rate preferred series
5 notes ('BB'); and (ii) the Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.'s
noncumulative perpetual floating-rate preferred series 2 notes
('BB').

The upgrades reflect the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of S&P's ratings on
the two underlying securities to 'BB' from 'B'.


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on SPR-1 Certs. to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of these certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series SPR-1:

  -- US$42,515,000 PPLUS Trust Series SPR-1 7.00% Trust
     Certificates, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on December 23,
     2008 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
Moody's rating of the Underlying Securities which are $43,297,000
6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint Capital Corporation and
which were downgraded to Ba3 by Moody's on November 20, 2009.


PPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these certificates issued by PPLUS Trust Series LMG-3:

  -- PPLUS Class A 7.00% Trust Certificates Series LMG-3,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on September 18, 2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- PPLUS Class B 1.25% Trust Certificates Series LMG-3,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on September 18, 2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of
the Moody's rating of the Underlying Securities which are 8.25%
Senior Debentures due 2030 issued by Liberty Media Corporation and
which were downgraded to B1 by Moody's on November 20, 2009.


PREFERRED PASS-THROUGH: S&P Raises Ratings on Two Certs. to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Preferred
Pass-Through Trust 2006-B's class A and B certificates to 'BB'
from 'B'.

The ratings on the class A and B certificates are dependent on the
credit rating on the underlying security, Bank of America Corp.'s
noncumulative perpetual floating-rate preferred stock series E
notes.

The rating actions reflect the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the
underlying security to 'BB' from 'B'.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Ratings on LMG-2 Certs. to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded these
certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series LMG-2:

  -- $31,000,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.50% Trust Certificates,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on September 18, 2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 8.50% Debentures due 2029 issued by Liberty Media
Corporation which was downgraded to B1 by Moody's on November 20,
2009.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on LMG-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded these
certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series LMG-1:

  -- $125,875,000 PREFERREDPLUS 8.75% Trust Certificates,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on September 18, 2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of 8.25% Senior Debentures due 2030 issued by Liberty Media
Corporation which were downgraded to B1 by Moody's on November 20,
2009.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $25 Mil. Certs. to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on
PreferredPlus Trust Series CCR-1's $25 million trust certificates
to 'BB' from 'B'.

The rating on the certificates is dependent solely on S&P's issue
rating on the underlying security, Countrywide Capital III's 8.05%
subordinated capital income securities series B due June 15, 2027.

The upgrade reflects the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the rating on
the underlying security to 'BB' from 'B'.


RUBY FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'C' Ratings on $50 Mil. Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the
rating of these notes issued by Ruby Finance Public Limited
Company Series 2007-4:

  -- US$50,000,000 Partly Paid Notes due 2019, Withdrawn;
     previously on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to C

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
underlying securities and legal structure of the transaction.  The
rating action is a result of the withdrawal of the Moody's rating
of the underlying securities, which are the $50,000,000 Aspen
Noah, Limited Notes.  Aspen Noah, a structured note, is exposed to
Lehman Brothers International (Europe), guaranteed by Lehman
Brothers Holding Inc., which acts as a swap counterparty in the
Aspen Noah transaction.  The ratings for Lehman Brothers Holding
Inc. were withdrawn following its bankruptcy filing.


SALT CREEK: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B-6$L 2005-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B-6$L note issued by Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1 Ltd., a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation of high-yield corporate
bonds transaction.  S&P also withdrew its 'AAA' rating on the A-
1EL notes and its 'AA' rating on the A-3 notes from this deal.
The ratings were previously on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrade follows a number of write-downs of underlying
reference entities, which have caused the class of notes to incur
principal losses.  The rating withdrawals follow the complete
paydown of the notes.

                          Rating Lowered

                 Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1

                     Rating                     Balance (mil.)
                     ------                     --------------
Class           To          From            Current      Previous
-----           --          ----            -------      --------
B-6$L           CC          CCC-            0.932         2.000

                         Ratings Withdrawn

                 Salt Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1

                   Rating                      Balance (mil.)
                   ------                      --------------
  Class        To     From                   Current      Previous
  -----        --     ----                   -------      --------
A-1EL          NR     AAA/Watch Neg          0.00          33.0
A-3            NR     AA/Watch Neg           0.00          19.5

                          NR - Not rated.


SAN DIEGO NATURAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on 1998 Certs. From 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa2 from B1, the
rating on San Diego Natural History Museum's Series 1998
Certificates of Participation issued through the County of San
Diego and has revised the outlook to negative from stable.  The
downgrade and outlook revision reflects Moody's ongoing concerns
about the financial health of the Museum.  Despite optimism that
recently successful visiting exhibits might stabilize operating
margins and boost liquidity, forecasts for FY2009 have not been
met and operations remains weaker than expected.  The Museum has
also been reliant upon an operating line of credit which is fully
drawn and expired on October 31, 2009.  The Museum is currently
negotiating terms for repayment.  Should the Museum be unable to
negotiate favorable terms, more significant financial pressure
could be realized leading to additional pressure on the rating.
The legal structure of the bonds is also relatively weak, with no
mortgage or deed of trust on the land or building occupied by the
Museum, but a security interest in gross revenues of the Museum's
operations.  There is a debt service reserve fund.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by certificates of
participation issued by the County of San Diego.  Payments on the
certificates are secured by the general obligation of the Museum,
with a security interest in gross revenues, as defined in the
sublease agreement.  There is a debt service reserve fund.  There
is no mortgage or deed of trust on the land or building occupied
by the Museum.

Debt-Related Derivatives: None

Following significant success with two visiting exhibits in fiscal
2008, the Museum has not been able to meet operating projections
given weaker than expected admissions and membership revenues
along with limited fundraising.  Due in part to current economic
challenges, the Museum's most recent visiting exhibit Bodyworlds,
which ran from April 2008 to October 2009, did not reach expected
admission goals.  In particular, visitorship fell 40-50% short of
projections for the summer months.  In total, the Museum had
378,087 visitors in FY2009 compared to 674,309 in FY2008.
Management notes membership levels have also been trending
downward as expected, but have fallen below budget with 6,345
members as of September 30, 2009, compared to a high of 11,444 at
the end of June 30, 2008.  The Museum has planned for several
exhibits in FY2010 and 2011 that are more closely aligned to its
mission of promoting natural history of the Southwest region.  An
exhibit on Darwin is set to run from November 2009 through
February 2010 and an exhibit on Baja California will run from
September 2009 to January 2010.  Management expects visitor-ship
similar to FY2007 levels of approximately 70,000 visitors per
quarter.  At this time, attendance is tracking slower than
expected.

Given the lower than expected attendance and limited gift
revenues, FY2009 results were weaker than anticipated, with an
operating margin (as calculated by Moody's) measuring at negative
22%.  FY2009 operations also relied on a maximum draw of
$2.57 million on an operating line of credit with Bank of America
to prepare for the Bodyworld's exhibit.  At this time, the Museum
maintains a $2 million draw on the operating line which has had
its maximum limit reduced to the current balance.  Management has
made several major expenditure reductions for the FY2010 budget
including the elimination of 15 positions, ending the 401K match
to employees and mandatory salary reductions.  With these
reductions, management expects break-even operations; however the
budget also assumes that no repayment is required on the
outstanding line of credit and an estimated 300,000 of admissions.
At this time, it appears admissions and gift revenues remain below
targeted amounts and Moody's remain concerned the Museum will not
be able to meet budgeted goals.  The Museum does receive annual
support of approximately $400,000 from the City of San Diego
through tourism related sales tax revenues and $100,000 from the
County of San Diego through discretionary funds, however it is
unlikely that the City or County will provide extraordinary
support to the Museum.  Unexpected extraordinary support from the
City or County would could significantly impact the rating
positively.

Due to the Museum's heavy reliance on the operating line, the
Museum's liquidity continues to remain a serious concern.  The
Museum has a $2 million outstanding draw on its line of credit
which officially expired on October 31, 2009.  Should the Museum
be unable to negotiate favorable terms for repayment of this line,
more significant financial pressure could be realized leading to
additional pressure on the rating given limited liquidity.  In
FY2009, unrestricted financial resources measured at negative
$3.5 million and total cash measured at a limited $1.9 million.
Management notes liquidity has weakened further since the end of
the fiscal year.  Thus, Moody's remains very concerned as the
Museum expects to pay the scheduled debt service payment of
$750,450 on January 1, 2010, leaving very minimal cash to fund
operations.  Management notes December is typically a strong month
for fundraising, which should provide some liquidity for January
operations; however fundraising overall continues to remain weak
given the current economy.  At the end of FY2009, the Museum also
maintained $7.5 million of investments although the majority of
investments are permanently restricted.  Due to investment
volatility, the Museum endowment experienced a negative 22%
investment return in FY2009, but management notes a positive 20%
fiscal year to date return as of September 30th.  The current
asset allocation of the endowment is 58% domestic equities, 15%
international equities and 27% fixed income.

                              Outlook

The rating has been revised to negative from stable reflecting
Moody's ongoing concerns about financial operations of the Museum
and its ability to maintain adequate operating cash flow to meet
monthly expenditures.  The outlook also incorporates uncertainty
surrounding the Museum's ability to negotiate a favorable
repayment plan for the Museum's outstanding operating line of
credit.

                 What could change the rating-UP

Robust growth in financial resources and liquidity, coupled with
trend of more stabilized and balanced operating performance with
no declining on operating lines

                What could change the rating - DOWN

Continued shortfalls in operating performance or attendance;
failure to negotiate favorable repayment of outstanding operating
line balance.

Key Indicators (Fiscal year 2009 audited financial data -
6/30/2009):

* Total Direct Debt: $16.6 million
* Total Cash and Investments: $10.6 million
* Total Financial Resources: $8.3 million
* Expendable Financial Resources: - $1.7 million
* Expendable Resources to Debt: -0.12 times
* Expendable Resources to Operations: - 0.10 times
* Operating Margin: -21.8%
* Operating Cash Flow Margin: -4.2%

Rated Debt:

* Series 1998 Certificates of Participation: Caa2

The last rating action with respect to San Diego Natural History
Museum was on December 23, 2008, when the B1 rating was affirmed
and the outlook was revised to stable from positive.


SASCO 2007-BHC1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust, a re-REMIC transaction.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed one rating and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications, and 14 ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on 33 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for SASCO 2007-
BHCI.  The certificates are from 17 transactions and the
securities have total balance of $201.6 million (40.2% of the pool
balance).  The downgrades to 'D' on classes P and Q reflect
interest shortfalls to the classes over the last nine months,
which S&P expects to continue for the foreseeable future.

The ratings remaining on CreditWatch negative reflect the
transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on
CreditWatch negative ($204.6 million, 41%).

S&P affirmed the rating on the class X interest-only certificates
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may revise its current
IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the class X certificates from SASCO 2007-BHCI.

According to the Nov. 23, 2009, trustee report, SASCO 2007-BHCI is
collateralized by 88 CMBS certificates ($501.3 million, 100%) from
42 distinct transactions issued between 2004 and 2006.  SASCO
2007-BHCI has significant exposure to Standard & Poor's downgraded
CMBS includes:

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2006-
  LDP7 (classes G and H; $30 million, 6%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C7 (classes G, H,
  J, and K; $25 million, 5%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C3 (classes G, J,
  and K; $17 million, 3.4%);

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C3 (class G;
  $15.7 million, 3.1%); and

* GS Mortgage Securities Trust series 2006-GG6 (classes G, J, and
  K; $15 million, 3.0%).

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on
SASCO 2007-BHCI in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch resolutions
of the underlying CMBS assets.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                      SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-2              BB+/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
         B                BB/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
         C                B+/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg
         D                B+/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg
         E                B/Watch Neg      BB-/Watch Neg
         F                B-/Watch Neg     B+/Watch Neg
         G                CCC+/Watch Neg   B+/Watch Neg
         H                CCC-/Watch Neg   B-/Watch Neg
         J                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC+/Watch Neg
         K                CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         P                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
         Q                D                CCC-/Watch Neg

       Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         X                AAA              AAA/Watch Neg

             Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                      SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                Class            Rating
                -----            ------
                A-1              A+/Watch Neg
                L                CCC-/Watch Neg
                M                CCC-/Watch Neg
                N                CCC-/Watch Neg


SATURN VENTURES: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of notes from Saturn Ventures II Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation transaction, and on one class of
notes from Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VIII, a hybrid CDO
transaction.  At the same time, S&P removed these ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its 'CC' ratings on two other classes from Zais Investment Grade
Ltd..  These transactions are backed predominantly by mezzanine
tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities.

The rating actions follow S&P's receipt of notices from the
trustees that a majority of the controlling class of noteholders
has directed the trustees to proceed with the liquidations of the
collateral backing the rated notes.

The rating actions are consistent with the criteria S&P use to
assess ratings on CDO transactions subject to acceleration or
liquidation after an event of default has occurred.

S&P previously received notices that the transactions had
experienced EODs according to the transactions' indentures.

                          Rating Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
Transaction                       Class     To      From
-----------                       -----     --      ----
Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VIII   A-1       CCC-    BB/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II Ltd.           A-1       CCC-    BB/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II Ltd.           A-2       CC      CCC/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II Ltd.           A-3       CC      CCC/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II Ltd.           B         CC      CCC/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Transaction                       Class    Rating
         -----------                       -----    ------
         Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VIII   C        CC
         Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VIII   D        CC


SATURNS SPRINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of these certificates issued by SATURNS Sprint Capital
Corporation Debenture Backed Series 2003-2:

  -- US$30,000,000 of 8.625% Callable Units due March 15, 2032,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ba2

  -- US$30,000,000 Notional Amount of Interest-Only 0.0816% Class
     B Callable Units Due March 15, 2032, Downgraded to Ba3;
     previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on
the rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of
the transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of
the Moody's rating of the Underlying Securities which are
$30,000,000 8.750% debentures due March 15, 2032 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation and which were downgraded to Ba3 by Moody's on
November 20, 2009.


SATURNS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $63 Mil. Units to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on SATURNS
Trust Series 2001-6's $63 million units to 'BB' from 'B'.

The rating on the units is dependent on the lower of the issue
credit rating on the underlying security, BankAmerica
Institutional Capital A's 8.07% preferred capital securities
series A notes due Nov. 30, 2026 ('BB'); and the issuer credit
rating on the swap guarantor, Morgan Stanley (A/Negative/A-1).

The rating action reflects the Dec. 4, 2009, upgrade of the
underlying security to 'BB' from 'B'.


SIGNUM FINANCE: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB' rating on the
class E notes issued by Signum Finance II PLC's series 2005-5, a
synthetic emerging market collateralized debt obligation
transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the termination of the transaction,
as stated in the termination deed S&P received.


SOLAR TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2002-1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded three classes of Solar Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-1.  The downgrades are due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from increased
leverage of the conduit component, anticipated losses from several
highly leveraged watchlisted loans and refinancing risk associated
with loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Four
loans, representing 10% of the pool, mature within the next 36
months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage less than
1.0X.

The affirmations are primarily due to key rating parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  In
addition, the pool has benefited from increased credit
subordination due to loan payoffs and amortization as well as
increased defeasance.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the November 30, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 29% to
$190.6 million from $266.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 58% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan,
representing 8% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  At last review, the Hotel Novotel Loan, which represents
9% of the pool, also had an underlying rating.  However, because
of a decline in performance which resulted in increased leverage,
the loan is now analyzed as part of the conduit.  Eleven loans,
representing 11% of the pool, have defeased and are now
collateralized by U.S. Government securities, compared to 4% at
last review.

Eight loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization and
currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has identified three troubled loans, representing 3% of
the pool, with a high default probability and has estimated an
aggregate $1.0 million loss (17% loss severity on average) from
these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 93%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV ratio is 80% compared to 73% at Moody's prior review.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.81X and 1.98X, respectively, compared to 1.55X and 1.54X at last
review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 19 compared to 27 at last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Chateaugay Centre Loan
($15.7 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 211,000
square foot enclosed retail center located Chateaugay, Quebec, a
submarket of Montreal.  The property was 96% leased as of February
2009.  The center is anchored by Super C and Hart.  Performance
has been stable.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed
DSCR are Aa3 and 2.14X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 2.02X at
last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 24% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Hotel Novotel Loan ($16.9 million --
9% of the pool), which is secured by a 62-room full service hotel
located in downtown Toronto, Ontario.  Performance has declined
since last review due to a drop off in tourist and business
travel.  Occupancy and revenue per available room for year-to-date
ending October 2009 were 68% and $89, respectively, compared to
80% and $118 in 2008.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100% and
1.25X, respectively, compared to 57% and 2.17X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Langley Gate Shopping
Centre Loan ($14.9 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by
a 152,000 square foot retail center located in the Langley suburb
of Vancouver, British Columbia..  The property was 100% leased as
of February 2009.  The center is anchored by Sears Home and Home
Sense.  Performance has improved due to increase in rental
revenues and loan amortization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
56% and 1.78X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.25X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Parkland Mall Loan ($12.9 million --
7% of the pool), which is secured by a 268,000 square foot
enclosed retail center located in Yorkton, Saskatchewan.  The
property was 80% leased as of February 2009.  The center is
anchored by Zellers, IGA and Shoppers Drug Mart.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.42X, respectively, compared to 80% and
1.39X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $23,983,875, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 12/11/2002

  -- Class A-2, $127,959,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     at Aaa on 12/11/2002

  -- Class IO, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 12/11/2002

  -- Class B, $8,665,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa on 4/6/2006

  -- Class C, $7,999,000, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
     A1 on 4/6/2006

  -- Class D, $6,665,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded to
     Baa1 on 4/6/2006

  -- Class E, $2,667,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously upgraded to
     Baa2 on 4/6/2006

  -- Class F, $3,999,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously assigned at
     Ba2 on 12/11/2002

  -- Class G, $1,333,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba3; previously
     assigned at Ba3 on 12/11/2002

  -- Class H, $2,667,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     assigned at B2 on 12/11/2002

  -- Class J, $665,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
     assigned at B3 on 12/11/2002


STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Withdraws Ratings on $47.5 Mil. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn its rating on the $47,500,000 of notes
issued by Structured Enhanced Return Vehicle Trust, series 2004-1.

On Dec. 3, 2009, Fitch downgraded the rating of SERVES 2004-1 from
'CCC' to 'C'.  Fitch's downgrade was based on the lower indicative
rating of the market value risk and the credit risk of the
portfolio.  For more information regarding the recent downgrade,
please see the press release titled 'Fitch Downgrades SERVES 2004-
1', dated Dec. 3, 2009.

Subsequently, on Dec. 9, 2009, Fitch received an amendment to the
indenture which removed Fitch from the transaction documents as
per the request of the sole Class A noteholder.  Therefore, the
decision to withdraw the rating is driven by a lack of investor
interest and Fitch's expectation that it will no longer receive
ongoing transaction information.

SERVES 2004-1 is a synthetic total rate of return collateralized
loan obligation with a market value termination trigger.  The
transaction closed on Nov. 10, 2004, and is managed by PPM
America, Inc.


STRUCTURED REPACKAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded these
certificates issued by Structured Repackaged Asset-Backed Trust
Securities Trust for Sprint Capital Corporation Securities, Series
2004-2:

  -- $38,000,000 6.500% STRATS, Series 2004-2, Class A-1
     Certificates, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on December 23,
     2008 Downgraded to Ba2

The transaction is a structured note whose rating is based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.  The rating action is a result of the change of the
rating of $38,000,000 6.875% Notes due 2028 issued by Sprint
Capital Corporation which were downgraded to Ba3 by Moody's on
November 20, 2009.


TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes and affirmed
six classes of notes from Taberna Preferred Funding III,
Ltd./Inc., following a payment default on scheduled interest due.
A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this press
release.

The downgrades incorporate the transaction's non-payment of the
full interest due to the class A-1A, A-1C, A-2A and A-2B notes
(collectively, the class A notes) on the Nov. 9, 2009 payment
date.  In addition, the class B-1 and B-2 notes (together, the
class B notes) missed their scheduled interest distribution for
the second consecutive payment date.  Available interest proceeds
were insufficient to pay the $5 million interest rate hedge
payment, causing $1.1 million to be diverted from principal
proceeds in the priority of payments.  The class A-1A notes
received only 74.2% of their $823,811 interest due.  This partial
interest payment, along with the non-payment to the remaining
class A and B notes are considered payment defaults.

Taberna III entered into an Event of Default as a result of the
partial non-payment of interest to the class B notes on Aug. 5,
2009.  Fitch received a notice of an event of default as of
Aug. 11, 2009, followed by a notice of acceleration as of Sept. 3,
2009.

These notes are backed by $740.6 million of trust preferred
securities and subordinated debt issued by subsidiaries of real
estate investment trusts, real estate operating companies,
homebuilders and specialty finance companies, as well as
commercial mortgage-backed securities.

The important factor for Fitch's downgrade is the failure to make
timely payments to classes whose rating addresses the ability of
the issuer to make timely interest payments.

Fitch has taken these actions:

  -- $369,730,731 class A-1A downgraded to 'D' from 'BB';
  -- $9,278,061 class A-1C downgraded to 'D' from 'BB';
  -- $38,500,000 class A-2A downgraded to 'D' from 'B';
  -- $15,000,000 class A-2B downgraded to 'D' from 'B';
  -- $91,250,000 class B-1 affirmed at 'D';
  -- $7,500,000 class B-2 affirmed at 'D';
  -- $38,921,840 class C-1 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $57,653,254 class C-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $48,435,453 class D affirmed at 'C';
  -- $37,342,197 class E affirmed at 'C'.

In addition, the class A notes have been removed from Rating Watch
Negative.


TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed eight
classes of notes from Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd./Inc.
following a payment default.

On the Nov. 5, 2009 payment date, the class A-1 notes received
partial accrued interest, while the class A-2 and A-3 notes did
not receive any interest payments.  The downgrades incorporate the
non-payment of the full interest due to the class A-1, A-2 and A-3
notes (collectively, the class A notes).  All available interest
proceeds were exhausted when paying requisite transaction
expenses, the hedge counterparty and approximately 68.4% of the
$629,011 of periodic interest due to the class A-1 notes.  This
partial payment to the A-1 notes and non-payment to the A-2 and A-
3 notes is considered a payment default.

During October 2009, two obligors representing $54.8 million of
collateral defaulted on their interest payments, decreasing
available interest proceeds to the transaction.  On the Nov. 5,
2009 payment date, 83.8% of the available interest proceeds were
paid to the hedge counterparty.  Interest rate hedging strategies
employed at the onset of the deal have moved into deep 'out-of-
the-money' positions as three-month LIBOR has remained at
historically low levels.  The combined impact of decreased
interest proceeds from portfolio securities, as well as increased
payments to the swap counterparty led to an interest shortfall to
the senior-most notes in Taberna IV as of the Nov. 5, 2009 payment
date.

Taberna IV entered into an Event of Default on Aug. 11, 2009 as a
result of the partial non-payment of interest to the class B
notes.  Fitch subsequently received notice from the Trustee on
Sept. 3, 2009 that the majority of the controlling class voted to
accelerate the maturity of the transaction.

These notes are backed by $639 million of trust preferred
securities and subordinated debt issued by subsidiaries of real
estate investment trusts, real estate operating companies,
homebuilders and specialty finance companies, as well as senior
debt securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities.

The important factor for Fitch's downgrade is the failure to make
timely payments to classes whose rating addresses the ability of
the issuer to make timely interest payments.

Fitch has taken these actions:

  -- $292,363,212 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'BBB',
     removed from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $50,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'BB',
     removed from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $20,000,000 class A-3 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'B',
     removed from Rating Watch Negative

  -- $81,450,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'D';

  -- $7,000,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'D';

  -- $47,859,377 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $21,661,028 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $39,041,229 class C-3 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $23,225,722 class D-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $15,145,176 class D-2 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $27,863,358 class E notes affirmed at 'C'.


TRIAXX FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B-1 to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Triaxx Funding High Grade I,
Ltd.:

  -- US$80,000,000 Class B-1 Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
     2047, Downgraded to C; previously on March 2, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca.

Moody's rating actions reflect the further deterioration in the
market value and credit quality of the Issuer's portfolio, which
consists of prime RMBS with a preponderance of Alt A mortgages.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should the current Event of
Default continue.  As provided in Section 5 of the Indenture,
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, a
majority of the Controlling Class may vote to accelerate the
payments on the Notes by declaring the principal of all the Notes
to be immediately due and payable.  Although the Repurchase
Counterparty (also the Controlling Class) has agreed to forbear
from exercising certain of its rights and remedies under the
Master Repurchase Agreement and Indenture until January 25, 2010,
upon the expiration of the forbearance period, it may take
possession of the collateral under the Master Repurchase Agreement
as a result of the Issuer's missed margin payments and the cross
default caused by the Issuer's failure of the Portfolio Coverage
Ratio 3% threshold, and or exercise its right under the Indenture
to accelerate the transaction.  In addition, after acceleration
and if the trustee determines that the anticipated net proceeds of
a liquidation of collateral will not be sufficient to discharge
the full amounts then due and unpaid on the Notes, administrative
expenses and amounts due under the Master Repurchase Agreement and
certain loan and hedge agreements, 66 2/3% of the Controlling
Class and 66 2/3% of each of the Class B, C and D Notes may direct
the trustee to proceed with the sale and liquidation of the
collateral.  The severity of any potential losses to the Notes may
depend on the timing and choice of these remedies following an
Event of Default.  As a result of these uncertainties and the
portfolio deterioration mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
Class B-1 Notes was downgraded.  In concluding its review, Moody's
performed a liquidation sensitivity analysis based on the current
market value of the portfolio provided by the trustee monthly
report, the result of which formed the basis for the rating
actions.

Triaxx Funding High Grade I, Ltd., is a Structured Investment
Vehicle - Lite managed by ICP Asset Management LLC.


TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1L to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of one class of notes issued by Tricadia CDO 2005-3, Ltd.:

  -- US$155,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due June 2041
     (current balance of $131,574,419), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on Jul 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of this class of
notes:

  -- US$5,000,000 Class X Notes Due June 2010 (current balance of
     $824,690), Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Jul 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Tricadia CDO 2005-3, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of CLOs.  CLOs comprise
approximately 89% of the portfolio.

The rating downgrade actions take into consideration deterioration
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as reflected in
the recent rating actions taken with respect to underlying assets.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase
in the weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities, and failure of the coverage tests,
among other measures.  The ratings of approximately 40% of the
underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review
of the transaction in July 2009.  The Trustee reports that the
WARF of the portfolio is 3444 as of November 17, 2009, and also
reports defaulted assets in the amount of $62.9 million.

Moody's has been notified that the Issuer, as reported by the
Trustee on June 29, 2009, experienced an event of default because
the A-1L and A-2 L Overcollateralization ratio was less than 100%.
As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities
and the Notes, including liquidation.  The Issuer is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CLO tranches are
currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry
depressed market valuations that may herald poor recovery
prospects in a sale and liquidation of the Collateral.

The actions consider the risk that liquidation of the Collateral
may be selected as the post-Event of Default remedy and may cause
the change of payment priority of certain classes.  According to
Section 11.1(d) of the Indenture, if liquidation and final
distribution occur before the scheduled maturity of the Class X
Notes, the payment of interest and principal to Class X and Class
A-1L will proceed on a pro rata basis, thus lowering Class X's
payment priority in the Issuer's capital structure.  The
liquidation of the CDO collateral may result in a probability of
repayment and a severity of loss that are inconsistent with an
investment-grade rating on Class X Notes.  The rating on the Class
X Notes is confirmed at its current level due to the approaching
scheduled maturity date of the tranche in June 2010.


TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2003-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of six classes of notes issued by Tricadia CDO 2003-1,
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$76,500,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jul 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$8,500,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$85,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jul 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jul 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$12,000,000 Class A-4L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2016, Downgraded to C; previously on Jul 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3 and Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade

Tricadia CDO 2003-1, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.  CLOs comprise approximately 92% of the portfolio, of
which a majority are from the 2003 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions take into consideration the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by the recent rating actions taken with respect to
underlying assets.  Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is
observed through a decline in the average credit rating (as
measured by an increase in the weighted average rating factor), an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and failure
of the coverage tests, among other measures.  The ratings of
approximately 39% of the underlying assets have been downgraded
since Moody's last review of the transaction in July 2009.  The
trustee reports that the WARF of the portfolio is 3922 as of
November 19, 2009, and also reports defaulted assets in the amount
of $38.7 million.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  Since the last review of this
transaction in July 2009, Moody's has completed its two-stage
review of U.S. CLOs.  Some of the underlying securities in the
portfolio experienced more severe rating action than was
anticipated at the time of last review.  Due to the recent
completion by Moody's of Stage II of the U.S. CLO review, ratings
assigned to notes issued by the Issuer that were on review for
possible downgrade will no longer remain on review for possible
downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 20 classes of UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust series 2007-FL1, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates on Rating Watch Negative.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this press release.

The Negative Watch is due to the deteriorating performance of many
loans in the pool.  The pool has a high concentration of hotel
loans at approximately 45% which have been severely affected by
the economic downturn.  Many of the loans were made based on
business plans which have become have become less feasible in the
current economic climate.  These include four loans (16%) secured
by land intended for development (one of which is in foreclosure),
four loans (13%) secured by office properties with significant
vacancies, two loans (11%) secured by under-performing multi-
family properties and one loan (2%) secured by a portfolio of
skilled nursing facilities.  Additionally, the largest loan
sponsor in the pool, Dubai Holdings (2 loans, 16% of the pool),
has recently defaulted on other securitized loans and has had a
significant deterioration in financial condition.

Fitch will resolve the Rating Watch Negative when current
financial information becomes available.  It is expected that
classes B through O will have ratings downgrades of at lease one
category.

Fitch Ratings has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $901.2 million class A-1 'AAA'
  -- Interest-only class X 'AAA'
  -- $309.5 million class A-2 'AA';
  -- $57.3 million class B 'A+';
  -- $31 million class C 'A';
  -- $27.2 million class D 'A-';
  -- $27.2 million class E 'BBB';
  -- $27.2 million class F 'BB+';
  -- $27.2 million class G 'BB-';
  -- $29.1 million class H 'B+';
  -- $27.1 million class J 'B';
  -- $27.1 million class K 'B-'
  -- $35 million class L 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $6.7 million class M-MP'B-';
  -- $7 million class N-MP 'B-';
  -- $16.3 million class O-MP 'B-';
  -- $5 million class O-HW 'BBB-';
  -- $1.9 million class O-MD 'BBB-';
  -- $4.5 million class O-WC 'BB-';
  -- $3 million class O-BH 'BB-'.


UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-FL1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two pooled
classes of UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-FL1.  Pooled classes E and
F had been placed on review for possible downgrade on September 3,
2009 due to concerns about potential interruption in operations of
the Maui Prince Hotel which is the collateral for the second
largest loan in the pool.  Since then, the transition to a new
management company at the property has occurred and other
operational issues are being addressed without any interruption to
the operations of the hotel.  However, since the September 3, 2009
rating action, new credit concerns have arisen relating to sponsor
exposure to subsidiaries of Dubai World.  On November 26, 2009,
Moody's downgraded the ratings of six government-related issuers
in Dubai and left them on review for possible downgrade.  This
rating action was in response to the announcement by the Dubai
government of a restructuring of Dubai World, including a
requested standstill of all financings to Dubai World and its
subsidiary, Nakheel.  Neither Dubai World nor Nakheel are rated by
Moody's.  However, the restructuring of the parent company creates
uncertainty for subsidiaries.  As a result, the default risk for
the two loans in the pool with exposure to Dubai World, both of
which are underperforming, has increased prompting the downgrades.
This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

The affected loans in this pool are the Essex House and W Hotel
Washington DC which together represent approximately 16% of the
trust balance.  Furthermore, these two properties are not
generating sufficient net cash flow from operations to service
their respective trust debt amount.  Both loans have significant
subordinate non-trust debt which Moody's expect will significantly
limit the loss given default on the trust debt based on Moody's
sustainable value.  As of the November 14, 2009 remittance report
both loans are current.  Moody's also affirmed ten pooled and five
non-pooled or "rake" classes.  This concludes Moody's review of
this transaction.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a fee interest in
Jumeirah Essex House ($186.5 million, or 12% of the trust balance)
located in Midtown Manhattan on Central Park South.  The sponsor
for the 515-room full-service hotel and ten condominium units is
Dubai Investment Group Limited and Dubai Holdings LLC.  The
property completed a $91 million renovation ($176,700 per room) in
the fourth quarter of 2007.  This is a flagship property for the
Jumeirah brand in the US.  The loan is scheduled to mature on
September 9, 2010, and the final maturity date including extension
options is September 9, 2012.  There is an additional $117 million
of non-trust junior component and $32 million of mezzanine debt.

The property's net cash flow for the first six months of 2009 was
negative and experienced a significant decline from that of the
same period last year.  Moody's believes that the current net cash
flow performance is not reflective of the inherent value of this
asset.  Trophy assets such as the Essex House, located in a high
barrier to entry market are highly desirable to hotel operators
and owners.  However, Moody's also recognize that the sponsor must
come out of pocket to "carry" the asset until cash flow recovers
along with improving market conditions.  The ability to carry the
property becomes more doubtful given the potentially weaker
financial strength of the sponsor.  Moody's values remains
unchanged from last review at $179 million.

The W Washington DC Hotel Loan ($65 million pooled balance plus a
$5 million non-pooled or 'rake' bond) is the ninth largest loan
(4% of the trust balance) in the pool.  The loan is secured by fee
simple interest in 317-full service hotel built in 1988 and
renovated between 2007 and 2008 at a cost of $62 million, or
$182,000 per key.  The hotel is located two blocks form the White
House and has unobstructed views of the White House, Ellipse and
Washington Monument.  There is an additional $70 million of non-
trust junior component and a mezzanine loan of $20 million.  The
sponsor is Istithmar Building FZE, a subsidiary of Dubai World.
Moody's value is $72 million, down 30% from a value of
$103 million at securitization.

The hotel re-opened after a major renovation in July 2009.
Although Washington DC's lodging market outperformed those of
other major gateway cities in the US, the property is not expected
to generate positive net cash flow in the foreseeable future
unless there is an immediate and significant improvement in
lodging demand.  The loan was structured with debt service reserve
of $17.7 million at securitization which is almost depleted.

As of the November 16, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 2% to
$1.56 billion from securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 12%
of the pool, with the top three loans representing 31% of the
pool.  Hotels account for 55% of the trust balance.  There is
additional exposure to volatile property types such as land (3% of
the trust balance) and healthcare (2% of the trust balance).

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio remains at 88%
same as last review.  Moody's weighted average trust debt service
coverage ratio is 1.00X compared to 1.12X at last review.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There are two loans totaling $214 million, or approximately 14% of
the trust balance, currently in special servicing.  The Maui
Prince Hotel Loan, the second largest loan in the pool
($162.5 million of pooled balance plus $30 million of rake bonds),
accounts for approximately 12% of the trust balance.  The loan
transferred to special servicing on June 18, 2009, and a
foreclosure with the appointment of a receiver was filed on
September 8, 2009.  A new management company was hired effective
September 16, 2009, and is currently in the process of addressing
operational issues.  Moody's value for this asset is $195 million.
Moody's does not rate the three rake bonds associated with this
loan (Classes M-MP, N-MP and O-MP).

The second loan in special servicing, Altantic Towers Loan
($21.6 million, or 1% of the trust balance), was transferred to
special servicing on May 1, 2009.  The loan is secured by two
acres of land located in Washington, D.C., which was slated for a
multifamily development.  The final maturity date for this loan
was May 9, 2009.  The new appraised value as of July 2009 was
$15.8 million, 78% below the appraised value at securitization.
This has resulted in appraisal reduction amount of $7.2 million.
The special servicer is pursuing the appointment of a receiver.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $891,562,394, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     January 15, 2008 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class X, Notional, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on January 15,
     2008 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, $309,526,000, Affirmed at Aa1; previously on
     March 5, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Class B, $57,309,000, Affirmed at A1; previously on March 5,
     2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Class C, $31,074,000, Affirmed at A3; previously on March 5,
     2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- Class D, $27,190,000, Affirmed at Baa1; previously on
     March 5, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Class E, $27,191,000, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class F, $27,190,000, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class G, $27,190,000, Affirmed at Ba2; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Class H, $29,132,000, Affirmed at B1; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- Class J, $27,190,000, Affirmed at B3; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Class K, $27,190,000, Affirmed at Caa1; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Class O-HW, $5,000,000, Affirmed at B1; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- Class O-MD, $1,900,000, Affirmed at Ba3; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Class O-WC, $4,500,000, Affirmed at B2; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- Class O-SA, $2,000,000, Affirmed at B3; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Class O-HA, $1,500,000, Affirmed at Caa1; previously on
     September 3, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Nine 2005-C19 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on nine classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2005-C19,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates including downgrades
of eight classes.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at
the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations and its
prospective views regarding cash flow declines and commercial real
estate market values.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of 3.1%
for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.  The
rating actions are based on the full losses of 3.1% as a majority
of loans mature in the next five years.  The bonds with Negative
Rating Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in the
future.

To determine potential defaults for each loan, Fitch assumed cash
flow would decline by 10% from year-end 2008.  That is consistent
with the analysis used in its review of recent vintage
transactions whereby cash flow was assumed to decline 15% from
year-end 2007 projected over a three-year period.  If the stressed
cash flow would cause the loan to fall below 0.95 times debt
service coverage ratio, Fitch assumed the loan would default
during the term.  To determine losses, Fitch used the above
stressed cash flow and applied a market cap rate by property type,
ranging between 7.5% and 9.5%, to derive a value.  If the loan
balance at default is less than Fitch's derived value, the loan
would realize that amount of loss.  These loss estimates were
reviewed in more detail for loans representing 64.2% of the pool
and, in certain cases, revised based on additional information
and/or property characteristics.  Loss expectations attributed to
loans reviewed in detail represent approximately 95% of the 3.1%.

Approximately 45.6% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 20.7% in 2010, 11.4% in 2011, 13% in 2012, none in 2013 and
0.5% in 2014.  An additional 54.2% are scheduled to mature in
2015.

Fitch identified nine Loans of Concern (17.1%) within the pool,
two of which (6%) are in the top 15 loans (60.8%).  One of the
Loans of Concern in the top 15 is specially serviced (2.7%) and
the other is a portfolio of cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted retail property loans (3.3%).

Of the top 15 loans, the two Loans of Concern are assumed to
default during the term.  Twelve of the remaining top 15 loans may
default at based on an insufficient accrued equity position as
calculated in Fitch's refinance test; however, no losses are
expected at this time on eight of the twelve loans.  A loan would
pass the refinance test if the stressed cash flow would achieve a
1.25x DSCR as calculated based on a 30-year amortization schedule
and an 8% coupon.

The largest contributors of term and maturity loss are: 50 West
23rd Street (4.8% of the pool); the O'Fallon Walk, Valparaiso
Walk, and Valley Walk crossed portfolio (3.3%); and 240 West 40th
Street (0.6%).

The 50 West 23rd Street loan is secured by a 333,959 square foot,
13-story office building located between Fifth Avenue and Avenue
of the Americas in the Chelsea area of Manhattan.  The reported
occupancy is 96.9% as of the October 2009 rent roll and the
reported debt service coverage ratio as of June 2009 was 1.52x on
an interest-only basis.  The Midtown South submarket has continued
to see vacancies increase with average rents decreasing, according
to CBRE's third quarter 2009 office market report for Manhattan.
The sponsor is Joseph Moinian.

The O'Fallon Walk, Valparaiso Walk, and Valley Walk crossed loan
portfolio comprises over 300,000 sf of retail space located in
O'Fallon, MO, Valparaiso, IN and Aurora, IL.  The largest crossed
property is O'Fallon Walk, located 30 miles west of St. Louis,
which had a reported occupancy as of June 2009 of 79.2%, compared
to 83.3% at issuance.  The property lost its second largest
tenant, Linens 'N Things, and its third largest tenant, Old Navy,
which is vacating under a co-tenancy clause prior to its lease
expiring in 2010.  All three properties reported a June 2009 DSCR
at or below 1.0x.  The loans began amortizing in 2008 after an
initial 36 month interest-only period.  As of the November 2009
remittance, the loan is greater is 30 days delinquent.

The 240 West 40th Street loan is secured by the land and
improvements located at 240 West 40th Street in Midtown Manhattan.
The reported occupancy is 98.6% as of the June 2009 rent roll.
The largest tenant, Donna Karan New York, which represents
approximately 91.9% of the net rentable area, has lease expiration
in 2016.  The loan began amortizing in 2008 after an initial 36
month interest-only period.  The loan sponsor is Sitt Asset
Management.

The only loan in special servicing is Centennial Tower (2.7%), a
638,363-sf office building located in downtown Atlanta, GA.  The
asset transferred to special servicing in November 2009 for
imminent default.  The loan is scheduled to mature in June 2010,
and the borrower is seeking a loan extension in order to lease up
the building.  Per the September 2009 rent roll, occupancy is
78.8% with 60% of the lease expected to expire in the next four
years.  Occupancy at issuance was 73%.  There is a $20.5 million
B-note held outside of the trust.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Loss Severity ratings and Rating Outlooks to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $20.2 million class F to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $16.1 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.2 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $8.1 million class J to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.1 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.1 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative, assigned a
LS rating and Rating Outlook to this class as indicated:

  -- $4 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch also affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings and Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $220.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $179 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $202.2 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52.6 million class A-PB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $237.3 million class A-6 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $115.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $80.7 million class A-FL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $80.7 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100.9 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-P at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.4 million class B at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.2 million class C at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.3 million class D at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class E at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $24.2 million class P.  Class A-1 is paid
in full.


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine Series of Rental Car Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's places select rental car asset backed securities on review
for possible upgrade.

Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade nine series of
rental car asset backed notes issued by three different sponsors.
These reviews for possible upgrades reflect, to varying degrees
according to the related sponsor, improved rental car fleet
diversification, improved outlook for the Detroit 3 vehicle
manufacturers, shorter remaining life of the transactions, and, in
the case of Dollar Thrifty, an upgrade in the corporate rating of
the sponsor.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from monoline
insurance.  The current ratings on the below notes are consistent
with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at the higher
of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and any
underlying rating.

Complete Rating Actions:

Issuer: Avis Budget Rental Car Funding (AESOP) LLC

* Series Description: Series 2003-4 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-4

  -- Current Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 16, 2009 Upgraded to Ba3

  -- Underlying Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jun 16, 2009 Upgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly XL
     Capital Assurance (Ca; previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to
     Ca from Caa1)

* Series Description: Series 2005-4 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-1, A-2 and A-3

  -- Current Rating: Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

* Series Description: Series 2006-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Current Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 16, 2009 Upgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

* Series Description: Series 2007-2 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Current Rating: Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Jun 16, 2009 Upgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

Issuer: Hertz Vehicle Financing LLC

* Series Description: Series 2005-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5

  -- Current Rating: Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

* Series Description: Series 2005-2 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6

  -- Current Rating: Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

Issuer: Rental Car Finance Corp.

* Series Description: Series 2005-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A-1 and A-2

  -- Current Rating: Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Mar 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Underlying Rating: Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly XL
     Capital Assurance (Ca; previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to
     Ca from Caa1)

* Series Description: Series 2006-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A

  -- Current Rating: Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Caa2;
     previously on 7/29/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3)

* Series Description: Series 2007-1 Rental Car Asset-Backed Notes

  -- Class Description: Class A

  -- Current Rating: Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (rating withdrawn; previously rated Caa3 on 3/25/2009)

The primary asset backing the notes is the monthly lease payments
owed by the related sponsoring rental car company under an
operating lease, as well as a pool of vehicles comprising the bulk
of the sponsor's daily rental car fleet, including both program
vehicles (acquired vehicles subject to repurchase, or guaranteed a
minimum depreciation or resale value, by the related auto
manufacturer at pre-set prices) and non-program vehicles (acquired
vehicles that do not benefit from such repurchase or guaranteed
depreciation agreements).  The vehicles are owned by a bankruptcy-
remote entity, referred to as the lessor, which may also be the
issuer or be an affiliate of the issuer.  The sponsor and/or
operating affiliates act as lessees.

The key factors in Moody's rating analysis include the probability
of default of the sponsor, the likelihood of a bankruptcy or
default by the auto manufacturers providing vehicles to the rental
car fleet owned by the lessor, and the recovery rate on the rental
car fleet in case the rental car sponsor defaults.  Monte Carlo
simulation modeling was used to assess the impact on bondholders
of these variables.

The default probability of the sponsor is simulated based on its
current corporate probability of default rating and Moody's
idealized default rates.  For surveillance purposes, in the event
that an upgrade above the initial rating is being considered,
Moody's stress the rating of the sponsor as lessee to provide a
limited degree of de-linkage of the rated ABS from the corporate
rating of the sponsor, otherwise, the current rating of the
sponsor is used.

All of the sponsoring rental car companies fleets include both
program vehicles and non-program vehicles (also known as 'risk'
vehicles).  Under the terms of the simulation, in cases where the
related sponsor does not default it is assumed that bondholders
are repaid in full and no liquidation of the lessor's rental car
fleet is necessary.

In cases where the sponsor does default, the lessor's fleet must
be liquidated in order to repay their secured loans to the Issuer,
and ultimately the bondholders.  In those cases, the default
probability of the related auto manufacturers must also be
simulated.  Due to the Detroit Three's current highly uncertain
credit status, their defaults were simulated based on estimates
for probability of default provided by Moody's corporate analysts
that incorporated the likelihood of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
bankruptcies.  The default probability of other manufacturers is
derived from their respective ratings.  For each manufacturer
simulated to be in Chapter 11, Moody's further simulate whether
each such manufacturer will honor its obligation with respect to
program vehicles or default on that obligation.

In simulating liquidation of the rental car fleet following a
sponsor default, it is assumed that the portion of the program
vehicle fleet associated with non-defaulting manufacturers (both
non-bankrupt manufacturers and bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers
honoring their program obligations) is returned to the related
manufacturer at full book value.  For the non-program (risk)
fleet, as well as the portion of the program fleet associated with
defaulting manufacturers not honoring obligations on their program
vehicles, it is assumed the vehicles will be sold in the open
market.

For vehicles sold in the open market, the market value of a
vehicle at time of liquidation before any haircuts are applied is
estimated using market depreciation data from the National
Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) for each manufacturer with
vehicles in the collateral pool.  In making this calculation
Moody's generally assume a purchase price for program and non-
program (risk) vehicles which is 10% below MSRP, to give credit to
the volume discounts typically achieved by rental car companies.
However, in the case of Avis Budget, Moody's assume the discount
for non-program (risk) vehicles is 15% to reflect both the terms
required under the transaction documentation and historic
performance.  In addition, Moody's assume a delay in sale of six
months and therefore net an additional six months of depreciation.
This six month delay in fleet liquidation following the sponsor's
default contemplates potential legal challenges to obtaining
control of the fleet and the potential difficulties of marshaling
and selling such a large quantity of vehicles.  The base
liquidation value of sold vehicles is determined by applying a
base haircut to this estimated depreciated market value.  The base
haircut is simulated using a triangular distribution (i.e.,
minimum, mode, maximum) with values of (5%, 15%, 30%).  The
resulting calculation provides the base liquidation value.

Additional haircuts may be applied to the base liquidation value
depending on the manufacturer's simulated status: non-bankrupt,
bankrupt Chapter 11 or bankrupt Chapter 7.  No further haircuts
are applied to either (i) non-program (risk) and program vehicles
from non-bankrupt manufacturers or (ii) program vehicles from
bankrupt Chapter 11 manufacturers who are assumed to honor their
program obligations.  However, in all other cases, the base
liquidation value is further reduced.  For bankrupt Chapter 11
manufacturers, Moody's reduce the base liquidation of their non-
program (risk) vehicles and their program vehicles whose
obligations are assumed not to be honored by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (14%, 18%, 19%).
For manufacturers assumed to be in Chapter 7, Moody's reduce base
liquidation value of their vehicles by multiplying the base
liquidation value by a haircut, which is simulated using a
triangular distribution with input parameters (25%, 35%, 50%).


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Structured Note Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
action on these structured note transactions listed below.
Moody's explains that these Transactions are structured as direct
pass-throughs of underlying securities each of which have
experienced recent rating actions due to the revision to Moody's
methodology for rating bank hybrid and subordinate debt announced
by Moody's on November 18, 2009.

The rating actions are:

Deal: $45,548,550 8.20% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
Certificates issued by CorTS Trust for First Union Institutional
Capital I

  -- Tranche: $1,821,942 8.20% Corporate-Backed Trust Securities
     Certificates; Downgraded to Baa2; Previously on April 23,
     2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- Underlying security: 8.04% Capital Securities due December 1,
     2026 issued by First Union Institutional Capital I

Deal: ABN AMRO North America Holding Preferred Capital Repackaging
Trust I

  -- Tranche: $850,000,000 6.523% Fixed/Floating Noncumulative
     Trust Securities; Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on
     August 21, 2009 B3, Placed on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Company
     Preferred Securities each issued by an indirect subsidiary of
     ABN AMRO North America Holding Company

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-1

  -- Tranche: $50,600,000 Class A Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on June 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3

  -- Tranche: $12,650,000 Class B Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on June 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3

  -- Underlying security: Series F Floating Rate Preferred Stock
     and Series G Floating Rate Preferred Stock issued by HSBC USA
     Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-3

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21,2009 B3, Placed on review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21,2009 B3, Placed on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Series 4 Floating Rate Non-Cumulative
     Preferred Stock issued by Merrill Lynch

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-4

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21,2009 B3, Placed on review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21,2009 B3, Placed on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Series 4 Floating Rate Non-Cumulative
     Preferred Stock issued by Merrill Lynch

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-5

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; A2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2;

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; A2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2;

  -- Underlying security: Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
     Stock, Series 4 issued by U.S Bancorp

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-6

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; A2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2;

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; A2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2;

  -- Underlying security: Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
     Stock, Series 4 issued by U.S Bancorp

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-7

  -- Tranche: $96,000,000 Class A Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to A3;

  -- Tranche: $24,000,000 Class B Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to A3;

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series A, C, and D issued by Goldman, Sachs Group,
     Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-8

  -- Tranche: $96,000,000 Class A Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to A3;

  -- Tranche: $24,000,000 Class B Certificates; A3, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to A3;

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series A, C, and D issued by Goldman, Sachs Group,
     Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-10

  -- Tranche: $96,000,000 Class A Certificates; Baa1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Tranche: $24,000,000 Class B Certificates; Baa1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series A issued by Morgan Stanley

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-11

  -- Tranche: $96,000,000 Class A Certificates; Baa1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Tranche: $24,000,000 Class B Certificates; Baa1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series A issued by Morgan Stanley

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-12

  -- Tranche: $70,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $35,000,000 Class B Certificates, Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously onAugust 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series D
     issued by Bank of America

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-2

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-3

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-4

  -- Tranche: $120,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $30,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc.

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-5

  -- Tranche: $112,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $28,000,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series E issued by Bank of America

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-T1

  -- Tranche: $95,000,000 Class A Certificates; A1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Tranche: $19,000,000 Class B Certificates; A1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Underlying security: JP Morgan Chase Capital XXI Floating
     Rate Capital Securities

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-T2

  -- Tranche: $60,000,000 Class A Certificates; Baa2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Tranche: $20,000,000 Class B Certificates; Baa2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Underlying security: Non-Cumulative Callable Dollar
     Preference Shares, Series 1 issued by Barclays Bank Plc

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-T4

  -- Tranche: $45,000,000 Class A Certificates; Baa2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Tranche: $15,000,000 Class B Certificates; Baa2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Underlying security: Non-Cumulative Callable Dollar
     Preference Shares, Series 1 issued by Barclays Bank Plc

Deal: Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-T5

  -- Tranche: $72,000,000 Class A Certificates; A1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Tranche: $18,000,000 Class B Certificates; A1, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Underlying security: JP Morgan Chase Capital XXIII Floating
     Rate Capital Securities, Series W

Deal: Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-1

  -- Tranche: $60,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates;
     Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on
     review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $15,000,000 Class B Leveraged Trust Certificates;
     Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on
     review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch

Deal: Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-2

  -- Tranche: $40,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates;
     Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on
     review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $10,000,000 Class B Leveraged Trust Certificates;
     Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, placed on
     review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series E issued by Bank of America

Deal: CABCO Series 2004-1 Trust (Goldman Sachs Capital I)

  -- Tranche: $62,500,000 Certificate Principal Balance, Class A-1
     Callable Certificates 6.00% Pass-Through Rate; A2, Placed on
     review for downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: CABCO Series 2004-101 Trust (Goldman Sachs Capital I)

  -- Tranche: $150,000,000 Floating Rate Callable Certificates;
     A2, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Goldman Sachs Capital I
Securities-Backed Series 2004-7 Trust

  -- Tranche: US$30,000,000 Class A-1 Certificates due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Corporate Backed Trust Certificates, Series 2004-4, Goldman
Sachs Capital I Securities-Backed

  -- Tranche: US$85,000,000 6.00% Class A-1 Certificates due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: US$3,656,000 7.00% Class A-2 Certificates Due
     02/15/2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Corporate-Backed Trust Certificates, Goldman Sachs Capital I
Securities-Backed Series 2004-6 Due 2034

  -- Tranche: US$25,000,000 Floating Rate Certificates due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: CorTS Trust for Goldman Sachs Capital I

  -- Tranche: Class A Corporate-Backed Trust Securities due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: Class B Corporate-Backed Trust Securities due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: CorTS Trust II for Goldman Sachs Capital I

  -- Tranche: Class A Corporate-Backed Trust Securities due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: Class B Corporate-Backed Trust Securities due
     February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Fixed Income Pass-Through Trust 2007-C

  -- Tranche: US$110,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust
     Certificates; A1, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously
     on January 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Tranche: US$22,000,000 Class B Leveraged Trust Certificates;
     A1, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on January 30,
     2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Underlying security: JPMorgan Chase Capital XXIII, Floating
     Rate Capital Securities, Series W

Deal: HSBC - STARS & STRIPES Custodial Receipts (Merrill Series 2)

  -- Tranche: $36,400,000 Structured Auction Rate Securities Stock
     Custodial Receipts, Merrill Series 2; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3 placed on review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $19,600,000 Structured Residual Interest Preferred
     Enhanced Securities Stock Custodial Receipts, Merrill Series
     2; Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3 placed
     on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 2 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.

Deal: HSBC - STARS/STRIPES Custodial Receipts (Goldman Series D)

  -- Tranche: $52,000,000 Structured Auction Rate Securities Stock
     Custodial Receipts, Goldman Series D; A3, Placed on review
     for downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to
     A3

  -- Tranche: $28,000,000 Structured Residual Interest Preferred
     Enhanced Securities Stock Custodial Receipts, Goldman Series
     D; A3, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A3

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series D issued by Goldman, Sachs Group, Inc.

Deal: Landmark Primary Trust Series A Interest Certificates

  -- Tranche: US $20,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Certificates, Series A; Baa1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 23, 2009 downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: $20,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Subordinated Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes, Series 1
     issued by Barclays Bank Plc.

Deal: Landmark Primary Trust Series C Interest Certificates

  -- Tranche: US $16,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Certificates, Series C; Aa3, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 17, 2008 upgraded to Aa3

  -- Underlying security: US$16,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Subordinated Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes issued by
     Societe Generale

Deal: BAC AAH Capital Funding LLC X

  -- Tranche: $70,000,000 Money Market Preferred Stock Custodial
     Receipts, Bank of America Corporation, Series X; Upgraded to
     Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, Placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Noncumulative Company
     Preferred Securities X issued by BAC AAH Capital Funding LLC
     X

Deal: BAC AAH Capital Funding LLC XI

  -- Tranche: $70,000,000 Money Market Preferred Stock Custodial
     Receipts, Bank of America Corporation, Series XI; Upgraded to
     Ba3; Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, Placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Noncumulative Company
     Preferred Securities XI issued by BAC AAH Capital Funding LLC
     XI

Deal: Pass-Through Auction Market Preferred Securities, Series
2007-1

  -- Tranche: $65,000,000 Class A Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, Placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Tranche: $16,250,000 Class B Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3;
     Previously on August 21, 2009 B3, Placed on review for
     upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series 2 and Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co.,
     Inc.

Deal: PPLUS Trust Series GSC-1

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class A 6.25% Trust Certificates; A2, Placed
     on review for downgrade, Previously on December 23, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class B 0.095% Trust Certificates Series GSC-
     1; A2, Placed on review for downgrade, Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: PPLUS Trust Series GSC-3

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class A 6.00% Trust Certificates; A2, Placed
     on review for downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class B 0.345% Trust Certificates Series GSC-
     3; A2, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: PPLUS Trust Series GSC-4

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class A 6.00% Trust Certificates; A2, Placed
     on review for downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: PPLUS Class B 0.345% Trust Certificates Series GSC-
     4; A2, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on
     December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Saguaro Issuer Trust

  -- Tranche: US $15,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series A; Baa1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 23, 2009 downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: $15,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Subordinated Floating Rate Notes issued by Barclays Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $10,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series B; Baa1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 23, 2009 downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: $10,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Subordinated Floating Rate Notes issued by Barclays Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $13,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series C; Baa1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 23, 2009 downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: $13,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Subordinated Floating Rate Notes issued by Barclays Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $11,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series D; A1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on September 18, 2009 downgraded to A1;

  -- Underlying security: US$11,000,000 face amount of Perpetual
     Floating Rate Subordinated Notes of Den Norske Creditbank

  -- Tranche: US$7,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series E; A1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on September 18, 2009 downgraded to A1;

  -- Underlying security: US$7,000,000 face amount of Floating
     Rate Capital Notes of Den Norske Creditbank.

  -- Tranche: US $20,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series F; Downgraded to Ba2; Previously on
     September 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed on review for
     downgrade;

  -- Underlying security: US$20,000,000 face amount of Primary
     Capital Undated Floating Rate Notes of Lloyds Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $20,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series G; Downgraded to Ba2; Previously on
     September 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed on Review for
     downgrade;

  -- Underlying security: US$20,000,000 face amount of Undated
     Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series 2 of Lloyds Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $14,550,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series H; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 30,2009 Downgraded to A2;

  -- Underlying security: US$14,550,000 face amount of Undated
     Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes of Midland Bank Plc

  -- Tranche: US $20,800,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
     Units, Series I; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on April 30,2009 Downgraded to A2;

  -- Underlying security: US$20,800,000 face amount of Undated
     Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes of Midland Bank Plc

Deal: SATURNS Goldman Sachs Capital I Debenture Backed Series
2004-4

  -- Tranche: US $81,000,000 of 6.00% Deferrable Class A Callable
     Units due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for
     downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: US $3,615,000 Initial Notional Amortizing Balance of
     Interest-Only 7.43% Deferrable Rate Class B Callable Units
     Due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: SATURNS Goldman Sachs Capital I Debenture Backed Series
2004-6

  -- Tranche: US $80,000,000 of 6.00% Deferrable Class A Callable
     Units due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for
     downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: US $3,564,000 Initial Notional Amortizing Balance of
     Interest-Only 7.44% Deferrable Rate Class B Callable Units
     Due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on 12/23/2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: SATURNS Goldman Sachs Capital I Debenture Backed Series
2005-1

  -- Tranche: US $60,000,000 of 6.25% Deferrable Class A Callable
     Units due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for
     downgrade; Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Tranche: US $1,574,000 Initial Notional Amortizing Balance of
     Interest-Only 7.69% Deferrable Rate Class B Callable Units
     Due February 15, 2034; A2, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on December 23, 2008 Downgraded to A2

  -- Underlying security: 6.345% Guaranteed Capital Securities
     issued by Goldman Sachs Capital I

Deal: Spyglass Trust-1

  -- Tranche: $70,000,000 Face Amount of Principal Units Due
     January 28, 2019; Baa1, Placed on review for downgrade;
     Previously on June 17, 2009 downgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying security: Undated Subordinated Floating Rate Notes
     issued by Barclays Bank Plc

Deal: Spyglass Trust-4

  -- Tranche: $70,000,000 Face Amount of Principal Units Due
     January 28, 2019; Downgraded to Ba2; Previously on
     September 18, 2009 downgraded to Ba1 and placed on review for
     downgrade


  -- Underlying security: Primary Capital Undated Floating Rate
     Notes (Series 3) of Lloyds Bank Pl

Deal: Spyglass Trust-6

  -- Tranche: $40,000,000 Face Amount of Principal Units Due 2018;
     Aa3, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on May 22,
     2009 upgraded to Aa3

  -- Underlying security: Undated Subordinated Floating Rate
     Primary Capital Notes issued by Societe Generale

Deal: Wachovia Fixed Income Pass-Through Trust 2007-B (LeNS)

  -- Tranche: $30,600,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates;
     A1, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on January 30,
     2009 downgraded to A1

  -- Tranche: $6,800,000 Class B Leveraged Trust Certificates; A1,
     Placed on review for downgrade; Previously on January 30,
     2009 downgraded to A1

  -- Underlying security: JP Morgan Chase Capital XXI Floating
     Rate Underlying Securities, Series U

Deal: Wachovia Preferred Pass Through Trust 2006-A

  -- Tranche: $50,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Preferred Trust
     Certificates; A3, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously
     on December 23, 2008 downgraded to A3

  -- Tranche: $25,000,000 Class B Leveraged Preferred Trust
     Certificates; A3, Placed on review for downgrade; Previously
     on December 23, 2008 downgraded to A3

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series D issued by Goldman, Sachs Group, Inc.

Deal: Wachovia Preferred Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

  -- Tranche: $124,000,000 Class A Money Market Preferred Trust
     Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on September 21,
     2009 B3 placed on review for upgrade

  -- Tranche: $31,000,000 Class B Leveraged Preferred Trust
     Certificates; Upgraded to Ba3; Previously on September 21,
     2009 B3 placed on review for upgrade

  -- Underlying security: Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred
     Stock, Series E issued by Bank of America Corporation


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Tranches From 15 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 37
tranches from 15 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed one rating from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The ratings on 36 of the downgraded
tranches are on CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating
a significant likelihood of further downgrades.

All of the tranches S&P downgraded come from CDO transactions that
have triggered an EOD.  The rating actions are consistent with
S&P's criteria for CDO transactions that have triggered an event
of default and which may be subject to acceleration or
liquidation.

The U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches S&P downgraded have a total
issuance amount of $4.003 billion and are categorized:

* Two mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed securities
  collateralized in large part by mezzanine tranches of
  residential mortgage-backed securities and other SF securities;

* Two high-grade SF CDOs of ABS collateralized in large part by
  senior tranches of RMBS and other SF securities;

* Three CDO of CDO transactions collateralized primarily by
  tranches from CDOs of ABS and other SF securities;

* Three CDO of CDO transactions collateralized primarily by
  tranches from corporate CDOs;

* Two CDOs of commercial mortgage-backed securities
collateralized by tranches from CMBS transactions and other
  commercial real estate assets;

* One collateralized loan obligation transaction
  collateralized primarily by loan obligations;

* One CDO of trust preferred CDO transaction collateralized by
  trust preferred securities; and

* One collateralized bond obligation transaction
  collateralized primarily by bond obligations.

S&P will continue to monitor the CDO transactions S&P rate and
will take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
S&P believes appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                                 Rating
                                                 ------
  Transaction                        Class  To             From
  -----------                        -----  --             ----
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd                     A-1    BB/Watch Neg   A/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd                     C      CCC/Watch Neg  B/Watch Neg
Acacia CDO 6 Ltd                     D      CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
Ambassador Structured Finance CDO    A-1    BB/Watch Neg   BB+/Watch Neg
Class V Funding, Ltd.                A1     BB/Watch Neg   BBB-/Watch Neg
Connecticut Valley Structured        B-1    B/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
Credit CDO II LTD
Connecticut Valley Structured        B-2    B/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
Credit CDO II LTD
High Grade Structured Credit CDO     A-1    BB/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
2005-1 LTD.
MMCapS Funding XIX Ltd               A-1    BB/Watch Neg   BBB-/Watch Neg
MMCapS Funding XIX Ltd               A-2    CCC/Watch Neg  BB+/Watch Neg
Nova CDO 2001 Ltd                    B      BB/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
Premium Loan Trust I Ltd             X      B/Watch Neg    BB+/Watch Neg
Premium Loan Trust I Ltd             B      B/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd.             A-1    BB/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd.             A-2    CCC/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd.             A-3    CCC/Watch Neg  BB/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II, Ltd.               S      BBB-/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II, Ltd.               A-2    CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
Slate CDO 2007-1 Ltd                 A1SA   BB/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
Slate CDO 2007-1 Ltd                 A1SB   CCC/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
Slate CDO 2007-1 Ltd                 A3     CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
Slate CDO 2007-1 Ltd                 B1     CCC/Watch Neg  CCC+/Watch Neg
Stone Tower CDO II Ltd               X      BBB/Watch Neg  AAA
Stone Tower CDO II Ltd               A-1LA  BB/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
Stone Tower CDO II Ltd               A-1LB  CCC/Watch Neg  B/Watch Neg
Stone Tower CDO II Ltd               A-2L   D              CCC-/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd              A-1L   BB/Watch Neg   BB+/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd              A-2L   CCC/Watch Neg  B+/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        A      BB/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        B      CCC/Watch Neg  BBB-/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        C      CCC/Watch Neg  BB/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        D      CCC/Watch Neg  BB-/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        E      CCC/Watch Neg  B/Watch Neg
Vertical CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd.        F      CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited V      A-1    BB/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited V      B-1    CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited V      B-2    CCC/Watch Neg  B-/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 48 Classes From 26 Subprime RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 48
classes from 26 U.S. subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions from 1993-2001.  S&P removed seven of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on 81 classes from these
transactions, as well as 20 additional transactions, and removed
19 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's current and
projected losses based on the dollar amounts of loans currently in
the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real estate owned
pipelines, as well as S&P's projection of future defaults.  S&P
also incorporated cumulative losses to date in its analysis when
assessing rating outcomes.

For information on how S&P derives its loss assumptions, its use
of loss curve forecasting methodology, and how S&P incorporate
each transaction's current delinquency (including 60- and 90-day
delinquencies), default, and loss trends into S&P's analysis,
please see the articles list in the Related Research section
below.

As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, its assessment of the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default
projections, while its outlook for housing price declines and the
health of the housing market influence S&P's loss severity
assumptions.  Furthermore, for each deal, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations based on upward trends in delinquencies.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given its current
projected losses.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in its view, withstand approximately
150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of subprime fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage
loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                    Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4
                        Series      2001-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        00253CHK6     B-                   BB
        M-2        00253CHL4     CC                   CCC

                 ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-4
                        Series      2000-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A          00079CAA7     CC                   CCC

    AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates Series 1999-2
                        Series      1999-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A         00105HDZ6     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    2A         00105HEA0     CC                   CCC

                     AFC Trust Series 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1A         00105HEB8     CC                   BBB+

                Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
                       Series      2001-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-3        03072SBE4     BB-                  BBB

             Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust
                       Series      2001-BC5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        86358RHD2     AA                   AAA

        Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2001-BC6
                      Series      2001-BC6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M1         86358RNA1     CC                   BBB
        M2         86358RNB9     CC                   B

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                      Series      1999-LB1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1F       04541GAD4     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    A-2F       04541GAE2     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    A-3A       04541GAF9     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    A-5A       04541GAH5     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                       Series      2001-HE2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M1         04541GBR2     BBB-                 AAA
        M2         04541GBS0     B-                   A

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                       Series      2001-HE3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M1         04541GBW1     CCC                  AA
        M2         04541GCC4     CCC                  A
        B          04541GBX9     CC                   BBB

                Chase Funding Trust, Series 2001-4
                       Series      2001-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        IM-1       161551FF8     B-                   AA
        IM-2       161551FG6     CCC                  A
        IB         161551FH4     CC                   BB
        IIM-1      161551FK7     CCC                  B
        IIM-2      161551FL5     CCC                  B-

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE16
                      Series      2001-HE16

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        22540A3N6     CC                   CCC

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE17
                      Series      2001-HE17

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        22540A7E2     CC                   B

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE22
                      Series      2001-HE22

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        22540VCT7     CC                   BB

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE25
                      Series      2001-HE25

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        22540VHE5     B-                   A
        M-2        22540VHF2     CC                   CCC

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE30
                      Series      2001-HE30

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        22540VMH2     CCC                  BBB
        M-F-1      22540VMK5     BBB+                 AA+
        M-F-2      22540VML3     CC                   B

                            CWABS, Inc.
                       Series      2001-BC3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A          126671NA0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-IO       126671NF9     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        126671NB8     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    M-2        126671NC6     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B-1        126671ND4     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

           Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1
                       Series      1999-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B          24763LFF2     D                    CC

           Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3
                       Series      1999-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        24763LFY1     D                    CC

           Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 2000-4
                        Series      2000-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        24763LHN3     D                    AA

                   DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-5
                        Series      2000-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        23323CBX2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                   DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-7
                        Series      2000-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        23323CCL7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        23323CCN3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        23323CCQ6     CCC                  BBB
    M-2        23323CCR4     CCC                  BBB

            First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-1
                       Series      1999-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        31846LCD6     AA+                  AA+/Watch Neg
    A-2        31846LCE4     A                    A/Watch Neg

            First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-2
                        Series      1999-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        31846LCF1     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-2        31846LCG9     A                    A/Watch Neg

            First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        31846LCJ3     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-1        31846LCH7     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

            First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-4
                        Series      1999-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        31846LCK0     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-2        31846LCL8     AA                   AA/Watch Neg

           First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FF2
                      Series      2001-FF2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M-1        32027NAK7     B-                   A/Watch Neg

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        35729BAE1     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    A-2        35729BAF8     BB                   BB/Watch Neg

Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD 2000-C
                     Series      SPMD 2000C

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        MF-1       456606BJ0     CC                   CCC
        MV-1       456606BN1     CC                   B-

  Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD 2001-C
                     Series      SPMD2001-C

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-2        456606DD1     CC                   B

               Lehman Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-1
                        Series      2001-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        525180CA1     CC                   AA

          Provident Bank Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        X-1        743844IN3     CC                   BBB
        X-2        743844IO0     CC                   BBB
        X-3        743844IP8     CC                   AA+

                Residential Asset Securities Corp.
                      Series      1999-RS1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I-3      76110WFW1     A                    A/Watch Neg
    A-II       76110WFX9     A                    A/Watch Neg

               Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-2
                        Series      2001-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        805564JR3     CCC                  BBB
        M-2        805564JS1     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4
                        Series      2001-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-4        00253CHH3     AAA

                 ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1
                        Series      2001-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        000759BU3     BB+

                 ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4
                        Series      2001-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          000759CA6     BB+

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2001-HE1
                      Series      2001-HE1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        004427AL4     AAA
                 M-2        004427AM2     BB
                 M-3        004427AN0     CCC

         Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust 2001-BC6
                      Series      2001-BC6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          86358RMY0     AAA

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                      Series      2001-HE2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         04541GBN1     AAA
                 A2         04541GBP6     AAA

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                      Series      2001-HE3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         04541GBU5     AAA

             Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc.
                        Series      2000-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        07383GBN5     A+
                 B          07383GBP0     BBB

                Chase Funding Trust, Series 2001-4
                        Series      2001-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 IA-5       161551FD3     AAA
                 IA-6       161551FE1     AAA
                 IIA-1      161551FJ0     AAA

            ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-2
                        Series      1999-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-6        21075WKJ3     A
                 A-7        21075WKK0     A
                 A-8        21075WKL8     A

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE16
                      Series      2001-HE16

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          22540A3L0     AAA

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE17
                      Series      2001-HE17

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        22540A7A0     AAA
                 A-2        22540A7B8     AAA
                 A-IO       22540A7C6     AAA

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE22
                      Series      2001-HE22

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        22540VCP5     AAA
                 A-IO       22540VCR1     AAA

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE25
                      Series      2001-HE25

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        22540VHA3     AAA
                 A-IO       22540VHC9     AAA

                 CSFB ABS Trust Series 2001-HE30
                      Series      2001-HE30

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        22540VMB5     AAA
                 A-3        22540VMC3     AAA
                 A-F        22540VME9     AAA

            Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1
                        Series      1999-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-5F       24763LFA3     A
                 A-6F       24763LFB1     A
                 A-1A       24763LFD7     A

            Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3
                       Series      1999-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1F       24763LFU9     AAA
                 A-2F       24763LFV7     AAA
                 A-1A       24763LFX3     AAA

           Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 2000-2
                       Series      2000-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        24763LGX2     CCC

                   DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-5
                        Series      2000-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        23323CBW4     AAA
                 A-3        23323CBY0     AAA
                 A-IO       23323CBZ7     AAA
                 M-1        23323CCA1     BBB

                   DLJ ABS Trust Series 2000-7
                        Series      2000-7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-4        23323CCP8     AAA

            First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1993-2
                       Series      1993- 2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        31846LAC0     A

           First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FF2
                      Series      2001-FF2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        32027NAH4     AAA

Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD 2000-C
                     Series      SPMD 2000C

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AF-5       456606BF8     AAA
                 AF-6       456606BG6     AAA
                 AV         456606BM3     AAA

Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series SPMD 2001-C
                     Series      SPMD2001-C

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AF-A       456606CY6     AAA
                 M-1        456606DC3     AA

              HomeGold Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1
                        Series      1999-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        43740CAB4     AAA
                 A-2        43740CAA6     AAA

               Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-4
                        Series      2001-4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 II-A1      542514BQ6     AAA
                 II-A3      542514BS2     AAA

      Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2001-NC2
                      Series      2001-NC2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        61746WHY9     CCC

      Mortgage Lenders Network Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1
                        Series      1999-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        61913JAE6     BB+
                 A-2        61913JAF3     BB+

               Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-5
                        Series      2000-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A          68389FBH6     AAA

           Provident Bank Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        743844CU4     BB+
                 A-2        743844CV2     BB+
                 A-3        743844CW0     BB+

               Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-2
                        Series      2001-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AF-5       805564JL6     AAA
                 AF-6       805564JM4     AAA
                 X-IO       805564JU6     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Tranches From 10 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 51
tranches from 10 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $3.132 billion.
S&P also affirmed S&P's ratings on eight tranches from four of the
same CLO transactions and removed six of them from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's new corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of six classes from four transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

S&P's analysis incorporates the asset recovery assumptions in its
new CDO criteria.  To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions used in the analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate assumed for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA'
liability rating for each transaction.

                              Table 1
         Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating

       Transaction                        Recovery Rate (%)
       -----------                        -----------------
       AMMC CLO III Ltd.                     46.8
       BlueMountain CLO Ltd.                 44.0
       Celerity CLO Ltd.                     48.1
       Granite Ventures I Ltd.               45.4
       Halcyon Loan Investors CLO I Ltd.     41.2
       Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.                42.7
       Octagon Investment Partners V Ltd.    40.6
       Regatta Funding Ltd.                  45.9
       Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.            44.2
       Symphony CLO V Ltd.                   39.8

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions placed on
CreditWatch following S&P's corporate CDO criteria update and
resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
   Transaction                  Class       To     From
   -----------                  -----       --     ----
   AMMC CLO III Ltd.            A           AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   AMMC CLO III Ltd.            Brevolving  BB+    A+/Watch Neg
   AMMC CLO III Ltd.            C           B+     A+/Watch Neg
   AMMC CLO III Ltd.            D           CCC-   BBB/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        A-1         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        A-1 Rev     AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        A-2         AA     AAA/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        B           A+     AA/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        C           BBB+   A/Watch Neg
   BlueMountain CLO Ltd.        D           BB+    BBB-/Watch Neg
   Celerity CLO Ltd.            C           BBB+   A/Watch Neg
   Celerity CLO Ltd.            D           CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
   Celerity CLO Ltd.            E           CCC-   B+/Watch Neg
   Granite Ventures I Ltd.      A-1         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Granite Ventures I Ltd.      B           A-     A/Watch Neg
   Granite Ventures I Ltd.      C           BB+    BBB/Watch Neg
   Granite Ventures I Ltd.      D           CCC+   BB/Watch Neg
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   A-1A        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   A-1B        A+     AAA/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   A-2         A-     AA/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   B           BBB    A/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   C           BB+    BBB/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Halcyon Loan Investors CLO   D           CCC+   BB/Watch Neg
    I Ltd.
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       A-2         AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       B           AA-    AA/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       C           A-     A/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       D           BBB-   BBB/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       E           BB-    BB/Watch Neg
   Octagon Investment Partners  A-1         A+     AAA/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Octagon Investment Partners  A-2         A+     AAA/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Octagon Investment Partners  B           BBB-   A/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Octagon Investment Partners  C-1         BB-    BBB/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Octagon Investment Partners  C-2         BB-    BBB/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Octagon Investment Partners  D           B+     BB/Watch Neg
    V Ltd.
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         A-1L        AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         A-1LV       AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         A-2L        AA-    AA/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         A-3L        A-     A/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         B-1L        BBB-   BBB/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   A           AA+    AAA/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   B-1         BBB+   A+/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   B-2         BBB+   A+/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   C-1         CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   C-2         CCC+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   D-1         CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
   Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.   D-2         CCC-   BB/Watch Neg
   Symphony CLO V Ltd.          A-1         A-     AAA/Watch Neg
   Symphony CLO V Ltd.          A-2         BBB+   AA/Watch Neg
   Symphony CLO V Ltd.          B           BB+    A/Watch Neg
   Symphony CLO V Ltd.          C           B+     BBB/Watch Neg
   Symphony CLO V Ltd.          D           CCC+   BB/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                                              Rating
                                              ------
   Transaction                  Class       To     From
   -----------                  -----       --     ----
   Celerity CLO Ltd.            A Funded    AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Granite Ventures I Ltd.      A-2         AA     AA/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       A-1         AAA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Landmark VIII CLO Ltd.       Comp Nts    BBB-   BBB-/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         B-2L        BB     BB/Watch Neg
   Regatta Funding Ltd.         X           AAA    AAA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Transaction                  Class       Rating
         -----------                  -----       ------
         Celerity CLO Ltd.            A Revolvin  AAA
         Celerity CLO Ltd.            B           AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 65 Tranches From 14 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 65
tranches from 14 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $4.601 billion.
S&P also affirmed its ratings on 24 tranches from nine
transactions and removed 19 of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's new corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of nine classes from seven transactions resulted
from S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which
is one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of
its criteria update.

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions placed on
CreditWatch following its corporate CDO criteria update and
resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected tranches.

                         Rating Actions

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Transaction                            Class  To        From
  -----------                            -----  --        ----
  Atlantis Funding Ltd                   A-1    A+        AAA/Watch Neg
  Atlantis Funding Ltd                   A-2    A+        AA/Watch Neg
  Atlantis Funding Ltd                   B      BBB-      A/Watch Neg
  Atlantis Funding Ltd                   C      B+        BBB/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  A-1L   AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  A-2L   BBB+      AA/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  A-3L   BB+       A-/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  B-1F   CCC-      BB+/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  B-1L   CCC-      BB+/Watch Neg
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  B-2L   CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   A-1    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   A-3    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   B      AA-       AA/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   C-1    BBB+      A/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   C-2    BBB+      A/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   D-1    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   D-2    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   E      B+        BB/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      A-1    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      A-2    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      C      BBB+      A/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      D-1    CCC+      BBB-/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      D-2    CCC+      BBB-/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        A      AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        B-1    AA-       AA/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        B-2    AA-       AA/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        C      A-        A/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        D      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        A-1a   AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        A-1b   A+        AAA/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        A-2    A+        AAA/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        B      A-        AA/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        C      BBB-      A/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        D      BB        BBB/Watch Neg
  Flagship CLO VI                        E      CCC-      BB/Watch Neg
  Galaxy X CLO Ltd                       A      AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Hamlet II, Ltd.                        A-1    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Hamlet II, Ltd.                        A-2b   AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.           A      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
  Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.           B      A-        AA/Watch Neg
  Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.           C      BBB       A/Watch Neg
  Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.           D-1    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.           E      CCC-      BB/Watch Neg
  LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 plc   A      AA        AAA/Watch Neg
  LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 plc   B      A         AA/Watch Neg
  LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 plc   C      BBB-      A-/Watch Neg
  LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 plc   D      B+        BBB-/Watch Neg
  LightPoint Pan-European CLO 2006 plc   E      CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg
  NACM CLO I                             A-1    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  NACM CLO I                             B      A-        A/Watch Neg
  NACM CLO I                             C      BBB-      BBB/Watch Neg
  NACM CLO I                             D      B+        BB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    C-1    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    C-2    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    D-1    CCC+      BB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    D-2    CCC+      BB/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    D-3    CCC+      BB/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  B-1L   BB+       BBB-/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  B-2L   CCC+      BB-/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   A-1    AA+       AAA/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   A-2    AA        AAA/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   B      A+        AA/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   C      BBB+      A/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   D      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
  Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd                   E      B+        BB/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                                                     Rating
                                                     ------
  Transaction                            Class     To       From
  -----------                            -----     --       ----
  Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  X         AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
  Avery Point CLO Ltd.                   A-2       AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
  BlackRock Senior Income Series II      B         AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        E-1       BB       BB/Watch Neg
  Emporia Preferred Funding I Ltd        E-2       BB       BB/Watch Neg
  Galaxy X CLO Ltd                       B         AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Galaxy X CLO Ltd                       C         A        A/Watch Neg
  Galaxy X CLO Ltd                       D         BBB      BBB/Watch Neg
  Hamlet II, Ltd.                        B         A        A/Watch Neg
  NACM CLO I                             A-2       AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    A-1a      AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    A-1b      AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    A-2a      AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    A-2b      AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Oak Hill Credit Partners II Limited    B         A        A/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  A-1L      AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  A-2L      AA       AA/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  A-3L      A-       A-/Watch Neg
  Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  X         AAA      AAA/Watch Neg

                           Ratings Affirmed

     Transaction                            Class       Rating
     -----------                            -----       ------
     Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd.                  P1          AAA
     Hamlet II, Ltd.                        A-2a        AAA
     Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  PN1 Com Se  AAA
     Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  PN2 Com Se  AAA
     Pacifica CDO IV, Ltd.                  PN3 Com Se  AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches From 15 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 76
tranches from 15 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed 75 of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The affected tranches have a total issuance amount
of $5.497 billion.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 12 tranches
from six transactions and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect two primary factors:

* The application of S&P's new corporate collateralized debt
  obligation criteria; and

* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
  to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
  experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

The downgrades of 15 classes from 10 transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.

S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions placed on
CreditWatch following S&P's corporate CDO criteria update and
resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
   Transaction                  Class       To    From
   -----------                  -----       --    ----
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       A-1         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       A-2B        AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       B           A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       C           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       D           B+    BBB-/WatchNeg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       E           CCC-  B+/Watch Neg
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       SPref Shrs  CCC-  B+/Watch Neg
   Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.     A           AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.     B           BBB   A/Watch Neg
   Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.     C           CCC+  BBB/Watch Neg
   Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.     D           CCC-  B/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  A-1L        AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  A-1LR       AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  A-2L        A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  A-3L        BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  B-1L        BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   First 2004-II CLO Ltd.       A-1         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   First 2004-II CLO Ltd.       A-2         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   First 2004-II CLO Ltd.       B           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   First 2004-II CLO Ltd.       C           B+    BB+/Watch Neg
   GoldenTree Capital           D-1         BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           D-2         BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           E           B+    BB/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   Katonah III Inc.            A           AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            B-1         BBB+  A-/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            B-2         BBB+  A-/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            C-1         B+    BBB/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            C-2         B+    BBB/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            D-1         CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Katonah III Inc.            D-2         CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        A-1L        AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        A-1LB       AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        A-2L        BBB+  AA/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        A-3L        BB+   A-/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        B-1L        CCC-  BBB/Watch Neg
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        B-2L        CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO V Ltd.        A-1         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO V Ltd.        A-2         A+    AA/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO V Ltd.        B           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO V Ltd.        C           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO V Ltd.        D           CCC+  BB/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO VII Ltd.      A-1         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO VII Ltd.      A-2         AA-   AA/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO VII Ltd.      B           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO VII Ltd.      C           BBB-  BBB/Watch Neg
   LightPoint CLO VII Ltd.      D           CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  A-1a        AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  A-1b        AA-   AAA/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  A-2         A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  B           BBB-  A/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  C           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Madison Park Funding V Ltd.  D           B+    BB/Watch Neg
   Merritt Funding Trust        A-2         AA+   AAA
    Series 2005-2
   Merritt Funding Trust        B           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
    Series 2005-2
   Merritt Funding Trust        C           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
    Series 2005-2
   Merritt Funding Trust        Com Tr Cer  CC    BB/Watch Neg
    Series 2005-2
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    A-1         AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    A-2         AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    A-3         AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    B           A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    C           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    D           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO II Ltd.    E           CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   A-2         AA    AAA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   B           A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   C           BBB+  A/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   D           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   E           CCC+  BB/Watch Neg
   Nantucket CLO I Ltd.         A           AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Nantucket CLO I Ltd.         C           A-    A/Watch Neg
   Nantucket CLO I Ltd.         D           BB+   BBB/Watch Neg
   Nantucket CLO I Ltd.         E           CCC-  BB/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital VI Ltd.   A-1         AA+   AAA/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital VI Ltd.   A-2         A+    AA/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital VI Ltd.   B           BBB   A/Watch Neg
   Northwoods Capital VI Ltd.   C           CCC+  BBB-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                                              Rating
                                              ------
   Transaction                  Class       To    From
   -----------                  -----       --    ----
   Babson CLO Ltd. 2003-I       A-2A        AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   Denali Capital CLO VII Ltd.  B-2L        BB    BB/Watch Neg
   GoldenTree Capital           A-1         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           A-2         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           A-3         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           B-1         AA    AA/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           B-2         AA    AA/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           C-1         A     A/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   GoldenTree Capital           C-2         A     A/Watch Neg
    Opportunities
   Landmark III CDO Ltd.        A-1LA       AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   Mountain View CLO III Ltd.   A-1         AAA   AAA/Watch Neg
   Nantucket CLO I Ltd.         B           AA    AA/Watch Neg



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
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liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
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than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
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The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
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are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
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                  *** End of Transmission ***