TCR_Public/091025.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 25, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 295

                            Headlines



BATTERSON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'C'
ACA ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Series A-4 Notes
ALLMERICA CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

ALLEN SYSTEMS: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Eight Tranches
ARLO III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005 Notes
AURELIUS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-1 Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2005-TOP18 Certs.

BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-PWR15 Certs.
BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on 2001C Bonds
BINGHAM CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-3 From 'Ba1'
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
C-BASS X: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2007A Bonds
CAMULOS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-NC4 Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-7 Cert. to 'D'

CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certs. to 'D'
CHASE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2000-2 Certs.
CITIMORTGAGE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 123 Tranches
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-RR1 Certs.
CLEARWATER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes

CLYDESDALE CBO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Class B Notes to 'B1'
COLTS 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class E to 'B2'
COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Notes to 'Ba2'
COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CORSAIR NO 4: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $15 Mil. Notes

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-C6 Certs.
CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-1 Notes
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-51 Tranches
DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
DIAMOND INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes

EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes
FC CBO: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class B Floating Notes
FC CBO: Moody's Junks Ratings on US$65 Mil. Class B Notes
FLATIRON RE: Moody's Withdraws Debt Ratings on Various Loans
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes

GCCFC 2006-RR1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certificates
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various 2006-3 Notes
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-2 2006-2 Notes
GEMSTONE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

GILLESPIE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-C2 Certs.
GRAMERCY REAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of CDOs
GREENWICH 2007-RR2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-RR2 Certs.
GREYLOCK SYNTHETIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes

GSMS 2006-CC1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CC1 Notes
GSMSC PASS-THROUGH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-1R Certs.
HALYARD CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 18 2007-CIBC18 Securities
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Ten 2007-C3 Certs.

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2005-C3 Certs.
LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2008-1 Certificates
LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Rating on Class A2 Notes From 'AAA's
MARINER CDS: Moody's Junks Rating on US$175 Mil. CDO Deal
MASTR RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Certs. to 'CC'

MASTR RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two 2008-3 Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-CIP1 Certs.
MERRITT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
ML CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 1999-Putnam-1 Notes
NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2001-3 Notes

NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-3A Notes
OAK HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
OSPREY CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
PASADENA CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
PERITUS I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

PHILADELPHIA HOSPITAL: S&P Junks Ratings on 1997A Revenue Bonds
PHILADELPHIA HOSPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Rating on 1997A Bonds
PHOENIX CDO: Moody's Junks Ratings on US$31 Mil. Notes
PLAINFIELD HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1993A Bonds to 'BB'
RAHWAY HOSPITAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on 1998 Bonds

RBSGC STRUCTURED: S&P Junks Rating on Class A2 Certs. From 'AAA'
RENAISSANCE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 100 Securities
REVE SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
RUTLAND RATED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes

SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2007-7 Certs.
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SKM-LIBERTYVIEW CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
SPF CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SPRING ROAD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Various Notes

STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
STRAFFORD COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on GO Bonds to 'Ba2'
TELOS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-2 Notes
TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Certs.
TROPIC CDO: Fitch Puts Ratings on Seven Notes on Negative Watch

TROPIC CDO: Fitch Puts Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
TROPIC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
TW HOTEL: S&P Puts Ratings on 2005-LUX Certs. On Negative Watch
WACHOVIA AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2005-C18 Certs.

WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-ESH Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-ESH Certs.
WAVE SPC: S&P  Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of 2007-3 Notes
WAVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2007-2 Notes
WAVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007-1 Certificates

* Fitch Comments on Decline for Collateral in U.S. CRE Loans
* Fitch Puts Ratings on 247 CMBS Bonds on Negative Watch
* Moody's Retains Review on 18 CMBS Rake Bonds on GGP Bankruptcy
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes From Three Subprime RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 29 Classes of Notes From Three CDOs

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 78 Classes From Four Prime Jumbo RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 198 Classes From 21 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 712 Classes From 654 RMBS to 'D'



                            *********

BATTERSON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Batterson Park CBO I, Ltd.:

  -- US $16,500,000 Class B Notes (current balance of $9,708,494),
     Downgraded to C; previously on September 20, 2006 Downgraded
     to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflects Moody's concerns about the insufficient collateralization
of the notes.  In particular, the Overcollateralization Ratio Test
was reported at 26.47% versus a test level of 130.0%, as reported
in the most recent trustee report dated June 20, 2009, with all
collateral in the form of cash collections.  While the Class B
Notes have delevered significantly, Moody's believes that there is
a high likelihood that the issuer will default on its obligation
to repay the current outstanding balance of the notes at their
maturity, and that such a default will result in significant
losses to holders of the notes.

Batterson Park CBO I, Ltd., issued on November 17, 1998, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ACA ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed three classes of
notes issued by ACA ABS 2004-1, Limited/LLC.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
February 2009.  Approximately 59.8% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review.

The downgrades to the portfolio have left approximately 57.3% of
the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 29.4% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 34% and 9.5%, respectively at last review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The
class A-1 notes have paid down approximately 85.9% of its original
balance since closing.  This class is affirmed at 'AA' to reflect
Fitch's opinion that this class has a high likelihood of being
paid in full.  The class A-2 notes were downgraded to 'BB' to
reflect the diminished likelihood of being paid in full, given the
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  Given the expected
further downgrades in the underlying assets, Fitch assigns a
Negative Outlook to both classes.

The classes A-1 and A-2 notes are assigned a Loss Severity rating
of 'LS4'.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The
LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches.

The class B notes have been downgraded to 'C' and classes C-1 and
C-2 were affirmed at 'C' to indicate Fitch's belief that default
is inevitable at or prior to maturity.  Fitch does not assign LS
ratings and outlooks for classes rated CCC and lower.

ACA ABS 2004-1 is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on May 27, 2004.  The portfolio is
monitored by Solidus Capital, LLC.  The portfolio is composed
primarily of residential mortgage-backed securities 60.9%, CDO
21%, real estate investment trusts 9.8%, asset-backed securities
5.7%, and commercial mortgage-backed securities 2.6%.

Fitch has downgraded, affirmed, assigned LS ratings and revised
Outlooks as indicated:

ACA ABS 2004-1, Limited/LLC.

  -- $44,362,394 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AA/LS4', revised the
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $49,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'BB/LS4' from 'A',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $47,250,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B', and
     removed the Negative Outlook;

  -- $15,002,866 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $2,449,447 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.


ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$245,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     (current balance of $240,704,017) , Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on May 31, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$26,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,250,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021 (current balance of $12,009,815), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On

     Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class D Overcollateralization Test
and the Weighted Average Rating Factor Test.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2680 versus a test level of 2576 as of the last
trustee report, dated September 8, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $22 million, accounting for roughly 7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D overcollateralization
test was reported at 99.82% versus a test level of 100.9%.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued on May 23, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Series A-4 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-' rating on
the series A-4 notes issued by Aladdin Synthetic CDO II SPC, a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transaction.  The rating
was previously on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The withdrawal follows S&P's receipt of a zero redemption option
notice, referencing the redemption of the notes, as permitted by
section 9.9 of the indenture dated Dec. 19, 2006.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                   Aladdin Synthetic CDO II SPC

               Rating                    Balance (mil. EUR)
               ------                    ------------------
    Series   To      From               Current       Original
    ------   --      ----               -------       --------
    A-4      NR      CCC-/Watch Neg        0.00          5.000

                          NR - Not rated.


ALLMERICA CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Allmerica CBO I, Limited:

  -- US$151,000,000 Senior Secured Notes due 2010 (current
     balance of $6,340,000), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     June 3, 2004, Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$34,000,000 Second Priority Senior Notes due 2010,
     Downgraded to C; previously on April 23, 2002, Downgraded to
     Ca;

  -- US$20,250,000 Senior Subordinated Notes due 2010,
     Downgraded to C; previously on July 17, 2001, Downgraded to
     Ca.

According to Moody's, the deal has delevered significantly and
there are five assets left in the pool.  The weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
3906 versus a test level of 2720 as of the last trustee report,
dated September 25, 2009.  Based on the same report, one of the
assets accounting for almost 20% of the total collateral principal
balance defaulted in March 2009.  The underlying assets excluding
defaulted assets are concentrated in three issuers, currently
rated B2 or Caa2.  Any material change in the credit profile of
each obligor will have a significant impact on the rated notes.
Moody's also noted that all the assets mature after the maturity
date of the notes, exposing the notes to market risk in the event
of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

The downgrade actions also reflect Moody's concerns about the
potentially insufficient collateralization of the notes.  In
particular, the Second Priority Par Value Test was reported at
7.58% versus a test level of 104.9%, as reported in the trustee
report dated September 25, 2009.  Moody's believes that there is a
high likelihood that the issuer will default on its obligation to
repay the current outstanding balance of these notes at their
maturity, and that such a default will result in significant
losses to holders of the notes.

Moody's rating analysis incorporates certain revised assumptions
with respect to default probability.  The revised assumptions are
described in the publication, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  The
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds will be below their historical averages.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication, "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Allmerica CBO I, Limited, issued in June 1999, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed by a portfolio of senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ALLEN SYSTEMS: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its corporate
credit rating on Naples, Florida-based Allen Systems Group Inc. to
'B' from CCC+.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with developing implications
on Oct. 3, 2008.

S&P also assigned a 'BB-' rating to the company's $260 million
first-lien tranche with a recovery rating of '1' and a 'B+' rating
to its $95 million second-lien tranche with a recovery rating of
'2'.  The outlook is negative.

"The ratings reflect ASG's modest EBITDA base, acquisitive growth
strategy, and leveraged financial profile," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Joseph Spence.  The company's diversified customer
base and a significant level of recurring revenues partly offset
those factors.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Eight Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on 8 tranches from
American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-2.  Moody's has
updated the expected loss numbers on these pools to reflect
continued deterioration in performance.  In addition, Moody's has
adjusted the ratings of 5 of the tranches in Group III to correct
certain inaccurate assumptions previously made as to the principal
distribution features for this group.  The ratings of these 5
tranches have been adjusted to reflect the fact that after the
depletion of the subordinated certificates, principal will be
distributed to the Class A certificates on a pro rata basis, based
on the certificate principal balances.

Given the recent increase in the pace of credit support erosion
relative to the paydown of the tranches, there is an increased
likelihood that the downgraded bonds may not be completely paid
off before subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In its
analysis, Moody's has considered the current available level of
credit enhancement and has also incorporated additional cashflow
stresses to assess the impact on the bonds.

These rating actions are a result of corrections to principal
distribution assumptions, and the updated expected loss on the
pool:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-2/ Group III

* Pool current expected loss: 21% of original balance

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on July 26, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

These updated rating actions are a result of the updated expected
loss on the pool:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2006-2/ Group II-1
II-2

* Pool current expected loss: 19% of original balance

  -- Cl. II-A-1B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on July 26, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1C, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.


ARLO III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2005 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Arlo III Limited under Series 2005, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: ARLO III Limited, Series 2005

  -- Credit-Linked Notes due 2015, Downgraded to B2; previously on
     Feb. 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 270 initially to 1190, equivalent to an average
rating of the current portfolio of Ba1.  The reference portfolio
includes an exposure to Ambac Assurance Corporation which has
experienced a substantial credit migration in the past few months,
and is now rated Caa2.  Since inception of the transaction, the
subordination of the rated tranche has been reduced due to credit
events on Dana Corporation, General Motors Corporation, and
Tribune Company.  These credit events lead to a decrease of
approximately 1.9% of the subordination of the tranche.  The
portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in Insurance
(13.1%), Automotive (10.7%), Utilities -- Electric (9.8%) and
Finance (7.4%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

    Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (14 September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


AURELIUS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2007-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of four classes of Notes issued by Aurelius Capital CDO
2007-1 Limited.  The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$240,300,000 Class A Loan due 2052, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$15,200,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Deferrable
     Interest Notes due 2052, Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$18,000,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Deferrable
     Interest Notes due 2052, Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$13,500,000 Class E Secured Floating Rate Deferrable
     Interest Notes due 2052, Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Aurelius Capital CDO 2007-1 Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of Collateralized Loan
Obligations.

Moody's explained that its rating actions take into account
certain recent key events with respect to the transaction.  On
August 28, 2009, the Trustee reported the occurrence of an Event
of Default for this transaction due to the Default Par Value
Coverage Ratio falling below the required 104.5% on a
Determination Date.  The trustee also reports that on
September 14, 2009, the Controlling Class declared all of the
principal of and all accrued and unpaid interest on the Class A
Loan and all of the Secured Notes to be immediately due and
payable in full and terminated the Reinvestment Period.  On
September 18, 2009, the Trustee issued a notice of Public Auction
of Collateral with respect to this transaction indicating that,
pursuant to applicable provisions of the Indenture, the
Controlling Class directed the Trustee to sell and liquidate the
Cash Assets portion of the Collateral.  Moody's believes that the
expected losses to Noteholders as a result of the liquidation of
the Cash Assets will be inconsistent with the current Moody's
ratings of the Notes and are reflected in the rating downgrade
actions.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2005-TOP18 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded 14 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-TOP18.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing, increased leverage from the
remainder of the pool, increased credit quality dispersion,
concerns about refinancing risk associated with loans approaching
maturity and increased loan concentration.  Two loans,
representing 9% of the pool, mature within the next six months and
have a stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.00X.

On September 3, 2009, Moody's placed ten classes on review for
possible downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from a decline in the pool's overall credit quality.
Moody's placed four additional classes on review for possible
downgrade on October 8, 2009, due to a $2.3 million realized loss
that occurred in September 2009 and the transfer of the Boulevard
Mall at the Capital Centre Loan ($71.5 million -- 7%) into special
servicing.  This action concludes Moody's review of the
transaction.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the September 14, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 6% to
$1.06 billion from $1.12 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 156 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 43% of the pool.  The pool contains six loans,
representing 15% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings.  At securitization three additional loans, representing
10% of the pool, had underlying ratings.  The performance of these
loans has declined since securitization and they are now analyzed
as part of the conduit pool because of increased leverage.  Four
loans, representing 1% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty six loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's (CMSA) monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.  Not all loans
on the watchlist are delinquent or have significant issues.

The pool has experienced a $2.3 million realized loss (67% loss
severity) from the liquidation of one loan.  Six loans,
representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Boulevard at Capital
Centre Loan ($71.5 million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by
485,000 square foot life-style retail center located in Landover,
Maryland.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in August
2009 for imminent maturity default.  The loan matured in October
2009.  The property was 81% occupied as of April 2009 compared to
100% at last review.  The decline in occupancy is due to Linen 'N
Things (7% NRA) and Circuit City (7% NRA) vacating the property
upon filing for bankruptcy.  The loan previously had an underlying
rating of Baa3.  Moody's is not estimating a loss on this loan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.88X compared to 70%
and 1.28X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Whiting Shopping
Center Loan ($10.9 million -- 1%), which is secured by an 115,000
square community shopping center located in Manchester Township,
New Jersey.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in July
2009 and is currently 60+ days delinquent.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $9.5 million in losses (41% loss severity on average)
for five of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 96%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value (LTV) ratio
for the conduit pool is 90% compared to 86% at last review.  In
addition to the overall increase in leverage, the pool has
experienced increased credit quality dispersion since last review.
Based on Moody's analysis, 20% of the pool has an LTV in excess of
100% compared to 16% at last review.  Approximately 4% of the pool
has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 0% at last review.

Moody's stressed DSCR for the conduit pool is 1.18X compared to
1.21X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 34 compared to 45 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the 111-115 Fifth
Avenue Loan ($75 million -- 7%), which is secured by two
contiguous office/retail buildings totaling 582,600 square feet
located in the Flatiron District of New York City.  Based on the
leasable area, the office component represents 80% of the property
and retail represents 20%.  The property is primarily tenanted by
high-end textile and home furnishing companies.  The largest
tenant is ABC Carpet, a luxury home-furnish retailer, which
occupies 12% of the NRA through January 2019.  The property was
100% occupied as of March 2009, essentially the same since last
review.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's underlying rating
and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.63X, respectively, compared to A1
and 1.59X at last review.

The second loan with underlying rating is the Capital Arms
Apartment Loan ($29 million -- 3%), which is secured by a 278-unit
apartment tower located in the Midtown West / Time Square section
of New York City.  As of September 2009, the property was 98%
occupied compared to 97% at last review.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aa2 and
1.43X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and 1.45X at last review.

The third loan with an underlying rating is Watertown Mall Loan
($20 million -- 2%), which is secured by a 231, 200 square foot
retail center located in Watertown, Massachusetts.  The property
was 99% occupied as of March 2009 compared to 89% at last review.
The largest tenants are Target (72% of NRA; lease expiration
October 2015) and BestBuy (20% of NRA; lease expiration October
2015).  Performance has improved due to higher revenues and stable
expenses.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3
and 1.45X, respectively, compared to Ba1 and 1.27X at last review.

The remaining three loans with underlying ratings represent 3% of
the pool.  The 340 East 93rd Street Co-op Loan ($15 million --
1.4%) is secured by a 358-unit residential co-op located in New
York City.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa
and 4.31X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 4.09X at last review.
The Dal-Rich Village Loan ($7.5 million -- 0.7%) is secured by a
163,000 square foot retail center located in Richardson, Texas.
Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.42X at last review.  The 3200
Liberty Avenue Loan ($6.9 million -- 07%) is secured by a 212,600
square foot warehouse/flex space located in North Bergen, New
Jersey.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.33X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.29X at last review.

The largest performing loan that previously had an underlying
rating is the Chateau on the Lake Loan ($28.3 million -- 3%),
which is secured by a full-service hotel and spa located in
Branson, Missouri.  The loan is on the watchlist for low DSCR.
Net operating income has been negatively impacted by the decline
in tourist and convention travel and increased operating expenses.
Occupancy and revenue per available room for 2008 were 56% and
$102, respectively, compared to 58% and $109 in 2007.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.93X, respectively, compared to
67% and 1.69X at last review.

The second loan that previously had underlying rating is the
Holiday Inn Express Midtown Hotel Loan ($7.2 million -- 0.7%),
which is secured by a 168-room limited service hotel located in
Philadelphia, PA.  Performance has been negatively impacted by the
decline in tourist and business travel.  Occupancy and RevPAR for
the first quarter 2009 were 67% and $127, respectively, compared
to 71% and $131 in the first quarter of 2008.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.72X, respectively, compared to 64% and
1.96X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 18% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 95-97 Horatio Street Apartment Loan
($85.0 million -- 8%), which is secured by a 325-unit multi-family
complex located in the Greenwich Village section of New York City.
The property was 95% occupied as of March 2009 compared to 100% at
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.04X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Waikele Center Loan
($63.3 million -- 6%), which is a 45% pari passu interest in a
$140.7 million loan.  The collateral is a 521,332 square foot
community shopping center located in Waipahu, Hawaii.  The
property was 97% occupied as of March 2009 compared to 99% at
last review.  The largest tenants are Lowe's, Kmart and The Sports
Authority.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.06X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Janus World Headquarters
Loan ($36.5 million -- 3%), which is secured by a 160,000 square
foot office building located in Denver, Colorado.  The property is
99% leased to the Janus Capital Group (Moody's unsecured rating of
Baa3/negative outlook) through January 2019.  The property's
current rent of $28 per square foot is approximately 27% above the
current market rent of $21 per square foot.  Although the
property's performance has been stable since securitization,
Moody's performed a dark/lit analysis, which factors in current
market conditions.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and
0.96X, respectively compared to 82% and 1.12X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $8,109,716, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-2, $121,900,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $105,700,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-3, $41,600,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-4, $517,238,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-4FL, $75,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 5/2/2007

  -- Class A-J, $74,307,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009

  -- Class B, $29,443,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009

  -- Class C, $8,412,000, downgraded to A3 from Aa3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009

  -- Class D, $12,618,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009

  -- Class E, $11,216,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class F, $9,814,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class G, $9,814,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class H, $8,412,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class J, $4,206,000, downgraded to Caa1from Ba1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class K, $4,206,000, downgraded to Caa2 from rated Ba2;
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class L, $4,206,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class M, $1,402,000,000, downgraded to Ca from B1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class N, $1,403,000, downgraded to C from B2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class O, $2,804,000, downgraded to C from B3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-PWR15 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR15 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from loans in special servicing and
increased credit quality dispersion for the remainder of the pool.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the October 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than l% to
$2.77 billion from $2.81 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 206 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 38% of the pool.

Forty four loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$1.9 million realized loss.  Six loans, representing 17% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the World Market Center II Loan ($345.0 million -
- 12.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.4 million square
foot home furniture and furnishing accessories design center
located in downtown Las Vegas, Nevada.  For the six month period
ending June 2009, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
occupancy rate were 0.90X and 75%, respectively.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2009.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sheraton
Universal Hotel Loan ($84.0 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by
a 436-room full service hotel located in Universal City,
California.  The loan is 90+ days delinquent.  The remaining four
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of office,
multifamily and retail properties.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $155,710,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aaa on 4/9/2007

  -- Class A-MFL, $125,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aaa on 4/9/2007

  -- Class A-J, $117,113,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class A-JFL, $125,000,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $52,633,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $28,072,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $38,597,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $28,071,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $38,598,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $28,071,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $28,071,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $10,527,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $7,017,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $10,527,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $3,509,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $7,018,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class O, $7,018,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/11/2009


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on 2001C Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Bexar County (TX)
Housing Finance Corporation Multifamily Revenue Refunding Bonds
(Doral Club and Sutton House Apartments Project), Series 2001A at
Baa2 and Subordinate Series 2001C at Ba2.

The Series 2001A Bonds will continue to maintain MBIA bond
insurance.

The rating affirmations are reflective of debt service coverage
levels that are consistent with Moody's benchmarking standards.
The outlook remains negative.

Doral Club, which is a 297 unit multi-family property, was built
in 1985 and is composed of 11, three story buildings located in
the northwest section of San Antonio.

Sutton House Apartments, which was also built in 1985, is a 265
unit multi-family garden style complex comprised of 18 three story
buildings located in the north central section of San Antonio.

Legal Security:

The Bonds are secured by revenues of the project as well as by
funds and investments pledged to the trustee as security for the
bonds.

Strengths:

-- Revenues continue to generate enough funds for all expenses
    and debt service payments.

-- The properties are located near major employment centers.

Challenges:

-- A substantial number of multi-family units are currently in
    the pipeline within the northwest and north central San
    Antonio submarket which will likely reduce occupancies at
    existing properties.

Recent Developments:

Interim financial statements indicate coverage increased in 2008
with projected senior debt coverage of 1.54x and subordinate
coverage projected at 1.33x.

Occupancy at the Doral and Sutton developments were 92.77% and
94.05% respectively in 2008, which exceeds the 92% average for
both submarkets reported by Torto Wheaton Research (TWR).  Vacancy
in the submarkets is forecasted to average 92% in 2009 and
increase to 94% in 2010 by TWR.

                What could change the rating -- UP

Increases in occupancy and debt service coverage.

               What could change the rating -- DOWN

A decline in occupancy and/or a decrease in debt service coverage.

                              Outlook

The outlook remains negative.


BINGHAM CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-3 From 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Bingham CDO LP:

  -- US$62,400,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Participating Notes due 2012 (current balance of
     $33,137,094), Upgraded to Baa2; previously on 10/12/2009
     Downgraded to Ba1.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes
reflects the continued deleveraging of the transaction.  The
principal balance of the Class A-3 Notes has been reduced by about
47% from its original balance as of the last trustee report, dated
9/1/2009.  According to the same trustee report, the Class A-3
overcollateralization ratio is 118.6%.

The upgrade action taken on the Class A-3 Notes reflects Moody's
revised assumptions with respect to default probability and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating action also reflects the credit
deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such credit
deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
and an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 3214 versus a test level of
1800 as of the last trustee report.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$5.46 million, accounting for roughly 11% of the collateral
balance.  Finally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a
number of investments in securities that mature after the maturity
date of the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes
to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the
notes' maturity.

In addition, the rating on Class A-3 Notes reflects the actual
underlying rating of the Class A-3 Notes.  This underlying rating
is based solely on the intrinsic credit quality of the Class A-3
Notes in the absence of the guarantee from MBIA Insurance
Corporation, whose insurance financial strength rating was
downgraded from to B3 on 2/18/2009.  The above action is a result
of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors as
described in the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled
"Moody's modifies approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors."

Bingham CDO LP, issued in December 16, 1999, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
and senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by BlueMountain CLO III Ltd.:

  -- US$31,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on February 11, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,150,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B3.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$131,487,500 Class A-1a Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021
     (current balance of $130,081,903), Confirmed at Aaa;
     previously on February 11, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$131,487,500 Class A-1b Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021
     (current balance of $130,081,903), Confirmed at Aaa;
     previously on February 11, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Revolving Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021 (current balance of $49,465,501), Confirmed at Aaa;
     previously on February 11, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2795 as of the last trustee report, dated
September 8, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $20.7 million,
accounting for roughly 4.7% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 4.4% of the
underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

BlueMountain CLO III Ltd., issued in 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


C-BASS X: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes issued by C-
BASS X, Ltd./Corp.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
February 2009.  Approximately 56% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review.

The downgrades to the portfolio have left approximately 59.9% of
the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 35.9% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 29.8% and 15.4%, respectively at last review.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Based on this analysis, the class A and class B notes are now
passing the 'BBB' and 'B' rating stresses and have been downgraded
accordingly.  Despite the downgrades of the underlying assets,
class A benefits from the excess spread used to pay down this
class as a result of the failing class C overcollateralization
test.  The class A notes have paid down approximately 78.2% since
closing.  However, given the expected further downgrades in the
underlying assets, Fitch assigns a Negative Outlook to both
classes.

The classes A and B notes are assigned Loss Severity ratings of
'LS3' and 'LS5', respectively.  The LS ratings indicate each
tranche's potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by
the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss expectation for
the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for Structured Finance
Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered
in conjunction with the probability of default for tranches.

The class C notes have been downgraded to 'CC' to indicate Fitch's
belief that based on the percentage of defaulted securities and
the portfolio and the performance expectations for the remainder
of the portfolio, there is a high probability the notes will
default at or prior to maturity.

The class D and C notes have been downgraded to 'C' to indicate
Fitch's belief that default is inevitable at or prior to maturity.
Fitch does not assign LS ratings and Outlooks for classes rated
'CCC' and lower.

C-BASS is a structured finance collateralized debt obligation that
closed on May 27, 2004.  The portfolio is monitored by C-BASS
Investment Management LLC.  The portfolio is composed primarily of
residential mortgage-backed securities 92.3%, commercial mortgage-
backed securities 4.4%, CDO 2.1%, and asset-backed securities
1.2%.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings, and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

C-BASS X, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $77,857,530 class A notes downgraded to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AA',
     revised the Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $25,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'B/LS5' from 'A',
     revised the Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $20,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'BBB', and
     remove Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,201,519 class D notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B'.


CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2007A Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded to Aaa/VMIG1 from Ba3/S.G. the rating of the
California Municipal Finance Authority's Variable Rate Demand
Revenue Bonds (Pacific Institute Project) Series 2007A (the Bonds)
($21,705,000 outstanding) in conjunction with the issuance of a
confirming letter of credit provided by The Federal Home Loan Bank
of San Francisco to cover payments of principal, interest and
purchase price on the Bonds, effective October 15, 2009.  The CLOC
is being issued as a confirmation to the letter of credit
currently provided by California Bank & Trust.

The long-term portion of the rating is based upon the credit
quality of the FHLB-SF as provider of the CLOC, the credit quality
of CB&T as provider of the letter of credit, and the structural
and legal protections of the transaction, which ensure timely
payment of principal and interest to bondholders.  The short-term
portion of the rating is based on the structure and legal
protections of the transaction that ensure timely payment of
purchase price to bondholders, and the short-term rating of the
FHLB-SF.

Moody's currently rates California Bank & Trust Ba3 for its long-
term obligations and NP for its short-term obligations.  Moody's
currently rates The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco Aaa
for its long-term obligations and P-1 for its short-term
obligations.

A payment default will only occur if both the FHLB-SF and CB&T
default on their obligations under their respective letters of
credit.  However, due to very high correlation among entities in
the banking/financial services sectors, the long-term rating on
the transaction reflects solely the long-term deposit rating of
the FHLB-SF as the CLOC provider.

                 Interest Rate Modes And Payment

The Bonds will continue to bear interest in a weekly rate mode
following the effective date of the CLOC and pay interest on the
first business day of each month.  The first interest payment date
following the effective date of the CLOC will be November 2, 2009.
The Bonds are subject to conversion, in whole, to either a term or
a fixed rate mode, and the Bonds will be subject to mandatory
tender on the date of any such conversion.  Moody's rating covers
the Bonds while they bear interest in the weekly rate mode only.

                          Flow Of Funds

The trustee is instructed to draw under the LOC in accordance with
its terms for principal and interest by 3:00 p.m., New York, NY
time, on the second business day prior to each interest payment
date, redemption date or maturity date of the Bonds.

If the LOC bank fails to honor a drawing for principal or interest
by 1:00 p.m., New York, New York time on the business day prior to
a payment date or if the LOC is repudiated, then the trustee shall
draw on the CLOC in accordance with its terms by 11:30 a.m., Los
Angeles, California time, on the business day prior to any date on
which the payment of principal of or interest on the Bonds is due.
Such draw shall be for the full principal and interest due on the
Bonds on the mandatory purchase date occurring one business day
following the LOC bank's failure to honor a conforming draw for
principal and interest under the LOC or the repudiation of the
LOC.

The trustee is also instructed to draw under the LOC, in
accordance with its terms, by 12:00 noon, New York, New York time,
on the second business day prior to each purchase date, for the
full purchase price of any Bonds being tendered pursuant to either
an optional or a mandatory tender.

If the LOC bank fails to honor such a drawing by 3:00 p.m., New
York, NY time, on such second business day, or if the LOC is
repudiated, then the trustee shall draw on the CLOC in accordance
with its terms by 4:00 p.m., New York, New York time (i.e. 1:00
p.m., Los Angeles, California time), on the second business day
prior to the purchase date.  Such draw shall be for the full
purchase price of the Bonds due on the mandatory purchase date
occurring on the second business day following the LOC bank's
failure to honor a conforming draw for purchase price under the
LOC or the repudiation of the LOC.

Bonds that are purchased by the LOC or CLOC bank due to a failed
remarketing are held by the trustee and will not be released until
the trustee has received written confirmation from the respective
bank stating that the LOC, or CLOC, as appropriate has been
reinstated in the amount of the purchase price drawn for such
Bonds.

                        Additional Bonds

The trust indenture allows for the issuance of additional Bonds of
separate series under supplemental trust indentures.

         Letter Of Credit And Confirming Letter Of Credit

The LOC and the CLOC are each sized for full principal plus 45
days' interest at the maximum rate of 10% on the Bonds, and will
provide sufficient coverage for the Bonds while they are in the
weekly rate mode.  The LOC and CLOC are not sized to cover the
Bonds while they are in the term or fixed rate modes, and Moody's
rating does not apply to such Bonds.

The LOC is subject to the International Standby Practices 1998,
International Chamber of Commerce Publication No.  590 (the ISP98)
and the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in the State of
California.  The CLOC is subject to the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (1993 Revision), International
Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 500 and the laws of the State
of California.

   Draws On The Letter Of Credit And Confirming Letter Of Credit

Conforming draws under the LOC for the payment of principal and
interest on the Bonds received by CB&T by 3:00 p.m., Eastern time,
on a business day, will be honored by CB&T by 1:00 p.m., Eastern
time, on the next succeeding business day.  Conforming draws under
the CLOC for the payment of purchase price on the Bonds received
by CB&T by 12 noon, Eastern time, on a business day, will be
honored by CB&T by 3:00 p.m., Eastern time, on the same business
day.

Conforming draws under the CLOC for the payment of principal,
interest and purchase price received by the FHLB-SF by 11:30 a.m.,
California time, on a business day, will be honored by 1:30 p.m.,
California time, on the next succeeding business day.

                    Reinstatement Of Interest

Draws for interest on the LOC will be automatically reinstated at
the close of business on the sixth calendar day following the date
such drawing is honored unless the trustee receives from CB&T
prior to such time a notice stating that such reinstatement shall
not occur.  Upon the trustee's receipt of an interest non-
reinstatement notice from CB&T, the trustee shall direct a
mandatory tender in whole of the bonds on a business day no later
than the fifth calendar day following its receipt of such notice.

Draws for principal and interest on the CLOC will not be
reinstated.

       Events of Default Under The Reimbursement Agreement

CB&T has the right, as LOC bank, to send a notice to the trustee
declaring that an event of default under the reimbursement
agreement has occurred and directing the trustee to either
accelerate the Bonds or to arrange for a mandatory tender of the
Bonds.  Upon its receipt of a notice from the LOC bank directing
that the Bonds be accelerated, the trustee shall immediately
declare the Bonds due and payable and shall draw under the LOC for
the full principal and accrued interest on the Bonds.  Interest on
the Bonds will cease to accrue on the declaration date.  Upon its
receipt of a notice from the LOC bank directing a mandatory tender
of the Bonds, the trustee shall immediately arrange for such
mandatory tender and purchase on a business day no later than the
fifth day following its receipt of the LOC bank's notice.

  Expiration/Termination of The Letter Of Credit And Confirming
                         Letter Of Credit

The LOC expires on the earliest to occur of: (i) the LOC bank's
receipt of the LOC along with a certificate from the trustee
stating that is surrendering the LOC to the bank for cancellation;
(ii) the LOC's stated expiration date, July 12, 2012; (iii) the
bank's honoring of the final drawing available under the LOC; and
(iv) 15 days following the trustee's receipt of a notice from the
LOC bank stating that an event of default under the reimbursement
agreement has occurred and directing the trustee to accelerate the
Bonds pursuant to Section 7.01 of the trust indenture.

The CLOC expires on the earliest of: (i) the CLOC's stated
expiration date, July 12, 2012; (ii) the date on which the FHLB-SF
honors any demand for payment made under the CLOC; or (iii) the
date on which the trustee surrenders the CLOC to the FHLB-SF for
cancellation.

       Substitution of The Letter Of Credit And Confirming
                        Letter Of Credit

Substitution of either the LOC or CLOC is permitted and requires a
mandatory tender of the Bonds on the effective date of any
substitute LOC or CLOC.  Any required draw for purchase price made
in connection with the substitution of the LOC or CLOC will be
made under the existing LOC, and the trustee is prohibited from
surrendering either the LOC or CLOC, as applicable, for
cancellation unless such tender draw has been honored.  The LOC
and CLOC each terminate upon their surrender by the trustee to the
respective bank for cancellation.

                        Optional Tenders

While in the weekly rate mode bondholders may optionally tender
their Bonds to the tender agent on any business day with seven
days prior notice.  Bonds so tendered will be purchased from their
owners at a price of par plus interest accrued to the purchase
date.

                       Mandatory Purchases

The Bonds are subject to mandatory tender on: (i) a business day
at least five days prior to the stated expiration date of the LOC
or CLOC; (ii) the effective date of any substitute LOC or CLOC;
(iii) a business day no later than the fifth day following the
trustee's receipt of notice from the LOC bank stating that the
interest component of the LOC will not be reinstated; (iv) a
business day not later than the fifth day following the trustee's
receipt of a notice from the LOC bank stating that an event of
default under the reimbursement agreement has occurred and
directing a mandatory tender of the Bonds; (v) any conversion date
of the Bonds to another interest rate mode; and (vi) on the
business day next succeeding the last day of a term rate period.

                      Mandatory Redemption

The Bonds are not subject to any mandatory redemption under the
terms of the trust indenture.

The most recent rating action taken on the Bonds was on April 21,
2009, when the rating on the Bonds was downgraded to Ba3/S.G.
from A2/VMIG 1.

Key Contacts:

* Underwriter: Zions First National Bank
* Trustee: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
* Remarketing Agent: Zions Bank


CAMULOS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Camulos Loan Vehicle I, Ltd.:

  -- US$31,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due
     2018 upgraded to Baa2; Previously, on March 23, 2009,
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due
     2018 upgraded to Ba2; Previously, on March 23, 2009,
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$24,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Term Notes Due 2018
     upgraded to B2; Previously, on March 23, 2009, Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$46,750,000 Class B Deferrable Senior Term Notes Due 2018
     downgraded to A1; Previously, on March 4, 2009, Aa2 Placed
     Under review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade actions on the Class C Notes,
the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes primarily result from
updated analysis indicating that the impact of revised assumptions
and modest credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio on the
ratings of these notes is not as negative as previously assessed
during Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current
conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed
during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which
included an in-depth assessment of results from Moody's
quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of deal-
specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during Stage
I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result of a
parameter-based approach (see press release dated March 4, 2009,
titled "Moody's puts all but senior-most CLO tranches on review
for downgrade").

The rating action taken on the Class B Notes reflects Moody's
revised assumptions with respect to default probability, the
calculation of the Diversity Score, and other assumptions
described in the publications "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009 ,and "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  It also reflects moderate credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio, which is observed through an increase in the
dollar amount of defaulted securities and an increase in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $14 million, accounting for roughly 2% of the
collateral balance, as of the last trustee report, dated September
25, 2009.  Based on the same report, securities from issuers rated
below B3 by Moody's or below B- by S&P make up approximately 13%
of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also notes the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Camulos Loan Vehicle I, Ltd., issued in April of 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled with the key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate that reflect all of the
aforementioned revised assumptions, and which, as a result, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers, qualitative factors
are part of rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include the structural protections in each transaction,
the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the
legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan
Trust 2007-2:

  -- US$400,000,000 Class A Asset Backed Notes due 2019 (current
     balance of 217,170,546), Downgraded to A3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B Asset Backed Deferrable Notes due 2019,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 4789 as of the
last trustee report, dated October 10, 2009.  Based on the same
report, securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 56%
of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2007-2, issued in October
2007, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-NC4 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes from Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC4 and
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC1.  Both deals are
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions backed by U.S.
subprime mortgage loan collateral.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 10 other classes from these two transactions.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for subprime
transactions rated in 2006 and 2007.  S&P derived these losses
using the criteria that S&P outlined in "Standard & Poor's Revises
U.S. Subprime And Alternative-A RMBS Loss Assumptions For
Transactions Issued In 2005, 2006, And 2007," published July 6,
2009.  In addition, S&P is updating its lifetime projected losses
for both transactions:

                                             Orig. bal.  Updated lifetime
  Transaction                                (mil. $)    exp. loss (%)
  -----------                                ----------  ----------------
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1        1,463               21.45
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC4        1,619               30.25

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings given S&P's current projected losses.  The affirmations
reflect S&P's opinion that the classes will be able to perform
under its applicable stress scenarios.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, the classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pools of loans backing these transactions consist
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that
are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

          Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC4
                       Series      2006-NC4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-3        14453MAC8     BBB-                 BBB
        A-4        14453MAD6     BBB-                 BBB
        M-1        14453MAF1     B-                   B

         Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1
                       Series      2006-NC1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-1        144531EY2     A                    AA+
        M-2        144531EZ9     BB-                  AA
        M-3        144531FA3     B-                   AA
        M-4        144531FB1     B-                   AA-
        M-5        144531FC9     CCC                  A+
        M-6        144531FD7     CCC                  BB
        M-7        144531FE5     CCC                  B
        M-8        144531FF2     CC                   B
        M-9        144531FG0     CC                   CCC
        M-10       144531FH8     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

          Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC4
                       Series      2006-NC4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        14453MAA2     AAA
                 A-2        14453MAB0     AAA
                 A-5        14453MAE4     AAA
                 M-2        14453MAG9     CCC
                 M-3        14453MAH7     CCC
                 M-4        14453MAJ3     CCC
                 M-5        14453MAK0     CCC

          Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-NC1
                       Series      2006-NC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2        144531EV8     AAA
                 A-3        144531EW6     AAA
                 A-4        144531EX4     AAA


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class M-7 Cert. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-7 commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from CBA
Commercial Assets' series 2006-2 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade of the class M-7 certificate reflects a $627,772
principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of the
security due to the liquidation of three assets that were
previously with the special servicer, Litton Loan Servicing L.P.
The most recent loss occurred on the Sept. 25, 2009, remittance
date.  The principal balance as of the Sept. 25, 2009, remittance
report was $514,228.

Details of the three assets that were liquidated are:
The 3 Wake Field Street asset had a total exposure of $255,878 and
was secured by a seven-unit, multifamily property in Webster,
Mass.  According to the Aug. 25, 2009, trustee remittance report,
the property was liquidated with a 75.9% loss severity, resulting
in a $194,224 realized loss to the trust.  The 86 Waterman Avenue
asset had a total exposure of $388,037 and was secured by a 3,307-
sq.-ft. retail property built in 1930 in North Providence, R.I.
According to the Aug. 25, 2009, trustee remittance report, the
property was liquidated with a 72.8% loss severity, resulting in a
$282,723 realized loss to the trust.

The 81 Columbus Avenue asset had a total exposure of $324,293 and
was secured by a 4,014-sq.-ft. mixed-use property built in 1920 in
Pawtucket, R.I.  According to the Sept. 25, 2009, trustee
remittance report, the property was liquidated with a 74.6% loss
severity, resulting in a $241,910 realized loss to the trust.
As of the Sept. 25, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 224 loans and three real estate owned assets with an
aggregate trust balance of $102.7 million, down from 294 loans
totaling $130.5 million at issuance.  There are currently 62 loans
totaling $32.6 million (31.8%) with the special servicer.  Three
of the assets in the pool are REO (0.5%), 38 are in foreclosure
(21.3%), 10 are 90-plus-days delinquent (6.1%), four are 60-plus-
days delinquent (0.9%), and nine are 30-plus-days delinquent
(2.5%).  To date, the trust has experienced losses on 12 loans.
Class M-7 experienced its first losses in August 2009.  The total
losses to the trust are $2.1 million, and the loans that have
incurred losses have experienced an average loss severity of
approximately 50.5%.

                         Rating Lowered

                      CBA Commercial Assets
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

                 Rating
                 ------
   Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
   -----       --          ----             ------------------
   M-7         D           CCC-                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class M-6 and M-7 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from CBA Commercial Assets' series 2006-1 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade of the class M-6 certificate reflects a $1,624,962
principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of the
security.  The principal balance as of the Sept. 25, 2009,
remittance report was $2,128,037.  The class M-7 certificate
experienced a $1,460,000 principal loss.  The current outstanding
principal balance of class M-7 has been reduced to zero.

As of the Sept. 25, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 197 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
112.7 million, down from 316 assets totaling $166.8 million at
issuance.  There are 48 assets totaling 25.2 million (22.4%) with
the special servicer, Litton Loan Servicing L.P.  Eight of the
assets in the pool are real estate owned (7.3%), 27 are in
foreclosure (9.0%), seven are 90-plus-days delinquent (1.9%), two
are 60-plus-days delinquent (0.6%), and eight are 30-plus-days
delinquent (2.6%).  To date, the trust has experienced losses on
19 loans.  The M-6 and M-7 classes first experienced losses in
April and May of 2009, respectively.  The total losses to the
trust are $4.6 million, and the loans that have incurred losses
have an average loss severity of approximately 68.2%.

                         Ratings Lowered

                      CBA Commercial Assets
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-1

                   Rating
                   ------
   Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
   -----       --          ----             ------------------
   M-6         D           CCC-                            N/A
   M-7         D           CCC-                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CHASE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2000-2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded five classes of Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp.  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2000-2.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool due to increased leverage, realized and anticipated
losses from loans in special servicing and concerns about
refinancing risk for loans approaching maturity.  Seven loans,
representing 10% of the pool, mature within the next year and have
a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.00X.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the September 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 19%
to $588.9 million from $731.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 31% of the pool.  Thirty-five loans,
representing 57% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $12.4 million realized loss (80% loss severity on
average).  Three loans, representing 2% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Highland Villas Loan ($9.4 million - 1.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 234 unit apartment complex located in Clarkston,
Georgia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2008 and became REO in February 2009.  The special
servicer has recognized a $4.3 million appraisal reduction for
this loan.  The two remaining specially serviced loans are secured
by a multifamily and retail property and are each 90+ days
delinquent.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $6.7 million
(60% loss severity on average) for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 87%
of the pool, excluding the defeased loans.  Moody's weighted
average loan to value ratio, excluding the defeased loans, is 88%
compared to 84% at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's stressed DSCR, excluding the defeased loans, is 1.31X
compared to 1.36X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 15
compared to 18 at last review.

The pool's largest non-defeased loan is the Embassy Suites
Atlanta-Buckhead Loan ($32.8 million - 5.6%), which is secured by
a 317-room full service hotel located in the Buckhead area of
Atlanta, Georgia.  Occupancy and RevPAR for full year 2008 were
75% and $111, respectively, compared to 77% and $115 at last
review.  Moody's valuation of this loan incorporates a stressed
cash flow to reflect Moody's negative outlook for the lodging
industry.  Moody's LTV and DSCR are 82% and 1.42X, respectively,
compared to 71% and 1.63X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Cross County Plaza Loan
($30.0 million -- 5.1%), which is secured by a 357,000 square
foot retail center located in West Palm Beach, Florida.  The
center was 81% occupied as of August 2009 compared to 93% at last
review.  Major tenants include Kmart (35% GLA, lease expiration
September 2018) and Winn Dixie (15%, lease expiration May 2019).
The center's increased vacancy is primary due to Linens 'N Things
vacating its space in August 2008.  The loan, which is on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low debt service coverage,
matures in January 2010.  Moody's considers the loan to be a high
maturity default risk because of its decline in performance and
the near term loan maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
116% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 89% and 1.13X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Pacific Place Loan ($23.8 million --
4.0%), which is secured by a 275,920 square foot office building
located in San Pedro, California.  The center was 95% leased as of
December 2008, the same as at last review.  The largest tenant is
Logicon (64% NRA; Moody's senior unsecured rating of parent,
Northrop Grumman Corporation, is Baa1, stable outlook) through
August 2010.  Although the property's performance has been stable,
Moody's valuation incorporates a stressed cash flow due to Moody's
concerns about near-term rollover risk.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 83% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.57X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $424,020,074, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 06/04/2008

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 06/04/2008

  -- Class B, $26,779,086, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 06/04/2008

  -- Class C, $34,166,423, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 06/04/2008

  -- Class D, $12,004,419 affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 06/04/2008

  -- Class E, $23,085,420, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded to
     Aa2 from Aa3 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class F, $12,927,835, affirmed at A2; previously upgraded to
     A2 from Baa1 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class G, $12,927,835, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     to Baa1 from Baa2 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class H, $18,468,337, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class I, $5,540,501, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class J, $7,387,334, downgraded to Caa3 from B1; previously
     affirmed at B1 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class K, $7,387,335, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 06/04/2008

  -- Class L, $3,693,667, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 06/04/2008


CITIMORTGAGE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 123 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 123 tranches from 14
transactions issued by CitiMortgage.  The collateral backing these
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, 30yr and 15yr
fixed-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.  The actions are triggered by
rapidly increasing delinquencies and mounting losses in the
underlying collateral.

In addition, for the 15yr fixed-rate sub-groups, which have small
numbers of loans and therefore may be subject to more performance
volatility, Moody's applied additional stresses in line with the
methodology applied to transactions with small pool factors and/or
small numbers of loans: First, gross defaults were determined by
applying assumed lifetime roll-rates (probabilities of transition
to default) to the transactions' current delinquency buckets
("delinquency pipeline") and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline
multiplier accounts for further possible defaults that might arise
from borrowers that are current.  The pipeline multiplier differs
for each pool based on the number of loans remaining in the pool -
greater the number of loans remaining the higher the multiplier.
The estimated defaults are subject to a floor -- a minimum
default.  The minimum default also differs based on the number
loans remaining in the pool.  The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool the higher the minimum default since each
loan represents a higher percentage of the pool.  The final
default number is then multiplied by expected loss severity to
arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Since many of these
sub-groups have a low weighted average LTV, Moody's loss severity
assumption was 35%.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated loss
expectation relative to current level of credit enhancement.
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching, and other
structural features within the Aaa waterfalls.  Some senior notes
carry higher ratings as they are associated with the better
performing sub-groups backed by 15-yr fixed-rate mortgages.  These
transactions have loss allocation limitation to the seniors which
prevents the weaker groups from depleting the credit enhancement
of the stronger performing group.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A1

* Pool current expected loss: 7% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A3

* Pool current expected loss: 10% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-14, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Sep 19, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Sep 19, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A4

* Pool current expected loss: 13% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Oct 9, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Oct 9, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on Oct 9, 2006
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A5

* Pool current expected loss: 12% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-13, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A6

* Pool current expected loss: 11% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2006-A7

* Pool current expected loss: 15% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A1

* Pool current expected loss: 16% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-12, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A3

* Pool current expected loss: 18% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-12, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A4

* Pool current expected loss: 18% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. IA-13, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-14, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A5

* Pool current expected loss: 19% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-14, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-15, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-16, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust 2007-A6

* Pool current expected loss: 19% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-22, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jul 6, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Jul 6, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust Series 2007-A7

* Pool current expected loss: 19% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Aug 7, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIIA-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Aug 7, 2007
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. IIIA-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Aug 7, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CitiMortgage Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2007-A2

* Pool current expected loss: 18% of original balance

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IA-15, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. IA-16, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 16, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 16, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.



CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-RR1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of certificates from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-
RR1, a U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.  S&P lowered
its rating on the class A-1A1 certificate to 'BBB' from 'AAA' and
on the class A-1A2 certificate to 'CCC' from 'BBB.' The downgrades
reflect significant deterioration in the performance of the loans
backing the underlying certificate.  This performance
deterioration is so severe that the credit enhancement for CMLT
2008-RR1 is insufficient to maintain the ratings on the re-REMIC
classes.

CMLT 2008-RR1, which closed in April 2008, is collateralized by
one underlying class that supports both classes within the re-
REMIC.  The loans securing the single underlying class consist
predominantly of fixed-rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

Classes A-1A1 and A-1A2 from CMLT 2008-RR1 are supported by the A-
1A class from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-OPX1 (currently
rated 'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing this trust
has declined precipitously in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 7.20% as of the September 2009 distribution,
and currently has approximately 45.58% in delinquent loans as a
percentage of the current pool balance.  Based on the losses to
date, the current pool factor of 0.7399 (73.99%), which represents
the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the original
balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current
projected loss for this pool is 23.49%, which exceeds the level of
credit enhancement available to cover losses.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                         Ratings Lowered

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2008-RR1
                          Series 2008-RR1

                                        Rating
                                        ------
       Class        CUSIP         To                   From
       -----        -----         --                   ----
       A-1A1        173145AA1     BBB                  AAA
       A-1A2        173145AB9     CCC                  BBB


CLEARWATER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Clearwater Funding CBO 99-A,
Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B Second Senior Secured Notes due 2011,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 27, 2006 Downgraded
     to B1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 1941 versus a
test level of 825 as of the last trustee report, dated
September 1, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total $1.5 million, accounting for
roughly 2% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 17.5% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of investments
in securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
These investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.
Moody's also noticed that the portfolio has a large exposure to
the emerging market securities.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO/CBO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Clearwater Funding CBO 99-1, Ltd., issued in March 1999, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CLYDESDALE CBO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Class B Notes to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Clydesdale CBO I, Ltd:

  -- US$47,000,000 (current balance of $2,795,828) Class B Senior
     Secured Notes Due 2011, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     Nov. 23, 2005 Upgraded to Ba2.

According to Moody's, the deal has delevered significantly and
there are only few assets left in the pool.  The weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and was currently
6316 versus a test level of 2720 as of the last trustee report,
dated September 18, 2009.  The underlying assets are concentrated
in one obligor, currently rated Caa.  Any material change in the
credit profile of this one obligor will have a significant impact
on the rated notes.  Moody's also noted that the deal has been
accelerated due to the occurrence of Event of Default.  The rating
action also reflects increased concerns about the uncertainty
arising from the potential liquidation of the collateral.

Moody's rating analysis incorporates certain revised assumptions
with respect to default probability.  The revised assumptions are
described in the publication, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  The
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds will be below their historical averages.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication, "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Clydesdale CBO I, Ltd., issued in March 1999, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed by a portfolio of senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COLTS 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class E to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Colts 2005-1 Ltd:

  -- US$10,568,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Notes (current balance of $5,763,020), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$25,364,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Notes (current balance of $8,903,342), Confirmed at Baa2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio, which is
observed through an increase in the dollar amount of charged-off
and delinquent securities.  Based on the latest trustee report
dated September 21, 2009, charged-off and delinquent loans
currently held in the portfolio total about $21 million,
accounting for roughly 65% of the total collateral balance.  The
rating action also considers the high high level of uncertainty in
the recovery rate and timing of the charged-off and delinquent
loans.  Further, the portfolio contains only four performing
obligors, all of which hold speculative grade rating or credit
estimates.  In its analysis, Moody's assessed the collateral
pool's high concentration risk in debt obligations of a small
number of obligors and industries, and considered the potential
impact of default of any single issuer.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

Colts 2005-1 Ltd., issued in March 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2021 (current rated
     balance of $7,479,777), Downgraded to Ba2; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of the mild credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the interest
diversion test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 3168 as of the
last trustee report, dated September 6, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $24.7 million, accounting for roughly 6.2% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
10.0% of the underlying portfolio.  The interest diversion test
was reported at 105.65% versus a test level of 106.90%.  The
downgrade action on the Combination Notes has also taken into
consideration the possibility of reduced interest being received
by preference shares as a result of the failure of the interest
diversion test.

The downgrade action taken on the Combination Notes also reflect
Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default probability
and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$21,215,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed
     at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,250,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2021, Confirmed at B3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class C and D Notes
and the rating confirmation on the Class B and E Notes have
incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the actions
reflect updated analysis indicating that the impact of these
factors on the ratings of the Class B, C, D, and E Notes is not as
negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review
in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-
level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd., issued in February of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COMMODORE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of four classes of Notes issued by Commodore CDO III, Ltd.
The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$245,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- US$83,300,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- US$16,700,000 Class A-1C First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- US$63,750,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on March 20,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca

Commodore CDO III is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage back securities
and other types of assets backed securities.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's notes that in the
case of Commodore CDO III, more than 46% of its assets have been
the subject of ratings downgrade since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  All the OC and IC tests are failing
their trigger levels and continuing to deteriorate.  Additionally,
Principal Proceeds are being used to pay a portion of the Interest
payments due on the Notes.  In the latest trustee report defaults
totaled $118,190,876 as compared to $69,002,504 of defaults as
reported in the February trustee report.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to a Missed Interest payment on the Class A-1 Note,
Class A-2 Note or Class B Note.  As provided in Article V of the
Indenture during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of
Default, certain parties to the transaction may be entitled to
direct the Trustee to take particular actions with respect to the
Collateral and the Notes, including the sale and liquidation of
the assets.  The severity of losses of certain tranches may be
different depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


CORSAIR NO 4: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $15 Mil. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Corsair (Jersey) No. 4 Limited, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Corsair (Jersey) No.  4 Limited

  -- US$15,000,000 Deferrable Fixed Rate Secured Portfolio Credit-
     Linked Notes due 2014 Notes, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     Feb. 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 360 initially to 1424, equivalent to an average
rating of the current portfolio of Ba2.  The reference portfolio
includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc., which has experienced
substantial credit migration in the past few months, and is now
rated Ca.  Since the last rating action the percent of assets
rated Caa and below has increased from 8% to 11%.  Since inception
of the transaction, the subordination of the rated tranche has
been reduced due to credit events on Washington Mutual, Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage
Association, Washington Mutual, Inc., and Delphi Corporation.
These credit events lead to a decrease of approximately 1.5% of
the subordination of the tranche.  The portfolio has the highest
industry concentrations in Retail (9%), Telecommunications (9%),
Insurance (8%), and Aerospace and Defense(4%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

-- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (14 September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-C6 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 12 classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C6.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from increased leverage, increased credit
quality dispersion and realized and anticipated losses from loans
in special servicing.

On September 3, 2009, Moody's placed eleven classes on review for
possible downgrade due to concerns about the decline in the pool's
credit quality and potential losses from specially serviced loans.
Moody's placed one additional class on review for possible
downgrade on October 15, 2009 based on additional information
received from the servicer for watchlisted and specially serviced
loans.  This action concludes Moody's review of the transaction.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the October 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$2.41 billion from $2.50 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 229 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 33% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan,
representing 5% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  Six loans, representing 2% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Fifty-two loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.  Not all loans on the
watchlist are delinquent or have significant issues.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  Eleven loans,
representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Fashion Place Loan
($143.3 million - 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 889,950
square foot regional mall (324,000 square feet of loan collateral)
owned by an affiliate of General Growth Properties and located in
Murray, Utah.  The loan was transferred to special servicing due
to GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  Moody's is
currently not estimating a loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the AIMCO Chimneys
of Oak Creek Apartments Loan ($14.6 million - 1%), which is
secured by a 388-unit multifamily property located in Kettering,
Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in January
2009 and is currently 90+ days delinquent.  The remaining nine
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of multifamily,
retail and office properties.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$36.3 million loss (55% loss severity on average) for ten of the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 89%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
conduit pool is 109% compared to 103% at last review.  In addition
to the overall increase in leverage since last review, the pool
has experienced increased credit quality dispersion.  Based on
Moody's analysis, 26% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120%
compared to 3% at last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit pool
is 0.94X compared to 0.98X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 53 compared to 54 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the One Madison
Avenue Loan ($121.0 million - 5%), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.2 million square foot office building
located in the East Midtown South submarket of Manhattan.  The
property is also encumbered by a subordinate $50.0 million B-Note.
The loan fully amortizes on a 132-month schedule and matures in
May 2016.  Credit Suisse (USA) Inc. (senior unsecured rating of
Aa1, negative outlook) is the anchor tenant, leasing approximately
95% of the net rentable area through December 31, 2020 with three
successive five-year renewal options.  The property was 99%
occupied as of June 2009 which is similar to the occupancy level
at last review.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed
DSCR are Aaa and 1.40X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 17% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 450 Park Avenue Loan ($175.0 million -
7%), which is secured by a 313,135 square foot office building
located in midtown Manhattan.  The loan is interest only for its
entire term.  The property was 71% occupied as of June 2009
compared to 94% at last review.  The property's 10,000 square foot
floor-plates have traditionally attracted high-end finance
companies.  Performance has declined due to several larger tenants
vacating early and the softening Manhattan office market.  The
loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to the decline in
occupancy and low DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 153%
and 0.60X, respectively, compared to 108% and 0.83X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Fashion Place Loan
($143.3 million - 6%), which is secured by a 889,950 square foot
regional mall (324,000 square feet of loan collateral) owned by an
affiliate of GGP and located in Murray, Utah.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing due to GGP's bankruptcy filing.
Mall shop occupancy is 96% compared to 94% at securitization.  The
mall is anchored by Nordstrom, Sears and Dillards.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 97% and 0.94X, respectively, compared to 99%
and 0.81X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the HGA Alliance - Portfolio
Loan ($78.9 million - 3%), which is secured by four multifamily
properties containing 1,030 units.  The properties are located in
Florida (3) and Nevada (1).  The loan is interest only for its
entire term.  Performance has declined due to softening market
conditions and increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 158% and 0.55X compared to 105% and 0.79X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $19,157,978, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-2FX, $135,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-2FL, $150,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-3, $195,937,000, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-4, $628,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-1-A, $527,878,547, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-M, $250,460,000, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-J, $178,452,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa; placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 10/15/2009

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; assigned Aaa on
     1/25/2006

  -- Class B, $43,830,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class C, $28,177,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class D, $18,785,000, downgraded to A3 from A1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class E, $25,046,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class F, $31,307,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class G, $31,308,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class H, $25,046,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class J, $28,176,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class K, $12,523,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba1; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class L, $12,523,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009

  -- Class M, $6,262,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3; placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 9/3/2009


CRYSTAL RIVER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of Notes issued by Crystal River CDO
2005-1, Ltd.  The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$109,750,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2046,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/17/2008 Downgraded to
     Baa3 On Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$20,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2046,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/17/2008 Downgraded to B2
     On Review for Possible Downgrade.

Crystal River CDO 2005-1, Ltd., is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a portfolio of Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities and Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities.  Of the
performing collateral in the portfolio, CMBS and RMBS are
approximately 98% and 2%, respectively, of which the majority is
from 2005 vintage.  The rating downgrade actions reflect
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through
several factors, including a decline in the average credit rating
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities rated Caa1and
below.  The ratings of approximately 60% of the underlying assets
have been downgraded since Moody's last review of the transaction
in December 2008.  The trustee reports that the WARF of the
portfolio is 5,364 as of September 30, 2009, and also reports
defaulted assets in the amount of $160.8 million.  Securities
rated Caa1 or lower comprise approximately 88.4% of the underlying
portfolio.  The Trustee also reports that the Class A/B/C/D Par
Value and Class A/B/C/D Interest Coverage Tests are currently
failing.

Moody's also notes that the rating downgrade actions are explained
by other factors.  Currently, there is a significant single
transaction concentration in the performing pool of underlying
assets.  Mezzanine tranches of two CMBS transactions, each of
which have been the subject of recent Moody's downgrade or on
review for possible downgrade rating actions and which comprise
approximately 57% and 24%, respectively, of the aggregate
performing pool balance outstanding balance.  Moody's continues to
monitor both transactions on an ongoing basis.

The actions also take into consideration the occurrence on
September 2, 2009, as reported by the Trustee, of an Event of
Default described in Section 5.01 (a) of the Indenture dated
November 30, 2005, due to a default in the payment of interest on
the Class D Notes which lasted for three business days.  As
provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence and
continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities
and the Notes, including liquidation of the Collateral..  The
liquidation of the CDO collateral may result in a probability of
repayment and a severity of loss that are inconsistent with a
Moody's investment-grade rating.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-51 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the ratings of 10 tranches
from CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-
51.  Previously, the rating as to three of the tranches, Cl. 1-A-
2A, Cl. 2-A-2A, and Cl. 3-A-B1, did not give benefit to the
sequential nature of the pay structure.  These tranches receive
more than their pro rata within their respective group, and their
ratings have been adjusted to reflect this fact.  In addition, the
earlier rating action in February 2009 for the other seven
tranches underestimated the available credit enhancement.  In this
transaction, losses are allocated to the Class A certificates;
however, some bonds have additional support from senior support
bonds, and their ratings have been adjusted accordingly.  The
ratings of all 10 tranches have also been adjusted to incorporate
Moody's updated expected losses on the transaction, to reflect
continued deterioration in performance.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-51

* Pool current expect loss: 24% of original balance

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to B3; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. 1-A-2A, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. 1-X, Upgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Upgraded to A1; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. 3-A-2A, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A-3A, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 3-A-B1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. 3-A-B2, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. 4-X, Upgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 19, 2009
     Downgraded to C

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, negative amortization, Alt-A mortgage
loans.  Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings,
level of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated
pool-level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes and confirmed the rating of one
class of notes issued by Davis Square Funding IV, Ltd.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$387,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $330,316,432), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on February 4, 2009 Downgraded to B3;

  -- US$950,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $810,854,291), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on February 4, 2009 Downgraded to B3;

  -- US$2,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $1,809,595), Confirmed at Baa1;
     previously on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Davis Square Funding IV, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities.  RMBS are approximately 79% of the underlying
portfolio of which the majority is from 2004 and 2005 vintages.
The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The ratings of approximately 48.2%
of the underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last
review of the transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reports
that the WARF of the portfolio is 624 as of October 1, 2009, and
also reports defaulted assets in the amount of $217.4 million.
Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 22.7% of the
underlying portfolio.  The trustee reports that coverage tests are
failing, including the Class A/B Overcollateralization Test.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Condition 12 of the Trust Deed dated April 6, 2005, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.  Moody's continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology and its supplements
for ABS CDOs as described in Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)


DIAMOND INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Diamond Investment Grade CDO,
Ltd.:

  -- US$29M US $29,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2014
     Notes, Downgraded to B2; previously on Oct. 30, 2003
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- US$36M US $36,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2014
     Notes, Downgraded to B2; previously on Oct. 30, 2003
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- US$20M Preference Shares, Downgraded to C; previously on
     Oct. 30, 2003 Downgraded to Ca

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and
failure of Class B Note Par Value Coverage Test.  In particular,
the weighted average rating factor has increased over the last
year and is currently 1086 versus a test level of 610 as of the
last trustee report, dated September 15, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $7.05 million, accounting for roughly 5% of the collateral
balance.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated
concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO/CBO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Diamond Investment Grade CDO, Ltd., issued in September 2000, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


EMPORIA PREFERRED: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by Emporia Preferred Funding III,
Ltd.:

  -- US$26,845,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$37,170,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,650,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,585,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at B3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating actions are primarily the result of
updated analysis incorporating certain rating stresses assumed by
Moody's and credit deterioration (discussed below), but reflect
Moody's conclusion that the impact of these factors on the ratings
of the notes is not as negative as previously assessed during
Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem
from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II
of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

Moody's rating analysis applies certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that there is mild credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio since the effective date (April 17, 2008) of
the transaction.  For example, the Class A/B Principal Coverage
Test ratio was 138.83% on the effective date but has since dropped
to 132.35% as of the last trustee report, dated September 2, 2009.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Additionally, there was an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 13.9% of the
underlying portfolio as of the last trustee report.

Emporia Preferred Funding III, Ltd., issued on March 15, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FC CBO: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class B Floating Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by FC CBO III Limited:

  -- US$37,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2011
     (current balance of $14,233,407), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on January 27, 2006 Upgraded to Ba3

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflects Moody's concerns about the insufficient collateralization
of the notes.  In particular, the Class B Par Value Test was
reported at 74.92% versus a test level of 109.7%, as reported in
the most recent trustee report dated October 8, 2009.
Additionally, there are very few assets left in the portfolio.
The currently reported Moody's Diversity Score of the underlying
collateral pool is 6, with the assets heavily concentrated in a
small number of obligors.  As such, any material change in one
obligor will have a significant impact on the rated notes.  While
the Class B Notes have delevered significantly, Moody's believes
that there is a high likelihood that the issuer will default on
its obligation to repay the current outstanding balance of the
notes at their maturity, and that such a default will result in
significant losses to holders of the notes.

FC CBO III Limited, issued November 17, 1999, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FC CBO: Moody's Junks Ratings on US$65 Mil. Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by FC CBO II Limited:

  -- US $65,000,000 (current balance of $6,260,570) Class B
     Secured Floating Rate Global Notes Due 2010, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on February 13, 2004 Downgraded to B2.

According to Moody's, the deal has delevered significantly and
there are three assets remaining in the pool.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 8304 versus a test level of 2720 as of the last trustee
report, dated October 1, 2009.  The underlying assets have
concentrated risk in several obligors, therefore, any material
change in the credit profile of any one of the obligors will have
a significant impact on the rated notes.

In addition, Moody's rating analysis applies certain revised
assumptions with respect to default probability.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO/CBO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

FC CBO II Limited, issued in March 1999, is a collateralized bond
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior unsecured
bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FLATIRON RE: Moody's Withdraws Debt Ratings on Various Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the debt ratings on
Flatiron Re Ltd. after its loans were prepaid in full earlier this
year.  The lenders did not suffer any loss of interest or
principal during the life of the transaction.  Moody's has also
withdrawn Flatiron Re's insurance financial strength rating for
business reasons.

Flatiron Re is a limited-life special purpose reinsurer
("sidecar") that provided quota share reinsurance exclusively to
Arch Reinsurance Ltd., a subsidiary of Arch Capital Group Ltd.
That reinsurance arrangement is in the process of winding down.

These ratings have been withdrawn:

* Flatiron Re Ltd. -- senior secured term loan due December 30,
  2010 at Ba1;

* Flatiron Re Ltd. -- senior secured delayed draw term loan due
  December 30, 2010 at Ba1;

* Flatiron Re Ltd. -- senior secured revolving credit facility due
  December 30, 2010 at Ba2;

* Flatiron Re Ltd. -- insurance financial strength at Baa2.

The last rating action on Flatiron Re occurred on August 24, 2006,
when Moody's assigned the ratings.


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms eight and upgrades seven classes of three
Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust transactions as part of its on going
surveillance process.

The affirmations and upgrades are a result of continued available
credit enhancement in excess of stressed remaining losses.  The
collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base case
expectations.  Currently, the securities can withstand stress
scenarios consistent with the current rating categories and still
make full payments of interest and principal in accordance with
the terms of the documents.

As before, the ratings reflect the quality of Ford Motor Credit
Co.'s retail auto loan originations, the sound financial and legal
structure of the transactions, and servicing provided by Ford
Motor Credit Co.

Fitch takes various actions on these classes of Ford Credit Auto
Owner Trust:

2006-B

  -- Class A-4 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2006-C

  -- Class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2007-B

  -- Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB'; Outlook Positive.


GCCFC 2006-RR1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 17 classes and removed from Rating
Watch Negative 16 classes issued by GCCFC 2006-RR1 as a result of
significant negative credit migration of the 2006 vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities collateral within the
portfolio.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
January 2009.  Since that time, approximately 75.7% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and an additional 23.7% were placed
on Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 79.2% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 16.3% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 3.4% and
0%, respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.

The transaction was analyzed under the 'Global Rating Criteria for
Structured Finance CDOs' using the Portfolio Credit Model.  The
credit enhancement to the class A-1 notes is consistent with the
'B' category rating loss rate generated by PCM.  Similarly, the
class A-2 notes credit enhancement is consistent with the 'CCC'
category rating loss rate.

Due to the significant collateral deterioration, all PCM rating
loss rates exceed the credit enhancement to the class B and all
other junior classes.  For these classes, Fitch relied on a
deterministic approach to assign ratings.  Given the thin tranche
size of the underlying collateral, Fitch assumed limited recovery
prospects upon default, consistent with the above referenced
criteria.

For classes B through F, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
rating and performance of the underlying collateral needed to
repay the classes in full, specifically 'CCC' rated collateral
that is not currently experiencing interest shortfalls.

For classes G through Q, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
classes' current or likely future interest-shortfalls that are
unlikely to be recouped.  As of the Sept. 22, 2009 trustee report,
5.2% of the underlying collateral is experiencing full interest
shortfalls, while 3.1% is experiencing partial interest
shortfalls.  Fitch believes the CMBS classes that are experiencing
partial interest shortfalls are likely to experience full interest
shortfalls in the near to medium term.  Moreover, the recovery
prospects for CMBS interest shortfalls are low.  Class G is
receiving current interest; however, due to Fitch's expectation of
further CMBS interest shortfalls, Fitch believes default is
probable.  Class H is currently receiving partial interest, and
classes J through Q are not receiving any current interest.  Fitch
believes that for these classes default is inevitable because
Fitch does not expect interest to recover on these classes.

The class A-1 notes were assigned a Negative Rating Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  The class A-1 notes were
also assigned a Loss Severity rating of 'LS3'.  An 'LS3' rating
indicates that a tranche has a medium risk of severe loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base case loss expectation for the collateral.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or
lower.

GCCFC 2006-RR1 is a static CMBS resecuritization, which closed
Nov. 8, 2006.  The transaction is collateralized by 74 CMBS
assets, of which 79.4% are from the 2006 vintage.  The remaining
assets are from the 2005 vintage (20.2%) and 1998 vintage (0.5%).

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and Outlooks to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $429,619,000 class A-1 downgrade to 'B/LS3' from 'BBB+';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $122,276,000 class A-2 downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $16,524,000 class B downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $9,914,000 class C downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $4,957,000 class D downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $13,219,000 class E downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $5,783,000 class F downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $14,872,000 class G downgrade to 'CC' from 'BB-';

  -- $11,567,000 class H downgrade to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $4,957,000 class J downgrade to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $6,609,000 class K downgrade to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $4,957,000 class L downgrade to 'C' from 'B';

  -- $3,305,000 class M downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $2,479,000 class N downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $3,304,000 class O downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $827,000 class P downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $1,652,000 class Q downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC'.

In addition, classes A-1 through P have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.

The ratings of all classes address the likelihood that investors
will receive full and timely payment of interest, as per the
governing documents, as well as the stated balance of principal by
the legal final maturity date.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series
2006-1:

  -- US$281,007,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Secured Notes, due
     2017 (current balance of $167,938,504), Upgraded to Aa3;
     previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to A3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-PT Floating Rate Secured Notes, due
     2017 (current balance of $12,786,595), Upgraded to Aa1;
     previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to A3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$80,753,000 Class B Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, due 2017 (current balance of
     $39,346,641), Confirmed at B1; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade actions taken on the Class A-1
and Class A-PT notes and the confirmation action taken on the
Class B notes are a result of the delevering of the transaction,
which was in part driven by mandatory sales of Required Sale
Assets ("RSA").  This feature, which is incorporated in the above
transaction, specifies general conditions under which the issuer
is required to sell the underlying loans.  Under certain market
conditions there is an increased potential for such required asset
sales, which could expose the transaction to elevated levels of
loan price volatility.  When Moody's last reviewed this
transaction on December 12, 2008, it concluded that there existed
an elevated risk of par loss due to potential mandatory asset
sales.  Moody's notes that in the current market environment the
overall improvement in credit markets has contributed to a
significant decrease in the volume of collateral subject to RSA
characterization and RSA sales since the first quarter of 2009.
As a result the current rating actions consider a reduced risk of
further asset sales.

The upgrade actions taken on the Class A-1 and Class A-PT notes
and the confirmation action taken on the Class B notes also
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability and Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$32,123,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, due 2017 (current balance of
     $15,651,829), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$37,477,000 Preferred Trust Certificates (current balance
     of $18,531,826), Downgraded to C; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class C notes and the Preferred
Trust Certificates reflect principal losses resulting from the
sale of RSAs as well as consideration for future possible
principal losses.  The cumulative loss from these sales, as
evidenced in the July 20, 2009 Payment Date Report, shows a
$602,983 principal loss for the Class C Notes, and a 100%
principal loss for the Preferred Trust Certificate.  These actions
also reflect the aforementioned Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and Diversity Score.

GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series 2006-1, issued in March 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various 2006-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series
2006-3:

  -- US$433,467,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Secured Notes, Due
     2015 (current balance of $1,345,977), Confirmed at Aa3;
     previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to Aa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$352,822,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Secured Notes, Due
     2017 (current balance $211,814,935), Confirmed at Baa1;
     previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Class A-1
and Class A-2 notes are a result of the delevering of the
transaction, which was in part driven by mandatory sales of
Required Sale Assets.  This feature, which is incorporated in the
above transaction, specifies general conditions under which the
issuer is required to sell the underlying loans.  Under certain
market conditions there is an increased potential for such
required asset sales, which could expose the transaction to
elevated levels of loan price volatility.  When Moody's reviewed
this transaction on December 12, 2008, it concluded that there
existed an elevated risk of par loss due to potential mandatory
asset sales.  Moody's notes that in the current market environment
the overall improvement in credit markets has contributed to a
significant decrease in the volume of collateral subject to RSA
characterization and RSA sales since the first quarter of 2009.
As a result the current rating actions consider a reduced risk of
further asset sales.

The confirmation actions taken on the Class A-1 and Class A-2
notes also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability and Diversity Score.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$36,826,000 Class B Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2017 (current balance of
     $22,848,878), downgraded to Ba3; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$64,695,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2017 (current balance of
     $40,140,339), downgraded to Ca; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$44,789,000 Class D Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2017 (current balance of
     $27,789,561), downgraded to C; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,431,000 Preferred Trust Certificates (current balance
     of $9,036,755), downgraded to C; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

The downgrade actions taken on the Class B, Class C, Class D, and
the Preferred Trust Certificates reflect principal losses
resulting from the sale of RSAs as well as consideration for
future possible principal losses.  The cumulative loss from these
sales, as evidenced in the July 20, 2009 Payment Date Report,
shows a $28 million principal loss for the Class C Notes, and a
100% principal loss for the Preferred Trust Certificate.  These
actions also reflect the aforementioned Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and Diversity
Score.

GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series 2006-3, issued in September 2006,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class A-2 2006-2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series
2006-2:

  -- US$291,823,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Secured Notes, Due
     2016 (current balance of $161,872,199), Upgraded to Aa2;
     previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to A2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$30,849,000 Class B Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2016 (current balance of
     $14,220,436), Confirmed at Baa1; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade action taken on the Class A-2
notes and the confirmation action taken on the Class B notes are a
result of the delevering of the transaction, which was in part
driven by mandatory sales of Required Sale Assets ("RSA").  This
feature, which is incorporated in the above transaction, specifies
general conditions under which the issuer is required to sell the
underlying loans.  Under certain market conditions there is an
increased potential for such required asset sales, which could
expose the transaction to elevated levels of loan price
volatility.  When Moody's last reviewed this transaction on
December 12, 2008, it concluded that there existed an elevated
risk of par loss due to potential mandatory asset sales.  Moody's
notes that in the current market environment the overall
improvement in credit markets has contributed to a significant
decrease in the volume of collateral subject to RSA
characterization and RSA sales since the first quarter of 2009.
As a result the current rating actions consider a reduced risk of
further asset sales.

The upgrade action taken on the Class A-2 notes and the
confirmation action taken on the Class B notes also reflect
Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default probability
and Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in
the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$56,697,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2016 (current balance of
     $26,135,565), Downgraded to B1; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$47,526,000 Class D Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes, Due 2016 (current balance of
     $21,908,017), Downgraded to Ca; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$8,337,000 Preferred Trust Certificates, Due 2016 (current
     balance of $3,921,654), Downgraded to C; previously on
     December 12, 2008 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class C notes, Class D notes,
and the Preferred Trust Certificates reflect principal losses
resulting from the sale of RSAs as well as consideration for
future possible principal losses.  The cumulative loss from these
sales, as evidenced in the July 20, 2009 Payment Date Report,
shows a $7,956,706 principal loss for the Class D notes, and a
100% principal loss for the Preferred Trust Certificate.  These
actions also reflect the aforementioned Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and Diversity
Score.

GE Commercial Loan Trust, Series 2006-2, issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GEMSTONE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of four classes of notes issued by Gemstone CDO, Ltd. The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$143,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- US$160,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2

Gemstone CDO, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities.  RMBS are approximately 75% of the underlying
portfolio of which the majority is from a 2004 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The ratings of approximately 19% of
the underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last
review of the transaction in March 2009.  The trustee reports that
the WARF of the portfolio is 1,354 as of September 30, 2009 and
also reports defaulted assets in the amount of $48.5 million.
Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 32% of the
performing portfolio.  The trustee reports that the Class C
Overcollateralization Test is currently failing.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Article V of the Indenture dated December 8, 2004, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GILLESPIE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gillespie CLO plc:

  -- EUR97,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023 (current balance of EUR94,498,011.99), Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on August 6, 2007 Assigned Aaa

  -- EUR65,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable
     Funding Multi-Currency Notes due 2023 (current balance
     approximately EUR9m, GBP23.5m and $29m), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on August 6, 2007 Assigned Aaa

  -- EUR40,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR26,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2023, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR20,700,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023 (current balance of EUR15,214,322.84), Downgraded to
     Caa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio and par
loss due to defaults.  Such credit deterioration is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Moody's Maximum Weighted Average Recovery Rate Test.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2715 versus a test level of 2564 as
of the last trustee report, dated September 1, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities total about $25 million,
accounting for roughly 9% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 8.4% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Class D overcollateralization test was
reported at 106.44%% versus a test level of 106.5%, and the Class
E overcollateralization test was reported at 100.39% versus a test
level of 102.8%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class E
Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the failure of
the Class D overcollateralization test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs").  Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain stresses with respect
to the default probabilities associated with CEs.  These
additional stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in
credit market conditions and the default rate expectations in the
current economic cycle that are higher than the historical
averages.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gillespie CLO plc, issued in August 2007, is a multicurrency
collateralized loan obligation backed by a portfolio consisting
primarily of 222.7 million EURo, 23.6 million British Pounds and
28.4 million U.S. Dollar-denominated senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2004-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C2 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from loans in special servicing and concerns about
refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the October 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $814.1
million from $933.7 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 67 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
51% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$4.8 million realized loss.  Five loans, representing 8% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest non-
performing specially serviced loan is the Turnbury Park Apartments
Loan ($15.7 million - 1.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
161-unit apartment property in Canton, Michigan.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2009 due to imminent
default and is now 30+ days delinquent.  The debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and occupancy rate as of March 2009 were 0.50x and
82% respectively.

The second largest non-performing specially serviced loan is the
Lakeside Office Building Loan ($12.5 million - 1.5%), which is
secured by a 152,600 square foot office complex located in
Phoenix, Arizona.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in October 2008 due to imminent default and is now 90+ days
delinquent.  The servicer recognized an $8.0 million appraisal
reduction on this loan in October 2009.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Class C, $10,504,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3 on
     3/27/2007

  -- Class D, $18,675,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to A1 from A2 on
     3/27/2007

  -- Class E, $12,839,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at A3 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class F, $10,504,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa1 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class G, $15,173,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa2 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class H, $14,006,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Baa3 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class J, $5,836,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba1 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class K, $5,836,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba2 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class L, $4,669,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba3 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class M, $2,334,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at B1 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class N, $3,502,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at B2 on 8/16/2004

  -- Class O, $3,501,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned at B3 on 8/16/2004


GRAMERCY REAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes from Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd., a commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation transaction.  In
addition, 13 of the lowered ratings and one additional rating
remain on CreditWatch negative.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
rating on one other class from this transaction and removed it
from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its downgrades of 20 classes of commercial mortgage-backed
securities that serve as collateral for Gramercy 2007-1.  The
securities are from 20 transactions and total $437.6 million
(39.6% of the total asset balance).  The downgrades also reflect
the transaction's exposure to two defaulted assets ($50.6 million,
4.6%).

The negative CreditWatch placements on Gramercy 2007-1 reflect
exposure to underlying CMBS assets with ratings on CreditWatch
negative ($150.7 million, 13.6%) or to assets related to CMBS
loans, such as subordinate and mezzanine loans, for which the
senior loan is held in one or more CMBS transactions with ratings
on CreditWatch negative ($105.4 million, 9.5%).

Gramercy 2007-1 has significant exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2007-C32 (class
  AJ; $40 million, 3.6%);

* GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10 (class AJ; $36.6 million,
  3.3%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-CIBC19
  (class AJ; $35 million, 3.2%);

* Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ14 (class AJ; $35 million,
  3.2%); and

* Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 (class AJ;
  $30 million, 2.7%).

According to the Sept. 30, 2009, trustee report, two loans
($50.6 million, 4.6%) in Gramercy 2007-1 have defaulted:

* The Sheraton Hotel Orlando first mortgage loan ($30 million,
  2.7%); and

* The Jewelry Center B note ($20.6 million, 1.9%).

Excluding the defaulted assets, the transaction's current asset
pool includes these:

* Forty-three CMBS classes ($796.7 million, 72%);
* Four mezzanine loans ($132.3 million, 12%);
* Three whole loans ($85.6 million, 7.7%); and
* Two B notes ($40.5 million, 3.7%).

S&P based its analysis of the transaction primarily on information
the collateral manager provided to us, as well as the Sept. 30,
2009, trustee remittance report and data on the underlying CMBS
transactions.

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on Gramercy 2007-1 in conjunction with its resolution
of the CreditWatch placements on the underlying CMBS assets and as
S&P analyze the credit characteristics of the remaining assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

               Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-2       AA-/Watch Neg        AAA/Watch Neg
          A-3       BBB/Watch Neg        AAA/Watch Neg
          B-FL      BB+/Watch Neg        AA/Watch Neg
          B-FX      BB+/Watch Neg        AA/Watch Neg
          C-FL      B+/Watch Neg         A+/Watch Neg
          C-FX      B+/Watch Neg         A+/Watch Neg
          D         B+/Watch Neg         A/Watch Neg
          E         B/Watch Neg          A-/Watch Neg
          F         B-/Watch Neg         BBB+/Watch Neg
          G-FL      CCC+/Watch Neg       BBB/Watch Neg
          G-FX      CCC+/Watch Neg       BBB/Watch Neg
          H-FL      CCC/Watch Neg        BBB-/Watch Neg
          H-FX      CCC/Watch Neg        BBB-/Watch Neg

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          J         CCC-                 BB-/Watch Neg

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          K         CCC-                 CCC-/Watch Neg

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

               Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.

                     Class     Rating
                     -----     ------
                     A-1       AAA/Watch Neg


GREENWICH 2007-RR2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 20 2007-RR2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 20 classes and removed from Rating
Watch Negative 17 classes issued by Greenwich 2007-RR2 as a result
of significant negative credit migration of the 2006 vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities collateral within the
portfolio.  A complete list of rating actions follows at the end
of this press release.

These rating actions are the result of substantial credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
January 2009.  Since that time, approximately 79.3% of the
portfolio has been downgraded, and an additional 17.7% were placed
on Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 92.9% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 17.7% has a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 13.6%
and 0%, respectively, when Fitch took its last rating action.

The transaction was analyzed under the 'Global Rating Criteria for
Structured Finance CDOs' using the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM).
The credit enhancement to the class A-1 notes is consistent with
the 'B' category rating loss rate generated by PCM.  Similarly,
the class A-2 notes credit enhancement is consistent with the
'CCC' category rating loss rate.

Due to the significant collateral deterioration, all PCM rating
loss rates exceed the credit enhancement to the class A-3 and all
other junior classes.  For these classes, Fitch relied on a
deterministic approach to assign ratings.  Given the thin tranche
size of the underlying collateral, Fitch assumed limited recovery
prospects upon default, consistent with the above referenced
criteria.

For classes A-3 through F, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
rating and performance of the underlying collateral needed to
repay the classes in full, specifically 'CCC' rated collateral
that is not currently experiencing interest shortfalls.

For classes G through Q, Fitch assigned the ratings based on the
classes' current or likely future interest-shortfalls that are
unlikely to be recouped.  As of the Sept. 22, 2009 trustee report,
2.8% of the underlying collateral is experiencing full interest
shortfalls, while 4.3% is experiencing partial interest
shortfalls.  Fitch believes the CMBS classes that are experiencing
partial interest shortfalls are likely to experience full interest
shortfalls in the near to medium term.  Moreover, the recovery
prospects for CMBS interest shortfalls are low.  Class G is
receiving current interest; however, due to Fitch's expectation of
further CMBS interest shortfalls, Fitch believes default is
probable.  Class H is currently receiving partial interest, and
classes J through Q are not receiving any current interest.  Fitch
believes that for these classes default is inevitable because
Fitch does not expect interest to recover on these classes.

The class A-1 and X (Interest-Only) notes were assigned a Negative
Rating Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative
credit migration of the underlying collateral.  The class A-1
notes were also assigned a Loss Severity rating of 'LS3'.  An
'LS3' rating indicates that a tranche has a medium risk of severe
loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche
size to the base case loss expectation for the collateral.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with probability
of default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch
does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated
'CCC' or lower.

Greenwich 2007-RR2 is a static CMBS resecuritization, which closed
in June 2007.  The transaction is collateralized by 63 CMBS
assets, of which 99.4% are from the 2006 and 2007 vintages.  The
remaining assets are from the 2005 vintage (0.6%).

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and Outlooks to these
classes as indicated:

  -- $528,721,000 class X* downgrade to 'B' from 'BBB+', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $245,000,000 class A-1FL downgrade to 'B/LS3' from 'BBB+',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $72,232,000 class A-1FX downgrade to 'B/LS3' from 'BBB+',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $79,308,000 class A-2 downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BBB-';

  -- $40,315,000 class A-3 downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $16,523,000 class B downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $6,609,000 class C downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $4,626,000 class D downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $11,235,000 class E downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $4,627,000 class F downgrade to 'CCC' from 'BB-';

  -- $11,235,000 class G downgrade to 'CC' from 'BB-';

  -- $9,253,000 class H downgrade to 'C' from 'B+';

  -- $3,965,000 class J downgrade to 'C' from 'B';

  -- $5,287,000 class K downgrade to 'C' from B-';

  -- $3,966,000 class L downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $2,643,000 class M downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $1,322,000 class N downgrade to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $3,305,000 class O downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $1,982,000 class P downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $661,000 class Q downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC'.

  * Interest-Only

In addition, classes A-1 through N have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.

The ratings on classes A-1FX through Q address the likelihood that
investors will receive timely payments of interest, per the
governing documents, as well as the aggregate outstanding amount
of principal by the stated maturity date.  The rating on the A-1FL
certificates only addresses receipt of the fixed rate coupon and
does not address whether investors will receive a floating rate
coupon.  Additionally, the rating of the class A-1FL certificates
does not address any costs associated with a floating rate swap.
The rating on the class X interest-only certificates does not
address that a security holder might fail to recover its initial
investment due to a rapid rate of principal payments (including
both voluntary and involuntary prepayments) or realized losses.


GREYLOCK SYNTHETIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006,
collateralized debt obligation transactions referencing a managed
portfolio of corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 756 from the last rating action to 1,039
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba2.
The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc
which has experienced substantial credit migration in the past few
months, and is now rated Ca.  Since inception of the transactions,
the subordination of the rated tranches has been reduced due to
credit events on Lehman Brothers Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association and Station
Casinos.  These credit events lead to a decrease of approximately
1.0% of the subordination of the tranches.  The portfolio has the
highest industry concentrations in Insurance (10.1%), Finance
(8.2%), Capital Equipment (7.8%) and Banking (6.6%).

Moody's monitors these transactions using primarily the
methodology for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

    Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The rating actions are:

Issuer: Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006

  -- Series 1 $30,000,000 Sub-Class A1-$LMS Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on February 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Series 1 $105,000,000 Sub-Class A3-$LMS Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Series 1 $87,000,000 Sub-Class A4-$L Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Series 2 $5,000,000 Sub-Class A3-$FMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Series 2 $20,000,000 Sub-Class A3A-$FMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Series 2 $51,000,000 Sub-Class A3-$LMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Series 2 $10,000,000 Sub-Class A3A-$LMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Series 2 $20,000,000 Sub-Class A3B-$LMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Series 2 $20,000,000 Sub-Class A4-$F Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Series 2 $70,000,000 Sub-Class A4-$L Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Series 2 $13,000,000 Sub-Class A6-$L Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Series 2 $16,000,000 Sub-Class B2-$L Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Series 2 $2,000,000 Sub-Class B2A-$L Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Series 2 $1,500,000 Sub-Class B2B-$L Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Series 3 EUR 15,000,000 Sub-Class A1-ELMS Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on February 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Series 4 Yen2,000,000,000 Sub-Class A3-YFMS Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Series 4 Yen2,000,000,000 Sub-Class A4-YF Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on February 11, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Series 5 $20,000,000 Sub-Class A1-$LMS Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on February 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Series 6 $100,000,000 Sub-Class A1A-$LMS Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on February 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3


GSMS 2006-CC1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-CC1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative seven classes issued by GSMS 2006-CC1 as a result of
significant negative credit migration of the commercial mortgage
backed securities collateral within the portfolio.  A complete
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

Since Fitch's last rating action in January 2009, approximately
33% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently 27% of the
portfolio is on Rating Watch Negative by at least one of the three
rating agencies.  Approximately 55.7% of the portfolio has a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade and 6.5% has a rating in the
'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 12% and 0%,
respectively, at last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  Based on this analysis, the credit
enhancement available to the class A notes is generally consistent
with the PCM rating loss rate for the 'B' rating category.
Similarly, the CE available to each of classes B through E is
generally consistent with the PCM rating loss rate for the 'CCC'
rating category.

Due to the significant collateral deterioration, all PCM rating
loss rates exceed the CE available to classes F and G.  For these
classes, Fitch compared the respective CE levels to the amount of
underlying assets considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower).
Given the high probability of default of these assets and the
expected low recoveries upon default, classes F and G have been
assigned a 'CC' rating.

The class A notes were assigned a Negative Rating Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  The class A notes were
also assigned a Loss Severity rating of 'LS2'.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for
the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating should always
be considered in conjunction with probability of default indicated
by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating
Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

GSMS 2006-CC1 is a CMBS Mezzanine Resecuritization issued in April
2006.  The transaction is collateralized by 89 CMBS assets, of
which 72.0% are from the 2004 and 2005 vintages, with the balance
from pre-2004 vintages (26.5%) and the 2006 vintage (1.5%).

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and Outlooks to these
classes, as indicated:

  -- $334,700,825 class A to 'B/LS2' from 'BBB-', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18,280,000 class B to 'CCC' from 'BB';

  -- $10,155,000 class C to 'CCC' from 'BB-';

  -- $3,554,000 class D to 'CCC' from 'BB-';

  -- $3,554,000 class E to 'CCC' from 'B+';

  -- $4,062,000 class F to 'CC' from 'B+';

  -- $3,046,000 class G to 'CC' from 'B+'.

In addition, classes A through G have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.

Fitch does not rate classes H through M.


GSMSC PASS-THROUGH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-1R Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes from GSMSC Pass-Through Trust 2008-1R.  S&P lowered its
rating on class A1 to 'B-' from 'AAA', and S&P lowered its rating
on class A2 to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificate.  This
performance deterioration is so severe that the credit enhancement
for GSMSC 2008-1R is insufficient to maintain the ratings on the
re-REMIC classes.

GSMSC 2008-1R, which closed in April 2008, is a re-securitized
real estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage
backed securities transaction, collateralized by one underlying
class that supports both classes within the re-REMIC.  The loans
securing the underlying class consist predominately of adjustable-
rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

The class A1 and A2 certificates from GSMSC 2008-1R are supported
by the class A-1 certificate from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust
2007-AR17 (currently rated 'CCC').  The performance of the loans
securing the class A-1 certificate from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan
Trust 2007-AR17 has declined precipitously in recent months.  As
of the September 2009 distribution date, this pool had experienced
losses of 6.79% and currently has approximately 50.26% in
delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool
factor of 0.8065 (80.65%), which represents the outstanding pool
balance as a proportion of the original balance, and the pipeline
of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
34.00%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to
cover losses.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                         Ratings Lowered

                 GSMSC Pass-Through Trust 2008-1R
                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A1         362528AA9     B-                   AAA
        A2         362528AB7     CCC                  AAA


HALYARD CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Halyard CBO I Limited:

  -- US$12,700,000 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2010 (current balance of $5,726,148), Downgraded to
     C; previously on October 17, 2003 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$12,700,000 Senior Subordinated Fixed Rate Notes due 2010
     (current balance of 19,209,255), Downgraded to C; previously
     on May 21, 2002 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect Moody's concerns about the insufficient collateralization
of the notes.  In particular, the Second Priority Par Value Test
was reported at 14.3% versus a test level of 104.0%, and the
Senior Subordinated Par Value Test was reported at 3.4% versus a
test level of 101.5%, as reported in the most recent trustee
report, dated September 17, 2009.  While the Second Priority Notes
have delevered significantly, Moody's believes that there is a
high likelihood that the issuer will likely default on its
obligation to repay the current outstanding balance of the notes
at their maturity, and that such a default will result in
significant losses to holders of the notes.  Moody's also notes
that the underlying portfolio consists entirely of defaulted
securities totaling about $2.7 million.  As a result, Moody's does
not expect any principal repayments to the Senior Subordinated
Notes.

Halyard CBO I Limited, issued in March of 1998, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 18 2007-CIBC18 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-CIBC18 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on three classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow its analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the subordinate
and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of several specially serviced
loans.  its analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.42x and a loan-to-value ratio of 115.7%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.81x and an LTV of
168.2%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 87.0% and 46.0%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
LTV calculations noted above exclude 16 ($157.6 million, 4.1%) of
the 19 specially serviced loans.  S&P separately estimated losses
for these loans, which are included in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that adequately support
the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed the rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its criteria review,
S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding
ratings, including the rating on the IO certificates that S&P
affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

As of the October 2009 remittance report, 19 loans
($219.4 million, 5.7%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc. A breakdown of the specially
serviced loans by payment status is: one is real estate owned
($5.3 million, 0.1%), 16 are more than 90 days delinquent
($157.1 million, 4.1%), and two are in their grace periods
($57.0 million, 1.5%).  Eleven of the specially serviced loans
have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $37.9 million.

The largest loan with the special servicer is the Crowne Plaza -
LaGuardia loan, with an exposure totaling $49.7 million (1.3%).
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on July 10, 2009,
for imminent payment default; however, the loan was current as of
the October payment date.  The reported DSC for the trailing 12
months ended June 30, 2009, was 0.66x, down from 1.39x at
issuance.  Discussions on a loan modification are in process.  The
remaining specially serviced loans have balances that individually
represent less than 0.9% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the October 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 224 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$3.85 billion, which represents approximately 98.7% of the trust
balance at issuance.  Two realized losses ($4.7 million) on a
total loan balance of $13.3 million have occurred since issuance.
The master servicer for the transaction, Capmark Finance Inc.,
provided financial information for 99.6% of the pool; 98.1% of the
financial information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.43x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.42x
and 115.7%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude 16 of the 19 specially serviced loans ($157.6 million,
4.1%), for which S&P separately estimated losses.  Capmark
provided DSC figures for 14 of these 16 loans ($147.3 million,
3.8%).  Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P calculated
a weighted average DSC of 1.07x for these 14 loans.  Fifty-three
loans (19.7%) are on Capmark's watchlist, including two of the top
10 loans.  Forty-four loans ($641.3 million, 16.6%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 31 of these loans
($387.9 million, 10.1%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.21 billion (31.3%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.48x.
Two of the top 10 loans ($212.7 million, 5.5%) appear on Capmark's
watchlist and are discussed below.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans are 1.47x and 114.4%, respectively.

The Marriott - Hilton Head Island loan is the fourth-largest loan
in the pool and the largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan
appears on the watchlist due to low DSC.  The reported DSC for the
trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2009, was 0.92x, and the year-
end 2008 DSC was 1.10x.  At issuance, the DSC was 1.37x.  DSC has
generally declined as a result of lower occupancy at the property.
The loan has a trust balance of $120.5 million (3.1%) and is
secured by a 512-room full-service hotel in Hilton Head Island,
S.C.  The sponsor of the loan is Columbia Sussex Corp., which is
also the sponsor of the Hilton - Anchorage loan discussed below.

The Hilton - Anchorage loan is the fifth-largest loan in the
pool and is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.
The loan is in its grace period and has a trust balance of
$92.2 million (2.4%).  The loan is secured by a 606-room full-
service hotel in Anchorage, Alaska.  The reported DSC for the
trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2009, was 1.02x, down from
1.25x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-CIBC18
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----           ----------------------
      A-4       A+     AAA/Watch Neg                   30.27
      A-1A      A+     AAA/Watch Neg                   30.27
      A-M       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                   20.14
      A-MFL     BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                   20.14
      A-J       BB     AAA/Watch Neg                   11.66
      B         BB-    AA/Watch Neg                     9.76
      C         B+     AA-/Watch Neg                    9.00
      D         B+     A/Watch Neg                      7.48
      E         B      A-/Watch Neg                     6.46
      F         B      BBB+/Watch Neg                   4.94
      G         B-     BBB/Watch Neg                    3.80
      H         CCC+   BB+/Watch Neg                    2.66
      J         CCC    BB/Watch Neg                     2.41
      K         CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg                    2.03
      L         CCC-   B+/Watch Neg                     1.65
      M         CCC-   B/Watch Neg                      1.40
      N         CCC-   B-/Watch Neg                     1.27
      P         CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg                   0.89

                         Ratings Affirmed

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-CIBC18
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                        30.27
            A-3       AAA                        30.27
            X         AAA                          N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Ten 2007-C3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded 20 classes of LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C3.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from loans in special servicing
and interest shortfalls.  On June 26, 2009, Moody's placed 20
classes on review for possible downgrade.  The action concludes
that review.  This action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

Classes A -- 1 through A -- 1A are affirmed based on existing key
parameters for the deal and the current estimated losses for the
loans in special servicing.  However, if the loss severity from
the specially serviced loans were to increase from Moody's current
45% estimate to 75%, Classes A-1 through A -- 1A would likely be
downgraded by one to three notches.

As of the September 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$3.231 billion from $3.232 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 117 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 53% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 2% of the
pool, have investment grade underlying ratings.  At securitization
and at last review, an additional 8 loans, representing 35% of the
pool, also had underlying ratings.  The performance of these loans
has declined since last review and they are now analyzed as part
of the conduit pool due to their increased leverage.

Nineteen loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

There have been no realized losses since securitization.  Nine
loans, representing 17% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan, the Larken
Portfolio Loan ($172.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), is secured
by 20 office, retail and industrial properties located in New
Jersey.  The loan was transferred to special servicing on May 15,
2009 due to imminent default.  The portfolio was 79% occupied as
of June 2009 compared to 99% at securitization.  The portfolio
was appraised for $88.5 million in September 2009 compared to
$215.0 million at securitization.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Bethany Phoenix
Portfolio I Loan ($164.5 million - 5.1%), which is secured by
seven multifamily properties located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2009 when the
master servicer became aware of mechanics liens against six of the
properties.  The portfolio was 72% occupied as of December 2008.
The portfolio was appraised for $109.5 million in September 2009
compared to $231.7 million at securitization.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Bethany Colorado
Portfolio Loan ($64.0 million -- 2.0%), which is secured by four
multifamily properties located in and around Colorado Springs,
Colorado.  The loan, which has the same sponsor as the Bethany
Colorado Portfolio I Loan., was transferred to special servicing
in January 2009 for imminent default.  The portfolio was appraised
for $63.2 million in September 2009 compared to $93.5 million at
securitization.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, office and retail properties.  The master servicer
has recognized appraisal reductions totaling $141.1 million on the
specially serviced loans.  Moody's estimates a $255.5 million
aggregate loss (45% loss severity on average) from the specially
serviced loans.

As a result of appraisal reductions, special servicing fees and
other trust expenses, interest shortfalls totaling $3.8 million
have affected Classes T through H.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 99% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to
value ratio for the conduit component, excluding the specially
serviced loans with anticipated losses, is 114% compared to 150%
at Moody's prior review in February 2009.  The decline in reported
leverage is due in large part to the inclusion of lower levered
loans which previously had underlying ratings in the weighted
average calculation.  The previous review was part of Moody's
first quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS
transactions.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit
component is 0.93X compared to 0.68X at last review.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 22 compared to 26 at last
review.

Two loans currently have investment grade underlying ratings.  The
315 Hudson Street Loan ($35.0 million -- 1.1%) is secured by an
office/retail property located in New York City.  Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.87,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.19 at securitization.  The 133
East 58th Street Loan ($25.0 million -- 0.8%) is also secured by
an office/retail property located in New York City.  Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.63, respectively,
compared to Aaa and 2.12 at securitization.

The largest loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
237 Park Avenue Loan ($419.6 million -- 13.0%), which is secured
by a 1.1 million square foot office building located in the Grand
Central office submarket of New York City.  The building was 98%
occupied as of June 2009, similar to securitization.  The largest
tenants are JW Thompson (23% NRA; lease expiration December 2016),
Credit Suisse (22% NRA; lease expiration October 2014) and Bear
Stearns Companies, Inc. (22% NRA; lease expiration August 2020).
Moody's NCF at securitization incorporated significant revenue
growth based on the strength of New York's office market and the
expectation that the property's cash flow would increase as leases
rolled.  The current analysis reflects a much lower level of
revenue growth due to decline in market conditions.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 60%
and 1.48X at securitization.

The second largest loan that previously had an underlying rating
is the Rosslyn Portfolio Loan ($310.0 million -- 9.6%), which is
secured by two office properties located in Arlington, Virginia.
The two properties were 98% occupied as of August 2009, similar to
securitization.  The two largest tenants are GSA (19% of NRA;
lease expiration December 2012) and Northrop Corporation (10% of
NRA; lease expiration December 2012).  Although occupancy has been
stable, performance has declined due to increased expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.20X, respectively,
compared to 63% and 1.40X at securitization.

The third largest loan that previously had an underlying rating is
the Bay Colony Corporate Center Loan ($143.9 million -- 4.5%),
which is secured by a 970,000 square foot office building located
in Waltham, Massachusetts.  The property was 83% occupied as of
June 2009 compared to 94% at securitization.  The largest tenant
is Private Healthcare Systems, Inc., which occupies 21% of NRA
through October 2010.  The decrease in occupancy has negatively
impacted property performance.  Moody's valuation incorporates a
stressed cash flow due to concerns about lease rollover risk
during the loan term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and
1.11X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.32X at securitization.

The remaining five loans that previously had underlying ratings
comprise 8% of the pool.  The loans are secured by office
properties located in Austin, Texas (four loans) and Miami,
Florida (one loan).  Three of the properties experienced a decline
in performance due to increased vacancies and operating expenses.
Moody's NCF at securitization for the other two loans, One
Congress Plaza Loan and One American Center Loan, both secured by
office properties, incorporated revenue growth that did not
materialize and is unlikely to materialize over the remaining loan
term.

The three largest conduit loans represent 12% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest conduit loan is the 100 William Street
Loan ($156.6 million -- 4.8%), which is secured by an 858,000
square foot office building located in the Insurance submarket in
New York City.  The building was 85% occupied as of July 2009
compared to 99% at securitization.  The decline in occupancy is
largely due to the September 2008 lease expiration of American
Home Assurance Corp. The largest tenant is the NYC Economic
Development, which occupies 30% of the NRA through August 2019.
The decline in occupancy has negatively impacted property
performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.77X,
respectively, compared to 121% and 0.83X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 300 West 6th Street Loan
($127.0 million -- 3.9%), which is secured by a 447,000 square
foot office building located in Austin, Texas.  The property was
87% occupied as of June 2009, similar to securitization.  The
largest tenants are Clark, Thompson & Winters, PC (22% of NRA;
lease expiration December 2016) and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
(20% of NRA; lease expiration March 2013).  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 171% and 0.58X, respectively, compared to 170%
and 0.59X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the University Mall Loan
($92.0 million -- 2.8%), which is secured by a 609,000 square
foot regional mall located South Burlington, Vermont.  The mall
is anchored by JC Penney, Sears and Kohl's.  The center was 97%
occupied as of June 2009, similar to securitization.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 152% and 0.64X, respectively, compared
to 164% and 0.59X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $5,702,192, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-1A, $894,617,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-2, $320,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-2FL, $110,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-3, $71,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $21,700,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-4, $568,338,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-4B, $100,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-4FL, $170,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 7/31/2007

  -- Class A-M, $203,379,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/29/2009

  -- Class A-MB, $100,000,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/26/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $20,000,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/26/2009

  -- Class A-J, $103,789,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/26/2009

  -- Class A-JFL, $163,000,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Aa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade 6/26/2009


  -- Class B, $32,338,000, downgraded to B2 from A1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class C, $32,338,000, downgraded to B3 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class D, $28,295,000, downgraded to Caa1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class E, $24,254,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/26/2009

  -- Class F, $28,296,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class G, $40,422,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class H, $36,380,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class J, $28,296,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class K, $32,338,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class L, $20,211,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class M, $12,127,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class N, $4,042,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class P, $8,085,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class Q, $8,084,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009

  -- Class S, $8,084,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/26/2009


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2005-C3 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 16 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C3 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from loans in special servicing, increased leverage of the
conduit component, downward credit quality migration of a number
of loans with underlying ratings and concerns about refinancing
risk associated with five-year loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  Four loans, representing 6% of the pool,
mature within the next year and have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio below 1.00X.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the September 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $1.86 billion
from $1.97 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 110 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
49% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 11% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

At securitization, ten loans, representing 54% of the pool, had
investment grade underlying ratings.  However, based on Moody's
preliminary analysis, seven of these loans, representing 29% of
the pool, have experienced declines in performance.

Twenty-eight loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Six loans, representing 2% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Estates at
Eagle Pointe ($20.4 million -- 1.1%), which is secured by a
multifamily complex located in Peru, Indiana.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $184,378,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 6/05/2007

  -- Class B, $22,125,000, currently rated Aa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa1 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class C, $19,667,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class D, $19,667,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class E, $12,292,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A1 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class F, $19,667,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class G, $14,750,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class H, $22,125,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class J, $19,667,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class K, $19,667,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class L, $7,375,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class M, $2,459,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class N, $2,458,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class CBM-1, $4,214,385, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class CBM-2, $16,500,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/05/2007

  -- Class CBM-3, $20,800,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/05/2007


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2008-1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of certificates from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-1.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in the
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
This performance deterioration is so severe that the credit
enhancement for LMT 2008-1 is insufficient to maintain S&P's
previous ratings on the re-REMIC classes.

LMT 2008-1, which closed in February 2008, is a re-securitized
real estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage
backed securities transaction, collateralized by five underlying
classes that support all of the classes within the re-REMIC.  The
loans securing the five underlying classes, which are included in
five different trusts, consist predominately of fixed- and
adjustable-rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

All classes of certificates from LMT 2008-1 are supported by class
1-A-1 from Alternative Loan Trust 2006-J5 (currently rated 'CCC'),
class A-4 from Alternative Loan Trust 2006-J8 (currently rated
'CCC'), class 2-A1 from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-6 (currently
rated 'CCC'), class A-7 from RALI Series 2006-QS16 Trust
(currently rated 'CCC'), and class 2-CB-1 from Washington Mutual
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2006-5 (currently
rated 'CCC').

The performance of the loans securing class 1-A-1 from Alternative
Loan Trust 2006-J5 has declined precipitously in recent months.
This pool had experienced losses of 3.10% as of the September 2009
distribution date and currently has approximately 36.84% in
delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool
factor of 0.6735 (67.35%), which represents the outstanding pool
balance as a proportion of the original balance, and the pipeline
of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
17.0%.

The performance of the loans securing class A-4 from Alternative
Loan Trust 2006-J8 has declined significantly in recent months as
well.  This pool had experienced losses of 2.61% as of the
September 2009 distribution date and currently has approximately
42.18% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the
current pool factor of 0.7245 (72.45%), and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
21.52%.

The performance of the loans securing class 2-A1 from Lehman
Mortgage Trust 2007-6 has also declined precipitously in recent
months.  This pool had experienced losses of 3.64% as of the
September 2009 distribution date and currently has approximately
31.98% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the
current pool factor of 0.7106 (71.06%), and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
17.04%.

The performance of the loans securing class A-7 from RALI Series
2006-QS16 Trust has also declined precipitously in recent months.
This pool had experienced losses of 4.44% as of the September 2009
distribution date and currently has approximately 34.62% in
delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool
factor of 0.6421 (64.21%), and the pipeline of delinquent loans,
S&P's current projected loss for this pool is 17.14%.

The performance of the loans securing class 2-CB-1 from Washington
Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2006-5 has
declined precipitously as well in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 2.79% as of the September 2009 distribution
date and currently has approximately 30.54% in delinquent loans.
Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.6542
(65.42%), and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current
projected loss for this pool is 9.82%.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                         Rating Actions

                  Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-1

                                        Rating
                                        ------
       Class      CUSIP         To                   From
       -----      -----         --                   ----
       A1         52519LAA6     CCC                  AAA
       A2A        52519LAB4     CCC                  AAA
       A2B        52519LAC2     CCC                  AAA
       A2C        52519LAD0     CCC                  AAA
       A2D        52519LAE8     CC                   AAA
       A2E        52519LAF5     CCC                  AAA
       A2F        52519LAG3     CC                   AAA
       A2G        52519LAH1     CCC                  AAA
       A2H        52519LAK4     CCC                  AAA
       AIO        52519LAJ7     CCC                  AAA


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Junks Rating on Class A2 Notes From 'AAA's
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class A2
from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4, a U.S. residential mortgage-
backed securities re-securitized real estate mortgage investment
conduit transaction, to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' rating on class A1.

The downgrade reflects the significant deterioration in the
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificate.
Although this performance deterioration is severe, the credit
enhancement within LMT 2008-4 is sufficient to maintain the rating
on class A1.

LMT 2008-4, which closed in June 2008, is collateralized by one
underlying class that supports both classes within the re-REMIC.
The loans securing the underlying class consists predominately of
fixed-rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.

Classes A1 and A2 from LMT 2008-4 are supported by the 2-A1 class
from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-9 (currently rated 'CCC').  The
performance of the loans securing this trust has declined
precipitously in recent months.  This pool had experienced losses
of 2.66% as of the September 2009 distribution period, and
currently has approximately 29.50% in delinquent loans.  Based on
the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.7659 (76.59%),
which represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of
the original balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's
current projected loss for this pool is 14.74%, which exceeds the
level of credit enhancement available to cover losses to class A2.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Rating Lowered

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A2         52524UAB7     CCC                  AAA

                         Rating Affirmed

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A1         52524UAA9     AAA


MARINER CDS: Moody's Junks Rating on US$175 Mil. CDO Deal
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on US$175,000,000 Mariner CDS (Ref# PYR_810RI081085), a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Mariner CDS (Ref# PYR_810RI081085)

  -- US$175,000,000 Credit Derivative Transaction Due 2012 Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 25, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 416 initially to 1928, equivalent to an average
rating of the current portfolio of Ba3.  The reference portfolio
includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc. which has experienced
substantial credit migration in the past few months, and is now
rated Ca.  Since the last rating action the percent of assets
rated Caa and below has increased from 12% to 17% and the
subordination of the rated tranche has been reduced due to the
credit event on Chemtura Corporation.  Combined with credit events
since the inception of the transaction on Glitnir Banki, Kaupthing
Bank, Landsbanki Islands, Washington Mutual, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, and
Lehman Brothers Holdings, the subordination of the tranche has
decreased by approximately 5.17%.  The portfolio has the highest
industry concentration in Finance (12%), High Tech Industries(9%),
Chemicals and Plastics (8%), and Banking (8%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

   Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (14 September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


MASTR RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Certs. to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of certificates from MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-4.
S&P lowered the rating on class A-1 to 'A+', the rating on class
A-2 to 'CCC', and the rating on class A-3 to 'CC'.  All three
classes were downgraded from 'AAA'.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificate.  This
performance deterioration is so severe that the credit enhancement
for MASTR 2008-4 is insufficient to maintain the previous ratings
on the MASTR 2008-4 classes.

MASTR 2008-4, which closed in June 2008, is a re-securitized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction, collateralized by one underlying class
that supports all of the classes within the re-REMIC.  The loans
securing the underlying class consist predominately of fixed-rate,
Alternative-A mortgage loans.

The re-REMIC classes are supported by the 1-A-2 class from RALI
Series 2006-QS6 Trust (currently rated 'CCC').  The performance of
the loans securing this trust has declined precipitously in recent
months.  This pool had experienced losses of 5.52% as of the
September 2009 distribution, and currently has approximately
32.18% in delinquent loans as a percentage of the current pool
balance.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of
0.5703 (57.03%), which represents the outstanding pool balance as
a proportion of the original balance, and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
17.27%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to
cover losses to the 1-A-2 class.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                         Ratings Lowered

                MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
           Class    CUSIP          To              From
           -----    -----          --              ----
           A-1      55292FAA5      A+              AAA
           A-2      55292FAB3      CCC             AAA
           A-3      55292FAC1      CC              AAA


MASTR RESECURITIZATION: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two 2008-3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of certificates from MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-3.
S&P lowered the rating on class A-2 to 'BB' from 'AAA' and lowered
the rating on class A-3 to 'CC' from 'AA+'.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' rating on class A-1.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
Although this performance deterioration is severe, the credit
enhancement within MASTR 2008-3 is sufficient to maintain the
rating on class A-1 because classes A-2 and A-3 provide additional
credit enhancement to class A-1.

MASTR 2008-3, which closed in May 2008, is a re-securitized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction collateralized by three underlying classes
that support the three classes within the re-REMIC.  The loans
securing the three underlying classes, which are included in three
different trusts, consist predominately of fixed-rate Alternative-
A mortgage loans.

The A-1, A-2, and A-3 classes from MASTR 2008-3 are supported by
the A-1 class from Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan Trust
2007-10CB (currently rated 'CCC'), the 2-A-1 class from
Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan Trust 2007-16CB (currently
rated 'CCC'), and the 1-A-2 class from Countrywide Home Loans
Alternative Loan Trust 2007-18CB (currently rated 'CCC').  The
performance of the loans from all three underlying transactions
has declined precipitously in recent months.

The pool of loans securing Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan
Trust 2007-10CB had experienced losses of 1.04% as of the
September 2009 distribution, and currently has approximately
24.50% in delinquent loans as a percentage of the current pool
balance.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of
0.7615 (76.15%), which represents the outstanding pool balance as
a proportion of the original balance, and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
13.04%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to
cover losses to the class A-1 underlying certificate.

The pool of loans securing Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan
Trust 2007-16CB had experienced losses of 0.83% as of the
September 2009 distribution, and currently has approximately
23.71% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the
current pool factor of 0.7767 (77.67%), and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
12.26%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to
cover losses to the class 2-A-1 underlying certificate.

The pool of loans securing Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan
Trust 2007-18CB had experienced losses of 0.58% as of the
September 2009 distribution, and currently has approximately
18.94% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to date, the
current pool factor of 0.8086 (80.86%), and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
8.24%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to
cover losses to the class 1-A-2 underlying certificate.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the housing
market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                         Ratings Lowered

                MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        57643EAB8     BB                   AAA
        A-3        57643EAC6     CC                   AA+

                          Rating Affirmed

               MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        57643EAA0     AAA


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-CIP1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 11 classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIP1.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from loans in special servicing,
increased pool leverage, increased credit quality dispersion and
refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity.
Thirteen loans, representing 26% of the pool mature within the
next 12 months.  Eight of these loans, representing 23% of the
pool, have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below
1.00X.

Classes A-1 through A-M are affirmed based on existing key
parameters for the deal and the current estimated losses for the
loans in special servicing and expected losses for the balance of
the pool.  However, if Moody's estimated losses were to increase
by an additional $83.4 million (4% of the current outstanding
balance), the A-M class would likely be downgraded by one to three
notches.

On July 30, 2009, Moody's placed 11 classes on review for possible
downgrade due to concerns about the decline in the pool's credit
quality and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  This
action concludes that review.  The action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the October 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 3% to
$1.9 billion from $2.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 135 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased
loans representing 33% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans
with investment grade underlying ratings, representing 9% of the
pool.  Nineteen loans, representing 9% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-one loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.  Six
loans, representing 14% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Glenbrook
Square Mall Loan ($175.6 million -- 8.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 1.2 million square foot (873,230 square feet of
collateral) regional mall in Fort Wayne, Indiana that is owned by
an affiliate of General Growth Properties.  This loan was
transferred to special servicing after GGP's bankruptcy filing on
April 16, 2009.  The mall is anchored by Macy's, JC Penney and
Sears.  In-line occupancy was 92% as of April 2009 compared to 90%
at securitization.  Moody's is not currently anticipating a loss
from this loan, however, Moody's are concerned about the decline
in performance since securitization.  Further performance declines
could result in losses for this loan.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of retail (2), hotel, mixed use and industrial properties.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $37.0 million loss (48% loss
severity on average) from these specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 96%
of the pool, excluding the defeased loans.  Moody's weighted
average loan to value ratio for the conduit component is 107%
compared to 101% at Moody's prior full review.  In addition to the
increase in overall leverage since last review, the pool has
experienced increased credit quality dispersion.  Based on Moody's
analysis, 35% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to
2% at last review.

Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.01X, essentially the same as at last
review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 32, the same as at last
review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is The Westchester Loan
($100.0 million -- 5.0%), which is a pari passu interest in a
$300.0 million mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by the
borrower's interest in an 832,000 square foot regional mall
located in White Plains, New York.  The mall is anchored by
Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus.  The in-line space was 95% occupied
as of March 2009, essentially the same as at last review.
Performance has improved due to increased rental revenues.  The
loan matures in June 2010.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.33X, respectively, compared to A3 and
1.28X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the E Walk on
New 42nd Street Loan ($77.5 million -- 3.9%), which is secured by
a leasehold interest in a 177,000 square foot theater-anchored
retail center located on 42nd Street in New York City.
Performance has been stable.  Moody's current underlying rating
and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.36X, respectively, compared to
Baa2 and 1.22X at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 14% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Highwoods Portfolio Loan
($160.0 million -- 8.0%), which is secured by a pool of 33 office
buildings located in Tampa, Florida (64%) and Charlotte, North
Carolina (36%).  The portfolio totals 2.0 million square feet.
The loan is interest only for its entire term.  The portfolio was
71% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 83% at last review.
Performance has declined due to the decrease in occupancy.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.75X, respectively,
compared to 105% and 0.97X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the U-Haul Self-Storage
Portfolio Loan ($77.1 million -- 3.9%), which is secured by a
pool of 50 U-Haul Self Storage facilities located throughout 26
states.  The largest state concentrations are New York (20%),
Texas (11%) and Pennsylvania (8%).  The facilities contain a total
of 1.1 million square feet.  The portfolio was 83% occupied as of
December 2008 compared to 88% at last review.  Despite the decline
in occupancy, performance has improved due to higher rental
revenues and stable expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
77% and 1.37X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.28X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Residence Inn Hotel
Portfolio Loan ($50.2 million -- 2.5%), which is secured by four
limited service hotels located in New York, Florida and Texas.
Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
110% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 110% and 1.11X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $16,193,761, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-2, $533,800,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-3A, $157,900,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-3B, $50,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-SB, $108,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-4, $510,325,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class A-M, $205,675,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 9/20/2005

  -- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 9/20/2005

  -- Class XP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 9/20/2005

  -- Class AJ, $138,830,000, downgraded to A3 from Aaa; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class B, $43,706,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class C, $17,997,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Aa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class D, $38,564,000, downgraded to B1 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class E, $25,709,000, downgraded to B2 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class F, $33,423,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class G, $20,567,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/30/2009

  -- Class H, $25,709,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/30/2009

  -- Class J, $10,284,000 downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class K, $5,142,000, downgarded to Ca from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009

  -- Class L, $7,713,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/30/2009


MERRITT CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Merritt CLO 2005-2:

  -- US$205,404,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Secured Notes (current
     balance of $94,008,575), Upgraded to Aa1; previously on
     December 12, 2008 Downgraded to Aa2 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$69,998,000 Class B Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes (current balance of $31,448,582),
     Upgraded to Baa1; previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded
     to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,883,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
     Interest Rate Notes (current balance of $9,382,279), Upgraded
     to Ba2; previously on December 12, 2008 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$30,165,000 Preferred Trust Certificates (current balance
     of $13,877,477), Upgraded to B2; previously on December 12,
     2008 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the upgrade actions taken on the notes are a
result of the delevering of the transaction, which was in part
driven by mandatory sales of Required Sale Assets.  This feature,
which is incorporated in the above transaction, specifies general
conditions under which the issuer is required to sell the
underlying loans.  Under certain market conditions there is an
increased potential for such required asset sales, which could
expose the transaction to elevated levels of loan price
volatility.  When Moody's last reviewed this transaction on
December 12, 2008, it concluded that there existed an elevated
risk of par loss due to potential mandatory asset sales.  Moody's
notes that in the current market environment the overall
improvement in credit markets has contributed to a significant
decrease in the volume of collateral subject to RSA
characterization and RSA sales since the first quarter of 2009.
As a result the current rating actions consider a reduced risk of
further asset sales.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and Diversity Score.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Merritt CLO 2005-2, issued in September of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ML CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 1999-Putnam-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by ML CBO XXVI, Series 1999-Putnam-1:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes Due
     2011 (current balance of $26,781,548 including deferred
     interest balance of $13,082,444), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on December 11, 2002 Downgraded to Caa2.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes
reflects Moody's concerns about the insufficient collateralization
of the notes.  In particular, the Class B overcollateralization
test was reported at 44.01% versus a test level of 113.5%, as
reported in the most recent trustee report dated October 10, 2009.
While the Class B Notes have delevered, Moody's believes that
there is a high likelihood that the issuer will likely default on
its obligation to repay the current outstanding balance of the
notes (which includes the current deferred interest balance) at
their maturity, and that such a default will result in significant
losses to holders of the notes.

ML CBO XXVI, Series 1999-Putnam-1, issued in June of 1999, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2001-3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of Notes issued by North Street Referenced
Linked Notes, 2001-3 Trust.  The Notes affected by the rating
action are:

  -- US$100,000,000 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on 4/10/2009 Downgraded to B1

North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2001-3 Trust is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation that references primarily a
portfolio of collateralized debt obligations, commercial mortgage
back securities and other types of asset-backed securities.

The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the reference portfolio.  Moody's notes that in the
case of North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2001-3, more than
$151MM of the assets comprising the reference portfolio have been
the subject of ratings downgrade since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  The trustee is currently reporting a
WARF of 318 as compared to a WARF of 198 reported in March by the
Trustee.  Additionally, a credit event was determined on June 1,
2009 with regard to a $9.9MM RMBS security, thereby eroding the
tranches subordination level.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


NORTH STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-3A Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of Notes issued by North Street Referenced
Linked Notes, 2002-3A Limited.  The Notes affected by the rating
action are:

  -- US$100,000,000 Floating Rate Notes Due 2031, Downgraded to
     Ba2, Previously on 4/30/2009 Downgraded to Aa3

North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2002-3A is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation that references primarily a
portfolio of collateralized debt obligations, commercial mortgage
back securities and other types of asset-backed securities.

The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the reference portfolio.  Moody's notes that in the
case of North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2002-3A, more than
$151MM of the reference pool has been the subject of ratings
downgrades since Moody's last review of the transaction in April
2009.  The trustee is currently reporting a WARF of 318 as
compared to a WARF of 198 reported in March by the Trustee.
Additionally, a credit event was declared on June 1, 2009 with
respect to a $9.9MM RMBS security, thereby eroding the tranche
subordination level.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


OAK HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners IV,
Limited:

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     August 4, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$385,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on August 4, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,800,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,800,000 Class C-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$24,200,000 Class C-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C-3 Secured Deferrable Discount Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Type I Composite Notes (rated balance of
     $14,937,471), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Type II Composite Notes (rated balance of
     $3,831,164), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,700,000 Type III Composite Notes (rated balance of
     $9,314,136), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Type V Composite Notes (rated balance of
     $3,739,593), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2021 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Type IV Composite Notes Notes (rated balance of
     $10,041,102), Confirmed at Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of this class of notes:

  -- US$15,000,000 Type VI Composite Notes Notes (rated balance of
     $10,140,296), Upgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating action is primarily a result of Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes also
reflects moderate credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor) and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2482 as of the last trustee report, dated
September 1, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $17.1 million,
accounting for roughly 2.8% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 5% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Oak Hill Credit Partners IV, Limited, issued in July of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OSPREY CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Osprey CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$7,500,000 Class X Notes Due January 2014 (current balance
     of $5,625,000), Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25,
     2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$184,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due April 2022
     (current balance of $178,190,649), Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to A2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$28,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due April 2022
     (current balance of $27,722,960), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2022,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2022,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class B-1L Overcollateralization
Ratio Test and Class B-2L Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2771 versus a test level of 2055 as
of the latest trustee report, dated August 31, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $19 million, accounting for roughly 6.3% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 16.3% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class B-1L
Overcollateralization Ratio Test was reported at 104.8% versus a
test level of 105% and the Class B-2L Overcollateralization Ratio
Test was reported at 92.7% versus a test level of 104%.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class B-2L Notes are
presently being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class
B-1L Overcollateralization Ratio Test.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration in mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CLO tranches are
currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry
depressed market valuations that may herald poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.  Based on the latest trustee
report, CLO Securities and Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $115.4 million,
accounting for approximately 38.4% of the collateral balance.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect the increased risk of an event of
default due to a failure to maintain the Class A
Overcollateralization Ratio greater than or equal to 95%, as
described in Section 5.1 of the Indenture, dated December 13,
2006.  Such an event of default may lead to acceleration of the
Notes and liquidation of the collateral.  As provided in Article V
of the Indenture, during the occurrence and continuance of an
Event of Default, the holders of at least 60% of the Controlling
Class, voting together as a single class, may direct the trustee
to declare the principal of all the Notes to be immediately due
and payable.  Following an acceleration of the Notes, holders of a
majority of the Class A Notes may direct the trustee to proceed
with the sale and liquidation of the collateral.  The severity of
losses to the Notes depends on the remedies exercised following an
Event of Default.  The actions take into consideration the risk of
acceleration of the Notes and liquidation of the collateral and
the resulting change of payment priority of certain classes.
Pursuant to Section 11.1(d) of the Indenture, the payment of
interest and principal to the Class X Notes and the Class A-1LB
Notes would proceed on a pro rata basis, junior to the Class A-1LA
Notes, thereby lowering the Class X Notes' payment priority in the
capital structure.  As a result of this risk, the Class X Notes
were downgraded from Aaa to A1.

Osprey CDO 2006-1 Ltd., issued on December 13, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PASADENA CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of notes issued by
Pasadena CDO, Ltd.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action in
February 2009.  Approximately 19.3% of the portfolio has been
downgraded a weighted average of 6.9 notches and 4.7% has been
upgraded a weighted average of 1.4 notches since the last review.

The rating migration in the portfolio has left approximately 31.2%
of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment
grade and 13.3% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or
lower, compared to 23.8% and 10.3%, respectively, when Fitch took
its last rating action.  The percentage of defaulted securities
per the transaction's governing documents has increased to 16.3%
of the portfolio from 9.5% during this same period.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The
class A notes are downgraded to 'BBB' due to the increased risk
within the underlying portfolio of assets.  Additionally,
principal proceeds were needed to cover interest shortfall on the
Sept. 21, 2009 distribution date because interest proceeds were
insufficient to cover the entire amount of accrued class B
interest.  This credit enhancement erosion is likely to continue
as long as the interest rate swap is out-of-the-money.

The Rating Outlook for the class A notes is revised to Negative
from Stable due to the concentration of residential mortgage-
backed securities in the portfolio, which are expected to continue
to face ratings volatility in the next one to two years.

The class A notes are also assigned a Loss Severity rating of
'LS3'.  The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'
report.  The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction
with the probability of default for tranches with a long-term
credit rating in the 'B' rating category or higher.

According to the Sept. 6, 2009 trustee report, the class B notes
are already undercollateralized, with an overcollateralization
ratio of 98.4%.  Based on the expectation that principal will
continue to be used to pay a portion of the class B interest
distribution and the credit quality of the portfolio, the class B
notes are downgraded to 'CCC' to indicate Fitch's belief that
default is a real possibility at or prior to maturity.

The class C notes are no longer receiving interest distributions
due to failing class A and class B coverage tests and are not
expected to receive any distributions in the future.  The class C
notes are downgraded to 'C' to indicate Fitch's belief that
default is inevitable at or prior to maturity.

Pasadena is a structured finance collateralized debt obligation
that closed on June 21, 2002 and is managed by Western Asset
Management Co.  The portfolio is composed of RMBS (56.5%), asset-
backed securities (28.7%), commercial mortgage-backed securities
(12.5%), SF CDOs (1.2) and corporate bonds (1.1%).

Fitch has downgraded, revised Outlooks, and assigned LS ratings to
these classes of Pasadena CDO, Ltd. as indicated:

  -- $138,515,881 class A to 'BBB/LS3' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $66,500,000 class B to 'CCC' from 'BB-';

  -- $26,500,000 class C to 'C' from 'CC'.


PERITUS I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Peritus I CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class X Deferrable Amortizing Fixed Rate Notes
     Due May 24, 2015 (current balance of $10,483,270), Downgraded
     to Ba3; previously on January 16, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     May 24, 2015, Downgraded to B1; previously on January 16,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$64,000,000 Class C Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due May 24,
     2015 (current balance of $55,256,544), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on January 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class A overcollateralization test.  In particular, based on the
last trustee report dated September 15, 2009, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total $19.0 million, accounting
for roughly 6.25% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower by Moody's or CCC+ or lower by S&P (including
defaulted securities) make up approximately 26.6% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Class A overcollateralization ratio was
reported at 130.18% versus a test level of 135.08%.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO and CBO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Peritus I CDO Ltd., issued on May 24, 2005, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PHILADELPHIA HOSPITAL: S&P Junks Ratings on 1997A Revenue Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Philadelphia Hospital and Higher Education Facilities Authority,
Pa.'s FHA-insured mortgage hospital revenue bonds (North
Philadelphia Health System) series 1997A to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.

The rating on the FHA-insured bonds reflects S&P's assessment of
the processes and procedures set forth in both bond documents and
HUD regulations.  In S&P's view, neither the trustee nor the
authority has acted in accordance with the documents.


PHILADELPHIA HOSPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Rating on 1997A Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC' rating on
Philadelphia Hospital and Higher Education Facilities Authority,
Pennsylvania's FHA-Insured mortgage hospital revenue bonds (North
Philadelphia Health System) series 1997A.


PHOENIX CDO: Moody's Junks Ratings on US$31 Mil. Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Phoenix CDO, Limited:

  -- US$31,000,000 Class II Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2011 (current balance of $4,863,077), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on September 2, 2008 Upgraded to Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes
reflects Moody's concerns about the insufficient collateralization
of the notes.  In particular, the Senior Par Value Test was
reported at 98.2% versus a test level of 124% as of the last
trustee report dated September 23, 2009.  In addition, the Senior
Interest Coverage Test was reported at 86.14% versus a test level
of 144.5%.  Moody's notes that due to the insufficient interest
coverage on the Class II Notes principal proceeds could be
potentially used for payment of the current interest on the notes
in the future.

Moody's rating analysis incorporates certain revised assumptions
with respect to default probability.  The revised assumptions are
described in the publication, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  The
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds will be below their historical averages.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication, "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Phoenix CDO, Limited, issued in March of 1999, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PLAINFIELD HOUSING: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1993A Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Plainfield Housing Finance Corp., New Jersey's Section 8 housing
revenue refunding bonds (Liberty Village Apartments) series 1993A
and 1993B to 'BB' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook remains stable.

In S&P's view, the downgrade reflects these weaknesses: sharp drop
in debt service coverage ratio to 1.02x maximum annual debt
service (MADS) based on 2008 audited financial statements; no
rental increase received by the project since 1999; steep rise in
expenses leading to deterioration in the expense ratio; and
contract rent above fair market rent decreasing the possibility of
receiving future rental increases.

However, the above weaknesses are mitigated, in S&P's opinion, by
good real estate assessment center score of 83; debt service
reserve fund funded at more than MADS; and good demand at the
property as indicated by 256 families on the waiting list.

"In S&P's opinion, the stable outlook reflects sound operating
performance of the property commensurate with the current rating,
as evident by good demand at the property, adequate reserves, and
good condition of the property," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Renee Berson.

Liberty Village Apartments is a 96-unit garden style complex
located in Plainfield, N.J.


RAHWAY HOSPITAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on 1998 Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 rating on Rahway
Hospital's (NJ) outstanding Series 1998 bonds ($14.9 million).
The outlook has been revised to stable from positive due to the
decline in operating performance through eight months of fiscal
year 2009 but with expectations of stabilized operating
performance by fiscal year end 2009, although lower than FY 2008
results.

Legal Security: Series 1998 bonds are secured by a gross revenue
pledge of Rahway Hospital.  The Series 2003 bonds ($11 million)
are backed by a Letter of Credit from Wachovia and rated
Aa2/VMIG1.  The Letter of Credit expires August 2010.

Interest Rate Derivatives: Floating-to-floating rate swap with
Wachovia Bank based on $11 million notional amount; expires 2010;
management reports that there are no collateral requirements.

                            Strengths

* Legal affiliation with A2-rated Robert Wood Johnson University
  Hospital (New Brunswick) which has aided Rahway with its
  financial and strategic planning efforts

* Good liquidity level at Ba-rating level through eight months of
  FY 2008 with $29.7million in unrestricted cash and investments \
  (82.7 days cash on hand) although down from $32.2 million (91.7
  days cash on hand) at FYE 2008

* Good leverage position as of August 31, 2009, with cash to debt
  of 122.7% which is above median levels; cash to puttable debt is
  293%

                           Challenges

* Decline in operating performance through eight months FY 2009
  with an operating income of $39 thousand (0.0% operating margin)
  and operating cash flow of $4.0 million (4.4% operating cash
  flow margin) compared to an operating income of $2.9 million
  (3.3% operating margin) and operating cash flow of $7.2 million
  (8.0% operating cash flow margin) during the same period last
  year driven by declines in volume and increases in pension
  expense and physician on-call expenses

* High reliance on Medicare, 59% of revenues, one of the highest
  in Moody's portfolio

* Location in fragmented market of Union and Middlesex counties
  with other sizable community hospitals providing a wider array
  of services than Rahway; stagnant and aging population
  demographics in Rahway's primary service area

* High age of plant (19.5 years) due to low level of capital
  spending the last several years ($4.4 million in FY 2008) due in
  part to liquidity pressures related to required pension
  contributions of approximately $12 million during the last three
  fiscal years

* Material decline in pension funding level (66%) at FYE 2008 due
  to declines in equity market that began the fourth quarter of FY
  2008

                   Recent Developments/Results

The revision of the outlook to stable from positive reflects the
downturn in recent financial performance.  Through eight months of
FY 2009 ended August 31, 2009, operating performance has declined
materially year over year with breakeven operating income (0.0%
operating margin) and operating cash flow of $4.0 million (4.4%
operating cash flow margin) compared to an operating income of
$2.9 million (3.3% operating margin) and operating cash flow of
$7.2 million (8.0% operating cash flow margin).  The drop off in
performance was in part, driven by a decline in patient volumes.
Admissions declined 10.6% and outpatient surgeries declined 16%.
According to management, the decline was attributed to the current
recession and the loss of a surgeon.  In addition to flat revenue
growth, expense growth was exacerbated with the rise in pension
expense to $3 million from $179 thousand and $1 million in
additional expenses driven by costs associated with on-call
surgeons.

As a result, management positions were frozen, open positions are
now closely monitored for necessity, and management is exploring
expense saving opportunities with the help of Robert Wood Johnson
University Hospital including the evaluation of a new group
purchasing organization.  In an effort to reverse volume trends,
management recently opened a new joint replacement center with a
local orthopedic group and is looking to expand its ambulatory
presence in its service area with the construction of a new
ambulatory care center.  Management projects that by fiscal year
end 2009, operating performance should improve to an operating
income of $655 thousand (0.5% operating margin) and operating cash
flow of $6.5 million (5.5% operating cash flow margin).

The decline in financial performance follows two years of better
earnings.  After a banner year of operating performance in FY
2007, Rahway Hospital reported a second good year albeit softened
from FY 2007 levels with an operating income of $6.2 million (4.5%
operating margin) and operating cash flow of $12.0 million (8.7%
operating cash flow margin) compared to an operating income of
$8.1 million (6.3% operating margin) and $14.0 million operating
cash flow (10.9% operating cash flow margin) in FY 2007.
According to management, the softened performance was attributed
to a deterioration in payor mix with an increase in self pay
patients and a decrease in commercially-insured patients with
commercial insurance.  Despite the softening in operating
performance, debt coverage ratios remained somewhat flat with debt
to cash flow of 2.03 times and Maximum Annual Debt Service (MADS)
coverage of 4.03 times in FY 2008 compared to 1.99 times debt to
cash flow and 4.43 times MADS coverage in FY 2007.

As of August 31, 2009, liquidity has declined to $29.7 million
(82.7 days cash on hand) from $32.0 million (91.7 days) at the end
of FY 2008, due to the payment of a Medicare cost report and
capital spending.  In an effort to maintain liquidity, management
has cut capital spending in half to $3 to $4 million from a
capital budget of $7 million.  Rahway benefits from its
conservative asset allocation of its unrestricted cash which is
primarily invested in cash and cash equivalents which includes
Treasuries and has allowed liquidity to remain above its days cash
covenant of 65 days as stated in its LOC agreement with Wachovia.
However, there could be pressure on the balance sheet in the near
term as Rahway's defined benefit pension plan is currently 66%
funded and will drive an increase in pension funding requirements
in FY 2010.

In recent years, Rahway has benefited from the closure of Union
Hospital but its service area remains crowded with many other
community hospitals in Union and Middlesex counties.  The
immediate service area continues to age as evidenced by the above
average Medicare exposure (59% of revenue).  Rahway Hospital does
not have any material service niche to distinguish itself in this
market but its long-standing legal affiliation with A2 rated
Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital continues to be a credit
strength as RWJUH has aided Rahway with managed care negotiations,
information technology needs and strategic planning.  In addition,
Rahway is now looking to further leverage off of RWJUH's strengths
with the plan to utilized RWJUH's GPO.  While not legally
obligated on Rahway's debt, Moody's does not believe that RWJUH
would allow Rahway to default on a debt service payment.

                             Outlook

Moody's stable outlook reflects the expectation of stabilized
operation performance by year end following the downturn in
performance through the interim FY 2009 period.

                 What could change the rating -- UP

Material improvement in operating performance that is sustainable;
continued gains in liquidity; sustained volume gains

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

Continued decline in operating performance from current levels;
decline in liquidity; continued decline patient volumes

                          Key Indicators

Assumptions & Adjustments:

  -- Based on financial statements for Robert Wood Johnson
     University Hospital at Rahway And Affiliates

  -- First number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2007

  -- Second number reflects audit year ended December 31, 2008

  -- Investment returns normalized at 6% unless otherwise noted

* Inpatient admissions: 8,170; 8,399

* Total operating revenues: $129.0 million; $138.6 million

* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service:
  $16.0 million; $14.5 million

* Total debt outstanding: $27.9 million; $25.8 million

* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $3.6 million; $3.6 million

* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
  income: 4.43 times; 4.03 times

* Debt-to-cash flow: 1.99 times; 2.03 times

* Days cash on hand: 90.6 days; 91.7 days

* Cash-to-debt: 103.9%; 124.7%

* Operating margin: 6.3%; 4.5%

* Operating cash flow margin: 10.9%; 8.7%

Outstanding Bonds (as of December 31, 2008):

  -- Series 1998: $14.9 million outstanding; Ba2

  -- Series 2003: $11 million outstanding; LOC from Wachovia;
     Aa2/VMIG1

The last rating action was on December 22, 2008, when the bond
rating of Rahway Hospital was affirmed at Ba2 and the outlook was
revised to positive from stable.


RBSGC STRUCTURED: S&P Junks Rating on Class A2 Certs. From 'AAA'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A2 certificates from RBSGC Structured Trust Pass Through
Certificates Series 2008-A to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'AAA' rating on the class A1 certificates.

The downgrade reflects the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificate.
Although this performance deterioration is severe, the credit
enhancement within RBSGC 2008-A is sufficient to maintain the
rating on class A1.

RBSGC 2008-A, which closed in May 2008, is a re-securitized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction, collateralized by one underlying class
that supports both classes within the re-REMIC.  The loans
securing the underlying class consist predominately of interest-
only, fixed-rate, Alternative-A mortgage loans.

Classes A1 and A2 from RBSGC 2008-A are supported by the 1-A-1
class from Alternative Loan Trust 2005-50CB (currently rated
'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing this trust has
declined precipitously in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 1.04% as of the September 2009 distribution,
and currently has approximately 17.92% in delinquent loans, as a
percentage of the current balance.  Based on the losses to date,
the current pool factor of 0.6133 (61.33%), which represents the
outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the original balance,
and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss
for this pool is 4.92%, which exceeds the level of credit
enhancement available to cover losses to class 1-A-1.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Rating Lowered

RBSGC Structured Trust Pass Through Certificates, Series 2008-A
                         Series    2008-A

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A2         74928AAB7     CCC                  AAA

                          Rating Affirmed

RBSGC Structured Trust Pass Through Certificates, Series 2008-A
                         Series    2008-A

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A1         74928AAA9     AAA


RENAISSANCE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 100 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 100
securities issued by Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust from 2005
through 2007.  Additionally, Moody's has corrected and upgraded
the ratings of 21 classes within these transactions.  Each of
these deals is primarily backed by first-lien fixed- and
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgage loans.  These
actions are part of an ongoing review of subprime RMBS
transactions and reflect the corrections described above.

Each of the transactions on which Moody's has taken rating action,
with the exception of 2005-4, has a parity structure by which all
losses on the smaller, adjustable-rate loan-group are covered by
diverting principal funds which would otherwise be distributed to
the fixed-rate notes.  This structural feature effectively
subordinates the fixed rate notes to the adjustable rate notes and
had not been accounted for in Moody's earlier rating actions.  As
a result, the fixed-rate bonds are materially weaker when analyzed
in light of this feature, as they will have to bear all losses
generated by the weaker-performing adjustable rate group.  The
ratings of the fixed-rate notes have been adjusted accordingly.
Additionally, in light of the substantial enhancement provided
within this structure for the adjustable rate notes (often in
excess of 70% of the current outstanding balance), all of the
previously downgraded Class AV bonds have been upgraded back to
Aaa from current ratings ranging from Aa to Ca.

The ratings downgrades announced are also attributable to
persistent deterioration in both the level of delinquency and the
severity of loss on defaulted loans relative to Moody's prior
assumptions.  As a result of this deterioration and updated
modeling assumptions Moody's has increased its loss expectations
on all 2005 to 2007 Renaissance pools by over 30% on average.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

* Pool current expected loss: 11% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2

* Pool current expected loss: 13% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

* Pool current expected loss: 16% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

* Pool current expected loss: 18% of original balance

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

* Pool current expected loss: 20% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

* Pool current expected loss: 22% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-3

* Pool current expected loss: 24% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4

* Pool current expected loss: 27% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1

* Pool current expected loss: 27% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. AF-1A, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. AF-1B, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. AF-1Z, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-2

* Pool current expected loss: 30% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-3

* Pool current expected loss: 32% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AV-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at B1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 25, 2009
     Confirmed at Caa2


REVE SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes and Dryden XVII Credit
Default Swaps, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a managed portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating actions are:

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref.  #37585711 (DRYDEN XVII)

  -- US$25,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference Number
     37585711 (DRYDEN XVII), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref.  # (DRYDEN XVII)

  -- US$60,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference Number
     37613894 (DRYDEN XVII), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch CDS Ref.  #37613929 (Dryden XVII)

  -- US$15,000,000 UBS AG, London Branch CDS Reference Number
     37613929 (DRYDEN XVII), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-11 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 10)

  -- US$25,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes of Series 2007-1, Class B-2
     due September 20, 2014, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-1 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 11)

  -- EUR 10,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes, Series 2007-1 Class B-2 due
     September 20, 2014, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series 2007-1 (Segregated
Portfolio Series 23)

  -- US$80,000,000 Dryden XVII Notes of Series 2007-1, Class JSS
     due September 20, 2014, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 337 from the last rating action to 1,156,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba1.
The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc.
and Ambac Assurance Corporation which have experienced substantial
credit migration in the past few months, and are now rated Ca and
Caa2, respectively.  Since inception of the the transaction, the
subordination of the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit
events on, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, and
Syncora Guarantee Inc. These credit events lead to a decrease of
approximately 1.6% of the subordination of the tranches.  The
portfolio has the highest industry concentrations in Banking
(14.4%), Insurance (12.1%), Finance (10.1%), and
Telecommunications (9.2%).

Moody's monitors these transactions using primarily the
methodology for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (14 September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


RUTLAND RATED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by Rutland Rated Investments under the
Dryden XII series referred below, collateralized debt obligation
transaction referencing a managed portfolio of corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating actions taken are the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 1027 from the last rating action to 1125,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of B1.

The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc.
and Ambac Assurance Corporation which have experienced substantial
credit migration in the past few months, and are now modeled at Ca
and Caa2 respectively.  Since the last rating action on the
transactions, the subordination of the rated tranches has been
reduced due to credit events on Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.  This
credit event lead to a decrease of 0.5% of the subordination of
the tranches.  The portfolio has the highest industry
concentrations in Insurance (11.6%), Finance (11.4%), Telecom
(7.4%), Banking (6.3%) and Real Estate (6.1%).

Moody's monitors these transactions using primarily the
methodology for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

    Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (14 September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The rating actions are:

Transaction: Dryden XII

  -- US$5,000,000 Tranche A2-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- US$ 38,500,000 Tranche A3-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- US$1,000,000 Tranche A3B-$LS Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- US$ 1,000,000 Tranche A3-$FS Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- US$ 55,000,000 Tranche A4-$L Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

  -- US$ 10,000,000 Tranche A4-$F Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

  -- US$ 10,000,000 Tranche A6-$F Notes Due June 2013-1,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

Transaction: Dryden XII - IG Series 26 Synthetic CDO 2006-3

  -- Class A3-EL, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Transaction: Dryden XII Additional Issuance I

  -- Class A1A-$LS, Downgraded to B1; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

Transaction: Dryden XII Additional Issuance II

  -- Class A3C-$LS, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

Transaction: Dryden XII Additional Issuance III

  -- Class A6-$L, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

Transaction: Dryden XII Additional Issuance IV

  -- Class A4B-$L, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Class A4C-$L, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Class A4-EL, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Transaction: Dryden XII IG Synthetic CDO 2006-2

  -- Class A1A-$LS, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class A1-$LS, Downgraded to B1; previously on Feb 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2


SAPPHIRE VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Sapphire Valley CDO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$5,000,000 Class X Notes Due 2013 (current balance of
     $3,066,619), Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 25, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$418,500,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2022 (current balance
     of $403,729,541), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 25,
     2009 Downgraded to A3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$73,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to
     B1; previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2022
     (current balance of $20,187,765), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E Overcollateralization Tests.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2536 as of the latest trustee report, dated September 8,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $45 million, accounting for
roughly 8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 14% of the underlying portfolio.  The
Class A/B Overcollateralization Test was reported at 102.83%
versus a test level of 109.38%, the Class C Overcollateralization
Test was reported at 98.69% versus a test level of 106.71%, the
Class D Overcollateralization Test was reported at 94.87% versus a
test level of 104.39%, and the Class E Overcollateralization Test
was reported at 91.67% versus a test level of 102.27%.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class C Notes, Class D
Notes and Class E Notes are presently being deferred as a result
of the failure of the Class A/B, Class C and Class D
Overcollateralization Tests.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration in mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CLO tranches are
currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry
depressed market valuations that may be an indication of poor
recovery prospects in the event of default.  Based on the latest
trustee report, CLO Securities currently held in the portfolio
account for approximately 24.1% of the collateral balance.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should an Event of Default
occur and continue.  As provided in Article 5 of the Indenture,
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, the
holders of a majority of the Controlling Class may direct the
trustee to declare the principal of all the Notes to be
immediately due and payable.  Following an acceleration of the
Notes, holders of a majority of the Notes of each Class (other
than the Class X Notes) may direct the trustee to proceed with the
sale and liquidation of the collateral.  The severity of any
potential losses to the Notes may depend on the timing and choice
of these remedies following an Event of Default.  As a result of
these uncertainties, the Class X Notes were downgraded from Aaa to
Aa3.

Sapphire Valley CDO I, Ltd., issued on December 14, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2007-7 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes and
downgraded three classes of Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-7.  The downgrades are due
to increased pool leverage, increased credit quality dispersion
and refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity.
Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, mature within the next 24
months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
less than 1.0X.  Both loans are on the servicer's watchlist due to
performance issues.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the September 14, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to
$405.5 million from $427.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.

Nine loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization and
currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 72%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
conduit component is 94% compared to 91% at securitization.  In
addition to the overall increase in leverage, the pool has
experienced increased credit dispersion since securitization.
Based on Moody's analysis, 31% of the pool has a LTV in excess of
100% compared to 11% at securitization.

Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.10X compared to 1.08X at
securitization.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 31, essentially the same as
at securitization.

The top three loans represent 22% of the pool.  The largest loan
is the MTS Building Loan ($71.6 million -- 15.7% of the pool),
which is secured by two adjacent office buildings located in
Winnipeg, Manitoba.  The two properties total 275,000 square feet.
The properties were 100% occupied as of June 2009, the same as
securitization.  The largest tenant is MTS Airstream, which
occupies 89% of the net rentable area through December 2021.
Performance has declined due to increased operating expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.84X, respectively,
compared to 98% and 0.97X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Aviva Insurance Complex Loan
($41.2 million -- 9.0%), which is secured by a 438,000 square foot
mixed-use commercial complex located in Toronto, Ontario.  The
property was 80% occupied as of January 2009 compared to 100% at
securitization.  The increased vacancy is due to the September
2007 lease expiration of Pfizer Canada, which occupied 20% of the
NRA at securitization.  The decline in performance has been
partially offset by principal amortization.  The loan has
amortized 4% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 95% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at
securitization.

The third largest loan is the Festival Marketplace Loan
($16.2 million -- 3.5%), which is secured by a 208,000 square foot
enclosed community shopping center located in Stratford, Ontario.
The property was 96% occupied as of January 2009 compared to 94%
at securitization.  The property's performance has declined due to
increased operating expenses.  The loan has amortized 5% since
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.14X at securitization.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $144,891,776 affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/6/2007

  -- Class A-2, $214,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 3/6/2007

  -- Class XP, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class XC, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class B, $9,500,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned Aa2
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class C, $8,600,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned A2
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class D, $10,834,841, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned
     Baa2 on 3/6/2007

  -- Class E, $2,137,860, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
     Baa3 on 3/6/2007

  -- Class F, $3,206,791, affirmed at Ba1; previously assigned Ba1
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class G, $1,603,396, affirmed at Ba2; previously assigned Ba2
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class H, $1,603,396, affirmed at Ba3; previously assigned Ba3
     on 3/6/2007

  -- Class J, $1,068,930, downgraded to B2 from B1; previously
     assigned B1 on 3/6/2007

  -- Class K, $1,068,931, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     assigned B2 on 3/6/2007

  -- Class L, $1,603,396, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
     assigned B3 on 3/6/2007


SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes issued by Seawall SPC's series MLMT 2007-C1, 2008 CMBS CDO-
10, and MLCFC 2007-8 and removed two of them from CreditWatch
negative.  All three deals are U.S. synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

S&P's rating on the tranche from Seawall SPC's series MLMT 2007-C1
is directly linked to S&P's rating on the class A-J certificates
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2007-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction.  The ratings on the
tranches from Seawall SPC's series 2008 CMBS CDO-10 and MLCFC
2007-8 are directly linked to the rating on the class AJ
certificates from ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-8, another
U.S. CMBS transaction.

The actions follow S&P's downgrades of the related CMBS classes on
Oct. 9, 2009.

                          Rating Actions

                            Seawall SPC
   $31,062,983 series MLMT 2007-C1 class AJ floating-rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
       Class                    To             From
       -----                    --             ----
       Notes                    BB             AAA/Watch Neg

                            Seawall SPC
  $62,125,964 series 2008 CMBS CDO-10 class A floating-rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
       Class                    To             From
       -----                    --             ----
       Notes                    BBB-           BBB

                            Seawall SPC
   $31,062,982 series MLCFC 2007-8 class AJ floating-rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
       Class                    To             From
       -----                    --             ----
       Notes                    BBB-           AAA/Watch Neg


SKM-LIBERTYVIEW CBO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by SKM-Libertyview CBO I Limited:

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2011 (current
     balance of $4,854,179), Downgraded to C; previously on May
     15, 2003 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class C Fixed Rate Notes Due 2011 (current
     balance of $8,737,522), Downgraded to C; previously on May
     15, 2003 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect further declines in the overcollateralization of the Class
C notes and credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated October 5, 2009,
the Class C overcollateralization ratio was reported at 72.98%
versus a test level of 105.00%.  Based on the same report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 7735 versus a test
level of 2720.  Moody's also observes that the transaction is
exposed to a significant concentration in mezzanine and junior CBO
tranches in the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CBO
tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and
carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.  Moody's believes that the
issuer will amost be certain to default on its obligation to repay
the current outstanding balance of the notes at their maturity,
and that such a default will result in significant losses to
holders of the notes.

SKM-Libertyview CBO I Limited, issued on April 1, 1999, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SPF CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by SPF CDO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$ 250,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate First Priority
     Senior Secured Class A-1 Notes due 2019, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on January 12, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$ 245,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate First Priority
     Senior Secured Term Notes due 2019 (current balance of
     $200,487,528), Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 12,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$ 45,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Second Priority
     Senior Secured Term Notes due 2019, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 45,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Third Priority Senior
     Secured Deferrable Interest Term Notes due 2019, Downgraded
     to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 45,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Fourth Priority
     Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Term Notes due 2019


     (current balance of $33,461,325), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
are a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below, and failure of the Second and Third
Overcollateralization Ratio Tests.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 4659 versus a test level of 4230 as of the last trustee
report, dated September 16, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$119 million.  The Second Overcollateralization Ratio Test was
reported at 126.63% versus a test level of 130.41% and the Third
Overcollateralization Ratio Test was reported at 116.34% versus a
test level of 121.25%.  Additionally, interest payments on the
Class D Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Second Overcollateralization Ratio Test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 notes and Class A-2 notes are
generally paid interest and principal on a pari passu basis.
However, should an overcollateralization or interest coverage test
fail during the reinvestment period, the maximum commitment amount
of the Class A-1 notes does not get reduced by cure payments
received on the Class A-1 notes in respect of such failed tests.
In contrast, cure amounts apportioned and paid to the Class A-2
notes are applied to amortize the outstanding balance of Class A-2
notes.  Due to this unique feature and the current deal
performance (i.e., the Second and Third Overcollateralization
Tests are failing), the effective prioritization between the Class
A-1 notes and Class A-2 notes has resulted in divergent credit
profiles that Moody's views to be sufficient in driving a
difference in their respective current ratings.

SPF CDO I, Ltd., issued in January of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans and middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SPRING ROAD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Various Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Spring Road CLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021 Notes, Upgraded to A3; previously
     on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3; previously
     on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated
     Deferrable Notes Due 2021 Notes, Upgraded to Ba3; previously
     on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$38,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due 2021
     Notes, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating actions primarily result from
updated analysis incorporating certain rating stresses (discussed
below), but reflect Moody's conclusion that the impact of these
factors on the ratings of the Notes is not as negative as
previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.  Additionally, the actions consider
the positive implications of performance stabilization in several
deal collateral quality measurements over the previous year.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
time and is currently 3078, but is lower than the test level of
3683, based on the last trustee report dated September 2, 2009.
According to the same report, the overcollateralization, spread
and diversity tests are also well within their covenant levels.
The current Class A/B OC Ratio is 136.18% versus a test level of
123.25% and the current weighted average spread of the portfolio
is 4.267% versus a covenant of 3.25%.  Additionally, the
transaction is allowed a 20% bucket of securities rated Caa1 or
lower and the current reported percentage is 13.56%.  There are
two defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio, with a
total principal amount of $11.8 million, accounting for roughly
2.8% of the collateral balance.

The rating actions taken on the Notes also reflect Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-
yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Spring Road CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
loans from middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stone Tower CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$148,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due January
     29, 2020 (current balance of $126,499,169), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to A2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$37,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due January 29,
     2040, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$44,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January 29,
     2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due January 29,
     2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January 29,
     2040 (current balance of $17,435,101), Downgraded to C;
     previously on March 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class A and Class B
Overcollateralization Tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
3211 versus a test level of 1050 as of the last trustee report,
dated September 21, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$28.4 million, accounting for roughly 10.8% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
19.9% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class A
Overcollateralization Ratio was reported at 104.77% versus a test
level of 107.00%, and the Class B Overcollateralization Ratio was
reported at 79.79% versus a test level of 105.00%.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CLO tranches are
currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry
depressed market valuations that may anticipate poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Stone Tower CDO Ltd., issued in 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations and senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STRAFFORD COUNTY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on GO Bonds to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba2 from A1 Strafford
County's (NH) general obligation bond rating, affecting
approximately $21 million in outstanding parity debt.  The bonds
are secured by a general obligation unlimited tax pledge.  The
downgrade reflects the severe deterioration of the county's
financial position, lack of liquidity, and heavy reliance on cash
flow borrowing to fund operations.

The Watchlist action reflects the possibility of further downward
rating movement.  Given the deterioration of Strafford's financial
position it is not clear to Moody's that the county will continue
to benefit from continued access to the capital markets to fund
operations potentially threatening the county's ability to make
debt service payments and finance government operations.

The county's financial position has been weakened by continued
annual deficits at the county-run nursing home, the Riverside Rest
Home.  The Unrestricted Net Asset position of the nursing home
enterprise fund has declined to a substantial -$21.1 million at
fiscal year-end 2008 from -$3.9 million in 2004, despite General
Fund support ranging from $1.7 million fiscal 2004 to $9 million
in fiscal 2008.  Further, as the county has extended operating
support to the nursing home it has accumulated a sizable non-
current General Fund receivable totaling $27.5 million in fiscal
2008, the primary driver of the county's -$10.5 million (-30% of
revenues) Unreserved General Fund balance.  The receivable is
likely uncollectible, but the county has not written it off as a
loss despite the inability of the nursing home to repay it.
Additionally, over the last several years the county has seen its
net cash position (cash and investments minus operating loans)
decline to -5.3 million (-15.2% of revenues) in 2008 from $961,000
(4.4% of revenues) in 2004, with negligible available liquidity
outside of the General Fund.  While fiscal 2009 operations are
currently projected to end positively, due primarily to the
receipt of one-time federal stimulus funds and actions taken by
the county to reduce personnel related expenditures, deep
structural challenges remain, with no clear path to recovery.

Due to a constrained cash position, and the timing of property tax
receipts (one payment on December 17th), the county has continued
to rely heavily on use of tax anticipation notes (TANs) with the
county regularly issuing TANs equal to the entire amount of the
property tax levy.  Importantly, the county's levy is made whole
by its member municipalities with no history of missed payments.
During fiscal 2009 the county issued a $10 million note to fund
operations for the month of January, which was paid down with a
$19 million note in February (due 12/31).  Finally, the county
issued a $7.2 million note in April (due 12/31), following the
adoption of the county's budget in March.  The county's largest
debt service payments are due in January and July, making
continued access to the capital markets critical to fund core
county operations and pay debt service, particularly in light of
the timing of the county's coupon payments at a cash low point in
the beginning on January.  Moody's will continue to monitor the
situation closely with renewal of the Watchlist designation
possible given the sequence of note borrowing throughout the year.
The county's debt portfolio consists entirely of fixed rate
borrowing and the county has not entered into any derivative
agreements.

The last rating action with respect to Strafford County (NH) was
on June 28, 2004, when the county's A1 rating was affirmed.


TELOS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by TELOS CLO 2007-2, Ltd.:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to A1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$27,500,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class E Sixth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2022, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2022, Confirmed
     at Baa3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class D Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2022, Confirmed
     at Ba3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  As of the latest
trustee report, dated August 31, 2009, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $13.4 million,
accounting for roughly 3.4% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 17.5% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also notes that the weighted
average rating factor is 3112 based on the same report.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

TELOS CLO 2007-2, Ltd., issued in June of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


TIMBERSTAR TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
downgrade the ratings of certificates issued by TimberStar Trust
I, a securitization of approximately 900,000 acres of timberlands
located in Louisiana, Texas and ArkansasIn February 2008, iStar
Financial sold the timberlands to investor-clients of the Hancock
Timber Resource Group for $1.7 billion, including the assumption
of debt.  HTRG manages the land on behalf of its investor-
clients.The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: TimberStar Trust I, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. A, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. D, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. E, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned Baa3

  -- Cl. F, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct. 31, 2006 Assigned Ba2

The rating actions are prompted by the uncertainties regarding the
future cash flow from timber and pulp sales generated by the
timberlands, the value of the underlying timberlands and the
ability to liquidate them, if necessary, to repay the
certificates.

The weakened economy along with the slump in the construction and
packaging industries has reduced the demand for saw timber and
pulpwood.  While some rebound is expected as the economy recovers,
the extent and timing is highly uncertain.  The decline in demand
and lower prices may affect the valuation of the timberland
collateral in this transaction.  Lower valuations mean a higher
loan-to-value ratio resulting in a reduction in the amount of
credit enhancement supporting the certificates.  In addition, the
market for timberland, especially large tracts, is relatively thin
and could be quite volatile, given the economic weakness and the
likely difficulty for the potential buyers to obtain financing.

The transaction's debt service coverage ratio has been under
pressure as well.  As a result of weakened timber prices, Hancock
has been cutting a minimal amount of wood in anticipation of a
price rebound.  Consequently, it has not been generating
sufficient timber revenue to make the required interest and fee
payments, making up the difference with proceeds from land sales.
Reliance on land sales was not contemplated as a major source of
support of cash flow for the transaction in the initial rating
analysis.  While this can be seen as savvy management in light of
economic events, it is unlikely that it can be sustained in the
case of a prolonged economic slump, adding to the uncertainty
surrounding the deal's performance.

Moody's review will focus on several factors, including: (i) the
projection of stumpage prices (ii) the cap rate assumption and
(iii) the sale prices of similar tracts of timberland.


TROPIC CDO: Fitch Puts Ratings on Seven Notes on Negative Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings places seven notes issued by Tropic CDO V Ltd. on
Rating Watch Negative following notification of an offer by Trust
Preferred Solutions, LLC, to purchase up to 20 trust preferred
securities totaling $115 million for a price of $5.75 million, or
5% of the par amount.  Additionally, the TPS offer includes an
offer to the preferred shareholders in the form of a $5.75 million
consent payment to approve the sale.  Fitch is placing the notes
on Rating Watch Negative to reflect the potential impact to
Fitch's ratings if the TPS offer is accepted.  A full list of the
rating actions is included at the end of this release.

Fitch's review of section 10.3(d)(ii) of the indenture shows that
with a two-thirds vote, the preference shareholders can direct the
trustee to accept offers for securities provided that an event of
default has not occurred.  Events of default defined in the Tropic
V indenture include provisions such as failure to make payments on
notes when due; however, they do not include provisions for a
minimum senior note collateralization level.  Fitch has not been
notified that Tropic V is in default, nor is it aware of any
existing or proposed amendments to the transaction that would
change its understanding of the indenture.

Additionally, the indenture provides that an offer to purchase
securities as described in section 10.3(d)(ii) be made to all of
the holders of such class of security.  The TPS offer letter
states that other offers have been made to the holders of other
securities.  Fitch is aware of other TruPS collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) that hold the same class of security from some
of the issuers listed in the TPS offer.  However, Fitch has not
yet been notified that these other CDOs have received a similar
offer from TPS at this time.

At Fitch's last review on April 9, 2009, nine TruPS representing
$95 million were defaulted, an additional four TruPS representing
$41 million were deferring, and Fitch deemed another 21 TruPS
representing $166.5 million were at imminent risk of deferral.
The total combination of actual defaulted, deferring and imminent
risk securities represented approximately 38.5% of the Tropic V
collateral portfolio.  At the last review the weighted average
adjusted bank score for the securities subject to the TPS offer
was 3.33, which is representative of 'BB/BB-' credit quality.
This is higher than the 'BB-/B+' credit quality of the entire
portfolio at that review.  The potential removal of 15% of the
stronger performing collateral at a 95% loss would leave the CDO
notes undercollateralized by a portfolio concentrated in
underperforming TruPS securities.

As of the July 15, 2009 trustee report, all of the Tropic V
overcollateralization tests were failing the respective
performance triggers.  At the last payment period the class A-1L1,
A-1L2 and A-1LB notes (class A-1 notes) received full interest
payments.  Additionally, the class A-1L1 and A-1L2 notes received
approximately $1 million of remaining proceeds as OC redemptions
of principal resulting from the senior OC test failure.  In July,
the senior OC test was at 115.19% compared to a trigger of
127.00%.  Fitch projects that if the TPS offer is accepted then
the senior OC test will drop to approximately 94% indicating the
three classes of A-1L notes would be undercollateralized by this
action.  Additionally, Fitch projects the loss of approximately
$957,300 of interest proceeds from these securities each quarter
if this offer is accepted.

At the July distribution date the interest proceeds from the TruPS
subject to the TPS Offer and the amount of excess interest to
service the class A-1 notes both totaled approximately $1 million.
If the offer is accepted in its entirety, Fitch expects the class
A-1 notes would likely receive interest at the next payment date,
as the $5.75 million principal payment would be available to pay
interest.  However, in subsequent payment dates there is a real
possibility that interest proceeds would be insufficient to pay
the trust expenses and interest on the class A-1 notes.  If the
class A-1 notes do not receive full interest payments when due, an
Event of Default would occur and Fitch will downgrade the A-1
notes to 'D'.

Fitch will resolve the Rating Watch status of the notes pending
the outcome of the TPS offer.  Should the offer be accepted in
full, it is likely all the ratings on the notes would be
downgraded to distressed levels of 'CCC' or lower.

Fitch has placed these CDO notes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $210,807,686 Class A-1L1 'A';
  -- $212,479,016 Class A-1L2 'BBB';
  -- $94,000,000 Class A-1LB 'B';
  -- $51,000,000 Class A-2L 'CCC';
  -- $62,000,000 Class A-3L 'CC';
  -- $45,000,000 Class A-3F 'CC';
  -- $50,000,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

In addition, the $8,000,000 Class B-2L remains at 'C'.


TROPIC CDO: Fitch Puts Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed various notes issued by Tropic CDO I,
Tropic CDO II, Tropic CDO III, Tropic CDO IV, Soloso CDO 2005-1
and 2007-1 (the collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs) on
Rating Watch Negative.  Fitch's rating actions follow notification
of an offer by Trust Preferred Solutions, LLC, to purchase certain
collateral debt securities in each of the six CDOs totaling
$355.8 million for a price of $17.8 million in aggregate, or 5% of
the par amount.  Additionally, TPS has offered the preferred
shareholders a consent payment equal to 5% of the par amount of
each security.

A similar offer was made by TPS in connection with Tropic CDO V
for $115 million of collateral debt securities for $5.75 million
with a $5.75 million consent payment.  On Oct. 19, 2009, Fitch
placed seven notes of Tropic V on Rating Watch Negative.  In
connection with the actions, Fitch is placing 34 of the 38 notes
issued from these six CDOs on Rating Watch Negative to reflect the
potential impact to Fitch's ratings if the TPS offer is accepted.

Fitch will resolve the Rating Watch Negative status of the notes
pending the outcome of the TPS offer.  Should the offer be
accepted in full, it is likely that the ratings for a number of
tranches in the CDOs will be downgraded to distressed levels of
'CCC' or lower.  This rating commentary summarizes the key
factors, on a CDO-specific basis that support Fitch's rating
actions on the six affected CDOs:

Tropic CDO I, Ltd., experienced one default, six deferrals and
nine securities were deemed at imminent risk of deferral at
Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total combination of
actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk securities totaled
$104.4 million, or 37.3% of the portfolio.  The weighted average
adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.68, which is representative
of 'B' credit quality.  This is significantly lower than the 2.90
('BBB-/BB+') credit quality of portfolio securities subject to the
TPS offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Tropic I was passing
its senior overcollateralization and interest coverage test
triggers at 126.5% and 193.9%, respectively.  Fitch projects that
if the TPS offer is accepted in full, the OC test will fall to
92.2% indicating that the A-1L, A-2L, and A-3L classes of notes
will be undercollateralized.  Additionally, Fitch projects the
loss of approximately $388,186 of interest proceeds from these
securities each quarter.  Should this offer be accepted in full,
the A-2L notes are expected to remain investment grade, the A-3L
notes are expected to be downgraded to below investment grade,
with the remainder of the notes expected to be downgraded to
distressed rating categories.

Fitch has placed these notes from Tropic I on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$90,000,000 Class A-2L 'AA';
  -- US$42,000,000 Class A-3L 'BBB';
  -- US$48,000,000 Class A-4L 'CC';
  -- US$32,000,000 Class A-4 'CC';
  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

Tropic CDO II, Ltd., experienced three defaults, two deferrals and
five securities were deemed at imminent risk of deferral at
Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total combination of
actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk securities totaled
$66 million, or 20.6% of the portfolio.  The weighted average
adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.51, which is representative
of 'BB-' credit quality.  This is slightly lower than the 3.20
('BB/BB-') credit quality of portfolio securities subject to the
TPS offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Tropic II was failing
its senior OC test trigger but passing its IC test trigger at
106.7% and 213.9%, respectively.  Fitch projects that if the TPS
offer is accepted in full, the OC test will fall to 73.8%
indicating that the A-1L, A-2L, and A-3L classes of notes will be
undercollateralized.

Additionally, Fitch projects the loss of approximately $840,974 of
interest proceeds from these securities each quarter.  At the
October distribution date, interest proceeds totaled $834,599.  If
the offer is accepted in its entirety, Fitch expects the A-1L
notes to receive interest at the next payment date as the
$3.5 million consent payment would be available to pay interest.
However, in subsequent payments there is a real possibility that
interest proceeds would be insufficient to pay interest on the A-
2L notes.  If the A-2L notes do not receive full interest payments
when due, an Event of Default would occur and Fitch will downgrade
the A-2L notes to 'D'.  The remaining notes are expected to be
downgraded to distressed rating categories, should the offer be
accepted in full.

Fitch has placed these notes from Tropic II on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$121,984,681 Class A-1L 'AA';
  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2L 'A';
  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-3L 'BB';
  -- US$38,000,000 Class A-4L 'CC';
  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-4 'CC';
  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

Tropic CDO III, Ltd., experienced one default, five deferrals and
five securities were deemed at imminent risk of deferral at
Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total combination of
actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk securities totaled
$74 million, or 22.1% of the portfolio.  The weighted average
adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.49, which is representative
of 'BB-' credit quality.  This is slightly lower than the 3.20
('BB/BB-') credit quality of portfolio securities subject to the
TPS offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Tropic III was
failing its senior OC test trigger but passing its IC test trigger
at 122.9% and 285.1%, respectively.  Fitch projects that if the
TPS offer is accepted in full, the OC test will fall to 87.4%
indicating that the A-1L, A-2L and A-3L classes of notes will be
undercollateralized.

Additionally, Fitch projects the loss of approximately $559,993 of
interest proceeds from these securities each quarter.  Should this
offer be accepted in full, the A-1L notes are expected to remain
investment grade, the A-2L notes are expected to be downgraded to
below investment grade, with the remainder of the notes expected
to be downgraded to distressed rating categories.

Fitch has placed these notes from Tropic III on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$121,984,681 Class A-1L 'AA';
  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2L 'A'
  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-3L 'BB';
  -- US$38,000,000 Class A-4L 'CC';
  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-4 'CC';
  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

Tropic CDO IV, Ltd. (Tropic IV) experienced zero defaults, six
deferrals and eight securities were deemed at imminent risk of
deferral at Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total
combination of actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk
securities totaled $96.5 million, or 28.8% of the portfolio.  The
weighted average adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.60, which
is representative of 'BB-/B+' credit quality.  This is slightly
lower than the 3.40 ('BB-') credit quality of portfolio securities
subject to the TPS offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Tropic
IV was failing its senior OC test trigger but passing its IC test
trigger at 123.8% and 342.2%, respectively.  Fitch projects that
if the TPS offer is accepted in full, the OC test will fall to
90.1% indicating that the A-1L, A-2L and A-3L classes of notes
will be undercollateralized.

Additionally, Fitch projects the loss of approximately $562,146 of
interest proceeds from these securities each quarter.  Should this
offer be accepted in full, the A-1L notes are expected to remain
investment grade, the A-2L notes are expected to be downgraded to
below investment grade, with the remainder of the notes expected
to be downgraded to distressed rating categories.

Fitch has placed these notes from Tropic IV on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$151,984,515 Class A-1L 'AA';
  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2L 'A';
  -- US$37,500,000 Class A-3L 'BBB';
  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-4L 'CC';
  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-4 'CC';
  -- US$20,000,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

Soloso CDO 2005-1, Ltd., experienced three defaults, three
deferrals and seven securities were deemed at imminent risk of
deferral at Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total
combination of actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk
securities totaled $69.9 million, or 13.9% of the portfolio.  The
weighted average adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.57, which
is representative of 'BB-/B+' credit quality.  This is lower than
the 3.00 ('BB+/BB') credit quality of portfolio securities subject
to the TPS offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Soloso 2005-1
was passing its senior OC and IC test triggers at 127.0% and
332.1%, respectively.  Fitch projects that if the TPS offer is
accepted in full, the OC test will fall to 105.8%.  Additionally,
Fitch projects the loss of approximately $378,640 of interest
proceeds from these securities each quarter.  Should this offer be
accepted in full, the A-1L notes are expected to remain investment
grade, the A-1LA and A-1LB notes are expected to be downgraded to
below investment grade, with the remainder of the notes expected
to be downgraded to distressed rating categories.

Fitch has placed these notes from Soloso 2005-1 on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$159,302,052 Class A-1L 'AA';
  -- US$115,616,698 Class A-1LA 'A';
  -- US$39,000,000 Class A-1LB 'A';
  -- US$45,500,000 Class A-2L 'BBB';
  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-3L 'CCC';
  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3A 'CCC';
  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3B 'CCC';
  -- US$30,500,000 Class B-1L 'CC'.

Soloso CDO 2007-1, Ltd. experienced two defaults, eight deferrals
and six securities were deemed at imminent risk of deferral at
Fitch's last review in April 2009.  The total combination of
actual defaulted, deferring and imminent risk securities totaled
$115.3 million, or 21.9% of the portfolio.  The weighted average
adjusted score for the portfolio was 3.59, which is representative
of 'BB-/B+' credit quality.  This is lower than the 3.20 ('BB/BB-
') credit quality of portfolio securities subject to the TPS
offer.  As of the latest Trustee report, Soloso 2007-1 was failing
its senior OC test trigger but passing its senior IC test trigger
at 124.7% and 227.80%, respectively.  Fitch projects that if the
TPS offer is accepted in full, the OC test will fall to 112.3%.
Additionally, Fitch projects the loss of approximately $569,918 of
interest proceeds from these securities each quarter.  Should this
offer be accepted in full, the A-1L notes are expected to remain
investment grade, with the remainder of the notes expected to be
downgraded to distressed rating categories.

Fitch has placed these notes from Soloso 2007-1 on Rating Watch
Negative:

  -- US$256,227,666 Class A-1LA 'A';
  -- US$83,000,000 Class A-1LB 'BBB';
  -- US$68,000,000 Class A-2 'CCC'.

In addition, these CDO notes for Soloso CDO 2007-1, Ltd. remain at
'C':

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-3F;
  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-3L;
  -- US$22,000,000 Class B-1L.


TROPIC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Tropic CDO V, Ltd., a trust
preferred CDO:

  -- US$220,000,000 Class A-1L1 Floating Rate Notes Due July
     2036, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$220,000,000 Class A-1L2 Floating Rate Notes Due July
     2036, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$94,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due July
     2036, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to B1;

  -- US$51,000,000 Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due July 2036, Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$62,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due July
     2036, Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class A-3F Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due
     July 2036, Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due July
     2036, Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     downgraded to Ca;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of larger than anticipated par loss and credit
deterioration in the collateral pool as well as an increase on the
assumed defaulted amount.

Moody's took its last rating action on this deal on March 27,
2009.  Since then, Moody's noticed a significant increase on the
actual defaulted amount (from $85 mm to $269.5 mm with $55 mm
deferring and $8 mm defaulted in October).  In addition, the
transaction has experienced a failure in all its coverage tests,
including, Senior Overcollateralization Ratio Test (104.86% actual
as reported by trustee vs 127% the trigger), Class A-2L
Overcollateralization Ratio Test (95.45% actual as reported by
trustee vs 116% the trigger), Class B-2L Overcollateralization
Ratio Test (73.74% actual as reported by trustee vs 104.67% the
trigger), Senior Interest Coverage Test (77.84% actual as reported
by trustee vs 127% the trigger), Class B-2L Interest Coverage Test
(19.69% actual as reported by trustee vs 104.67% the trigger).

Furthermore, due to this significant increase in the actual
defaulted amount (an additional $63 mm occurring this past month),
the transaction is now negatively impacted by a unbalanced pay-
fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap that results in
payments to the hedge counterparty that absorb a large portion of
the excess spreads in the deal.  In particular, Moody's projects
that the burden of making hedge payment over the remaining life of
this transaction will significantly reduce the amount of cash
available to pay Class A-1L1 Notes and put interest payments of
Class A-1L1 at significant risk.  In addition, from the
information reported in the Trustee report dated October 15, 2009,
Moody's believes that an Event of Default will be declared due to
failure to pay interest when due to some of the senior notes.  In
the recent October 15th payment date, Class A-1LB did not receive
its interest payment due and Class A-1L2 had a small interest
shortfall of about 5.6% of the full interest amount due while
Class A-1L1 received its interest payment in full.

In addition, Moody's has become aware of an outstanding offer to
purchase part of the transaction collateral at a substantial
discount which, if executed, will have a negative impact on the
rated notes.  Because such offer has not been executed, the rating
action does not address any potential credit risk resulting from
it.  The execution of such offer, in the terms that have been
described to Moody's, may result in future negative rating actions
on the rated notes.  Moody's is following closely the development
of this situation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, the
collateral manager's impact and the potential for selection bias
in the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


TW HOTEL: S&P Puts Ratings on 2005-LUX Certs. On Negative Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed all of its outstanding
ratings on the commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
TW Hotel Funding 2005 LLC's series 2005-LUX on CreditWatch with
negative implications, reflecting S&P's credit concerns about the
sole underlying loan.

The master servicer, Capmark Finance Inc., provided trailing-12
month financials as of June 30, 2009, that reflect an aggregate
net cash flow of $29.4 million for the properties securing the
loan, which is 46% below S&P's estimates at issuance.  Standard &
Poor's will resolve or update the CreditWatch placements after S&P
conduct a full reanalysis of cash flows for the property and have
discussions with the special servicer.

The TY Warner Hotels & Resorts Loan, the sole loan in the trust,
is currently scheduled to mature in January 2010.  The loan has
one 12-month extension option remaining.  However, the loan is
currently failing a debt service coverage hurdle that it must
clear in order to qualify for an extension.  As a result, Capmark
transferred the loan to special servicing (also with Capmark) on
Oct. 16, 2009.  The loan's final maturity is January 2011.

The master servicer reported a DSC of 3.61x (based on one-month
LIBOR plus the weighted average spread) and occupancy of 58% for
the trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2009, compared with 4.25x
and 69% for the year ended Dec. 31, 2008.  The actual NCF at year-
end 2008 and for the trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2009 were
$55.5 million and $29.4 million, respectively.

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                    TW Hotel Funding 2005 LLC
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LUX

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                Class      To                 From
                -----      --                 ----
                A-1        AAA/Watch Neg      AAA
                A-2        AAA/Watch Neg      AAA
                B          AA+/Watch Neg      AA+
                C          AA/Watch Neg       AA
                D          AA-/Watch Neg      AA-
                E          A+/Watch Neg       A+
                F          A/Watch Neg        A
                G          A-/Watch Neg       A-
                H          BBB+/Watch Neg     BBB+
                J          BBB/Watch Neg      BBB
                K          BBB-/Watch Neg     BBB-
                L          BB+/Watch Neg      BB+
                M          BB/Watch Neg       BB
                N          BB-/Watch Neg      BB-


WACHOVIA AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of the Wachovia Auto Loan
Owner Trust 2006-1 and 2006-2 transactions as part of its on going
surveillance process.

The collateral continues to perform within Fitch's expectations.
Currently, the securities can withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the rating categories and still make full payments
of interest and principal in accordance with the term of the
documents.

The ratings reflect the servicing capabilities of Wachovia Bank
N.A., the high quality of retail auto receivables originated by
WFS Financial Inc, and the sound legal and cash flow structures.

The securities are backed by a pool of new and used automobile and
light-duty truck installment loans originated by WFS, a subsidiary
of Wachovia.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

Wachovia Auto Loan Owner Trust series 2006-1

  -- Class A-4 notes at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes at 'AA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes at 'A', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D notes at 'BBB', Outlook Stable.

Wachovia Auto Loan Owner Trust series 2006-2

  -- Class A-3 notes at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 notes at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes at 'AA', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes at 'A', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D notes at 'BBB+', Outlook Stable;
  -- Class E notes at 'BB', Outlook Stable.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2005-C18 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded 14 classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
C18.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing and increased leverage and credit quality dispersion.
On August 11, 2009, Moody's placed 14 classes on review for
possible downgrade due to credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire
Properties Inc., the sponsor of the Park Place II Loan (7% of the
outstanding deal balance).  This action concludes that review.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the September 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 6%
to $1.3 billion from $1.4 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 52% of the pool.  The pool includes
one loan with an underlying rating, representing 2% of the pool.
At last review, one additional loan, representing 16% of the pool
also had an underlying rating.  The performance of this loan has
declined and it is now analyzed as part of the conduit pool
because of increased leverage.  Five loans, representing 13% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Four loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's (CMSA) monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

There are currently three loans, representing 8% of the pool, in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Park Place II ($98.3 million -- 7.4%), which is secured by a
275,000 square foot mixed-use office and retail complex located in
Irvine, California.  This loan was transferred to special
servicing on August 10, 2009, after the loan's sponsor, Maguire,
announced that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls
associated with the respective mortgages for six mortgage loans in
CMBS transactions, including this loan.  The property was 52%
occupied as of March 2009.  U.S. Bank National Association
(Moody's senior unsecured rating -- Aa1; negative outlook)
recently signed a lease for 82,500 square feet bringing occupancy
to 83%.  Moody's is concerned about the ultimate resolution of
this loan given the decline in the property's performance and the
softness of the Orange County office market.

The remaining two specially serviced loans represent 0.7% of the
pool.  The loans are secured by a 52,000 square foot retail center
in Fishers, Indiana and a 58,000 square foot self-storage facility
located in Fort Meyers.  Florida.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$51.2 million loss for all loans in special servicing (47% loss
severity on average).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 81%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value (LTV) ratio
for the conduit component, excluding the specially serviced loans
with estimated losses, is 118% compared to 104% at Moody's prior
full review.  In addition to the increase in overall leverage,
credit quality dispersion has increased since last review.  Based
on Moody's analysis, 50% of the pool has an LTV ratio in excess of
120% compared to 7% at last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit pool
is 0.93X compared to 0.96X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances, unless addressed by extra
credit enhancement.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with underlying ratings,
has a Herf of 21, the same as at last review.

The remaining loan with the underlying rating is the 2700 Broadway
Loan ($27.5 million - 2.1%), which is secured by a 25,000 square
foot condominium interest in the retail portion of a mixed-use
building located in New York City.  The condo unit is 100% leased
to the Trustees of Columbia University through October 2054.
Moody's current underlying rating is A2, the same as at last
review.

The loan that previously had an underlying rating is the One &
Two International Place Loan ($207.9 million - 15.7%), which
represents a 50% participation interest in a first mortgage
loan.  The loan is secured by two Class A office towers comprising
1.9 million square feet located in Boston, Massachusetts.  The
property was 94% leased as of March 2009 compared to 100% at last
review.  The lease for the property's largest tenant, Ropes &
Gray, which occupies 19% of the NRA, expires in December 2010.
Performance has decreased since last review due to a decline in
occupancy and an increase in operating expenses.  Moody's
valuation of this loan reflects weaker performance and concerns
about potential increased vacancy due to near-term lease
expirations.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 71% and 1.26X at last review.

The three largest non-defeased conduit loans comprise 16% of
the pool.  The largest loan is the Kadima Medical Office Loan
($121.4 million - 9.2%), which is secured by 16 medical office
buildings totaling 779,000 square feet.  One property has been
released from the collateral since Moody's last review.  The
properties are located in eight states with the largest
concentration in Florida (8 properties).  The portfolio was 89%
leased as of December 2008 compared to 94% at last review.  Net
operating income has declined due to lower occupancy and increased
expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 117% and 0.93X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Happy Valley Towne Centre
Loan ($55.1 million -- 4.2%), which is secured by a 680,000 square
foot shopping center located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The shopping
center is anchored by Wal-Mart, Lowe's and Sports Chalet.  The in-
line space was 91% leased as of April 2009 compared to 96% at
securitization.  Performance has weakened due to increased vacancy
and increased operating expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 117% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 94% at last and
1.00X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is 590 Fifth Avenue Loan
($39.8 million -- 3.0%), which is secured by a 98,000 square foot
office building in New York City.  The property was 81% occupied
as of March 2009 compared to 100% at last review.  The lease for
the property's largest tenant, Strategic Insight Consulting
(Strategic), which occupies 15% of the NRA, expires in December
2009.  Strategic's original leases expired recently, but were
extended until December 2009.  The property's vacancy rate could
increase to 34% at the end of 2009 if Strategic does not renew.
Moody's valuation of this loan reflects a decline in performance
and concerns about potential increased vacancy due to Strategic's
near-term lease expiration.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
151% and 0.72X, respectively, compared to 109% and 0.85X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1-A, $59,664,046, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-2, $111,688,945, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-3, $174,126,000, affirmed at Aaa , previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-PB, $81,472,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-4, $476,015,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-J-1, $140,537,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class A-J-2, $89,592,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/11/2009

  -- Class B, $31,621,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class C, $12,297,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class D, $28,107,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class E, $14,054,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class F, $19,324,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class G, $12,297,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class H, $24,594,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/11/2009

  -- Class J, $5,270,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class K, $7,027,000, downgraded to C from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class L, $5,270,000, downgraded to C from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class M, $3,514,000, downgraded to C from B1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class N, $3,513,000, downgraded to C from B2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class O, $5,270,000, downgraded to C from B3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/11/2009

  -- Class XP, notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class XC, notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 5/4/2007


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-ESH Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 15 and confirmed five classes
of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-ESH.  The bonds had been
placed on review for possible downgrade on June 16 and 17, 2009.
On August 31, 2009, Moody's extended Moody's review period.  The
action was triggered by TriMont Real Estate Advisors, Inc.'s (the
Special Servicer) decision to reserve monthly payments made by the
borrower, and recognizes that Wachovia Bank, National Association
(the Servicer) will be advancing subject to the Appraisal
Reduction Amount instead of advancing on the entire first mortgage
balance.  As a result, timely interest payments will not be made
to all classes.  This action concludes Moody's review.

The collateral consists of first lien mortgages on 664 hotels, a
vacant parcel of land, and the company's headquarters building in
Spartanburg, SC along with a capital lease on 17 hotels.  The
hotels are operated under six flags including Extended
StayAmerica, Extended Stay Deluxe, StudioPLUS Deluxe Studios,
Crossland Economy Studios, Homestead Studio Suites and Wellesley
Inn and Suites.

Extended Stay Inc. and certain affiliates filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on June 15, 2009, in the US Bankruptcy Court, Southern
District of New York.  The filing constituted a default under the
mortgage loan, and on June 16, 2009, the loan was transferred to
the Special Servicer.

As a result of the default, Moody's placed all classes on review
for potential downgrade.  That action was driven by Moody's
concerns about interest shortfalls and the potential for a "cram
down" based on the borrower's proposal to the bankruptcy court,
which included the creation of a new first mortgage, the
conversion of certain certificates into second lien notes, and the
conversion of other certificates into preferred and common equity.

On July 23, 2009, the bankruptcy court issued a cash collateral
order calling for a monthly payment from the borrower equal to the
amount owed under the terms of the mortgage at the contract rate
rather than the default rate.  In bankruptcy, this required cash
payment is called an adequate protection payment.  Cash collateral
orders may be changed as the bankruptcy court determines.

A new appraisal was received and an appraisal reduction occurred
which triggered a change in the controlling class on September 17,
2009.

The Servicer had been passing through the adequate protection
payments to the certificateholders paying both interest and
principal due on the bonds.  On October 13, 2009, the Special
Servicer instructed the Servicer to hold the adequate protection
payments in a reserve account starting from the October remittance
date.  Going forward, the Servicer will advance based on the
appraisal reduction amount rather than the entire first mortgage.
As a result, timely interest payments will not be made to all
classes.

Moody's rating action considered the current reorganization
proposal made by the borrower, the $3.3 billion option purchase
price, the $2.8 billion appraised value, Moody's $3.6 billion
stabilized value, Moody's $3.3 billion distressed value, Starwood
Capital's proposed $3.5 billion bid for the mortgage note, current
and expected future market performance, and the potential risk of
the bankruptcy court determining that the adequate protection
payments should be re-characterized and treated as principal
payment at some point in the future.  Moody's ratings address the
likelihood of the bondholders receiving timely payment of interest
and all distribution of principal by the rated final distribution
date.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $587,710,892, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class A-2FL, $121,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class A-2FX, $279,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class A-3, $800,000,000, downgraded to A3 from Aaa;
     previously placed under review for possible downgrade on
     June 17, 2009

  -- Class A-4FL, $250,000,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Aaa;
     previously placed under review for possible downgrade on June
     17, 2009

  -- Class A-4FX, $525,000,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Aaa;
     previously placed under review for possible downgrade on
     June 17, 2009

  -- Class B, $125,360,000, downgraded to B1 from Aa1; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class CFL, $85,860,000, downgraded to B2 from Aa2; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class CFX, $91,980,000, downgraded to B2 from Aa2; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class D, $107,640,000, downgraded to B3 from Aa3; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class E, $114,160,000, downgraded to Caa1 from A2; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class F, $124,520,000, downgraded to Caa2 from A3; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class G, $131,040,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2;
     previously placed under review for possible downgrade on
     June 16, 2009

  -- Class H, $130,440,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class J, $100,000,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class K, $214,000,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class L, $200,000,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class M, $100,000,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed under review for possible downgrade on June 16, 2009

  -- Class X-A, $700,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

  -- Class X-B, $700,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     under review for possible downgrade on June 17, 2009

Moody's will continue to monitor the financial performance of the
pool, market conditions, the latest developments in the bankruptcy
court, the status of the Starwood Capital's proposal and any other
proposals that may emerge, and their impact on the ratings.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-ESH Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-ESH due to
interest shortfalls.  The ratings on these classes, along with
seven others, remain on CreditWatch negative, where they were
placed on Oct. 14, 2009.  S&P also placed its ratings on five
additional classes on CreditWatch negative due to the uncertainty
surrounding the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of the borrowers.
All outstanding ratings on the deal are now on CreditWatch
negative.

The collateral underlying Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust's series 2007-ESH consists of one loan secured by 664
extended-stay hotels, cash flow distributions from 17 leased
extended-stay hotels, one office building, and one vacant land
parcel.

The borrowers -- Extended Stay Inc., Homestead Village LLC, and
their affiliates) -- filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 15,
2009.  The adequate protection payments being made to the trust
pursuant to the order of the bankruptcy court are being set aside
in a reserve account and are not being remitted to trust
certificateholders.

Wachovia Bank N.A., the master servicer, is advancing debt
service payments, subject to an appraisal reduction amount of
$1.57 billion.  The related $6.75 million appraisal subordinated
entitlement reduction is prompting interest shortfalls on all
classes subordinate to class A-3.  All of the classes that
experienced shortfalls received 0% of their monthly interest
payment except the A-4FX class, which received 49%.  S&P will
continue to monitor payments to the certificates and lower the
ratings on the classes to 'D' if interest shortfalls recur for a
prolonged period.

Class A-3 may be susceptible to future liquidity interruption if
additional expenses or shortfalls affect the trust.  Currently the
trust is not paying all of the expenses related to the bankruptcy
and the transfer of the loan to the special servicer, such as the
ongoing special servicing fee.  Given this and considering the
uncertainty of the bankruptcy proceedings, S&P has downgraded this
class to 'B'.

All of the ratings on this transaction are on CreditWatch negative
due to the uncertainties related to the bankruptcy case.  S&P will
follow the development of the bankruptcy proceedings and analyze
any related impact on the loan.  Standard & Poor's notes that
changes to the loan terms could occur as part of the bankruptcy
proceeding, which might cause additional payment interruptions
and/or losses to the trust.  S&P will continue to monitor this
situation and take rating actions as S&P determines appropriate.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-ESH

                              Rating
                              ------
           Class      To                  From
           -----      --                  ----
           A-3        B/Watch Neg         AA-/Watch Neg
           A-4FL      CCC-/Watch Neg      BB+/Watch Neg
           A-4FX      CCC-/Watch Neg      BB+/Watch Neg
           B          CCC-/Watch Neg      BB-/Watch Neg
           CFL        CCC-/Watch Neg      B-/Watch Neg
           CFX        CCC-/Watch Neg      B-/Watch Neg
           D          CCC-/Watch Neg      CCC+/Watch Neg
           E          CCC-/Watch Neg      CCC/Watch Neg

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-ESH

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                Class      To                  From
                -----      --                  ----
                A-1        AAA/Watch Neg       AAA
                A-2FL      AAA/Watch Neg       AAA
                A-2FX      AAA/Watch Neg       AAA
                X-A        AAA/Watch Neg       AAA
                X-B        AAA/Watch Neg       AAA

            Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-ESH

                     Class     Rating
                     -----     ------
                     F         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     G         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     H         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     J         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     K         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     L         CCC-/Watch Neg
                     M         CCC-/Watch Neg


WAVE SPC: S&P  Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of 2007-3 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from WAVE SPC's series 2007-3.  Three of the five ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative, and S&P removed two of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-3.
The certificates are from five transactions and total $235 million
(23.5% of the total asset balance).  Three of the ratings on WAVE
2007-3 remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's
exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative
($520.4 million, 52%).

According to the Sept. 21, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-3 was
collateralized by 29 classes of CMBS ($1 billion, 100%) from 29
distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  WAVE 2007-3 has exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
  (class A-J; $55 million, 5.5%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP12
  (class A-J; $55 million, 5.5%);

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C32 (class
  A-J; $55 million, 5.5%);

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C3 (class A-
  J; $40 million, 4%); and

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C27 (class
  A-J; $30 million, 3%).

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on
WAVE 2007-3 in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch resolutions of
the underlying CMBS assets.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                          Series 2007-3

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              BBB+/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         A-2              B+/Watch Neg     A/Watch Neg
         B                CCC/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                           Series 2007-3

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         C                CCC-             BB-/Watch Neg
         D                CCC-             CCC/Watch Neg


WAVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2007-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from WAVE SPC's series 2007-2.  S&P removed two of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative, while five of the seven
lowered ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed two other ratings from the transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on the commercial mortgage-backed securities
that serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-2.  The
certificates are from four transactions and total $962.8 million
(32.1% of the total asset balance).  Five of the ratings on WAVE
2007-2 remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's
exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative
($647.5 million, 22%).

According to the Sept. 30, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-2 was
collateralized by 43 classes of CMBS ($3 billion, 100%) from 28
distinct transactions issued in 2006 or 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  WAVE 2007-2 has exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has recently downgraded:

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31 (class
  A-4; $375 million, 12.5%);

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust'sseries 2007-C32 (class
  A-3;

* $375 million, 12.5%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2 (classes A-M
  and A-J;

* $145.8 million, 4.9%); and

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
  (class A-M and A-J; $67 million, 2.2%).

S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
WAVE 2007-2 in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch resolutions of
the underlying CMBS assets.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                           Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              BBB/Watch Neg    AA-/Watch Neg
         A-2              BB+/Watch Neg    A/Watch Neg
         B                BB/Watch Neg     BBB+/Watch Neg
         C-FL             B/Watch Neg      BB/Watch Neg
         C-FX             B/Watch Neg      BB/Watch Neg

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                          Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         D-FL             CCC-             B-/Watch Neg
         D-FX             CCC-             B-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                             WAVE SPC
                           Series 2007-2


                    Class             Rating
                    -----             ------
                    E-FL              CCC-
                    E-FX              CCC-


WAVE SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2007-1 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from WAVE SPC's series 2007-1.  Two of the lowered ratings
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, and S&P removed
one of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative.  S&P also
affirmed its ratings on two other classes from this transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed securities that
serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-1.  The securities
are from four transactions and total $188 million (9.4% of the
total asset balance).  Two of the ratings on WAVE 2007-1 remain on
CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure to CMBS
collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative ($692 million,
35%).

According to the Sept. 31, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 was
collateralized by 31 classes of CMBS ($2 billion, 100%) from 31
distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  WAVE 2007-1 has exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C31 (class
  A-J;

* $100 million, 5%);

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C27 (class
  A-J; $35 million, 1.8%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-6 (class A-J;
  $28 million, 1.4%); and

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C3 (class A-
  J; $25 million, 1.3%).

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on
WAVE

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                           Series 2007-1

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              BB+/Watch Neg    BBB/Watch Neg
         A-2              B/Watch Neg      B+/Watch Neg

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                             WAVE SPC
                          Series 2007-1

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         B                CCC-             CCC/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                             WAVE SPC
                          Series 2007-1

                     Class            Rating
                     -----            ------
                     C                CCC-
                     D                CCC-


* Fitch Comments on Decline for Collateral in U.S. CRE Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
Credit fundamentals continue to decline for collateral within U.S.
commercial real estate loan collateralized debt obligations,
according to Fitch Ratings.  In response, Fitch has updated its
surveillance methodology for U.S. CREL CDOs.  Concurrently, Fitch
has placed an additional $6.1 billion (41 classes from 18
transactions) on Rating Watch Negative.  As a result, Fitch's
entire rated CREL CDO universe is on Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch anticipates substantial rating actions across the capital
structures of U.S. CREL CDOs after applying its new surveillance
criteria.  Few tranches will receive ratings higher than 'BBB',
with a majority of classes expected to be assigned below
investment grade ratings.

The Fitch CREL CDO Delinquency Index reached 8.7% in September
2009, with delinquencies in individual CDOs ranging from 0% to
35%.  This rate is nearly 2.5 times that of the Fitch CMBS
delinquency rate of 3.58% reported in October 2009.  Further, the
CREL CDO Delinquency Index understates the full extent of
underperforming loans in CREL CDOs by excluding realized losses,
as well as extensions and modifications on high risk loans.

Fitch has increasingly observed asset managers removing credit
impaired assets at prices below par, resulting in realized losses
to the portfolios.  To date, aggregate losses to CDO collateral
are estimated at $825 million, or 3.4% of initial fully-ramped
collateral.  The cumulative delinquency rate for CREL CDOs is
likely to exceed 15% by year-end 2009 when realized losses are
considered.

Delinquencies have been and are expected to be tempered as asset
managers continue to extend and modify many assets.  Asset
managers have extended, on average, 70% of loans maturing since
January 2009.  Additionally, while managers are realizing losses
by trading out impaired assets, they are often reinvesting in
discounted assets with the full notional amount counted as par.
Known as 'par-building', these trades generally result in a net
increase to the notional collateral balance.  The effect of par-
building may be to reduce the significance of
overcollateralization tests by allowing the tests to stay in
compliance.  Although par-building is typically permitted under
transaction documents, Fitch may increase its expected loss on new
purchases to reflect, at a minimum, the difference between par and
the purchase price.

Preliminary application of Fitch's updated criteria results in an
average CREL CDO loss expectation of 35%, ranging from less than
20% to more than 60%.  The broad range of loss expectations
reflects the unique characteristics of each portfolio.  For
example, the lower expected losses reflect portfolios with lower
leveraged, less transitional assets, while higher expected losses
typically reflect portfolios with transitional, deeply
subordinated collateral.

To derive the base case expected losses for each transaction,
Fitch's analysis included a prospective cash flow decline for each
loan, which averages 15%.  The corresponding value declines range
from 35% to 60%.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

AMAC CDO Funding I

  -- 240,257,724 class A-1 notes 'AAA';
  -- 50,000,000 class A-2 notes 'A'.

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1, Ltd.  / LLC

  -- 180,808,518 class A notes 'AAA';
  -- 51,590,000 class B notes 'AA'.

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2005-1 Ltd.  / LLC

  -- 161,500,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2006-1 Ltd.  / LLC

  -- 230,000,000 class A-1A notes 'AAA';
  -- 86,700,000 class A-1AR notes 'AAA'.

FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd.

  -- 131,825,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd./LLC

  -- 513,000,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA';
  -- 57,000,000 class A-2 notes 'AA';
  -- 102,500,000 class B notes 'BBB';
  -- 47,000,000 class C notes 'BB+';
  -- 12,500,000 class D notes 'BB';
  -- 16,000,000 class E notes 'BB-';
  -- 16,000,000 class F notes 'B+';
  -- 18,500,000 class G notes 'B';
  -- 28,000,000 class H notes 'B-'.

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd./LLC

  -- 703,933,197 class A-1 notes 'A';
  -- 121,000,000 class A-2 notes 'BBB';
  -- 116,600,000 class A-3 notes 'BB';
  -- 29,500,000 class B-FL notes 'B';
  -- 20,000,000 class B-FX notes 'B';
  -- 20,323,439 class C-FL notes 'B-';
  -- 3,574,489 class C-FX notes 'B-'.

Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-3, Ltd.

  -- 20,000,000 class S notes 'AAA';
  -- 117,566,498 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-4 Ltd./LLC

  -- 20,000,000 class S fixed-rate notes 'AA-';
  -- 183,765,128 class A-1 floating-rate notes 'AA-';
  -- 34,833,426 class A-2 floating-rate notes 'A'.

Hartford Mezzanine Investors I CRE CDO 2007-1

  -- 137,500,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

N-Star REL CDO VIII, Ltd./LLC

  -- 100,000,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA';
  -- 188,085,000 class A-R notes 'AAA'.

Prima Capital CRE Securitization 2006-1 Ltd./Corp

  -- 265,368,445 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd./LLC

  -- 200,000,000 class A-1A notes 'AAA';
  -- 275,000,000 class A-1B notes 'AAA'.

RFC CDO 2007-1 Ltd./LLC

  -- 423,377,782 class A-1 notes 'AA';
  -- 47,041,976 class A-1R notes 'AA'.

Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2006-1, Ltd

  -- 129,370,000 class A-1 notes 'AAA'.

Resource Real Estate Funding CDO 2007-1

  -- 180,000,000 class A-1 floating-rate notes 'AAA'.

Sandelman Realty CRE CDO I

  -- 250,000,000 class A-1 notes 'AA'.

Wachovia CRE CDO 2006-1, Ltd

  -- 616,500,000 class A-1A notes 'AAA'.


* Fitch Puts Ratings on 247 CMBS Bonds on Negative Watch
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 247 U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities bonds in 22 fixed-rate, vintage 2005 transactions on
Rating Watch Negative.  The Rating Watch Negative placements are
the result of Fitch's initial review of the entire 2005 fixed-rate
vintage based prospective future performance.

Fitch rates 794 classes in 34 fixed-rate, vintage 2005
transactions.  Prior to this review 80 classes in seven deals had
been placed on Rating Watch Negative due to performance issues.
Senior and mezzanine 'AAA' classes are expected to maintain their
ratings.

In total, $9.3 billion of bonds have been placed on Rating Watch
Negative or are already on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $3 billion A-J or below classes, currently rated 'AAA';
  -- $1.4 billion of classes currently rated 'AA';
  -- $1.4 billion of classes currently rated 'A';
  -- $2 billion of classes currently rated 'BBB';
  -- $883.5 million of classes currently rated 'BB';
  -- $642.9 million of classes currently rated 'B'.

On average, these transactions have 4.3% of loans in special
servicing and 13.1% Fitch Loans of Concern, compared to recent
vintages:

  -- 2006: 7.2% specially serviced, 18.3% loans of concern;
  -- 2007: 7.1% specially serviced, 25.9% loans of concern;
  -- 2008: 9.6% specially serviced, 23.7% loans of concern.

While these transactions are currently performing better than
those recently reviewed and benefit from defeasance (a weighted
average of 5.4%), all vintages are now susceptible to the severe
economic conditions experienced over the past few years.  Fitch
recently reviewed the 2006-2008 vintages using stressed cash flow
and market values declines using a revised set of criteria as
published in 'Surveillance Methodology for Recent Vintage U.S.
CMBS', published July 9, 2009.  In reviewing the 2005 vintage,
Fitch modified this criteria slightly to determine defaults and
losses.

To determine potential defaults for each loan Fitch assumed cash
flow would decline 10% from year-end 2008, which is consistent
with the analysis used in its review of the recent vintage
transactions whereby cash flow was assumed to decline 15% from
year-end 2007 projected over a three year period.  If the stressed
cash flow would cause the loan to fall below 0.95 times (x), Fitch
assumed the loan would default during the term.

To determine losses, Fitch used the above stressed cash flow, and
applied a market cap rate, ranging between 7.5% and 9.5%, for each
specific property type.  If the loan balance at default is less
than the stressed cash flow the loan would realize that loss.

The Rating Watch Negative placements will be resolved when Fitch
performs an in-depth review of each transaction.  The in-depth
review, again similarly to the 2006 through 2008 vintage review,
would involve a thorough analysis of the top 15 loans, any
specially serviced loans and additional Fitch Loans of Concern.
Fitch expects the majority of the classes will be downgraded
approximately one category when the Negative Watch is resolved.


* Moody's Retains Review on 18 CMBS Rake Bonds on GGP Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service continues the review of 18 rake or non-
pooled bonds from six CMBS transactions.  Moody's is keeping the
bonds on review for possible downgrade as Moody's seek greater
clarification from the various servicers as to the potential
magnitude of legal expenses, servicing fees and other trust
expenses which are being incurred as a result of the Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing of General Growth Properties and affiliates on
April 16, 2009.  In CMBS transactions, Moody's rated promise is to
the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal
by the final rated distribution date.  Moody's action reflects the
possibility that non-reimbursed trust expenses and interest
shortfalls may cause a disruption in the timely payment of
interest on the rake or non-pooled bonds.

As non-pooled bonds, these rake classes are exposed to the first
loss occurring on a single loan assuming there is no additional
subordinate debt.  In addition, these rake classes are exposed to
non-reimbursed trust expenses and interest shortfalls.  Being
backed by a single loan, there is no benefit from the pooling of
cash flows from other loans.  As a result, special servicing fees,
legal expenses, and other trust expenses may create interest
shortfalls that could negatively impact the rated classes in
reverse sequential order.  In many cases, particularly in
situations where a loan is overcollateralized, these shortfalls
and expenses may be reimbursed by the loan borrower upon the
return of the loan to master servicing.  However, this is by no
means certain given the bankruptcy filing of the sponsor.

As of the October remittance dates, six rake classes have incurred
interest shortfalls as noted: Gallery at Harborplace 2000-C5C:
Class B-3 ($13,766); GSMS 2001-GL3A: Class G-NFC ($147,987); WBCMT
2004-C14: Class PP ($47,550); CGCMT 2006-C5: Class AMP-3 ($10,350)
and GECMC 2003-C2: Class BLVD-5 ($96,735).

On July 28th, the bankruptcy court granted the debtors motion to
extend the "exclusive" period to file a bankruptcy plan for an
additional six months.  The debtors have until February 29, 2010,
to file a plan and April 23, 2010, to confirm the plan.  Moody's
will continue to monitor the GGP bankruptcy case and the
transactions with exposure to GGP; if there are any material
changes, rating actions will be taken, if warranted.

Moody's rating action is:

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through

Certificates, Series 2006-C5

  -- Class AMP-1, $40,000,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class AMP-2, $48,000,000, currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class AMP-3, $27,000,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

These classes are supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Ala Moana Center, a 2.0 million square foot regional
mall and office component located in Honolulu, Hawaii.  The Ala
Moana Center is the dominant retail center in its trade area and
is considered the world's largest open-air shopping center.  The
property recently completed an expansion that included a 200,000
square foot Nordstrom department store as well as 100,000 square
feet of additional retail space.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
February 9, 2009.

Gallery at Harborplace Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2000-C5C

  -- Class B-1, $3,200,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class B-2, $5,100,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class B-3, $2,200,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

These classes are supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Gallery at Harborplace, a 404,000 square foot office
and retail mixed use complex located within the Inner Harbor
development in Baltimore, Maryland.  The property was developed in
1987 by The Rouse Company which was acquired by GGP in 2004.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
March 11, 2009.

GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-C2

  -- Class BLVD-1, $1,706,377, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class BLVD-2, $2,501,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class BLVD-3, $4,502,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class BLVD-4, $3,549,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class BLVD-5, $7,960,750, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

These classes are supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Boulevard Mall, a 1.2 million square foot shopping
center located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The center is anchored by
Sears, Dillard's, Macy's and J.C. Penney.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
November 7, 2007.

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-GL III

  -- Class F-NFC, $10,460,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

  -- Class G-NFC, $5,910,569, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

These classes are supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Northridge Fashion Center, a 1.4 million square foot
regional mall located in Northridge, California.  The mall is
anchored by Macy's, Sears and J.C. Penney.

  -- Class F-GGP, $5,960,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/27/2009

  -- Class G-GGP, $3,500,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/27/2009

  -- Class H-GGP, $3,480,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/27/2009

These classes are supported by a junior participation interest in
a first mortgage loan secured by the borrower's interest in three
regional shopping centers with total gross leasable area of
1.6 million square feet located in tertiary markets in Missouri,
Oregon and Kentucky.  The properties are: Capital Mall, located in
Jefferson City, Missouri, containing 392,028 square feet and
anchored by JC Penney, Dillard's, Sears, and an eight-screen movie
theater; Gateway Mall, located in Springfield, Oregon, containing
602,946 SF and anchored by JC Penney, Sears and two movie theaters
with a total of 12 screens; and Greenwood Mall in Bowling Green,
Kentucky, containing 558,434 SF and anchored by Dillard's, Macy's
and Sears.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
July 31, 2008.

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-C14

  -- Class PP, $37,145,889, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

The class is supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Park Place Mall, a 1.0 million square foot regional
mall located in Tucson, Arizona.  The center is anchored by Sears,
Dillard's and Macy's.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
May 4, 2007.

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C26, Commercial Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-C26

  -- Class WM, $10,000,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously placed on review for downgrade
     on 4/23/2009

The class is supported by a B note secured by the borrower's
interest in Woodlands Mall, 1.4 million square foot mall located
in Woodlands, Texas.  The center is anchored by Dillard's,
Foley's, Sears and J.C. Penney.

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
February 10, 2009.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes From Three Subprime RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes from three U.S. subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 1999 and 2007.  S&P removed all
of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight
classes from these transactions and removed all of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate its current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as its
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in its analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, its assessment of the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences its default projections,
while its outlook for housing price declines and the health of the
housing market influence its loss severity assumptions.
Furthermore, for each deal, S&P adjusted its loss expectations
based on rising delinquencies.

The lowered ratings reflect its belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given its current
projected losses.

The affirmations reflect its belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in its view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of subprime fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage
loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in its view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

           ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-2
                        Series      1999-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-6        21075WKJ3     A                    A/Watch Neg
    A-7        21075WKK0     A                    A/Watch Neg
    A-8        21075WKL8     A                    A/Watch Neg

           ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3
                        Series      1999-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-6        21075WKU8     A+                   A+/Watch Neg
    A-7        21075WKV6     A+                   A+/Watch Neg
    A-8        21075WKW4     A+                   A+/Watch Neg

            Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-3
                        Series      2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AV-1       75971FAA1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-2       75971FAB9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-3       75971FAC7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-1       75971FAD5     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       75971FAE3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-3       75971FAF0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-4       75971FAG8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-5       75971FAH6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-6       75971FAJ2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        75971FAK9     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        75971FAL7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        75971FAM5     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        75971FAN3     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        75971FAP8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-6        75971FAQ6     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    M-7        75971FAR4     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-8        75971FAS2     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-9        75971FAT0     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 29 Classes of Notes From Three CDOs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 29
classes of notes from three U.S. collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  The ratings on three of the downgraded tranches
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.  One of the CDO
transactions is a CDO backed predominantly by senior tranches of
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions, while the
other two transactions are backed by mezzanine tranches of RMBS
transactions and tranches of corporate CDO transactions,
respectively.

The rating actions follow an update to the criteria S&P use to
assess ratings on CDO transactions subject to acceleration or
liquidation after an event of default has occurred.  After the
EODs, the maturity of the notes was accelerated and the
controlling noteholders elected to liquidate the collateral
assets.

S&P has received notices from the trustees for Tierra Alta Funding
I Ltd. and Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd. stating that the liquidation of
the portfolio assets is complete and that the available proceeds
were insufficient to pay the noteholders in full.

The controlling noteholders for Tower Hill CDO II Ltd. have issued
a notice of intent to liquidate.  In this transaction, the vote of
the subordinate class noteholders was also required in order to
effect liquidation.  In S&P's view, this voting pattern is
somewhat atypical of transactions that have elected to liquidate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
  Deal Name                    Class      To           From
  ---------                    -----      --           ----
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        S1VF       D            CCC/Watch Neg
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        S2T        D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        A1         D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        A2         D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        A3         D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        B          D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        C          D            CC
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.        Combo Nts  D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   A-1        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   A-2        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   A3A        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   A3B        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   B1A        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   B1B        D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   C          D            CC
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.   F          D            CC
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       A-X         B/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       A-1Fund     B/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       A-1Unfund   B/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       A-2Fund     CC          A/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       A-2Unfund   CC          A/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       B Type1Fun  CC          BBB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       B Type2Fun  CC          BBB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       B Type2Unf  CC          BBB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       C Type1Fun  CC          BB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       C Type2Fun  CC          BB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       C Type2Unf  CC          BB/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       D           CC          B/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO II Ltd.       E           CC          CCC/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 78 Classes From Four Prime Jumbo RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 78
classes from four U.S. prime jumbo and Alternative-A residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions issued in 2003-2005 and
2007.  S&P removed 39 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on
16 classes from three of these transactions and removed three of
the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

For information on how S&P derive its loss assumptions, its use of
loss curve forecasting methodology, and how S&P incorporates each
transaction's current delinquency (including 60- and 90-day
delinquencies), default, and loss trends into its analysis, please
see the articles list in the Related Research section below.

As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, S&P's assessment of the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default
projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and
the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss severity
assumptions.  Furthermore, for each deal, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations based on upward trends in delinquencies.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each prime
jumbo and Alt-A transaction rated in 2005 based on a forward-
looking default curve.  Due to continuing deterioration in
performance, S&P's lifetime projected losses have changed for one
of the transactions in this release:

                                          Original       Loss
  Transaction                             bal. (mil. $)  proj. (%)
  -----------                             -------------  ---------
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Trust 2005-1                               1,229.8         1.92

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given out current
projected losses.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

For prime jumbo transactions, a class may have to withstand
approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions in order to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while a different class may have to
withstand approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  An affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects
S&P's opinion that the class can withstand approximately 235% of
its base-case loss assumptions.

For Alt-A transactions, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P consider
whether a class is able to withstand approximately 150% of its
base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions.  When
affirming a 'B' rating on a class, S&P consider whether a bond is
able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  Other rating
categories are dispersed, about equally, between S&P's 'AAA' and
'B' loss assumptions.  For example, to maintain a 'BB' rating on
one class, S&P may consider whether the class is able to withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, while in
connection with a different class, S&P may consider whether it is
able to withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of prime jumbo fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage
loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions


                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class      CUSIP         To                   From
     -----      -----         --                   ----
     1-A1       52521LAA2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     1-A2       52521LAB0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     1-A3       52521LAC8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     1-A4       52521LAD6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2A-1       52521LAE4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A2       52521LAF1     CCC                  A
     2-A3       52521LAG9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A4       52521LAH7     CCC                  A
     2-A5       52521LAJ3     CCC                  A
     2-A6       52521LAK0     CCC                  A
     2-A7       52521LAL8     CCC                  A
     2-A8       52521LAM6     CCC                  A
     2A-9       52521LAN4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     2-A10      52521LAP9     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     2-A11      52521LAQ7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     2-A12      52521LAR5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     2-A13      52521LAS3     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A14      52521LAT1     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A15      52521LAU8     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A16      52521LAV6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A17      52521LAW4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A18      52521LAX2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     2-A19      52521LAY0     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     2-A20      52521LAZ7     CCC                  A
     3-A1       52521LBD5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     3-A2       52521LBE3     CCC                  A
     3-A3       52521LBF0     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     3-A4       52521LBU7     CCC                  A
     3-A5       52521LBV5     CCC                  A
     3-A6       52521LBW3     CCC                  A
     3-A7       52521LBX1     CCC                  A
     3-A8       52521LBY9     CCC                  A
     3-A9       52521LBZ6     CCC                  A
     4-A1       52521LBG8     CC                   B
     AP         52521LBH6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
     AX         52521LBJ2     CCC                  A
     B1         52521LBK9     D                    CCC

            Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9
                        Series      2004-9

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A        61748HFT3     A                    AAA
        2-A        61748HFU0     A                    AAA
        3-A-2      61748HFW6     A                    AAA
        3-A-3      61748HFX4     A                    AAA
        3-A-4      61748HFY2     A                    AAA
        3-A-5      61748HFZ9     A                    AAA
        3-A-P      61748HGC9     A                    AAA
        4-A        61748HGD7     A                    AAA
        5-A        61748HGE5     A                    AAA
        5-A-X      61748HGF2     A                    AAA
        5-A-P      61748HGG0     A                    AAA
        B-1        61748HGH8     CCC                  AA
        B-2        61748HGJ4     CC                   A
        B-3        61748HGK1     CC                   BBB
        B-4        61748HGM7     CC                   BB

       Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-1
                        Series      2005-1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class      CUSIP         To                   From
     -----      -----         --                   ----
     1-A1       86359B2R1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     1-A2       86359B2S9     A                    AAA
     1-A3       86359B2T7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     1-A4       86359B2U4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     1-A5       86359B2V2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     1-A6       86359B2W0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     2-A1       86359B2X8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     3-A1       86359B2Y6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
     4-A1       86359B2Z3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     5-A1       86359B3A7     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     6-A1       86359B3B5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A1       86359B3E9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A2       86359B3F6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A3       86359B3G4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A4       86359B3H2     A                    AAA
     7-A5       86359B3J8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A6       86359B3K5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     7-A7       86359B3L3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     AP         86359B3M1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
     B1         86359B3Q2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
     B2         86359B3R0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
     B3         86359B3S8     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
     B4         86359B2N0     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg
     B5         86359B2P5     CC                   B/Watch Neg

   WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR9 Trust
                       Series      2003-AR9

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-B-1      92922FBY3     A                    AA
        I-B-2      92922FBZ0     CCC                  A
        I-B-3      92922FCA4     CC                   BBB
        I-B-4      92922FCF3     CC                   BB
        I-B-5      92922FCG1     CC                   B

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9
                        Series      2004-9

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 3-A-1      61748HFV8     AAA
                 3-A-6      61748HGA3     AAA
                 3-A-X      61748HGB1     AAA

       Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-1
                        Series      2005-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AX         86359B3N9     AAA
                 PAX        86359B3P4     AAA

   WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR9 Trust
                       Series      2003-AR9

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-6      92922FBV9     AAA
                 I-A-7      92922FBW7     AAA
                 II-A       92922FBX5     AAA
                 II-B-1     92922FCB2     AA
                 II-B-2     92922FCC0     A
                 II-B-3     92922FCD8     BBB
                 II-B-4     92922FCJ5     BB
                 II-B-5     92922FCK2     B


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 198 Classes From 21 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 198
classes from 21 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued from 2005-2007.  S&P removed 129 of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 21 other classes from 10 of these
transactions, and S&P removed 13 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for all
subprime transactions rated in 2006 and 2007.  S&P derived these
losses using the criteria that S&P outlined in "Standard & Poor's
Revises U.S. Subprime And Alternative-A RMBS Loss Assumptions For
Transactions Issued In 2005, 2006, And 2007," published July 6,
2009.  S&P changed its lifetime projected losses for these
transactions:

                                           Orig. bal.       Lifetime
  Transaction                              (mil. $)         exp. loss (%)
  -----------                              ----------       -------------
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1           1,004           24.91
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2           1,400           29.98
BCAPB LLC Trust 2007-AB1                          565           46.26
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FS1            385           35.66
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-16   1,080           14.41
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-16   1,200           26.17
CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-23   1,600           49.21
CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2007-QX1    152           55.66
CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-QH2    117           52.04
Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-E                  1,283           50.26
HSI Asset Securitization Corp. Tr.  2006-HE1     1,273           48.78
HSI Asset Securitization Corp. Tr.  2006-HE2     1,525           49.66
Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-1               1,000           34.34
Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-3                 796           36.19
Ownit Mtg Ln Trust Ser 2006-7                    685           48.87
Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3           1,000           44.59

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings given S&P's current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its
base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance that is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, the senior class could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pools of loans backing these transactions consist
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that
are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

               Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
                        Series      2006-1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-3        004375EW7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   A-4        004375FG1     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1        004375EX5     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2        004375EY3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-3        004375EZ0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   M-4        004375FA4     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
   M-5        004375FB2     D                    B/Watch Neg

              Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A2         00437NAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A3         00437NAC6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   A4         00437NAD4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   M1         00437NAE2     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M2         00437NAF9     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M3         00437NAG7     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
   M4         00437NAH5     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
   M5         00437NAJ1     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg
   M6         00437NAK8     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                     BCAPB LLC Trust 2007-AB1
                       Series      2007-AB1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        05529DAA0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        05529DAB8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-3        05529DAC6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-4        05529DAD4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-5        05529DAE2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1        05529DAF9     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2        05529DAG7     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
   M-3        05529DAH5     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg
   M-4        05529DAJ1     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
   M-5        05529DAK8     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M-6        05529DAL6     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M-7        05529DAM4     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   M-8        05529DAN2     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

      Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-AQ1
                       Series      2006-AQ1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-1A-2     07389PAB6     CCC                  AA
        I-1A-3     07389PAC4     CCC                  A
        I-2A       07389PAD2     CCC                  A
        I-M-1      07389PAE0     CCC                  B
        I-M-2      07389PAF7     CC                   CCC
        I-M-3      07389PAG5     CC                   CCC
        I-M-4      07389PAH3     D                    CC

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A1         05570GAA1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A2         05570GAB9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A2A        05570GBN2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A2B        05570GBP7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A3         05570GAC7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A3A        05570GAV5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A3B        05570GAW3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A4         05570GAD5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A4A        05570GAX1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A4B        05570GAY9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M1         05570GAE3     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M1A        05570GAZ6     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M1B        05570GBA0     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M2         05570GAF0     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M2A        05570GBB8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M2B        05570GBC6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M3         05570GAG8     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M3A        05570GBD4     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M3B        05570GBE2     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M4         05570GAH6     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
   M4A        05570GBF9     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
   M4B        05570GBG7     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
   M5         05570GAJ2     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M5A        05570GBH5     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M5B        05570GBJ1     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M6         05570GAK9     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M6A        05570GBK8     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M6B        05570GBL6     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M7         05570GAL7     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   M8         05570GAM5     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   M9         05570GAN3     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg
   B1         05570GAQ6     CC                   BB+/Watch Neg
   B2         05570GAR4     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
   B3         05570GAS2     CC                   B+/Watch Neg

  C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2007-SP2
                      Series      2007-SP2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        1248MHAA0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        1248MHAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-3        1248MHAC6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1        1248MHAD4     A                    AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2        1248MHAE2     BB                   AA+/Watch Neg
   M-3        1248MHAF9     B                    AA+/Watch Neg
   M-4        1248MHAG7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-5        1248MHAH5     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg
   M-6        1248MHAJ1     CC                   CCC
   M-7        1248MHAK8     CC                   CCC
   M-8        1248MHAL6     CC                   CCC
   M-9        1248MHAM4     CC                   CCC
   M-10       1248MHAN2     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FS1
                       Series      2007-FS1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A1       17313EAA3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A1A     17313EAB1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A1B     17313EAC9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2A       17313EAD7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2B       17313EAE5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A2      17313EAU9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1A       17313EAF2     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M-1B       17313EAG0     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2A       17313EAH8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-2B       17313EAJ4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-3A       17313EAK1     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M-3B       17313EAL9     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M-4A       17313EAM7     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
   M-4B       17313EAN5     CC                   A+/Watch Neg

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2005-16
                       Series      2005-16

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   3-AV       126670PC6     BBB                  AAA
   4-AV-3     126670PF9     BB                   AAA
   4-AV-4     126670PG7     BB                   AAA
   MV-1       126670PH5     CCC                  AA+
   MV-2       126670PJ1     CCC                  AA
   MV-3       126670PK8     CCC                  AA-
   MV-4       126670PL6     CCC                  A+
   MV-5       126670PM4     CCC                  A
   MV-6       126670PN2     CC                   A-
   MV-7       126670PP7     CC                   BBB+
   MV-8       126670PQ5     CC                   BBB
   BV         126670PR3     CC                   BBB-
   1-AF       126670NV6     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
   2-AF-2     126670NX2     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
   2-AF-3     126670NY0     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
   2-AF-4     126670NZ7     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
   2-AF-5     126670PA0     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
   BF         126670PB8     CC                   BBB

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2007-QX1
                       Series      2007-QX1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
  Class      CUSIP         To                   From
  -----      -----         --                   ----
  A-1        12670EAA1     CCC                  AAA
  M-1        12670EAB9     CCC                  AA+
  M-2        12670EAC7     CCC                  AA

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-23
                       Series      2006-23

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1-A        12666CAA1     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
   2-A-1      12666CAB9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A-2      12666CAC7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A-3      12666CAD5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   2-A-4      12666CAE3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
   M-1        12666CAF0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   M-2        12666CAG8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
   M-4        12666CAJ2     CC                   CCC
   M-5        12666CAK9     CC                   CCC
   M-6        12666CAL7     CC                   CCC
   M-7        12666CAM5     CC                   CCC

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-QH2
                       Series      2007-QH2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        12668JAA4     CCC                  AAA
        M-1        12668JAB2     CCC                  AA+
        M-2        12668JAC0     CCC                  AA
        M-3        12668JAD8     CC                   A
        M-4        12668JAE6     CC                   BBB
        B-1        12668JAF3     CC                   BBB-

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-E
                        Series      2006-E

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A1       35729NAA3     CCC                  BB
        2-A1       35729NAB1     CCC                  AAA
        2-A2       35729NAC9     CCC                  AAA
        2-A3       35729NAD7     CCC                  BBB
        2-A4       35729NAT2     CCC                  BB
        M1         35729NAE5     CCC                  B
        M2         35729NAF2     CC                   CCC
        M3         35729NAG0     CC                   CCC

        HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-HE1
                       Series      2006-HE1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-A-1     44328AAB6     CCC                  AA
        II-A-2     44328AAC4     CCC                  BB
        M1         44328AAG5     CC                   CCC

       HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-HE2
                       Series      2006-HE2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A        44328BAB4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   II-A-1     44328BAC2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-2     44328BAD0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   II-A-3     44328BAE8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   II-A-4     44328BAF5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   M-1        44328BAG3     CC                   CCC
   M-2        44328BAH1     CC                   CCC

                 Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-1
                        Series      2007-1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        452559AA5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        452559AB3     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
   A-3        452559AC1     CCC                  B+/Watch Neg
   A-M        452559AD9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   M-1        452559AE7     CC                   CCC
   M-2        452559AF4     D                    CCC

                Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-3
                        Series      2007-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A1-A       45257VAA4     CCC                  AAA
        A1-B       45257VAB2     CCC                  AA
        A1-C       45257VAC0     CCC                  AA
        AM         45257VAD8     CC                   CCC
        M-1        45257VAE6     CC                   CCC
        M-2        45257VAF3     CC                   CCC
        M-3        45257VAG1     CC                   CCC
        M-4        45257VAH9     D                    CCC
        M-5        45257VAJ5     D                    CCC

                 Mid-State Cap Corp. 2006-1 Trust
                        Series      2006-1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A Notes    59548PAA7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1 Notes  59548PAB5     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
   M-2 Notes  59548PAC3     A                    A/Watch Neg
   B Notes    59548PAD1     BB                   BBB/Watch Neg

              Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                        Series      2007-3

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A-1      68402BAA4     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
   II-A-1     68402BAB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-2     68402BAC0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   II-A-3     68402BAD8     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
   II-A-4     68402BAE6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
   M-1        68402BAF3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   M-2        68402BAG1     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
   M-3        68402BAH9     CC                   CCC
   M-4        68402BAJ5     CC                   CCC
   M-5        68402BAK2     CC                   CCC
   M-6        68402BAL0     CC                   CCC

                   Ownit Mtg Ln Trust Ser 2006-7
                        Series      2006-7

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        69121UAA0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   A-2A       69121UAB8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2B       69121UAC6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2C       69121UAD4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   A-2D       69121UAE2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   M-1        69121UAF9     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
   M-2        69121UAG7     CC                   B/Watch Neg

                    RAMP Series 2007-RS2 Trust
                       Series      2007-RS2

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        75157DAA2     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        75157DAB0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   A-3        75157DAC8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
   M-3        75157DAF1     CC                   CCC
   M-4        75157DAG9     CC                   CCC
   M-5        75157DAH7     D                    CCC

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                       Series      2007-BC4

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A1         86365DAA7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A2         86365DAB5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A3         86365DAC3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A4         86365DAD1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M1         86365DAH2     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M2         86365DAN9     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M3         86365DAP4     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M4         86365DAQ2     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
   M5         86365DAR0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   M6         86365DAS8     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M7         86365DAT6     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   M8         86365DAU3     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   M9         86365DAV1     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg
   B1         86365DAY5     CC                   BB+/Watch Neg
   B2         86365DAZ2     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-AQ1
                       Series      2006-AQ1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-1A-1     07389PAA8     AAA

          CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-23
                       Series      2006-23

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        12666CAH6     CCC

       HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-HE1
                       Series      2006-HE1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A        44328AAA8     CCC
                 II-A-3     44328AAD2     CCC
                 II-A-4     44328AAE0     CCC
                 II-A-5     44328AAF7     CCC

                    RAMP Series 2007-RS2 Trust
                       Series      2007-RS2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        75157DAD6     CCC
                 M-2        75157DAE4     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 712 Classes From 654 RMBS to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
712 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 654 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions.  S&P removed
10 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  In addition, S&P placed 59 other ratings from nine
of the affected transactions on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The ratings on 97 additional classes from 10 of
these transactions remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

Approximately 86.24% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A or subprime mortgage loan
collateral.  The 712 defaulted classes consisted of these:

* 404 classes were from Alt-A transactions (56.74% of all
  defaults);

* 210 were from subprime transactions (29.49% of all defaults);

* 67 were from prime jumbo transactions;

* Six were from reperforming transactions;

* Five were from seasoned loan transactions;

* Four were from outside-the-guidelines transactions;

* Three were from closed-end second-lien transactions;

* Three were from risk-transfer transactions;

* Two were from first-lien high loan-to-value transactions;

* Two were from home equity line of credit (HELOC) transactions;

* Two were from RMBS other transactions;

* Two were from re-REMIC (resecuritized real estate mortgage
  investment conduit) transactions;

* One was from a document-deficient transaction; and

* One was from a nonperforming transaction.

The 712 downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of principal
write-downs on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  The CreditWatch placements reflect the fact that the
affected classes are within a group that includes a class that
defaulted from a 'B-' rating or higher.  S&P lowered approximately
97.05% of the ratings from the 'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories,
and S&P lowered approximately 99.02% from a speculative-grade
category.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements affecting these
transactions after S&P completes its reviews of the underlying
credit enhancement.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor
its ratings on securities that experience principal write-downs
and adjust the ratings as S&P deem appropriate.



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie
Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.

                  *** End of Transmission ***