TCR_Public/091004.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, October 4, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 274

                            Headlines



505 CLO III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Senior Notes
505 CLO IV: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-NC3 Securities
AES EASTERN: Moody's Gives Negative Outlook; Rates Certs. at 'Ba1'

AIR FORCE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Certificates to 'BB+'
ANTARES FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-6 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-PW13 Certs.

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Puts 2005-PWR10 Note Ratings on Negative Watch
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TOP28 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 Certificate
BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
C-BASS CBO XI: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
C-BASS CBO XII: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
CENTRAL PACIFIC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Securities to 'C/RR6'
CENTRAL PLAINS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007B Bonds to 'BB+'

CIT RV: S&P Junks Ratings on Class B 1998-A Notes From 'B-'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-AMC2 Securities
CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
COA CAERUS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
COMMODORE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

CORNERSTONE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C2 Securities
CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-1 Notes
CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
CTX CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three CRE CDO Classes to 'BB+'

DUNHILL ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
FALCON AUTO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes of Notes
FAYETTE COUNTY: S&P Junks Rating on Series 2004 Bonds From 'AAA'
FIRST DOMINION: S&P Withdraws Rating on Class A Notes
FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FF13 Securities

FORT POINT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-C1 Certs.
GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GREENS CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 1999-1 Certs.

GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2004-GG2 Securities
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2007-GKK1 Notes
GSAA ALT-A: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 27 Tranches
GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 2007-NC1 Securities
HIGH POINT: Moody's Confirms Long-Term Rating on $4 Mil. Bonds

INDYMAC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
ING INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ISCHUS CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 2007-LDP12 Securities
JP MORGAN: S&P Junks Rating on Class A-2 Certificate From 'B'

JPMORGAN RV: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-2 Notes From 'BB+'
JWS CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of 2000-1 Notes
KINGSLAND I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
KINGSLAND V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LAFAYETTE SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes

LCM I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
LCM VI: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
LNR CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of 2002-1 Notes
LNR CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes 2007-2 of Notes
LBSBC NIM: S&P Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes

M-2 SPC: Moody's Junks Ratings on $125 Mil. Series 2005-G Notes
MBIA INSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Hybrid CDO Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2006-Canada 20 Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Rating on Three 2006-HE5 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-WMC2 Securities

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 19 2003-IQ6 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-HQ13 Securities
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NACM CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2003-1 Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes

ONE WALL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
PASADENA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
RASC SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five 2007-KS2 Securities
RYLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 1993-06A Certs.
SARGAS CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

SAYBROOK POINT: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A Secured Notes
SCHILLER PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
SCOTTISH RE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Securities
SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Securities
SOUTH COAST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

STACK 2004-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
STACK LTD: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-1 Notes
STARTS 2007-21: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $25 Mil. Notes
STARTS LIMITED: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A4-D4 Notes
STEARNS: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various 2000-1 Notes

STEERS MORNINGSIDE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-1 Certs.
STEERS MORNINGSIDE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2005-4 Certs.
STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

SUMMIT LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
VENTURE IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 16 2006-C25 Certs.
WG HORIZONS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
WILLACOOCHEE CITY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Bonds From 'Ba3'

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Five CDO Retranches
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches From 27 Synthetic CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 249 Classes From 27 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 349 Classes From 45 RMBS Transsactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 717 Classes From 206 RMBS Transactions

* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 11 Emerging Market Transactions



                            *********

505 CLO III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Senior Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of these notes issued by 505 CLO III Ltd.:

  -- US$62,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     August 2018, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$48,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     August 2018, Upgraded to A3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 23,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on March 23,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the B Notes and the
upgrade actions on the Class C, Class D and Class E Notes consider
updated analysis incorporating certain rating stresses assumed by
Moody's (discussed below) and credit deterioration, but reflect
Moody's conclusion that the impact of these factors on the ratings
of the notes is not as negative as previously assessed during
Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem
from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II
of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.  In
its analysis, Moody's also considered the positive implications of
the continued deleveraging of the transaction as a result of the
partial paydown of the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes.  Over the
course of the last three payment dates, the principal balances of
the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes have both been reduced by about
24.3%.

Moody's rating analysis applies certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

505 CLO III Ltd., issued in August of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


505 CLO IV: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of these notes issued by 505 CLO IV LTD.:

  -- US$62,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     August 2018, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$48,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     August 2018, Upgraded to A3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 23,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on March 23,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the B Notes and the
upgrade actions on the Class C, Class D and Class E Notes consider
updated analysis incorporating certain rating stresses assumed by
Moody's (discussed below) and credit deterioration, but reflect
Moody's conclusion that the impact of these factors on the ratings
of the notes is not as negative as previously assessed during
Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem
from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II
of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.  In
its analysis, Moody's also considered the positive implications of
the continued deleveraging of the transaction as a result of the
partial paydown of the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes.  Over the
course of the last three payment dates, the principal balances of
the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes have both been reduced by about
25.5%.

Moody's rating analysis applies certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

505 CLO IV LTD., issued in August of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACA CLO 2007-1, Limited:

  -- US$259,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on June 29, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$19,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,875,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022
     (current balance of $10,964,769), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,750,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Reinvestment Test.  In particular, as of the last trustee report,
dated August 14, 2009, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $12.07 million, accounting for roughly 3.68%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 4.6% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Additionally, Moody's observes that the transaction is exposed to
a number of mezzanine CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
Some of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-
grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may
herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress
factors to default probability assumptions for structured finance
asset collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's
CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

ACA CLO 2007-1, Limited, issued in June 29, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-NC3 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
securities issued by ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-NC3.  The rating actions are the result of recent
deterioration relative to expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's have increased Moody's loss projection on
the underlying assets in light of recent increases in both
default-rate and loss severity.

Generally, the downgraded securities are expected to ultimately
recover less of their outstanding principal balance than had
previously been expected.  The Class A-2A in particular is at
higher risk of losses if it is not paid off before supporting
subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the event that
subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal has
structural features that redirect principal payments pro-rata
toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp.  Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
NC3

  -- Pool current expected loss: 43% of original balance

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 16, 2009
     Confirmed at Baa3

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 16, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 16, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 16, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2


AES EASTERN: Moody's Gives Negative Outlook; Rates Certs. at 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has revised AES Eastern Energy, L.P.'s
outlook to negative from stable.  AEE's Series 1999 Pass Through
Trust Certificates are rated Ba1.  The negative outlook reflects
Moody's expectation that AEE could experience a further
deterioration in financial performance in 2010 as a result of its
reduced energy hedging program together with currently weak energy
market conditions.

Due to the underlying regulatory uncertainties and energy market
illiquidity AES Eastern has not added any new energy hedges for
2010 in at least the past fifteen months and currently has energy
hedges in place through 2010 covering just 12% of its total
available generating capacity.  This contrasts sharply with its
hedged position over the past few years.  As recently as June
2008, it was 65% hedged through the end of 2009 and 10% hedged
through 2010 and it was even more hedged in prior years.  While
the project has entered into gas hedges that are expected to cover
an additional 33% of its expected energy generation in 2010,
Moody's does not believe that these offer the same degree of cash
flow certainty as energy hedges as they leave the project exposed
to fluctuations in the market heat rate.

Reflecting the drop in demand for power that has resulted from the
current economic recession and mild weather conditions, the 365
day rolling average around the clock price for energy in the
region in which the project is located had fallen by nearly 50% as
of the end of July to just $42/MWh from $62/MWh a year ago.
Forward prices for 2010 have experienced a similar decline.
Additionally, the project's weighted average capacity factors for
the six months through June declined to 68% from 80% during the
same period the prior year, a decline of 15%.  This trend has been
exacerbated by the sharp decline in natural gas prices, which has
allowed gas-fired generation to displace coal-fired generation in
the supply stack at times.  As a result, some of AES Eastern's
units have been shut down for extended periods while others have
been economically dispatched at reduced output levels or even
ramped down to minimum generating capacity during off-peak
periods.  The capacity factors also reflect the fact that at times
some of the units have been kept on line for system reliability
purposes even if it was not otherwise economic to dispatch them.

While rent coverage declined considerably during the first six
months of the year from 3.1x over the previous six month period,
it remained relatively robust at 2.3x.  As of July, the company
forecast that coverage would equal roughly 2.0x through the end of
2011.  However, Moody's believes these forecasts may be somewhat
optimistic as they incorporate expectations for a rebound in
revenues notwithstanding the significant reduction in the
company's hedged position and the currently weak energy market
conditions.

Given the negative outlook, the rating is unlikely to be upgraded
in the near to medium term.  The outlook could be revised to
stable, however, if the company is able to achieve its financial
forecasts and it adds a significant degree of energy hedging for
at least the current and coming year.  The rating could face
downward pressure if rent coverages fall below 2.0x and the
company does not materially increase its hedged energy position.

The last rating action on the company's debt occurred on April 26,
1999 when the Ba1 rating was assigned.

AES Eastern operates a portfolio of four coal-fired power plants
with a total of 1,166 MWs of baseload generating capacity in
western New York.  The portfolio includes facilities at Somerset
(675 MW) and Cayuga (303 MW), which are leased from independent
owner trusts, in addition to smaller and older units at Westover
(84 MW) and Greenidge (104 MW), which are owned by affiliates of
AEE.  All four plants participate in the NYISO's wholesale energy
and capacity markets on a merchant basis.  Somerset and Cayuga,
which have historically been among the lowest cost assets in
western and central New York, generate the large majority of the
portfolio's cash flows.  AES Eastern is a wholly owned subsidiary
of AES NY, LLC and AES NY2, LLC, which are, in turn, both wholly
owned subsidiaries of AES Corporation (B1 corporate family
rating).


AIR FORCE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Certificates to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-' on Riverside County Public Financing Authority,
California's certificates of participation, issued on behalf of
Air Force Village West Inc.  The outlook remains negative.

The lower rating reflects Standard & Poor's view of AFVW's
significant decline in independent-living occupancy level, coupled
with declining liquidity and continued operating losses that have
accelerated at the eight-month interim period ended August 2009.
In fiscal 2008, AFVW breached several covenants on its series 1999
and 2005 debt, including rate and occupancy violations.
Currently, S&P understand that management is working with
investors and KBC Bank to obtain waivers with respect to the
covenant violations.  Due to the ongoing negotiations, the final
fiscal 2008 audit has been delayed.  Given that AFVW has
approximately 30% of variable-rate debt with the series 2005
bonds, there is exposure to renewal risk and likely increased
letter of credit costs at time of renewal (set to expire April
2010), as well as the potential for an acceleration of the
variable-rate debt by the bank as a remedy for the certain
covenant violations.

AFVW currently has cash in excess of its variable-rate-debt
exposure.  However, should there be a need to use unrestricted
cash to cover a portion or all of the variable-rate debt, AFVW's
liquidity position would be diminished and, in S&P's opinion,
likely resulting in a lowering of the rating.  While management
has told us that its negotiations and relationship with KBC Bank
are positive, S&P believes the risk is still present and this risk
is reflected in the lower rating and negative outlook.  For fiscal
2008 results, Standard & Poor's used AFVW's draft audited
statements.

Other credit concerns, in S&P's opinion, include AFVW's reliance
on investment earnings and entrance fees to service its debt,
history of rate increases or revenue growth that have failed to
keep pace with expenses, and a service area that in S&P's view has
been hit very hard by the housing crisis and economic downturn.

Factors that support the 'BB+' rating include S&P's view of AFVW's
good operational liquidity for the rating level even with the
continued decline in unrestricted cash, while debt liquidity is
more limited and AFVW's historical market niche as one of two
continuing-care retirement communities in California that serve
retired and honorably separated officers of the seven branches of
the uniformed services.

"The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of AFVW's accelerated
operating losses, continued liquidity erosion, and much weaker
occupancy levels," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Stephen
InfranCo. "If occupancy levels do not improve and operating losses
remain at current levels or higher, S&P believes AFVW will likely
erode its cash position further and thus may warrant a lowering of
the rating," said Mr. InfranCo.

The negative rating outlook also reflects Standard & Poor's
concern about AFVW's variable-rate debt exposure.

A return to a stable outlook, according to Standard & Poor's,
would depend upon, among other factors, much improved operating
performance, including improved occupancy levels and at least
stable liquidity.


ANTARES FUNDING: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating on five classes of notes
from Antares Funding, LP/Corp., a CDO managed by GE Asset
Management.  A complete list of rating actions follows at the end
of this release.

The affirmations of the class C, D and E notes reflect the
offsetting effects of structural and portfolio changes in the
transaction.  Class C notes are currently the most senior notes
since the transaction concluded its reinvestment period, and
principal amortization has redeemed the notes in order of
priority.  The class C notes began receiving principal
distributions on the distribution date on Sept. 14, 2009.  While
the credit enhancement to the class C notes has improved since the
last rating review on June 11, 2008, portfolio credit
deterioration and defaults have offset the effect.  The credit
enhancement of class D and E notes have also benefited from
portfolio amortization but are more vulnerable to the lower
quality assets.  Finally, principal proceeds have been used to
make up a class D interest shortfall, resulting in a reduction of
principal proceeds of approximately $1.4 million on a cumulative
basis.

The portfolio has experienced some negative credit migration since
the last rating review.  Credit deterioration in the portfolio is
particularly evidenced by the recent increase in defaulted
obligors, which were reported at 7.6% of the current collateral
balance as of the latest monthly report, dated Sept. 1, 2009.
Underlying obligors considered 'CCC+' or below represented about
34.7% of the portfolio, which exceeds the limit of 10%.  Over 7.3%
of the collateral portfolio are long-dated securities, which
presents market risk to the transaction, since they must be
liquidated on or prior to the stated maturity of the transaction.
Fitch has factored this risk in the cash flow model analysis.

In its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity to
potential softness in U.S. corporate recoveries.  To accomplish
this, Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for each
asset type by 30% in one sensitivity scenario and by 50% in a
second sensitivity scenario.  The class C notes were less
sensitive to lower recovery rates and have therefore been assigned
Stable Outlooks.

The Loss Severity ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.

The ratings of the classes C and D notes address the likelihood
that investors will receive ultimate and compensating interest
payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.  The rating
of the class E notes addresses the likelihood that investors will
receive the stated balance of principal by the legal final
maturity date.  To date, the class E notes have received 77.7% of
their original stated balance.

Antares is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Dec. 14, 1999.  The transaction's substitution period
ended on Dec. 4, 2009, and the notes are scheduled to mature on
Dec. 14, 2011.  The portfolio is composed of 71.5% loans and 28.5%
bonds as of the Sept. 1, 2009 trustee report.  The three largest
industries are Industrial and Manufacturing at 11.1%, Healthcare
at 11.1% and Consumer Products at 9.7%.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $25,984,495 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS3';

  -- $13,676,060 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS3';

  -- $23,911,911 class D-1 notes affirmed at 'CC/RR3' (revised
     from 'CC/DR3);

  -- $14,065,830 class D-2 notes affirmed at 'CC/RR3' (revised
     from 'CC/DR3');

  -- $9,372,583 class E notes affirmed at 'C/RR6' (revised from
     'CC/DR6').


ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ARES Enhanced Loan Investment
Strategy IR:

  -- US$373,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on September 4, 2008
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$24,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 20,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$ 13,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed On Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  As of the last
trustee report, dated August 12, 2009, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $17.3 million,
accounting for roughly 3.5% of the collateral balance and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 13.3% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also notes that the weighted
average rating factor is 2572 based on the same report.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans and
high yield bonds will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

ARES Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy IR, issued in September of
2008, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-6 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-6 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on six additional classes and removed two of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
mezzanine and subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of two of the three
specially serviced loans and one loan that S&P considers credit
impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.29x and a loan-to-value ratio of 115.5%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.81x and an LTV of
153.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 93.4% and 40.4%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
LTV calculations noted above exclude two (1.7%) of the three
specially serviced loans and one asset (6.1%) that S&P considers
credit impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for these three
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

As of the September 2009 remittance report, three loans
($48.4 million, 2.0%) in the pool, including the 10th-largest
exposure (discussed in more detail below), are with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  One ($3.4 million,
0.1%) of the specially serviced loans is more than 90 days
delinquent, one ($39.0 million, 1.6%) is 60 days delinquent, and
one ($6.0 million, 0.3%) is current.  There is a $459,928
appraisal reduction amount in effect against one of the specially
serviced loans.  In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P
considers one loan, the EZ Storage Portfolio loan ($150.0 million,
6.1%), to be credit impaired; S&P discuss this loan in detail
below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 116 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.44 billion, compared with 117 loans with an aggregate trust
balance of $2.46 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Bank of America N.A.  The master servicer provided
financial information for 99.2% of the pool, and 99.3% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.30x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.29x and
115.5%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
two ($42.4 million, 1.7%) of the three specially serviced loans,
and one loan ($150 million, 6.1%) that S&P determined to be credit
impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for these three loans.
Servicer-reported financial information was available for all
three of these loans, and based on this information, the weighted-
average DSC for these loans was 0.98x.  To date, the transaction
has experienced realized losses in the amount of $115,206 on one
loan.  The master servicer reported a watchlist of 31 loans
($1.09 billion, 44.5%), including six of the top 10 exposures.
Eleven loans ($426.1 million, 17.4%) in the pool have reported DSC
between 1.10x and 1.00x, and 12 loans ($117.5 million, 4.8%) have
reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.52 billion (62.0%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.26x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.24x and
118.4%, respectively.  These calculations exclude the 1700
Twinbrook Office Center loan, which is a top 10 loan that is
currently with the special servicer, and the EZ Storage Portfolio
loan, which is a top 10 loan that S&P considers credit impaired.
Six ($853.0 million, 34.9%) of the top 10 loans appear on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The three largest of these, as well
as the top 10 loan with the special servicer, are discussed below.

The 1700 Twinbrook Office Center loan, which is the 10th-largest
loan in the pool, is with the special servicer.  The loan has a
balance of $39.0 million (1.6%) and is secured by a 162,357-sq.-
ft. office property in Rockville, Md.  The loan is 60 days
delinquent.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
June 2009.  The borrower has cited significant cash flow
shortfalls.  The special servicer is reviewing the file to
determine the workout strategy going forward.  At this time,
Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of this loan.

The Riverchase Galleria loan, which is the largest loan in the
pool, appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to General
Growth Properties' bankruptcy filing.  The loan has a trust
balance of $305.0 million (12.5%) and is secured by a 581,630-sq.-
ft. retail shopping mall in Hoover, Alabama.  The loan reported
DSC of 1.14x at year-end 2008 and was reported as being current on
the September 2009 remittance report.  S&P will continue to
monitor the developments relating to this loan and will take
rating actions on this transaction as necessary.

The Chicago Loop Portfolio loan, the fifth-largest loan in the
pool, appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.
The loan has a trust balance of $164.2 million (6.7%) is secured
by three office towers (with some retail) in downtown Chicago,
comprising 1,634,750-sq.-ft.  DSC and occupancy at year-end 2008
were 1.05x and 74.0%, respectively.  The low year-end 2008 DSC was
partly due to new tenants at the property being in a free rent
period.  DSC has since improved to 1.15x at June 2009, while
occupancy remains at 74.0%.  The loan is scheduled to be removed
from the master servicer's watchlist based on the updated
financial information.

The EZ Storage Portfolio loan, the sixth-largest loan in the pool,
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.  The
loan has a trust balance of $150.0 million (6.1%) and is secured
by 48 self-storage facilities with a total of 30,797 units, with
geographic concentrations in Detroit, Michigan; Minneapolis,
Minnesota; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Boston, Massachusetts.  The
consolidated DSC was 1.07x at year-end 2008, and the consolidated
occupancy was 66.4% at March 2009.  Based on the low DSC and
occupancy, at this time, S&P considers this asset to be credit
impaired.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-6
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class       To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --        ----             ----------------------
    A-4         A         AAA/Watch Neg                     30.23
    A-1A        A         AAA/Watch Neg                     30.23
    A-M         BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                     20.15
    A-J         BB        AAA/Watch Neg                     12.22
    B           BB-       AA/Watch Neg                      10.20
    C           B+        AA-/Watch Neg                      9.19
    D           B         A/Watch Neg                        7.93
    E           B         A-/Watch Neg                       6.67
    F           B-        BBB+/Watch Neg                     5.54
    G           B-        BBB/Watch Neg                      4.40
    H           CCC+      BBB-/Watch Neg                     3.15
    J           CCC       BB/Watch Neg                       2.89
    K           CCC       BB-/Watch Neg                      2.52
    L           CCC       B+/Watch Neg                       2.14
    M           CCC       B/Watch Neg                        2.01
    N           CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                       1.63
    O           CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg                     1.26

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-6
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class       To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --        ----             ----------------------
    A-3         AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                   30.23
    A-SB        AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                   30.23

                         Ratings Affirmed

            Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-6

    Class              Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----              ------             ----------------------
    A-1                AAA                                 30.23
    A-2                AAA                                 30.23
    XP                 AAA                                   N/A
    XC                 AAA                                   N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-PW13 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative
nine classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities, 2006-
PW13, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  Fitch also
assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity Ratings.  A detailed
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 6.3% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
4.9%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 4.9% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 37.7% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.  Approximately 70.4%
of the recognized losses were due to loans reviewed in detail.

Approximately 8.9% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 4.2% in 2011 and 4.7% in 2013.  All losses associated with
these loans are recognized in the rating actions.

Fitch identified 32 Loans of Concern (10.6%) within the pool, five
of which (2%) are specially serviced.  Four of the specially
serviced loans are current (1.8%).  Two of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (4.4%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans (28.6%)
by unpaid principal balance.

Five of the loans within the top 15 (10.7%) are expected to
default during the term, with loss severities ranging from 11% to
47%.  The largest contributors to loss are: CSM Hotel Portfolio
(2.9% of the pool), Paces West (3%) and Le Pavilion Hotel (1.5%).

The CSM Hotel Portfolio consists of eight hotel properties
comprising 1,050 rooms located in Minnesota, Massachusetts,
Oregon, Washington and Michigan.  The CSM Hotel Portfolio includes
one Marriott-flagged full service hotel, two Courtyard by
Marriott-flagged limited service hotels, three Residence Inn-
flagged extended stay hotels, and two TownePlace Suites flagged
extended stay hotels.  The hotels were built between 1984 and
2002.  The servicer-reported year-end 2008 and second quarter 2009
DSCR was 1.94 times (x); however, it has declined to 1.02x as of
June 2009.  Based on an anticipated continued decline in
performance a default is probable prior to the loan's maturity in
May 2016.

Paces West is secured by a 646,471 square foot office complex
located in Atlanta, Georgia.  The property consists of two
separate buildings.  Paces One was built in 1987 and contains 14
stories, while Paces Two was completed in 1989 and contains 17
stories.  As of March 31, 2009, servicer reported occupancy and
annualized DSCR was 82% and 1.18x, respectively.  Based on
anticipated declines in performance, including high lease rollover
during the loan term, a default is probable prior to the loan's
maturity in May 2016.

Le Pavilion Hotel is secured by a 226-room full-service luxury
hotel property built in 1907 and renovated in 2003, located in the
Central Business District of New Orleans, Louisiana.  The servicer
reported year-end 2008 and second quarter 2009 DSCR was 0.85x for
both periods.  Additionally, ADR and RevPAR have decreased since
year-end 2008 to second quarter 2009 dropping from $146.5 and $104
to $67.9 and $46.9, respectively.  Based on an anticipated
continued decline in performance a default is probable prior to
the loan's maturity in May 2016.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity to these classes:

  -- $232.5 million class A-J to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $65.4 million class B to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $40 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $32.7 million class F to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $32.7 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.2 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.6 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $10.9 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.3 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.3 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.3 million class O to 'B-/LS5' from 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $83.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $60.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $138 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $136.1 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.19 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $363.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $290.7 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $36.3 million class P.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Puts 2005-PWR10 Note Ratings on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings places 16 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-PWR10, on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $210.7 million class A-J 'AAA';
  -- $19.8 million class B 'AA+';
  -- $29.6 million class C 'AA';
  -- $23.0 million class D 'AA-';
  -- $16.5 million class E 'A+';
  -- $26.3 million class F 'A';
  -- $26.3 million class G 'A-';
  -- $29.6 million class H 'BBB+';
  -- $26.3 million class J 'BBB';
  -- $36.2 million class K 'BB+';
  -- $3.3 million class L 'BB';
  -- $9.9 million class M 'BB-';
  -- $13.2 million class N 'B+';
  -- $6.6 million class O 'B';
  -- $6.6 million class P 'B-';
  -- $9.9 million class Q 'B-'.

The Rating Watch Negative placements on classes A-J through Q are
due to the transfer of the second largest loan (8.6%), World
Market Center, to special servicing in September 2009, as well as
recent transfers to special servicing of five additional loans
(2.9%).  In total, there are eight loans in special servicing
(12.1%).

World Market Center is secured by a 1.1 million square foot
furniture showroom space located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  For the
year-ended 2008, the servicer reported a debt service coverage
ratio of 1.05 times and occupancy of 88%.  For the first quarter
of 2009, the servicer-reported DSCR had dropped to 0.98x.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch status of these classes
as more information on the potential workout and valuation of the
assets becomes available.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TOP28 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various actions, including downgrades, on Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2007-TOP28.  A detailed list of
rating actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 2.5% for this transaction should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
1.9%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 1.9% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 49.5% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
The sampled loans represent 86.3% of the recognized losses.

Approximately 10.1% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 1.6% in 2011, 4.1% in 2012, and 4.4% in 2014.  All losses
associated with these loans are fully recognized in the rating
actions.

Fitch identified 27 Loans of Concern (10.4%) within the pool.
There are currently no specially serviced loans.

Eight of the top 15 loans (13.1%) are expected to default during
the term or at maturity, with loss severities up to 36%.  The
largest contributors to loss are: The Shops at Biddeford Crossing
(2.6%), The Cove Apartments (1.7%) and Pavilions at Hartman
Heritage (1.3%).

The Shops at Biddeford Crossing is a 384,655 square foot retail
center in Biddeford, ME.  The servicer reported June 2009 debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.08 times and 92%,
respectively, compared to 1.40x and 98% at issuance.  Although
performance has declined since issuance, occupancy improved from
88% at year end 2008.  Based on current occupancy, Fitch does not
expect the loan to default during the term.

The Cove Apartments is a 652-unit multifamily property in Phoenix,
AZ.  The servicer reported June 2009 DSCR and occupancy were 1.19x
and 74%, respectively, compared to 2.10x and 91% at issuance.
Based on current performance and market conditions, Fitch expects
the loan to default during the term.

Pavilions at Hartman Heritage is a 223,881 sf retail in
Independence, Missouri.  The servicer reported March 2009 DSCR and
occupancy were 1.03x and 50%, respectively, compared to 2.06x and
92% at issuance.  Based on current performance, losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Fitch has downgraded, revised the Rating Outlooks and assigned
Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $15.4 million class C to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $22 million class E to 'BBB/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $17.6 million class F to 'BBB/LS4' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $19.8 million class G to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $15.4 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $2.2 million class J to 'B/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $2.2 million class K to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $2.2 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $4.4 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $4.4 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed, revised Rating Outlooks and assigned LS
ratings to this class:

  -- $114.5 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $30.8 million class B at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $28.6 million class D at 'A/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $2.2 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Also, Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $66.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $63.2 million class A-2 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $79.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $76.4 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $841.7 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $145.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $176.1 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The $17.6 million class P is not rated by Fitch.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1 Certificate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the Class
A-1 certificate issued by Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc.
NIM Trust 2004-15 resecuritized transaction.

The certificate in the resecuritization is backed by one or more
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc.  NIM Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 20, 2004
    Assigned Baa2


BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Blackrock Senior Income Series:

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016 (current balance of $295,654,741), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on October 20, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes due 2016, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes due 2016 (current balance of $4,379,634),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Deferrable Notes due 2016 (current balance of $4,415,650),
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class 1 Composite Securities, Downgraded to
     Caa1; previously on October 20, 2004 Assigned Ba1.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$29,500,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2016, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,500,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2016, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class C and Class D
Overcollateralization Tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2543 as of the last trustee report, dated September 4, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $9 million, accounting for roughly 2.5%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 8.4% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class C
Overcollateralization Test was reported at 104.37% versus a test
level of 105.3% and the Class D Overcollateralization Test was
reported at 101.86% versus a test level of 103.2%.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Blackrock Senior Income Series, issued on October 20, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BRISTOL CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of Notes issued by Bristol CDO I, Ltd.
The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$223,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2032, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- US$20,500,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2032, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     2/26/2009 Downgraded to Caa3

Bristol CDO I, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation backed by
a portfolio with a significant concentration in Residential ABS
Securities.  RMBS is approximately 37% of the underlying portfolio
of which the majority is 2002 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The ratings of approximately 19% of
the underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last
review of the transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reports
that the WARF of the portfolio is 3,747 as of August 31, 2009 and
also reports defaulted assets in the amount of $17 million.
Securities rated "Caa1" or lower make up approximately 42% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Trustee reports also that coverage
tests are failing, including the Class A and Class B
Overcollateralization Ratio Tests.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Section V of the Indenture dated October 11, 2002, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of five classes of Notes issued by C-BASS CBO IX Limited.
The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$220,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Baa1; previously
     on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously Downgraded to Caa1

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Fifth Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Deferrable Interest Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously Downgraded to Caa3

C-BASS CBO IX Ltd is a collateralized debt obligation backed by a
portfolio that has a significant concentration in Residential ABS
Securities.  RMBS is approximately 78% of the underlying portfolio
of which the majority is 2002-2004 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities rated
"Caa1" and below.  The ratings of approximately 16% of the
underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review
of the transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reports that the
WARF of the portfolio is 2,445 as of August 31, 2009, and also
reports defaulted assets in the amount of $17.1 million.
Securities rated "Caa1" or lower make up approximately 20% of the
underlying portfolio.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Section V of the Indenture dated March 23, 2004, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


C-BASS CBO XI: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades four classes of notes issued by C-BASS
CBO XI, LTD.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004 vintage residential mortgage-backed securitizations
since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009.  Approximately
58.4% of the portfolio has been downgraded since the last review,
with about 35% of the portfolio downgraded since June 1, 2009.
The main drivers for the downgrades in the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securitizations during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

The credit deterioration has resulted in a portfolio with an
average rating of 'B-' compared to 'BB+' at the last review.  In
addition, approximately 23.2% of the portfolio is defaulted per
the governing documents of the transaction and 55.8% of the
portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade,
compared to 5.7% and 25.2%, respectively, in February 2009.

The significant credit deterioration has caused all
overcollateralization tests to fail, resulting in interest
proceeds being diverted to redeem the class A notes in order to
cure the failing A/B OC test.  The class A and B notes will be
reliant on the performance of assets rated 'CCC' and below for
full principal repayment.  Due to the placement of the A/B OC test
the class C and D notes are not receiving interest payments.
Future payments to the class C notes will be dependent on the
performance of the performing portfolio and ultimate recoveries
received on defaulted assets.  The class D notes are not expected
to receive any future distributions.

In Fitch's opinion, based on the percentage of defaulted assets
and the performance expectations for the remainder of the
portfolio, the class A and B notes are downgraded to 'CCC' to
reflect the high possibility of default at or prior to maturity.
The classes C notes are downgraded to 'CC' which reflects that
there is a high probability the notes will default, and the class
D notes are downgraded to 'C', indicating Fitch's belief that
default is inevitable at or prior to maturity.

C-BASS XI is a cashflow collateralized debt obligation that closed
on Sept. 14, 2004 and is managed by C-BASS Investment Management.
The portfolio is composed of 80.7% RMBS, 6.8% structured finance
CDOs, 10.3% asset-backed securities and 2.2% commercial mortgage
backed securities, with 93.7% of these assets originated in 2004.

Fitch has downgraded these:

C-BASS CBO XI, LTD

  -- $169,354,001 class A notes to 'CCC' from 'A', Outlook Stable;

  -- $17,500,000 class B notes to 'CCC' from 'BBB+', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $ 20,000,000 class C notes to 'CC' from 'BBB-', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $14,250,000 class D notes to 'C' from 'BB-', Outlook Stable'.


C-BASS CBO XII: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades four classes of notes issued by C-BASS
CBO XII, LTD.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004 vintage residential mortgage-backed securitizations
since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009.  Approximately
71% of the portfolio has been downgraded since the last review,
with about 36.2% of the portfolio downgraded since June 1, 2009.
The main drivers for the downgrades in the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securitizations during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

The credit deterioration has resulted in a portfolio with an
average rating of 'B-' compared to 'BB+' at the last review.  In
addition, approximately 24.7% of the portfolio is defaulted per
the transaction's governing documents and 58% of the portfolio has
a Fitch derived rating below investment grade, compared to 3% and
15%, respectively, in February 2009.

The significant credit deterioration has caused all
overcollateralization tests to fail, resulting in interest
proceeds being diverted to redeem the class A notes in order to
cure the failing A/B OC test.  The class A and B notes will be
reliant on the performance of assets rated 'CCC' and below for
full principal repayment.  Due to the placement of the A/B OC test
the class C and D notes are not receiving interest payments and
are not expected to receive future distributions.

In Fitch's opinion, based on the percentage of defaulted assets
and the performance expectations for the remainder of the
portfolio, the class A notes are downgraded to 'CCC' to reflect
the possibility of the notes defaulting at or prior to maturity.
The class B notes are downgraded to 'CC' to show there is a high
probability of default at or prior to maturity.  The classes C and
D notes are downgraded to 'C', indicating Fitch's belief that
default is inevitable at or prior to maturity.

C-BASS XII is a cashflow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) that
closed on Dec. 16, 2004, and is managed by C-BASS Investment
Management.  The portfolio is composed of 88.4% residential
mortgage-backed securities, 6.5% structured finance CDOs, 3.4%
asset-backed securities and 1.7% commercial mortgage backed
securities, with 93.2% of these assets originated in 2004.

Fitch has downgraded these:

C-BASS CBO XII, LTD

  -- $157,078,373 class A notes to 'CCC' from 'A+', Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $14,000,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'A', Outlook Stable;

  -- $24,000,000 class C notes to 'C' from 'BB+', Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,690,430 class D notes to 'C' from 'B+', Outlook Stable.


CENTRAL PACIFIC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Securities to 'C/RR6'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings for the hybrid securities
of Central Pacific Financial Corp. to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6' to
reflect that CPF has deferred on its dividend payments for its
hybrid securities, including its $135 million of preferred stock
issued to the U.S. Treasury as part of the capital purchase
program.  All other Fitch ratings for CPF (Issuer Default Rating
of 'CCC') are unaffected by this action.

Fitch indicated in its Aug. 6, 2009 rating action commentary that
the deferral of dividends on CPF's hybrid securities could be
imminent.  Further, while the hybrids are structured to be
deferrable and thus not in default, Fitch considers the deferral
to be non-performance which translates into a 'C' rating
classification.

Fitch has maintained a recovery rating of 'RR6' on the preferred
and trust preferred securities of CPF.  The 'RR6' implies recovery
between 0%-10% on these issues should the issuer fail or default.

CPF is a $5.5 billion banking company headquartered in Honolulu,
HI.  CPF provides a full range of traditional commercial and
consumer banking services.  Through its bank subsidiary, Central
Pacific Bank, the company operates 39 branches through-out Hawaii.

Fitch has downgraded these ratings:

Central Pacific Financial Corp.

  -- Preferred Stock downgraded to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.

CPB Capital Trust I, II, & IV
CPB Statutory Trust III & V

  -- Trust Preferred Securities downgraded to 'C/RR6' from
     'CC/RR6'.


CENTRAL PLAINS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007B Bonds to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on Central
Plains Energy Project series 2007A fixed-rate gas project revenue
bonds and series 2007B index-rate gas project revenue bonds to
'BB+' from 'BBB'.  The outlook is negative.

The rating and outlook on the CPEP bonds is currently linked to
the rating and outlook on MBIA Insurance Corp., which guarantees
the debt service reserve repurchase agreement provided by MBIA
Inc. The repurchase agreement has been deemed to be insufficient
to delink the ratings on MBIA Insurance from the ratings on the
CPEP transaction under Standard & Poor's counterparty criteria.
The overcollateralization levels and permitted securities under
the repurchase agreement are below the threshold required by
Standard & Poor's.  In addition, the repurchase agreement does not
include a covenant related to additional collateral and
replacement as required under S&P's criteria.

On Sept. 28, 2009, S&P downgraded MBIA Insurance and MBIA Inc.
because losses on the group's 2005-2007 vintage direct RMBS and
CDO of ABS could be higher than S&P had expected.  However, the
downgrade also reflects potentially increased losses in other
asset classes, including by not limited to CMBS -- for other years
prior to 2005 -- within RMBS.


CIT RV: S&P Junks Ratings on Class B 1998-A Notes From 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B notes issued by CIT RV Trust 1998-A to 'CCC-' from 'B-'.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-5 and B notes
from CIT RV Trust 1999-A at 'AAA' and 'CCC-', respectively.

The downgrade of class B from the 1998-A transaction reflects
S&P's assessment of the deteriorating performance of the
underlying collateral, which consists of recreational vehicle
loans that CIT acquired or originated, as well as the resulting
decline in available credit enhancement.  The affirmations
pertaining to the 1999-A transaction reflect adequate credit
support relative to remaining losses.

As of the September 2009 distribution date, the series 1998-A
trust had a pool factor of 3.1%; a cumulative net loss rate of
8.3%; and a 90-plus-day delinquency rate of 7.5% of the current
pool balance.  The 1998-A trust also continues to experience a
growing principal shortfall carryover (currently $6,060,865).  S&P
expects this transaction to experience base-case cumulative net
losses of 9.0%-10%.

S&P believes that the subordination provided by the certificate
class ('D') will eventually be eroded and excess spread will
continue to be insufficient to cover monthly net losses.  As a
result, S&P expects the credit enhancement available to cover
expected remaining losses for the series 1998-A transaction to
continue to decline.  S&P deems the lowered rating to be
appropriate given the percentage of available credit support
available relative to remaining losses.

As of the September 2009 distribution date, the series 1999-A
trust had a pool factor of 3.1%; a cumulative net loss rate of
9.0%; and a 90-plus-day delinquency rate of 3.7% of the current
pool balance.  The 1999-A trust also continues to experience a
growing principal shortfall carryover (currently $15.9 million).
S&P expects this transaction to experience base-case cumulative
net losses of 10%-11%.  However, S&P believes the credit support
available to the class A-5 and B notes is adequate to maintain
their assigned ratings of 'AAA' and 'CCC-' respectively.

                          Rating Lowered

                       CIT RV Trust 1998-A

                                            Rating
                                            ------
           Series         Class          To        From
           ------         -----          --        ----
           1998-A         B              CCC-      B-

                         Ratings Affirmed

                       CIT RV Trust 1999-A

               Series         Class          Rating
               ------         -----          ------
               1999-A         A-5            AAA
               1999-A         B              CCC-


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-AMC2 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3
securities issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC2.  The
rating actions are the result of recent deterioration relative to
expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's have increased Moody's loss projection on
the underlying assets in light of recent increases in both
default-rate and loss severity.

Generally, the downgraded securities are expected to ultimately
recover less of their outstanding principal balance than had
previously been expected.  The Class A-3A in particular is at
higher risk of losses if it is not paid off before supporting
subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the event that
subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal has
structural features that redirect principal payments pro-rata
toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC2
Pool current expected loss: 46 % of original balance

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3


CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns a Recovery Rating, and withdraws
the ratings on the classes of notes issued by Cloverie Plc 2005-
78, 2005-79, 2005-80, and 2005-81.

This rating action is a result of an early termination of each
transaction's underlying credit default and interest rate swaps on
Sept. 15, 2009.  All notes have taken a full loss, as a result of
multiple Credit Events with respect to obligations within the
reference portfolios of Cloverie 2005-78, 79, 80, and 81.

Accordingly, the notes are downgraded to 'D' with a Recovery
Rating of 'RR6', which indicates a recovery in the 0%-10% range.
The ratings are being simultaneously withdrawn.

Cloverie 2005-78, 79, 80, and 81 are partially funded, static
synthetic collateralized debt obligations that closed in November
2005.  The transactions represented leveraged exposure to
diversified portfolios of asset-backed securities.  The note
proceeds collateralized credit default swaps with Citigroup Global
Markets Limited as the Swap Counterparty.  A modified 'Pay-As-You-
Go' template was utilized to define the terms of the credit
default swap.

Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn these ratings:

  -- $15,000,000 class S-2 (2005-78) notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC';
  -- $15,000,000 class S-4 (2005-79) notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC';
  -- $15,000,000 class A (2005-80) notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC';
  -- $15,000,000 class B (2005-81) notes to 'D/RR6' from 'CC'.


COA CAERUS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by COA CAERUS CLO LTD.:

  -- US$181,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 19, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$13,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2019
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2019 Notes,
     Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due 2019 Notes,
     Confirmed at B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor)
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2743 versus a
test level of 2410 as of the last trustee report, dated
September 1, 2009.  Based on the same report, securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 15.7% of the underlying
portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

COA CAERUS CLO LTD., issued in December 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COMMODORE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of notes issued by
Commodore CDO III, Ltd.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004 and 2005 vintage residential mortgage-backed
securitizations experienced since Fitch's last rating action in
August 2008.  Approximately 87.6% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review, with about 52% of the portfolio
downgraded since June 1, 2009.  The main drivers for the
downgrades in the underlying RMBS during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

Approximately 75.1% of the portfolio carries a Fitch-derived
rating below investment grade, with 63.7% rated in the 'CCC'
category or lower.  This is up from 47.6% rated below investment
grade and 20.1% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.  As of
the September 2009 trustee report, 53.2% of the portfolio is
considered defaulted.

Given the composition of the portfolio, classes A-1A, A-1B, and A-
1C have a high probability of default and are downgraded to 'CC'.
The class A-2 and class B notes have been downgraded to 'C'
because Fitch believes that the default of these classes of notes
is inevitable.  The class C notes are receiving interest paid in
kind whereby the principal amount of the notes is written up by
the amount of interest due.  The class C notes have been affirmed
at 'C'.  Fitch does not expect this class to receive any future
payments.

Commodore III is a collateralized debt obligation that closed in
March 1, 2005.  The portfolio is monitored by Fischer Francis
Trees & Watts, Inc. reinvestment period ended in March 2008.  The
reference portfolio is composed of 71.4% subprime RMBS, 8.1%
commercial mortgage backed securities, 12.4% CDOs, 4.8% asset-
backed securities, and 3.3% prime RMBS.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $76,693,911 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A';
  -- $14,719,427 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A';
  -- $16,584,235 class A-1C notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A';
  -- $63,750,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BB';
  -- $50,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $20,068,861 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $2,509,741 class C-2 notes is affirmed at 'C'.


CORNERSTONE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Cornerstone CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$34,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$51,500,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These
revised assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation
that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect moderate credit deterioration in
the underlying portfolio.  Based on the last trustee report, dated
August 25, 2009, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $14 million, accounting for roughly 2% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 5% of the underlying portfolio.  In addition,
Moody's notes that the weighted average rating factor has slightly
increased over the last year and is currently 2434 as of the same
trustee report.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Cornerstone CLO Ltd., issued in July of 2007 and managed by Stone
Tower Debt Advisors LLC on behalf of the issuer, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C2 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on four classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of the pooled specially
serviced loans, as well as S&P's analysis of loans that S&P
considers credit-impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.29x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 118.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.83x and an LTV
of 147.7%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 94.3% and 44.2%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
LTV calculations noted above exclude all 10 (4.0%) of the
specially serviced loans and two credit impaired loans (16.6%).
S&P separately estimated losses for these loans, which are
included in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P downgraded classes P and Q to 'D' to reflect interest
shortfalls resulting from four appraisal reduction amounts
totaling $45.9 million in effect on four loans with the special
servicer.  S&P expects the shortfalls to recur in the future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the class A-X interest-only
certificates based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may
revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings,
including the rating on the IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Ten loans ($132.1 million, 4.0%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC.  The payment
status of the loans is: three are in foreclosure ($103.3 million,
3.1%), four are more than 90 days delinquent ($22.5 million,
0.7%), one is 60 days delinquent ($1.7 million, 0.1%), and two are
30 days delinquent ($4.6 million, 0.1%).  Four of the specially
serviced loans have ARAs in effect totaling $45.9 million.  One of
the specially serviced loans has a balance that is 2.8% of the
pool, and the remaining specially serviced loans have balances
that are less than 0.3% of the total pool balance.  The loan that
is 2.8% of the pool is the only top 10 loan with the special
servicer and is discussed below.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P considers the
Alliance SAFD - PJ ($475.0 million, 14.5%) and Broadway Portfolio
($70.0 million, 2.1%) loans credit impaired.  Both loans are
discussed below.  The Alliance SAFD - PJ loan is the largest loan
in the pool.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 207 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$3.29 billion, which represents approximately 99.7% of the trust
balance at issuance.  No loans have paid off or have been
liquidated since issuance.  The master servicers for the
transaction, KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. and Wachovia
Bank N.A., provided financial information for 98.5% of the pool;
94.5% of the financial information was full-year 2008 data or
interim 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.22x
for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.29x and 118.3%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures exclude all 10 of the specially serviced loans and
two loans that S&P considers credit impaired.  S&P estimated
losses separately for these loans ($677.1 million, 20.6%).  The
servicer reported DSC figures for 11 of these loans
($674.4 million, 20.5%).  Based on the servicer reported DSC
figures, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.01x for these
11 loans.  Thirty-five loans (31.4%) are on the master servicers'
watchlists, including three of the top 10 loans.  Forty-three
loans ($579.5 million, 17.6%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and
25 of these loans ($273.8 million, 8.3%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.48 billion (45.0%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.14x.
Three of the top 10 loans ($627.4 million, 19.1%) appear on the
master servicers' watchlists.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the
top 10 loans, excluding the one specially serviced loan and two
credit impaired loans, are 1.23x and 126.2%, respectively.

The Alliance SAFD - HC4 loan is the largest loan with the special
servicer and the sixth-largest loan in the pool.  The loan has a
trust balance of $93.0 million (2.8%) and is secured by 10
multifamily properties totaling 1,938 units in Texas and Florida.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in October 2008
due to an imminent default and is in foreclosure.  A receiver was
appointed in May 2009.  The properties are being actively
marketed.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of the loan.

The Alliance SAFD - PJ loan is the largest loan in the pool and
the largest credit impaired loan.  The sponsor of this loan,
Alliance Holdings LLC, is also the sponsor of the Alliance SAFD -
HC4 loan.  The loan is current and on the watchlist due to low
DSC.  The loan has a trust balance of $475.0 million (14.5%) and
is secured by 32 multifamily properties totaling 9,504 units in
five states, including Texas (20 properties; 58.7% of units),
Arizona (six properties; 19.0%), Florida (three properties; 9.4%),
Georgia (one property; 8.1%), and Tennessee (two properties;
4.7%).  For the trailing six months ended June 20, 2009, DSC was
0.98x and occupancy was 86%.  As of year-end 2008, DSC was 1.10x
and occupancy was 86%.  At issuance, the DSC was 1.37x and
occupancy was 89%.

The Broadway Portfolio loan is the eighth-largest loan in the pool
and a credit impaired loan.  The loan is current and is on the
watchlist due to the low DSC.  The loan has a trust balance of
$70.0 million (2.1%).  The loan is secured by 455 multifamily
units and 43 commercial units totaling 453,340 sq. ft. in eight
apartment buildings in the Washington Heights section of
Manhattan.  The remaining building is on 191st St. and Broadway.
The year-end 2008 DSC was 0.31x and occupancy was 97.4%, down from
1.36x and 99.0% at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
     Class     To     From              Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --     ----              ----------------------
     A-3       A-     AAA/Watch Neg                      30.11
     A-1A      A-     AAA/Watch Neg                      30.11
     A-M       BB+    AAA/Watch Neg                      20.07
     A-MFL     BB+    AAA/Watch Neg                      20.07
     A-J       B      AAA/Watch Neg                      11.79
     B         B      AA+/Watch Neg                      11.29
     C         B-     AA/Watch Neg                        9.66
     D         B-     AA-/Watch Neg                       8.78
     E         B-     A+/Watch Neg                        8.28
     F         B-     A/Watch Neg                         7.40
     G         CCC+   A-/Watch Neg                        6.52
     H         CCC+   BBB+/Watch Neg                      5.14
     J         CCC    BBB/Watch Neg                       4.01
     K         CCC    BBB-/Watch Neg                      3.01
     L         CCC    BB+/Watch Neg                       2.76
     M         CCC    BB/Watch Neg                        2.51
     N         CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg                       2.01
     O         CCC-   B+/Watch Neg                        1.88
     P         D      B/Watch Neg                         1.51
     Q         D      B-/Watch Neg                        1.25

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
             -----     ------    ----------------------
             A-1       AAA                        30.11
             A-2       AAA                        30.11
             A-AB      AAA                        30.11
             A-X       AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.  S&P
removed four of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative, and
three remain on CreditWatch negative.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed three other ratings from this transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on 29 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for Crystal River
2006-1.  The certificates are from 11 transactions, and the
securities total $163.6 million (42% of the pool balance).  Three
ratings on Crystal River 2006-1 remain on CreditWatch negative due
to the transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on
CreditWatch negative ($171.9 million, 44%).

According to the Aug. 24, 2009, trustee report, Crystal River
2006-1 is collateralized by 71 CMBS certificates ($390.5 million,
100%) from 32 distinct transactions issued between 2002 and 2007.
Crystal River 2006-1 has significant exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has recently downgraded:

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C4 (classes
  K through Q; $51.8 million, 13.3%);

* COMM 2005-C6 (classes H and J; $27.9 million, 7.2%);

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR9
  (classes H and J; $20.7 million, 5.3%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. series 2006-2 (classes
  J through O; $14.1 million, 3.6%); and

* CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust (classes J through M; $13 million,
  3.3%).

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on Crystal River 2006-1 in conjunction with S&P's
CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

             Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A                BB+/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
         B                B+/Watch Neg     BB-/Watch Neg
         C                B-/Watch Neg     B+/Watch Neg

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         D                CCC-             B/Watch Neg
         E                CCC-             CCC+/Watch Neg
         F                CCC-             CCC/Watch Neg
         G                CCC-             CCC/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         H                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         J                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         K                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg


CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8 tranches
from the CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-8.  The actions were driven by weaker than expected
performance on some pools since the last review.

Moody's has also corrected the ratings of Class V-A-2 and Class V-
A-3, which had been transposed in the February 25, 2009 press
release because of a transcription error.  In the February 25th
press release Moody's incorrectly stated that the V-A-2 was
downgraded to Ba2 from Aa1.  In fact, the V-A-2 class should have
been downgraded to Caa1 from Aa1.  The V-A-3 class was incorrectly
downgraded to Caa1 from Aaa.  In fact, the V-A-3 rating should
have been downgraded to Ba2 from Aaa.  The corrected ratings,
incorporating updated pool performance information, are now Ca for
Class V-A-2 (incorrectly published on February 25th as Ba2) and B3
for Class V-A-3 (incorrectly published on February 25th as Caa1).

Also addressed are the ratings of 1 tranche (Class III-A-13) from
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8, and
31 tranches from CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-6, which were incorrectly placed on review for
possible downgrade on March 19, 2009 due to an administrative
error.  Moody's has corrected the ratings of these 32 tranches by
expunging the earlier watch list action.  The current ratings on
these tranches are detailed below.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.  Moody's final
rating actions are based on current ratings, level of credit
enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level loss
expectations relative to current level of credit enhancement.
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.
General loss estimation methodology is outlined below.

For details regarding Moody's approach towards calculating updated
expected losses on Alt-A pools backed by collateral originations
from 2006 and 2007, please refer to the methodology publication
"Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update: January 2009," available on
Moodys.com.  Moody's followed a similar approach for deals from
the 2005 vintage with appropriate changes to certain key input
parameters such as severity and the rate of delinquency build up,
which would be generally lower relative to the 2006 and 2007
vintages.  These differences are aimed at better capturing the
specific characteristics of loans from the 2005 vintage that were
originated in an environment of relatively tighter underwriting
standards and also benefited from some initial home price
appreciation.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Current ratings are:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-6

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Current rating at Aaa; previously on March 19,
     2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Current rating at Ca; previously on March 19, 2009
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Current rating at Aa1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-6, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-7, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-8, Current rating at Baa1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-9, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Current rating at A1; previously on March 19, 2009
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-1, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A-2, Current rating at Ba2; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-1, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VII-A-2, Current rating at Ba2; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19,
     2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IX-A-1, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Current rating at Ba1; previously on March 19, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Current rating at A3; previously on March 19, 2009
     A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-X, Current rating at Baa3; previously on March 19, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-X, Current rating at Baa3; previously on March 19, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Current rating at Caa1; previously on March 19,
     2009 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Current rating at Ca; previously on March 19, 2009
     Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-8

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. III-A-13, Current rating at Aaa; previously on March 19,
     2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. IX-A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. IX-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. IX-A-13, Downgraded to B2; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. IX-A-15, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 25, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1


CTX CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three CRE CDO Classes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligations
from CTX CDO I Ltd. to 'BB+'.  The ratings on all 11 classes from
the transaction, including those with lowered ratings, remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The lowered ratings follow the Sept. 28, 2009, downgrade of MBIA
Insurance Corp., which is the super-senior counterparty for the
transaction, to 'BB+' from 'BBB'.  All 11 ratings remain on
CreditWatch negative due to the CRE CDO transaction's exposure to
commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral with ratings on
CreditWatch negative.

In S&P's review of the transaction documents for CTX CDO I Ltd.,
S&P did not find any provisions that could mitigate the impact of
a MBIA Insurance Corp. downgrade, such as requirements to post
collateral or find a replacement counterparty.  Due to the
transaction's structural linkage to MBIA Insurance Corp., the
ratings on the classes from the transaction may not be higher than
the rating on MBIA Insurance Corp. under S&P's criteria.  S&P
first discussed this linkage in "Five CTX CDO I Ltd. and CWCapital
COBALT III Synthetic CDO Ltd.

S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
CTX CDO I Ltd. after S&P resolves the CreditWatch placements
affecting the underlying CMBS collateral.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                          CTX CDO I Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         SS               BB+/Watch Neg    BBB/Watch Neg
         A                BB+/Watch Neg    BBB/Watch Neg
         B                BB+/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg

             Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                          CTX CDO I Ltd.

                 Class            Rating
                 -----            ------
                 C                BB+/Watch Neg
                 D                BB+/Watch Neg
                 E                BB/Watch Neg
                 F                B+/Watch Neg
                 G                B+/Watch Neg
                 H                B-/Watch Neg
                 J                CCC/Watch Neg
                 K                CCC/Watch Neg


DUNHILL ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades the notes issued by Dunhill ABS CDO, Ltd.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004 vintage residential mortgage-backed securitizations
since Fitch's last rating action.  Approximately 64% of the
portfolio has been downgraded since the last review, with about
43.3% downgraded since June 1, 2009.  The main drivers for the
downgrades in the underlying RMBS during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

The negative credit migration has left approximately 45.7% of the
entire portfolio considered defaulted per the transaction's
governing documents.  In addition, 67.5% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade including the 51.8% of
the portfolio rated in the 'CCC' rating category and below.

The deterioration has caused all overcollateralization and
interest coverage tests to fail by significant margins.  As a
result of the failing coverage tests, principal proceeds are being
used to redeem the class A-1 notes.  On the most recent payment
date in July 2009, some principal proceeds were used to pay class
A-2 and B interest prior to curing the failing coverage test,
further eroding par coverage to the notes.

The class A-1 notes will likely be reliant on the full return of
par on the performing portfolio, 40% of which is considered below
investment grade, plus some recovery on the already defaulted
assets in order to receive a full return of principal.  All junior
classes are reliant on the recoveries from defaulted assets for
any principal return.  The majority of the defaulted assets are
subprime RMBS and have little to no expected recovery.

In Fitch's opinion it is probable that the class A-1NV, A-1VA and
A-1VB notes will default and inevitable that all other classes
will default at their maturity.

Dunhill is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
Dec. 16, 2004, and is managed by Vanderbilt Capital Advisors LLC.
Dunhill's reinvestment period ended in April 2007.  Dunhill has a
portfolio comprised primarily of (82%) subprime RMBS bonds, (11%)
prime RMBS, (5%) structured finance CDOs and (2%) other structured
finance assets.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Dunhill ABS CDO, Ltd.

  -- $130,539,007 class A-1NV notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A-';
  -- $99,679 class A-1VA notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A-';
  -- $7,974,324 class A-1VB notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'A-';
  -- $57,500,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BB';
  -- $55,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $19,106,647 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.


FALCON AUTO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 20 classes and
confirmed the ratings of two classes from three Falcon Financial
deals.  The securities are backed by automobile dealership
franchise loans.

In May 2009, the securities were placed on review for possible
downgrade following announcements to close a number of Chrysler
and General Motor dealerships.  During the review period, Moody's
assessed the impact of dealership closures, as well as potential
future defaults on the remaining loans based on automobile
manufacturers represented at the dealership, fixed-charge coverage
ratios, and compliance status reports provided by Falcon.

Moody's applied default probabilities in the range of 10%-50% for
current loans, 25%-75% for loans on watch list, and 85%-100% for
loans in special servicing.  Loss severity assumptions were
generally between 40%-50%.  These assumptions reflect Moody's view
on the stressed auto sector especially with the decrease in auto
sales, limited financing options for the borrowers, as well as
limited alternative use for the properties.

Credit support for the certificates in these transactions consists
primarily of subordination and overcollateralization of the bonds
by the loans.  Losses are allocated to the bonds in reverse
alphabetical order.  The final rating actions are based on the
pro-forma credit enhancement levels resulting from application of
the default and severity assumptions discussed above.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2001-1

  -- Class IO, Confirmed at A3; previously on May 21, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1, Confirmed at A3; previously on May 21, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on May 21, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on May 21, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B3; previously on May 21, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 21, 2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb. 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Falcon Auto Dealership LLC, Series 2003-1

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on May 21, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class IO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on May 21, 2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on May 21, 2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B3; previously on May 21, 2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on May 21, 2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 21, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on May 21, 2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Falcon Franchise Loan Trust 2000-1

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on May 21, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on May 21, 2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on May 21, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on May 21, 2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on May 21, 2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Ca; previously on May 21, 2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on Feb. 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Falcon Financial Investment Trust, the parent of the issuer, was a
specialty finance company that lent to franchised vehicle
dealerships.  Falcon Financial II, LLC, the primary and special
servicer for the Trust, is now owned by AutoStar Realty Operating
Partnership, LP.  Neither Falcon Financial II, LLC, nor AutoStar
Realty Operating Partnership, LP, is rated by Moody's.


FAYETTE COUNTY: S&P Junks Rating on Series 2004 Bonds From 'AAA'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating on
Fayette County Health Facilities Development Corp., Texas' FHA-
insured mortgage revenue bonds (St. Mark's Medical Center) series
2004 to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's
removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The issue was placed on CreditWatch with negative implications as
a result of potentially decreased investment income on the debt
service reserve fund which was invested pursuant to a guaranteed
investment contract issued by AIG.  Subsequently, the issuer has
terminated the GIC and has invested the debt service reserve and
bond funds in money market funds.  Standard & Poor's has received
cash flows which show that there would be insufficient assets to
meet debt service payments in 2012.  In addition, a portion of the
debt service reserve fund is covered by a non-rated letter of
credit.


FIRST DOMINION: S&P Withdraws Rating on Class A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'AAA' rating on
the class A notes issued by First Dominion Funding III, a cash
flow corporate loan obligation transaction managed by CSFB
Alternative Capital Inc.

The rating withdrawal follows the complete paydown of the class A
notes on the Sept. 22, 2009, payment date.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                    First Dominion Funding III

                      Rating           Balance (mil. $)
                      ------           ----------------
          Class     To    From       Current     Original
          -----     --    ----       -------     --------
          A         NR    AAA          0.000      570.000

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

                     First Dominion Funding III

                                         Balance (mil. $)
                                         ----------------
    Class      Rating              Current            Original
    -----      ------              -------            --------
    B-1        AAA/Watch Neg        19.858              20.000
    B-2        AAA/Watch Neg        47.163              47.500
    C          BBB-/Watch Neg       26.250              26.250
    D-1        CCC-/Watch Neg        7.000               7.000
    D-2        CCC-/Watch Neg       14.250              14.250
    D-3        CCC-/Watch Neg       10.000              10.000

                          NR - Not rated.


FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FF13 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of one
securities issued by First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF13.
This rating action is the result of recent deterioration relative
to expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgraded senior bond's support has deteriorated in
recent months, as principal payments have slowed relative to
erosion of credit support provided by subordinate bonds.  While
Moody's overall expected pool loss has not changed, the downgraded
security is expected to ultimately recover less of its outstanding
principal balance than previously thought.  The Class A-2B is at
higher risk of losses if it is not paid off before supporting
subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the event that
subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal has
structural features that redirect principal payments pro-rata
toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF13

Pool current expected loss: 34 % of original balance

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3


FORT POINT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of notes issued by Fort
Point CDO I, Ltd.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004, 2005, and 2006 vintage residential mortgage-backed
securitizations experienced since Fitch's last rating action in
September 2008.  Approximately 66% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review, with about 45.9% of the
portfolio downgraded since June 1, 2009.  The main drivers for the
downgrades in the underlying RMBS during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

Approximately 62.4% of the portfolio carries a Fitch-derived
rating below investment grade, with 50.5% rated in the 'CCC'
category or lower.  This is up from 42.2% rated below investment
grade and 22.3% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.  As of
the August 2009 trustee report, 16.9% of the portfolio is
considered defaulted.

Fitch has downgraded the A-1 class of notes to 'CC' because in
Fitch's opinion, default of this class of notes is probable.
Fitch believes that default of the A-2 and A-3 classes of notes is
inevitable.  These notes have been downgraded to 'C'.  Fitch does
not expect classes B and C to receive any future payments.  These
classes are affirmed at 'C'.

Fort Point I is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
Oct. 24, 2002.  The portfolio is monitored by State Street
Research & Management Company.  The reinvestment period ended in
October 2006.  The reference portfolio is composed of 58.1% RMBS,
24.2% commercial mortgage backed securities, 8.7% asset backed
securities, 7.0% CDOs, and 2.0% real estate investment trusts.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $132,567,445 class A-1 downgraded to 'CC' from 'A';
  -- $33,000,000 class A-2a downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $12,000,000 class A-2b downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $14,000,000 class A-3a downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $12,000,000 class A-3b downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $12,539,600 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,881,851 class C affirmed at 'C'.


GE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-C1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 13 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, series 2006-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  In addition, Fitch has assigned, maintained, or
revised Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings as applicable.
A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this press
release.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 4.6% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 3.1%, including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 56.7% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 8% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature or
anticipated to repay within the next five years: 2.9% in 2010, 3%
in 2011, and 1.5% in 2013, and 0.6% in 2014.  In 2015 and 2016,
91.8% of the pool is scheduled to mature or anticipated to repay.

Fitch identified 16 Loans of Concern (12.2%) within the pool,
three of which (1.6%) are specially serviced.  None of the
specially serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15
loans, which comprise 51% of the total pool's unpaid principal
balance.  (Note: Fitch considers the transaction's top 15 loan
concentration to include one portfolio of three cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans, in addition to 14 other
individual loans, as ranked by unpaid principal balance.)

Three of the top 15 loans (6.5% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term, with loss severities ranging from
approximately 27% to 35%.  Of the top 15 loans, the largest
contributors (by loan balance) to maturity and term losses are: 33
Washington Street (3.5%), Atlanta Mall Area Portfolio (1.9%) and
Marriott Saratoga (1.1%).

The 33 Washington Street loan (3.5%) is secured by a 19-story
class B office property with 240 parking spaces located in
Newark's central business district.  The property benefits from a
convenient location with easy access to public transportation and
major arterials.  The largest tenants at the property include the
State of New Jersey (23.4%; rated 'AA-' by Fitch) on seven
separate leases with expirations ranging from month-to-month to
2017; Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz (11%), which has leased its space
through 2010; and Commonwealth Business Media (10.2%), which has
leases expiring in 2010 with two five-year renewal options
remaining.  There is significant near-term exposure to lease
expirations, with leases corresponding to approximately 51.1% of
the space expiring in 2010 and an additional 10.1% of the space
expiring in 2011; the concentration consists of 10 separate
tenants.  As of June 2009, occupancy at 33 Washington Street had
declined to 74.3% from 94.6% at issuance, attributable primarily
to the downsizing of Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield (to 10.1% from
29.1%) upon lease expiration.

The property has operated at its current occupancy level for over
a year and continues to generate sufficient cash flow to service
the debt, with a year-end 2008 servicer-reported debt servicer
coverage ratio of 1.38 times, compared to a Fitch stressed DSCR of
1.03x at issuance.  However, the loan has been designated as a
Fitch Loan of Concern due to a lack of re-leasing progress coupled
with the high concentration of lease expirations in the next two
years (61%).  Fitch anticipates that the loan will default during
the term.  As of the August remittance, approximately $1.6 million
of reserves were available for leasing costs.

The Atlanta Mall Area Portfolio loan (1.9%) is secured by seven
retail buildings comprising a total of 158,297 square feet (sf),
which are located across two submarkets of Atlanta, GA.  The
properties were developed between 2000 and 2005, and are located
adjacent to super-regional malls with high visibility and access
to major highways.  The combined rent roll consists of 13 tenants,
the largest of which include hhgregg (19.2%), Georgia Backyard
(15.8%), and Bassett Furniture Industries (7.6%) which are
operating on leases expiring 2018, 2020, and 2014, respectively.
Bassett has vacated the property but continues to pay rent.

As of August 2009, the Atlanta Mall Area properties were 61.8%
occupied and 69.4% leased, from 97.1% at year-end 2008 and 98.4%
at issuance.  According to a rent roll provided at issuance, each
of the five tenants which vacated did so prior to expiration of
the lease term.  The tenant roster generally consists of
discretionary retailers in businesses such as furniture,
electronics, mattress, and linens.  According to the master
servicer, the borrower has stated that there are currently
negotiations ongoing with or letters of intent signed by
prospective tenants interested in approximately 15% of the space.
Scheduled lease expirations are minimal during most years of the
remaining loan term; the highest scheduled rollover occurs in
2012, when 11.3% of the space expires.  Approximately 8.2% of the
rent roll expires in the next two years.

The most recent servicer-reported DSCR was 1.22x as of year-end
2008, based on cash flows received when occupancy stood at
approximately 97%; this compares to a Fitch stressed DSCR of 1.03x
at issuance.  Based on revenues expected from the most recent rent
roll, Fitch estimates a current DSCR of approximately 0.72x on a
net operating income basis.  The loan has been designated a Fitch
Loan of Concern.  Due to declining performance at the property,
Fitch anticipates that the loan will default during the term.  As
of the September remittance, approximately $209,000 in reserves
($3.46 per sf of vacant space) were available for leasing costs.

The Marriott Saratoga loan (1.1%) is secured by a 146-key limited
service hotel located in Saratoga Springs, NY which was
constructed in 2004.  Amenities at the property are typical of the
competitive set.  The most recently reported occupancy and revenue
per available room as of year-end 2008 were 57.6% and $86.9,
respectively.  While underwritten cash flows proved to be in line
with 2006 and 2007 servicer-reported levels, property performance
deteriorated in 2008.  The year-end 2008 reported net cash flow
declined by 30% over that of the previous year, reportedly due to
a decrease in convention activity and business travel within the
market.  With a reported DSCR of 1.10x on a NOI and 0.94x on a net
cash flow basis, the loan is considered a Fitch Loan of Concern.

Due to the failure of the property's reported cash flows to
service the debt, Fitch anticipates that the Marriott Saratoga
loan will default during the term.  As of the September
remittance, reserves in place included a $237,000 seasonality
reserve and $500,000 available for replacement costs.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $14.1 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch downgrades, assigns LS ratings and revises Rating Outlooks
on these classes:

  -- $146.8 million class A-J to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $36.2 million class B to 'A/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.1 million class C to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $24.1 million class D to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.1 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.1 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $14.1 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Additionally, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings, as applicable,
to these classes:

  -- $22.5 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $54.4 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $53.2 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $620.1 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $293.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $160.9 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-W at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Lastly, Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative and
assigns an LS rating to this:

  -- $2 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

The $18.1 million class P is not rated by Fitch.


GOLDENTREE LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities
III, Limited:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-1A-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$39,500,000 Class A-1B-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022 Notes, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022 Notes, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2022 Notes,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$7,800,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2022 Notes,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Type III Composite Notes due 2022 Notes,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$43,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$52,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022 Notes, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3082 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 18, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$19 million, accounting for roughly 3% the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11.84% of the
underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Additionally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a high
concentration in issuers from the Healthcare, Education and
Childcare industry.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

GoldenTree Loan Opportunities III, Limited, issued in March 23,
2007 is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GREENS CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Greens Creek Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$342,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021
     (current balance of $323,576,696), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on May 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes Due 2021 (current balance of $8,216,178), Confirmed at
     B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class C and Class D
overcollateralization tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2765 versus a test level of 2510 as of the last trustee report,
dated September 9, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$14.4 million, accounting for roughly 3.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
14.7% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class C
overcollateralization test was reported at 104.59% versus a test
level of 104.90% and the Class D overcollateralization test was
reported at 102.45% versus a test level of 103.3%.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
overcollateralization test.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress
factors to default probability assumptions for structured finance
asset collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's
CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Greens Creek Funding Ltd., issued in May of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 1999-1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on three
certificates issued in GS Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 1999-1
resecuritization transaction.

The certificates in the resecuritization are backed by several
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e.  the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Bond 1-B has started taking a loss since Dec 2008 because an
amount equal to tax preparation fee that the Trustee spends in
relation to the resec deal is deducted from the available funds to
the bond.  Trustee is indemnified for the tax preparation fee
according to the trust document.  For this reason, Bond 1-B is
given an impairment rating of Caa1 rating even though none of the
bonds pledged to the resec deal are expected to take a loss.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: GS Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 1999-1

  -- I-B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 26, 1999 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- II-B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 26, 1999
     Assigned Ba2

  -- II-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 26, 1999 Assigned
     B2


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2004-GG2 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II's series 2004-GG2 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 12 other classes from the same transaction and
removed 10 of these classes from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades follow its analysis of the transaction using its
revised U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the
primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the pooled
specially serviced loans.  its analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.68x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 81.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.22x and an LTV
of 106.2%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 38.7% and 29.4%, respectively.  These implied
defaults and loss severity calculations exclude nine defeased
loans ($337.3 million; 14.8%).

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in its view, provide
adequate support through various stress scenarios.  S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the classes XP and XC interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may
revise its current IO criteria, which may affect outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P
affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Eight loans ($300.1 million; 13.2%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Property Inc. (LNR).  The payment status of
the loans is: two are current (2.6%); one is late but less than 30
days delinquent (1.2%); two are 90-plus-days delinquent (1.3%);
one is in bankruptcy (7.7%) and two have matured (0.4%).  Four of
the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts
totaling approximately $49.9 million.  One of these loans is a top
10 loan (7.7%) and is discussed below.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined one
loan ($5.5 million; 0.2%) to be credit-impaired.  The Haven
Commerce Center loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to the
Department of Correction's lease expiration (26,000 sq. ft.; 34%
of NRA).  The tenant is occupying the space on a month-to-month
basis for another year.  Without this tenant, the servicer's
projected DSC and occupancy are 0.03x and 53%, respectively.  The
loan payment status is late but within the applicable grace
period.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $2.3 billion (126 loans), compared with $2.6 billion
(141 loans) at issuance.  Wells Fargo Bank, the master servicer,
reported financial information for 85.2% of the pool, for all the
loans in the pool with the exception of the defeased loans
(14.8%); 96% of the financial information was full-year 2008 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.73x for the pool based
on the master servicer's reported figures.  its adjusted DSC and
LTV were 1.68x and 81.9%, respectively.  The transaction has
experienced two principal losses to date ($2.2 million; 0.1%).
Twenty loans are on the servicer's watchlist ($285.7 million;
12.5%).  Seven loans ($160.7 million, 7.1%) have reported DSCs
between 1.10x and 1.0x, and four loans ($49.0 million, 2.2%) have
reported DSCs of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$935.3 million (41.1%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.95x for the top 10 loans.
The largest loan in the pool ($175.2 million, 7.7%) is with the
special servicer, and another top 10 loan ($107.7 million, 4.7%)
appears on the master servicer's watchlist.  Both loans are
discussed below.  its adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans
were 1.88x and 74.8%, respectively.

The Grand Canal Shoppes at the Venetian loan is the largest loan
in the pool and is with the special servicer.  The loan is secured
by 537,000 sq. ft. of retail space constructed in 1999 and at the
Venetian Casino Resort Complex in Las Vegas.  The loan's interest
payments remain current, and the servicer reported 100% occupancy
at September 2008 and a DSC of 2.1x for year-end 2008.  The
scheduled maturity date of the loan was May 1, 2009.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer, due to imminent maturity
default, on April 13, 2009 prior to the General Growth
Properties'bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.   S&P will
continue to monitor developments relating to this loan and will
take rating actions on this transaction as necessary.

The Stony Point Fashion Park loan ($107.7 million; 4.7%) is the
fourth-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the
servicer's watchlist.  The loan was placed on the watchlist due to
a low DSC.  The loan is secured by 382,636 sq. ft. of a 665,131-
sq.-ft. open-air, lifestyle center in Richmond Va., which was
built in 2003.  For year-end 2008, the servicer-reported occupancy
was 85% and the DSC was 1.02x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to its updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-GG2

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --        ----           ----------------------
     G          BBB-      BBB/Watch Neg                    5.19
     H          BB        BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.90
     J          BB-       BB+/Watch Neg                    3.62
     K          B+        BB/Watch Neg                     3.05
     L          B         BB-/Watch Neg                    2.48
     M          B-        B+/Watch Neg                     2.05
     N          CCC+      B/Watch Neg                      1.76
     O          CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                     1.33

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-GG2

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --        ----           ----------------------
     A-3     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                     15.05
     A-4     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                     15.05
     A1A     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                     15.05
     A-5     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                     15.05
     A-6     AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                     15.05
     B       AA+   AA+/Watch Neg                     12.19
     C       AA    AA/Watch Neg                      10.91
     D       A     A/Watch Neg                        8.62
     E       A-    A-/Watch Neg                       7.34
     F       BBB+  BBB+/Watch Neg                     6.19

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-GG2

         Class   Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
         -----   ------             ----------------------
         XP      AAA                                  N/A
         XC      AAA                                  N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2007-GKK1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes from GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GKK1.
Concurrently, 10 of the lowered ratings remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications, while S&P removed the remaining two ratings
from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on 21 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for GSMST 2007-
GKK1.  The certificates are from 12 transactions, and the
securities total $209.2 million (33% of the pool balance).  Ten
ratings from GSMST 2007-GKK1 remain on CreditWatch negative due to
the transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on
CreditWatch negative ($209.6 million, 33%).  S&P lowered its
rating on class L to 'D' to reflect interest shortfalls to the
class, which S&P has determined to be susceptible to liquidity
interruptions in the future.

According to the Sept. 22, 2009, trustee report, 73 CMBS
certificates ($633.7 million, 100%) from 46 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2007 collateralize GSMST 2007-GKK1.
Significant transactions in GSMST 2007-GKK1's exposure to Standard
& Poor's downgraded CMBS certificates include:

* ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 (classes G, H, and J;
  $44.9 million, 7.1%);

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5 (classes
  G and H; $30.1 million, 4.8%);

* GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series 2005-GG4 (classes C, D,
  and G; $25.3 million, 4%);

* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2 (classes F, G, and H;
  $25.1 million, 4%); and

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4 (class C;
  $25 million, 3.9%).

S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
GSMST 2007-GKK1's certificates following S&P's CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

      Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

              GS MORTGAGE SECURITIES Trust 2007-GKK1
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              AA+/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
         A-2              BBB-/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
         B                BB+/Watch Neg    BBB-/Watch Neg
         C                BB/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
         D                BB/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
         E                BB-/Watch Neg    BB+/Watch Neg
         F                B+/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg
         G                B/Watch Neg      BB/Watch Neg
         H                B/Watch Neg      BB-/Watch Neg
         J                CCC+/Watch Neg   B+/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              GS MORTGAGE SECURITIES Trust 2007-GKK1
  Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         K                CCC-             B-/Watch Neg
         L                D                CCC-/Watch Neg


GSAA ALT-A: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 27 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 27
tranches from 7 GSAA Alt-A transactions.  Moody's has updated the
expected loss numbers on these pools to reflect continued
deterioration in performance and higher than expected severities,
and the ratings have been adjusted accordingly.  In addition,
Moody's has adjusted the ratings of 21 of these tranches to
correct certain inaccurate assumptions previously made as to the
available credit enhancement.  Moody's has also adjusted the
ratings of another 4 of these tranches to address certain loss and
principal allocation features of the transactions that had not
been accurately accounted for; the corrected ratings reflect the
fact that losses will not be allocated to certain senior
certificates, and distribution of principal to those tranches will
remain sequential after depletion of the subordinated
certificates.  As to the GSAA 2006-8 transaction, Moody's has
corrected a data error in the February 2009 analysis which may
have underestimated the expected loss.

These rating actions are a result of credit enhancement
corrections and updated expected loss:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-18

  -- Pool current expected loss: 24% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. AF-2A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. AF-5A, Downgraded to B2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-4

  -- Pool current expected loss: 20% of original balance

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 4A2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. 4A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. 4A-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-1

  -- Pool current expect loss: 32% of original balance

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-2

  -- Pool current expected loss: 29% of original balance

  -- Cl. AV1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. AF2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. AF3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. AF4A, Upgraded to B3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-5

  -- Pool current expected loss: 31% of original balance

  -- Cl. 1AV1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. 1AF2A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 1AF2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. 1AF6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

These updated rating actions are a result of corrections to loss
and principal allocations:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-7

  -- Pool current expected loss: 13% of original balance

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. AF-5B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. AF-5A, Upgraded to A2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

These updated rating actions are a result of the updated loss on
the pool:

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-8

  -- Pool current expected loss: 23% of original balance

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Feb. 19, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.


GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 2007-NC1 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 3 securities
issued by GSAMP Trust 2007-NC1 on review for possible downgrade.
The actions are the result of recent deterioration relative to
expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's are reviewing its loss projection on the
underlying assets in light of recent increases in both default-
rate and loss severity.

The Class A-2A and A-2B are at higher risk of losses if they are
not paid off before supporting subordinate bonds are completely
written down.  In the event that subordinate bonds are written
down entirely; this deal has structural features that redirect
principal payments pro-rata toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2007-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. A-2A, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. A-2B, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3


HIGH POINT: Moody's Confirms Long-Term Rating on $4 Mil. Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the long-term rating of
High Point University's $4 million outstanding Series 2001 bonds
issued through the North Carolina Capital Facilities Finance
Agency.

The removal from Watchlist and stable rating outlook reflect the
University's amended financial covenants for the letters of credit
supporting the Series 2006, 2007, and 2008 bonds, the University's
ongoing strong relationship with Branch Banking and Trust Company
(BB&T, rated Aa2), remarkably strong revenue growth (up 38% based
from prior year) and operating performance in FY 2009, as well as
positive trends in student demand as demonstrated by fall 2009
enrollment growth.

Legal Security: Unsecured general obligation.  The Loan Agreement
for the Series 2001 bonds includes covenants intended to limit
additional indebtedness undertaken by the University; these
covenants include restrictions on both long and short term
indebtedness.  The University failed to comply with the
Limitations on Incurrence of Indebtedness as covenanted under the
Series 2001 bond documents (see Moody's report dated May 15,
2009).

Interest Rate Derivatives: High Point University has entered into
a floating-to fixed Interest Rate Swap Agreement with BB&T (rated
Aa2) with a $73.5 million notional amount outstanding.  The
agreement covers a portion of the University's variable rate debt
and has a termination date of 11/1/2018.  As of May 31, 2009, the
mark-to-market on the swap was a liability of $5.7 million for the
University.  Events of Default under the swap include cross-
default under BB&T's Letter of Credit Agreements and downgrade of
the long-term senior, unsecured debt rating below Baa3 by Moody's
or BBB- by Standard & Poor's, in addition to standard events of
default.  If at any time the S&P or Moody's debt ratings differ;
the lower debt rating is specified as the controlling threshold.
The collateral posting threshold is zero if either party's long-
term senior, unsecured rating is withdrawn or moves below
investment grade.  BB&T has not asked the University to post
collateral related to the terms of the swap agreement.

                            Strengths

* Growing private university with Mid-Atlantic draw located in
  High Point, North Carolina just outside of the City of
  Greensboro, with 3,437 full-time equivalent students in fall
  2009.  Total FTE enrollment has grown approximately 32% over the
  past five years and includes a shift toward full time
  undergraduates (increase of 67% over this period) and graduate
  students (increase of 53% over this period) and away from
  evening and part-time students (decline of 16% over this
  period).  In fall 2009, student demand resulted in selectivity
  of 74% and a yield of 32% on admitted students resulting in an
  incoming freshman class of 1,030 compared to 881 in fall 2008.
  Management reports that retention of current students is also at
  record levels, which when combined with growing freshman
  enrollment, results in overall traditional day student
  enrollment for the University growing from 1,628 in fall 2005 to
  2,717 in 2009, a 67% increase.  Management believes the
  University could reach an enrollment of 5,000 FTE students
  within five years combining the traditional day, evening degree,
  and graduate programs.

* Healthy demand has translated into continued growth in net
  tuition per student with management projecting that full time
  undergraduate students paid a net tuition per student of $24,800
  in fall 2008; Moody's calculates net tuition per student
  averaged over all enrollment (including evening and graduate
  programs) at $15,754 in FY 2009 (a 18% increase over FY 2008 and
  approximately two times the net tuition per student of five
  years ago); however, net tuition per student remains below
  Moody's median (the FY 2008 preliminary median for Baa rated
  institutions was $15,608) but the net tuition per student is
  more favorable when compared to regional peers.

* Positive operating performance characterized by vibrant cash
  flow from operations (operating cash flow margin of 36% in FY
  2009 and three year average debt service coverage of 4.2 times).
  Management states that cash flow available for debt service was
  $21 million in FY 2009 and projects this to reach $36 million in
  FY 2010.  With 90% of full time undergraduates living on campus
  in fall 2009, operating performance has also been positively
  impacted by growth in auxiliary revenue streams.  Moody's
  expects debt service coverage to show pressure in the future due
  to accelerating annual debt service.

* Significant increase in gift revenue as administration
  successfully engages donors with total gift revenue averaging
  $14.3 million for the last three years, nearly four times the
  prior pace of support and characteristic of a more highly rated
  institution (compares to Moody's Baa median of $6.4 million for
  FY 2008).

                           Challenges


* Highly leveraged operating profile with outstanding direct debt
  expected to reach approximately $175 million during FY 2010
   (includes $4 million of the fixed rate Series 2001 bonds,
  $105.9 million in BB&T backed letter of credit supported VRDBs,
  $42 million loan with BB&T, and approximately $20 million
  outstanding on lines of credit with BB&T).  At this level, pro-
  forma debt is 2.3 times FY 2009 operating revenues (given
  expected growth in revenues during FY 2010 this ratio is
  expected to show improvement), and estimated pro forma MADS
  ($14 million estimated at 8% of pro forma debt) is a very high
  22% share of FY 2009 annual operating costs (compares to Moody's
  Baa median of 6.1% for FY 2008).

Moody's uses an 8% of principal conservative estimate to compare
to a debt portfolio that is amortizing and long-term; however, the
University's debt structure is characterized by $42 million in
short-term bank loans and approximately another $20 million in
borrowing on lines of credit.  These short-term loan instruments
mature over a short time frame and the University projects total
debt service of $100 million in the next five years (the majority
of which, $50 million is projected to occur in FY 2011 and FY
2012).  High Point has demonstrated an ability to grow revenues
rapidly and these leverage ratios may improve more rapidly than
for other organizations.  However, the University has locked in
high debt service obligations which pose a risk should growth slow
considerably.  High Point has limited revenue diversity and is
reliant on student charges for 90% of operating revenues in FY
2009.  High Point's management expects substantial future growth
in revenue; however, at current debt levels and considering
additional capital plans of the University, High Point will likely
remain one of the most highly leveraged entities in Moody's
portfolio of private colleges and universities for some time.

* Limited balance sheet liquidity with negative expendable
  financial resources of $2.2 million as the result of fiscal year
  2009 investment losses (negative return for the long term
  investment pool of 29.5% for fiscal year 2009 with an allocation
  of 36.6% to public equity, 27.4% to alternative equity, 24.7% to
  fixed income, 6.8% to real assets and private equity, and 4.5%
  to cash).  The investment pool has rebounded 5.5% for FY 2010 to
  date as of 8/31/09.  The University had cash and cash
  equivalents of $6.4 million as of the FY 2009.  Moody's note
  that the University generated substantial cash flow and could
  choose to build liquidity more rapidly by slowing capital
  spending.  However, near term plans of the University are to
  continue recent trend of investing substantially all cash flow
  generated from operations into plant facilities, including space
  to accommodate growth in enrollment.

* High Point's debt structure is dependent upon access to letters
  of credit and lines of credit with $105.9 million in letter of
  credit exposure with BB&T.  Moody's believe the renewal risk
  with a single bank as well as default and covenant provisions in
  the University's letters of credit add risk to University's
  credit profile.  These risks could result in a more rapid rating
  decline than would otherwise be the case (see RECENT
  DEVELOPMENTS below).

* Rapidly growing university, with expansive capital plans which
  will limit financial resource growth.  University leadership has
  identified future capital projects totaling approximately
  $160 million over the next five years (includes $85 million for
  student dorms which are expected to add another 1,600 beds,
  $40 million for a new athletic facility and classroom space, and
  $30 million for a library).  Additional borrowing to fund
  revenue generating projects such as student housing is under
  consideration, with the other projects expected to be funded
  through cash flow.

                       Recent Developments

The University has continued to generate strong growth in
enrollment and net tuition revenue based on audited FY 2009
financials and management reported fall 2009 enrollment data.  The
University's strategy is heavily dependent on enrollment and
revenue growth to support high debt service levels.  Therefore,
the ability to continue growing revenues at a rapid pace will be a
key driver of credit quality in the future.  Likewise, the
University has been aggressively investing in capital facilities
with over $200 million in capital purchases in just the last three
years (compares to gross property, plant and equipment of
$104 million at the beginning of the same period).  As the ability
to comfortably service the additional debt and capital planned for
the next several years is contingent on revenue growth, Moody's
believe management's ability and willingness to slow capital
spending should growth targets not be met will also be a key
credit factor.  The University's growth strategy has been highly
successful to-date.  Although Moody's believes the strategy may
continue to be successful, Moody's believe it reflects a
substantially higher risk strategy than peer institutions.

With $105.9 million in variable rate debt supported by letters of
credit outstanding, the College is subject to events of default
and financial covenants under its letters of credit with BB&T
(rated Aa2).

The Letters of Credit support the Series 2008, Series 2007, and
Series 2006 bonds (these bonds are not rated by Moody's) and the
letters of credit expire in June 2015, October 2014, and December
2013, respectively.  Events of default that could result in
acceleration of the bonds include the failure to maintain certain
financial covenants including: i) Debt Service Coverage Ratio of
at least 1.25 to 1.0 (management provided DSRC of 5.3 times for FY
2009 ii) Ratio of Total Funded Debt (defined as bonds, notes
payable, and capital lease obligations) to Unrestricted Net Assets
(excluding any unrealized gains or losses of Rate Hedging
Obligations) of 1.5 to 1.00 (management provided ratio at 1.24 for
FY 2009) iii) Unrestricted Net Assets plus Temporarily Restricted
Net Assets of at least $100 million (management provided
$123.3 million for FY 2009) iv) limitations on additional
indebtedness which University management reports caps debt at
$182.8 million without prior written consent of BB&T.  The above
covenants reflect amendments to prior financial covenants
negotiated with BB&T's cooperation.

Although Moody's believes the debt structure creates substantial
additional risks to the University, Moody's notes that thus far
BB&T has cooperated with the University and revised covenants as
needed.  In addition, the bank has extended additional capital to
the University when requested.  Maintenance of this strong
relationship with the bank has become an important credit factor
and the risk of the relationship changing over time is reflected
in the current rating.

                              Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that High Point
University will maintain a strong student market position for the
next few years and that operating cash will continue to provide
healthy support for debt service.

                 What Could Change the Rating - UP
Sustained growth trend aligned with University management's
projections resulting in a less leveraged balance sheet and
operating position; reduced exposure to variable rate demand debt
and/or diversification of counterparty risk.

                What Could Change the Rating - DOWN

Failure to grow revenues to support increasing debt service
obligations, weakened operating performance, deterioration of
student demand
.
Key Indicators And Ratios (Fall 2009 enrollment data and FY 2009
financial data):

* Enrollment: 3,437 full-time equivalents

* Total pro forma debt: estimated to reach $175 million during FY
  2010 (includes $4 million of the fixed rate Series 2001 bonds,
  $105.9 million in BB&T backed letter of credit supported VRDBs,
  $42 million loan with BB&T, and approximately $20 million
  outstanding on lines credit with BB&T)

* Net tuition per student: $15,754

* Expendable financial resources: negative $2.2 million

* Pro forma debt to revenue: 2.3 times

* Operating Cash Flow Margin: 36%

* Average debt service coverage: 4.2 times

                            Rated Debt

* Series 2001: Ba1

The last rating action was on May 15, 2009; High Point
University's rating was downgraded to Ba2, and placed on
Watchlist.


INDYMAC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of twenty one
tranches in nine IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust
transactions.  The rating actions are driven by increased expected
losses on the underlying pools in relation to available credit
enhancement for the bonds.

Underlying collateral consists of first-lien adjustable-rate
residential lot loans.  Lot loans are used to purchase land, with
the ultimate purpose of building a home on the land.  Most loans
have a five-year maturity with a single "balloon payment" at the
maturity date.  A majority of the loans have "interest only"
payments.  Loans paying interest and principal amortize on a
thirty year schedule.  Lot loans are typically refinanced into
construction loans evolving into regular home mortgages.  Higher
loss expectations are based on the increased refinancing risk in
the current depressed real estate and construction markets, lack
of exit opportunities in the secondary market, a short loan tenor,
and the loans' geographical concentration in California, Florida
and Hawaii.

The methodology used to estimate losses is:

  -- Current delinquencies are used to project pipeline losses.

  -- Lifetime roll rates are assumed at 75% for current loans, 90%
     for 30 day delinquent loans, and 100% for loans more than 30
     days delinquent, in foreclosure or REO (Real Estate Owned).

  -- Severities have been estimated at 90% based on actual
     severities.

  -- The expected loss is estimated, with particular attention to
     refinancing risk, modifications and short loan tenor.

  -- Expected loss is finally compared to credit enhancement,
     including benefit for excess spread, to derive a rating.

The ratings on the certificates were assigned by evaluating
factors determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the
certificates, such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
historical performance information regarding the asset class as
well as for the transaction sponsor, ii) an analysis of the
collateral being securitized, iii) an analysis of the policies,
procedures and alignment of interests of the key parties to the
transaction, most notably the originator and the servicer, iv) an
analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral cash-flow
and capital structure, v) an analysis of the transaction's
governance and legal structure, and (vi) a comparison of these
attributes against those of other similar transactions.

Also, Moody's Investors Service completed its review of the
underlying rating on the certificates guaranteed by Ambac
Assurance Corporation and Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.
The underlying rating on these reflects the intrinsic credit
quality of the certificates in the absence of the guarantee.  The
current rating on the certificates guaranteed by AMBAC is
consistent with Moody's practice of rating these securities at the
higher of (1) the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and (2) the underlying rating based on Moody's modified approach
to rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors.  In light of the withdrawal of FGIC's insurance
financial strength ratings on March 25, 2009, Moody's ratings on
structured finance securities that are guaranteed or "wrapped" by
FGIC are based solely on the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security, regardless
of whether the underlying rating had been previously published or
not.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac Loan Trust 2004-L1

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1; previously on Dec. 9, 2008
Downgraded
     to Ba2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2005-L1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec. 19, 2008
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2005-L2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan. 8, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec. 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2005-L3

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec. 19, 2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2006-L1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on April 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to Caa2, Outlook Developing on July 29, 2009; previously on
     Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2006-L2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec. 9, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on March 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on March 25, 2009; previously on
     March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2006-L3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on Dec. 9, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to Caa2, Outlook Developing on July 29, 2009; previously on
     April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on April 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to Caa2, Outlook Developing on July 29, 2009; previously on
     April 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2006-L4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on July 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to Caa2, Outlook Developing on July 29, 2009; previously on
     Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: IndyMac Residential Mortgage-Backed Trust 2007-L1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on July 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to Caa2, Outlook Developing on July 29, 2009; previously on
     Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec. 9, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca


ING INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ING Investment Management CLO IV,
Ltd.:

  -- US$380,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2022,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on June 14, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2022,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the Class A-1
Notes and the Class A-2 Notes are a result of credit deterioration
of the underlying portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is
observed through a decline in the average credit rating (as
measured by the weighted average rating factor), an increase in
the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an increase in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2895 versus a test level of 2480 as
of the last trustee report, dated August 13, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $20.2 million, accounting for roughly 4.2% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 7.6% of the underlying portfolio.

The actions taken on the notes also reflect Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for second
lien loans will be below their historical averages, consistent
with Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Upgraded
     to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2022, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Confirmed
     at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade action on the Class D Notes and the
rating confirmation on the Class B Notes and the C Notes
incorporate the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the actions
reflect updated analysis indicating that the impact of these
factors on the ratings of the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes,
and the Class D Notes is not as negative as previously assessed
during Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current
conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed
during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which
included an in-depth assessment of results from Moody's
quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of deal-
specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during Stage
I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result of a
parameter-based approach.

ING Investment Management CLO IV, Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ISCHUS CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of notes issued by
Ischus CDO I, Ltd./LLC.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2004 vintage residential mortgage-backed securitizations
experienced since Fitch's last rating action in September 2008.
Approximately 91.5% of the portfolio has been downgraded since the
last review, with about 69.1% of the portfolio downgraded since
June 1, 2009.  The main drivers for the downgrades in the
underlying RMBS during the summer were the continued deterioration
of home prices and employment rates causing an increase in
delinquencies despite significant seasoning in the loans.

Approximately 90.2% of the portfolio carries a Fitch-derived
rating below investment grade, with 65.0% rated in the 'CCC'
category or lower.  This is up from 32.5% rated below investment
grade and 4.0% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.  As of
the August 2009 trustee report, 50.8% of the portfolio is
considered defaulted.

Fitch has downgraded the class A-1 notes to 'CCC' as principal
impairment of this class is likely given the exposure to defaulted
assets.  Fitch considers the default of the A-2, B, C-1 and C-2
classes of notes to be inevitable.  Accordingly, these classes are
downgraded to 'C'.

Ischus I is a collateralized debt obligation with a static
portfolio that closed in Dec. 29, 2004.  The portfolio is
monitored by Ischus Capital Management, LLC.  The reference
portfolio is composed of 61.1% subprime RMBS, 14.9% CDOs, 11.9%
commercial mortgage backed securities, 11.1% prime RMBS, and 1.0%
asset-backed securities.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $86,428,850 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'A';
  -- $47,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
  -- $39,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BB';
  -- $11,476,051 class C-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $4,909,731 class C-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'B'.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 2007-LDP12 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 21
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP12 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on three classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow its analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially serviced
loans, as well as its analysis of the loans that S&P has
determined to be credit impaired.  Its analysis included a review
of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.33x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 116.1%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.77x and an LTV
of 167.8%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 92.5% and 46.5%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations noted above exclude four (1.7%) of the six specially
serviced loans and seven credit-impaired loans (7.9%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for these loans, which are included in
the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the rating on the class X interest-only certificate
based on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Six loans ($70.2 million, 2.8%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, J.E.  Robert Co. Inc. The payment status of the loans
is: one is in foreclosure ($5.3 million, 0.2%), three are more
than 90 days delinquent ($17.16 million, 0.7%), one is 30 days
delinquent ($24.25 million, 1.0%), and one is in its grace period
($23.5 million, 0.9%).  One of the specially serviced loans has a
$3.2 million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) in effect.  All of
the specially serviced loans have balances that are less than 1.0%
of the total pool balance.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P considered seven
loans to be credit impaired, including two top 10 loans: the Hard
Rock Hotel-Chicago loan ($69.5 million, 2.8%) and the 7000 Central
Park loan ($65.0 million, 2.6%).  These loans are discussed in
detail below.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $2.496 billion, slightly down from $2.505 billion at
issuance.  The number of loans in the pool, at 163, is unchanged
since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is Wells
Fargo Bank N.A.  The master servicer provided financial
information for 99.3% of the pool, and 99.4% of the servicer-
provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.30x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.33x and
116.1%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
four of the six specially serviced loans and the seven loans S&P
deemed to be credit impaired.  S&P estimated losses separately for
these loans ($240.6 million, 9.6%).  Of these loans, nine
($228.5 million, 9.2%) had servicer-reported DSC figures and the
weighted average DSC of these loans was 1.03x.  The transaction
has not experienced any principal losses to date.  Thirty-six
loans ($693.5 million, 27.8%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including two of the top 10 loans.  Nine loans
($193.0 million, 7.7%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x,
and 24 loans ($392.0 million, 15.7%) have reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$868.5 million (34.8%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.36x and
113.9%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV calculations
excluded the two top 10 loans that were deemed to be credit
impaired.  The credit-impaired loans are discussed below.

The Hard Rock Hotel-Chicago loan is the fourth-largest loan in the
pool and the largest loan on the servicer's watchlist.  The loan
has a balance of $69.5 million (2.8%).  It appears on the
watchlist because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The loan is secured
by a first mortgage encumbering the fee interest in a 40-story,
381-unit, full-service hotel located on Michigan Avenue in the
central business district of Chicago, just south of Chicago's
Magnificent Mile.  Due to the economic downturn, the hotel's
revenue per available room declined by 25.3% between June 30,
2008, and June 30, 2009.  The year-end 2008 DSC was 1.47x, and, as
a result of the decline in RevPAR, the DSC for the trailing six
months ended June 30, 2009, was negative 0.10x.  Due to the
decline in performance and accompanying DSC decline, S&P deemed
the loan to be credit impaired.

The 7000 Central Park loan is the eighth-largest loan in the pool
and the second-largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a
balance of $65.0 million (2.6%) and appears the servicer's
watchlist because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The loan is secured
by a first mortgage encumbering the fee interest in an 18-story,
class A office building located in Atlanta, Ga.  The property,
which was built in 1988, contains 415,324 sq. ft.  S&P deemed the
loan to be credit impaired based on low occupancy and DSC.
Occupancy was 76.4% based on the June 30, 2009, rent roll, and the
servicer-reported year-end 2008 DSC was 0.82x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-3       A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.10
     A-4       A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.10
     A-SB      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.10
     A-1A      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.10
     A-M       BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.07
     A-J       BB-     AAA/Watch Neg                    12.17
     B         B+      AA+/Watch Neg                    11.29
     C         B+      AA/Watch Neg                     10.16
     D         B       AA-/Watch Neg                     9.28
     E         B       A+/Watch Neg                      8.78
     F         B-      A/Watch Neg                       7.78
     G         B-      A-/Watch Neg                      6.65
     H         CCC+    BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.52
     J         CCC     BBB/Watch Neg                     4.39
     K         CCC     BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.26
     L         CCC     BB+/Watch Neg                     2.88
     M         CCC     BB/Watch Neg                      2.51
     N         CCC     BB-/Watch Neg                     2.26
     P         CCC-    B/Watch Neg                       2.01
     Q         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      1.76
     T         CCC-    CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.63

                         Ratings Affirmed

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

           Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----      ------      ----------------------
           A-1        AAA                          30.10
           A-2        AAA                          30.10
           X          AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


JP MORGAN: S&P Junks Rating on Class A-2 Certificate From 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-2 certificate from J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust Series
2009-1 (JPMRT 2009-1) to 'CCC' from 'B'.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on nine other rated classes from this
transaction.

The downgrade reflects the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificate.
Although this performance deterioration is severe, the credit
enhancement within JPMRT 2009-1 is sufficient to maintain the
'AAA' ratings on the other rated certificates because of the
additional support the class A-2 certificate provides.

JPMRT 2009-1, which closed in March 2009, is a re-securitized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction collateralized by one underlying class.
The collateral securing the underlying class consists
predominately of fixed-rate prime residential mortgage loans.

All of the rated certificates from JPMRT 2009-1 are supported by
the 2-A-1 class from JP Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-S3 (currently
rated 'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing this trust
has declined precipitously in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 0.45% of the original pool balance as of the
September 2009 distribution, and currently has approximately 11.8%
in delinquent loans as a percentage of the current pool balance.
Based on the current pool factor of 0.655 (65.5%), which
represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the
original balance, as well as the cumulative losses to date and
pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for
this pool is 4.49%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement
available to cover losses passed through to the class A-2.
However, because the class A-2 certificates provide sufficient
credit support for the other rated classes of certificates, S&P
has affirmed the 'AAA' ratings on them.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace market expectations.

                          Rating Lowered

         J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust Series 2009-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        46633CAB7     CCC                  B

                         Ratings Affirmed

         J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust Series 2009-1

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        46633CAA9     AAA
                  A-3        46633CAC5     AAA
                  A-4        46633CAD3     AAA
                  A-5        46633CAE1     AAA
                  A-6        46633CAF8     AAA
                  A-7        46633CAG6     AAA
                  A-8        46633CAH4     AAA
                  A-9        46633CAJ0     AAA
                  A-10       46633CAK7     AAA


JPMORGAN RV: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-2 Notes From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-2 notes issued by JPMorgan RV Marine Trust 2004-A to 'CCC-' from
'BB+'.

The downgrade reflects what S&P considers a worse-than-expected
performance of the underlying recreational vehicle and marine
retail installment sale contracts collateralizing this
transaction, which is reflected in the high levels of losses and
delinquencies, and the resulting reduction in existing credit
support.

As of the September 2009 distribution date, the transaction had a
pool factor of 16.92% and had experienced cumulative net losses of
9.3%, which has exceeded its original expected base-case
cumulative net losses of 7.0% of the original pool balance and is
approaching its previously revised expected base-case cumulative
net loss range of 9%-10%.  In addition, 5.9% of the current pool
balance was 60 days or more delinquent, and 12.7% of the current
pool balance was 30 days or more past due.  S&P expects this
transaction to experience base-case cumulative net losses of 13%-
15% of the initial principal pool balance.

This transaction has an unconditional, irrevocable financial
guarantee insurance policy issued by Financial Guaranty Insurance
Co. (not rated).  On April 22, 2009, Standard & Poor's withdrew
its rating on FGIC because S&P expected that timely and
comprehensive financial information would no longer be available.
its 'CCC-' rating on the transaction's class A-2 notes is based on
the creditworthiness of the underlying RV and marine assets and
not on the FGIC guarantee.

S&P deems the lowered rating to be appropriate given the
percentage of available credit support available relative to
remaining losses.


JWS CBO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of 2000-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes and affirms one class of
notes issued by JWS CBO 2000-1, LTD./Corp.

The rating actions are the result of credit deterioration and
increased exposure to defaulted assets.  The class C notes will be
reliant on collateral rated 'CCC' or below for the full return of
principal.  In Fitch's opinion the class C notes have a
possibility of default and as such are downgraded to 'CCC'.  For
the class D notes, Fitch believes default is probable, and the
notes are affirmed at 'CC'.  The performance of the class D notes
will be determined by realized recoveries on defaulted collateral
as well as the future performance of the performing portfolio.

Since the last rating action in September 2008, JWS CBO's
portfolio has experienced further credit deterioration.  As of the
most recent trustee report dated Sept. 16, 2009, defaulted
securities represented 28% of the total portfolio versus 21% at
the last review.  Approximately 61% of the portfolio is rated
'CCC+' or lower, compared to 42% at the last review.
Additionally, 3% of the assets are currently on Rating Watch
Negative and 15% have a Negative Rating Outlook by at least one
rating agency.  As described in Fitch's corporate CDO criteria,
Fitch accounts for Rating Watch and Rating Outlook status in its
modeling assumptions, which are reflected in these rating actions.

On the Sept. 28, 2009 payment date the class A notes were paid in
full.  The benefit from the increase in credit enhancement to the
junior notes has been offset by portfolio credit deterioration and
exposure to defaulted assets.  Recent recovery rates on defaulted
assets have been lower than historical averages, especially for
bonds, which has negatively impacted the junior notes of JWS CBO.
The credit deterioration has caused the class C and class D OC
tests to fail.  Due to the failure of the class C OC test,
interest proceeds available after class C interest were used to
redeem notes in order of priority, causing the class D notes to
defer interest and subsequently write up their principal balance.
The class A/B and C OC tests divert interest proceeds to redeem
notes sequentially, while the class D OC test diverts proceeds to
pay down only the class D notes.

JWS CBO is a collateralized bond obligation managed by Stonegate
Capital Management, L.L.C., that closed on July 18, 2000.  JWS
CBO's current portfolio is comprised of 72% senior unsecured debt,
18% of subordinated debt, 8% senior secured debt and 2% senior
unsecured loans.  The top three industry concentrations are
Automobiles (15%), Gaming, Leisure and Entertainment (11%), and
Building and materials (9%).  The single largest obligor
represents 4% of the collateral par balance.  The transaction is
scheduled to mature in July 2012.

Fitch does not rate the class A and class B notes.

Fitch takes various rating actions on these classes of JWS CBO
2000-1, LTD./Corp. as specified below:

  -- $15,000,000 class C-1 downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $16,500,000 class C-2 downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $23,112,085 class D affirmed at 'CC'.


KINGSLAND I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Kingsland I, Ltd.:

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-la Senior Secured Delayed Drawdown
     Notes (current balance of $98,575,877), Downgraded to A1;
     previously on July 14, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$190,000,000 Class A-lb Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     (current balance of $187,294,167), Downgraded to A1;
     previously on July 14, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-l Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$17,250,000 Class C-l Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$8,750,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,750,000 Type I Composite Notes (current balance of
     $9,191,769), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Type II Composite Notes (current balance of
     $3,772,790), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009
     A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2618 as of the last
trustee report, dated September 4, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $13 million, accounting for roughly 3.5% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
13% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  According to the
latest trustee report, exposure to corporate bonds, most of which
are non-investment grade, is currently at 17%.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Kingsland I, Ltd., issued in September 31, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


KINGSLAND V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Kingsland V, Ltd.:

  -- US$295,975,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021 (current balance of $292,288,115), Downgraded to A1;
     previously on May 24, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-2R Secured Revolving Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021 (current Commitment Amount of $59,260,000),
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$12,125,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,900,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,900,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,330,000 Composite Notes Due 2021 (current rated balance
     of $13,450,042), Downgraded to Caa1; previously on May 24,
     2007 Assigned Baa2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class C Overcollateralization Ratio
Test, Class D Overcollateralization Ratio Test and Class E
Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2650 versus a test level of 2528 as of the last trustee
report, dated September 7, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$14.5 million, accounting for roughly 4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
11.5% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class C
overcollateralization ratio was reported at 107.90% versus a test
level of 108.50%, the Class D overcollateralization ratio was
reported at 102.65% versus a test level of 103.90%, and the Class
E overcollateralization ratio was reported at 98.68% versus a test
level of 101.70%.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  According to the
latest trustee report, exposure to corporate bonds and structured
finance securities, most of which are non-investment grade, is
currently at 13% and 4%, respectively.  Moody's has also applied
resecuritization stress factors to default probability assumptions
for structured finance asset collateral as described in the press
release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating
structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Kingsland V, Ltd., issued on May 24, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LAFAYETTE SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by Lafayette Square CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$52,000,000 Class A-3 Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class B-1 Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class B-2 Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
     on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C-1 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Fifth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Term Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba3; previously
     on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class Q-4 Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance
     of $4,178,110), Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these Class Q
combo notes:

  -- US$5,000,000 Class Q-1 Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance
     of $3,763,089), Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4,
     2009 A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10,000,000 Class Q-2 Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance
     of $6,012,552), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$7,000,000 Class Q-3 Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance
     of $4,561,297), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5,000,000 Class Q-5 Notes Due 2019 (current rated balance
     of $2,883,976), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the Class A-2, Class
A-3, Class B-1, Class B-2, Class C-1, Class C-2, and Class Q-4
Notes have incorporated the stresses mentioned in these paragraphs
as well as credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
However, the actions reflect updated analysis indicating that the
impact of these factors on the ratings of these Notes is not as
negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review
in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-
level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of mild credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 3118 as of the
last trustee report, dated September 7, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $4 million, accounting for roughly 0.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
19% of Caa-rated securities of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class Q-1, Class Q-2, Class Q-3
and Class Q-5 Notes also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Lafayette Square CDO Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans and senior secured loans
of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LCM I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by LCM I Limited Partnership:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to A1, previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2015, Downgraded to B1, previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable 7.607% Fixed Rate Notes
     due 2015, Downgraded to B1, previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$11,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2015, Confirmed at Baa2, previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
consider mild credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
Moody's notes that as of the last trustee report, dated
September 8, 2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2415,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$3 million, accounting for roughly 1% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 6% of the
underlying portfolio.

LCM I Limited Partnership, issued on June 5, 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LCM VI: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by LCM VI Ltd.:

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$32,500,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- $15,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
consider minimal credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
Moody's notes that as of the last trustee report, dated August 27,
2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2457, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$14 million, accounting for roughly 2.9% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
5.6% of the underlying portfolio.

LCM VI Ltd., issued in May of 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LNR CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings on All Classes of 2002-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of all rated
classes of Notes of LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd.  The affirmations are due
to a lower probability of default and higher weighted average
recovery on the remaining commercial mortgage backed securities
securities after Moody's projected losses are taken from the
underlying CMBS securitizations.  Additionally, a large Preferred
Shares class and four non-Moody's rated classes, F-FL, F-FX, G,
and H, buffer Moody's rated classes from current projected losses.

Moody's review of LNR 2002-1 Ltd. was prompted by the high number
of Impaired and Defaulted securities listed on the August 24, 2008
trustee report.  The Notes are currently collateralized by 129
classes of CMBS securities from 22 separate transactions dated
between 1998 and 2002.  As of the August 24, 2008 distribution
date, 35 CMBS securities (30.4%) were listed as impaired and 59
CMBS securities (39.9%) were listed as defaulted.

Since Moody's last review, among the Moody's rated securities
(59.5% of the pool), there have been 21 downgrades and no
upgrades.  Credit estimates were performed on all non-Moody's
rated securities (40.5%).

The transactions aggregate collateral balance has decreased to
$694 million from $800 million at issuance, due to approximately
$105 million in losses from the underlying CMBS transactions, and
$3 million in paydowns to the Class A Notes.  Moody's estimates an
additional $157 million in expected losses to the Notes due to
losses on defaulted and/or specially serviced loans currently
within the underlying CMBS transactions.

In Moody's review of the deal, Moody's undercollateralized the
Notes by $157 million after determining potential losses on
collateral tranches.  As a result, the remaining CMBS securities
have a lower overall probability of default and a higher weighted
average recovery rate.  This result, along with a large Preferred
Shares class and four non-Moody's rated classes F-FX, F-FL, G, and
H which act as a buffer to the Moody's rated classes, led Moodys'
to conclude that there is no material change in the expect losses
of the rated Notes.

Moody's uses a weighted average rating factor as an overall
indicator of the credit quality of a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  Based on Moody's
analysis, the current WARF is 4,663 compared to 4,188 at last
review and 3,967 at issuance.  Moody's modeled a WARF of 3,465
which is the adjusted WARF after excluding certain defaulted and
impaired collateral.  Moody's reviewed the ratings or performed
credit estimates on all the collateral supporting the Notes.  The
distribution of ratings, excluding certain defaulted and impaired
assets, is: Baa1-Baa3 (4.6% compared to 2.7% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (31.3% compared to 31.9%), B1-B3 (39.9% compared to 30.7%),
Caa1-NR (24.2% compared to 34.7%).

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
February 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or real estate investment
trust debt) within CRE CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15%
to 35% previously.

Default probability is typically captured in the collateral WARF.
For CUSIP collateral, the default probability re-securitization
stress was applied to capture potential future ratings volatility
of the underlying collateral.

The rating actions is:

  -- Class A, $95,070,976, Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, affirmed
     at Aa2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa

  -- Class B, $80,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, affirmed
     at Baa1; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa

  -- Class C, $25,000,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037, affirmed at
     Baa3; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to Baa3 from Aa1

  -- Class D-FX, $40,150,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037, affirmed
     at Ba2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to Ba2 from A2

  -- Class D-FL, $45,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     affirmed at Ba2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to Ba2 from
     A2

  -- Class E-FX, $22,000,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037, affirmed
     at B2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to B2 from Baa3

  -- Class E-FXD, $33,059,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2037, affirmed
     at B2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to B2 from Baa3

  -- Class E-FL, $21,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     affirmed at B2; previously on 1/23/09 downgraded to B2 from
     Baa3

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated January 23, 2009.


LNR CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes 2007-2 of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from LNR CDO VI Ltd.'s series 2007-2.  Six of these
ratings remain on CreditWatch negative.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed four other ratings from this transaction and removed them
from CreditWatch negative.  The rating on class B also remains on
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on 41 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for LNR CDO VI.
The certificates are from 10 transactions and the securities total
$246.5 million (22% of the pool balance).  Seven ratings on LNR
CDO VI remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's
exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative
($292.1 million, 27%).

According to the Aug. 20, 2009, trustee report, LNR CDO VI is
collateralized by 132 CMBS certificates ($1.099 billion, 100%)
from 28 distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  LNR CDO VI
has significant exposure to these recently downgraded CMBS
transactions:

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2007-C31 (classes
  K through N; $47.5 million, 4.3%);

* Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12 (classes J through P;
  $46.5 million, 4.2%);

* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2007-C3 (classes
  L through S; $37.2 million, 3.4%); and

* ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 (classes K through Q;
  $33.1 million, 3%).

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on
LNR CDO VI in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch resolutions of
the underlying CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                   LNR CDO VI Ltd. Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              A-/Watch Neg     A+/Watch Neg
         A-2              A-/Watch Neg     A+/Watch Neg
         C                BB-/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
         D                B+/Watch Neg     BB-/Watch Neg
         E                B/Watch Neg      B+/Watch Neg
         F                CCC/Watch Neg    B-/Watch Neg

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   LNR CDO VI Ltd. Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         G                CCC-             CCC/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   LNR CDO VI Ltd. Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         H                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         J                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         K                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg
         L                CCC-             CCC-/Watch Neg

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                  LNR CDO VI Ltd. Series 2007-2

              Class                  Rating
              -----                  ------
              B                      BBB-/Watch Neg


LBSBC NIM: S&P Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on all
outstanding classes of notes from LBSBC NIM Co.'s series 2006-1,
2006-2, 2006-3, 2007-1, and 2007-3.  The ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The net interest margin securities from the LBSBC NIM Co. trusts
hold two classes of asset-backed pass-through certificates--the
class X subordinate certificates and the class P certificates
previously issued by the underlying transactions, the five Lehman
Bros. Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trusts.  The class X
certificates entitles certificateholders to receive excess cash
flow (if any) generated by the loans and pass-through certificates
each month after transaction expenses and required distributions
to each class of rated certificates have been paid.  The class P
certificates entitle certificateholders to receive any prepayment
penalties associated with certain prepayments on the related
mortgage loans in the underlying transactions.

Because of the increased delinquencies in the collateral for the
underlying transactions, excess cash flow is now being trapped
rather than being passed on to the NIM trusts.  The NIM
transactions are currently reliant solely on prepayment penalties
and the reserve funds to make their interest payments.  Depending
on individual loan seasoning and performance, the availability of
future prepayment penalty funds could be significantly reduced.
Three of the NIM trusts--series 2006-3, 2007-1, and 2007-3--have
received limited or no prepayment penalties in the past three
collection periods and have been paying interest on the senior
classes solely from their reserve accounts.  The reserve accounts
for these trusts have fallen below their initial nine-month
interest levels, and in the case of series 2006-3, may not be
sufficient to make a full interest payment on the next payment
date.  Series 2006-1 and 2006-2 are at their target nine-month
reserve amounts and have received monthly prepayments between $0
and $144,320 in the previous three months.

The current structure of these securitizations allows the most
senior class of notes, currently N1, to experience an interest
default for three consecutive payment dates before triggering an
event of default.  The subordinate classes can receive payment-in-
kind (PIK) interest payments as long as there are senior notes
outstanding.

The ratings remain on CreditWatch negative to reflect the
possibility that the trusts will continue to use their reserve
accounts to make interest payments because future cash flows may
be lower than expected.  Cash flow from the class X certificates
may not resume in the near future if the underlying transactions'
delinquencies remain at their current levels.  The underlying
LBSBC securitizations' delinquencies would have to significantly
diminish and their reserve accounts, currently at zero, would have
to reach their target levels before the excess spread from these
transactions continue being passed to the NIM trusts.

If the underlying transactions continue to squeeze the NIMs' cash
flows and their enhancement deteriorates, S&P may take further
negative rating actions as S&P deem appropriate.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                       LBSBC NIM Co. 2006-1
  $26 million LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2006-1

                             Rating
                             ------
            Class       To              From
            -----       --              ----
            N1          BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
            N2          B+/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
            N3          B-/Watch Neg    B/Watch Neg

                      LBSBC NIM Co. 2006-2
  $28 million LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2006-2

                             Rating
                             ------
            Class       To              From
            -----       --              ----
            N1          BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
            N2          B+/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg
            N3          B-/Watch Neg    B/Watch Neg

                      LBSBC NIM Co. 2006-3
  $29 million LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2006-3

                             Rating
                             ------
            Class       To               From
            -----       --               ----
            N1          BB-/Watch Neg    BBB/Watch Neg
            N2          B/Watch Neg      BB/Watch Neg
            N3          CCC/Watch Neg    B/Watch Neg

                       LBSBC NIM Co. 2007-1
  $25 million LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2007-1

                             Rating
                             ------
            Class       To              From
            -----       --              ----
            N1          BB-/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
            N2          B/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg
            N3          CCC/Watch Neg   B/Watch Neg

                       LBSBC NIM Co. 2007-3
  $40 million LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2007-3

                             Rating
                             ------
            Class       To                From
            -----       --                ----
            N1          BB-/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
            N2          B/Watch Neg       BB/Watch Neg
            N3          CCC/Watch Neg     B/Watch Neg


M-2 SPC: Moody's Junks Ratings on $125 Mil. Series 2005-G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes issued by M-2 SPC Series 2005-G, a collateralized
debt obligation transaction referencing a managed portfolio of
corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: M-2 SPC Series 2005-G

  -- US$125M M2 Series 2005-G Notes, Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on Feb. 20, 2009 Downgraded to B2

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10-year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 292 since inception to 1215 currently,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba2.
The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc.
which has experienced substantial credit migration in the past few
months, and is now rated Ca.  Since inception of the transaction,
the subordination of the rated tranche has been reduced due to
credit events on Lehman Brothers Inc., Washington Mutual, RH
Donnelly, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National
Mortgage Association and Idearc Inc.  These credit events lead to
a decrease of approximately 3.5% of the subordination of the
tranches.  The industry sector the most represented in the
portfolio are Banking (19%), Real Estate (10%), Finance (9%) and
Insurance (6%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


MBIA INSURANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 Hybrid CDO Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12 U.S.
cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt obligation tranches
insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. to 'BB+'.  Five of the 12 ratings
are currently on CreditWatch with negative implications and will
remain as such.  Additionally, S&P placed one rating on another
transaction insured by MBIA on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The rating actions follow S&P's Sept. 28, 2009, downgrade of MBIA
to 'BB+' from 'BBB'.

Because Standard & Poor's underlying ratings on these tranches are
below 'BB+', which do not account for the insurance policies, S&P
lowered its ratings on them to reflect the rating currently
assigned to the monoline insurer.

Due to a structural linkage to MBIA as a super-senior
counterparty, as well as the absence of provisions that could
offset the impact of an MBIA downgrade, none of ratings on the
tranches from CWCapital COBALT III Synthetic CDO Ltd. can be
higher than the rating on MBIA.  Because there has been no change
in the structural features of the transaction since the
CreditWatch placements and MBIA continues to be the super-senior
counterparty, S&P lowered the ratings on all tranches that were
previously higher than the current rating on MBIA.  S&P is keeping
these ratings on CreditWatch negative due to a decline in the
credit quality of the underlying collateral.

                           Ratings Lowered

                                         Rating
                                         ------
    Transaction             Class  To              From
    -----------             -----  --              ----
    Captiva CBO Finance
     Ltd. 1997-1            A      BB+             BBB
    Fulton Street
     CDO Ltd.               A-1A   BB+             BBB
    Mulberry Street
     CDO Ltd.               A-1A   BB+             BBB
    Mulberry Street
     CDO II Ltd.            A-1A   BB+             BBB
    Mulberry Street
     CDO II Ltd.            A-1B   BB+             BBB
    Mulberry Street
     CDO II Ltd.            A-1W   BB+             BBB
    Oceanview CBO I Ltd.    A-1A   BB+             BBB
    CWCapital COBALT III
    Synthetic CDO Ltd.     A      BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
    CWCapital COBALT III
     Synthetic CDO Ltd.     B      BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
    CWCapital COBALT III
     Synthetic CDO Ltd.     C      BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
    CWCapital COBALT III
     Synthetic CDO Ltd.     D      BB+/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
    CWCapital COBALT III
     Synthetic CDO Ltd.     E      BB+/Watch Neg   BBB-/Watch Neg

                   Rating Placed On Creditwatch

                                            Rating
                                            ------
       Transaction              Class  To              From
       -----------              -----  --              ----
       Bingham CDO L.P.         A-3    BBB/Watch Neg   BBB


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2006-Canada 20 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through, Series
2006-Canada 20 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing, increased leverage from the
remainder of the pool and concerns about refinancing risk
associated with loans maturing within the next twenty four months.
Two loans, representing 6% of the pool, have recently been
transferred to special servicing.  The largest loan in special
servicing is the Marriott Pooled Senior Loan ($26.1 million -- 5%
of the pool).  The loan is a 50% pari passu interest in a
$52.1 million mortgage.  The loan is secured by a pool of five
Marriot-flagged, limited service hotels totaling 632 rooms located
throughout the province of Ontario.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in August 2009 due to imminent default.  The
Borrower notified the Lender that it does not have sufficient
funds to sustain current and future debt service payments.  At
securitization, the loan had an underlying rating of Baa3.

As of the September 14, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to
$546.9 million from $595.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 64 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 53% of the pool.

Five loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Based on Moody's preliminary analysis, the pool's weighted average
loan to value ratio has increased since securitization due to a
decline in performance of a portion of the pool.  Moody's review
will focus on potential losses from specially serviced loans and
the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class C, $14,139,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class D, $15,626,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa2 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class E, $4,465,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Baa3 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class F, $5,209,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class G, $2,232,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba2 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class H, $2,232,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba3 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class J, $1,488,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class K, $1,488,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 10/26/2007

  -- Class L, $2,232,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Ba1 on 10/26/2007


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Rating on Three 2006-HE5 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 3 securities
issued by Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE5
on review for possible downgrade.  The actions are the result of
recent deterioration relative to expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The placement of these securities on review for possible
downgrade relates to senior bonds whose support has deteriorated
in recent months, as principal payments have slowed relative to
erosion of credit support provided by subordinate bonds.  Further
Moody's are reviewing Moody's loss projection on the underlying
assets in light of recent increases in both default-rate and loss
severity.

The Class A-2A and A-2B are at higher risk of losses if they are
not paid off before supporting subordinate bonds are completely
written down.  In the event that subordinate bonds are written
down entirely; this deal has structural features that redirect
principal payments pro-rata toward all senior bonds.  At the
conclusion of this review, it is likely that the A-2A tranche will
be downgraded to below investment grade.

In it's analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the
current available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2006-HE5

  -- Cl. A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. A-2A, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2B, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-WMC2 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
securities issued by Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-
WMC2.  The rating actions are the result of recent deterioration
relative to expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's have increased Moody's loss projection on
the underlying assets in light of recent increases in both
default-rate and loss severity.

Generally, the downgraded securities are expected to ultimately
recover less of their outstanding principal balance than had
previously been expected.  The Class A-2fpt and A-2b in particular
are at higher risk of losses if they are not paid off before
supporting subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the
event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal
has structural features that redirect principal payments pro-rata
toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.


Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC2
Pool current expected loss: 42% of original balance

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-2fpt, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-2c, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms Ratings on 19 2003-IQ6 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6 and removed 16 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction using
its recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  Its
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, excluding loans that S&P stressed as credit concerns,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.78x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 70.8%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.45x and an LTV of 88.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 17.8% and 23.5%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations excluded one credit-
impaired loan (0.6%), 74 cooperative apartment loans (13.1%), and
11 loans (7.5%) that have been defeased.  S&P separately estimated
losses for the credit-impaired loan and included these losses in
the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.  S&P excluded
the cooperative apartment loans because they did not default under
its 'AAA' scenario due to extremely low leverage.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

One loan ($747,170, 0.1%) in the pool is with the special servicer
for the coop loans, National Consumer Cooperative Bank FSB (NCB).
This loan is current, and S&P expects that it will be returned to
the master servicer.  In addition to the specially serviced loan,
S&P regards one loan ($5.3 million, 0.6%) as credit-impaired.
This loan is current; however, it is on the servicer's watchlist
for low DSC and low occupancy, and S&P regards it as a near-term
default risk.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $890.1 million, which represents 89.2% of the
aggregate trust balance at issuance.  There are 171 loans in the
pool, down from 175 at issuance.  The master servicers for this
transaction are Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (for the non-coop loans) and
NCB (for the coop loans).  The master servicers provided financial
information for 99.0% of the nondefeased loans, and 92.9% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim 2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.03x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  Excluding the coop and defeased
loans, S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.78x and 70.8%,
respectively.  These calculations exclude the 74 cooperative
apartment loans in the pool.  To date, the transaction has not
experienced any realized losses.  Eighteen loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including one of the top 10 loans.  Fifteen
loans ($55.5 million, 6.2%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, and six of these loans ($14.4 million, 1.6%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures secured by commercial real estate have an
aggregate outstanding balance of $400.0 million (44.9%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.85x for the top 10 loans.  The eighth-largest loan in the
pool ($22.3 million, 2.5%) appears on the master servicer's
watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were
1.79x and 71.9%, respectively.

The Woodhawk Apartments loan is the eighth-largest loan in the
pool and is secured by a 436-unit multifamily complex in Ross, Pa.
The loan appears on the watchlist due to a drop in occupancy and a
corresponding decline in DSC.  Since its placement on the
watchlist, the property's performance has improved, and the master
servicer expects to remove the loan from the watchlist in October
2009.  Occupancy was 78.4% as of July 2009, and DSC was 1.14x as
of Dec. 31, 2008.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2003-IQ6

                Rating
                ------
    Class  To              From          Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --              ----          ----------------------
    A-2    AAA             AAA/Watch Neg                  14.01
    A-3    AAA             AAA/Watch Neg                  14.01
    A-4    AAA             AAA/Watch Neg                  14.01
    A-1A   AAA             AAA/Watch Neg                  14.01
    B      AA+             AA+/Watch Neg                  11.07
    C      A+              A+/Watch Neg                    7.71
    D      A               A/Watch Neg                     6.45
    E      BBB+            BBB+/Watch Neg                  5.60
    F      BBB             BBB/Watch Neg                   4.34
    G      BBB-            BBB-/Watch Neg                  3.50
    H      BB+             BB+/Watch Neg                   2.80
    J      BB              BB/Watch Neg                    2.24
    K      BB-             BB-/Watch Neg                   1.96
    L      B+              B+/Watch Neg                    1.68
    M      B               B/Watch Neg                     1.40
    N      B-              B-/Watch Neg                    1.12

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ6
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2003-IQ6

               Class  Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
               -----  ------   ----------------------
               X-1    AAA                         N/A
               X-2    AAA                         N/A
               X-Y    AAA                         N/A


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-HQ13 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on three other classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially serviced
loans, as well as its analysis of the loan that S&P has determined
to be credit impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.23x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 115.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.85x and an LTV
of 158.1%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 93.8% and 39.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations noted above exclude the two specially serviced loans
(2.2%) and one credit-impaired loan (7.8%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificate based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may
revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings,
including the rating on the IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Two loans ($22.8 million, 2.2%) in the pool are specially
serviced.  The named special servicer for the transaction is
Centerline Servicing Inc.  Centerline specially services the
Country Club Village loan ($9.4 million, 0.9%).  The Country Club
Village loan is 90-plus days delinquent.  As of year-end 2008,
occupancy was 77% and DSC was 0.46x, compared with 93% and 1.27x,
respectively, at issuance.  Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of this loan.

CWCapital Asset Management LLC is the special servicer for the
High Pointe Tower loan ($13.4 million, 1.3%).  This loan contains
a B note, and the B noteholder for this loan recently transferred
the special servicing rights to CWCapital.  The High Pointe Tower
loan is 30 days delinquent.  As of year-end 2008, occupancy was
62% and DSC was 0.60x, compared with 87.8% and 1.95x,
respectively, at issuance.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate
loss upon the resolution of this loan.

Neither of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the September 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $1.032 billion, slightly down from $1.039 billion at
issuance.  The number of loans in the pool, at 82, is unchanged
since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is
Wachovia Bank N.A.  As of the September 2009 remittance report,
the master servicer provided financial information for 95.3% of
the pool, and 99.1% of the servicer-provided information was full-
year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.21x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.23x and 115.3%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the two specially serviced
loans and the one loan S&P deemed to be credit impaired.  S&P
estimated losses separately for these loans ($103.3 million,
10.0%).  These loans had a weighted average servicer-reported DSC
of 0.67x.  The transaction has not experienced any principal
losses to date.  Twenty-four loans ($270.5 million, 26.2%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10
loans.  Six loans ($28.9 million, 2.8%) have reported DSC between
1.10x and 1.0x, and eight loans ($172.4 million, 16.7%) have
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$533.0 million (51.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.14x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.12x and
125.2%, respectively.  S&P's DSC and LTV calculations exclude one
top 10 loan, currently on the watchlist, that S&P deemed to be
credit impaired.  The credit-impaired loan and the other two top
10 loans on the watchlist are discussed below.

The Pier at Caesars loan is the largest exposure in the pool.  The
loan was current in its debt service payments as of the September
2009 remittance report.  This loan has a trust balance of
$80.5 million (7.8%) and a whole-loan balance of $135.0 million.
The loan appears on the servicer's watchlist because the DSC is
below 1.10x.  Through recent news articles, S&P has learned that
the sponsor, Taubman Centers Inc., plans to relinquish the
property.  S&P expects this loan to be transferred to the special
servicer in the near future.  The loan is secured by a first
mortgage encumbering the leasehold interest in a 303,788-sq.-ft.
unanchored retail center located in Atlantic City, N.J.
Originally constructed from 2004 to 2006, the retail center is
centrally located along the boardwalk in front of Caesars Atlantic
City and next to the Bally's Park Place and Trump Palace casinos.
Year-end 2008 occupancy has improved to 80% from 75.4% at
issuance.  Many tenants pay rent on a percentage basis, however,
and sales have been weak.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 0.70x.  Due to
the ongoing occupancy issues, low DSC, and the recent news
concerning the sponsor, S&P deemed the loan to be credit impaired.

The Tower 17 loan is the seventh-largest loan in the pool and the
second-largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a trust
balance of $38.3 million (3.7%) and a whole-loan balance of
$78.75 million.  The loan appears on the servicer's watchlist
because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The loan is secured by a
first mortgage encumbering the fee interest in a 231,598-sq.-ft.,
17-story class A office building and a five-story parking garage
located in Irvine, Calif.  The property was constructed in 1987
and renovated in 2006 and is located near the John Wayne Airport
in Irvine.  As of year-end 2008, the DSC was 0.82x and occupancy
was 73%, practically unchanged from the occupancy of 72% at
issuance.  At issuance, Standard & Poor's performed a stabilized
analysis due to the departure of major tenants.  Occupancy remains
at what S&P considers low, however, because the soft market
conditions in the Irvine area continue to affect the property.

The Comfort Inn & Suites - Sea World loan is the eighth-largest
loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $30.0 million (2.9%) and
appears on the watchlist because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The
loan is secured by a first priority leasehold deed of trust
encumbering a 216-room limited service hotel located in San Diego,
Calif.  Due to the economic downturn, the hotel's occupancy and
average daily rate experienced declines since issuance.  The year-
end 2008 DSC was 1.14x, down from 1.42x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-1A      A+      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.22
     A-3       A+      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.22
     A-M       BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.15
     A-J       BB      AAA/Watch Neg                    13.09
     B         BB-     AA/Watch Neg                     11.33
     C         B+      AA-/Watch Neg                    10.20
     D         B       A/Watch Neg                       8.56
     E         B       A-/Watch Neg                      7.30
     F         B-      BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.17
     G         B-      BBB/Watch Neg                     5.04
     H         CCC+    BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.78
     J         CCC+    BB+/Watch Neg                     3.40
     K         CCC     BB/Watch Neg                      3.02
     L         CCC     BB-/Watch Neg                     2.64
     M         CCC     B+/Watch Neg                      1.64
     N         CCC-    B/Watch Neg                       1.39
     O         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      1.01

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
          -----      ------      ----------------------
          A-1        AAA                          30.22
          A-2        AAA                          30.22
          X          AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO V LTD.:

  -- US$191,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018 (current balance of $188,541,747), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on June 29, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009, Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009,
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018 (current balance of $10,159,495), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due September
     2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below and the failure of the Class B-2L Overcollateralization
Test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2828 versus a test
level of 2690 as of the last trustee report, dated September 8,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $21 million, accounting for
roughly 7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 9% of the underlying portfolio.  The
Class B-2L overcollateralization test was reported at 101.97%
versus a test level of 102.25%.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Mountain Capital CLO V LTD., issued on June 29, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NACM CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NACM CLO I:

  -- US$224,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on June 20, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Downgraded
     to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$16,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the Class A-1
Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D
Notes also reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit
deterioration.  Such credit deterioration is observed through an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.  In
particular, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $10.1 million, accounting for roughly 3.5% of the
collateral balance, according to the trustee report dated
September 8, 2009.  Moody's also notes that according to the same
report, the weighted average rating factor is 2407, and securities
rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 3.4% of the underlying
portfolio.

Moody's further notes that the rating confirmation on the Class B
Notes has incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well as
credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the
action reflects updated analysis indicating that the impact of
these factors on the rating of the Class B Notes is not as
negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review
in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-
level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

NACM CLO I, issued in June of 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Navigator CDO 2005, Ltd.:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Term
     Notes due 2017, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Subordinate Secured
     Deferrable Term Notes due 2017 (current balance of
     $19,183,230), Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Subordinate Secured
     Deferrable Term Notes due 2017 (current balance of
     $7,137,946), Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class Q-2 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of $16,533,748), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class Q-3 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of $5,023,803), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class Q-4 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of $3,995,772), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class Q-5 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of 10,602,540), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4,
     2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class Q-6 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of $4,607,584), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class Q-7 Notes due 2017 (current rated balance
     of $6,530,276), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the notes are
a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B and the Class C
overcollateralization tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2890 as of the last trustee report, dated September 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $33.2 million, accounting for roughly
7.1% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 13.4% of the underlying portfolio.  The
Class B overcollateralization test was reported at 109.21% versus
a test level of 109.90%, and the Class C overcollateralization
test was reported at 102.45% versus a test level of 105.20%.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class C Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B
overcollateralization test.

The downgrade actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,500,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Secured Deferrable Term
     Notes due 2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Secured Deferrable Term
     Notes due 2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class B-1 Notes
and the Class B-2 Notes have incorporated the aforementioned
stresses as well as credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated analysis
indicating that the impact of these factors on the ratings of the
Class B-1 Notes and the Class B-2 Notes is not as negative as
previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.

Navigator CDO 2005, Ltd., issued in July of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Northwoods Capital VIII, Limited:

  -- US$162,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on June 28, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$175,000,000 (current drawn balance of $174,500,000) Class
     A-2 Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on June 28, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 (current balance of $10,611,595) Class E
     Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 (current balance of $9,592,311) Type III
     Composite Obligations due 2022 Notes, Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$37,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$32,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3186 as of the last
trustee report, dated September 9, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $40.9 million, accounting for roughly 8.1% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12.7 % of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest
payments on the Class E Notes are presently being deferred.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Northwoods Capital VIII, Limited, issued in June 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2003-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2003-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$17,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,500,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2015 (current balance $11,631,481), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2015
     (current balance $11,166,222), Downgraded to B1; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$17,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2015, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2903 versus a test
level of 2550 as of the last trustee report, dated August 31,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $21 million, accounting for
roughly 6.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or CCC and lower make up approximately 11% of the underlying
portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2003-1 Ltd., issued in July of 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners V,
Ltd.:

  -- US$229,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Notes due November
     28, 2018, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 14, 2003
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$7,250,000 Class A-2 Note Components, Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on January 14, 2003 Assigned Aaa;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes due November 28, 2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes due November 28, 2018, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes due November 28, 2018, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,500,000 Class D Subordinated Secured Deferrable Interest
     Notes due November 28, 2018, Confirmed at B3; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These
revised assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation
that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
consider moderate credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  Moody's notes that as of the last trustee report,
dated August 19, 2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2333,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$9.8 million, accounting for roughly 3.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
6.6% of the underlying portfolio.

Octagon Investment Partners V, Ltd., issued in January of 2003, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners VII,
Ltd.:

  -- US$16,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due December 2,
     2016, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,750,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December 2,
     2016, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2,2016, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,750,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December 2,
     2016 (current balance of $10,336,885), Confirmed at B3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class A-3L and Class
B-1L Notes and the rating confirmations on the Class A-2L and
Class B-2L Notes consider updated analysis incorporating certain
rating stresses assumed by Moody's, but reflect Moody's conclusion
that the impact of these factors on the ratings of the notes is
not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal
review in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive
deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.  Additionally,
the actions consider the positive implications of performance
stabilization in certain deal collateral quality measurements
since the time of the previous rating actions.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over time and is
currently 2405, but is lower than the test level of 2580, based on
the last trustee report dated August 26, 2009.  According to the
same report, securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.1% of the underlying portfolio versus 11.5% as of the trustee
report dated March 25, 2009.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These
revised assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation
that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Octagon Investment Partners VII, Ltd., issued in September of
2004, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.  Additionally, the transaction
is allowed a bond bucket of up to 15% and the current bond
holdings amount to 12.1%.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners VIII,
Ltd.:

  -- US$318,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on August 24, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Revolving Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes due 2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     August 24, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2017, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class E Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2017
     (current balance of $15,862,617), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,400,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the Class A-1
Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, and the Class E
Notes are a result of moderate credit deterioration of the
underlying portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2385 as of the last trustee report, dated
September 3, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $15.4 million,
accounting for roughly 3.6% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 7.6% of the
underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that the rating confirmations on the Class C
Notes and the Class D Notes have incorporated the aforementioned
stresses as well as credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated analysis
indicating that the impact of these factors on the ratings of the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes is not as negative as
previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.

Octagon Investment Partners VIII, Ltd., issued in August of 2005,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ONE WALL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by One Wall Street CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$244,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.  In
particular, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $26.2 million, accounting for roughly 6.6% of the
collateral balance as of the last trustee report, dated August 31,
2009.  The deterioration is mitigated in part by the failure of
the Interest Reinvestment Test.  The Interest Reinvestment Test
was reported at 101.77% versus a test level of 102.2%.  The
failure is causing excess interest to be diverted for
reinvestment.

One Wall Street CLO II Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PASADENA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of two classes of Notes issued by Pasadena CDO I Ltd.  The
Notes affected by the rating actions are:

  -- US$387,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Ba1; previously on Feb. 26, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- US$66,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Caa3; previously on Feb. 26, 2009 Downgraded to B1

Pasadena CDO I Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage backed securities
and other types of assets backed securities (ABS).

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor).  Moody's notes that in the case of Pasadena CDO I
Ltd., more than 25% of its assets have been the subject of ratings
downgrade since Moody's last review of the transaction in February
2009.  The trustee reports that WARF is 685 and defaults total
$38,816,186 as compared to a WARF of 536 and defaults totaling
$25,636,182 as reported by the Trustee in February 2009.  All the
IC tests and the Class B and C OC tests are failing.
Additionally, on the last paydate, September 21st, principal
proceeds were used to cover a part of the Class B interest
payments.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to a missed interest payment with respect to the
Class A or Class B Notes or the failure to maintain the Class A
Overcollateralization Ratio at an amount equal to at least 101.5%.
As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


RASC SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five 2007-KS2 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
securities issued by RASC Series 2007-KS2 Trust.  The rating
actions are the result of recent deterioration relative to
expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's have increased Moody's loss projection on
the underlying assets in light of recent increases in both
default-rate and loss severity.

Generally, the downgraded securities are expected to ultimately
recover less of their outstanding principal balance than had
previously been expected.  The Class A-I-2 in particular is at
higher risk of losses if it is not paid off before supporting
subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the event that
subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal has
structural features that allocate losses pro-rata toward all
outstanding senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Issuer: RASC Series 2007-KS2 Trust

  -- Pool current expected loss: 46% of original balance

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca


RYLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 1993-06A Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on two
certificates issued by Ryland Mortgage Securities 1993-06A
resecuritization transaction

The certificates in the resecuritization are backed by several
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Ryland Mortgage Securities 1993-06A

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Sep 17, 1993
     Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Sep 17, 1993
     Assigned A3


SARGAS CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four and downgraded two classes of
notes issued by Sargas CLO II Ltd./LLC.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this press release.

The affirmations are the result of the credit enhancement
available to the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes relative to the
observed and expected performance of the underlying loan
portfolio.  Currently, four loans totaling 5.2% of the portfolio
are considered defaulted, one of which the portfolio manager
expects to resume cash flows in the near future.  Additionally,
all loans in the portfolio are senior secured positions, which
should exhibit relatively strong recoveries in the event of future
defaults.

Structural features of the transaction, such as the application of
excess spread to redeem the notes in order of priority should the
General Overcollateralization Test fail, also serve to protect the
higher-priority classes.  The General OC test was passing at a
level of 106.2% versus a trigger of 106% as of the Aug. 31, 2009
trustee report.  While Sargas CLO II is currently in compliance
with this test, future deterioration may result in the application
of excess interest to redeem senior notes to offset principal
losses.

The senior notes have also benefited from collateral amortization.
The class A-1 notes have received almost 40% of their initial
principal balance since the closing date.  Principal proceeds were
originally distributed pro rata to the liability structure;
however, the calculation of a class E accrued payable at the July
2008 payment date permanently triggered sequential distributions
of principal payments, further benefiting the higher-priority
notes.

The classes D and E notes have been downgraded as their credit
enhancement levels are no longer consistent with their original
ratings due to observed credit deterioration in the portfolio.  In
addition to the defaulted assets, the percentage of obligors
considered 'CCC+' or below currently represents about 28% of the
performing portfolio, compared to 16% at the last review in July
2008.  Further, due to the switch to sequential payment, these
notes are no longer entitled to receive principal proceeds until
all higher-priority notes are fully redeemed.

In its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity to
potential softness in U.S. corporate recoveries.  To accomplish
this, Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for each
asset type by 30% in one sensitivity scenario and by 50% in a
second sensitivity scenario.  The classes A-1, A-2, and B notes
were less sensitive to lower recovery rates and have therefore
been assigned Stable Outlooks.  The classes C, D, and E notes
displayed relatively greater sensitivity to lower recovery rates
and have been assigned Negative Outlooks.

Each class of notes was assigned a Loss Severity rating.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral.  The LS rating should
always be considered in conjunction with the probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.

Sargas CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on Aug. 16, 2006, and was originally named De Meer Middle
Market CLO 2006-1 Ltd./LLC.  In June 2009, collateral management
duties were transferred to Pangaea Asset Management from Bank of
America, N.A. Bank of America, N.A assumed management
responsibilities from De Meer Asset Management, the initial asset
manager for the transaction and a division of LaSalle Financial
Services, Inc., through its acquisition of LaSalle Bank
Corporation and LaSalle Bank, N.A. in October 2007.  In connection
with the management assignment to Pangaea Asset Management, the
issuer's name was changed to Sargas CLO II in July 2009.  The
transaction's substitution period ended in March 2009.  The
portfolio is composed of 100% senior secured loans, 46% of which
are broadly syndicated loans, 41% of which are traditional middle
market loans, and 13% of which are larger middle market loans.

Fitch has taken these rating actions and assigned LS ratings and
Rating Outlooks as indicated to these classes of notes issued by
Sargas CLO II:

  -- $116,225,569 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; assigned
     'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70,968,089 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; assigned
     'LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9,256,707 class B notes affirmed at 'AA'; assigned 'LS5';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $29,141,486 class C notes affirmed at 'A'; assigned 'LS4';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,113,528 class D notes downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB';
     assigned 'LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19,199,097 class E notes downgraded to 'B' from 'BB';
     assigned 'LS5'; Outlook Negative.



SAYBROOK POINT: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A Secured Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Saybrook Point CBO II,
Limited.  The Note affected by the rating action is:

  -- US$255,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Secured Notes, Due 2035,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/6/2009 Downgraded to B1

Saybrook Point CBO II, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a Residential Mortgaged Backed Securities.
RMBS is approximately 81% of the underlying portfolio of which the
majority is 2002-2006 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The ratings of approximately 51% of
the underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last
review of the transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reports
the WARF of the portfolio is 4,073 as of August 24, 2009 and also
reports defaulted assets in the amount of $21.8 million.
Securities rated "Caa1" or lower comprise approximately 44% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Trustee also reports that coverage
tests are failing, including the Class A, Class B and Class C
Overcollateralization Tests.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Section V of the Indenture dated November 14, 2002, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SCHILLER PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Schiller Park CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$54,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 1, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Securities Due 2021 (current rated
     balance of $8,321,443), Downgraded to B1; previously on March
     4, 2009 A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$27,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2824 versus a test
level of 2744 as of the last trustee report, dated August 14,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $15.5 million, accounting for
roughly 3.9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.6% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Schiller Park CLO Ltd., issued in May of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SCOTTISH RE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Securities
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of certain life insurance-linked securities sponsored by
Scottish Re Group Limited as detailed below.  Moody's noted that
while the insurance risk in these transactions has performed
within expectations, the assets backing insurance reserves have
substantially underperformed original expectations.  The rating
agency also said that all ratings -- including both uninsured and
insured securities -- of the transactions sponsored by Scottish Re
will be withdrawn as further discussed below.

UNINSURED NOTES:

These ratings were downgraded and will be withdrawn for business
reasons.  The downgrades are due to higher projected investment
losses for the underlying asset portfolios.

  -- Ballantyne Re plc: $250 million of Class A-1 Floating Rate
     Notes downgraded to C from Caa2

  -- Orkney Re II plc: $42.5 million of Series A-2 Floating Rate
     Notes downgraded to Ca from Caa2

These ratings were affirmed and will be withdrawn for business
reasons.

  -- Ballantyne Re plc: $10 million of Class B-1 Subordinated
     Fixed Rate Notes at C; $40 million of Class B-2 Subordinated
     Floating Rate Notes at C

  -- Orkney Re II plc: $30 million of Series B Floating Rate Notes
     at C

Notes Insured By Ambac Assurance UK Ltd. (which is rated Caa2 for
insurance financial strength, developing outlook):

These ratings were downgraded and will be withdrawn for business
reasons.  The downgrade is consistent with Moody's policy of
maintaining ratings on securities that are insured by a financial
guarantor at a level equal to the higher of 1) the rating of the
guarantor, or 2) the published underlying rating or the published
rating of pari pasu debt.  Moody's approach to rating insured
transactions is outlined in Moody's Special Comment entitled
"Assignment of Wrapped Ratings When Financial Guarantor Falls
Below Investment Grade" (May, 2008).

  -- Ballantyne Re plc: $500 million of Class A-2, Series A and
     $400 million of Class A-3, Series A-D Floating Rate
     Guaranteed Notes downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1.

Notes Insured By Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. (which is rated Aa2
for insurance financial strength, review for downgrade):

These ratings will be withdrawn for business reasons:

  -- Ballantyne Re plc: $500 million of Class A-2, Series B
     Floating Rate Guaranteed Notes at Aa2

  -- Orkney Re II plc: $382.5 million of Series A-1 Floating Rate
     Guaranteed Notes at Aa2, on review for possible downgrade.

Notes Insured By MBIA Insurance Corporation (which is rated B3 for
insurance financial strength, negative outlook):

This rating will be withdrawn, consistent with Moody's policy for
rating insured notes when the financial guarantor is downgraded to
below investment grade and there is no published underlying
rating:

  -- Orkney Holdings, LLC: $850 million of Series A Floating Rate
     Insured Notes at Baa1

The last rating action on the uninsured notes of Ballantyne Re and
Orkney Re II was on August 25, 2008 and September 12, 2008,
respectively, when the ratings were downgraded.  The last rating
action on the Ambac-insured notes of Ballantyne Re was on
April 13, 2009, when the rating of Ambac was downgraded to Ba3
from Baa1.  The last rating action on the MBIA-insured notes of
Orkney Holdings was on February 18, 2009, when the rating of MBIA
was downgraded to B3 from Baa1.  The last rating action on the
Assured-insured notes of Ballantyne Re and Orkney Re II was on
May 20, 2009, when the rating of Assured was placed under review
for downgrade.

The Ballantyne Re's, Orkney Re II's, and Orkney Holdings'
underlying ratings were assigned by evaluating factors believed to
be relevant to the credit profile of the notes such as (i) the
demographics and actuarial experience of the referenced block of
(re)insurance business, (ii) relevant industry experience for
similar products/underwriting, (iii) review of independent
actuarial report, including assumptions underlying projected cash
flows, (iv) expected loss and probability of default estimated via
stochastic and deterministic modeling of the insurance cashflows
and the performance of invested assets, and (v) other factors
believed to be applicable to the assessment of the
creditworthiness of the transaction, such as a review of the
structural, legal, and regulatory risks.

Ballantyne Re plc, Orkney Re II plc, and Orkney Re, Inc.
(subsidiary of Orkney Holdings, LLC) are special purpose
reinsurers sponsored by Scottish Annuity & Life Insurance Company
(Cayman) Ltd. (subsidiary of Scottish Re) for the purpose of
financing the excess reserve requirement associated with distinct
blocks of business ceded by Scottish Re (U.S.), Inc., also a
subsidiary of Scottish Re.  The reinsurance agreement between
Scottish Re (U.S.) and the special purpose reinsurers cover
defined blocks of level premium term life policies subject to the
statutory reserve requirements of Regulation XXX.

Moody's insurance financial strength ratings are opinions of the
ability of insurance companies to punctually pay senior
policyholder claims and obligations.


SECURITIZED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3
securities issued by Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC
Trust 2006-HE2.  The rating actions are the result of recent
deterioration relative to expected performance.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable subprime residential mortgage
loans.  The downgrades relate to senior bonds whose support has
deteriorated in recent months, as principal payments have slowed
relative to erosion of credit support provided by subordinate
bonds.  Further Moody's have increased Moody's loss projection on
the underlying assets in light of recent increases in both
default-rate and loss severity.

Generally, the downgraded securities are expected to ultimately
recover less of their outstanding principal balance than had
previously been expected.  The Class A-2B in particular is at
higher risk of losses if it is not paid off before supporting
subordinate bonds are completely written down.  In the event that
subordinate bonds are written down entirely; this deal has
structural features that redirect principal payments pro-rata
toward all senior bonds.

In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-HE2
Pool current expected loss: 37 % of original balance

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1


SOUTH COAST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of three classes of Notes issued by South Coast Funding IV
Ltd.  The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$690,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2034, Downgraded to Baa1; previously
     on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on March 12, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- US$110,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2038, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March
     12, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

South Coast Funding IV Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage backed
securities.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor) and failure of the coverage tests, among other
measures.  Moody's notes that in the case of South Coast Funding
IV Ltd., the trustee reports that WARF is 1022 in August 2009 as
compared to a WARF of 569 reported by the Trustee in February
2009.  In addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is
currently failing one or more coverage tests, including the Class
A/B Overcollateralization Ratio test.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to a missed interest payment with respect to Class A
or B Notes.  During the occurrence and continuance of an Event of
Default, certain parties to the transaction may be entitled to
direct the Trustee to take particular actions with respect to the
Collateral and the Notes, including the sale and liquidation of
the assets.  The severity of losses of certain tranches may be
different depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


STACK 2004-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of four classes of Notes issued by STACK 2004-1, LTD.  The
Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$240,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Term Notes, due May 10,
     2034, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- US$27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Term Notes, due May 10,
     2039, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 6, 2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- US$ 8,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Term
     Notes, due May 10, 2039, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- US$11,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Term
     Notes, due May 10, 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     March 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

STACK 2004-1, LTD. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage backed
securities.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating) and failure of the coverage tests, among other measures.
Moody's notes that in the case of South Coast Funding IV Ltd., the
trustee reports that weighted average rating of the portfolio is
B1 as compared to Ba2 reported by the Trustee in February 2009.
In addition, the Trustee reports that the transaction is currently
failing one or more coverage tests, including the Class D
Overcollateralization Ratio test.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to a missed interest payment with respect to Class A
or B Notes.  During the occurrence and continuance of an Event of
Default, certain parties to the transaction may be entitled to
direct the Trustee to take particular actions with respect to the
Collateral and the Notes, including the sale and liquidation of
the assets.  The severity of losses of certain tranches may be
different depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


STACK LTD: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes of notes issued by
STACK Ltd, Series 2005-1.

These rating actions are the result of severe credit deterioration
among 2003 and 2004 vintage residential mortgage-backed
securitizations experienced since Fitch's last rating action in
January 2009.  Approximately 84.4% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since the last review, with about 76% of the portfolio
downgraded since June 1, 2009.  The main drivers for the
downgrades in the underlying RMBS during the summer were the
continued deterioration of home prices and employment rates
causing an increase in delinquencies despite significant seasoning
in the loans.

The downgrades to the portfolio have left approximately 99.5% of
the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 84.8% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 66.5% and 22.1%, respectively, in January 2009.  The
percentage of the portfolio that has experienced a credit event
has increased to 30.5% according to the Aug. 31, 2009 trustee
report, from 13.3%.

Since the last rating action, the class A2 notes have become the
senior most tranche in the capital structure and have begun to
amortize.  However, the amount of credit deterioration in the
portfolio greatly outweighs the increase in credit enhancement
from amortization of the capital structure.

The class A2 notes are downgraded to 'CC' to reflect Fitch's
opinion that, based on the percentage of declared credit events
and the performance expectations for the remainder of the
portfolio, there is a high probability the notes will default at
or prior to maturity.  The classes B, C and D notes are downgraded
to 'C', indicating Fitch's belief that default is inevitable at or
prior to maturity.

STACK 2005-1 is a synthetic collateralized debt obligation that
closed on March 24, 2005 and is managed by TCW Asset Management
Co.  The portfolio is composed entirely of subprime RMBS, with
94.5% of these assets originated in 2003 and 2004.

Fitch has downgraded these:

STACK Ltd, Series 2005-1

  -- $109,396,137 series A2-US$ notes to 'CC' from 'AA';
  -- Eur5,380,138 series A2-EUR notes to 'CC' from 'AA';
  -- $74,000,000 series B-US$ notes to 'C' from 'BBB';
  -- Eur6,000,000 series B-EUR notes to 'C' from 'BBB';
  -- $33,000,000 series C-US$ notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- JPY1,000,000,000 series C-JPY notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $31,000,000 series D-US$ notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- JPY500,000,000 series D-JPY notes to 'C' from 'CC'.


STARTS 2007-21: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $25 Mil. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of notes issued by STARTS 2007-21 LSS, a leverage super
senior collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a
portfolio static of corporate entities.  If the accumulated loss
of the portfolio has exceeded the predefined loss trigger for the
relevant predetermined times ("Trigger Event"), the investors of
the leverage senior tranche may choose to incur the mark-to-market
loss of the super senior tranche up to the initial investment or
increase the size of their investment.  Moody's explained that its
rating methodology applicable to this transaction address the
probability of a Trigger Event and assumes no recovery for a
leveraged super senior note once a Trigger Event is breached.

The rating action is:

  -- US$25,000,000 STARTS 2007-21 LSS Credit Linked Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 3, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 912 from the last rating action to 1,174,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba1.
The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, Inc.
and Ambac Financial Group which have experienced substantial
credit migration in the past few months, and are now rated Ca.
Since the inception of the transaction, the subordination of the
rated tranche has been reduced due to credit events on Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp, and
Federal National Mortgage Association.  These credit events lead
to a decrease of approximately 1% of the subordination of the
tranche.  The reference portfolio has the highest industry
concentration in insurance (9.2%), telecommunications (8.3%),
Sovereign & Public Finance (7.5%) and Banking (7.5%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


STARTS LIMITED: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A4-D4 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on notes a CDS issued by Starts (Cayman) Limited Series
2007-28, a collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing
a managed portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Starts (Cayman) Limited Series 2007-28

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A4-D4 Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes
     due 2017 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 6, 2009
     Downgraded to B2

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 688 from the last rating action to 960,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of Ba2.
The reference portfolio includes an exposure to CIT Group, which
has experienced substantial credit migration in the past few
months, and is now rated Ca.  Since the last rating action on the
transaction, the subordination of the rated tranche has been
reduced due to a credit event on Idearc Inc. This credit event
leads to a decrease of approximately 0.5% of the subordination of
the tranche.  The industry sectors that are most represented in
the portfolio are Banking (11%), Finance (9%), Insurance (12%) and
Real Estate (4%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


STEARNS: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various 2000-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded one tranche and downgraded
three tranches issued by Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust
2000-1 resecuritization transactions.

The certificates in the resecuritization are backed by several
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

The upgrade of class I-B is a result of significant build-up in
credit enhancement due to the sequential nature of principal
allocation in the capital structure.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. 1-B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Apr 26, 2000
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-C, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Apr 26, 2000
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. 1-D, Downgraded to B2; previously on Apr 26, 2000
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Apr 26, 2000
     Assigned Aaa


STEERS MORNINGSIDE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on certificates issued by Steers Morningside Heights CDO
Trust Series 2005-1, a collateralized debt obligation transaction
referencing four inner CDOs tranches exposed to static portfolios
of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Steers Morningside Heights CDO Trust, Series 2005-1

  -- US$100,000,000 Trust Certificates Notes, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on Feb. 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the inner CDOs'
reference portfolios.  The 10-year weighted average rating factor
of the portfolios of the four inner CDOs, not adjusted with
forward looking measures, has deteriorated respectively from 753,
836, 737, and 817 initially to 1987, 1079, 1495, and 1443 as of
this rating action, equivalent to a current average rating of the
portfolios of Ba3.  The reference portfolios include exposures to
Ambac Financial Group, Great Lakes Chemical Corporation, Clear
Channel Communications Inc. and Istar Financial Inc. which have
experienced substantial credit migration in the past few months,
and are now modeled at Ca/C.  Since inception of the transaction,
the subordination of the inner CDO tranches has been reduced due
to credit events on General Motors, Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.,
Bowater Incorporated, Dana Corporation, Delphi Corporation, Great
Lakes Chemical Corporation, Tribune Company(Old), Lear
Corporation, Visteon Corporation, Chemtura Corporation, Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., Rouse Company (The), Washington Mutual,
Inc.  These credit events lead to a decrease of approximately
4.2%, 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.1% of the subordination of the four inner
CDOs, respectively.  The industry sectors the most represented in
the portfolio are Banking (10.7%), Insurance (7.7%) and Retail
(6.6%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


STEERS MORNINGSIDE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2005-4 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on certificates issued by Steers Morningside Heights CDO
Trust Series 2005-4, a collateralized debt obligation transaction
referencing four inner CDO tranches exposed on static portfolios
of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Steers Morningside Heights CDO Trust, Series 2005-4

  -- US$25,000,000 Trust Certificates Notes, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on March 16, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the inner CDOs'
reference portfolios.  The 10-year weighted average rating factor
of the portfolios of the four inner CDOs, not adjusted with
forward looking measures, has deteriorated respectively from 1729,
1222, 1379 and 1359 since March to 1868, 1189, 1486, and 1516,
equivalent to a current average rating of Ba3.  The reference
portfolios include an exposure to Great Lakes Chemical
Corporation, Clear Channel Communications Inc. and Istar Financial
Inc. which have experienced substantial credit migration in the
past few months, and are now modeled at Ca/C.  Since inception of
the transaction, the subordination of the four inner CDO tranches
has been reduced due to credit events on General Motors, Abitibi-
Consolidated Inc., Bowater Incorporated, Dana Corporation, Delphi
Corporation, Tribune Company(Old), Lear Corporation, Visteon
Corporation, Chemtura Corporation, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,
Rouse Company (The), Washington Mutual, Inc.  These credit events
lead to a decrease of approximately 5.1%, 1.6%, 0.9% and 1.1% of
the subordination of the four inner CDOs, respectively.  The
industry sectors the most represented in the portfolios are
Banking (10.7%), Insurance (7.7%) and Retail (6.2%).

Moody's monitors this transaction using primarily the methodology
for Corporate Synthetic Obligations as described in Moody's
Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (September 2009)

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.


STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stone Tower CLO IV Ltd.:

  -- US$567,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 31, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$42,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$2,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded
     to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$316,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class J Blended Securities Due 2018 (current
     rated balance of $1,992,987), Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$33,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2438 as of the
last trustee report, dated August 10, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $18.6 million, accounting for roughly 2.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
5.91% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations
of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Stone Tower CLO IV Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stone Tower CLO VI Ltd.:

  -- US$61,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$56,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class J Blended Securities (current rated
     balance of $2,937,971), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

  -- US$5,000,000 Class K Blended Securities (current rated
     balance of $4,903,844), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$47,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

  -- US$37,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed
     at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2465 as of the
last trustee report, dated August 6, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total
about $16.3 million, accounting for roughly 1.72% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 5.36% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also
assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt
obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.

Stone Tower CLO VI Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STRATFORD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stratford CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$417,200,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current balance of $409,652,781),
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on October 25, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$104,300,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$41,300,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
     Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$37,100,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
     $37,683,037), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,100,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
     $16,476,294), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current balance of
     $18,137,450), Downgraded to C; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class A/B overcollateralization
test, the Class C overcollateralization test, the Class D
overcollateralization test and the Class E overcollateralization
test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3099 versus a test
level of 2597, as of the latest trustee report, dated August 31,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $93 million, accounting for
roughly 13.7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 14.3% of the underlying portfolio.
The Class A/B overcollateralization test was reported at 105.97%
versus a test level of 112.14%, the Class C overcollateralization
test was reported at 99.33% versus a test level of 107.59%, the
Class D overcollateralization test was reported at 96.7% versus a
test level of 105.79%, and the Class E overcollateralization test
was reported at 93.97% versus a test level of 103.91%.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Stratford CLO Ltd., issued in October of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SUMMIT LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Summit Lake CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$44,880,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 7, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$35,520,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018 (current balance of $14,047,592), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the notes are
a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2806 versus a
test level of 2540 as of the last trustee report, dated August 17,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $13.8 million, accounting for
roughly 4.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 11.5% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the Class A-3L Notes
incorporates the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the action
reflects updated analysis indicating that the impact of these
factors on the rating of the Class A-3L Notes is not as negative
as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusion stems from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.

Summit Lake CLO, Ltd, issued in December of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


VENTURE IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgrades the ratings of $460 MM CLO notes issued by
Venture IX CDO, Limited;

  -- US$370,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on October 18, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Interest Reinvestment Test.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2571 versus a test level of 2562 as
of the last trustee report, dated July 29, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $23.4 million, accounting for roughly 4.9% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 6.5% of the underlying portfolio.  The Interest
Reinvestment Test was reported at 103.48% versus a test level of
103.90%.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Venture IX CDO, Limited, issued in September of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 16 2006-C25 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 16 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C25, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.  In addition, Fitch has
assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings, as applicable.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 6.5% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 3.4% including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 63.4% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 4.9% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature within
the next five years.  In 2016, 89% of the pool is scheduled to
mature.

Fitch identified 25 Loans of Concern (18.4%) within the pool, four
of which (1%) are specially serviced.  None of the specially
serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans, which
comprises 51% of the total pool's unpaid principal balance.

Twelve of the top 15 loans (39.7% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from less than 5% to approximately 30%.  Of the top 15
loans, the largest contributors (by loan balance) to expected term
losses are: Piedmont Center Buildings 9-12 (2.4% of the pool
balance), Campbell Technology Park (1.7%) and Bethesda Gateway
(1.6%).

Piedmont Center Buildings 9-12 is secured by a four building
office complex comprising of approximately 550,000 square foot
located in Atlanta, GA within the Buckhead submarket.  As of June
2009, occupancy was 82.3% compared to 73.4% at issuance.
Approximately 67.9% of the leases are scheduled to expire prior to
YE 2011.  The major tenant is Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, which
occupies 37.7% of the net rentable area with their lease expiring
in 2011.  The servicer reported debt service coverage ratio as of
YE 2008 was 1.37 times on an interest-only basis.

Campbell Technology Park is collateralized by a 280,000 sf office
park located in Campbell, CA within the Silicon Valley submarket.
As of June 2009, occupancy was 59.8% compared to 98.2% at
issuance.  Approximately 41.8% of the leases are scheduled to
expire prior to YE 2011.  The servicer reported DSCR as of YE 2008
was 1.25x on an interest-only basis.  The loan begins to amortize
in 2010.

Bethesda Gateway is secured by a 149,074 sf office building
located in Bethesda, MD.  As of June 2009, occupancy was 91.8%
compared to 95.3% at issuance.  Approximately 57.5% of the leases
are scheduled to expire prior to YE 2011.  There is a letter of
credit in the amount of $2,125,000 for rolling tenants.  The
servicer reported DSCR as of YE 2008 was 0.94x on an interest-only
basis.  The loan began amortizing in February 2009 after an
initial 36 month interest-only period.

Fitch downgrades, assigns LS ratings and revises Rating Outlooks
to Negative from Stable these classes:

  -- $17.9 million class E to 'A/LS-5' from 'A+';
  -- $32.2 million class G to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'A-';
  -- $32.2 million class H to 'BB/LS-5' from 'BBB+'.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
LS ratings and Negative Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $32.2 million class J to 'BB/LS-5' from 'BBB'
  -- $32.2 million class K to 'B/LS-5' from 'BBB-';
  -- $10.7 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+';
  -- $10.7 million class M to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB';
  -- $10.7 million class N to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB-';
  -- $7.2 million class O to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B+';
  -- $7.2 million class P to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B'.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns a
LS rating and Negative Outlook to this class:

  -- $7.2 million class Q at 'B-/LS-5'.

Fitch also affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and revises
Rating Outlooks to Negative:

  -- $218.3 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- $10.7 million class B at 'AA+/LS-5';
  -- $35.8 million class C at 'AA/LS-5';
  -- $32.2 million class D at 'AA-/LS-5';
  -- $32.2 million class F at 'A/LS-5'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and
maintains Stable Outlooks:

  -- $116.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $57.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $50 million class A-PB1 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $75.8 million class A-PB2 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $723.7 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $500 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $331.8 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $286.2 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- Interest-only class at 'AAA'.

Class A-1 is paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $42.9 million
class S.


WG HORIZONS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by WG Horizons CLO I:

  -- US$296,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2777 versus a test
level of 2515 as of the last trustee report, dated August 19,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $15.95 million, accounting for
roughly 4.09% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 8.01% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Additionally, Moody's observes that the transaction is exposed to
mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  A
significant proportion of these CLO tranches are currently
assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market
valuations that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of
default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

WG Horizons CLO I, issued on May 24, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WILLACOOCHEE CITY: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Bonds From 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long term rating to Aaa
from Ba3 and has assigned the short term rating of VMIG 1 to City
of Willacoochee Development Authority Tax-Exempt Adjustable Mode
Pollution Control Revenue Bonds (Langboard, Inc. Project), Series
1997 (the Bonds) in conjunction with (a) the substitution of the
current letter of credit provided by Columbus Bank and Trust
Company with a new letter of credit to be provided by First State
Bank and Trust Company of Valdosta (the Bank) and (b) the issuance
of a confirming letter of credit by the Federal Home Loan Bank of
Atlanta, scheduled to occur on September 30, 2009.  The FHLB CLOC
is being issued as a confirmation to the letter of credit provided
by First State Bank and Trust Company of Valdosta.  Upon the
issuance of the CLOC the long-term rating on the Bonds will be
based upon the CLOC provided by FHLB and the structure and legal
protections of the transaction, which ensures timely payment of
debt service payments to bondholders.  The short-term rating on
the Bonds will be based on the structure and legal protections of
the transaction and the short term rating of FHLB.

Moody's does not rate the Bank.  Moody's rates FHLB Aaa for long-
term deposits and P-1 for short-term deposits.

                  Interest Rate Modes And Payment

The Bonds will continue to bear interest in the weekly rate mode
and pay interest on the first day of every February, May, August,
and November.  The trust indenture permits conversion of the
Bonds, in whole, to the monthly, money market, daily, quarterly,
semiannual, medium term or fixed rate modes.  Upon any such
conversion, the Bonds will be subject to mandatory tender on the
conversion date.  Moody's rating only applies to Bonds in the
daily, weekly and monthly rate modes.  While the Bonds are in the
daily and monthly rate modes, the Bonds shall pay interest on the
first day of every February, May, August, and November.

For payment of principal and interest (to the extent eligible
moneys are insufficient) as well as purchase price draws (to the
extent that the remarketing proceeds and eligible moneys are
insufficient), the trustee is instructed to timely draw under the
Bank's LOC in accordance with its terms in order to have
sufficient funds on the payment date.  In the event that the
trustee has not received the proceeds from such draw under the
Bank's LOC or the Bank's LOC is repudiated, the trustee shall
immediately effect a mandatory tender of the Bonds on the date of
such event and draw on the CLOC for the amount due and payable on
the Bonds.

Bonds which are purchased by the Bank due to a failed remarketing
are held by the trustee and will not be released until the trustee
has received written confirmation from the Bank stating that the
letter of credit has been reinstated in the amount of the purchase
price drawn for such Bonds.

         Letter of Credit And Confirming Letter Of Credit

Both the LOC and CLOC are sized for full principal plus 120 days
of interest at the maximum rate of 12% on the Bonds.  Both the LOC
and CLOC will provide sufficient coverage for the Bonds in the
daily, weekly and monthly rate modes.  Both the LOC and CLOC are
subject to the International Standby Practices 1998, ICC
Publications No.  590.

  Draws on The Letter Of Credit And Confirming Letter Of Credit

Conforming draws for the payment of principal, interest or
purchase price on the LOC received by the Bank before 11:00 a.m.,
ET, on a business day, will be honored by 10:00 a.m., Eastern
Time, on these business day.  Conforming draws for the payment of
principal, interest or purchase price on the CLOC received by the
Confirming Bank by 11:00 a.m., ET, on a business day, will be
honored by 3:00 p.m., ET, on the same business day.

                     Reinstatement of Interest

Interest draws made under the LOC shall be reinstated
automatically upon the Bank's honoring of such draw.
The CLOC is a one-time draw facility.  A wrongful dishonor or
repudiation of a drawing on the LOC will result in an immediate
mandatory tender of the Bonds and a drawing for the full
outstanding amount of the Bonds on the CLOC.

                 Reimbursement Agreement Defaults

The Bank may at any time, send written notice to the trustee
stating that an event of default under the reimbursement agreement
has occurred and direct either a mandatory tender or an
acceleration of the Bonds.  With direction to tender, the trustee
shall effect such tender on the date of receipt of such notice.
With direction to accelerate, the trustee shall immediately
declare the Bonds due and payable (at which time interest shall
cease to accrue) and the trustee shall draw on the LOC.

          Expiration/Termination of The Letter Of Credit
                  And Confirming Letter Of Credit

The LOC shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of:
(1) March 31, 2011, unless extended; (2) the Bank's honoring of
the final drawing; (3) the date the Bank' receives notice of the
trustee's acceptance of a substitute LOC provided the Bank has
honored the related drawing; and, (4) the date the Bank' receives
notice from the trustee indicating no Bonds remain outstanding.
The CLOC expires upon the earlier of (a) September 15, 2010, the
scheduled expiration date, unless extended and (b) the first
business day following the date the LOC terminates pursuant to its
terms.

               Substitution Of The Letter Of Credit
                  And Confirming Letter Of Credit

Substitution of the LOC or CLOC is permitted under the trust
indenture and requires a mandatory tender of the Bonds on the date
upon which any substitute LOC or CLOC goes into effect.  On the
substitution date, the trustee shall draw under the existing
letter of credit for purchase price.  The LOC will not terminate
until the related drawing has been honored by the Bank.

                         Optional Tenders

Bondholders may optionally tender their Bonds during the daily,
weekly or monthly rate modes on any business day with seven days
prior notice to the remarketing agent and trustee.

                         Mandatory Tenders

The Bonds are subject to mandatory tender on these dates: (1) the
date of conversion; (2) the effective date of the alternate LOC or
CLOC; (3) the business day prior to the date the LOC or CLOC
expires or terminates pursuant to its terms; (4) the date the Bank
fails to honor a draw on the LOC or the LOC is repudiated; and (5)
the date the trustee receives notice from the Bank indicating an
event of default under the reimbursement agreement has occurred
and directing the trustee to effect a mandatory tender of the
Bonds.

                      Mandatory Redemptions

The Bonds are subject to mandatory redemption upon the event of
determination of taxability.

                        Last Rating Action

The last rating action on this issue was on April 23, 2009, when
the long-term rating was downgraded from to Ba3.  For more
information on this transaction see the original New Issue Report
dated May 6, 1997.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Five CDO Retranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
tranches from five U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligation
retranche transactions.  At the same time, S&P withdrew its rating
on one tranche from Eirles Two Ltd.  Finally, S&P affirmed its
ratings on seven tranches from six transactions.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration of the portfolios.

The six downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $86.657 million.  All five affected
transactions are retranchings of other CDO tranches.

In addition to the transactions with lowered ratings, Standard &
Poor's reviewed the ratings assigned to Classic Finance B.V.'s
series 2009-1A, HSNR Trust Certificates Series 2005-A, Senior ABS
Repack Trust's series 2002-1, and Restructured Asset Backed
Securities Series 2003-2 Trust.  Based on the current credit
support available to the tranches, S&P left its ratings on these
transactions, as well as two tranches from two transactions with
lowered ratings, at their current level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions
S&P rate and take rating actions, including CreditWatch
placements, when appropriate, in S&P's opinion.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                                      Rating
                                                      ------
Transaction                               Class    To       From
-----------                               -----    --       ----
CBO Holdings III Ltd.                     C-2      B-      A-/Watch Neg
Clydesdale CBO I Class B Restructured
   CDO Ltd.                                C        CCC+    BB
Eirles Two Ltd.                           Series90 NR      BBB
Securitized Product Restructured
   Collateral Ltd. SPC for account
   Ser. 2005-1 Segregated Portfolio         A2       AA+     AAA
Securitized Product Restructured
   Collateral Ltd. SPC for account
   Ser. 2005-1 Segregated Portfolio         B        A       AA-
Structured Investments Corp. Series 82     B        B-      B+
Tradewinds II CDO SPC Series 2006-1
   Segregated Portfolio                     A        CC      BBB-

                       Rating Affirmations

  Transaction                                   Class     Rating
  -----------                                   -----     ------
  Classic Finance B.V. Series 2009-1A           A         A
  HSNR Trust Certificates Series 2005-A         T-1      AAA
  Restructured Asset Backed Securities
    Series 2003-2 Trust                         A-1-A     AAA
  Restructured Asset Backed Securities
    Series 2003-2 Trust                         A-1-B     AAA
  Securitized Product Restructured Collateral
    Ltd. SPC for account Ser.  2005-1 Segregated
    Portfolio                                   A1        AAA
  Senior ABS Repack Trust Series 2002-1         A-2       AAA
  Structured Investments Corp. Series 82        A         BBB


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches From 27 Synthetic CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 40
tranches from 27 U.S. synthetic collateralized debt obligation
transactions backed by residential mortgage-backed securities.

The downgrades affected RMBS-backed synthetic CDOs that
experienced downward rating migration in their underlying
reference portfolios and had synthetic rated overcollateralization
ratios below 100% as of the August month-end run and at a 90-day
forward run.  S&P's rating actions follow its August 2009 month-
end review.

                          Ratings Lowered

                         ABACUS 2004-2 Ltd.
                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A                           B                  BB
        B                           CCC-               CCC+

                        ABACUS 2004-3 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Class C                     BB-                BB+

                        ABACUS 2005-1 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A-1                         BBB+               A+

                        ABACUS 2005-2 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A-1                         BBB-               A
        A-2                         CCC+               BB+
        A-3                         CCC-               B

                        ABACUS 2005-3 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A-2                         AA+                AAA
        B                           B+                 BB+
        C                           B                  BB
        D                           CCC-               CCC+
        B Series 2                  B+                 BB+
        C Series 2                  B                  BB
        D Series 2                  CCC-               CCC+
        D Series 3                  CCC-               CCC+

                        ABACUS 2005-5 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A-1                         BB-                BB+

        Calculus ABS Resecuritization Trust Series 2007-1

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        VarDisTrUn                  CCC                B-

        Calculus ABS Resecuritization Trust Series 2007-2

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        VarDisTrUn                  CCC-               CCC+

                           Cloverie PLC
                          Series 2005-56

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A                           A                  A+

                          Eirles Two Ltd.
                            Series 212

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        212                         CCC-               B-

                          Eirles Two Ltd.
                            Series 209

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series 209                  BB-                BB+

                          Eirles Two Ltd.
                       Series 242-245 & 247

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series 242                  CCC-               B-
        Series 245                  CCC-               CCC+

                      Eolo Investments B.V.
                          Series 2006-1

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Tranche                     BBsrp              A-srp

             High Grade Structured Credit 2004-1 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        C                           A+                 AA
        E                           B-                 B+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                          Series 2006-6B

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series B                    B-                 BB

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-6C

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series C                    CCC+               B

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                          Series 2006-6D

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series D                    CCC+               B

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                          Series 2006-6E

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series E                    CCC                CCC+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-6FE

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series FE                   CCC-               CCC+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                          Series 2006-6FU

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Series FU                   CCC-               CCC+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-6A1

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Notes                       B+                 BBB

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-6A2E

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Notes                       B-                 BB+

                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-6A2G

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Notes                       B+                 BBB+

         North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2005-8 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A                           CCC+               B-

         North Street Referenced Linked Notes 2004-6 Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        A                           BB-                BB+

                             SPGS SPC
                US$35,000,000 Series BALDWIN 2006-I

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        Notes                       CCC-               CCC

                            STACK Ltd.

                                           Rating
                                           ------
        Class                       To                 From
        -----                       --                 ----
        C-US$                       BBB                BBB+
        C-JPY                       BBB                BBB+


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 249 Classes From 27 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 249
classes from 27 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2007.  S&P removed 164 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also downgraded seven
of these classes to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
58 classes from 21 of the transactions with lowered ratings and
removed 17 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

The downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of interest
shortfalls being consistently sustained on the affected classes
during previous remittance periods.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its
base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance that is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, the senior class could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consist of
fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that are
secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

     ACE Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-D1
                       Series      2007-D1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-M        00083BAE5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        00083BAF2     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        00083BAG0     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-3        00083BAH8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-4        00083BAJ4     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-5        00083BAK1     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-6        00083BAL9     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-7        00083BAM7     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    M-8        00083BAN5     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-9        00083BAP0     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-10       00083BAQ8     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
                       Series      2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         05569QAA2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A2         05569QAB0     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A3         05569QAC8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         05569QAD6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A5         05569QAE4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M1         05569QAF1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M2         05569QAG9     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M4         05569QAJ3     CC                   CCC
    M5         05569QAK0     CC                   CCC
    M6         05569QAL8     CC                   CCC
    M7         05569QAM6     CC                   CCC
    M8         05569QAN4     CC                   CCC

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                        Series      2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         05568QAA3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A2         05568QAB1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         05568QAC9     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         05568QAD7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    A5         05568QAE5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M1         05568QAF2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M2         05568QAG0     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M4         05568QAJ4     CC                   CCC
    M5         05568QAK1     CC                   CCC
    M6         05568QAL9     CC                   CCC
    M7         05568QAM7     CC                   CCC
    M8         05568QAN5     CC                   CCC

                       C-BASS 2007-CB4 Trust
                       Series      2007-CB4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1A       1248MEAA7     BBB-                 AAA
        A-1B       1248MEAB5     CCC                  A
        A-1C       1248MEAC3     CCC                  BB
        A-2B       1248MEAE9     BB                   AAA
        A-2C       1248MEAF6     B+                   BBB
        A-2D       1248MEAG4     BB-                  BB
        M-1        1248MEAH2     CCC                  B
        M-2        1248MEAJ8     CCC                  B-
        M-4        1248MEAL3     CC                   CCC
        M-5        1248MEAM1     CC                   CCC
        M-6        1248MEAN9     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4
                      Series      2007-WFHE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        17313JAB0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2A       17313JAC8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       17313JAD6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       17313JAE4     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        17313JAF1     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        17313JAJ3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3A       17313JAK0     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-3B       17313JAL8     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        17313JAM6     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        17313JAN4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-6        17313JAP9     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    M-7        17313JAQ7     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-8        17313JAR5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-9        17313JAS3     CCC                  BBB-/Watch Neg

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2007-10
                       Series      2007-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      23246BAE1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      23246BAF8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      23246BAG6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      23246BAH4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      23246BAJ0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      23246BAK7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1-M-1      23246BAL5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    2-M-1      23246BAM3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-M-2      23246BAN1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    2-M-2      23246BAP6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    1-M-3      23246BAQ4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-M-3      23246BAR2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M4         23246BAS0     CC                   CCC
    M5         23246BAT8     CC                   CCC
    M6         23246BAU5     CC                   CCC
    M7         23246BAV3     CC                   CCC
    M8         23246BAW1     CC                   CCC
    M9         23246BAX9     CC                   CCC
    B          23246BAB7     CC                   CCC

             Ellington Loan Acquisition Trust 2007-2
                        Series      2007-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        288547AA0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2a       288547AB8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2b       288547AC6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2c       288547AD4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2d       288547AE2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2e       288547AR3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2f       288547AS1     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1a       288547AF9     B-                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-1b       288547AT9     B-                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2a       288547AG7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2b       288547AU6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        288547AH5     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4a       288547AJ1     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-4b       288547AV4     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        288547AK8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-6        288547AL6     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    B-1        288547AM4     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    B-2        288547AN2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    B-3        288547AP7     CCC                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    B-4        288547AQ5     CC                   BB+/Watch Neg

       Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust, Series 2007-1
                        Series      2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        31659YAA2     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       31659YAB0     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       31659YAC8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       31659YAD6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M1         31659YAE4     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M2         31659YAF1     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    M3         31659YAG9     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M4         31659YAH7     CC                   CCC
    M5         31659YAJ3     CC                   CCC
    M6         31659YAK0     D                    CCC
    M7         31659YAL8     D                    CCC
    M8         31659YAM6     D                    CCC
    M9         31659YAN4     D                    CCC
    M10        31659YAP9     D                    CCC

                       GSAMP Trust 2007-HE2
                       Series      2007-HE2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        362440AA7     BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
    A-2A       362440AB5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       362440AC3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       362440AD1     BBB-                 AA+/Watch Neg
    A-2D       362440AE9     BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        362440AF6     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    M-2        362440AG4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-3        362440AH2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-6        362440AL3     CC                   CCC
    M-7        362440AM1     CC                   CCC

                     Lehman XS Trust 2007-17H
                       Series      2007-17H

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A1         52525PAA9     CCC                  B
        AIO        52525PAC5     CCC                  B
        M0         52525PAP6     CC                   B-
        M1         52525PAD3     CC                   CCC
        M2         52525PAE1     CC                   CCC
        M3         52525PAF8     CC                   CCC

  Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-1
                        Series      2007-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        59023LAA0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    A-2A       59023LAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       59023LAC6     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    A-2C       59023LAD4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    A-2D       59023LAE2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-2        59023LAG7     CC                   CCC

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-H1
                        Series      2007-H1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-5        59025TAM5     D                    CC
        M-6        59025TAN3     D                    CC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE2
                       Series      2007-HE2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        61753EAP5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    A-2a       61753EAA8     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2b       61753EAB6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2c       61753EAC4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-2d       61753EAD2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-3        61753EAG5     CC                   CCC
    M-4        61753EAH3     CC                   CCC
    M-5        61753EAJ9     CC                   CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC4
                       Series      2007-NC4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2a       61755EAB4     CCC                  AA
        A-2b       61755EAC2     CCC                  BBB
        A-2c       61755EAD0     CCC                  B-
        M-1        61755EAF5     CC                   CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2
                      Series      2007-FXD2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M-1        68403BAH8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-2        68403BAJ4     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-5        68403BAM7     CC                   CCC
    M-6        68403BAN5     CC                   CCC
    M-7        68403BAR6     CC                   CCC
    M-8        68403BAS4     CC                   CCC
    M-9        68403BAT2     CC                   CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1
                       Series      2007-HL1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      68402SAA7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     68402SAB5     A                    A/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     68402SAC3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     68402SAD1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     68402SAE9     CCC                  A/Watch Neg

                   RASC Series 2007-EMX1 Trust
                      Series      2007-EMX1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-I-1      74924XAA3     CC                   CCC
        A-I-2      74924XAB1     CC                   CCC
        A-I-3      74924XAC9     CC                   CCC
        A-I-4      74924XAD7     CC                   CCC
        A-II       74924XAE5     CC                   CCC

              SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-NC1
                       Series      2007-NC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        78420RAA6     BBB                  A/Watch Neg
    A-2        78420RAB4     BB+                  A/Watch Neg
    M-1        78420RAC2     B-                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        78420RAD0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-4        78420RAF5     CC                   CCC
    M-5        78420RAG3     CC                   CCC
    M-6        78420RAH1     CC                   CCC

               Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT1
                      Series      2007-OPT1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      83612TAA0     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     83612TAB8     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     83612TAC6     BB+                  AA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     83612TAD4     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     83612TAE2     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-1        83612TAF9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-5        83612TAK8     CC                   CCC
    M-6        83612TAL6     CC                   CCC
    M-7        83612TAM4     CC                   CCC
    M-8        83612TAN2     CC                   CCC

                Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT4
                      Series      2007-OPT4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      83613AAA0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    X-1        83613AAS1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     83613AAB8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     83613AAQ5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     83613AAR3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    X-2        83613AAT9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        83613AAC6     B-                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        83613AAD4     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        83613AAE2     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        83613AAF9     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        83613AAG7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-6        83613AAH5     CCC                  A-/Watch Neg
    M-7        83613AAJ1     CCC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-8        83613AAK8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-9        83613AAL6     CCC                  BBB-/Watch Neg

                Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT5
                      Series      2007-OPT5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      83613FAA9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    X-1        83613FAE1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     83613FAB7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     83613FAC5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     83613FAD3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    X-2        83613FAF8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    X-3        83613FAU5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        83613FAG6     B                    AA+/Watch Neg
    M-1B       83613FAV3     B                    AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        83613FAH4     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-2B       83613FAW1     B-                   AA/Watch Neg

    Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                       Series      2007-BC2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         86362YAA4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A2         86362YAB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         86362YAC0     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         86362YAD8     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A5         86362YAE6     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M1         86362YAF3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M2         86362YAG1     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    M3         86362YAH9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M4         86362YAJ5     CC                   CCC

   Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
                       Series      2007-OSI

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         863619AA0     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A2         863619AB8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         863619AC6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    A4         863619AD4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A5         863619AE2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M1         863619AF9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M2         863619AG7     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M3         863619AH5     CC                   CCC
    M4         863619AJ1     CC                   CCC
    M5         863619AK8     CC                   CCC
    M6         863619AL6     CC                   CCC

                  Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-4HE
                       Series      2007-4HE

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        88157QAA6     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-2        88157QAK4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-3        88157QAL2     CC                   CCC

                  Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-QHL1
                      Series      2007-QHL1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        88157YAA9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    G          88157YAM3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        88157YAB7     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        88157YAC5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        88157YAD3     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-4        88157YAE1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-5        88157YAF8     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-6        88157YAG6     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-7        88157YAH4     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B-1        88157YAJ0     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

       WaMu Asset Backed Certificates Series 2007-HE3 Trust
                       Series      2007-HE3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        93364EAA2     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A1      93364EAB0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     93364EAC8     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A3      93364EAD6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A4      93364EAE4     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A5      93364EAF1     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        93364EAG9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-2        93364EAH7     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-4        93364EAK0     CC                   CCC
    M-5        93364EAL8     CC                   CCC
    M-6        93364EAM6     CC                   CCC
    M-7        93364EAN4     CC                   CCC

    WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates WaMu Series 2007-HE4 Trust
                       Series      2007-HE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        93363XAA1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    II-A1      93363XAB9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A2      93363XAC7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A3      93363XAD5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    II-A4      93363XAE3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-1        93363XAF0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-2        93363XAG8     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M-4        93363XAJ2     CC                   CCC
    M-5        93363XAK9     CC                   CCC
    M-6        93363XAL7     CC                   CCC
    M-7        93363XAM5     CC                   CCC
    M-8        93363XAN3     CC                   CCC

                         Ratings Affirmed

     ACE Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-D1
                        Series      2007-D1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        00083BAA3     AAA
                 A-2        00083BAB1     AAA
                 A-3        00083BAC9     AAA
                 A-4        00083BAD7     AAA

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2
                        Series      2007-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M3         05569QAH7     CCC

                  BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3
                        Series      2007-3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M3         05568QAH8     CCC

                       C-BASS 2007-CB4 Trust
                       Series      2007-CB4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2A       1248MEAD1     AAA
                 M-3        1248MEAK5     CCC

                      GSAMP Trust 2007-HE2
                      Series      2007-HE2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-4        362440AJ8     CCC
                 M-5        362440AK5     CCC

  Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-1
                        Series      2007-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        59023LAF9     CCC

Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-H1
                       Series      2007-H1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A1       59025TAA1     BB+
                 1-A2       59025TAB9     CCC
                 1-A3       59025TAC7     CCC
                 2-A1       59025TAD5     BB
                 2-A2       59025TAE3     CCC
                 2-A3A      59025TAF0     CCC
                 2-A3B      59025TAW3     CCC
                 X-A        59025TAG8     BB+
                 M-1        59025TAH6     CCC
                 M-2        59025TAJ2     CCC
                 M-3        59025TAK9     CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE2
                       Series      2007-HE2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-1        61753EAE0     CCC
                 M-2        61753EAF7     CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC4
                       Series      2007-NC4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        61755EAA6     CCC
                 A-2d       61755EAE8     CCC

             Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD2
                      Series      2007-FXD2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      68403BAA3     AAA
                 II-A-1     68403BAB1     AAA
                 II-A-2     68403BAC9     AAA
                 II-A-3     68403BAD7     AAA
                 II-A-4     68403BAE5     AAA
                 II-A-5     68403BAF2     AAA
                 II-A-6     68403BAG0     AAA
                 M-3        68403BAK1     CCC
                 M-4        68403BAL9     CCC

               SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-NC1
                       Series      2007-NC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        78420RAE8     CCC

               Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT1
                      Series      2007-OPT1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        83612TAG7     CCC
                 M-3        83612TAH5     CCC
                 M-4        83612TAJ1     CCC

       WaMu Asset Backed Certificates Series 2007-HE3 Trust
                       Series      2007-HE3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        93364EAJ3     CCC

     WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates WaMu Series 2007-HE4 Trust
                       Series      2007-HE4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-3        93363XAH6     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 349 Classes From 45 RMBS Transsactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 349
classes from 45 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2005 and 2006.  S&P removed 204 of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also downgraded
43 of these classes to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 59 classes from 28 of the transactions with lowered ratings and
on one additional transaction, and S&P removed 24 of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each
subprime transaction rated in 2005 and 2006.  S&P derived these
losses using the criteria that S&P outlined in "Standard & Poor's
Revises U.S. Subprime And Alternative-A RMBS Loss Assumptions For
Transactions Issued In 2005, 2006, And 2007," published July 6,
2009.  S&P's lifetime projected losses have changed for some of
the transactions in this release:

                                           Orig. bal.  Lifetime
  Transaction                            (mil. $)    exp. loss (%)
  -----------                            ----------  -------------
CWABS Asset Backed Cert.  Trust 2006-9     172       20.82
CWBAS Asset Backed Cert.  Trust 2006-10    170       37.50
CWABS Asset Backed Cert.  Trust 2006-10    430       36.59
Morgan Stanley ABS Cap.  I Inc. 2005-WMC5  1,499     11.52

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

The downgrades to 'D' are the result of principal write-downs or
reflect S&P's assessment of interest shortfalls being consistently
sustained by the affected classes during previous remittance
periods.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its base-case loss
assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur because a group collateral balance is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
enior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in the final
period due to the aforementioned issues.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pools of loans backing these transactions consist
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that
are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

                          Rating Actions

  ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-ASAP3
                      Series      2006-ASAP3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        00442VAA5     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       00442VAC1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       00442VAD9     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       00442VAE7     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        00442VAF4     B-                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        00442VAG2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-3        00442VAH0     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-4        00442VAJ6     CC                   CCC

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE1
                       Series      2006-HE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       004421WJ8     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1B1      004421WK5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1B2      004421WL3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       004421WN9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       004421WP4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       004421WQ2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        004421WR0     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        004421WS8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-3        004421WT6     CC                   CCC
    M-4        004421WU3     CC                   CCC

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
                       Series      2006-OP1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       00442PAA8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1B       00442PAB6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       00442PAD2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       00442PAE0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       00442PAF7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        00442PAG5     B-                   A+/Watch Neg
    M-2        00442PAH3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-3        00442PAJ9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-5        00442PAL4     CC                   CCC
    M-6        00442PAM2     CC                   CCC

                Argent Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-W1
                       Series      2005-W1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        040104MX6     CCC                  BB
        A-2        040104MY4     CCC                  BB

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                      Series      NC2006-HE2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         04541GWB4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A1A        04541GWC2     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         04541GWE8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         04541GWF5     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M1         04541GWG3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                     Series      OOMC 2006-HE5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A1         04544PAA7     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A3         04544PAC3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A4         04544PAD1     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A5         04544PAE9     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M1         04544PAF6     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    M2         04544PAG4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M3         04544PAH2     CCC                  B-/Watch Neg
    M5         04544PAK5     CC                   CCC

                      C-BASS 2006-CB2 Trust
                      Series      2006-CB2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AV         12498NAW3     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       12498NAB9     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-3       12498NAC7     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-4       12498NAD5     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        12498NAE3     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        12498NAF0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        12498NAG8     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-4        12498NAH6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-5        12498NAJ2     CC                   CCC

                      C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust
                      Series      2006-CB6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I        14986PAA1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II-2     14986PAC7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II-3     14986PAD5     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II-4     14986PAE3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        14986PAF0     B-                   AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        14986PAG8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        14986PAH6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-4        14986PAJ2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-5        14986PAK9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-6        14986PAL7     CC                   CCC

             Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WMC1
                      Series      2006 WMC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        17307G2G2     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       17307GZ43     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       17307GZ50     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        17307GZ68     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-2        17307GZ76     CC                   B/Watch Neg

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2006-10
                       Series      2006-10

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-AF-2     12666PAB0     CCC                  AAA
        1-AF-3     12666PAC8     CCC                  BBB
        1-AF-4     12666PAD6     CCC                  BBB
        1-AF-5     12666PAE4     CCC                  BBB
        1-AF-6     12666PAF1     CCC                  BBB
        MF-1       12666PAG9     CCC                  BB
        MF-2       12666PAH7     CC                   CCC
        MF-3       12666PAJ3     CC                   CCC
        MF-4       12666PAK0     CC                   CCC
        MF-5       12666PAL8     CC                   CCC
        2-AV       12666PAR5     CCC                  AAA
        3-AV-3     12666PAU8     CCC                  AAA
        3-AV-4     12666PBE3     CCC                  AAA
        MV-1       12666PAV6     CCC                  AA
        MV-2       12666PAW4     CCC                  BB
        MV-3       12666PAX2     CCC                  B
        MV-4       12666PAY0     CC                   CCC
        MV-5       12666PAZ7     CC                   CCC

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9
                       Series      2006-9

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-AF-3     12666RAC4     B                    AAA
    1-AF-4     12666RAD2     B                    AAA
    1-AF-5     12666RAE0     B                    AAA
    1-AF-6     12666RAF7     B                    AAA
    MF-1       12666RAG5     CCC                  AA+
    MF-2       12666RAH3     CC                   A
    MF-3       12666RAJ9     CC                   BBB
    MF-4       12666RAK6     CC                   B
    MF-5       12666RAL4     CC                   B-
    MF-6       12666RAM2     CC                   CCC
    MF-7       12666RAN0     CC                   CCC
    MF-8       12666RAP5     CC                   CCC
    2AV        12666RAR1     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3AV-2      12666RAT7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3AV-3      12666RAU4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3AV-4      12666RAV2     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    MV-1       12666RAW0     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    MV-2       12666RAX8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    MV-3       12666RAY6     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    MV-4       12666RAZ3     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    MV-5       12666RBA7     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    MV-6       12666RBB5     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                 FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M1         30246QCP6     A+                   AA+
        M2         30246QCQ4     BB                   AA
        M3         30246QCR2     B-                   BBB
        M4         30246QCS0     CC                   BB
        M5         30246QCT8     CC                   B
        M6         30246QCU5     CC                   B-
        M7         30246QCV3     CC                   CCC
        M9         30246QCX9     D                    CC
        M10        30246QCY7     D                    CC
        M11        30246QCZ4     D                    CC
        M12        30246QDA8     D                    CC

        Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M3         31659EAG3     D                    CC

        Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust, Series 2006-1
                        Series      2006-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        31659TEY7     BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
    A-3        31659TEZ4     BBB-                 AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        31659TFA8     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-2        31659TFB6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-3        31659TFC4     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-4        31659TFD2     D                    CCC
    M-5        31659TFE0     D                    CCC
    M-6        31659TFF7     D                    CCC
    M-7        31659TFG5     D                    CCC
    M-8        31659TFH3     D                    CCC
    M-9        31659TFJ9     D                    CCC
    M-10       31659TFK6     D                    CCC

            First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF5
                       Series      2006-FF5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        32027EAB7     BB+                  AA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     32027EAE1     BB                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     32027EAF8     BB                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     32027EAG6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        32027EAH4     B-                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-2        32027EAJ0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     32027EAD3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-3        32027EAK7     CC                   B-/Watch Neg

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E
                        Series      2005-E

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      35729PMY3     AA+                  AAA
        2-A-4      35729PNC0     A-                   AAA
        M1         35729PND8     B                    AA+
        M2         35729PNE6     CCC                  AA
        M3         35729PNF3     CCC                  A
        M4         35729PNG1     CCC                  BBB
        M5         35729PNH9     CC                   B
        M6         35729PNJ5     CC                   B-

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      35729PPU8     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     35729PPW4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     35729PPX2     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     35729PPY0     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        35729PPZ7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        35729PQA1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        35729PQB9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-4        35729PQC7     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-5        35729PQD5     CC                   B/Watch Neg

                       GSAMP Trust 2006-HE4
                       Series      2006-HE4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        362439AA9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       362439AC5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       362439AD3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       362439AE1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        362439AF8     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        362439AG6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        362439AH4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-4        362439AJ0     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

                  Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-4
                        Series      2006-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      437084VJ2     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      437084VL7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      437084VM5     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      437084VN3     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        437084VR4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-2        437084VS2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-3        437084VT0     CC                   CCC
    M-4        437084VU7     CC                   CCC

                  Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-6
                        Series      2006-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      437097AA6     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      437097AB4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      437097AC2     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      437097AD0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      437097AE8     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        437097AG3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-2        437097AH1     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-3        437097AJ7     CC                   CCC

           JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-HE2
                       Series      2006-HE2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        46625SAA4     CCC                  AA
        A-3        46625SAC0     A-                   AAA
        A-4        46625SAD8     CCC                  AAA
        A-5        46625SAE6     CCC                  BBB
        M-1        46625SAF3     CCC                  B
        M-2        46625SAG1     CCC                  B-
        M-3        46625SAH9     CC                   CCC
        M-4        46625SAJ5     CC                   CCC
        M-5        46625SAK2     CC                   CCC

           JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2
                       Series      2006-NC2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1A       46629HAA4     BBB+                 AAA
        A-1B       46629HAB2     B-                   AAA
        A-4        46629FAC4     CCC                  AA+
        A-5        46629FAD2     CCC                  BBB
        M-1        46629FAE0     CCC                  B
        M-4        46629FAH3     CC                   CCC
        M-5        46629FAJ9     CC                   CCC

             Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL2
                       Series      2006-WL2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A1       542514RZ9     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-A3      542514SC9     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A4      542514SD7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        542514SE5     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        542514SF2     CC                   B/Watch Neg

             Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL3
                       Series      2006-WL3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        542514SS4     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    II-A3      542514SV7     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A4      542514SW5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        542514SX3     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

           MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC1
                       Series      2005-NC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    M-1        57643LGF7     D                    AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        57643LGG5     D                    AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        57643LGH3     D                    AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        57643LGJ9     D                    A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        57643LGK6     D                    A/Watch Neg
    M-6        57643LGL4     D                    A-/Watch Neg
    M-7        57643LGM2     D                    BBB+/Watch Neg
    M-8        57643LGN0     D                    BBB/Watch Neg
    M-9        57643LGP5     D                    BB/Watch Neg

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
                       Series      2005-HE2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-2        59020US55     CC                   CCC

      Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-AR1
                       Series      2006-AR1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        59020VAS2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    A-2B       59020VAU7     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       59020VAV5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       59020VAW3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-1        59020VAX1     CC                   B/Watch Neg

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-HE1
                       Series      2006-HE1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        59020U2Z7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       59020U3B9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       59020U3C7     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       59020U3D5     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59020U3E3     BB-                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        59020U3F0     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        59020U3G8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-4        59020U3H6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-5        59020U3J2     CC                   B/Watch Neg

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-WMC1
                      Series      2006-WMC1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1A       59020U4L6     B-                   AAA
        A-1B       59020U4M4     CCC                  AA
        A-2C       59020U3X1     B+                   AAA
        A-2D       59020U3Y9     CCC                  AA
        M-1        59020U3Z6     CCC                  BB
        M-3        59020U4B8     CC                   CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE7
                       Series      2005-HE7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        61744CWG7     A-                   AAA
        A-2c       61744CWK8     BB+                  AAA
        M-1        61744CWL6     B-                   AA+
        M-2        61744CWM4     CCC                  A
        M-3        61744CWN2     CCC                  BB
        M-4        61744CWP7     CCC                  B
        M-5        61744CWQ5     CC                   CCC
        M-6        61744CWR3     CC                   CCC

        Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5
                      Series      2005 WMC5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-5        61744CRV0     BBB                  A
        M-6        61744CRW8     B                    A-
        B-1        61744CRX6     CCC                  BBB+
        B-3        61744CRZ1     CC                   CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC1
                      Series      2006-WMC1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        61744CXJ0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2b       61744CXL5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2c       61744CXM3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        61744CXN1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        61744CXP6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-3        61744CXQ4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-4        61744CXR2     CC                   CCC

      Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust
                       Series      2006-FM1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A        65536HBT4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     65536HBV9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     65536HBW7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     65536HBX5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        65536HBY3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-2        65536HBZ0     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-3        65536HCA4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-4        65536HCB2     CC                   CCC
    M-5        65536HCC0     CC                   CCC

          NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       66988VAA6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       66988VAC2     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       66988VAD0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       66988VAE8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        66988VAF5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        66988VAG3     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        66988VAH1     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
    M-4        66988VAJ7     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-5        66988VAK4     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    M-6        66988VAL2     CC                   B/Watch Neg

                 Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4
                        Series      2006-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        69121QAA9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       69121QAC5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       69121QAD3     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       69121QAE1     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        69121QAF8     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        69121QAG6     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        69121QAH4     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    M-4        69121QAJ0     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

             Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-5
                        Series      2006-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       69121EAA6     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1B       69121EAB4     B+                   A/Watch Neg
    A-2B       69121EAD0     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       69121EAE8     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2D       69121EAF5     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    M-1        69121EAG3     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-2        69121EAH1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-3        69121EAJ7     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-4        69121EAK4     CC                   CCC

     People's Choice Home Loan Securities Trust Series 2005-2
                        Series      2005-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M1         71085PCA9     D                    AA+
        M2         71085PCB7     D                    AA
        M3         71085PCC5     D                    AA
        M4         71085PCD3     D                    AA-
        M5         71085PCE1     D                    A+
        M6         71085PCF8     D                    BB
        B1         71085PCG6     D                    CCC
        B2         71085PCH4     D                    CCC
        B3         71085PCJ0     D                    CCC
        B4         71085PCK7     D                    CC

                   RASC Series 2006-EMX5 Trust
                      Series      2006-EMX5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-2        74924QAB6     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        74924QAC4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    A-4        74924QAD2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-1        74924QAE0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-2        74924QAF7     CC                   CCC
    M-3        74924QAG5     CC                   CCC

                    RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust
                       Series      2006-KS3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-I-3      76113ABH3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-I-4      76113ABJ9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II       76113ABK6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76113ABL4     B-                   A/Watch Neg
    M-2        76113ABM2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-3        76113ABN0     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-4        76113ABP5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    M-5        76113ABQ3     CC                   CCC

             Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-3        759950FX1     A+                   AAA
        A-4        759950FY9     A                    AAA
        A-5        759950FZ6     A                    AAA
        A-6        759950GA0     A                    AAA
        M1         759950GB8     B+                   AA+
        M2         759950GC6     CCC                  AA+
        M3         759950GD4     CCC                  AA
        M4         759950GE2     CCC                  AA
        M5         759950GF9     CCC                  BBB
        M6         759950GG7     CCC                  B
        M7         759950GH5     CC                   CCC
        M8         759950GJ1     CC                   CCC
        M9         759950GK8     CC                   CCC
        M10        759950GL6     CC                   CCC

             Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AV-2       759676AB5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AV-3       759676AC3     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       759676AE9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-3       759676AF6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-4       759676AG4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-5       759676AH2     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-6       759676AJ8     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        759676AK5     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        759676AL3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        759676AM1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-4        759676AN9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    M-5        759676AP4     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M- 6       759676AQ2     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-7        759676AR0     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    M-8        759676AS8     CC                   CCC

      Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-CB1
                       Series      2006-CB1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    AV-1       81375WHF6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-2       81375WHH2     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-3       81375WHJ8     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AF-4       81375WHK5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        81375WHL3     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-2        81375WHM1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-3        81375WHN9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-4        81375WHP4     CC                   CCC

     Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM1
                       Series      2006-WM1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       81375WKL9     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-1B       81375WKA3     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2B       81375WKC9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2C       81375WKD7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-1        81375WKE5     CC                   B/Watch Neg

          Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-11
                        Series      2005-11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A1         86358EZM1     B-                   BBB
        A2         86358EZN9     B+                   AAA
        A3         86358EZP4     B-                   A
        A5         86358EZR0     BB+                  AAA
        A6         86358EZS8     BB+                  AAA
        A7         86358EZT6     B-                   BBB
        M1         86358EZU3     CC                   B

                   Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5
                        Series      2006-5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      8815612S2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2b     8815612F0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2c     8815612G8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-M-1      8815612H6     BB                   AA+/Watch Neg
    I-M-2      8815612J2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    I-M-3      8815612K9     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    I-M-4      8815612L7     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     881561Z49     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     881561Z56     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     881561Z64     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

   ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-OP1
                       Series      2006-OP1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-4        00442PAK6     CCC

    Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust
                             2006-HE5
                     Series      OOMC 2006-HE5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M4         04544PAJ8     CCC

          CWABS Asset Backed Certificates Trust 2006-10
                       Series      2006-10

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-AF-1     12666PAA2     AAA
                 3-AV-2     12666PAT1     AAA

           CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9
                        Series      2006-9

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-AF-1     12666RAA8     AAA
                 1-AF-2     12666RAB6     AAA

                 FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5
                        Series      2005-5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 AV1        30246QDB6     AAA
                 AV2-3      30246QCM3     AAA
                 AV2-4      30246QCN1     AAA

        Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A        31659EAA6     BB
                 2-A2       31659EAC2     B
                 2-A3       31659EAD0     B

                  Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-E
                        Series      2005-E

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-A-3      35729PNB2     AAA

           JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-NC2
                       Series      2006-NC2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-3        46629FAB6     AAA
                 M-2        46629FAF7     CCC
                 M-3        46629FAG5     CCC

              Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL3
                       Series      2005-WL3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A2       542514QB3     AAA
                 I-A3       542514QC1     AAA
                 I-A4       542514QD9     AAA
                 II-A2B     542514PP3     AAA
                 II-A3      542514PQ1     AAA
                 M-1        542514PR9     B-
                 M-2        542514PS7     CCC
                 M-3        542514PT5     CCC

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
                       Series      2005-HE2

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1A       59020UR72     AAA
                 A-1B       59020UR80     AAA
                 A-2B       59020US22     AAA
                 A-2C       59020US30     AAA
                 M-1        59020US48     CCC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2006-WMC1
                      Series      2006-WMC1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        59020U4A0     CCC

         Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-HE7
                      Series      2005-HE7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-2b       61744CWJ1     AAA

        Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5
                      Series      2005 WMC5

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 M-2        61744CRS7     AA
                 M-3        61744CRT5     AA-
                 M-4        61744CRU2     A+
                 B-2        61744CRY4     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 717 Classes From 206 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 717
classes from 206 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2002, 2003, and 2004.  S&P removed 44 of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 429 classes from 192 transactions.
Furthermore, S&P removed 29 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  For
mortgage pools that are continuing to show increasing
delinquencies, S&P increased S&P's cash flow stresses to account
for potential increases in monthly losses.  In order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', a class had to absorb losses in excess of
the base-case assumptions S&P assumed in its analysis.  For
example, a class may have to withstand 115% of S&P's base-case
loss assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while a
different class may have to withstand 125% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class that has an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can withstand approximately 150% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions under its analysis, subject to
individual caps assumed on specific transactions.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization provide credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that
are secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 11 Emerging Market Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took these rating actions on 11
emerging market transactions:

* S&P lowered its ratings on 11 series from six emerging market
  asset-backed future flow transactions;

* S&P lowered its global scale and Mexican national scale ratings
  on four series from three Mexican residential mortgage-backed
  securities transactions and made public the Standard & Poor's
  underlying ratings on these four series at the issuers' request;

* S&P affirmed its ratings on two emerging market asset-backed
  future flow transactions to reflect the SPURs and made public
  the SPUR on one of the transactions (Caribbean Oil Purchase Co.
  Ltd. at the issuer's request; and

* S&P affirmed its global scale and CaVal ratings on one Mexican
  RMBS transaction (Hipotecaria Su Casita's BRHCCB 07U) to reflect
  the SPUR and made public the SPUR on the transaction at the
  issuer's request.

S&P's previous ratings on the 18 affected series were based on the
full financial guarantee insurance policies that MBIA Insurance
Corp. ('BB+' insurer financial enhancement rating) provides, which
guarantee the timely payment of interest and principal according
to the respective transaction's terms.  Under S&P's criteria for
rating structured finance transactions, the issue rating on an
insured bond reflects the higher of the rating on the bond
insurer (monoline) or the SPUR on the securities.  As a result,
S&P is lowering its ratings on 15 series from nine MBIA-insured
transactions and affirming its ratings on three MBIA-insured
transactions to reflect the corresponding SPURs rather than its
'BB+' insurer financial enhancement rating on MBIA.  The SPURs on
the affected series reflect the securitizations' performance and
credit quality.

At the issuers' request, S&P has made public its SPURs on
Caribbean Oil Purchase Co.  Ltd.; GMAC Financiera's MXMACFW 07-3U
and MXMACFW 07-5U; and Hipotecaria Su Casita's BRHCCB 07U, BRHCCB
07-2U, and residential mortgage-backed class A notes due 2035.

The rating actions follow the Sept. 28, 2009, lowering of S&P's
insurer financial enhancement rating on MBIA to 'BB+' from 'BBB'.

S&P will continue to surveil the issue ratings on these future
flow and RMBS securitizations, and S&P will revise them as
necessary to reflect any future changes in the transactions'
underlying credit quality.

                  Ratings Lowered And Made Public

GMAC Financiera - Bursatilizaciones de Hipotecas Residenciales II

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              MXMACFW 07-3U    BB+               BBB
              MXMACFW 07-3U    mxA+              mxAA
              MXMACFW 07-5U    BB+               BBB
              MXMACFW 07-5U    mxA+              mxAA

                     Hipotecaria Su Casita -
        Bursatilizacioines de Hipotecas Residenciales III

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              BRHCCB 07-2U     BBB-              BBB
              BRHCCB 07-2U     mxAA-             mxAA

Hipotecaria Su Casita - residential mortgage-backed notes due 2035

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              A                BBB-              BBB

                         Ratings Lowered

                        AK Receivables Corp.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              2005-A           BBB-              BBB

             Akbank Remittances Trust Securitization

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              8                BBB-              BBB
              10               BBB-              BBB

          Garanti Diversified Payment Rights Finance Co.
                     (Turkiye Garanti Bankasi)

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              2005-A           BBB-              BBB
              2006-A           BBB-              BBB

     TIB Diversified Payment Rights Finance Co. Ltd. (Isbank)

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              2004-A           BBB-              BBB
              2005-A           BBB-              BBB
              2006-D           BBB-              BBB

                  VB DPR Finance Co. (Vakifbank)

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              2006-B           BBB-              BBB
              2007A            BBB-              BBB

         Yapi Kredi Diversified Payment Rights Finance Co.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
              Series/tranche   To                From
              --------------   --                ----
              2006B            BBB-              BBB

                 Ratings Affirmed And Made Public

           Caribbean Oil Purchase Co.  Ltd. (Petrotrin)

                     Series/tranche   Rating
                     --------------   ------
                     Senior notes     BBB

                      Hipotecaria Su Casita -
         Bursatilizacioines de Hipotecas Residenciales III

                     Series/tranche   Rating
                     --------------   ------
                     BRHCCB 07U       BBB
                     BRHCCB 07U       mxAA

                          RATING AFFIRMED

     Petroleum Export Ltd. (Egyptian General Petroleum Corp.)

                     Series/tranche   Rating
                     --------------   ------
                     A-1              BBB



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Danilo Munnoz, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie
Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.

                  *** End of Transmission ***