TCR_Public/090920.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 20, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 261

                            Headlines



1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns Ratings on $109 Mil. 2009-B Notes
1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns ' Ratings on $100 Mil. 2009-C Notes
ACA ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of 2002-1 Notes
ACA CDS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes to 'CC'
ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes

ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
AIRLIE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-II Notes
ALBANY INDUSTRIAL: S&P Corrects Rating on 2001A-D Bonds to 'CC'
ALFA DIVERSIFIED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Notes to 'BB+'
APIDOS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

APIDOS CINCO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
APIDOS QUATTRO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Takes Actions on Three Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-2 Securities
BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-2 Certificates

BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Nine 2008-1 Notes
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-PWR11 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-1 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-PWR8 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-TOP20 Certs.

BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2007-PWR16 Certs.
BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2006-2 Notes
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B 2008-1 Notes

CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-CD5 Certificates
CENTURION CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
CIFC CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-I Notes
CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-I B Notes

CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four 2006-II Notes
CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four 2007-II Notes
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 19 2005-2 Tranches
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $260 Mil. Bonds
COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Certs.

COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Puts Ratings on 33 Classes on Negative Watch
CREDIT DEFAULT: S&P Corrects Swap Risk Rating on Tranche
CREDIT DEFAULT: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Swap Risk Rating
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TFL2 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Raises Ratings on Five 2004-C4 Securities

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Shifts Watch on 2004-C4 Certs. to Developing
CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-8 Tranches
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AUTO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
DEUTSCHEMORTGAGE SECURITIES: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Certs.
DOWLING COLLEGE: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Rating on Two Bonds

DUKE FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
FIRST HORIZON : Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2004-HE4 Tranches
FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Rates Class D 2008-2 Notes at 'BB'
FORD CREDIT: S&P Assigns Ratings on $2.227 Bil. Asset-Backed Notes

FOREST CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
FOUNDERS GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GALLATIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
GANNETT PEAK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Puts Ratings on Four 2000-1 Certs. on Neg. Watch

GRANITE VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
GRANITE VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
GRENADIER FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-GG6 Certificates
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-GG4 Securities

GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-3 Notes
HARCH CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
HIGHLAND LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

HUDSON STRAITS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
INMOBILIARIA FUMISA: Moody's Continues Rating Reviews on Bonds
JPMORGAN AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2008-A Asset-Backed Notes
LB COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 2007-C3 Securities
LB-UBS 2007-C7: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Certificates

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-C5 Securities
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-C2 Securities
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LONG GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

MARYLAND ECONOMIC: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on 2003 Bonds
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Positive Outlook on 'BB+' Rating
MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2004-2 Notes to Ba1
MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2004-3 Notes to B3
MAX CMBS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Classes of Notes

MBIA INC: Moody's Keeps Maryland Economic Housing Bonds Rating
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 6 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Downgrades Class G Securities to 'BB'
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-IQ13 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Puts Ratings on 2006-XLF Notes on Neg. Watch

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-IQ16 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 23 2006-HQ10 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TOP27 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2003-TOP11 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-XLF Certificates

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 2007-HQ12 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IIA Notes
MOSELLE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MUIR GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
NEWSTAR TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes

NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Notes
NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
OCEAN TRAILS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
PANIOLO CABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on B Notes to 'Ba2'
PYXIS ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of 2006-1 Notes
REGATTA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2L Notes
RFMSI SERIES: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-15 Notes to 'B'

SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2000-C3 Securities
SANKATY HIGH: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SARGAS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
STANFIELD VANTAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Corrects Ratings on $100 Mil. Certs. at 'B'
TRIBECA PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes

TRIMARAN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
TRIMARAN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
VENTURE VIII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
WACHOVIA AUTO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-A Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch

WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Puts Ratings on 14 Classes Notes on WatchNeg.
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 2007-C31 Securities
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 2007-C32 Securities
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-OA4 Certs.
WATERFRONT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes

WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-2 Notes
WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Series 2007-3 Notes
JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-R4 Certificates

* Fitch Puts Ratings on 28 Classes by Eight CDOs on Negative Watch
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches From Two CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Seven Hybrid CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches From Tobacco Manufacturers
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 130 Classes From Four Prime Jumbo RMBS

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 204 Classes From 37 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Puts Ratings on 3,076 CDO Deals on CreditWatch Negative



                            *********

1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns Ratings on $109 Mil. 2009-B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to 1st
Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II Series 2009-B's
$109 million asset-backed notes series 2009-B.

The ratings reflect:

* S&P's view that the credit support for each class of notes is
  sufficient to withstand the simultaneous stresses S&P apply, for
  each rating category, to S&P's 9.5%-11.5% base case loss rate
  assumption, 7.0%-9.0% base case payment rate assumption, and
  17.0%-19.0% base case yield assumption.  In addition, S&P use
  stressed purchase rate, excess spread, and note interest rate
  assumptions to determine if sufficient credit support is
  available for each rating category.  All of the stress
  assumptions outlined above are based on S&P's current criteria
  and assumptions;

* S&P's view of the credit risk inherent in the collateral loan
  pool, based on its economic forecast, the trust portfolio's
  historical performance, the collateral characteristics, and
  vintage performance data;

* 1st Financial Bank USA's servicing experience; and its opinion
  of the quality and consistency of its account origination,
  underwriting, account management, collections, and general
  operational practices;

* S&P's expectation of the timely payment of interest and ultimate
  payment of principal by April 15, 2015, the legal final maturity
  date, based on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios using
  assumptions that are commensurate with the assigned rating
  categories; and

* The series 2009-B notes' underlying payment structure and cash
  flow mechanics, and legal structure.

                         Ratings Assigned

1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II Series 2009-B

  Class                              Rating           Amount (mil. $)
  ------                                 ------           ---------------
  A                                      AAA                       65.75
  B                                      AA                        11.75
  C                                      A                          8.75
  D                                      BBB-                      13.75
  Senior cash collateral account         BBp                        4.00
  Intermediate cash collateral account   BB-p                       1.50

       P - Principal-only rating; the interest is not rated.


1ST FINANCIAL: S&P Assigns ' Ratings on $100 Mil. 2009-C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to 1st
Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II Series 2009-C's
$100 million asset-backed notes series 2009-C.

The ratings reflect:

* S&P's view that the credit support for each class of notes is
  sufficient to withstand the simultaneous stresses S&P apply, for
  each rating category, to S&P's 9.5%-11.5% base case loss rate
  assumption, 7.0%-9.0% base case payment rate assumption, and
  17.0%-19.0% base case yield assumption.  In addition, S&P use
  stressed purchase rate, excess spread, and note interest rate
  assumptions to determine if sufficient credit support is
  available for each rating category.  All of the stress
  assumptions outlined above are based on S&P's current criteria
  and assumptions;

* S&P's view of the credit risk inherent in the collateral loan
  pool, based on its economic forecast, the trust portfolio's
  historical performance, the collateral characteristics, and
  vintage performance data;

* 1st Financial Bank USA's servicing experience; and its opinion
  of the quality and consistency of its account origination,
  underwriting, account management, collections, and general
  operational practices;

* S&P's expectation of the timely payment of interest and ultimate
  payment of principal by Oct. 15, 2015, the legal final maturity
  date, based on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios using
  assumptions that are commensurate with the assigned rating
  categories; and

* The series 2009-C notes' underlying payment structure and cash
  flow mechanics, and legal structure.

                         Ratings Assigned

   1st Financial Credit Card Master Note Trust II Series 2009-C

  Class                                  Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  -----                                  ------          ---------------
  A-1                                    AAA                       20.00
  A-2                                    AAA                       45.75
  B                                      AA                        11.75
  C                                      A                          8.75
  D                                      BBB-                      13.75
  Senior cash collateral account         BBp                        4.00
  Intermediate cash collateral account   BB-p                       1.50

       P - Principal-only rating; the interest is not rated.


ACA ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of 2002-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of notes issued by ACA
ABS 2002-1, Ltd./LLC.

The downgrades are the result of continued credit deterioration
experienced since Fitch's last rating action.  Approximately 42.4%
of the portfolio currently carries a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade, with 24.9% rated in the 'CCC' category or lower.
These are up from 26.8% rated below investment grade and 12.6%
rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.

Since the last review, the class A/B overcollateralization test
has dropped to 96.6% and is now failing the covenant of 103.4%.
Consequently, all excess spread after paying interest to class B
and all principal is being used to pay down the class A notes.
The class A notes have paid down approximately 85.9% since
closing.

Fitch expects the class A notes to continue to receive interest
and full principal repayment.  The class B notes have been
downgraded to 'CC' as they continue to receive interest payments,
but Fitch does not expect any principal recovery.  The class C
notes are receiving interest paid in kind whereby the principal
amount of the notes is written up by the amount of interest due.
The class C notes have been downgraded to 'C' as Fitch does not
expect this class to receive any future payments.

The class A notes were assigned a Stable Rating Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable over the
next one to two years.  The class A notes were also assigned a
Loss Severity rating of 'LS3'.  An 'LS3' rating indicates that a
tranche has a medium risk of severe loss severity given default,
as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base case loss
expectation for the collateral in the range of 1.1 to 4.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with probability
of default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating Fitch
does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated
'CCC' and lower.

ACA ABS 2002-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation that
closed on July 29, 2002, and was managed by ACA Management LLC
until April 2008, when management duties were transferred to
Solidus Capital, LLC.  The reinvestment period also ended in April
2008.  The reference portfolio is composed of 52.8% residential
mortgage-backed securities, 15.6% asset-backed securities 13.6%
commercial mortgage-backed securities, and 9.7% CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned LS ratings and Rating Outlooks
as indicated to these classes of notes issued by ACA ABS 2002-1,
Ltd./LLC:

  -- $46,066,866 class A notes to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $64,000,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'B';

  -- $16,932,418 class C notes to 'C' from 'CC'.


ACA CDS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes to 'CC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on ACA CDS
2006-1 Tranche F and Tribune Ltd.'s series 30 and 31 notes to 'CC'
from 'CCC-' and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades follow a number of credit events within the
underlying corporate reference entities.  S&P received final
valuations on the credit events in the underlying portfolio, which
indicated that losses in the portfolio had caused the notes to
incur a partial principal loss.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                            Tribune Ltd.
                             Series 30

                              Rating
                              ------
             Class          To     From
             -----          --     ----
             Tranche        CCsrp  CCC-srp/Watch Neg

                            Tribune Ltd.
                             Series 31

                              Rating
                              ------
             Class          To     From
             -----          --     ----
             Tranche        CC     CCC-/Watch Neg

                     ACA CDS 2006-1 Tranche F

                              Rating
                              ------
             Class          To     From
             -----          --     ----
             F              CC     CCC-/Watch Neg


ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACA CLO 2005-1, Limited:

  -- US$216,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2017 (current balance of $215,427,725), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on August 16, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2017, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2017, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due October 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of this class of
notes:

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2624 versus a test
level of 2600 as of the last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $12.6 million, accounting for roughly
4.25% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 8.2% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  Some of
these tranches carry depressed market valuations that may herald
poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's has also applied
resecuritization stress factors to default probability assumptions
for structured finance asset collateral as described in the press
release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating
structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

ACA CLO 2005-1, Limited, issued in August 16, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ACA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACA CLO 2006-1, Limited:

  -- US$255,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due July 2018 (current balance of $245,631,309), Downgraded
     to Aa1; previously on July 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due July 2018, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,375,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     July 2018, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,375,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     July 2018, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,750,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     July 2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2677 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 13, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$14.4 million, accounting for roughly 4.34% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
6.32% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  Some of
these CLO tranches carry depressed market valuations that may
herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's has also applied
resecuritization stress factors to default probability assumptions
for structured finance asset collateral as described in the press
release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating
structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

ACA CLO 2006-1, Limited, issued in July 27, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AIRLIE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-II Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.:

  -- US$320,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     due December 20, 2020 (current balance of $309,807,323),
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on December 21, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$24,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     due December 20, 2020, Downgraded to A3; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, due December 20, 2020, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     due December 20, 2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,400,000 (face amount) Composite Notes, due December 20,
     2020 (current rated balance of $2,825,972), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, due December 20, 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously
     on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class D overcollateralization test.  Based on the last trustee
report, dated August 10, 2009, defaulted securities currently held
in the portfolio total about $13.5 million, accounting for roughly
3.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 6.3% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class
D overcollateralization ratio was reported at 101.17% versus a
test level of 101.9%.  Moody's also notes that the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2726 as of the last trustee
report.  In addition, Moody's assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd., issued in December of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ALBANY INDUSTRIAL: S&P Corrects Rating on 2001A-D Bonds to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected to 'CC' and withdrew
its rating on Albany Industrial Development Agency, New York's
civic facilities revenue bonds, (University at Albany Foundation
Student Housing Corporation, Empire Commons Projects), series
2001A-D.  These bonds are guaranteed by a bond insurance policy
from Ambac Assurance Corp (CC/Developing).

Prior to this action, the rating on these bonds was 'BBB/Watch
Neg'.  On July 28, 2009, S&P incorrectly did not include these
bonds when S&P lowered to 'CC' and then withdrew its ratings on
all bonds covered by an Ambac bond insurance policy that did not
have Standard & Poor's underlying ratings.


ALFA DIVERSIFIED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
series of notes issued by Alfa Diversified Payment Rights Finance
Co. S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and removed the ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed
June 18, 2009.

The five series of notes are Russian financial future flow
transactions backed by diversified payment rights.

The ratings reflect S&P's survivability assessment of the
originator, OJSC Alfa Bank (Alfa Bank), and the transaction's
strong credit enhancement levels through overcollateralization and
other structural features that mitigate sovereign interference and
other credit risks.  S&P's survivability assessment of the
originator addresses the bank's ability to generate the assets
necessary to service the transactions even under a state of
selective default or other financial impairment over the life of
the transactions.

The rating actions follow the Sept. 11, 2009, lowering of S&P's
counterparty rating on Alfa Bank to 'B+' from 'BB-', and the
lowering of S&P's survivability assessment on the bank to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-'.  The downgrades reflect the continued deterioration
of Alfa Bank's and the entire Russian banking industry's asset
quality.  S&P's ratings on Alfa Bank broadly reflect the
increasing systemwide risks in Russia due to the global economic
recession and deteriorating operating environment.  For Alfa Bank,
this has resulted in rising credit loss charges, high funding and
liquidity risks, and a deposit base that is vulnerable to negative
market.

The performance of Alfa Bank's DPR transactions remains strong,
and the transactions had a 48.5x debt service coverage ratio as of
second-quarter 2009.  S&P will continue to surveil the issue
ratings on these future flow securitizations, and S&P will revise
them as necessary to reflect any future changes in the
transactions' underlying credit quality.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

         Alfa Diversified Payment Rights Finance Co. S.A.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
    Series                To                   From
    ------                --                   ----
    2006-A                BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    2006-B                BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    2006-C                BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    2007-A                BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    2007-B                BB+                  BBB-/Watch Neg


APIDOS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Apidos CDO V:

  -- US$130,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 8, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2755 versus a test
level of 2750 as of the last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $10 million, accounting for roughly 2.6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9.6% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Apidos CDO V, issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


APIDOS CINCO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Apidos Cinco CDO:

  -- US$37,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on May 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Confirmed
     at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Confirmed
     at B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor) and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2751 versus a test level of 2570 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 4, 2009.  Based on the same report,
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 13.4% of the
underlying portfolio.  Defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $2.3 million, accounting for roughly 0.7% of
the collateral balance.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress
factors to default probability assumptions for structured finance
asset collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's
CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Apidos Cinco CDO, issued in May of 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


APIDOS QUATTRO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Apidos Quattro CDO:

  -- US$262,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on October 31, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2630 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 12, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$10.4 million, accounting for roughly 3.1% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12.6%of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Apidos Quattro CDO, issued in October 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Takes Actions on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these actions for the Ballantyne Re Plc
tranches listed below:

  -- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'CC/RR5';
  -- Class B-1 notes affirmed at 'C/RR6';
  -- Class B-2 notes affirmed at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch's actions are based on the significant mark-to-market losses
Ballantyne Re has experienced in its investment portfolio of
residential-mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities.
Ballantyne Re's liabilities exceed the current book value of its
assets by a significant margin.

Interest payments on class A-1 are current, and Fitch expects
interest on class A-1 to remain current for the foreseeable
future.  Absent a remarkable recovery in RMBS/ABS values, however,
Fitch expects Ballantyne Re will eventually be unable to pay
interest or full principal on the class A-1 notes.  Fitch does not
expect holders of class B-1 or B-2 notes to receive any further
interest or principal payments.

The class A-2, series B notes are supported by a financial
guarantee insurance policy provided by Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd.

Ballantyne Re is a special purpose public limited company
incorporated and registered in Ireland.  The company was
established for the limited purpose of entering into a reinsurance
agreement and conducting activities related to the notes'
issuance.  Ballantyne Re issued the notes to finance excess
reserve requirements under Regulation XXX for the block of
business ceded under the reinsurance agreement.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-2 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2006-2 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction.  S&P removed two of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
revised U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the
primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the pool.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.43x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 102.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.93x and an LTV
of 140.3%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 82.9% and 36.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude four assets with the special servicer and
seven assets that did not report financial data (3.4% in the
aggregate).  S&P estimated losses for these 11 assets separately
and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in S&P's opinion, provide
adequate support through various stress scenarios.  S&P has
affirmed its rating on the class XW interest-only certificates
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may revise its current
IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Thirteen assets ($229.1 million; 8.7%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, Helios AMC LLC (Helios).  The payment status of
the assets is: one is real estate owned (0.1%); one is in
foreclosure (0.3%); one is 90-plus-days delinquent (0.5%); one is
60-plus days delinquent (0.2%); one is 30-plus days delinquent
(0.2%); seven are late but still within their grace periods
(3.9%), and one is current (3.5%).  Four of the specially serviced
assets have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$11.1 million.  One of the top 10 loans (3.5%) is with the special
servicer and is discussed below.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined one
loan ($26.5 million; 1.0%) to be credit-impaired.  The Nortel
Networks Building loan is on the servicer's watchlist because the
sole tenant, Nortel Networks Inc., is in bankruptcy; Nortel has
not yet affirmed or disaffirmed its lease.  The loan payment
status is current.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $2.6 billion (159 loans), compared with $2.7 billion
(160 loans) at issuance.  Bank of America, the master servicer,
reported financial information for 97.2% of the pool; 96.4% of the
financial information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the pool based on the master
servicer's reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.43x and 102.4%, respectively.  Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures exclude four assets ($27.1 million, 1.0%) with the
special servicer and seven assets (62.9 million; 2.4%) that did
not report financial data.  The transaction has not experienced
any principal losses to date.  Twenty-one loans are on the
servicer's watchlist ($371.9 million; 14.1%).  Six loans
($37.0 million, 1.4%) have reported DSCs between 1.10x and 1.0x,
and 15 loans ($371.2 million, 14.1%) have reported DSCs of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.1 billion (43.0%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.27x for the top 10 loans.
One of the top 10 loans ($94.1 million, 3.5%) is with the special
servicer, and another ($122.4 million, 4.6%) appears on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Both loans are discussed below.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.25x and 105.7%,
respectively.

The Faneuil Hall loan is the seventh-largest loan in the pool and
the largest loan with the special servicer.  The loan is secured
by a retail and office complex with three main buildings
containing 371,630 sq. ft. in downtown Boston.  The loan remains
current, and the servicer reported an occupancy of 87% and a DSC
of 1.26x for year-end 2008.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on April 17, 2009, due to General Growth
Properties' bankruptcy filing.  S&P will continue to monitor
developments relating to this loan and will take rating actions on
this transaction as necessary.

The Bon-Ton Department Stores Portfolio loan ($122.4 million;
4.6%) is the fourth-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan
on the servicer's watchlist.  The loan was placed on the watchlist
due to a low EBITDA trigger event in the loan documents.  The loan
is secured by 12 department stores encompassing 1.7 million sq.
ft.  Built between 1959 and 2004 and renovated between 1994 and
2003, the properties are located throughout Iowa (three
properties), Illinois (four properties), Minnesota (three
properties), and Michigan (one property).  For the 12 months ended
January 2009, the servicer-reported occupancy was 100% and the DSC
was 1.27x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.

The resultant credit enhancement levels support the lowered and
affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --        ----           ----------------------
     A-M        A         AAA/Watch Neg                   20.44
     A-J        BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                   12.26
     B          BBB-      AA/Watch Neg                    10.35
     C          BB+       AA-/Watch Neg                    9.32
     D          BB        A/Watch Neg                      7.79
     E          BB-       A-/Watch Neg                     6.77
     F          B+        BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.62
     G          B+        BBB/Watch Neg                    4.60
     H          B         BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.32
     J          B         BB+/Watch Neg                    2.94
     K          B-        BB/Watch Neg                     2.43
     L          B-        B+/Watch Neg                     2.04
     M          B-        B/Watch Neg                      1.92
     N          CCC+      B-/Watch Neg                     1.66
     O          CCC       CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.40

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

                     Rating
                     ------
   Class          To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
   -----          --        ----           ----------------------
   A-1A           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                 30.65
   A-4            AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                 30.65

                         RATINGS AFFIRMED

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2

             Class   Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------    ----------------------
             A-1     AAA                        30.65
             A-2     AAA                        30.65
             A-3     AAA                        30.65
             A-AB    AAA                        30.65
             XW      AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-2 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative 12 classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Bank of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., 2006-
2.  Fitch has also assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity
Ratings, and Recovery Ratings.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 5.7% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
3.3%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 3.3% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 60.2% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.  Approximately 61.7%
of the recognized losses were due to loans reviewed in detail.

Approximately 3.5% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 0.2% in 2010 and 3.3% in 2011.  All losses associated with
these loans are recognized in the rating actions.
Fitch identified 29 Loans of Concern (12.9%) within the pool, 12
of which (5.1%) are specially serviced.  Seven of the specially
serviced loans are current (4.0%0.  One of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (3.6%) is within the transaction's top 15 loans (52.4%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Three of the loans within the top 15 (16.2%) are expected to
default during the term, with loss severities ranging from 4% to
16%.  The largest contributors to loss are: 181 West Madison
Street (7.7% of the pool), Fortunoffs of Paramus (2%), and The
Glen Town Center (3.3%).

181 West Madison Street is secured by a 940,639 sf office property
built in 1990 and is located on the corner of Madison Street and
Wells in Chicago's Central Loop.  The servicer-reported YE 2008
and second quarter 2009 DSCR was 1.16x and 1.35x, respectively.
Occupancy has improved to 87% as of June 2009, compared to 85% at
issuance.  Based on anticipated declines in performance a default
is anticipated prior to the loan's maturity in May 2016.

Fortunoff's of Paramus is secured by 40,000 sf single-tenant
retail property built in 1988 and located in Paramus, NJ.  The
loan transferred to the special servicer in February 2009.  The
property is being marketed for sale by the servicer.  Based on
initial offers, losses are expected upon disposition.

The Glen Town Center is a 267,890 sf retail anchored property
built in 2003 located in Glenview, IL.  The property's largest
tenants include Dick's Sporting Goods, Von Maur and Crown
Theaters.  The loan transferred to the special servicer for
payment default on Aug 1, 2009.  The property is currently 95%
occupied although a number of tenants are in default under their
leases and two of the largest tenants are alleging co-tenancy
violations.  The servicer and borrower are negotiating a
modification, however, losses are expected.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned LS and RRs to these classes:

  -- $215.9 million class A-J to 'AA/LS-3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $50.6 million class B to 'A/LS-4' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27 million class C to 'A/LS-5' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $40.5 million class D to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27 million class E to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $30.4 million class F to 'BB/LS-5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27 million class G to 'B/LS-5' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $33.7 million class H to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $10.1 million class J to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.5 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $10.1 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.4 million class M to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.7 million class N to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.7 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and assigned LS
ratings:

  -- $52.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $68.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $145 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118.6 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.27 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $178.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $269.9 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $37.1 million class P.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Nine 2008-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades nine classes and affirms six classes of
Bank of America Auto Trust 2008-1 as part of its ongoing
surveillance process.  Fitch also revises the Rating Outlook to
Positive from Stable.

The upgrades are a result of continued available credit
enhancement in excess of stressed remaining losses.  The
collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base case
expectations.  Currently, under the credit enhancement structure,
the securities can withstand stress scenarios consistent with the
upgraded rating categories and still make full payments of
interest and principal in accordance with the terms of the
documents.

As before, the ratings reflect the quality of Bank of America,
N.A.'s retail auto loan originations, the sound financial and
legal structure of the transaction, and the servicing provided by
BANA.

Fitch takes these rating actions:

  -- Class A-2a asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-2b asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-3a asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-3b asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-4 asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class A-5 asset-backed notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- Class B asset-backed notes upgraded to 'AA+' from 'AA';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class C asset-backed notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'AA-';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class D asset-backed notes upgraded to 'AA-' from 'A';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class E asset-backed notes upgraded to 'A+' from 'A-';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class F asset-backed notes upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class G asset-backed notes upgraded to 'A-' from 'BBB';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class H asset-backed notes upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BBB-';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class I asset-backed notes upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB+';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable;

  -- Class J asset-backed notes upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB';
     Outlook to Positive from Stable.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-PWR11 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR11.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 3.4% for this transaction should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
1.6%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 1.6% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Of the recognized
losses, 63% were on loans reviewed in detail.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 62.6% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 11.4% of the mortgages mature or have an anticipated
repayment date within the next five years: 0% in 2009, 7.3% in
2010, 0.9% in 2011, 0% in 2013, and 2.2% in 2014.  All losses
associated with these loans are fully recognized in the rating
actions.

Fitch identified 17 Loans of Concern (17.3%) within the pool, two
of which (1.7%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, none are current.  None of the specially serviced loans are
within the transaction's top 15 loans (45.9%) by unpaid principal
balance.

None of the loans within the top 15 are expected to default during
the term.  The largest contributors to loss are: Investcorp Retail
Portfolio 1 & 2 (10.2%), Forum Center (1.1%) and Sunrise Lake
Village (0.7%).

Investcorp Retail Portfolio 1 & 2 are two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted retail portfolios.  The collateral consists of
eight properties and approximately 1.6 million square feet with
properties located Ohio and Indiana.  Anchor tenants at the
properties consist of Wal-Mart, Kohl's, Best Buy, Dick's Sporting
Goods, Petsmart, Officemax, and Hobby Lobby.  Investcorp Retail
Portfolio 1 was 77.2% occupied as of a March 31, 2009 rent roll,
compared to 91.7% reported for YE 2008.  The YE 2008 reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.36 times (x).  Investcorp
Retail Portfolio 2 was 89.9% occupied as of March 31, 2009,
compared 90.9% as of YE 2008.  The YE 2008 reported DSCR was
1.41x.  The sponsors are Investcorp and Cast.  The loans are
interest only for the loan term.

Forum Center (1.1%) is a retail property located in Louisville,
KY.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on April 7,
2009.  It is currently due for its April 1, 2009 payment.  The
property occupancy is currently approximately 55% as the center
has lost its biggest tenant and has another significant tenant
that is behind in its lease obligations.  The borrower has
requested a loan modification which is subject to receipt of the
updated appraisal and servicer evaluation.  YE 2008 DSCR was
1.42x, however, included rent from now vacated or delinquent
tenants.

Sunrise Lake Village (0.7%) is a mixed use property located in
Pearland, TX.  This loan is pending transfer to the special
servicer and is 60 days late in payments.  The property sustained
damage from Hurricane Ike and the insurance company has denied the
borrower's insurance claim.  YE 200 DSCR was 1.12x.

Fitch downgrades, revises Rating Outlooks and assigns LS ratings
as indicated:

  -- $23.2 million class H to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.0 million class J to 'BB/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.0 million class L to 'B/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.3 million class M to 'B/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.6 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes, maintained Rating
Outlooks and assigned LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $62.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $93.7 billion class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $90.4 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $830.7 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $127.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $185.9 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $146.4 million class A-J at 'AAA/LS2' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $37.2 million class B at 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $23.4 million class C at 'AA-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $27.9 million class D at 'A/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class E at 'A-/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class G at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.0 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.6 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Also, Fitch affirms this class:

  -- Class X affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate this class:

  -- $20.8 million class P.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on two
certificates issued in Bear Stearns Structured Products, Inc.
2003-1.

The certificates in the resecuritization are backed by one or more
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products, Inc. 2003-1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Apr 29, 2003
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 29, 2003
     Assigned Baa2


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-PWR8 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-PWR8 on review for possible
downgrade due to expected losses for the pool resulting from
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing, increased
credit quality dispersion, and concerns about the future
performance of significant loans, including the Marriott Troy, in
an adverse environment.  Since Moody's prior review in June 2007,
the pool's exposure to specially serviced loans has increased from
0% to 4.1%.  In addition, the number of loans with underlying
ratings has dropped from nine (18.4% of pool) to seven (7.4% of
pool).  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the September 11, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5.1% to
$1.67 billion from $1.77 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 193 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10.5% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 29.2% of the pool.

Thirty-five loans, representing 12.1% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Six loans, representing 4.1% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Kaleidoscope Center Loan ($33.9 million -- 2.0%), which is secured
by a retail center located in Mission Viejo, Orange County,
California.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in June
2009 due to imminent payment default resulting from the departure
of three major tenants.  Of the remaining five specially serviced
loans, one is 90+ days delinquent, two are in the process of
foreclosure and two are expected to be returned to the Master
Servicer as Corrected Mortgage Loans within 60 days.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $150,046,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 6/22/2007

  -- Class B, $37,511,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class C, $17,653,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class D, $26,478,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class E, $17,653,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class F, $19,859,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class G, $15,446,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class H, $17,652,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class J, $8,826,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class K, $4,413,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class L, $6,620,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class M, $6,620,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class N, $2,206,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class P, $4,413,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 6/22/2007


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-TOP20 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-TOP20, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-TOP20 on review
for possible downgrade due to the deteriorating performance of the
Lakeforest Mall loan and concerns about refinancing risk
associated with five-year loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Excluding specially serviced loans, twelve loans,
representing 16% of the pool, mature within the next three years
and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below
1.20X.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

Moody's is concerned about the weakening credit quality of the
largest loan in the deal.  The Lakeforest Mall Loan
($121.1 million -- 6%) is secured by the borrower's interest in a
1.1 million square foot regional mall located in Gaithersburg,
Maryland.  In-line occupancy for the mall has decreased
drastically to 64% from 89% at last review.  Expected sales for
2009 have also dropped significantly to a projected $269 per
square foot in 2009 versus $373 PSF at securitization.  This mall
is managed by Simon Property Group.  At last review, the loan had
an underlying rating of Baa3.

As of the September 14, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate principal balance has decreased by approximately 7% to
$1.9 million from $2.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 219 loans, ranging in size from
less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.  The pool includes eleven loans with
underlying ratings, which represent 12% of the pool.  Two loans,
representing 0.4% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Currently, there is one loan, representing less than 1% of the
pool, in special servicing.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool.
Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class G, $18,139,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa1 on 7/10/07

  -- Class H, $23,321,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa2 on 7/10/07

  -- Class J, $18,138,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa3 on 7/10/07

  -- Class K, $5,183,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba1 on 7/10/07

  -- Class L, $7,773,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba2 on 7/10/07

  -- Class M, $7,774,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba3 on 7/10/07

  -- Class N, $2,591,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed B1 on 7/10/07

  -- Class O, $2,591,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed B2 on 7/10/07

  -- Class P, $5,183,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed B3 on 7/10/07


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 16 2007-PWR16 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 16 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-PWR16 on review for possible
downgrade due to expected losses for the pool resulting from
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing and concerns
about refinancing risk associated with five-year loans approaching
maturity in an adverse environment.  Since Moody's prior review in
February 2009, the pool's exposure to specially serviced loans has
increased from 0% to 3%.  In addition, thirteen loans,
representing 20% of the pool, mature within the next three years
and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below
1.00X.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$3.31 billion from $3.29 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 261 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 42% of the pool.

Fifty-one loans, representing 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Eight loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the PGA Design
Center ($30.0 million -- 0.9%), which is secured by an anchored
retail center located in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in February 2009 due to
payment default resulting from the departure of two major tenants.
Of the remaining seven specially serviced loans, three are 30 or
60 days delinquent, two are 90+ days delinquent, and two are in
the process of foreclosure.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $273,400,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $33,139,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $33,140,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $33,139,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $20,712,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $24,855,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $28,997,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $41,424,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $33,139,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $33,140,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $16,569,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $12,428,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $12,427,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class O, $8,285,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class P, $8,285,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class Q, $8,285,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/11/2009


BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$431,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on April 7, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$75,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6l,000,000 Class D-l Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class I Combination Notes Due June 2017
     (current rated balance of $6,974,735), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class II Combination Notes Due June 2017
     (current rated balance of $2,194,689), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Ba1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$70,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due June 2017,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3420 versus a test
level of 2900 as of the last trustee report, dated August 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $78 million, accounting for roughly 7.5%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  The majority of
these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade
ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor
recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Black Diamond CLO 2005-1 Ltd., issued in April of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BLACK DIAMOND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Black Diamond CLO 2005-2:

  -- US$681,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 20, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$75,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$67,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class E-1 Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class E-2 Fixed Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class I Combination Notes due January 2018
     (current rated balance of $33,406,855), Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class II Combination Notes due January 2018
     (current rated balance of $3,825,222), Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class III Combination Notes due January 2018
     (current rated balance of $4,768,798), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$70,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due January 2018,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3137 versus a test
level of 2900 as of the last trustee report, dated August 25,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $94 million, accounting for
roughly 11% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 14.3% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Black Diamond CLO 2005-2, issued in October of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2006-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan
Trust 2006-2:

  -- US$147,500,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Confirmed at Aaa; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$71,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$157,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$101,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Confirmed at B2; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$56,250,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class A-1B,
Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes have incorporated the
aforementioned stresses as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated
analysis indicating that the impact of these factors on the
ratings of the Class A-1B, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of
the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-2, issued in 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B 2008-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners 2008-
1, Ltd.:

  -- US$27,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2016, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$29,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2016, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2016, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  Defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $7.4 million, accounting for roughly 1.52%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9.6% of the underlying portfolio, based on the
latest trustee report dated August 11, 2009.  Moody's also notes
that according to the same report, the weighted average rating
factor is 2773.

Carlyle High Yield Partners 2008-1, Ltd., issued in May 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed by a portfolio of senior
secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-CD5 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to certain
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CD
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-CD5.  A detailed list of
rating actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
7.3% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 5.8%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 57% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
Of the recognized losses, approximately 61% are derived from loans
which Fitch examined in detail.

Approximately 10.5% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 8.4% in 2012 and 2.1% in 2014.  In 2017, 87.9% of the pool
is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 33 Loans of Concern (17.4%) within the pool, 20
of which (8.7%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, 10 (2.2%) are current.  Two of the specially serviced loans
(3.9%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans (47.5%) by unpaid
principal balance.

Five of the Loans of Concern (9.9%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 5% to 39%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Georgian
Towers (2.8%), 150 18th Street NW(2.3%) and the CGM RRI Hotel
Portfolio (1.6%).

The Georgian Towers loan is collateralized by a 890 unit multi-
family property located in Silver Spring, MD.  Stellar Management
(Laurence Gluck) is the sponsor.  The loan was made with the
expectation that unit and common area upgrades would allow for
significantly increased rental rates.  Currently the property
renovations are approximately 50% complete.  The debt service
reserves have been nearly depleted and the renovation reserves
have been 60% depleted.  The property is not cash flowing and
Fitch expects the loan to default prior to maturity.

The 150 18th Street NW loan is collateralized by a 167,000 square
foot (sf) office property located in Washington, DC.  Lawrence
Botel and Steven Klein are the sponsors.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in August 2009 for monetary default.  Occupancy
at the property declined from 97% at issuance to 80% at YE 2008.
Three tenants vacated the property in 2008.  The special servicer
is in continuing negotiations with the sponsor.  Major tenants
include Reed Elsevier, Inc. (22% NRA, rated 'A-' by Fitch),
Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP (10% NRA) and Miller & Chevalier (10%
NRA) Additional upcoming lease rollover consists of 23% in 2010
and 40% in 2012.

The CGM RRI Hotel Portfolio loan is collateralized by 52 Red Roof
Inn hotels totaling 6,024 rooms, located in 22 different states.
Westmont Hospitality Group is the sponsor.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in May 2009.  The sponsorship is seeking to
restructure the loan due to economic conditions.  The sponsors are
currently negotiating with the mezzanine lender and the special
servicer.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, assigned
Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $111.8 million class AJ to 'AA/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27 million class A-JA to 'AA/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class B to 'A/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class C to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class D to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.3 million class E to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.3 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.6 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.6 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.9 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $26.2 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.9 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.2 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.2 million class 0 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $5.2 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $2.6 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and assigned LS ratings:

  -- $33.7 million class A-1 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88.5 million class A-2 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.4 million class A-3 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52 million class A-AB 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $958.9 million class A-4 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $284.6 million class A-1A 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-Only class XP 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $168.7 million class AM 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.7 million class A-MA 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-Only class XS 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate the $39.2 million class S.


CENTURION CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Centurion CDO 8 Limited:

  -- US$465,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on February 2, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$41,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
     (current balance of $14,373,355), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2729 versus a test
level of 2580 as of the last trustee report, dated July 28, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $42.0 million, accounting for roughly
7.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 10.4% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Centurion CDO 8 Limited, issued in 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CIFC CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CIFC CLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$24,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$38,200,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Notes,
     Confirmed at Aa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Notes, Confirmed
     at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Notes, Confirmed
     at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Notes, Confirmed
     at B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2988.as of the last trustee report, dated
July 28, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $17 million,
accounting for roughly 4.3% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.7% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the Class A-1LB,
Class A-3L, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L Notes have incorporated the
aforementioned stresses as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated
analysis indicating that the impact of these factors on the
ratings of the Class Class A-1LB, Class A-3L, Class B-1L, and
Class B-2L Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during
Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem
from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II
of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

CIFC CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-I Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CIFC Funding 2006-I, Ltd.:

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1LR Variable Funding Notes Due October
     2020,Downgraded to Aa2; previously on August 3, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$293,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on August 3, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$26,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2020, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due October 2020
     (current balance of $22,433,944) , Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$30,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2899 as of the last trustee report, dated
August 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $28.6 million,
accounting for roughly 5.5% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 10.0% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

CIFC Funding 2006-I, Ltd., issued in August of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-I B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CIFC Funding 2006-I B, Ltd.:

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-1LR Variable Funding Notes Due December
     2020, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 11, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$224,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2020, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 11, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2020, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2020, Confirmed at B3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3010 as of the last trustee report, dated
August 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $18.4 million,
accounting for roughly 4.7% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11.5% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

CIFC Funding 2006-I B, Ltd., issued in October of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four 2006-II Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by CIFC Funding 2006-II, Ltd.:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due March 2021,
     Confirmed at Aa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$36,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2021,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2021,
     Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed On Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2021,
     Confirmed at B3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed On Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due March 2021,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class I Combination Notes Due March 2021
     (current rated balance of $15,649,291), Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2928 as of the last trustee report, dated
August 21, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $46.7 million,
accounting for roughly 7.4% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.7% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class A-1LB,
Class A-3L, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L Notes have incorporated the
aforementioned stresses as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated
analysis indicating that the impact of these factors on the
ratings of the Class A-1LB, Class A-3L, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L
Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of
the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

CIFC Funding 2006-II, Ltd., issued in December of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Four 2007-II Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by CIFC Funding 2007-II, Ltd.:

  -- US$84,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due April 2021 Notes, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due April 2021 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$28,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due April 2021 Notes, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due April 2021 Notes, Confirmed at B3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$56,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due April 2021 Notes, Downgraded to A1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has moderately increased and is
currently 3044 as of the last trustee report, dated August 10,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $26.8 million, accounting for
roughly 4.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 16.9% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class A-1-J,
Class B, Class C, and Class D Notes have incorporated the
aforementioned stresses as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated
analysis indicating that the impact of these factors on the
ratings of the Class A-1-J, Class B, Class C, and Class D Notes is
not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal
review in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive
deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

CIFC Funding 2007-II, Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 19 2005-2 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 19 tranches from
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.  The
actions are triggered by higher than expected increase in
delinquencies and rising severities.

Moody's rating actions are based on current ratings, level of
credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level
loss expectations relative to current level of credit enhancement.
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, time tranching, and other structural features within
the senior note waterfalls.

Moody's followed a similar approach for deals from the 2005
vintage with appropriate changes to certain key input parameters
such as severity and the rate of delinquency build up, which would
be generally lower relative to the 2006 and 2007 vintages.  These
differences are aimed at better capturing the specific
characteristics of loans from the 2005 vintage that were
originated in an environment of relatively tighter underwriting
standards and also benefited from some initial home price
appreciation.

Moody's has revised the lifetime expected loss on this
transaction.  Loss estimates are subject to variability and are
sensitive to assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could
ultimately turn out higher or lower than Moody's current
expectations.  Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data
as it becomes available and will assess the pattern of potential
future defaults and adjust loss expectations accordingly as
necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2/ Group a I-1
I-3 I-4 I-5 Mortgage Loans

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 2% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. I-A2A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-A2B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. I-A3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. I-A3A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. I-A3B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. I-A4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. I-A5A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. I-A5B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-2/ Group II-1
II-1-1 II-1-2 II-2 Mortgage Loans - Combined

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 1% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. II-A1-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A1-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-XS1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-XS2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-PO1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-PO2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 20, 2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-B1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Feb. 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-B2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Feb. 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. II-B3, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb. 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:

  i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
     performance information available for the asset class as well
     as for the transaction sponsor,

ii) collateral analysis,

iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
     interests of the key parties to the transaction, most notably
     the originator and the servicer,

iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
     cashflow and capital structure,

  v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
     structure, and

vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
     similar transactions.


CITY OF MIAMI BEACH: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $260 Mil. Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed the 'BB+' rating on approximately
$260 million of the City of Miami Beach Health Facilities
Authority Hospital Revenue Bonds, series 1998, 2001A and 2004
issued on behalf of Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida.  The
Rating Outlook is revised to Stable from Negative.

The affirmation is based on MSMC's improved operating results,
relatively stable liquidity, and strong philanthropic support.
Following 2008's operating loss of $15.7 million (negative 3.2%
operating margin), which showed deterioration from the prior year
of negative $8.9 million (negative 1.9% operating margin),
management has taken several steps to improve the operating
results, including adding a new chief of cardiac surgery in
December 2008, a new chief of cardiology in January 2009, adding
additional doctors in key service lines, and maintaining overall
expense increases at only 0.3% year over year (through the six
month interim).

These initiatives have resulted in an increase in patient acuity,
driven by strong cardiac surgical volume (up 31% year over year),
thoracic surgery volume (up 15%), an increase in the case mix
index, and an increase in emergency room visits, mainly from the
freestanding emergency department in Aventura (up 52%).  As a
result, through the six month interim period ended June 30, 2009,
operating income was negative $5.4 million (negative 2.1%
operating margin) as compared to an $8.4 million loss (negative
3.3%) for the prior year period.  These figures do not include the
$5 million transfer from the foundation for the half year
($10 million will be transferred in the full fiscal year), which
is recorded as net revenue.  Additionally, management has hired
Wellspring Partners for a six month engagement which will
contribute to a total of $8.5 million in expense savings that is
expected to be realized over the course of 2009, with the majority
of the savings coming in the second half.

Although MSMC's liquidity metrics are relatively low at 83 days
cash on hand, 4.4 times (x) cushion ratio, and 39% cash to debt,
they are inline with the below investment grade medians of 60
days, 4.6x, and 40%, respectively.  Additionally, the liquidity
position is fairly stable as the asset allocation is very
conservative with 100% held in cash or short term fixed income
securities.  The Mount Sinai Medical Center Foundation continues
to see strong community support as pledge revenues are up over
100% year over year.  Through the interim period, the Foundation
has raised $8.7 million and in fiscal 2008, it raised
$10.5 million and made a $10 million contribution to MSMC.

Primary credit concerns include the high debt burden and the
disposition of Miami Heart Institute.  MSMC's debt burden remains
high, with MADS as a percentage of revenue of 4.7% and debt to
EBITDA of 7.7x at fiscal year end.  The debt is all fixed-rate and
there are no swaps outstanding, which Fitch views favorably.  The
strong historical debt service coverage, which has averaged 1.9x
over the last five fiscal years and was 1.9x in the interim, also
provides some offset to the high leverage position.  The
disposition of the Miami Heart Institute will have a material
impact on MSMC's financial standing as the facility carries
$108 million in debt and sizable yearly carrying costs.
Management has listed the property for sale since late 2007, and
has experienced trouble moving the property given the downturn in
the commercial real estate market in South Florida.

The Stable Outlook is based on improvements to utilization
figures, especially to the high end service lines which have
improved profitability.  Continued improvements to the operating
margin due to expense reductions and growth in key service lines,
combined with the stable liquidity position should maintain MSMC
at the current rating level for the near- to medium-term.

MSMC is a teaching hospital consisting of 955 licensed beds (780
staffed) and is the only health care provider in Miami Beach, FL,
that offers a wide range of tertiary services.  MSMC had total
operating revenue of $487 million in 2008.  The Foundation also
has an unconditional guaranty on MSMC's outstanding debt and total
assets were $82.7 million in 2008 and $86.9 million as of June 30,
2009.  MSMC covenants to provide annual and quarterly disclosure
to bondholders.  Fitch notes that quarterly disclosure is
excellent, and it includes management discussion and analysis,
balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and
utilization statistics that can be accessed at 'www.dacbond.com'.
MSMC also conducts quarterly conference calls for investors.


COMM 2005-FL10: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2005-FL10.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 other
classes from this transaction.  S&P removed all 25 of these
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on April 7, 2009.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the class X interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

One pooled loan has raked certificates that S&P downgraded (a
raked certificate represents a subordinate, nonpooled component of
the senior participation interest in a particular loan).  The
affected raked certificates include the 'N-PC', 'O-PC', 'P-PC',
and 'Q-PC' classes.  Details are:

The largest loan in the COMM 2005-FL10 pool, the Palisades Center
loan, has a pooled trust balance of $512.2 million (64%) and a
whole-loan balance of $550.0 million.  A $37.8 million subordinate
nonpooled component supports the 'PC' raked certificates.  The
loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interest in 2,004,571 sq.
ft. of a 2,325,571-sq.-ft. super-regional mall built in 1998 in
West Nyack, N.Y.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.
(Midland), reported a May 2009 occupancy rate of 87.3%, down from
98% at issuance.  The borrower has reported recent leasing
activity that is expected to bring the occupancy rate up to
approximately 89%.  However, in-line sales have decreased to $382
per sq.  ft., compared with $442 per sq. ft. at issuance.  The
loan is scheduled to mature on Feb. 9, 2010, and has no extension
options remaining.  S&P's adjusted valuation has fallen 27% since
issuance, contributing to the downgrades of the 'PC' raked
certificates.

Six loans in the COMM 2005-FL10 pool totaling $769.2 million (94%
of the pool's trust balance) are secured by retail properties.
These properties are located predominantly in New York (86%) and
Massachusetts (7%).  Several of these properties have experienced
declines in occupancy since issuance due to the chainwide
liquidations of retailers such as Linens 'N Things and Steve &
Barry's, as well as general weakness in the retail sector.  The
Pyramid Cos.  is the sponsor for five of the six remaining retail
loans (93% of the pool trust balance).

According to the Aug. 15, 2009, remittance report, pool statistics
for COMM 2005-FL10 are:

There are seven loans in the pool, including senior participation
interests in three floating-rate mortgage loans, three floating-
rate whole-mortgage loans, and one floating-rate pari passu
mortgage loan.  There are mortgages on 19 anchored retail
properties and one office property.

All of the loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR.

Details of the specially serviced loans in the COMM 2005-FL10 pool
are:

The fourth-largest loan in the pool, the Hudson Valley Plaza/West
Seneca loan, has a pooled trust balance of $49.0 million (6%) and
a whole-loan balance of $59.0 million.  There is a $10.0 million
junior participation interest held outside of the trust.  The loan
is secured by the fee interest in two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted retail centers.  Hudson Valley Plaza is a 689,342-
sq.-ft. regional shopping center built in 1995 in Kingston, N.Y.,
and Shops at West Seneca is a 199,123-sq.-ft. big box retail
property built in 1997 in West Seneca, N.Y.  Midland reported a
May 2009 occupancy rate of 89.2%, down from 93% at issuance.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.,
on July 28, 2009.  The loan is scheduled to mature on Sept. 9,
2009, and has no extension options remaining.  S&P's adjusted
valuation has fallen 12% since issuance.

The smallest loan in the pool, the Macquarie/DDR Trust Portfolio
loan, has a pooled trust balance of $4.9 million (1%) and a whole-
loan balance of $111.2 million.  Seven retail properties have been
released since issuance.  The remaining collateral consists of 13
retail properties totaling 1.9 million sq. ft. in various
locations throughout New York, Arkansas, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.  This loan has a whole-loan balance
of $111.2 million that is split into four pari passu pieces.  The
trust's portion of the pooled balance is $4.9 million (1%).  The
trust balance reflects $44.8 million in paydowns since issuance
due to collateral releases.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors, on May 28, 2009,
and will reach its final maturity on Oct. 1, 2009.  An additional
loan extension is currently being considered.  TriMont reported an
83% occupancy rate as of April 2009, down from 91% at issuance.
S&P's adjusted valuation has declined 27% since issuance,
primarily due to lower rent income and/or lower occupancy at the
remaining collateral properties.  However, the loan has
experienced a significant amount of deleveraging due to property
releases.

Excluding the two specially serviced loans, the remaining loans
have final maturities between February and April 2010.

LNR indicated that if there were any special servicing fees and/or
workout fees on the Hudson Valley Plaza/West Seneca loan following
an event of default, the nontrust junior participation interest
will absorb them.  In addition, the trust has incurred interest
shortfalls to class M.  Based on S&P's discussions with TriMont
regarding the Macquarie/DDR Trust Portfolio loan, TriMont expects,
as part of the negotiations with the borrower, that the borrower
will assume all special servicing fees.  If this does not occur
and interest shortfalls continue, S&P may lower its rating on
class M to 'D'.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                          COMM 2005-FL10
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----             ----------------------
    B        A-        AA+/Watch Neg                     23.41
    C        BBB+      AA/Watch Neg                      20.45
    D        BBB-      AA/Watch Neg                      17.22
    E        BB+       A+/Watch Neg                      13.99
    F        BB        A/Watch Neg                       10.76
    G        BB-       A/Watch Neg                        8.18
    H        B+        A-/Watch Neg                       5.37
    J        B+        BBB+/Watch Neg                     4.57
    K        B         BBB/Watch Neg                      2.15
    L        CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                      1.37
    M        CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                     0.00
    N-PC     B-        A-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    O-PC     CCC+      BBB+/Watch Neg                      N/A
    P-PC     CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
    Q-PC     CCC       BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                           COMM 2005-FL10
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----             ----------------------
    A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                     96.58
    A-J1     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                     57.04
    A-J2     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                     41.16
    A-J3     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                     35.54
    X-2-DB   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-2-NOM  AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-2-SG   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-3-DB   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-3-NOM  AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-3-SG   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Puts Ratings on 33 Classes on Negative Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 33 classes of COMM Mortgage Trust 2006-
FL12 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates on Rating Watch
Negative.

The Negative Watch is due to Fitch's expectation that hotel
performance will continue to be impacted by the economic downturn.
The pool is comprised of 61% hotel loans.  While year-end 2008
performance had generally declined only slightly from YE 2007,
Fitch expects second quarter and YE 2009 to show significant
declines.  In addition, five of the eight hotel loans in the pool
are collateralized by resort properties, which have been among the
most severely impacted by the downturn.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $93.9 million class B 'AA+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $66 million class C 'AA+; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $72.8 million class D 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $54.1 million class E 'AA-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $54.1 million class F 'A+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $51.6 million class G 'A+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $32.1 million class H 'A'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $36.7 million class J 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $70.9 million class KR-1 'BBB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $22.1 million class KR-2 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $62.5 million class KR-3 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5 million class HDC-1 'BBB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $6.5 million class FSH-1 'BBB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $8.7 million class FSH-2 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $9.1 million class FSH-3 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $3.3 million class MSH-1 'BB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $2.9 million class MSH-2 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $4.8 million class MSH-3 'BB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $4 million class MSH-4 'BB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5.9 million class FG-1 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $6.1 million class FG-2 'A+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $4.3 million class FG-3 'A-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5.5 million class FG-4 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $7.2 million class FG-5 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.8 million class ES-1 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.7 million class ES-2 'BB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.5 million class ES-3 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class AH-1 'BBB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class AH-2 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.5 million class AH-3 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.9 million class AH-4 'BB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.3 million class CM-1 'A-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $2.5 million class CM-2 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $824.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $507 million class A-J at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- Interest only classes X-1, X-2, X-3-BC, X-3-DB, X-3-SG, X-4,
     X-5-BC, X-5-DB, and X-5-SG at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.4 million class CN-1 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.8 million class CN-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.7 million class CN-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.8 million class IP-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.2 million class IP-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11 million class IP-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0.7 million class CA-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.1 million class CA-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.4 million class CA-4 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $5.5 million class AN-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.4 million class AN-4 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.5 million class LS-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.7 million class LS-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class LS-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.9 million class TC-1 at 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.4 million class TC-2 at 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $1.7 million class LB-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.2 million class LB-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.2 million class LB-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable.


CREDIT DEFAULT: S&P Corrects Swap Risk Rating on Tranche
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its swap risk rating
on the tranche from Credit Default Swap "Paoli" Reference No.
64451, an unfunded synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  S&P incorrectly
lowered the rating to 'BB-srp' from 'BBBsrp' on Aug. 7, 2009.

On Feb. 11, 2009, this transaction was amended to provide an
increase in subordination and an extension of the maturity date.
Due to an administrative error, these amendments were not taken
into account in S&P's analysis prior to the rating action of
Aug. 7, 2009.

The current rating reflects S&P's revised analysis, which takes
the amendments to the transaction into account.

                        Rating Corrected

                       Credit Default Swap
             Swap Risk Rating - "Paoli" Ref No. 64451

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                 Class       To             From
                 -----       --             ----
                 Tranche     BBBsrp         BB-srp


CREDIT DEFAULT: S&P Withdraws 'B-' Swap Risk Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'B-' swap risk
rating on Credit Default Swap CDS Reference No. SDB506887699.

The withdrawal follows the early termination of the swap agreement
on May 5, 2009, as per section 9 of the indenture.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                       Credit Default Swap
Swap risk rating - portfolio only, CDS reference No.  SDB506887699

                    Rating            Balance (mil. $)
                    ------            ----------------
         Class    To      From      Current      Previous
         -----    --      ----      -------      --------
         Notes    NR      B-srp       0.000        40.000

                          NR - Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TFL2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on 11 classes of Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2007-TFL2
including downgrades to eight tranches.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of the transfer of the largest loan,
Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino (30.9% of the pool) to special
servicing.  The loan transferred to special servicing in August
2009 due to imminent default and the borrower's request for
relief.  In May 2009, a modification was completed which enabled
the borrower to draw down $9 million of the $11 million interest
reserve, subject to replenishment at the December 2009 maturity
(and possible extension).  This strategy proved unsuccessful, and
the borrower defaulted on its loan obligations in August 2009
after asset performance continued to be poor through the summer
months.

The special servicer, Archon, is discussing workout options with
the borrower.  Fitch analyzed the effect of a loan liquidation
using three stress scenarios; a 50% value decline based on the
appraisal from issuance, a 66% value decline, and a stressed value
based on the trailing twelve month cash flow of $37 million and a
13% cap rate.  The rating actions reflect the stressed value
scenario.

Fitch will continue to monitor the workout of the loan and may
take additional negative rating actions once an updated appraisal
has been received and more detail on the workout becomes
available.

Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino is a 2,519 room hotel and
casino in Las Vegas, NV, previously operated as the Aladdin.  The
property is in the midst of a $178 million renovation and re-
development project that includes substantial improvements to the
facade, casino, restaurants, and guestrooms.  At issuance, the
property appraisal upon completion of all renovations was
$1.3 billion, including land value of $397.5 million.

The Resorts Atlantic City (11.7%) and Biscayne Landing (10.8%)
loans are also in special servicing with Fitch expecting losses
upon resolution of the workouts.

Fitch downgrades and places on Rating Watch Negative these classes
of CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., pass-through
certificates, series 2007-TFL2:

  -- $207 million class A-3 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA';
  -- $45.7 million class B to 'BB' from 'A+';
  -- $42.6 million class C to 'BB' from 'A';
  -- $33.5 million class D to 'B' from 'BBB+';
  -- $36.6 million class E to 'B' from 'BBB'.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings (RRs)
to these classes:

  -- $36.5 million class F to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $33.5 million class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $39.6 million class H to 'CC/RR6' from 'B'.

In addition, Fitch places this class on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $100 million class A-2 'AAA'.

In addition, the Recovery Rating on this class is revised:

  -- $36.6 million class J from 'CC/RR4' to 'CC/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these ratings:

  -- $39.6 million class K at 'C/RR6';
  -- $33.5 million class L at 'C/RR6';
  -- $8.9 million class BSL-A at 'C/RR6';
  -- $9 million class BSL-B at 'C/RR6';
  -- $8.9 million class BSL-C at 'C/RR6';
  -- $8.9 million class BSL-D at 'C/RR6';
  -- $7.9 million class BSL-E at 'C/RR6';
  -- $9.9 million class BSL-F at 'C/RR6'.

In addition, these classes remain on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $19.9 million class CSP-G 'BBB+';
  -- $9.9 million class CSP-H 'BBB';
  -- $15.9 million class CSP-J 'BBB-';
  -- $18 million class CSP-K 'BB+'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $518.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- Interest-only class A-X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class A-X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $85.9 million class CSP-A1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $33.6 million class CSP-A2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class CSP-AX at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.6 million class CSP-B at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $11.5 million class CSP-C at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.9 million class CSP-D at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10 million class CSP-E at 'A+': Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.7 million class CSP-F at 'A'; Outlook Stable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Raises Ratings on Five 2004-C4 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C4 and
removed them from CreditWatch with developing implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 17 classes from the same
transaction and removed 14 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch developing.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, excluding loans that S&P stressed as credit concerns,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.48x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 90.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.12x and an LTV of 113.1%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 30.1% and 29.0%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations excluded two specially
serviced loans (0.8%), 79 cooperative apartment loans (15.8%), and
nine loans that have been defeased (22.4%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the two specially serviced loans, and these
losses are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.  S&P excluded the cooperative apartment loans because
they did not default under the 'AAA' scenario due to extremely low
leverage.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Seven assets ($79.0 million, 8.2%) in the pool, including the
third- and ninth-largest exposures in the pool, are with the
special servicer, J.E.  Robert Cos.  The payment status of the
specially serviced loans is: one is a nonperforming matured
balloon ($628,598, 0.1%), one is 90 days delinquent ($7.0 million,
0.7%), three are performing matured balloons ($45.4 million,
4.7%), and two are current ($26.0 million, 2.7%).

An appraisal reduction amount of $1.7 million is currently in
effect for the Timber Hollow Apartments loan ($7.0 million, 0.7%).
Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of
this asset.  A discounted payoff was recently approved for the
Country Haven Mobile Home Park loan ($628,598, 0.1%).  Standard &
Poor's anticipates a moderate loss upon the resolution of this
asset.  S&P expects that this loan will be removed from the trust
after this transaction closes.

The Bertakis MHP Portfolio loan is the third-largest loan in the
pool ($36.5 million, 3.8%) and is secured by a seven-property
mobile home park portfolio.  The portfolio consists of 1,723 units
spread over six properties in southeastern Michigan and Manvel,
Texas.  The loan was transferred to JER on April 13, 2009, due to
an upcoming maturity.  Negotiations for a loan extension are in
process.

The Oak Grove Apartments loan is the ninth-largest loan in the
pool ($16.0 million, 1.7%) and is secured by a 369-unit
multifamily building in Miami.  The loan was transferred to JER on
Aug. 3, 2009, due to imminent default.  As of Dec. 31, 2008, the
reported DSC was 0.94x.  Occupancy was 92.4% as of July 23, 2009.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $969.6 million, which represents 85.2% of the
aggregate trust balance at issuance.  There are 165 loans in the
pool, down from 177 at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. Excluding
$217.4 million (23.4%) in defeased collateral, the master servicer
provided financial information for 99.4% of the pool, and 91.2% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.86x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.48x and
90.3%, respectively.  These calculations exclude the 79
cooperative apartment loans in the pool.  To date, the transaction
has experienced $539,080 losses associated with two defaulted
loans.  Twenty-six loans are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including three of the top 10 loans.  Twenty-five loans
($131.7 million, 13.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x,
and 21 of these loans ($107.5 million, 11.1%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$309.0 million (31.9%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the top 10 loans.
The third- and ninth-largest loans in the pool ($52.5 million,
5.4%) are with the special servicer and are discussed above.  The
second-, fourth-, and sixth-largest loans in the pool
($97.1 million, 10.0%) appear on the master servicer's watchlist.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.40x and
97.7%, respectively.

The Village on the Parkway loan ($45.8 million, 4.7%) is the
second-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 381,166-sq.-
ft. anchored retail center in Addison, Texas.  The master servicer
placed the loan on its watchlist due to the upcoming expiration of
a major tenant, which constitutes 33.4% of the center's net
rentable area.  The tenant has given notice that it will not renew
its lease, and the space is being marketed in advance of the
Jan. 31, 2010, lease expiration.  The property was 77.4% occupied
as of June 30, 2009, and DSC was 1.25x as of Dec. 31, 2008.

The Village Square and Deerpath Court loan ($30.7 million, 3.2%)
is the fourth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by two
anchored retail centers in Zurich, Illinois, totaling 363,021 sq.
ft.  The master servicer placed this loan on its watchlist due to
declines in occupancy and DSC.  The property was 89.9% occupied as
of July 31, 2008, and DSC was 1.32x as of Dec. 31, 2008.

The Governor's Marketplace Shopping Center loan ($20.6 million,
2.1%) is the sixth-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a
244,932-sq.-ft.  anchored retail center in Tallahassee, Fla.  The
loan is on the watchlist due to an upcoming loan maturity, for
which an extension is under negotiation.  The property was 92.0%
occupied as of April 14, 2009, and DSC was 2.17x as of Dec. 31,
2008.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Raised And Removed From Creditwatch Developing

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-C4

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class  To               From         Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --               ----         ----------------------
    B      AA+             AA/Watch Dev                   11.24
    C      A+              A/Watch Dev                     8.60
    D      A               A-/Watch Dev                    7.57
    E      A-              BBB+/Watch Dev                  6.25
    F      BBB+            BBB/Watch Dev                   5.37

    Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Developing

      Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
     Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-C4

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class  To               From         Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --               ----         ----------------------
    A-2    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-3    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-4    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-5    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-6    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-1-A  AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  23.42
    A-J    AAA             AAA/Watch Dev                  15.35
    G      BBB-            BBB-/Watch Dev                  3.91
    H      BB+             BB+/Watch Dev                   3.61
    J      BB              BB/Watch Dev                    3.17
    K      BB-             BB-/Watch Dev                   2.59
    L      B+              B+/Watch Dev                    2.15
    M      B               B/Watch Dev                     1.85
    N      B-              B-/Watch Dev                    1.41

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-C4

              Class  Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
              -----  ------   ----------------------
              A-X    AAA                         N/A
              A-SP   AAA                         N/A
              A-Y    AAA                         N/A


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Shifts Watch on 2004-C4 Certs. to Developing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its CreditWatch status
on 19 classes of certificates from Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C4 to developing from
negative.  The ratings were originally placed on CreditWatch
negative following the release of S&P's updated criteria for U.S.
conduit and fusion transactions on June 26, 2009.

S&P is in the process of analyzing the transaction utilizing S&P's
updated criteria.  Currently, its analysis indicates that S&P will
likely affirm the majority of the ratings in the transaction, and
several of the investment-grade classes have the potential for
upgrades.  S&P expects to finalize the analysis in the near
future, at which time S&P will release a full rationale.

As of the August remittance report, the collateral pool consisted
of 165 loans totaling $969.6 million.  Of these loans, nine have
been defeased ($217.4 million, 23.5%).  There are seven specially
serviced assets in the pool ($79.0 million, 8.2%), of which one is
a nonperforming matured balloon (0.1%), one is 90 days delinquent
(0.7%), three are performing matured balloons (4.7%), and two are
current (2.7%).  To date, the transaction has experienced $539,080
losses associated with two defaulted loans.

      Creditwatch Status Revised To Developing From Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
      Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2004-C4

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class  To               From         Credit enhancement (%)
    -----  --               ----         ----------------------
    A-2    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-3    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-4    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-5    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-6    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-1-A  AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  23.42
    A-J    AAA/Watch Dev   AAA/Watch Neg                  15.35
    B      AA/Watch Dev    AA/Watch Neg                   11.24
    C      A/Watch Dev     A/Watch Neg                     8.60
    D      A-/Watch Dev    A-/Watch Neg                    7.57
    E      BBB+/Watch Dev  BBB+/Watch Neg                  6.25
    F      BBB/Watch Dev   BBB/Watch Neg                   5.37
    G      BBB-/Watch Dev  BBB-/Watch Neg                  3.91
    H      BB+/Watch Dev   BB+/Watch Neg                   3.61
    J      BB/Watch Dev    BB/Watch Neg                    3.17
    K      BB-/Watch Dev   BB-/Watch Neg                   2.59
    L      B+/Watch Dev    B+/Watch Neg                    2.15
    M      B/Watch Dev     B/Watch Neg                     1.85
    N      B-/Watch Dev    B-/Watch Neg                    1.41


CSFB ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-8 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 16 tranches from CSFB
Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8.

The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.  The actions
are triggered by higher than expected increase in delinquencies
and rising severities.

Moody's rating actions are based on current ratings, level of
credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level
loss expectations relative to current level of credit enhancement.
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, time tranching, and other structural features within
the senior note waterfalls.

Moody's followed a similar approach for deals from the 2005
vintage with appropriate changes to certain key input parameters
such as severity and the rate of delinquency build up, which would
be generally lower relative to the 2006 and 2007 vintages.  These
differences are aimed at better capturing the specific
characteristics of loans from the 2005 vintage that were
originated in an environment of relatively tighter underwriting
standards and also benefited from some initial home price
appreciation.

Moody's has revised the lifetime expected loss on this
transaction.  Loss estimates are subject to variability and are
sensitive to assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could
ultimately turn out higher or lower than Moody's current
expectations.  Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data
as it becomes available and will assess the pattern of potential
future defaults and adjust loss expectations accordingly as
necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8/ Group 1 2 3 4
5 6

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 8% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. 4-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. 4-A-2-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8/ Group 7A 7B

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 13% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. 7-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. 7-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Feb 4, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:

  i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
     performance information available for the asset class as well
     as for the transaction sponsor,

ii) collateral analysis,

iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
     interests of the key parties to the transaction, most notably
     the originator and the servicer,

iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
     cashflow and capital structure,

  v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
     structure, and

vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
     similar transactions.


DAIMLERCHRYSLER AUTO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B notes issued from DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust's series 2006-A,
2006-C, and 2006-D transactions and affirmed its ratings on five
classes issued from series 2005-B, 2006-A, 2006-C, and 2006-D.  At
the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings on 16
classes issued from Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust's
series 2007-A, 2008-A, and 2008-B transactions, and removed the
ratings on the class A-4, B, and C notes issued from series 2007-A
and 2008-A from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed May 5, 2009.

The upgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's view that the total
credit enhancement available is adequate for each of the raised or
affirmed ratings when S&P factors in the remaining expected net
losses.  The collateral performance for each of the Chrysler
Financial-related securitizations, beginning with series 2005-B,
has been slightly worse than S&P's initial and/or revised
expectations, with each subsequently issued series performing
worse than its predecessor.  The series 2007-A, 2008-A, and 2008-B
transactions, however, have performed substantially worse than
S&P's initial expectations.  In May 2009, S&P revised its loss
expectations for the series 2007-A and 2008-A transactions to
6.75%-7.25% when S&P placed the class A-4, B, and C notes on
CreditWatch negative.  This compares with 6.50%-6.70% in November
2008 and 2.25%-2.75% and 2.50%-3.00%, respectively, when S&P
initially rated these transactions.

                             Table 1

                      Collateral Performance
          As Of The September 2009 Distribution Month (%)

                                                    Prior      Current
                              Cumulative Initial    revised    revised
               Pool   Current recovery   lifetime   lifetime   lifetime
  Series  Mo.  factor CNL     rate       CNL exp.   CNL exp.   CNL exp.
  ------  ---  ------ ------- ---------- --------   --------   --------
  2005-B  52   3.92   2.02    46.87      2.10-2.30  1.80-2.00  2.05-2.15
  2006-A  42   9.64   2.13    44.62      2.10-2.30  1.80-2.20  2.25-2.45
  2006-C  35   18.85  2.23    43.89      1.80-2.10  1.75-2.25  2.65-2.85
  2006-D  33   22.59  2.62    43.18      1.80-2.10  1.75-2.25  3.00-3.50
  2007-A  22   50.42  3.96    40.34      2.25-2.75  6.75-7.25  6.75-7.25
  2008-A  19   52.95  3.42    38.96      2.50-3.00  6.75-7.25  6.75-7.25
  2008-B  16   59.75  2.78    40.26      2.75-3.15  7.00-7.50  6.75-7.25

                    CNL - Cumulative net loss.

In addition S&P revised its loss expectations for the series 2008-
B transaction to 6.75%-7.25%, down from 7.00%-7.50% in January
2009, when S&P lowered the ratings on the class A-4, B, and C
notes, and from 2.75%-3.25% when S&P initially rated the
transaction.  The decrease in S&P's revised cumulative net losses
for the series 2008-B transaction since January 2009 is based on
S&P's view that the rate at which losses are increasing has begun
to slow down to loss levels that, in S&P's view, are in line with
the series 2007-A and 2008-A transactions' loss performance.

All of the aforementioned transactions have a sequential principal
payment structure, which pays principal to the senior-most classes
of notes in full before the other senior and subordinate classes
receive principal and will remain in place even if a monetary or
nonmonetary event of default and/or liquidation of collateral
occurs.  The issuer initially structured each transaction with
credit enhancement that consisted of subordination for the higher-
rated tranches, a reserve account, overcollateralization, and
yield supplement overcollateralization, which is used to cover
interest on lower-yielding loans.

The issuer also structured each transaction with a non-amortizing
reserve account, which was initially funded with 0.25%-0.92% of
the initial adjusted pool balance (the initial collateral balance
minus the yield supplement overcollateralization amount [the
percentage varies between transactions]).  On Nov. 26, 2008, the
transaction documents were amended for the series 2007-A and 2008-
A transactions to increase the specified reserve account amount.
As a result, the series 2007-A transaction's specified reserve
amount is equal to the reserve account initial deposit plus
$50 million and the series 2008-A transaction's specified reserve
amount is equal to the reserve account initial deposit plus
$30 million.

S&P's analysis of these transactions incorporated cash flows,
which took into account current and historical performance to
estimate the future performance.  S&P's various cash flow
scenarios and sensitivity analyses included assumptions on
recoveries, loss timing, and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds
that are appropriate given each transaction's current performance,
as well as S&P's view of future loss timing, recovery rates, and
voluntary prepayments.  The results demonstrated that the
transactions had adequate remaining loss coverage at their
respective rating levels for all of the classes that S&P reviewed.
The results also showed that the class B notes from the series
2006-B, 2006-C, and 2006-D transactions had adequate remaining
loss coverage at the revised rating levels.

Despite the increase in S&P's loss expectations since deal
inception, S&P have raised and affirmed its ratings on the
transactions as a result of the growth in credit support as a
percent of the amortizing pool balance.  In S&P's view, the
classes whose ratings S&P are affirming are currently able to
withstand stress scenarios at their current and revised rating
levels.  In addition, the high seasoning and relatively low pool
factors for the transactions whose ratings S&P are raising lead us
to believe that they are relatively far along in their loss timing
curve.  This factor, coupled with the increase in credit support
as a percent of the amortizing pool balance, has enabled the
transactions to exceed the requisite loss coverage multiple at the
previous rating levels.

                             Table 2
       Hard Credit Support As A % Of The Total Pool Balance

                                               Current
                            Total hard         total hard
                 Pool       credit support     credit support
Series   Class  factor(%)  at issuance(i)     (% of current)(i)
------   -----  ---------  --------------     -----------------
2005-B   B      3.92       1.87               42.45
2006-A   A-4    9.64       4.45               45.76
2006-A   B      9.64       1.68               17.02
2006-C   A-4    18.85      4.61               22.10
2006-C   B      18.85      1.84               7.44
2006-D   A-3    22.59      17.38              74.95
2006-D   A-4    22.59      4.66               18.64
2006-D   B      22.59      1.86               6.27
2007-A   A-2    50.42      43.85              92.55
2007-A   A-3    50.42      26.45              58.03
2007-A   A-4    50.42      7.18               19.81
2007-A   B      50.42      2.59               10.71
2007-A   C      50.42      0.89               7.35
2008-A   A-2    52.95      50.40              102.05
2008-A   A-3    52.95      20.50              45.57
2008-A   A-4    52.95      8.26               22.46
2008-A   B      52.95      2.92               12.37
2008-A   C      52.92      0.73               8.24
2008-B   A-2    59.75      39.67              69.51
2008-B   A-3    59.75      20.05              36.67
2008-B   A-4    59.75      9.58               19.14
2008-B   B      59.75      3.86               9.58
2008-B   C      59.75      1.00               4.79

(i) The current total hard credit support consists of a reserve
    account, overcollateralization, and, for the higher-rated
    tranches, subordination.  It excludes excess spread and yield
    supplement overcollateralization, which also provide
    additional enhancement (as of the September 2009 distribution
    period).

Earlier this year, GMAC LLC announced that it was given a four-
year agreement to provide incentivized retail financing with
limited exclusivity as the preferred provider of new wholesale
financing for Chrysler dealer inventory.  As a result, S&P will
continue to monitor new developments surrounding the future of
servicing operations at Chrysler Financial and assess the effect
on collateral performance.

S&P will continue to monitor the performance of each transaction
to assess whether the credit enhancement remains sufficient under
S&P's stress scenarios for each of the rated classes.

                          Ratings Raised

                    DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust

                                          Rating
                                          ------
            Series         Class       To         From
            ------         -----       --         ----
            2006-A         B           AAA        AA-
            2006-C         B           AA         A
            2006-D         B           AA-        A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust


                                      Rating
                                      ------
        Series         Class       To         From
        ------         -----       --         ----
        2007-A         A-4         AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
        2007-A         B           A          A/Watch Neg
        2007-A         C           BBB        BBB/Watch Neg
        2008-A         A-4         AAA        AAA/Watch Neg
        2008-A         B           A          A/Watch Neg
        2008-A         C           BBB        BBB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

           Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust

                 Series         Class       Rating
                 ------         -----       ------
                 2007-A         A-2a        AAA
                 2007-A         A-2b        AAA
                 2007-A         A-3a        AAA
                 2007-A         A-3b        AAA
                 2008-A         A-2a        AAA
                 2008-A         A-2b        AAA
                 2008-A         A-3a        AAA
                 2008-A         A-3b        AAA
                 2008-B         A-2a        AAA
                 2008-B         A-2b        AAA
                 2008-B         A-3a        AAA
                 2008-B         A-3b        AAA
                 2008-B         A-4a        AA
                 2008-B         A-4b        AA
                 2008-B         B           BBB
                 2008-B         C           BB-

                    DaimlerChrysler Auto Trust

                 Series         Class       Rating
                 ------         -----       ------
                 2005-B         B           AAA
                 2006-A         A-4         AAA
                 2006-C         A-4         AAA
                 2006-D         A-3         AAA
                 2006-D         A-4         AAA


DEUTSCHEMORTGAGE SECURITIES: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of certificates from DeutscheMortgage Securities Inc.
Mortgage Loan Resecuritization Trust Series 2009-RS2.  S&P
initially rated the certificates for loan groups II, III, and IV
out of the four-group structure within the DMSI 2009-RS2 re-REMIC
(resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit).  S&P
lowered the ratings on classes II-A-2 and III-A-2 to 'CCC' from
'B'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on 24 other
rated classes.

S&P's downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
Although this performance deterioration is severe, because classes
II-A-2 and III-A-2 provide credit enhancement to other classes
within group II and III, S&P affirmed the ratings on these other
classes.  In addition, S&P's affirmations with respect to group IV
reflect the performance of the loans and available credit
enhancements for the group IV underlying certificate.

DMSI 2009-RS2, which closed in May 2009, is a residential
mortgage-backed securities re-REMIC transaction collateralized by
four underlying classes that support four independent groups
within the re-REMIC.  On the closing date, S&P only rated the
certificates for loan groups II, III, and IV within DMSI 2009-RS2.
For groups II, III, and IV, the loans securing the three
underlying classes, which are from three different trusts, consist
predominantly of fixed-rate prime mortgage loans and fixed-rate
and adjustable-rate subprime mortgage loans.

All of the group II classes from DMSI 2009-RS2 are supported by
class A-1 from RFMSI Series 2006-S11 Trust (currently rated
'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing this trust has
declined precipitously in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 0.77% as of the August 2009 distribution and
currently has approximately 10.74% in delinquent loans.  Based on
the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.694 (69.4%),
which represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of
the original balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's
current projected loss for this pool is 4.34%, which exceeds the
level of credit enhancement available to cover losses to the II-A-
2 class of the re-REMIC.

All of the group III classes from DMSI 2009-RS2 are supported by
class 1-A-2 from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-18
(currently rated 'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing
this trust has declined precipitously in recent months.  This pool
had experienced losses of 0.36% as of the August 2009 distribution
and currently has approximately 13.58% in delinquent loans.  Based
on the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.738 (73.8%),
and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss
for this pool is 6.0%, which exceeds the level of credit
enhancement available to cover losses to class III-A-2 of the re-
REMIC.

All of the group IV classes from DMSI 2009-RS2 are supported by
class 2-A-1 from Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1
(currently rated 'AAA').  This pool had experienced losses of
7.08% as of the August 2009 distribution and currently has
approximately 34.9% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to
date, the current pool factor of 0.761 (76.1%), and the pipeline
of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is
29.1%.  The group IV affirmations are based on the available
credit enhancement for class 2-A-1 from Newcastle Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-1.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently its projected losses, to reflect the
continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the housing
market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS has
continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                          Ratings Lowered

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Resecuritization
                       Trust Series 2009-RS2

                                 Rating
                                 ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-A-2     25158EAE6     CCC                  B
        III-A-2    25158EAR7     CCC                  B

                          Ratings Affirmed

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Resecuritization
                       Trust Series 2009-RS2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  II-A-1     25158EAD8     AAA
                  II-A-3     25158EAF3     AAA
                  II-A-4     25158EAG1     AAA
                  II-A-5     25158EAH9     AAA
                  II-A-6     25158EAJ5     AAA
                  II-A-7     25158EAK2     AAA
                  II-A-8     25158EAL0     AAA
                  II-A-9     25158EAM8     AAA
                  II-A-10    25158EAN6     AAA
                  III-A-1    25158EAQ9     AAA
                  III-A-3    25158EAS5     AAA
                  III-A-4    25158EAT3     AAA
                  III-A-5    25158EAU0     AAA
                  III-A-6    25158EAV8     AAA
                  III-A-7    25158EAW6     AAA
                  III-A-8    25158EAX4     AAA
                  III-A-9    25158EAY2     AAA
                  III-A-10   25158EAZ9     AAA
                  IV-A-1     25158EBB1     AAA
                  IV-A-2     25158EBC9     AAA
                  IV-A-3     25158EBD7     AAA
                  IV-A-4     25158EBE5     AAA
                  IV-A-5     25158EBF2     AAA
                  IV-A-6     25158EBG0     AAA


DOWLING COLLEGE: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Rating on Two Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed the B1 rating on Dowling College's (NY)
Series 1996 and 2002 bonds and removed the rating from Watchlist
for possible downgrade.  The rating applies to $15.7 million of
rated debt, the Series 2002 bonds which were issued through the
Town of Brookhaven Industrial Development Agency and the Series
1996 bonds which were issued through the Suffolk County Industrial
Development Agency.  The rating outlook remains negative
reflecting near-term concerns about the College's thin
unrestricted liquidity, challenging student market position with
multiple years of pressure on enrollment, and dependence for
seasonal cash flow purposes on a $2 million operating line of
credit which matures in October 2009.

Legal Security:

The Series 1996 and 2002 bonds are general obligations of the
College and feature debt service reserve funds.  The Series 2002
bonds are further secured by a first leasehold mortgage and
security interest in the financed facility, a residence hall on
the Shirley (Brookhaven) campus.

The College's $38.5 million of Series 2006 bonds (not rated by
Moody's) are a general obligation of the College and also have a
debt service reserve fund.  They are secured by a first mortgage
lien and security interest in the College's Oakdale and Shirley
campuses and property, excluding the residential facility financed
with the Series 2002 bonds.  The Series 2006 bonds have a
subordinate mortgage lien and security interest in the Series 2002
facility.

Per the Series 2006 Sublease between the College and the issuing
authority, under certain circumstances (defined as Triggering
Events in the Sublease), the College's Gross Revenues, excluding
2002 Facility Revenues pledged to the Series 2002 Trustee to
secure the principal amount of the Series 2002 Bonds, would be
directed to the Series 2006 trustee.  Debt service on the Series
2006 bonds would first be paid from Gross Revenues, before other
operating costs of the College.  In Moody's opinion, the Series
1996 and 2002 bonds have a weaker legal security than the Series
2006 bonds.  Triggering Events include breach of a financial
covenant to maintain $4 million of unrestricted liquid funds
(excluding debt service reserve funds) tested every 3/31 and 9/30.
As of 3/31/09, Dowling's management reported that it met this
financial covenant with $6.7 million of unrestricted liquidity,
and management anticipates meeting the covenant when tested again
as of 9/30/09.

Debt-Related Rate Derivatives: None

                            Challenges

Very thin liquidity and reliance on $2 million operating line for
seasonal cash flow.  The College's levels of total cash and
investments are modest relative to a large amount of outstanding
debt ($66.7 million in FY 2008) and a large expense base
($73.5 million of expenses in FY 2008).  Based on unaudited data
provided by management, Moody's estimate that the College
currently has approximately $16 million of cash and investments
(excluding debt service reserve funds), although this is a high
point for the College's liquidity levels due to the receipt of
fall semester tuition revenue.  During this past summer, the
College fully drew on its $2 million operating line of credit
(which has since been repaid) and also used approximately
$5.5 million of its longer-term investment pool to cover expenses.
The operating line of credit is provided by TD Bank and expires at
the end of October 2009.  Moody's will continue to closely monitor
the College's liquidity levels and ability to either extend the
line of credit or add a new operating line of credit.

Challenging student market position, as evidenced by past
enrollment declines and weak freshmen selectivity and
matriculation levels.  In fall 2008, Dowling enrolled a combined
4,376 full-time equivalent (FTE) students at its two campuses on
the southern shore of Long Island, NY (compared to 4,798 FTE in
fall 2005).  In fall 2008, Dowling accepted 79% of freshmen
applicants and 23% of those accepted chose to enroll, highlighting
a significant amount of competition from both other local private
and public universities.  Management reports that fall 2009 total
credit hours are expected to decline by approximately 2 to 3%,
compared to fall 2008, a decline which was assumed in the FY 2010
operating budget.  Although fall 2009 undergraduate demand appears
healthy (535 entering freshmen, compared to an average of 483
during fall 2004-2008), the College is experiencing increased
pressure on enrollment in graduate and continuing education
programs.

Pressured operating performance (5.4% operating deficit in FY 2007
and 1.7% deficit, by Moody's calculation, in FY 2008) as the
College continues to work through past enrollment declines,
including a notable drop off in the size of the fall 2006 entering
freshmen class.  Based on discussions with management, Moody's
believes that the College generated another operating deficit in
FY 2009, with a roughly $3 million decline in unrestricted net
assets estimated for FY 2009.  However, this operating deficit
does include depreciation as an operating expense (approximately
$3.8 million), and Moody's expect that cash flow was positive
during FY 2009.  The estimated FY 2009 results are worse than
Moody's had anticipated in spring 2009, largely attributable to
increased health insurance costs and lower summer tuition revenue
during May and June 2009.  The College recently hired a new chief
financial officer, with a targeted focus on expense containment
($1.6 million of expense cuts made in the past month).  Moody's
will continue to monitor Dowling's ability to stay close to budget
targets throughout FY 2010.

Heavy reliance on student charges (92% of FY 2008 revenue base).
Stable to growing enrollment is essential to the College's credit
profile, as even a slight unexpected decline in enrollment levels,
due to either deterioration of recruitment or retention, could
result in significant operating pressure.

                            Strengths

Although the College's net tuition revenue declined 2.3% in FY
2007 due to overall enrollment declines in fall 2006, net tuition
revenue increased 4.3% in FY 2008.  Further, net tuition on a per
student basis has grown in each of the past five years with
$13,867 of net tuition per student in FY 2008.  Based on unaudited
financial data, Moody's believe that net tuition revenue (net of
institutional aid) increased approximately $2.8 million in FY 2009
over FY 2008.  Management reports that the current projection for
FY 2010 net tuition revenue is lower than the FY 2010 budgeted
amount by roughly $600,000, although the College's institutional
financial aid disbursements are tracking very close to budget
despite a sizeable tuition increase implemented in fall 2009
(12.5% increase in total undergraduate tuition and fees).

No near-term capital or borrowing plans, except for the possible
addition of a new operating line of credit when the existing line
expires at the end of October 2009.

The Series 1996 and 2002 bonds, which are rated by Moody's,
benefit from debt service reserve funds, which are on deposit with
the bond trustees and invested primarily in U.S. government
securities.

                              Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's longer-term concerns about
the College's market position, in light of trend of declining
enrollment and heavy reliance on net tuition revenue, coupled with
thin liquidity.

                What Could Change the Rating -- UP

Significant growth of financial resources coupled with
strengthening of operating performance and stabilization of
enrollment

               What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN

Additional borrowing; declining liquidity; further enrollment
declines and resulting pressure on operating performance;
weakening of operating cash flow and inadequate annual debt
service coverage

Key Indicators (FY 2008 audited financial data and fall 2008
enrollment data unless otherwise noted):

* Total Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment: 4,376 FTE students

* Total cash and investments (including $4.5 million of debt
  service reserve funds): $12.7 million

* Direct Debt: $66.7 million

* FY 2008 Operating Margin: -1.7%

* FY 2008 Operating Cash Flow Margin: 7.6%

* FY 2008 Annual Debt Service Coverage: 1.1 times

* Reliance on Student Charges: 91.7%

Rated Debt:

* Series 1996 and 2002: B1 rating

The last rating action was on June 3, 2009, when Dowling College's
rating was maintained on Watchlist for possible downgrade.


DUKE FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of notes issued by Duke
Funding X CDO, Ltd./Corp.  In Fitch's opinion, default of the
class A1, A2, A3, B1, and B2 notes is inevitable at or prior to
their maturity.  The details of the rating action follow at the
end of this press release.

The rating actions reflect the continued deterioration in the
quality of the portfolio since Duke X was last reviewed.
According to the July 6, 2009 trustee report, approximately 79.8%
of the portfolio is considered defaulted and all of the
overcollateralization tests are failing by a significant margin.
Currently, excess spread after the class A2 interest distribution
and all principal proceeds are being used to redeem the
outstanding swap counterparty amount due to the failing class A2
OC test.  However, based on the degree of undercollateralization
in the transaction and Fitch's recovery expectations on the
defaulted portion of the portfolio, the class A1 notes are not
expected to receive any principal repayment in the future.

The class A1 and A2 notes are likely to continue receiving
interest distributions, while the class A3, B1, and B2 notes are
not expected to receive any interest or principal distributions
going forward.

Duke X is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
April 12, 2006 and is managed by Duke Funding Management, LLC.
The portfolio is comprised of 58.2% subprime residential mortgage-
backed securities and 41.8% prime RMBS.

Duke Funding X CDO, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $72,000,000 class A1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $105,000,000 class A2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $83,452,014 class A3 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $19,884,662 class B1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $20,775,100 class B2 notes affirmed at 'C'.


FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
tranches issued in three First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust
transactions due to higher expected pool losses in relation to
available credit enhancement.  The collateral backing these
securities consists primarily of closed-end second lien
residential mortgage loans.

Each of the downgraded transactions relies on support provided by
pool insurance policies provided by Amerin Guaranty Corporation or
Radian Insurance Inc. Moody's observed that for these
transactions, losses associated with certain loans were not
covered by these policies.  Over the last 12 months, the
proportion of pool losses not covered by the mortgage insurance
policies has been as much as 50% of insured loans.  As a result,
Moody's substantially reduced the expected future benefit of the
mortgage insurance and in turn, anticipates higher pool losses.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

CDR -- There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The
first approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.  For
these transactions Moody's assumes that the CDR will decline by
25% for year 2, 50% for year 3, 75% for year 4, remaining constant
thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFA

  -- Expected Cumulative Losses: 0.10% (as a percentage of the
     original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on Oct 10, 2006
     Upgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Apr 16, 2003
     Assigned B2

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFB

  -- Expected Cumulative Losses: 1.4% (as a percentage of the
     original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Apr 20, 2007
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 20, 2007
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FFC

  -- Expected Cumulative Losses: 1.7% (as a percentage of the
     original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to B2


FIRST HORIZON : Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2004-HE4 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued in First Horizon ABS Trust 2004-HE4 transaction
due to higher expected pool losses in relation to available credit
enhancement.  The collateral backing these securities consists
primarily of closed-end second lien residential mortgage loans.

The primary driver of the downgrades is the increase in delinquent
loans over the last 10 months and in turn, the pool expected loss.
Currently 3.4% of the pool is 60 or more days past due.

The current rating on the security is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

CDR -- There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The
first approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.  For
this transaction Moody's assumes that the CDR will decline by 25%
for year 2, 50% for year 3, remaining constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: First Horizon ABS Trust 2004-HE4

  -- Expected Cumulative Losses: 3.2% (as a percentage of the
     original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Dec 22, 2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)


FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Rates Class D 2008-2 Notes at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates First National Master Note Trust Restructured
series 2008-2 variable funding notes:

  -- $40,584,000 LIBOR class C (2008-2) 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22,727,000 LIBOR class D (2008-2) 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying receivables
pool, the available credit enhancement, and the legal and cash
flow structure.

The notes are issued by First National Master Note Trust, a
Delaware statutory trust, and are secured by a beneficial interest
in a pool of receivables originated under First National Bank of
Omaha's VISA and MasterCard revolving credit card program.  Fitch
deems the underlying receivable pool to be of satisfactory quality
given its favorable FICO distribution, account seasoning and
overall performance to date.

Credit enhancement for the class C notes includes the
subordination of the class D notes and the spread account.  Credit
enhancement for the class D notes is the subordination of the
spread account, which will be funded with a 1% initial deposit on
the closing date.

Fitch also considers other features embedded in the transaction
for the ratings, such as 'fixed allocation of finance charge
collections' and other amortization triggers.


FORD CREDIT: S&P Assigns Ratings on $2.227 Bil. Asset-Backed Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Ford
Credit Auto Owner Trust 2009-D's $2.227 billion asset-backed
notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion of:

* The availability of approximately 19.2%, 16.0%, 13.9%, and 11.3%
  credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively,
  based on stressed break-even cash flow scenarios.  These credit
  support levels provide more than 5x, 4x, 3x, and 2x S&P's 2.95%-
  3.25% expected net loss range to the class A, B, C, and D notes,
  respectively;

* The transaction's ability to withstand more than 1.5x S&P's
  expected net loss level in S&P's "what-if" scenario analysis
  before the notes become vulnerable to a negative CreditWatch
  action and/or a potential downgrade;

* The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
  cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the rating
  categories;

* The characteristics of the pool being securitized;

* Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC's extensive securitization
  performance history, going back to 1989; and

* The transaction's legal structure.

                         Ratings Assigned

                Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust 2009-D

                              Interest      Amount      Expected legal
  Class   Rating   Type     rate          (mil. $)*   final maturity date
  -----   ------   ----     --------      ---------   -------------------
  A-1     A-1+     Senior   Fixed          640.00     September 2010
  A-2     AAA      Senior   Fixed          409.00     January 2012
  A-3     AAA      Senior   Fixed          805.00     October 2013
  A-4     AAA      Senior   Fixed          219.80     August 2014
  B       AA       Sub      Fixed           65.50     December 2014
  C       A        Sub      Fixed           43.70     May 2015
  D       BB+      Sub      Fixed           43.70     February 2016

                         Sub - Subordinate.


FOREST CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Forest Creek CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$88,800,000 Class A-1L-B Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015
     (current balance of $74,811,216), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on May 21, 2003 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$16,200,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015
     (current balance of $18,866,036), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015
     (current balance of $7,565,005), Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class I Combination Securities Due April 2015
     (rated balance of $5,294,423), Downgraded to Ba3; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,500,000 Class II Combination Securities Due April 2015
     (rated balance of $4,742,278), Downgraded to B1; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-4L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2015,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of certain overcollateralization tests.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2818 versus a test level of 2350 as
of the last trustee report, dated July 31, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $22 million, accounting for roughly 7.7% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 15.4% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class B-1L
Overcollateralization Ratio was reported at 97.59% versus a test
level of 103%, and the Class B-2L Overcollateralization Ratio was
reported at 94.83% versus a test level of 102.5%.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class B-2L Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B-1L
overcollateralization test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Forest Creek CLO Ltd., issued in May 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FOUNDERS GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Founders Grove CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1 Revolving Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on April 26, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$170,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on April 26, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$20,100,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$27,300,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2018 (current balance of $26,180,721), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$6,600,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class D Par Value Test I.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2838 versus a test level of 2803 as
of the last trustee report, dated August 20, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $7.9 million, accounting for roughly 2.8% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 10.0% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D Par
Value Test I was reported at 100.14% versus a test level of
101.60%.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Founders Grove CLO, Ltd., issued in 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GALLATIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gallatin CLO III 2007-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$253,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 8, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 8, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$33,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2842 versus a test
level of 2650 as of the last trustee report, dated August 13,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $28.3 million, accounting for
roughly 6.9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 14.1% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gallatin CLO III 2007-1 Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GANNETT PEAK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gannett Peak CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$369,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on October 5, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Revolving Floating
     Rate Notes, Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on
     October 5, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$41,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2020, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$33,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2020, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes, Due 2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes, Due 2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Type I Composite Obligations, Due 2020 (current
     rated balance of US$11.8 mil), Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 A3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$2,500,000 Type II Composite Obligations, Due 2020 (current
     rated balance of US$2 mil), Downgraded to B3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Reinvestment Diversion Threshold.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 3034 versus a test level of
2870 as of the last trustee report, dated as of August 1, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $19.4 million, accounting for roughly
3.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
by Moody's and CCC+ or lower by S&P make up approximately 18.2% of
the underlying portfolio.  The Reinvestment Diversion Threshold is
reported at 102.004% versus a test level of 103.65%.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gannett Peak CLO I, Ltd., issued in October of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Puts Ratings on Four 2000-1 Certs. on Neg. Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 4 classes of GE Capital Commercial
Mortgage Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2000-1 on Rating Watch Negative and revised the Outlook on
one class as indicated below.

The Rating Watch Negative placements and Negative Outlook are due
to the transfer to special servicing of the second largest loan
(5.3%) on Sept. 15, 2009, for imminent default.

The specially serviced loan is collateralized by the Embassy
Suites-New Orleans, which is secured by a 372-room hotel located
in New Orleans, LA.  The hotel sustained damage from Hurricane
Katrina that has been repaired; however, cash flow and performance
have never fully recovered.  The servicer reported year-end 2008
debt service coverage ratio was 0.69x and revenue per available
room dropped to $85 as of June 2009 from the pre-Katrina level of
$106.  The loan is scheduled to mature in May 2010.  Once more
information is known including valuations and workout strategies,
Fitch will revisit the ratings.

The Rating Watch Negative placements are based on loss estimates
derived from Fitch's historical cumulative loss average for hotel
loans, which is more conservative than the value derived from the
most recent net operating income at an 11% capitalization rate.
Downgrades are likely if losses are expected or a modification or
appraisal reduction is expected to cause sustained interest
shortfalls.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $8.8 million class D 'AAA';
  -- $23 million class E 'AA-';
  -- $8.8 million class F 'A-';
  -- $23.9 million class G 'BB-'.

In addition, Fitch revises the Rating Outlook on this class:

  -- $31.8 million class C 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from Stable.


GRANITE VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Granite Ventures II Ltd.:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Subordinate
     Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Subordinate
     Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's mild amount of credit
deterioration.  Based on the latest trustee report dated August 5,
2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2371, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about $4 million,
accounting for roughly 1.2% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 8.1% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Class D overcollateralization test is
reported at 102.34% versus a test level of 102.40%.  Moody's also
assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt
obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.

Granite Ventures II Ltd., issued in December of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GRANITE VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Granite Ventures I Ltd.:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Subordinate
     Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Senior Notes
     Due 2015, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Subordinate
     Notes Due 2015, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and the reported failure of the Class C and Class D
overcollateralization tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2521 versus a test level of 2250 as of the last trustee report,
dated August 13, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about $9 million,
accounting for roughly 3% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11% of the
underlying portfolio.  The Class C overcollateralization ratio was
reported at 103.73% versus a test level of 104.4%, and the Class D
overcollateralization ratio was reported at 100.38% versus a test
level of 101.9%.  Moody's notes, however, that as a result of
distributions made on the August 24, 2009 payment date, the Class
C overcollateralization test came into compliance and the Class D
overcollateralization ratio improved.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations
of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research (see Moody's Special Comment titled "Strong Loan Issuance
in Recent Years Signals Low Recovery Prospects for Loans and Bonds
of Defaulted U.S.  Corporate Issuers," dated June 2008).  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Granite Ventures I Ltd., issued in April of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GRENADIER FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of notes issued by
Grenadier Funding, Ltd.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration experienced since Fitch's last rating action.
Approximately 42.2% of the portfolio carries a Fitch-derived
rating below investment grade, with 26.3% rated in the 'CCC'
category or lower.  This is up from 9.8% rated below investment
grade and 7.3% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.

Since the last review, the class A-1 overcollateralization test
has dropped to 76.9% and is failing the covenant of 104.5%.
Consequently, after paying interest to class A-2 all funds are
being used to pay down the $1,077,686,108 funding notes.  The
commercial paper notes were paid in full through the issuance of
the funding notes, which Fitch does not rate.

As of the July 31, 2009 trustee report, 16.9% of the portfolio is
considered defaulted.  Fitch has downgraded the class A-1 and
class A-2 to 'C' due to the exposure to defaulted assets.  Default
of these classes is inevitable.  The class A-1 and A-2 notes
continue to receive interest payments, but Fitch does not expect
any principal recovery.  The class B notes are receiving interest
paid in kind whereby the principal amount of the notes is written
up by the amount of interest due.  The class B notes remain at
'C'.  Fitch does not expect this class to receive any future
payments.

Grenadier is a collateralized debt obligation that closed July 21,
2003 and was managed by ACA Management LLC until May 2008, when
management duties were transferred to Solidus Capital, LLC.  The
reinvestment period ended in August 2008.  The reference portfolio
is composed of 45.8% subprime residential mortgage backed
securities, 22.2% prime RMBS, 14.0% CDOs, 13.2% asset backed
securities, and 0.2% commercial mortgage backed securities.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $60,000,000 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $15,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $86,142,317 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-GG6 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings, as applicable,
to 16 classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, series 2006-GG6.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations on specially
serviced loans as well as Fitch's prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
foresees potential losses could reach as high as 9.3% for this
transaction should market conditions not recover.  The rating
actions are based on losses of 8.1%, including 100% of the term
losses and 25% of the losses anticipated to occur at maturity; the
8.1% recognizes all of the losses anticipated in the next five
years.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 63.2% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 35.1% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 13.1% in 2010, 14.9% in 2011, 4.4% in 2012, 2.3% in 2013
and 0.5% in 2014.  All losses associated with these loans are
fully recognized in the rating actions.

Fitch identified 27 Loans of Concern (14.9%) within the pool, 11
of which (8.5%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, two (3.1%) are current.  One (2.1%) of the specially
serviced loans is within the transaction's top 15 loans (46.0%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Two of the loans (4.0%) within the top 15 are expected to default
during the term, one of which is estimated to experience a loss
severity of 34.8%.  The largest contributors to loss across the
transaction are the Showplace Portfolio (2.1%) and the Northlake
Mall loan (5.6%).

The Showplace Portfolio loan is collateralized by a 699,475 square
foot mixed use development comprised primarily of showroom space
(73%) and exhibition space (11%) with the remainder of the space
divided between office and retail.  The property is located in
Highpoint, N.C., within the International Home Furnishing Market.
The loan is currently being specially serviced and is 60 days
delinquent.  Occupancy is down to approximately 70% as compared to
99.8% at issuance.  The most recent debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the property is 1.04 times as of year-end 2008.  The
sponsor for the loan is an affiliate of Walton Street Capital.
Based on current performance and anticipated declines, losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity in November 2010.

Northlake Mall is a regional mall located in Charlotte, North
Carolina.  Built in 2005, the property is anchored by Dillard's,
Belk, and Macy's.  Other large tenants include Dick's Sporting
Goods, Border's Books and Music Cafe and AMC Theaters.  As of June
2009, occupancy was approximately 93% and the YE 2008 DSCR, based
upon servicer reported net operating income, improved to 1.66x as
compared to 1.59x at issuance.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, assigned
Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $292.6 million class A-J to 'BBB-/LS-4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.5 million class B to 'BBB-/LS-5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $48.8 million class C to 'BB/LS-5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $39 million class D to 'BB/LS-5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $29.3 million class E to 'B/LS-5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $43.9 million class F to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $39 million class G to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $39 million class H to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $43.9 million class J to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $43.9 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.4 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14.6 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $19.5 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $4.9 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $9.8 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $14.6 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed, maintained the Rating Outlooks
and assigned LS ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $45.0 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.05 billion class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $75.6 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $187.8 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $309.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $390.1 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-C at 'AAA';
  -- Interest only class X-P at 'AAA'.

The $53.6 million class S is not rated by Fitch.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-GG4 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II's series 2005-GG4 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on 10 additional classes and removed one of the affirmed
ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially serviced
loans.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.57x and a loan-to-value ratio of 96.7%.  S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV of 129.4%.
The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario
were 66.4% and 33.7%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV
calculations noted above exclude two (2.2%) of the five specially
serviced assets.  S&P separately estimated losses for these loans,
which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Five assets ($163.6 million, 4.3%) in the pool, including the
seventh-largest exposure (discussed in more detail below), are
with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  One ($6.0 million,
0.2%) of the five specially serviced assets was transferred to the
special servicer after the August 2009 remittance report.  Two
($85.9 million, 2.2%) of the specially serviced loans are more
than 90 days delinquent, two ($71.7 million, 1.9%) are in their
grace period, and one ($6.0 million, 0.2%) is current.  There is a
$1.3 million appraisal reduction amount in effect against one of
the specially serviced assets.  The largest specially serviced
asset accounts for 2.1% of the trust balance, while the remaining
specially serviced assets each account for less than 1.0% of the
total trust balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 187 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$3.85 billion, compared with 189 loans with an aggregate trust
balance of $4.00 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Capmark Finance Inc. The master servicer provided
financial information for 94.8% of the pool, and 96.3% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.59x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.57x and 96.7%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude the two specially serviced loans ($85.9 million, 2.2%) for
which S&P estimated a loss.  A servicer-reported DSC figure was
available for one ($5.2 million, 0.1%) of these two loans.  The
loan's DSC was 0.84x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2008.  To
date, the transaction has experienced realized losses in the
amount of $454,305 on one asset.  The master servicer reported a
watchlist of 29 loans ($819.2 million, 21.3%), including four of
the top 10 exposures (discussed in more detail below), as well as
one loan ($6.0 million, 0.2%) that was transferred to the special
servicer after the August 2009 remittance report.  Eight loans
($252.5 million, 6.6%) in the pool have reported DSC between 1.10x
and 1.00x, and nine loans ($130.1 million, 3.4%) have reported DSC
of less than 1.00x.

                 Summary Of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.2 billion (29.9%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.61x for the top 10 assets.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.61x and
99.4%, respectively.  These calculations exclude the Astor Crowne
Plaza loan, which is a top 10 asset currently with the special
servicer.  Four ($425.9 million, 11.1%) of the top 10 assets
appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  These four assets and
the Astor Crowne Plaza loan are discussed below.

The Astor Crowne Plaza loan, the seventh-largest loan in the pool,
is with the special servicer.  The asset has a balance of
$80.7 million (2.1%) and is secured by a 707-room hotel in New
Orleans.  The asset is more than 90 days delinquent.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in May 2009.  The borrower has
requested debt service relief.  The special servicer is in
discussions with the borrower regarding possible options to
resolve the default and negotiate a possible forbearance.  In the
event that an agreement can't be reached, LNR will pursue
foreclosure.  At this time, Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The third- and 10th-largest loans in the pool appear on the master
servicer's watchlist due to General Growth Properties' bankruptcy
filing.  The Streets at Southpoint loan, the third-largest loan in
the trust, has a balance of $159.0 million (4.1%) and is secured
by a 583,696-sq.-ft. regional mall in Durham, N. C. The loan
reported DSC of 2.04x at year-end 2008 and was reported as being
in its grace period on the August 2009 remittance report.  The
Kings' Shops loan, the 10th-largest asset in the trust, has a
trust balance of $72.0 million (1.9%) and is secured by a 73,522-
sq.-ft. shopping center in Waikoloa, Hawaii.  The asset reported
DSC of 1.23x at year-end 2008 and was reported as being current on
the August 2009 remittance report.  S&P will continue to monitor
the developments relating to these loans and will take rating
actions on this transaction as necessary.

The Lantana Campus loan, the fourth-largest loan in the pool,
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to an occupancy
decrease.  The asset is secured by a 331,974-sq.-ft. office
complex in Santa Monica, Calif.  Reported occupancy was 84.0% as
of June 2009, down from 91.9% at issuance, while DSC was 1.59x at
year-end 2008, down from 1.90x at issuance.  The borrower has
submitted revised rent rolls, which include several short-term
tenants that were previously not being reported.  The loan is
scheduled to be removed from the master servicer's watchlist.

The Century Centre Office asset, the fifth-largest asset in the
pool, appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.
The asset is secured by a 447,692-sq.-ft. office complex in
Irvine, Calif.  Reported DSC was 0.90x for the three months ended
March 31, 2009, 1.00x as of year-end 2008, and 1.15x at issuance.
Reported occupancy was 87.3% as of April 2009, down from 94.5% at
issuance.  The decline in occupancy, with the associated decrease
in revenues, is the primary reason for the downward trend in DSC.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG4

                 Rating
                 ------
        Class   To     From          Credit enhancement (%)
        -----   --     ----          ----------------------
        A-4     AA     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.75
        A-4B    AA     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.75
        A-1A    AA     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.75
        A-J     BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                 12.97
        B       BBB    AA/Watch Neg                  11.28
        C       BBB-   AA-/Watch Neg                 10.37
        D       BB+    A/Watch Neg                    8.42
        E       BB     A-/Watch Neg                   7.39
        F       BB-    BBB+/Watch Neg                 5.96
        G       B+     BBB/Watch Neg                  4.79
        H       B      BBB-/Watch Neg                 3.75
        J       B      BB+/Watch Neg                  3.23
        K       B-     BB/Watch Neg                   2.71
        L       B-     BB-/Watch Neg                  2.19
        M       CCC+   B+/Watch Neg                   1.93
        N       CCC    B/Watch Neg                    1.68
        O       CCC    B-/Watch Neg                   1.42

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG4

                  Rating
                  ------
        Class    To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
        -----    --     ----           ----------------------
        A-DP     AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.75

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG4

               Class   Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
               -----   ------  ----------------------
               A-1     AAA                     20.75
               A-1P    AAA                     20.75
               A-2     AAA                     20.75
               A-3     AAA                     20.75
               A-ABA   AAA                     30.66
               A-ABB   AAA                     20.75
               A-4A    AAA                     30.66
               X-P     AAA                       N/A
               X-C     AAA                       N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes from Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2
Ltd., a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation.
The lowered ratings and one additional rating from this
transaction remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction due to
significant credit degradation in the underlying collateral pool.
As of the most recent trustee report, 31% of the assets in the
pool have been classified as impaired, and an additional 16.5%
($44 million) have experienced downward rating or credit estimate
migration.  All of the ratings on Guggenheim 2005-2 remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications due to potential downward
rating or credit estimate migration within the CRE CDO's
collateral pool.  Numerous assets in the collateral pool are
either commercial mortgage backed securities with ratings on
CreditWatch negative or assets related to CMBS loans, such as
subordinate and mezzanine loans ($78.7 million, 29.4%) where the
senior loan is held in CMBS transactions with ratings on
CreditWatch negative.

According to the Aug. 18, 2009, trustee report, five assets
($81.9 million, 31%) in Guggenheim 2005-2 are impaired.  The
amount of impaired assets caused four overcollateralization test
failures.  The impaired assets include:

* The class KERF from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
  Securities Corp.'s series 2006-TFL2 ($26.2 million, 10%);

* The Universal Boulevard Orlando first mortgage loan
  ($15.2 million, 5.7%);

* The Tishman Speyer Real Estate D.C.  Portfolio loan
  ($15 million, 5.6%);

* The Steeplegate Mall B note ($14.6 million, 5.5%); and

* The Resort International B note ($10.3 million, 3.9%).

Excluding the impaired assets, the transaction's current asset
pool includes these:

* Six subordinate interest loans ($64.4 million, 24%), including
  one where the senior loan is held in a CMBS transaction with
  ratings on CreditWatch negative;

* Two mezzanine loans ($39.4 million, 15%) are subordinate to
  senior loans that are held in CMBS transactions and have ratings
  on CreditWatch negative;

* Three whole loans ($37.3 million, 14%);

* One CMBS class ($30 million, 11%) has a rating on CreditWatch
  negative; and

* Two term loans ($14.1 million, 5%).

S&P's analysis of the transaction was based on information
provided to Standard & Poor's by the collateral manager, the
Aug. 18, 2009, trustee remittance report, and data on the
underlying CMBS deals.

S&P will update or resolve the CreditWatch negative placements on
Guggenheim 2005-2 in conjunction with S&P's resolution of the
CreditWatch placements on the underlying CMBS assets and/or as S&P
analyze the credit characteristics of the remaining assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

       Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 Ltd.

                             Rating
                             ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A         AA+/Watch Neg        AAA/Watch Neg
          B         A-/Watch Neg         AA/Watch Neg
          C         BB+/Watch Neg        A/Watch Neg
          D         CCC+/Watch Neg       BBB-/Watch Neg
          E         CCC-/Watch Neg       BB+/Watch Neg
          F         CCC-/Watch Neg       B+/Watch Neg

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

       Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 Ltd.

                     Class     Rating
                     -----     ------
                     S         AAA/Watch Neg


HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Halcyon Structured Asset
Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.:

  -- US$260,000,000 Class X Senior Interest Only Secured Notes,
     Due 2019, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on November 29, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$324,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2019 (current balance of $322,217,843), Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on November 29, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$31,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2019, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,700,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2019 (current balance of $22,165,255), Downgraded to
     Caa1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$9,100,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of certain overcollateralization tests.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2877 versus a test level of 2627 as
of the last trustee report, dated August 14, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $18 million, accounting for roughly 4% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make
up approximately 17.76% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D
overcollateralization test was reported at 102.907% versus a test
level of 103.2%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class D
Notes are presently being deferred as a result of a previous
failure of the Class C overcollateralization test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-3 Ltd., issued in November 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HARCH CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Harch CLO II Limited:

  -- US$27,600,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 9, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$38,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$26,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
     (current balance of $7,935,022), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2698 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 10, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$15 million, accounting for roughly 3.9% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.4% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Harch CLO II Limited, issued on November 9, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO I-R, Ltd.:

  -- US$195,850,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2019 (current balance of $185,648,512),
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 20, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$15,700,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed On
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,900,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current balance of
     $10,166,943), Downgraded to B2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,300,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019 (current balance of
     $9,097,805), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed On Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the dollar
amount of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class C, Class D and Class E Principal Coverage Tests.  In
particular, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $24 million, accounting for roughly 10% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 4.7% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class C
Principal Coverage Test was reported at 106.63% versus a test
level of 107.60%, the Class D Principal Coverage Test was reported
at 101.92% versus a test level of 104.60%, and the Class E
Principal Coverage Test was reported at 98.06% versus a test level
of 102.40%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class D and
Class E Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class C and Class D Principal Coverage Test.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Hewett's Island CLO I-R, Ltd., issued in November of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HIGHLAND LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.:

  -- US$352,500,000 Class A-I Floating Rate Senior Notes (current
     balance of $314,567,958), Downgraded to A2; previously on
     August 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$33,000,000 Class A-II-A Floating Rate Senior Notes,
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-II-B Fixed Rate Senior Notes,
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Subordinate Notes
     (current balance of $24,643,849), Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
     Notes (current balance of 23,189,535), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Senior Subordinate Notes
     (current balance of 4,696,007), Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Subordinate Notes (current
     balance of 8,153,895), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March
     20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Principal Coverage Test with respect
to the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D Notes.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2816 versus a test level of 2625 as
of the last trustee report, dated July 23, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $64 million, accounting for roughly 13% of defaults
based on total portfolio pre-defaults of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 4.14% of
the underlying portfolio.  The Class A Principal Coverage Test was
reported at 117.137% versus a test level of 118.75%, the Class B
Principal Coverage Test was reported at 109.96% versus a test
level of 112.5%, the Class C Principal Coverage Test was reported
at 102.87% versus a test level of 107%, and the Class D Principal
Coverage Test was reported at 100.98% versus a test level of
105.8%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class B, Class C,
and Class D Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class A Principal Coverage Test.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., issued in August of 2001, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HUDSON STRAITS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Hudson Straits CLO 2004, Ltd.:

  -- US$33,500,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,500,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$1,500,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,100,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2016 (current balance of   --
     US$10,981,461), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$25,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Confirmed at Baa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability (including certain stresses pertaining to credit
estimates) and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These
revised assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation
that recoveries for second lien loans will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other
assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the
publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect the underlying portfolio's
moderate credit deterioration.  Based on the last trustee report,
dated August 2, 2009, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $10 million, accounting for roughly 2.3% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 9.7% of the underlying portfolio.  In addition,
Moody's notes that the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2578 as of the same
trustee report.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Hudson Straits CLO 2004, Ltd., issued in July of 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


INMOBILIARIA FUMISA: Moody's Continues Rating Reviews on Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service continues to review the ratings on the
Inmobiliaria Fumisa, S.A. DE C.V.'s Mexico City Airport Trust
US$121 million and 119 million UDI lease receivable bonds.  The
last rating action occurred on May 12, 2009, when the rating was
changed to Ba2 from Baa3 and placed on review for further
downgrade.

Moody's notes that in June Fumisa and bondholders successfully
negotiated various changes to the passenger deficiency and debt
service coverage triggers, which was one of the key factors being
reviewed since the rating action.

The current decision to continue the period of review is to allow
for Moody's to receive additional information regarding the
outcome of the sponsor's efforts to secure leases on currently
vacant space in Terminal 1, an important feature given that debt
service on the bonds is paid primarily from lease revenues.

The lease receivable bond ratings were assigned by evaluating
factors believed to be relevant to the credit profile of the
Project such as i) the business risk and competitive position of
the project versus others within its industry or sector, ii) the
capital structure and financial risk of the project, iii) the
projected performance of the project over the near to intermediate
term, and iv) the project's history of achieving consistent
operating performance and meeting budget or financial plan goals.
These attributes were compared against other projects both within
and outside of the Airport's core peer group and the lease
receivable bond ratings are believed to be comparable to ratings
assigned to other projects of similar credit risk.


JPMORGAN AUTO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2008-A Asset-Backed Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms JPMorgan Auto Receivables Trust 2008-A
asset-backed notes as part of its ongoing surveillance process.

The collateral is performing slightly worse than Fitch's initial
expectations.  However, currently under the credit enhancement
structure, the securities can still withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the rating categories and make full payments of
interest and principal in accordance with the term of the
documents.

As before, the ratings of the securities reflect the high quality
of the underlying retail installment sales contracts, available
credit enhancement, the sound legal and cash flow structure, and
strength of System & Services Technologies, Inc. as the
receivables servicer and JPMorgan as master servicer.

The ratings are affirmed:

  -- Class A-2 asset-backed notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3 asset-backed notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 asset-backed notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B asset-backed notes at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C asset-backed notes at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D asset-backed notes at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class E asset-backed notes at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.


LB COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 2007-C3 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 23
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on seven additional classes and removed one of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially
serviced loans, as well as concerns with loans that S&P deems to
be credit impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.31x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 125.2%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.86x and an LTV
of 156.4%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 97.5% and 36.9%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
TV calculations noted above exclude nine of the 10 specially
serviced loans (16.0%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes Q and S to 'D' to reflect
recurring interest shortfalls S&P expects to continue for the
foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Ten loans ($564.2 million, 17.5%) in the pool are with a special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc. Six ($115.8 million, 3.6%)of
those loans are more than 90 days delinquent, two ($111.9 million,
3.6%) are more than 60 days delinquent, one ($164.5 million, 5.1%)
is more than 30 days delinquent, and one ($172.0 million, 5.3%) is
current.  Eight of the specially serviced loans have appraisal
reduction amounts (ARA) in effect totaling $71.3 million.  Two
specially serviced loans are top 10 loans: the Larken Portfolio
loan (5.3%) and the Bethany Phoenix Portfolio loan (5.1%).  These
loans are discussed in further detail below.  All the other
specially serviced loans have balances less than or equal to 2% of
the total pool balance.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $3.23 billion, which is approximately 99.9% of the
aggregate trust balance at issuance.  The number of loans in the
pool, at 117, is unchanged since issuance.  The master servicer
for the transaction is KeyBank Real Estate Capital Markets Inc.
The master servicer provided financial information for 100% of the
pool, and 99.7% of the servicer-provided information was full-year
2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.37x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.31x and 125.2%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude nine of the 10 specially
serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses separately for these nine
loans ($517.3 million, 16.0%).  Based on the servicer-reported DSC
figures, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 0.99x for these
nine loans, including five loans that had DSCs below 1.0x.  To
date, the transaction has not experienced principal losses.
Fourteen loans ($587.9 million, 18.2%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  Seven loans ($407.4 million, 12.6%) have
reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 16 loans ($535.7 million,
16.6%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.74 billion (53.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.41x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.33x and
115.8%, respectively.  Of these loans, two are with the special
servicer.

The Larken Portfolio loan is the third-largest loan in the pool
and the largest exposure with the special servicer.  The loan is
current.  This asset has a balance of $172.0 million (5.3%) and is
secured by a portfolio of 20 office, industrial, and retail
properties in New Jersey.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Feb. 5, 2009, due to imminent default.  Reported year-
end 2008 DSC was 1.16x.  Despite the referenced DSC, the borrower
indicated to the special servicer that it may not be able to meet
debt service obligation due to deteriorating market conditions.
The special server has ordered third-party reports and is
considering a loan modification request that the borrower has
submitted.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of the loan.

The Bethany Phoenix Portfolio loan is the fourth-largest loan in
the pool and the second-largest exposure with the special
servicer.  The loan is 30-plus-days delinquent.  This asset has a
balance of $164.5 million (5.1%) and is secured by a seven-
property, 2,759-unit, garden-style apartment complexes in Arizona.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 21, 2009,
after the master servicer became aware of mechanics liens in the
aggregate amount of $4.7 million recorded against six of the seven
properties.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 0.98x.  Midland is currently
working with a receiver to obtain interest payments as funds are
available.  Midland's counsel has filed a complaint against the
guarantors due to waste on the properties.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of the loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Rating
               ------
       Class  To    From             Credit enhancement (%)
       -----  --    ----             ----------------------
       A-4    A     AAA/Watch Neg                     30.02
       A-4B   A     AAA/Watch Neg                     30.02
       A-4FL  A     AAA/Watch Neg                     30.02
       A-1A   A     AAA/Watch Neg                     30.02
       A-M    BB+   AAA/Watch Neg                     20.01
       A-MB   BB+   AAA/Watch Neg                     20.01
       A-MFL  BB+   AAA/Watch Neg                     20.01
       A-J    B     AAA/Watch Neg                     11.76
       A-JFL  B     AAA/Watch Neg                     11.76
       B      B-    AA+/Watch Neg                     10.76
       C      B-    AA/Watch Neg                       9.76
       D      B-    AA-/Watch Neg                      8.88
       E      CCC+  A+/Watch Neg                       8.13
       F      CCC   A/Watch Neg                        7.25
       G      CCC-  BBB+/Watch Neg                     6.00
       H      CCC-  BBB/Watch Neg                      4.88
       J      CCC-  BBB-/Watch Neg                     4.00
       K      CCC-  BB/Watch Neg                       3.00
       L      CCC-  B/Watch Neg                        2.38
       M      CCC-  CCC+/Watch Neg                     2.00
       N      CCC-  CCC/Watch Neg                      1.88
       Q      D     CCC-/Watch Neg                     1.38
       S      D     CCC-/Watch Neg                     1.13

       Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

               LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class      To        From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --        ----            ----------------------
    P          CCC-      CCC-/Watch Neg                    1.63

                         Ratings Affirmed

               LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class  Rating          Credit enhancement (%)
          -----  ------          ----------------------
          A-1    AAA                              30.02
          A-2    AAA                              30.02
          A-2FL  AAA                              30.02
          A-3    AAA                              30.02
          A-AB   AAA                              30.02
          X      AAA                                N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


LB-UBS 2007-C7: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on LB-UBS 2007-C7,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  In addition, Fitch
has assigned Rating Outlooks, as applicable.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 5.9% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 4.0% including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 81.4% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 10.9% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature
within the next five years, with 10.5% maturing in 2013.  In 2017,
81.7% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 16 Loans of Concern (22.3%) within the pool, one
of which (0.3%) are specially serviced.  All of the top 15 loans
(76.9%) are current as of the August 2009 payment date.

Four of the top 15 loans (13.7% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from approximately 3% to 23%.  Of the top 15 loans, the
largest contributors (by loan balance) to term losses are:
District at Tustin Legacy (6.5% of the pool balance), Nashville
Multifamily Portfolio (3.7%) and Meyerland Plaza (2.9%).

District at Tustin Legacy is secured by a 985,684 square foot (sf)
retail center located in Tustin, CA.  The property is anchored by
Costco and Lowe's (not part of the collateral) as well as Target,
Whole Foods, TJ Maxx, AMC Theaters, and Best Buy.  As of June 30,
2009 the property was 99% occupied and near term lease expirations
are limited as tenants were signed when the property was
constructed in 2006.  The property has been unable to achieve the
rents expected at issuance, which led to a YE 2008 servicer
reported debt service coverage ratio of .90 times (x).  The loan
is sponsored by Lee and Nancy Hanley along with Kimco Realty.

The Nashville Multifamily Portfolio is collateralized by a four
property, 1,593 unit, multifamily portfolio located in the
Nashville, TN MSA.  Property performance has declined since
issuance and as of YE 2008 occupancy was 84%, down from 95% at
issuance.  Performance has also been hindered by increased
expenses which offset a recent jump in occupancy to 91% for per
the March 30, 2009 rent roll.  The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR
was 0.94x, down from 1.25x at issuance.  The loan is sponsored by
New Dawn Companies.

The Meyerland Plaza loan is collateralized by a 936,543 sf retail
center in Houston, TX.  The property is anchored by JC Penney and
Target, which is not part of the collateral.  The property is
currently 91% occupied down from 99% at issuance.  The property is
also subject to significant near term lease expirations including
19.5% in 2010 (Old Navy, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Office Max, and Stein
Mart) and 36.2% in 2012, which includes JC Penney.  Servicer
reported YE 2008 DSCR was 1.14x.  The loan is sponsored by Ronus,
Inc., an owner and developer of commercial real estate in the
eastern U.S.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity ratings and Negative Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $269.5 million class A-J to 'AA/LS-3' from 'AAA';
  -- $47.6 million class B to 'A/LS-5' from 'AA+';
  -- $35.7 million class C to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'AA';
  -- $23.8 million class D to 'BBB-/LS-5' from 'AA-';
  -- $27.7 million class E to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A+';
  -- $15.9 million class F to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A';
  -- $31.7 million class G to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A-';
  -- $27.7 million class H to 'B/LS-5' from 'BBB+';
  -- $23.8 million class J to 'B/LS-5' from 'BBB';
  -- $27.7 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-';
  -- $19.8 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+';
  -- $11.9 million class M to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB';
  -- $11.9 million class N to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB-';
  -- $4 million class P to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B+';
  -- $4 million class Q to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B'.

Fitch affirms this class, removes it from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigns an LS rating and Negative Outlook:

  -- $3.9 million class S at 'B-/LS-5'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and
maintains a Stable Outlook:

  -- $16.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $194 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $74 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $1.7 billion class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $265.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $317.0 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- Interest-only class X-CL at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-CP at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-W at 'AAA'.

The $47.6 million class T is not rated by Fitch.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-C5 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on eight other classes from the same transaction and
removed two from CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from 1345 Avenue of the
Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust's series FB 2005-1
transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the LB-UBS 2005-C5
transaction using S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion
CMBS criteria, which was the primary driver of S&P's rating
actions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.51x and a loan-to-value ratio of 95.8%.  S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario
to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.94x and an LTV of 128.1%.
The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario
were 78.7% and 31.5%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations
exclude one credit-impaired loan, five loans that haven't reported
financial results, and one defeased loan (1.2% in the aggregate).
S&P estimated losses for all except the defeased loan, which are
included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
for LB-UBS 2005-C5 reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.  S&P has affirmed its ratings on the interest-only
certificates based on its current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may
revise its current IO criteria, which may affect outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P
affirmed.

S&P's affirmed ratings on the FB 2005-1 certificates reflect the
stable operating performance of the properties and the
amortization of the whole loans.  The whole loans secured by 1345
Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza are participated in
both the LB-UBS 2005-C5 and FB 2005-1 trusts.  The FB 2005-1
certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the participated
interests, which are discussed in further detail below.

                          Credit Concerns

Two loans ($263.7 million; 11.6%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR).  One of these loans, the
second-largest loan in the pool (11.4%), is current and is
described below.  The other loan is less than 30 days delinquent
(0.2%).  No appraisal reduction amounts are in effect for these
loans.  In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P deem one
loan ($1.7 million; 0.1%) to be credit impaired.  This loan is on
the servicer's watchlist and is current but, based on low DSC, S&P
considers it to have near-term default risk.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 115 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.28 billion, compared with 115 loans and $2.34 billion at
issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A., the master servicer, reported
financial information for 99.1% of the pool; 95.0% of the
financial information was either full-year 2008 or interim 2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.52x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.51x and 95.8%, respectively, excluding one credit-impaired loan,
five loans not reporting financial results, and one defeased loan
(1.2% in the aggregate).  The transaction has not experienced any
principal losses to date.  Twenty-four loans are on the servicer's
watchlist ($240.3 million; 10.5%).  Six loans ($45.6 million,
2.0%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and eight loans
($81.5 million, 3.6%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $1.3 billion (57.7%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.55x for these loans.  One of the top 10 loans (11.3%) is with
the special servicer and two other top 10 loans (5.7%) are on the
servicer's watchlist, all of which are described below.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.55x and 94.1%,
respectively.

The Providence Place loan ($258.5 million; 11.3%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool and is the largest loan with the special
servicer.  The loan is secured by the leasehold interest in
960,803 sq. ft. of a 1,286,803-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Providence, R.I.  The property was built in 1998.  This loan was
transferred to LNR on April 29, 2009, following the borrower's (a
General Growth Properties entity) chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on
April 16, 2009.  he servicer reported a DSC of 1.82x and an
occupancy of 98% for year-end 2008.

The U-Store-It Portfolio loan ($77.8 million; 3.4%) is the fifth-
largest loan in the pool and is the largest loan on the servicer's
watchlist.  The loan is secured by 24 self-storage properties
encompassing 13,158 units and totaling 1,469,753 sq. ft. located
in eight states.  The properties were built between 1955 and 2003
and were renovated between 1997 and 2003.  The servicer reported a
DSC of 1.43x and an 76% occupancy for year-end 2008.  The loan was
placed on the watchlist due to deferred maintenance issues.

The TAG Portfolio loan (53.4 million; 2.3%) is the ninth-largest
loan in the pool and the second largest loan on the servicer's
watchlist.  The loan is secured by a portfolio of two properties
consisting of three class A office buildings built between 1989
and 2000, with an aggregate of 404,524 sq. ft.  Two of the office
buildings are located on adjacent sites in Downers Grove, Ill.,
approximately 20 miles west of Chicago, and one building is in
Dulles, Va., approximately 20 miles northwest of Washington.  The
servicer reported a DSC of 0.93x and a 73% occupancy for year-end
2008.

     1345 Avenue of The Americas And Park Avenue Plaza Trust
                 FB 2005-1 Stand-Alone Transaction

The 1345 Avenue of the Americas property is encumbered by a
$709.7 million whole loan.  The loan has four senior A and B
participations totaling $442.2 million and $267.5 million,
respectively.  The A-1 note ($36.7 million, 2%) serves as
collateral in the subject (LB-UBS 2005-C5) transaction, and the A-
3, A-4, B-1, and B-2 notes serve as collateral in the FB 2005-1
stand-alone transaction ($436.4 million; 80%).  Other notes serve
as collateral in Hypo Real Estate Bank International AG's series
Estate-US1 transaction and the Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities series 2005-T20 transaction.  The loan is secured by a
1,896,140-sq.-ft. office property in midtown Manhattan.  For the
year ended Dec. 31, 2008, the property was 100% occupied and the
weighted average in-place base rent was $66.36.  S&P's adjusted
valuation for this loan is up 8% since issuance.

The Park Avenue Plaza property is encumbered by a $244.5 million
whole loan.  The loan has four senior A participations totaling
$143.2 million, two B participations totaling $1.3 million, and
one C participation totaling $100.0 million.  In addition, there
is $85.0 million of preferred equity secured by the equity
interests of the borrower.  The A-1 note ($16.1 million, 1%)
serves as collateral in the subject (LB-UBS 2005-C5 transaction),
and the A-3, A-4, B-1, and B-2 notes serve as collateral in the FB
2005-1 stand-alone transaction ($112.3 million; 20%).  The C
participation serves as collateral in Hypo Real Estate Bank
International AG's series Estate-US1 transaction.  The loan is
secured by a 1,137,452-sq.-ft.  office property in midtown
Manhattan, N.Y.  As of Dec. 31, 2008, the property was 97%
occupied and the weighted average in-place base rent was $51.04.
S&P's adjusted valuation for this loan is up 29% since issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings in S&P's opinion.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class      To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --        ----           ----------------------
    A-M        A+        AAA/Watch Neg                20.57
    A-J        A-        AAA/Watch Neg                12.34
    B          BBB+      AA+/Watch Neg                11.44
    C          BBB       AA/Watch Neg                 10.03
    D          BBB-      AA-/Watch Neg                 8.74
    E          BB+       A+/Watch Neg                  7.71
    F          BB        A/Watch Neg                   6.43
    G          BB-       A-/Watch Neg                  5.27
    H          B+        BBB+/Watch Neg                4.24
    J          B+        BBB/Watch Neg                 3.60
    K          B+        BBB-/Watch Neg                2.70
    L          B         BB+/Watch Neg                 2.31
    M          B         BB/Watch Neg                  2.06
    N          B-        BB-/Watch Neg                 1.67
    P          B-        B+/Watch Neg                  1.54
    Q          B-        B/Watch Neg                   1.29
    S          CCC+      B-/Watch Neg                  1.03

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Class           Rating        Credit Enhancement (%)
       -----           ------        ----------------------
       A-1A            AAA                            30.85
       A-4             AAA                            30.85

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C5
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Class           Rating        Credit Enhancement (%)
       -----           ------        ----------------------
       A-1             AAA                            30.85
       A-2             AAA                            30.85
       A-3             AAA                            30.85
       A-AB            AAA                            30.85
       X-CL            AAA                              N/A
       X-CP            AAA                              N/A

                       N/A - Not Applicable

     1345 Avenue of the Americas and Park Avenue Plaza Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series FB 2005-1

                     Class           Rating
                     -----           ------
                     A-2             AAA
                     A-3             AAA
                     B               AAA
                     C               AAA
                     D               AA
                     E               A+
                     F               A
                     X               AAA


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-C2 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed the
ratings on six additional classes from this transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially
serviced loans, as well as concerns with loans that S&P deems to
be credit impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.39x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 111.8%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.76x and an LTV
of 146.1%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 93.1% and 41.1%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
LTV calculations noted above exclude 13 of the 15 specially
serviced loans (5.1%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P lowered the rating on class S to 'D' because of interest
shortfalls to the class that S&P expects to continue for the
foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Fifteen assets ($392.3 million, 11.1%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. One of those assets
($15.5 million, 0.4%) is real estate owned (REO); five
($63.9 million, 1.8%) are in foreclosure; five ($83.2 million,
2.4%) are more than 90 days delinquent; two ($19.7 million, 0.6%)
are more than 60 days delinquent; one ($25.0 million, 0.7%) is in
its grace period; and one ($185.0 million, 5.22%) is current.  Ten
of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts
(ARAs) in effect totaling $42.9 million.  One specially serviced
asset, the Bethany Maryland Portfolio II loan ($185.0 million,
5.2%), is a top 10 loan.  This loan is discussed in further detail
below.  All the other specially serviced assets have balances
below 1.2% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $3.55 billion, which is approximately 99.8% of the
issuance balance.  The number of loans in the pool, at 170, is
unchanged since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction
is Wachovia Bank N.A.  The master servicers provided financial
information for 97.8% of the pool, and 84.3% of the servicer-
provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.39x and
111.8%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
13 of the 15 specially serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses,
which ranged from 21% to 76%, separately for these 13 loans.
Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 0.96x for these 13 loans, including four
loans that had DSC of less than 1.0x.  To date, the transaction
has not experienced principal losses.  Forty-six loans
($757.4 million, 21.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Ten loans ($128.3 million, 3.6%) have reported DSC between 1.10x
and 1.0x, and 17 loans ($260.6 million, 7.4%) have reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.76 billion (49.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.49x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.47x and
105.8%, respectively.

The Bethany Maryland Portfolio II loan is the third-largest loan
in the pool and the largest exposure with the special servicer.
The loan is current.  This asset has a balance of $185.0 million
(5.2%) and is secured by a three-property, 1,909-unit multifamily
portfolio located in the Baltimore, Md., and Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan areas.  The loan originally transferred to the
special servicer due to imminent default.  Year-end 2008 DSC was
1.11x.  The lender has granted consent to a modification of
certain payment terms of the B note and modification of reserve
provisions.  The loan is likely to be returned to the master
servicer once an agreement has been reached.

The Extendicare Portfolio loan ($125.0 million, 3.5%) is the
seventh-largest loan in the pool and largest loan on the
servicer's watchlist.  The loan appears on the servicer's
watchlist due to deferred maintenance.  The loan is secured by 82
health care facilities located in 10 states, containing 8,492
licensed beds.  The year-end 2008 DSC was 2.56x, down from 3.31x
at issuance.

The Extendicar Portfolio II loan ($89.5 million, 2.5%) is the
Ninth-largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
servicer's watchlist.  The loan appears on the servicer's
watchlist due to deferred maintenance.  The year-end 2008 DSC was
2.68x, down from 2.85x at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From             Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----             ----------------------
     A-3       A+      AAA/Watch Neg                     30.07
     A-1A      A+      AAA/Watch Neg                     30.07
     A-M       BBB     AAA/Watch Neg                     20.05
     A-J       BB-     AAA/Watch Neg                     11.15
     B         B+      AA+/Watch Neg                     10.40
     C         B+      AA/Watch Neg                       8.90
     D         B       AA-/Watch Neg                      7.77
     E         B       A+/Watch Neg                       7.39
     F         B       A/Watch Neg                        6.64
     G         B-      A-/Watch Neg                       5.64
     H         B-      BBB+/Watch Neg                     4.76
     J         B-      BBB/Watch Neg                      3.76
     K         CCC     BB+/Watch Neg                      2.63
     L         CCC-    BB/Watch Neg                       2.13
     M         CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                      1.88
     N         CCC-    B+/Watch Neg                       1.75
     P         CCC-    B/Watch Neg                        1.50
     Q         CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                       1.38
     S         D       CCC+/Watch Neg                     1.00

                         Ratings Affirmed

         Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Class     Rating         Credit enhancement (%)
         -----     ------         ----------------------
         A-1       AAA                             30.07
         A-2       AAA                             30.07
         A-AB      AAA                             30.07
         X-CP      AAA                               N/A
         X-W       AAA                               N/A
         X-CL      AAA                               N/A


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed four classes of Lehman Brothers
Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-LLF C5 on review for possible
downgrade due to the significant decline in the performance of the
Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers Loan ($141.7 million -- 59% of
the pool balance) and a negative outlook for the lodging sector.
This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

The Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers Loan is secured by a 1,209-
room convention hotel located in Chicago, Illinois.  RevPAR
(Revenue per available room) for the trailing twelve months ending
June 2009 was down 14% from the 2008 RevPAR.  RevPAR for the July
2009 year to date period was 27% lower than the same period in
2008.  Similarly, the net cash flow for the trailing twelve months
ending June 2009 was down 32% from the 2008 net cash flow.  The
loan matures in January 2010.  The borrower is an affiliate of
Tishman Hotel and Realty L.P.

As of the September 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 81%
to $241.7 million from $1.3 billion at securitization as a result
of the pay off of 16 loans originally in the pool.  Since last
review, two loans have paid off decreasing the pool by 27%.  There
are two remaining loans in the pool, the Sheraton Chicago and the
Hilton in the Walt Disney World Resort (41% of the pool balance).

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class G, $27,800,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aa1 on
     3/4/2009

  -- Class H, $22,800,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa3 on
     3/4/2009

  -- Class J, $25,100,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A3 on
     3/4/2009

  -- Class K, $31,531,066, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3 on
     3/4/2009


LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Lightpoint CLO V, Ltd.:

  -- US$450,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on August 3, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class J Blended Securities (current rated
     balance of 2,848,807), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2559 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 30, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$26.9 million, accounting for roughly 4.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
8.0% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress
factors to default probability assumptions for structured finance
asset collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's
CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Lightpoint CLO V, Ltd., issued on August 3, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LONG GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Long Grove CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$319,400,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
          2016 (current balance of $313,080,847), Downgraded to Aa3;
          previously on June 14, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
          Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March
          18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review for
          Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,800,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
          Notes Due 2016 (current balance of $17,960,620), Downgraded
          to B2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
          Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
          Rate Notes Due 2016 (current balance of $11,217,555),
          Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
          B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class B, Class C, and Class D
Overcollateralization Tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2957 versus a test level of 2650 as of the last trustee report,
dated August 17, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$22.8 million, accounting for roughly 6.0% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
16.4% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class B
Overcollateralization Test was reported at 106.14% versus a test
level of 109.20%, the Class C Overcollateralization Test was
reported at 100.84% versus a test level of 105.60%, and the Class
D Overcollateralization Test was reported at 97.80% versus a test
level of 102.70%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class C
and Class D notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class B Overcollateralization Test.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Long Grove CLO Ltd., issued in 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MARYLAND ECONOMIC: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on 2003 Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Ba3 rating on the Maryland
Economic Development Corporation Student Housing Revenue Bonds
(Bowie State University Project) Series 2003.  Rating outlook
remains negative.  Approximately $20 million of the original
$21.47 million of bonds remains outstanding.  This rating
affirmation is due to Moody's ongoing assessment of the project's
financial position, as well as the termination of the Guaranteed
Investment Contract with MBIA Inc. and MBIA Insurance Corporation
(currently rated Ba3/ NEG and B3 / NEG, respectively), which held
the debt service reserve fund of the Salisbury University Project.
The debt service reserve fund is currently held with the Trustee
in a money market fund.

Recent Developments:

Based on the audited financial statements ending June 30, 2008,
the project's financial performance slightly improved from the
prior year, yet remains weak, as demonstrated by the low debt
service coverage level of 1.08x.  Several expenses, such as
student life and management fees are subordinated and are not
included in the debt service coverage calculations.  In an effort
to reduce the continuing bad debt situation at the project,
student residents who wish to pay rent with financial aid are able
to direct the University to send a portion of their financial aid
directly to the property manager to pay for their rental expenses.
Additionally, rent is now payable upfront and by semester.
According to management the bad debt expense was significantly
reduced to approximately 3% of revenues in FY2009.  However,
Moody's anticipate a substantial decline in interest income, given
the loss of revenues provided by the Guaranteed Investment
Contract.  Such loss of revenue income is likely to negatively
affect the debt service coverage on the bonds.

Occupancy has remained high at approximately 98% for the fall 2008
and spring 2009, and has always been near such levels since the
project opened in September 2004.  The average rent increase was
approximately 8.5% and 8.4% for FY2008 and FY2009, respectively.
Despite the rent increase, occupancy is not expected to be
affected due to the lack of comparably priced off-campus housing
available nearby.

Credit Strengths:

  -- Consistently high occupancy (approximately 98% in fall 2008
     and spring 2009) reflecting adequate demand for student
     housing, partially due to provided amenities which are
     superior to those at the University's own housing.

  -- Involvement of the University to mitigate the bad debt
     associated with collections by allowing students to direct
     the University to send their financial aid funds directly to
     the project to cover the rent.

  -- Strong oversight by MEDCO, as both issuer for the bonds and
     owner of the project.

Credit Challenges:

  -- The loss of investment income derived from the Guaranteed
     Investment Contract is likely to negatively affect the debt
     service coverage on the bonds.

  -- Audited financial statements for fiscal year ending June 30,
     2008 reflected slightly improved, albeit still low 1.08x debt
     service coverage.

  -- Absence of a long-term financial or legal commitment from the
     University, the University System of Maryland (rated Aa2), or
     the State of Maryland (rated Aaa).

                              Outlook

The negative rating outlook reflects the possibility of a further
downgrade if the project's financial position does not
significantly improve in the near term.

                What could change the rating - UP

  -- A substantial increase in debt service coverage.

               What could change the rating - DOWN

  -- Continued weak financial performance.

The last rating action was on August 6, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the rating on the Series 2003 bonds.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Positive Outlook on 'BB+' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
'BB+' underlying rating on Massachusetts Health & Educational
Facilities Authority's series 1998 revenue bonds, issued for
Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, to positive from stable.

At the same time, the rating service affirmed its 'BB+' SPUR on
the debt.

The positive outlook reflects the magnitude of Massachusetts Eye &
Ear Infirmary's recent receipt of proceeds awarded as the outcome
of its lawsuit.  The funds allow the organization significantly
greater financial flexibility.

The 'BB+' rating reflects Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary's
strong balance sheet that has consistently carried solid liquidity
for the rating and that has been bolstered by approximately $75
million of temporarily restricted funds derived from the favorable
outcome of a recent lawsuit -- In addition, there is very little
time left to maturity (2011) on the only series of debt (1998)
rated by Standard & Poor's; continued operating losses that have
typically been offset by nonoperating gains -- For fiscal 2009,
however, the organization has realized significantly lower
nonoperating revenues; and reliance on a service specialty niche -
- The organization, however, has been focused on expanding its
service area through various types of affiliations and outreach
services, which might lessen its dependence on its Boston-based
business.

"Before considering an upgrade to the 'BBB' investment-grade
category, S&P would like to better understand the organization's
overall future financial goals and master facility plans,
including plans to reduce operating losses and further debt
plans," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jennifer Soule.
"The credit, however, remains solidly 'BB+'; and it is extremely
unlikely S&P would lower the rating before the bonds mature,
unless it issues a substantial amount of additional debt or the
losses grow significantly."

A higher rating is precluded by Massachusetts Eye & Ear
Infirmary's continued operating losses, even though improvement
was evidenced in fiscal 2008 and despite the organization's one-
time infusion of money.

In January 2009, the federal appeals court ruled in favor of
Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary on liability and damages for the
organization's claims of unjust enrichment and unfair trade
practices against QLT Inc. According to management, MEEI felt it
was entitled to royalties associated with a QLT drug used in
patented clinical trials at the infirmary; the court agreed with
these claims and awarded Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary
approximately $127 million in damages.

The rating action affects roughly $12.8 million of debt
outstanding.


MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2004-2 Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the notes
issued by MASTR Resecuritization TRUST 2004-2 resecuritized
transaction.

The notes in the resecuritization are backed by a number of
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

   (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
       underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
       the underlying securities portfolio

  (ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
       securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e.  the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization TRUST 2004-2

  -- 5.25% Mortgage Resecuritization Notes, Series 2004-2,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Nov 14, 2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2004-3 Notes to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the notes
issued in the MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2004-3 resecuritized
transaction.

The notes in the resecuritization are backed by a number of
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction, as
      described in more detail below.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) were applied
to the current delinquency pipeline buckets to calculate a
pipeline default rate.  This value was then multiplied by a
replication factor to account for additional loans that are
expected to default over the remaining life of the deal.  The
replication factor differed for each deal based on pool factor and
current delinquency pipeline (higher pool factors and lower
delinquency pipelines resulted in higher replication factors, for
example).  The final expected default number was then multiplied
by an expected loss severity (based on vintage and product type -
older vintages from better performing deals had lower expected
severities) to arrive at an estimated expected loss.  In addition,
expected losses for deals with 50 or fewer loans remaining (these
deals referred to as "low pool factor") were subject to additional
stresses for replication factors and severities to account for
increased volatility.  An implicit rating was determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2004-3

  -- Notes, Downgraded to B3; previously on Sep 29, 2004 Assigned
     Baa3


MAX CMBS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 24
classes from MAX CMBS I Ltd.'s series 2007-1 and 2008-1 and from
COMM 2008-RS3.  In addition, S&P removed its ratings on class K
from MAX 2008-1 and class H from COMM 2008-RS3 from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The remaining lowered ratings remain
on CreditWatch with negative implications.

MAX CMBS I Ltd., the issuer, has the ability to issue one or more
series of notes.  MAX 2008-1 is the second series of notes.  The
first series, MAX 2007-1, is cross-collateralized with MAX 2008-1.
The issuer in the COMM 2008-RS3 transaction is a grantor trust
that primarily holds certain securities from MAX 2008-1 and has a
similar priority of distribution.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transactions
following its downgrades of 54 commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that serve as underlying collateral for
MAX 2007-1 and MAX 2008-1.  The certificates are from 25
transactions totaling $2.224 billion (28.2% of the pool balance
for these transactions).  S&P's ratings on MAX 2008-1, MAX 2007-1,
and COMM 2008-RS3 (with the exception of class K from MAX 2008-1
and class H from COMM 2008-RS3) remain on CreditWatch negative due
to each transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral that is on
CreditWatch negative ($3.6 billion, 45.6%).

According to the trustee report dated Aug. 17, 2009, MAX 2008-1
and MAX 2007-1 are collateralized by 156 CMBS certificates
($7.114 billion, 90% of the combined transaction balances) from 99
distinct transactions issued between 2005 and 2007.  The
collateral also includes 12 collateralized debt obligation
securities ($776.6 million, 10%) from 12 distinct transactions.
According to the trustee report, MAX 2007-1 and MAX 2008-1 have
significant exposure to downgraded CMBS, including these:

* CD 2007-CD4 Mortgage Trust series 2007-CD4 (classes A-4, A-MFX,
  and A-J; $311.3 million, 3.9%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust series 2007-
  CIBC19 (classes A-4, A-M, and A-J; $306.2 million, 3.9%);

* GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. series 2007-C1 (classes A-M, A-MFL,
  A-J, and A-JFL; $263.7 million, 3.3%);

* CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust series 2006-CD3 (classes A-M and A-J;
  $162.5 million, 2.1%); and

* COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C1 (class A-4
  and A-M; $119 million, 1.5%).

The collateral for COMM 2008-RS3 consists of classes A-2A, A-2B,
X-B, X-W, C, E, F, G, H, J, and K from MAX 2008-1.  S&P lowered
its ratings on the COMM 2008-RS3 classes concurrently with the
downgrades of the respective MAX 2008-1 classes.

The distribution of interest proceeds to the interest-only classes
X-B and X-W from MAX 2008-1 are made pro rata to classes A-2A and
A-2B, which S&P downgraded accordingly.  S&P published a request
for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1,
2009.  After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its
IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on IO certificates being lowered.

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on MAX 2007-1, MAX 2008-1, and COMM 2008-RS3 in
conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying
CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                      MAX CMBS I 2007-1 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              A+/Watch Neg     AAA/Watch Neg

                      MAX CMBS I 2008-1 Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              A+/Watch Neg     AAA/Watch Neg
         A-2A             BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         A-2B             BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         C                BB-/Watch Neg    A+/Watch Neg
         E                BB-/Watch Neg    A/Watch Neg
         F                B/Watch Neg      BBB+/Watch Neg
         G                B/Watch Neg      BBB/Watch Neg
         H                B-/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
         J                CCC+/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
         X-B              BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         X-W              BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg

                           COMM 2008-RS3

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-2A             BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         A-2B             BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         B                BB-/Watch Neg    A+/Watch Neg
         C                BB-/Watch Neg    A/Watch Neg
         D                B/Watch Neg      BBB+/Watch Neg
         E                B/Watch Neg      BBB/Watch Neg
         F                B-/Watch Neg     BB+/Watch Neg
         G                CCC+/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
         X-B              BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         X-W              BBB-/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      MAX CMBS I 2008-1 Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
         Class           To               From
         -----           --               ----
         K               CCC-             B-/Watch Neg

                           COMM 2008-RS3

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         H                CCC-             B-/Watch Neg


MBIA INC: Moody's Keeps Maryland Economic Housing Bonds Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Baa2 rating and
removed the rating from Watchlist on the Maryland Economic
Development Corporation's Student Housing Revenue Bonds
(University of Maryland, College Park Projects), Series 2008 and
the Student Housing Refunding Revenue Bonds (University of
Maryland, College Park Projects), Series 2006.  This rating action
affects approximately $166 million of parity debt outstanding.
This rating confirmation is prompted by MBIA Inc. and MBIA
Insurance Corporation (currently rated Ba1/ DEV and B3 / DEV,
respectively) and the Maryland Economic Development Corporation
terminating the Guaranteed Investment Contract which partially
held the debt service reserve fund of the College Park Projects.
According to the Trustee, the released funds are now invested in a
money market fund.  Moody's will continue to periodically assess
the operating performance at the project and review Moody's rating
on the bonds.

The last rating action was on March 20, 2009, when Moody's placed
the Baa2 rating on the Series 2006 and 2008 bonds on Watchlist for
potential downgrade.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of three classes of
Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001- Canada 6.  The upgrades are due
to increased credit support and defeasance.  The action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the August 31, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 45%
to $146.1 million from $265.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 63% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 11% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with Canadian
Government securities.

Three loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The largest loan on the watch list is the
Westbridge Shopping Center loan ($24.9 million -- 12.1%).  The
loan is on the watch list due to Linen 'N Things vacating the
center in early 2009.  Despite the departure of a major tenant,
the property continues to generate sufficient income to provide
for an estimated debt service coverage ratio of 1.29X.  As a
result, Moody's is not concerned about this loan at this time.
The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.  Not all loans on the watchlist are delinquent
or have significant issues.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  There are no
loans are in special servicing.  Moody's was provided with full-
year 2008 operating results for 95% of the pool.  Moody's weighted
average loan to value ratio for the total pool is 67%, basically
the same since last review, compared to 81% at securitization.

Moody's stressed DSCR for the pool is 1.49X compared to 1.55X at
Moody's last review and 1.31X at securitization.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple notch
downgrades under adverse circumstance.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 12 compared to 16 at last
review and 23 at securitization.

The three largest conduit loans represent 34% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Westbridge Shopping Center Loan ($24.9 million
-- 12.1%), which is secured by a 211,400 square foot retail center
located in Vaughan, Ontario, approximately 20 miles north of
Toronto.  Currently, the center's largest tenants are Toys "R" Us
(14.2% of the net rentable area; lease expiration November 2014)
and Mark's Work Warehouse (6.3% of the NRA; lease expiration March
2011).  In 2008, Linens 'N Things (16.7% of the NRA; lease
expiration January 2017) was the shopping center's anchor tenant.
However, Linen 'N Things vacated its space in early 2009 after
publicly announcing the closure of all its stores.  Consequently,
the loan was placed on the watchlist.  The current occupancy is
approximately 80% compared to 97% at last review and 100% at
securitization.  Moody's anticipates that the annualized net
operating income debt service coverage ratio would decrease to
1.29X from 1.53X with the loss of Linen 'N Things.  Moody's loan-
to-value ratio is 80% compared to 69% at last review.

The second largest loan is the Chateau Janville ($12.5 million --
8.6%), which is secured by a 271-unit apartment complex located in
Ottawa, Ontario.  As of January 2009, the property was 97%
occupied compared to 98% at last review and 100% at
securitization.  Moody's LTV ratio is 84% compared to 92% at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Zellers Centre Bridgeport Loan
($12.9 million - 6.3%), which is secured by a 210,800 square foot
retail center located in Waterloo, Ontario.  The center is
anchored by Zellers (49.7% of the NRA; lease expiration October
2018) and Sobeys (22.6% of the NRA; lease expiration July 2018).
As of May 2009, the property was 99% occupied, almost the same at
last review, compared to 96.0% at securitization.  Moody's LTV
ratio is 64% compared to 71% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $5,834,787, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/19/2008

  -- Class A-2, $95,882,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/19/2008

  -- Class X, $145,802,414, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/19/2008

  -- Class B, $43,111,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa 6/19/2008

  -- Class C, $8,628,000, upgraded to Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa3 from A1 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class D, $10,620,000, upgraded to Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa2 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class E, $1,991,000, upgraded to Baa2; previously affirmed at
     Baa3 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class F, $5,310,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class G, $1,991,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
     Ba3 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class H, $3,319,000, affirmed at B2; previously affirmed at
     B2 on 6/19/2008

  -- Class J, $1,328,000, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
     B3 on 6/19/2008


MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Downgrades Class G Securities to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the ratings on Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust,
Series 2007-IQ16's Classes A-1 through AM-FL, including notional
classes X-1 and X-2 at AAA with Stable trends.  All six shadow
ratings have also been confirmed.

In addition, DBRS downgraded 15 classes, Classes AJ through N,
based on the following: the most recent annual net cash flows have
declined for approximately 36% of the pool, based on balance from
DBRS' NCFs at issuance, the high percent of loans in special
servicing and the percentage of loans on the DBRS' HotList.
Losses from eleven delinquent and specially serviced loans are
currently projected to eliminate the unrated Class S and erode a
portion of the unrated Class Q.  Because DBRS expects further cash
flow decline in 2009, the trend remains Negative for Classes N
through K.

The majority of DBRS' anticipated losses are associated with
Prospectus ID#13 (Amalfi Hotel).  The loan is more than 90 days
delinquent and was transferred to the special servicer on
April 27, 2009, as a result of the borrower's claim that cash flow
from operations has declined substantially, and it will no longer
be sufficient to cover debt service.  As of March 31, 2009,
occupancy had decreased to 45% and DSCR was projected to be 0.5x,
for the full year.  The property is a 215-room boutique hotel
located in the River North neighborhood of Chicago, less than one
mile from Michigan Ave.  While the subject is a high-quality asset
in a good location, the current loan per key of $172,000 is
relatively high for an unflagged hotel in this challenging
environment.  Given the dearth of hotel transaction activity, it
is difficult to determine a liquidation value at this point in
time.  However, a large principal loss is considered possible
given the significant impairment to net cash flow and increased
cap rates in the hotel sector.  The DBRS liquidation scenario
assumes significant losses on this loan.

DBRS CMBS methodology assumes a mean reverting capitalization rate
applied to all loans and therefore the current market's property
value deterioration was already accounted for within the DBRS
ratings at issuance.  As a result, the downgrades are more related
to the loan specific increased probability of default, caused by a
deterioration of cash flow, for many loans within the transaction,
as compared to property value declines.

The pool is heavily concentrated in loans secured by retail and
hotel properties, each sector showing signs of stress in the
current economic environment.  As such, the DBRS HotList is
concentrated in these property types.  There are 12 loans (10.2%
of the transaction's outstanding balance) found on the DBRS
HotList.

As part of its review, DBRS analyzed the six shadow-rated loans,
the servicer's watchlist, the delinquent loans, the specially
serviced loans and the top ten loans.  Combined, these loans
represent 49.1% of the pool balance.

The ratings actions on the Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ16,
includes:

-- Class A-1, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-1A, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-2, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-3, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-4, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-M, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-MA, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-MFL, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class X-1, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class X-2, confirmed at AAA, stable trend;
-- Class A-JA, downgraded to A (low), stable trend;
-- Class A-J, , downgraded to A (low), stable trend;
-- Class A-JFL, downgraded to A (low), stable trend;
-- Class B, downgraded to BBB (high), stable trend;
-- Class C, downgraded to BBB (high), stable trend;
-- Class D, downgraded to BBB, stable trend;
-- Class E, downgraded to BBB (low), stable trend;
-- Class F, downgraded to BBB (low), stable trend;
-- Class G, downgraded to BB (low), stable trend;
-- Class H, downgraded to B (high), stable trend;
-- Class J, downgraded to B, stable trend;
-- Class K, downgraded to B (low), negative trend;
-- Class L, downgraded to CCC, negative trend;
-- Class M, downgraded to CCC, negative trend;
-- Class N, downgraded to CCC, negative trend.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-IQ13 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 13 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital
I Trust Series 2007-IQ13 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  In addition, Fitch has assigned or revised Rating
Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings, as applicable.  A detailed
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 9.6% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 9.0% including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 60.4% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 19% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature within
the next five years: 9.1% in 2011, 8.2% in 2012, and 1.6% in 2014.
In 2015 and 2016, 77% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 21 Loans of Concern (30.8%) within the pool,
seven of which (4.4%) are specially serviced.  None of the
specially serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15
loans, which comprise 53.3% of the total pool's unpaid principal
balance.  (Note: Fitch considers the transaction's top 15 loan
concentration to include one portfolio of four cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans, in addition to 14 other
individual loans, as ranked by unpaid principal balance.)

Three of the top 15 loans (23.7% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term, with loss severities ranging from
approximately 14% to 33%.  Of the top 15 loans, the largest
contributors (by loan balance) to maturity and term losses are:
75-101 Federal Street (13.0%), RREEF Portfolio (9.1%) and
Northridge I (1.7%).

The 75-101 Federal Street loan (13.0%) is secured by two inter-
connected office buildings comprising a total of 811,687 square
feet (sf) and 196 below-grade parking spaces, located in Boston's
Financial District.  The rent roll consists of over 80 tenants,
none of which represent more than 7% of the space.  As of
Aug.  24, 2009, occupancy had declined to 79.8% (81.2% leased),
from 90.7% at issuance.

At issuance, the in-place underwritten debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for 75-101 Federal Street was 1.05 times (x), while the
Fitch stressed DSCR was 0.86x.  The lender expected that
performance would improve as space leased at below-market rents
were increased to market rates upon lease rollover.  However,
revenues have since declined approximately 15% due to falling
occupancy, and the property's reported net cash flow is
insufficient to service the debt.  A cash flow sweep was triggered
in December 2008, and approximately $139,000 has been collected.
As of Sept. 9, 2009, approximately $3.6 million of reserves were
in place.  The loan sponsor is Aslan Realty Partners III, LLC, an
investment vehicle of Transwestern Investment Company.  Upon
acquisition, the borrower contributed approximately $64 million in
cash equity (23%).

The RREEF Portfolio loan (9.1%) is secured by a portfolio of eight
class A and class B multifamily properties comprising a total of
2,580 units, which are located in five metropolitan areas
throughout the Northern Virginia and Maryland suburbs.  As of
year-end 2008, the portfolio was approximately 94.1% occupied in
the aggregate, compared to 88.3% at issuance.  At issuance, the
loan was underwritten by the lender to 1.00x in-place debt service
coverage.  Performance remains in line with Fitch's expectation at
issuance, which was based on in-place tenancy and cash flow; the
Fitch stressed DSCR was 0.79x and the Fitch stressed loan-to-value
ratio (LTV) was 152.0% when the transaction closed.  However, at
year-end 2008 the property's reported net cash flow remained
approximately 6% below the lender's stabilized figure (which was
expected to be achieved by second-quarter 2007).  The loan
sponsor, RREEF/Bainbridge Companies LLC, contributed approximately
$134 million in cash equity at acquisition, excluding closing
costs (25%).  In addition to the two notes totaling $147 million
in the subject trust, the portfolio also secures pari passu notes
outside of the trust totaling $263 million.

The Northridge I loan (1.7%) is secured by a six-story class A
office property located in the Herndon submarket of Northern
Virginia.  The rent roll consists of seven tenants, the largest of
which is General Services Administration (42.1%, rated 'AAA' by
Fitch).  As of the most recent rent roll (June 30, 2009), the
property had remained 99.5% occupied; however, Time Warner Cable
(33.7%) vacated upon its recent expiration, indicating that the
property is now 65.8% occupied.  Based on the current rent roll,
the Fitch-calculated DSCR is approximately 0.63x when Time Warner
is excluded.  According to servicer reports, the borrower has
stated that there will be limited leasing prospects until the end
of the year.  Significant additional rollover occurs in 2011, the
year prior to loan maturity, when leases representing 62.3% of the
net rentable area expire.  The loan sponsor, Normandy Real Estate
Partners, contributed approximately $6.3 million of cash equity at
acquisition, excluding closing costs (19%).

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
LS ratings and Negative Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $149.6 million class A-J to 'BB/LS-4' from 'AAA';
  -- $32.8 million class B to 'B-/LS-5' from 'AA';
  -- $16.4 million class C to 'B-/LS-5' from 'AA-';
  -- $16.4 million class D to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A';
  -- $14.3 million class E to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A-';
  -- $18.4 million class F to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB+';
  -- $14.3 million class G to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB';
  -- $18.4 million class H to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-';
  -- $8.2 million class J to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+';
  -- $2 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB';
  -- $4.1 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB-';
  -- $6.1 million class M to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B+';
  -- $2 million class N to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B'.

Fitch affirms, assigns an LS rating, and revises the Rating
Outlook of this class:

  -- $163.9 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and
maintains a Stable Outlook:

  -- $29.7 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $470.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $114.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $64 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $448.8 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-Y at 'AAA'.

The $6.1 million class O and the $18.4 million class P are not
rated by Fitch.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Puts Ratings on 2006-XLF Notes on Neg. Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed five classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, Series 2006-XLF on Rating Watch Negative, and revised
Outlooks as shown below.

The Negative Watch and Negative Rating Outlooks are due to
increased loss expectations for the specially serviced assets as
well as upcoming maturities.  One asset, the Laurel Mall (7.4%),
incurred higher than expected losses upon disposition.  The two
additional loans which are in special servicing, the ResortQuest
Kauai (19.8%) and the Holiday Inn - Columbus (11.2%), have both
had recent appraisal reductions that indicate losses as well as
future interest shortfalls.  The Sheraton Delfina (13.7%) loan
matures in 2010 and has no remaining extension options.  Fitch
also expects to see declines in performance of the Sheraton
Delfina since the last reporting period.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $23.7 million class F 'AAA';
  -- $23.7 million class G 'AAA';
  -- $23.7 million class H 'AA+';
  -- $6.8 million class K 'BBB';
  -- $18.5 million class L 'CCC'.

Fitch revises the Rating Outlooks on these classes:

  -- $2 million class N-SDF 'A'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $10.9 million class N-LAF 'A-'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $7.9 million class O-LAF 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-IQ16 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 15 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.  In addition, Fitch has assigned Rating
Outlooks, as applicable.  A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 7.1% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 5.2% including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 59.2% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
Approximately 9.2% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature within
the next five years, with 8.2% maturing in 2012.  In 2017, 90% of
the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 53 Loans of Concern (20.6%) within the pool, nine
of which (6%) are specially serviced.  Two of the specially
serviced loans (4.8%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans,
which comprise 43.9% of the total pool's unpaid principal balance.

Nine of the top 15 loans (20.1% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from approximately 6% to 45%.  Of the top 15 loans, the
largest contributors (by loan balance) to expected term losses
are: Milford Crossing (2.9% of the pool balance), Ashtabula Mall
(1.6%) and the Almafi Hotel (1.4%).

Milford Crossing is collateralized by a 379,685 square foot (sf)
retail center located in Milford, CT.  The center is anchored by
Wal-Mart, on a ground lease.  As of June 2009, occupancy declined
to 88.7% from 97% at issuance due to the closure of Circuit City.
The servicer reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of YE
2008 was 1.15 times.

Ashtabula Mall is secured by 754,882 sf of retail space in an
820,368 sf mall located in Ashtabula, OH.  The tenant-in-common
sponsor is Cabot Investment Properties, LLC.  As of YE 2008, the
occupancy was 71.3% compared to 78.6% at issuance.  Approximately
8.5% of the leases are scheduled to expire prior to year-end 2011.
As of August 2009, $1.4 million remained in the leasing reserve.
The anchor tenants are Sears, Dillard's, JCPenney and Super Kmart.
The anchors, excluding Sears, operate under ground leases.  The
property lost Steve and Barry's (10% of the collateral space) as a
tenant after the company closed all its stores.  The servicer
reported DSCR as of YE 2008 was 1.20x.

The Almafi Hotel transferred to special servicing in March 2009
for imminent default.  The reported occupancy as of June 2009 was
57%.  Occupancy, average daily rate (ADR) and revenue per
available room have all significantly declined since issuance.  A
recent appraisal value indicated a value substantially below the
outstanding debt amount and the special servicer is pursuing
foreclosure.

The largest specially serviced asset, Wyvernwood Garden Apartments
(3.3%), which is located in Los Angeles, CA, transferred to
special servicing in October 2008 for imminent default.  The
borrower is in discussions with the special servicer for a loan
modification.  The borrower reported 95% occupancy as of April
2009.  The loan remains current.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity ratings and Negative Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $131 million class A-J to 'A/LS-3' from 'AAA';
  -- $30 million class A-JFL to 'A/LS-3' from 'AAA';
  -- $33.7 million class A-JA to 'A/LS-3' from 'AAA';
  -- $19.5 million class B to 'A/LS-5' from 'AA+';
  -- $26 million class C to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'AA';
  -- $16.2 million class D to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'AA-';
  -- $38.9 million class E to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A+';
  -- $13 million class F to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A';
  -- $35.7 million class G to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A-';
  -- $26 million class H to 'B/LS-5' from 'BBB+';
  -- $26 million class J to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB';
  -- $32.4 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-';
  -- $9.7 million class L to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB';
  -- $9.7 million class M to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB-';
  -- $9.7 million class N to 'B-/LS-5' from 'B+'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes, assigns LS ratings and
maintains Stable Outlooks:

  -- $43.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $313.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $91.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $83 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $1.28 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-1';
  -- $194.7 billion class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- $20 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- $44.9 million class A-MA at 'AAA/LS-3';
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'.

The $16.2 million class O, $6.5 million class P, $9.7 million
class Q and $29.2 million class S are not rated by Fitch.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 23 2006-HQ10 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 23 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-HQ10, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates including downgrades to 13 tranches.  In
addition, Fitch has assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity
ratings, as applicable.  A detailed list of rating actions follows
at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
6.1% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 4.4% including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 56.9% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
The loans in the reviewed sample accounted for 73% of the
recognized loss in the deal.

Approximately 6.2% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature within
the next five years, with all occurring in 2011.  In 2016, 91.4%
of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 27 Loans of Concern (18.6%) within the pool, five
of which (2.4%) are specially serviced and delinquent.  The
transaction's top 15 loans represent 45% of the pool by unpaid
principal balance.  Two of the Fitch Loans of Concern (7.5%) are
within the transaction's top 15 loans.

Twelve of the top 15 loans (44.2%) are expected to default during
the term or at maturity, with loss severities ranging from 1.8% to
32.3%.  Three of the largest contributors to Fitch expected losses
are: AZ Office/Retail Portfolio (4.9% of the pool), Kings Crossing
Shopping Centre (2.6%) and Norris Furniture & Interiors - Naples
(0.6%).

The AZ Office/Retail Portfolio consists of one retail and two
office properties in Scottsdale, AZ.  Most recent consolidated
occupancy is 73%, per the March 31, 2009 rent rolls, down from 84%
at issuance.  The most recent servicer reported debt service
coverage ratio is 1.17 times (x) as of the first quarter of 2009
(1Q'09), a decrease from 1.58x at origination.  Based on current
performance and anticipated declines in performance, losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2016.

Kings Crossing Shopping Centre is collateralized by a 272,136 SF
retail property in Shreveport, LA.  As of 1Q'09, the subject was
54% occupied and had a 0.91x DSCR due to the vacancy of space by
Circuit City and Linens N Things.  An additional 7% of the
tenants' leases expire in 2010.  Based on current performance and
anticipated declines in performance, along with increasing
vacancies in the area retail market, losses are expected prior to
the loan's maturity in 2016.

The Norris Furniture & Interiors - Naples is a 45,878 SF retail
property located in Naples, FL that is currently in special
servicing.  The property is now 100% vacant and foreclosure is
being filed.  Based on current performance, losses are expected
prior to the loan's maturity in 2016.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
LS ratings and Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $119.3 million class A-J to 'AA/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $31.7 million class B to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.8 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22.4 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.8 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.6 million class F to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.6 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative.

  -- $13 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.6 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.7 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.7 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;
  -- $3.7 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.8 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns a
LS rating and an Outlook to this class:

  -- $5.6 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings and Outlooks to
these classes:

  -- $25.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1; Outlook Stable;
  -- $77.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $62.9 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $610.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $150 million class A-4FL at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $149.1 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $16.8 million class P.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-TOP27 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various actions on Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, series 2007-TOP27.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 2.7% for this transaction should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
2.1%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 2.1% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 42.9% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
The sampled loans represent 53.2% of the recognized losses.

Approximately 20.4% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 0.4% in 2012, 1.9% in 2013, and 5.6% in 2014.  All losses
associated with these loans are fully recognized in the rating
actions.

Fitch identified 17 Loans of Concern (6.9%) within the pool, seven
of which (1.9%) are specially serviced.

None of the loans within the top 15 are expected to default during
the term.  The largest contributors to loss are: Towne Square Mall
(0.9%), Empire Towers (0.5%) and Grand Mart Chicago Portfolio
(VII) (0.5%).

Towne Square Mall is a 357,355 square foot anchored retail center
in Owensboro, Kentucky.  The servicer reported June 2009 debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.06 times and 90%,
respectively.  Based on current performance and anticipated
declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in
2017.

Empire Towers is 136,112 sf office property with an adjacent 5,336
sf retail building located in Glen Burnie, MD.  The loan
transferred to special servicing due to monetary default.  A
recent appraisal indicated a value below the debt amount and
losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Grand Mart Chicago Portfolio (VII) consists of three free-standing
retail centers totaling 193,566 sf located in Illinois.  The loan
transferred to special servicing for payment default.  The three
shopping centers are vacant and all copper has been stripped.  A
recent appraisal indicated a value below the debt amount and
losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Fitch has downgraded, revised the Rating Outlooks and assigned
Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $190.6 million class A-J to 'AA/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $54.5 million class B to 'A/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $30.6 million class C to 'A/LS4' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $30.6 million class D to 'BBB/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $23.8 million class E to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned LS ratings to this class:

  -- $23.8 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $30.6 million class G to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.8 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.4 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3.4 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.8 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.8 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to this class:

  -- $6.8 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) to this:

  -- $3.4 million class O to 'CCC/RR1' from 'CCC'.

Also, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $72.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $287.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $279.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $137.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $112.3 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $172.3 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50.2 million class AW34 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The $23.8 million class P is not rated by Fitch.  Class AW34 is
collateralized by the 330 34th Street asset and is a non-pooled
loan.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2003-TOP11 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of thirteen classes
and downgraded three classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-TOP11.
The downgrades are due to realized losses, increased credit
quality dispersion, anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing and refinancing risk for loans approaching maturity.
Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, mature within the next 12
months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
less than 1.0X.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the September 14, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 24%
to $907.39.0 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 167 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 25% of the pool.  The pool includes five loans with
investment-grade underlying ratings, representing 15% of the pool.
Twenty loans, representing 14% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Seventeen loans, representing 8.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch list.  The watch list includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watch list to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$2.6 million realized loss.  There are currently two loans,
representing 3% of the pool, in special servicing.  The largest
loan is Heritage Pavilion Loan ($21.5 million -- 2.4%), which is
secured by a 263,000 square feet retail property located in
Smyrna, Georgia.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on May 4, 2009 for maturity default.  A one-year extension of the
loan was approved on June 19, 2009 and the loan is currently being
monitoring for a 90-day period pursuant to its return to the
Master Servicer as a Corrected Mortgage Loan.  The property is
anchored by TJ Maxx, Marshall's and American Signature.  As of
March 2009, occupancy was 97% compared to 100% at securitization.
Although the property's performance has been stable, Moody's
valuation reflects a stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns
about retail properties in the current environment.  Moody's loan-
to-value ratio and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.18X, respectively,
compared to 76% and 1.28X at last review.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate loss of $1.5 million for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 97%
of the pool, excluding the defeased loans.  Moody's weighted
average LTV ratio is 71%, essentially the same as at Moody's prior
full review in February 2007.  However, the pool has experienced
increased credit quality dispersion since last review.  Based on
Moody's analysis, 12% of the pool has a LTV ratio greater than
100% compared to 0.3% at last review.  Approximately 7% of the
pool has a LTV ratio in excess of 120% compared to 0% at last
review.

Moody's stressed DSCR for the pool, excluding the defeased loans,
is 1.69X compared to 1.52X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of
56, compared to 60 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Center Tower
Loan ($64.0 million - 7.1%), which is secured by a 462,000 square
foot Class A office building located in Costa Mesa (Orange
County), California.  As of January 2009, the property was 81%
leased, compared to 90% at last review.  The largest tenants are
Latham & Watkins (24% of the net rentable area; lease expiration
July 2015), Sheppard Mullin Richter (14% of the NRA; lease
expiration April 2019) and Lewis, Bisbois, Bisgaar (12% of the
NRA; lease expiration July 2014).  Financial performance has
declined due to higher vacancy and increased expenses.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.63X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.69X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the 516 West
34th Street Loan ($22.9 million -- 2.5%), which is secured by a
264,000 square feet office building located in the Midtown
Manhattan submarket of New York City, New York.  The property is
100% occupied by two tenants: Coach Inc. (91% of the NRA; lease
expiration June 2015) and Forest Electric (9% of the NRA; lease
expiration June 2012).  Performance has improved since last review
due to higher revenues.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.88X, respectively, compared to A2 and
1.71X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the Rexmere
Village MHC Loan ($19.5 million - 2.1%), which is secured by a
774-site manufacturing housing community located in Davie,
Florida.  As of March 2009, occupancy was 94%.  The loan is
interest-only for its entire 10-year term.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Aa3 and 1.71X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.72X at last
review.

The fourth largest loan with an underlying rating is the ITT
Gilfillan Building Loan ($17.7 million - 2.0%), which is secured
by two single-story industrial buildings totaling 278,000 square
feet, located in Van Nuys, California.  The buildings are 100%
leased to ITT Industries Inc. through January 2013.  Performance
has improved due to higher rent.  The loan has amortized 19% since
securitization.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed
DSCR are Aa3 and 2.02X, respectively, compared to A1 and 1.75X at
last review.

The fifth largest loan with an underlying rating is the 9401
Wilshire Boulevard Loan ($14.4 million - 1.6%), which is secured
by a 130,000 square foot office building located in Beverly Hills,
California.  As of January 2009, occupancy was 98% compared to 95%
at last review.  The largest tenant is Ervin, Cohen & Jessup (29%
of the NRA, lease expiration August 2017).  Performance has
improved since last review due to higher rent.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.77X,
respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.56X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the 1333 Broadway Loan ($23.2 million
-- 2.6%), which is secured by a 239,000 square foot Class A office
building located in Oakland, California.  The property was 74%
occupied as of March 2009 compared to 96% at last review.
Occupancy dropped due to Washington Mutual vacating over 60,000
square feet in 2006.  The loan is on the master servicer watch
list due to low DSCR and occupancy.  The near-term loan maturity
date and low DSCR present considerable refinance risk.  Moody's
analysis incorporates a stressed case scenario.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 124% and 0.90X, respectively, compared to 83%
and 1.24X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Monterey Pines Apartments
Loan ($17.2 million -- 1.9%), which is secured by a 286-unit
garden style apartment complex in San Jose, California.  As of
March 2009, occupancy was 91% compared to 97% at last review.
Despite an increase in the vacancy rate, property performance has
been stable.  Nevertheless, Moody's analysis incorporated a higher
vacancy factor and higher capitalization rate due to concerns
about the market and property age.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 77% and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.32X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the East Hanover Properties Loan
($15.7 million -- 1.7%), which is secured by two retail
properties, totaling 168,000 square feet, located in East Hanover,
New Jersey.  As of December 2008, occupancy was 96% compared to
100% at last review.  The major tenants are Loews East Hanover
Cinema (13% of the NRA, lease expiration September 2012) and
Sports Authority (25% of the NRA, lease expiration September
2012).  Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 72% and 1.36X, respectively, essentially the same as at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $40,026,135, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/02/2007

  -- Class A-3, $165,114,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/02/2007

  -- Class A-4, $561,379,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/02/2007

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/02/2007

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/02/2007

  -- Class B, $31,366,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa2 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class C, $32,859,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class D, $13,443,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class E, $14,936,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class F, $7,468,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed at
     Baa2 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class G, $7,468,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed at
     Baa3 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class H, $11,948,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class J, $2,988,000, affirmed at B1; previously affirmed at
     B1 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class K, $2,987,000, downgraded to B3 from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 2/02/2007

  -- Class L, $2,987,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 2/02/2009

  -- Class M, $2,987,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1; previously
     affirmed at Caa1 on 2/02/2007


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-XLF Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch with negative implications its ratings on nine classes
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2006-XLF.

The downgrades reflect S&P's valuations of the three non-specially
serviced loans (61% of the pooled trust balance), which have
declined significantly since S&P's last review.  S&P also
anticipate significant losses on all three specially serviced
loans (39% of the pooled trust balance).  The master servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc., recently informed us that the
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amount for the
specially serviced Holiday Inn - Columbus loan will be
recalculated on the $18.4 million appraisal reduction amount,
which will prompt ongoing interest shortfalls in excess of
$100,000.  These interest shortfalls, coupled with other ASERs and
trust expenses, have significantly reduced the amount of available
interest.  S&P will further evaluate the impact of the interest
distribution on the rated classes once the interest shortfalls
occur, which may be reflected as early as in the September 2009
trustee remittance report.  If S&P determine that the interest
shortfalls will be ongoing and not recovered for an extended
period, S&P may lower the ratings to 'D'.

Details of the three specially serviced loans in the transaction,
with ARAs totaling $34.9 million, for which Standard & Poor's
anticipates significant losses upon eventual resolutions, are:

The Holiday Inn - Columbus loan, the fifth-largest loan in the
pool, had a trust and whole-loan balance of $24.5 million (13% of
the pooled trust balance) as of the Aug. 17, 2009, trustee
remittance report.  This loan, which is in foreclosure, was
transferred to the special servicer, also Midland, on Jan. 25,
2008, due to the following reasons: (1) the termination of the
collateral property's Holiday Inn franchise agreement; (2) a
change in property management; and (3) its Feb. 9, 2008, maturity.
Since the hotel lost its Holiday Inn flag, the loan did not meet
its extension hurdle.  To date, this loan has a total exposure of
$29.1 million.  In addition, the equity interests in the borrower
of the whole loan secure a $10.5 million mezzanine loan.

This loan is secured by a western-themed 337-room hotel resort in
Columbus, Ohio, which includes a 57,700-sq.-ft. indoor water park.
The property is not generating sufficient cash flow to cover
operating expenses and occupancy was reported to be 27% for the
six months ended June 30, 2009.  The property has been marketed
for sale and Midland is currently evaluating an offer.  The
December 2008 appraisal valued the property on an "as is" basis at
a level that is significantly lower than the outstanding debt on
the senior trust balance.  An ARA of $18.4 million is in effect
against this loan.  Based on S&P's discussions with Midland, it is
currently revising its ASER amount, which will likely cause
additional interest shortfalls on the rated certificates.
Although Midland has not declared existing or future advances to
be nonrecoverable at this time, S&P has concerns that future
advances could be nonrecoverable given the total exposure and
revised appraisal valuation on this asset.

The ResortQuest Kauai loan, the third-largest loan in the pool is
90-plus-days delinquent and was transferred to Midland on Jan. 14,
2009, due to imminent default.  This loan has a whole-loan balance
of $43.2 million that is split into a $34.0 million senior pooled
component that makes up 18% of the pooled trust balance and a
$9.2 million junior nonpooled component that is raked to the "N-
RQK" certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's).  In addition,
the equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure two
mezzanine loans totaling $31.2 million, $25.2 million of which has
been funded to date.

This loan, which matured on July 9, 2009, is secured by a 311-
room, full-service hotel in Kapa'a, Hawaii.  According to Midland,
the property is not generating sufficient cash flow to cover
operating expenses and debt service payments.  Midland recently
applied settlement proceeds received from the loan's guarantors to
repay outstanding advances and special servicing fees.  At this
time, no additional funds are expected from the guarantors.
Midland reported a 46% occupancy for the 12 months ended June 30,
2009.  The property, which has substantial deferred maintenance,
is currently being marketed for sale.  The February 2009 appraisal
valued the property on an "as is" basis at a level that is lower
than the outstanding debt on the senior trust balance.  An ARA of
$1.2 million is in effect against this loan.

The Laurel Mall loan, the smallest-loan in the pool, was
transferred to Midland on Nov. 10, 2008, due to imminent default
after the loan became 60-plus-days delinquent.  This loan has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $16.0 million (8% of the pooled
trust balance).  In addition, the equity interests in the borrower
of the whole loan secure a $9.5 million mezzanine loan.  This
loan, which matured on Feb. 9, 2009, is secured by 501,400 sq. ft.
of a 663,400-sq.-ft. regional mall in Laurel, Md.  Midland
indicated that the property is not generating sufficient cash flow
to cover operating expenses and the reported occupancy was 34% as
of May 21, 2009.  The July 2009 appraisal valued the property on
an "as is" basis at a level that is significantly lower than the
outstanding debt on the senior trust balance.  An ARA of
$15.3 million is in effect against this loan.  The note was sold
at a substantial loss in mid-August 2009.  The proceeds from the
note sale are expected to be reflected as early as in the
September 2009 trustee remittance report.

Details of the three non-specially serviced loans are:

The Market Post Tower loan, the largest loan in the pool, has a
trust balance of $50.5 million (27% of the pooled trust balance)
and a whole-loan balance of $58.0 million.  In addition, the
equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure a
$15.0 million mezzanine loan.  This loan is secured by a
294,900-sq.-ft. class A office and telecommunications building in
San Jose, Calif.  The master servicer reported a debt service
coverage (DSC) of 3.42x for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2008, and
93% occupancy as of May 31, 2009.  The loan matures on Nov. 9,
2009, and has one remaining one-year extension option.  Midland
stated that the borrower has submitted a request to exercise its
remaining extension option.  S&P's adjusted valuation has declined
21% since its last review due primarily to higher operating
expenses.

The Lafayette Estates loan, the second-largest loan in the pool,
has a whole-loan balance of $62.0 million that consists of a
$37.2 million senior pooled component (19% of the pooled trust
balance), a $16.8 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the "LAF" raked certificates (not rated by Standard &
Poor's), and a $8.0 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  The loan is secured by two multifamily apartment
complexes containing eight 19-story residential apartment
buildings totaling 1,872 units in Bronx, N.Y.  At issuance, the
borrower planned to convert the units from below-market rental
housing to affordable for-sale housing cooperatives.  According to
Midland, the conversion project is behind schedule; one of the two
complexes is currently being renovated and has received approval
to convert.  As of July 2009, 107 units had been sold.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined significantly since S&P's last
review.  The loan matures on Jan. 9, 2010, and has two six-month
extension options remaining.

The Sheraton Delfina loan, the fourth-largest loan in the pool,
has a trust and whole-loan balance of $30.0 million that is split
into a $28.0 million senior pooled component (15% of the pooled
trust balance) and a $2.0 million subordinate nonpooled component
that is raked to the "N-SDF" certificates.  In addition, the
equity interests in the borrower of the whole loan secure a
$30.0 million mezzanine loan.  The loan, secured by a 307-unit
apartment complex that was converted to a full-service hotel in
Santa Monica, Calif., matures on March 9, 2010, and has one
remaining one-year extension option.  S&P based its hotel analysis
on a review of the borrower's operating statements for the first
six months of 2009, the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2008, and the
borrower's 2009 budget.  S&P's adjusted valuation declined 32%
since its last review.  S&P's analysis factored in its assumption
that the overall average revenue per available room in 2009 in the
industry would decline between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a
recent article.  S&P also considered conditions in the Southern
California lodging market.  According to Smith Travel, the general
U.S. lodging industry posted a 18% decline in RevPAR in the first
seven months of 2009 compared with 2008.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-XLF

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    E        BB+       AAA/Watch Neg                      77.46
    F        B-        AAA/Watch Neg                      65.01
    G        CCC-      AA+/Watch Neg                      52.56
    H        CCC-      A+/Watch Neg                       40.10
    J        CCC-      A/Watch Neg                        27.88
    K        CCC-      BBB+/Watch Neg                     24.29
    L        CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg                      14.58
    N-SDF    CCC-      BB+/Watch Neg                        N/A
    X-1      BB+       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A

                      N/A - Not Applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 24 2007-HQ12 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 24
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three classes from the same transaction
and removed one of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, excluding
loans that S&P stressed as credit concerns, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.01x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 145.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.67x and an LTV
of 195.3%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 94.2% and 54.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude one loan that S&P deemed to be credit
impaired (0.2%).  S&P separately estimated a loss for this loan,
which is included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

S&P's affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Three assets ($99.0 million, 5.1%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR).  One of the assets
($90.0 million, 4.6%) is more than 90 days delinquent and two
($9.0 million, 0.5%) are current.

The 90-day delinquent loan is the sixth-largest in the pool and is
secured by the Four Seasons San Francisco asset.  The loan's
payment status in the August 2009 remittance report was 90-plus-
days delinquent.  This asset has a balance of $90.0 million (4.6%)
and is secured by a mixed-use development that includes a 277-
room, full-service hotel, approximately 61,000 sq. ft. of in-line
retail and restaurant space, and 21,900 sq. ft. of office space in
San Francisco.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.43x, with an occupancy of
80% and an average daily rate of $600.18 at Dec. 31, 2008.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on June 4, 2009, due
to payment default.  The special servicer received a request for a
loan modification on July 24, 2009.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the total pool balance
was $1.95 billion, down slightly from $1.96 billion at issuance.
The number of loans in the pool, at 97, is unchanged since
issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is Wells Fargo
Bank N.A.  The master servicer provided financial information for
99.5% of the pool, and 84.8% of the servicer-provided information
was full-year 2008 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.19x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.01x and 145%, respectively.  To date, the
transaction has not experienced principal losses.  Twenty-seven
loans ($928.4 million, 47.55%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans.  Six loans
($242.7 million, 12.4%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x,
and seven loans ($735.1 million, 37.65%) have reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.  A considerable percentage of the pool (46.1%) matures
in less than three years.  The loans have a weighted average DSC
of 1.01x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.25 billion (64.3%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.12x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 0.84x and
163.1%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ12

                 Rating
                 ------
Class     To               From           Credit enhancement (%)
-----     --               ----           ----------------------
A-2       BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-2FL     BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-3       BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-4       BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-5       BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-1A      BBB              AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
A-M       BB               AAA/Watch Neg              20.06
A-MFL     BB               AAA/Watch Neg              20.06
A-J       B+               AAA/Watch Neg              12.66
A-JFL     B+               AAA/Watch Neg              12.66
B         B+               AA/Watch Neg               10.53
C         B                AA-/Watch Neg               9.40
D         B                A/Watch Neg                 8.15
E         B                A-/Watch Neg                7.40
F         B-               BBB+/Watch Neg              6.14
G         B-               BBB/Watch Neg               5.02
H         B-               BBB-/Watch Neg              3.89
J         B-               BB+/Watch Neg               3.13
K         CCC+             BB/Watch Neg                2.88
L         CCC+             BB-/Watch Neg               2.51
M         CCC+             B+/Watch Neg                2.26
N         CCC              B/Watch Neg                 2.01
O         CCC              B-/Watch Neg                1.76
P         CCC              CCC+/Watch Neg              1.50

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ12

                 Rating
                 ------
Class     To               From           Credit enhancement (%)
-----     --               ----           ----------------------
Q         CCC              CCC/Watch Neg               1.25

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ12
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-HQ12

       Class               Rating     Credit enhancement (%)
       -----               ------     ----------------------
       A-1                 AAA                         30.09
       X                   AAA                           N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IIA Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-' rating on
the class IIA notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC's
series 2007-8, a synthetic corporate investment-grade
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  The rating was
previously on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating withdrawal follows the redemption and cancellation of
the notes pursuant to the Sept. 9, 2009, unwind notice.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                  Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                           Series 2007-8

               Rating                    Balance (mil. $)
               ------                    ----------------
    Class    To      From               Current      Previous
    -----    --      ----               -------      --------
    IIA      NR      CCC-/Watch Neg      0.000         10.000

                          NR - Not rated.


MOSELLE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Moselle CLO S.A.:

  -- EUR85,500,000 Class A-1E Floating Rate Notes due 2020
     (current balance of EUR84,079,922), Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on October 26, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$85,500,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2020
     (current balance of $84,079,922), Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on October 26, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- EUR35,500,000 and US$35,500,000 Class A-1LE Variable
     Principal Notes due 2020 (current balance of EUR34,910,377
     and $34,910,377), Downgraded to Aa3; previously on October
     26, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- EUR13,750,000 Class A-2E Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,750,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- EUR6,800,000 Class A-3E Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,800,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- EUR16,000,000 Class B-1E Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Senior Class A Overcollateralization
Test, the Class A Overcollateralization Test and the Class B-1
Overcollateralization Test.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2586 versus a test level of 2400 as of the last trustee report,
dated July 23, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities held in the portfolio total about $17.7 million,
accounting for roughly 6% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 12% of the
underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments on the
Class A-3E Euro Notes, the Class A-3L US$ Notes, the Class B-1E
Euro Notes and the Class B-1L US$ Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the overcollateralization
tests.

Moody's notes that a significant proportion of the collateral pool
is concentrated in non-U.S. dollar denominated obligations from
issuers in a relatively limited number of industries.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moselle CLO S.A., issued in October 2005, is a multicurrency
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans denominated in U.S. dollars and euros.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MUIR GROVE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Muir Grove CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$372,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on September 27, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$31,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020 (current balance of $17,254,523), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class D and Class E Par Value Tests.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 2876 versus a test level of
2703 as of the last trustee report, dated August 20, 2009.  Based
on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $12.7 million, accounting for roughly 2.6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9.2% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D
Par Value Test was reported at 104.07% versus a test level of
104.80%, and the Class E Par Value Test was reported at 100.14%
versus a test level of 102.20%.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Muir Grove CLO, Ltd., issued in 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NEWSTAR TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NewStar Trust 2005-1:

  -- US$156,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018
     (current balance of $146,519,247), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on August 10, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$80,476,777 Class A-2 Revolving Floating Rate Notes due
     2018 (current balance of $74,795,280), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on August 10, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $18,682,557), Downgraded to A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$39,375,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $39,233,370), Confirmed at Ba1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,375,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $24,287,324), Confirmed at B1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,375,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $24,287,325), Confirmed at Caa2;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor)
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 4023 versus a
test level of 3300 as of the last trustee report, dated July 13,
2009.  Based on the same report, securities rated Caa1 or lower by
Moody's or CCC+ or lower by S&P make up approximately 24.5% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

NewStar Trust 2005-1, issued in August of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Northwoods Capital VI, Limited:

  -- US$402,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 16, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$43,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$49,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3140 versus a test
level of 2993 as of the last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $60.7 million, accounting for roughly
10.2% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 21.2% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Northwoods Capital VI, Limited, issued in March of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Northwoods Capital VII, Limited:

  -- US$162,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on September 19, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Delayed Drawdown Notes
     Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on September 19, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$32,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     (current balance of $10,598,560), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$37,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3098 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 19, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$48 million, accounting for roughly 9.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
14.9% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest
payments on the Class E Notes are presently being deferred due to
the diversion of interest related to the loss replenishment
amount.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Northwoods Capital VII, Limited, issued in September of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NYLIM FLATIRON CLO 2004-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$260,750,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 27, 2004 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2016,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$26,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2016 (current balance of $24,501,068), Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Maximum Rating Factor Test and
Diversity Test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2637 versus a
test level of 2425 as of the last trustee report, dated July 13,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $15.9 million, accounting for
roughly 4.9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 8.5% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

NYLIM FLATIRON CLO 2004-1 Ltd., issued on October 27, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-1 Revolving Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on August 10, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Drawdown Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on August 10, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$180,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on August 10, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2017,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$26,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$28,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Maximum Rating Factor Test and
Diversity Test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2629 versus a
test level of 2478 as of the last trustee report, dated August 3,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $15.1 million, accounting for
roughly 3.95% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 5.95% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2005-1, Ltd., issued on August 10, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCEAN TRAILS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ocean Trails CLO II:

  -- US$12.5M Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded
     to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15M Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15M Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to
     Caa1 (current balance of $13,320,637); previously on March
     17, 2009 downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4.0M Class J Blended Securities Downgraded to Ba2 (current
     balance of $3,404,355); previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2762, as of the last
trustee report, dated August 6, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$11.2 million, accounting for roughly 2.88% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
9.46% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
Some of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-
grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may
herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The downgrade action also reflects Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans and
high-yield corporate bonds will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance collateral as described in the
press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for
rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$24M Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2022,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009 downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

  -- US$14M Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2022, Confirmed at
     Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class B and C Notes
have incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the actions
reflect updated analysis indicating that the impact of these
factors on the ratings of the Class B and C Notes is not as
negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review
in March.  The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-
level analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO
surveillance review, which included an in-depth assessment of
results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an
examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of
comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were
largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

Ocean Trails CLO II issued in June 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners IX,
Ltd.:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$21,200,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These
revised assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated
August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation
that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions are also a result of the underlying portfolio's
moderate credit deterioration.  Such credit deterioration is
observed through an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities and a decline in the average credit rating (as measured
by the weighted average rating factor).  According to the last
trustee report, dated August 17, 2009, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $14.6 million,
accounting for roughly 3.8% of the collateral balance.  Moody's
also notes that based on the same report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2381, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 7% of the underlying portfolio.

Octagon Investment Partners IX, Ltd., issued in May of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PANIOLO CABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on B Notes to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the A3 and Baa2 ratings
of Paniolo Cable Company, LLC's Senior Secured Series A and Second
Lien Series B Notes to Baa3 and Ba2 respectively and placed them
under review for possible further downgrade.  The downgrade
follows the determination by the Federal Communications
Commission's administrative agent, the National Exchange Carrier
Association, to deny the request by Sandwich Isles Communications,
Inc., the lessee of Paniolo's fiber optic network, for recovery of
costs associated with the lease.

Though NECA had already begun reimbursing SIC for its 2009 lease
payments, on May 5, 2009, NECA informed SIC that it had determined
that the costs related to the Paniolo lease "do not appear to meet
the standards of the 'used and useful' doctrine" and it was
thereby denying SIC's request for continued reimbursement of those
costs.  This is the first time NECA has invoked this doctrine to
deny a request by a member for reimbursement of costs, which it
says is necessary because the FCC no longer reviews proposed
projects eligible for such reimbursement for prudency.  On
June 26, SIC filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling with the FCC
requesting that the FCC declare that the lease costs are indeed
"used and useful" and that it direct NECA to reimburse SIC for
those costs.  The FCC is expected to make a ruling in the near
future, but the exact timing is uncertain.

The review will consider the likelihood that the FCC will comply
with SIC's petition that it overturn the NECA decision and direct
NECA to reimburse SIC for those costs in full, along with the
potential impact on SIC's willingness and ability to make lease
payments to Paniolo should the FCC reject SIC's petition in full
or in part.

Paniolo owns a fiber optic network connecting the Hawaiian Home
Lands on six Hawaiian Islands.  The Home Lands are geographically
isolated, sparsely inhabited, underserved and underprivileged.
Paniolo's debt is secured by lease payments from SIC, a Hawaiian
based Rural Local Exchange Carrier licensed and obligated to serve
the Hawaiian Home Lands.  SIC in turn expected to receive cost
recovery payments from NECA.  NECA is a not-for-profit corporation
mandated by the FCC to administer for the FCC's interstate access
charge system and associated revenue pools, which support
telephone companies operating in underserved areas.  Subject to
FCC approval, NECA sets the interstate access rate to be charged
to interstate access customers, collects these charges from
members, and redistributes them to those members whose costs
exceed their revenues.  SIC's revenues derive almost entirely from
payments from NECA.  Construction of the Paniolo network, which
was undertaken by ClearCom, SIC's sister company and a competitive
local exhange carrier, was completed about two weeks ahead of
schedule.  The project achieved Provisional System Acceptance on
August 3.

Both NECA and SIC have made arguments to the FCC supporting their
respective positions and refuting the other parties' arguments.
NECA has asserted that the capacity of the network far exceeds
reasonably expected demand and that there were more economical
alternatives available to SIC to fulfill its obligations to
provide service.  Finally, NECA sites concerns it has regarding
the possibility that SIC might permit ClearCom to utilize the
network's excess capacity to serve unregulated traffic.  SIC has
disputed these claims, contending that the project will only serve
regulated traffic for its first five years and arguing that the
incremental costs associated with the extra capacity are minimal
due to the high fixed costs involved in constructing a network in
such challenging terrain and that the alternatives were both
inadequate and not as economic as NECA indicates.

The last rating action on Paniolo was on April 15, 2008, when the
Baa2 rating was assigned to the Second Lien Series B Notes.  The
A3 rating was previously assigned to the Senior Secured Series A
Notes on February 26, 2008.

Paniolo's rating was assigned by evaluating factors believed to be
relevant to the credit profile of the issuer.  These attributes
were compared against other issuers both within and outside of
Paniolo's core peer group and Paniolo's rating is believed to be
comparable to ratings assigned to other issuers of similar credit
risk.

Paniolo Cable Company, LLC, is a limited liability company, formed
under the laws of the State of Delaware, specifically to undertake
the Hawaiian submarine telecommunication system project.


PYXIS ABS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of 2006-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades six classes of notes issued by Pyxis ABS
CDO 2006-1 Ltd.  In Fitch's opinion, default of the class A-1, A-
2, B, C, D and X notes is inevitable at or prior to their
maturity.  The details of the rating action follow at the end of
this press release.

Pyxis 2006-1 declared an event of default on Dec. 4, 2008 and
received the required majority of votes to accelerate the
transaction as of July 6, 2009.  The rating actions reflect the
continued deterioration in the quality of the portfolio since
Pyxis 2006-1 was last reviewed.

According to the Sept. 3, 2009 trustee report, approximately 94.7%
of the portfolio is considered defaulted.  Currently, excess
spread after the class A-2 interest distribution and all principal
proceeds are being used to redeem the outstanding swap
counterparty amount due to the acceleration.  However, based on
the degree of undercollateralization in the transaction and
Fitch's recovery expectations on the defaulted portion of the
portfolio, the class A-1 notes are not expected to receive any
principal repayment in the future.

The class A-1 and A-2 notes are likely to continue receiving
interest distributions, while the class B, C, D, and X notes are
not expected to receive any interest or principal distributions
going forward.

Pyxis 2006-1 is a hybrid cash and synthetic collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Oct. 3, 2006, and is managed by Putnam
Advisory Company, LLC.  The portfolio is comprised of
approximately 93.8% residential mortgage-backed securities and
6.2% structured finance CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded these:

Pyxis ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.

  -- $180,000,000 class A-1 notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $113,500,000 class A-2 notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $93,500,000 class B notes d to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $89,387,063 class C notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $34,359,406 class D notes to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $39,806,388 class X notes to 'C' from 'CC'.


REGATTA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Regatta Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$31,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due June 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $19.6 million, accounting for
roughly 3.9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 9.43% of the underlying portfolio,
based on the latest trustee report dated August 5, 2009.  Moody's
also notes that according to the same report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2595.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due June 2020,
     Upgraded to Baa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due June 2020,
     Upgraded to Ba2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due June 2020,
     Upgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class A-3L, B-1L and
B-2L Notes have incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well
as credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the
actions reflect updated analysis indicating that the impact of
these factors on the ratings of the Class A-3L, B-1L, and B-2L
Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of
the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

Regatta Funding Ltd., issued in March 29, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RFMSI SERIES: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-15 Notes to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
A-15 issued by RFMSI Series 2007-S4 Trust by raising it to 'B'
from 'CCC'.

On June 15, 2009, as a result of an administrative error, S&P
lowered the rating on class A-15 to 'CCC' from 'AA' and removed
the rating from CreditWatch with negative implications, as part of
a larger U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed securities
review that S&P conducted.  However, according to S&P's criteria,
the certificate has sufficient credit support to receive a 'B'
rating.  To maintain a 'B' rating (the base case), S&P assess
whether a class can withstand losses equal to the base-case loss
assumption.

                         Rating Corrected

                    RFMSI Series 2007-S4 Trust

                                Rating
                                ------
            Class    Current    June 15    Pre-June 15
            -----    -------    -------    -----------
            A-15     B          CCC        AA/Watch Neg


SALOMON BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2000-C3 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from the Salomon
Bros. Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3 transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
five classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades primarily reflect credit concerns with the
specially serviced assets and two loans that S&P deemed to be
credit impaired.  S&P expects eventual losses on these assets to
contribute to credit erosion in the future.  S&P lowered its
ratings on classes M and N to 'D' to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls.  The shortfalls are largely due to an appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction resulting from an $11.8 million
appraisal reduction amount in effect against the largest specially
serviced asset in the pool.  S&P expects the shortfalls to recur
in the future.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in S&P's view, provide
adequate credit support through various stress scenarios.  S&P
affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only certificate based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the
IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Six assets ($75.3 million, 12%) in the pool are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. A breakdown of the special-
serviced loans is: one asset is real estate owned (REO)
($20.9 million); two assets are past maturity ($24.4 million); one
asset is 90-plus days delinquent ($8.3 million); one asset is 30-
plus days delinquent ($.89 million); and one asset is current
($20.7 million).  Two assets have ARAs in effect in the amount of
$15.9 million.  Five of the specially serviced assets have a
balance greater than or equal to 1% of the total pool balance,
while the remaining loan has a balance that is less than 0.1% of
the total pool balance.

Five of the top 10 nondefeased assets in the pool are with the
special servicer.  This includes the largest as well as the
second-, fourth-, eighth-, and ninth-largest assets.  The largest
asset in the pool, Joirie Plaza ($20.9 million, 3.2%) was
initially transferred to the special servicer in September 2008
for imminent default.  The asset is secured by a 191,666-sq.-ft.
office building, located in Oak Brook, Ill., built in 1961 and
renovated in 1999.  Title to the property was obtained via a deed-
in-lieu on July 28, 2009.  Based on an Aug. 31, 2008, rent roll,
the property was 30.6% occupied.  S&P expects a significant loss
upon the eventual resolution of this asset.  The second-largest
loan in the pool, Westland Meadows ($20.7 million, 3.2%) was
initially placed on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
covenant compliance violation and was transferred to the special
servicer on Aug. 17, 2009, for imminent default.  The loan is
secured by a 774-pad mobile home park, built in 1985 and located
in Westland, Mich.  Based on a Sept. 30, 2008, rent roll, the
property was 83% occupied.  S&P expects a significant loss upon
the resolution of this loan.

The fourth-, eighth-, and ninth-largest loans in the pool are with
the special servicer due to various reasons and were stressed
accordingly in S&P's analysis.  The fourth-largest loan
($16.2 million, 2.5%) is with the special servicer due to a
maturity default; it matured on Sept. 1, 2008.  The loan is
secured by a 256,942-sq.-ft.-anchored retail center located in
Hooksett, N.H.  The eighth-largest loan ($8.3 million, 1.3%) is
with the special servicer due to imminent default; it is more than
90 days past due.  The loan is secured by a 127-room full-service
hotel located in Norwalk, Conn.  The ninth-largest loan
($8.2 million, 1.3%) is with the special servicer due to a
maturity default; it matured on July 9, 2009, and a large tenant
recently vacated the premises.  The loan is secured by a 326,014-
sq.-ft. industrial building located in Catano, Puerto Rico.  In
addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P deemed two loans
(4.4%) to be credit impaired and stressed them in S&P's analysis.
The loans have issues with respect to occupancy: major tenants
have recently vacated the premises in each of these properties.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 122 assets with an aggregate trust balance of
$654.4 million, compared with 180 loans and a balance of
$914.7 million at issuance.  Thirty-four loans (47.8% of pool)
have been defeased.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services
Inc., provided financial information for 97.8% of the nondefeased
loans by balance, and 77.6% of the servicer-provided information
was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average debt service coverage of 1.24x for the
nondefeased loans based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and loan-to-value were 1.35x and 108.21%, respectively.  The
adjusted DSC excludes the defeased, specially serviced, and two
aforementioned credit-impaired loans.  S&P ran its 'AAA' stress
scenario on the portion of the pool that was not defeased,
specially serviced, or credit impaired.  The implied defaults and
loss severity for these loans were 26.0% and 35.9%, respectively.

The transaction has experienced eight principal losses
($15.6 million, 2%) to date.  Twenty-nine loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist ($106.2 million, 16%).  Twenty-three loans
($121.9 million, 19%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, and 21 of
these loans ($111.4 million, 17%) have reported DSC of less than
1.0x.  Seventy-three loans totaling $307.3 million (47%) have
near-term maturity dates, maturing during the years 2009 and 2010.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 nondefeased exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $139.9 million (21%).  Using servicer-reported numbers,
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of
1.18x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.47x
and 65.77%, respectively; these calculations exclude the
aforementioned top 10 loans that are with the special servicer.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --        ----           ----------------------
    E         A         AA/Watch Neg                    13.35
    F         BB+       AA-/Watch Neg                   11.25
    G         B+        A-/Watch Neg                     9.16
    H         CCC+      BB+/Watch Neg                    4.96
    J         CCC       BB/Watch Neg                     3.91
    K         CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg                    3.04
    L         CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                     1.47
    M         D         CCC+/Watch Neg                   0.77
    N         D         CCC/Watch Neg                    0.24

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --        ----           ----------------------
    D         AA+       AA+/Watch Neg                   15.45

                         Ratings Affirmed

        Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class   Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------   ----------------------
             A-2     AAA                       29.77
             B       AAA                       23.13
             C       AAA                       17.54
             X       AAA                         N/A


SANKATY HIGH: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed its
ratings of these notes issued by Sankaty High Yield Partners II,
L.P.:

  -- US$45,000,000 Class A-2 Second Senior Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2009, Confirmed at B1; previously on Oct 24, 2008
     Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2009, Confirmed at B1; previously on Oct 24, 2008
     Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, Sankaty High Yield Partners II, L.P., issued
in November of 1999, is a market value collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by bank loans and high yield bonds.
The rating actions taken on the notes take into account that the
holders of the Class A-2 notes became the controlling class of the
transaction following a redemption in full of the Class A-1 notes
and the Senior Facility, which were the most senior obligations of
the issuer.  The Sankaty High Yield Partners II obligations were
accelerated in November of 2008 following the occurrence of an
event of default caused by the failure of the transaction to
comply with certain over-collateralization tests in October of
2008.  Since then, Sankaty Advisors LLC has been managing the
collateral on behalf of the holders of the Senior Facility and the
Class A-1 notes through the sale of assets in the portfolio.  As a
result, the Class A-1 notes and the Senior Facility were redeemed
in full in April of 2009.

Moody's explained that the rating actions take into consideration
a significant level of market value over-collateralization in the
transaction for the Class A-2 notes but also the risk of the
transaction experiencing a default on its payment obligations to
the outstanding Class A-2 notes on the legal final maturity date
on November 30, 2009.

Based on the trustee report, dated August 27, 2009, the Class A-2
Notes were over-collateralized by approximately $80 million or
417% of the Class A-2 outstanding principal amount.  This
calculation is based on Moody's Class A-2 advance rates specified
in the transaction documents.  Based on the revised assumptions
described in the MV CLO rating methodology publication cited
below, the Class A-2 Notes were over-collateralized by
approximately $62 million or 340% of the outstanding principal
amount.  The level of over-collateralization in the transaction is
one indicative measure of the sufficiency of the collateral should
the controlling class decide to liquidate within the exposure
period that was assumed in the calculation of the advance rates.
The severity of loss may be different depending on the timing and
outcome of a liquidation beyond the assumed exposure period.

Despite the level of over-collateralization, Moody's has also
considered a likelihood that the underlying collateral will not be
sold in time to repay the obligations of the Class A-2 notes by
the legal final maturity date.  Under the transaction's governing
documents, the controlling class has the right to direct the
secured parties' representative to liquidate the collateral
securing payment of the issuer's secured obligations in any
commercially reasonable manner.  As of this date, the Class A-2
noteholders have not directed the collateral to be liquidated.
Sankaty Advisors LLC continues to manage the portfolio of Sankaty
II on behalf of the Class A-2 noteholders.

For these reasons, Moody's has taken the Class A-2 notes off of
watch for possible downgrade, but otherwise left the notes at the
same rating level.


SARGAS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Sargas CLO I:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Notes, Upgraded to A3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Notes, Upgraded to B1; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$7,750,000 Class A-2A Notes, Confirmed at Aa2; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$3,250,000 Class A-2B Notes, Confirmed at Aa2; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Type I Composite Notes (Current Balance of
     $3,532,769), Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has downgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$2,000,000 Type II Composite Notes (Current Balance of
     $1,567,620), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class B, Class C,
and Class D and the rating confirmations on the Class A-2A, Class
A-2B Notes and Type I Composite notes consider updated analysis
incorporating certain rating stresses assumed by Moody's
(discussed below) and credit deterioration, but reflect Moody's
conclusion that the impact of these factors on the ratings of the
notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of
the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach (see
press release dated March 4, 2009, titled "Moody's puts all but
senior-most CLO tranches on review for downgrade").

The downgrade action on the Type II Composite Notes incorporates
Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default probability
and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

Sargas CLO I, issued in August of 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of broadly syndicated
senior secured loans and senior secured loans of middle market
issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes issued by Seawall SPC's series 2008 CMBS CDO-1, BSCMS 2007-
PW17, MLCFC 2007-7, and 2008 CMBS CDO-9 and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.  All four deals are U.S. synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

The ratings on the tranches from series 2008 CMBS CDO-1 and BSCMS
2007-PW17 are directly linked to the rating on the class A-J
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR17.  The ratings on the tranches from series MLCFC
2007-7 and 2008 CMBS CDO-9 are directly linked to the rating on
the class AJ certificates from ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-7.  S&P downgraded both commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions in conjunction with S&P's rating actions on CMBS on
Sept. 9, 2009.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                            Seawall SPC
US$62,125,964 series 2008 CMBS CDO-1 class A floating rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                    To                  From
    -----                    --                  ----
    Notes                    BB                  AAA/Watch Neg

                           Seawall SPC
US$31,062,982 series BSCMS 2007-PW17 class AJ floating rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                    To                  From
    -----                    --                  ----
    Notes                    BB                  AAA/Watch Neg


                           Seawall SPC
   US$31,062,982 series MLCFC 2007-7 class AJ floating rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                    To                  From
    -----                    --                  ----
    Notes                    B+                  AAA/Watch Neg


                           Seawall SPC
  US$62,125,964 series 2008 CMBS CDO-9 class A floating rate notes

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                    To                  From
    -----                    --                  ----
    Notes                    B+                  AAA/Watch Neg


STANFIELD VANTAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stanfield Vantage CLO, Ltd.

  -- US$327,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
          Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 16, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$12,800,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
          Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
          Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
          Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
          Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
          2017, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009
          Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
          Downgrade;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
          2017, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 18, 2009
          Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
          Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2564 versus a test
level of 2400 as of the last trustee report, dated August 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $11.3 million, accounting for roughly
2.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 14.7% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's
also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in
debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real
estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more
strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Stanfield Vantage CLO, Ltd., issued on March 16, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STRATA TRUST: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes issued by STRATA Trust Ltd.'s series 2006-14, 2006-15, 2006-
16, 2006-17, and 2006-18.  These transactions were synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligations.

The rating withdrawals follow the redemption of the notes in full.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                           STRATA Trust

                                    Rating
                                    ------
         Series         Class     To      From
         ------         -----     --      ----
         2006-14        Notes     NR      BB+
         2006-15        Notes     NR      B+
         2006-16        Notes     NR      BB-
         2006-17        Notes     NR      CCC+/Watch Neg
         2006-18        Notes     NR      BB-/Watch Neg

                          NR - Not rated.


SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Symphony CLO V, Ltd.:

  -- US$311,300,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024 Notes, Downgraded to A1; previously on December 13,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024 Notes, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,240,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024 Notes, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2024 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2024 Notes, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2991 versus a test
level of 2581 as of the last trustee report, dated August 18,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $22.9 million, accounting for
roughly 5.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 11.9% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Symphony CLO V, Ltd., issued in December 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Symphony CLO III, Ltd.:

  -- US$204,300,000 Class A-1a Senior Notes Due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 29, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,700,000 Class A-1b Senior Notes Due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Revolving Notes Due 2019
     Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 29, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$1,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019 Notes, Downgraded
     to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019
     Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019
     Notes, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2019 Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2870 versus a test
level of 2743 as of the last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $24 million, accounting for roughly 5.8%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 10.4% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Symphony CLO III, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


TIERS CORPORATE: S&P Corrects Ratings on $100 Mil. Certs. at 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on TIERS
Corporate Bond-Backed Certificates Trust's $100 million
certificates series AGC 1997-10 by affirming the 'B' rating and
removing the rating from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where it was placed March 4, 2009.

The rating on the series AGC 1997-10 certificates is linked to the
rating on American General Institutional Capital B's 8.125%
capital trust preferred securities ('B'; the underlying asset).

The rating action reflects the March 2, 2009, affirmation of S&P's
rating on the underlying asset and S&P's removal of that rating
from CreditWatch negative, where it was placed Oct. 3, 2008.  S&P
did not take rating action on the series AGC 1997-10 certificates
contemporaneously with the action on the underlying asset due to a
delay in S&P's analytical process.


TRIBECA PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Tribeca Park CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$25M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10M Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Upgraded to B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate amount of credit
deterioration.  Moody's notes that as of the latest trustee report
dated as of August 8, 2009, the weighted average rating factor is
2747, defaulted securities total about $13.62 million, accounting
for roughly 3.39% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 8.4% of the underlying
portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated
concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

The upgrade actions on the Class B, C, and D Notes are also a
result of the issuance of additional Subordinated Notes.  On
July 6, 2009, the issuer issued such notes in the aggregate
principal amount of $12,470,257, which provides the positive
benefit of increased collateralization.  In analyzing the
implications of this enhancement, Moody's concluded that the
mezzanine and junior notes would be subject to a positive ratings
impact.

Tribeca Park CLO Ltd., issued in May of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating.


TRIMARAN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Trimaran CLO IV:

  -- US$258,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on September 29, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2017, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2017, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2017, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2017, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflects mild credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's notes that as of the latest trustee report dated
August 20, 2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2390,
defaulted securities total about $9.1 million, accounting for
roughly 2.6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.12% of the underlying portfolio.

Trimaran CLO IV, issued in September of 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


TRIMARAN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Trimaran CLO V Ltd.:

  -- US$33M Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11M Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Confirmed at Aaa; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17M Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12M Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect moderate credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
Moody's notes that as of the latest trustee report dated as of
August 5, 2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2276,
defaulted securities total about $11.99 million, accounting for
roughly 4.12% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 5.59% of the underlying portfolio.

Trimaran CLO V Ltd., issued in February of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


VENTURE VIII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Venture VIII CDO, Limited:

  -- US$4,500,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$47,675,000 Class A-2B Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on June 14, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$46,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$32,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021 ,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Interest Reinvestment Test.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2484 as of the last trustee report,
dated August 12, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$42.8 million, accounting for roughly 5.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
8% of the underlying portfolio.  The Interest Reinvestment Test
was reported at 101.20% versus a test level of 101.80%.  Moody's
also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in
debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real
estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more
strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress
factors to default probability assumptions for structured finance
asset collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's
CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Venture VIII CDO, Limited, issued in June of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WACHOVIA AUTO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-A Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed one class of
Wachovia Auto Owner Trust 2006-A:

  -- Class A-4 notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

The rating action reflects the continued stabilization of
cumulative net loss performance and the building credit
enhancement in the transaction.  Through month 38 (the July
collection period), the pool factor was 21.5%, total 30+ days
delinquencies stood at 6.93% and CNLs were 3.21%.

Fitch's current analysis of the transaction incorporates updated
stresses of the revised base case CNL assumptions, the timing of
the remaining losses and various prepayment assumptions.  Based on
these new expectations, Fitch believes that current available
credit enhancement supports multiples consistent with the upgraded
rating.

The transaction was initially issued in June 2006.  Fitch
downgraded the class A-4 notes to 'AA' from 'AAA' and the class B
notes to 'BB+' from 'BBB' on Feb. 1, 2008, as delinquency and loss
performance was much weaker than initial expectations.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 19 classes on Rating Watch Negative and
revised the Rating Outlook on one class from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-Whale 8.

The ratings changes are due to Fitch's expectation that hotel
performance will continue to be impacted by the economic downturn.
The pool is comprised of 95% hotel loans.  While year-end 2008
performance had generally declined only slightly from YE 2007,
Fitch expects second quarter and YE 2009 to show significant
declines.  In addition, the loans consist of resort, luxury and
extended stay hotels, which have been among the most severely
impacted by the downturn.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $61.6 million class B 'AA-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $47.5 million class C 'A+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $71.2 million class D 'A'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $46.6 million class E 'A-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $46.6 million class F 'BBB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $46.6 million class G 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $30.4 million class H 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $10.1 million class J 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5.2 million class K 'B+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $12.5 million class L 'B'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $53.0 million class LXR-1 'BB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $70.8 million class LXR-2 'BB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $1.9 million class AP-1 'B-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5.0 million class AP-2 'B-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $3.8 million class LP-1 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $9.1 million class LP-2 'BB-; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $2.1 million class LP-3 'B+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $3.6 million class MH-1 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative.

In addition, Fitch revises the Outlook on this class:

  -- $345.4 million class A-2 at 'AA'; Outlook Negative.

This class remains on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $3.3 million class FSN-1 'B-'; Rating Watch Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $776.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Interest-only class X-1A has been paid in full.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Puts Ratings on 14 Classes Notes on WatchNeg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 14 classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2006-Whale 7 on Rating Watch Negative.

The Negative Watch is due to Fitch's expectation that hotel
performance will continue to be affected by the economic downturn.
The pool is comprised of 76% hotel loans.  While year-end 2008
performance had generally declined only slightly from YE 2007,
Fitch expects second-quarter and YE 2009 to show significant
declines.  In addition, five of the six hotel loans in the pool
are collateralized by either resort or limited service properties,
which have been among the most severely impacted by the downturn.

Fitch has placed these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $98.6 million class B 'AA+';
  -- $95 million class C 'AA';
  -- $76.8 million class D 'AA';
  -- $75.2 million class E 'AA-';
  -- $70.4 million class F 'A+';
  -- $71.8 million class G 'A';
  -- $64.9 million class H 'BBB';
  -- $21.9 million class J 'BB+';
  -- $68.9 million class KH-1 'BB';
  -- $54.1 million class KH-2 'BB-';
  -- $18 million class BH-1 'A-';
  -- $28 million class BH-2 'BBB+';
  -- $56 million class BH-3 'BBB-';
  -- $46 million class BH-4 'BB+.

These three classes remain on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $25.4 million class K 'BB';
  -- $28.3 million class L 'BB-';
  -- $3.3 million class WA 'B'.

Additionally Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $1.1 billion class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $573.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-1B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2 million class BP-1 at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.2 million class BP-2 at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5 million class WB at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.3 million class MB-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class MB-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class MB-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.5 million class MB-4 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.2 million class CM at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

Classes UV and X-1A have paid in full.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 2007-C31 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on five classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.24x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 131.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.67x and an LTV of 190.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 98.2% and 49.7%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude two (2.2%) of the seven specially serviced loans and one
credit impaired loan (4.3%).  S&P separately estimated losses for
these loans, which are included in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the
IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Seven loans ($298.9 million, 5.1%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. The payment status of the
loans are: one is in foreclosure ($122.5 million, 2.1%), three are
more than 90 days delinquent ($13.3 million, 0.2%), two are 30
days delinquent ($137.6 million, 2.4%), and one is less than 30
days delinquent ($25.6 million, 0.4%).  Four of the specially
serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$35.3 million.  Two of the specially serviced loans have balances
that are greater than 2.0% of the pool, and the remaining
specially serviced loans have balances that are less than 0.5% of
the total pool balance.  In addition to the specially serviced
loans, S&P deem one loan, the Peter Cooper Village & Stuyvesant
Town Pool loan ($247.7 million, 4.3%), to be credit impaired and
is discussed below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 189 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$5.82 billion, which represents approximately 99.5% of the trust
balance at issuance.  No loans have paid off Or have been
liquidated since issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction, Wachovia Bank N.A., provided financial information
for 95.3% of the pool; 92.4% of the financial information was
full-year 2008 data or interim 2009 data.  S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.20x for the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.24x and 131.9%,
respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude two of
the seven specially serviced loans and one credit impaired loan.
S&P estimated losses separately for these three loans
($373.7 million, 6.4%).  Based on the servicer reported DSC
figures, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 0.76x for these
three loans.  Thirty-one loans (38.2%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including six of the top 10 loans.  Twenty-
eight loans ($2.2 billion, 38.3%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x,
and 18 of these loans ($1.5 billion, 26.5%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$2.60 billion (44.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.02x,
which excludes one loan that is not required to report financial
information since it is a credit tenant loan subject to a 30-year
lease.  Six of the top 10 loans ($1.9 billion, 32.7%) appear on
the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans, excluding the one credit impaired loan and the
one loan that is not required to report, are 1.10x and 153.3%,
respectively.

The Peter Cooper Village & Stuyvesant Town Pool loan is the fifth-
largest loan in the pool and the largest credit impaired loan.
The loan is current, has a trust balance of $247.7 million (4.3%),
and has a whole-loan balance of $3.0 billion.  In addition, the
borrower's equity interest is secured by $1.4 billion of mezzanine
debt.  The whole loan is secured by a 110-building apartment
complex consisting of 11,227 market-rent and rent-stabilized units
in New York.  The year-end 2008 DSC was 0.69x and the occupancy
was 97%.  The current balance of the debt service reserve is
$49.3 million, and is likely to be depleted by the end of the
year.  In addition, S&P is awaiting a ruling by the New York State
Court of Appeals on whether properties receiving New York City
real estate tax benefits are permitted to decontrol rent
stabilized apartments pursuant to New York State rent
stabilization law.  Currently, the
master servicer is holding the rent differential from decontrolled
rent stabilized units in a separate escrow account.  The court is
expected to issue the ruling in October 2009.  S&P will evaluate
any impact this ruling may have on the future performance of the
property.

The Five Times Square loan is the largest loan in the pool and the
largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a trust balance of
$536.0 million (9.2%) and a whole-loan balance of $1.13 billion.
The loan appears on the watchlist because its DSC is less than
1.10x.  The loan is secured by a 1.1 million-sq.-ft.  office
building in New York.  The year-end 2008 DSC was 0.96x and
occupancy was 99%, down from 1.11x and 100% at issuance.

The Beacon D.C. & Seattle Portfolio loan is the second-largest
loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the watchlist.
The loan has a trust balance of $414.0 million (7.1%) and a whole-
loan balance of $2.7 billion.  The loan appears on the watchlist
because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The loan is secured by 16
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties, the
pledge of a mortgage on one office property and the related cash
flows, and a covenant to deposit cash flows from three office
properties that totals 9.8 million sq. ft. of space.  The year-end
2008 DSC was 1.08x and occupancy was 93%, down from 1.27x and 97%
at issuance.  For the six months ending June 30, 2009, the
reported occupancy was 90% and the DSC increased to 1.12x.  The
loan has been removed from the September 2009 watchlist.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----            ----------------------
      A-4       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.15
      A-5       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.15
      A-5FL     BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.15
      A-1A      BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.15
      A-M       BB+    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.10
      A-J       B+     AAA/Watch Neg                    12.19
      B         B+     AA+/Watch Neg                    11.56
      C         B+     AA/Watch Neg                     10.30
      D         B      AA-/Watch Neg                     9.05
      E         B      A+/Watch Neg                      8.54
      F         B      A/Watch Neg                       7.66
      G         B-     A-/Watch Neg                      6.66
      H         B-     BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.28
      J         B-     BBB/Watch Neg                     4.40
      K         CCC+   BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.27
      L         CCC+   BB/Watch Neg                      2.76
      M         CCC+   BB-/Watch Neg                     2.51
      N         CCC    B+/Watch Neg                      2.14

                         Ratings Affirmed

     Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C31
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                        30.15
            A-2       AAA                        30.15
            A-3       AAA                        30.15
            A-PB      AAA                        30.15
            IO        AAA                          N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 2007-C32 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C32 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on six classes from the same transaction and
removed four of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of the pooled specially
serviced loans, as well as S&P's analysis of loans that S&P has
determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.33x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 126.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.70x and an LTV of 181.4%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 98.7% and 49.7%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude five (2.2%) of the eight specially serviced loans and
three credit-impaired loans (4.6%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for these loans, which are included in S&P's 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed its rating on the interest-only certificate based on
its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the
IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Eight loans ($109.3 million, 2.9%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment
status of the loans is: one is in foreclosure ($29.5 million,
0.8%), five are more than 90 days delinquent ($68.9  million,
1.8%), and two have bankrupt borrowers and are less than 30 days
delinquent ($10.9 million, 0.3%).  Five of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$41.9 million.  All specially serviced loans have balances that
are less than 1.0% of the total pool balance.  In addition to the
specially serviced loans, S&P considered three loans to be credit-
impaired, including one top 10 loan, Centerside II ($89.3 million,
2.3%).  This loan is discussed below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $3.816 billion, down from $3.823 billion at issuance.
The number of loans in the pool, at 142, is unchanged since
issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction, Wachovia Bank
N.A., provided financial information for 99.2% of the pool; 95.2%
of the financial information was full-year 2008 data or interim
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.26x for the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.33x and 126.4%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude five of the eight specially serviced loans and
three credit-impaired loans.  S&P estimated losses separately for
these eight loans ($258.65 million, 6.8%).  Based on the servicer-
reported DSC figures, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
0.72x for these eight loans.  As of the August 2009 remittance
report, 41 loans (51.5%) were on the master servicer's watchlist,
including five of the top 10 loans.  Thirty-eight loans
($1.63 billion, 42.8%) had a reported DSC below 1.10x, and 24 of
these loans ($869.9 million, 22.8%) had a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.75 billion (45.8%).  Using servicer-reported numbers from the
Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.27x.  Five of the top 10
loans ($1.1 billion, 29.5%) appeared on the master servicer's
August 2009 watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
loans, excluding the one credit-impaired loan, are 1.38x and
123.6%, respectively.

The Centerside II loan is the 10th-largest loan in the pool.  The
loan is current and has a trust balance of $89.3 million (2.3%)
and a whole-loan balance of $119.3 million.  The loan appears on
the watchlist because its DSC is less than 1.10x.  The property
lost several large tenants in the beginning of this year, and
leasing activity has been slow.  Currently, the master servicer is
monitoring this loan and communicating with the borrower about
leasing strategies.  For the 12 months ended June 30, 2009, DSC
was 0.54x and occupancy was 63.1%, down from 1.66x and 88.7% at
issuance.  Given the occupancy issues, S&P considers this loan to
be credit-impaired and more susceptible to default.

The Beacon D.C. & Seattle Portfolio loan is the largest loan in
the pool and the largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a
trust balance of $414.0 million (7.1%) and a whole-loan balance of
$2.7 billion.  The loan appears on the watchlist because its DSC
is less than 1.10x.  The loan is secured by 16 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office properties, the pledge
of a mortgage on one office property (and the related cash flows),
and a covenant to deposit cash flows from three office properties
that total 9.8 million sq. ft. of space.  As of year-end 2008, the
DSC was 1.08x and occupancy was 93%, down from 1.27x and 97% at
issuance.  For the six months ended June 30, 2009, the reported
occupancy was 90% and the DSC had increased to 1.12x.  The master
servicer has indicated that the loan will be removed from the
September 2009 watchlist.

The ING Hospitality Pool loan is the second-largest loan in the
pool and the second-largest loan on the watchlist.  The loan has a
trust balance of $283.85 million (7.4%) and a whole-loan balance
of $567.7 million.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to the
poor inspection report for the Residence Inn Chicago-Deerfield
($6.0 million allocated loan balance).  The loan is secured by the
fee interest in 46 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
extended-stay hotels in 18 states.  The year-end 2008 DSC for the
portfolio was 1.86x.  According to the borrower, the guest rooms
at the Residence Inn Chicago-Deerfield are in the process of being
renovated.  Through discussions with the master servicer, S&P has
learned that this loan will likely be removed from the October
2009 watchlist.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----            ----------------------
      A-3       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.06
      A-1A      BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.06
      A-4FL     BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.06
      A-MFL     BB+    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.04
      A-J       BB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    13.40
      B         B+     AA+/Watch Neg                    12.27
      C         B+     AA/Watch Neg                     11.02
      D         B      AA-/Watch Neg                    10.27
      E         B      A+/Watch Neg                      9.52
      F         B      A/Watch Neg                       8.52
      G         B-     BBB+/Watch Neg                    7.39
      H         B-     BBB/Watch Neg                     6.14
      J         B-     BB+/Watch Neg                     4.76
      K         CCC+   BB-/Watch Neg                     3.88
      L         CCC    B/Watch Neg                       3.38
      M         CCC-   B-/Watch Neg                      3.13
      N         CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg                    2.76
      O         CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg                     2.50

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----            ----------------------
      A-2       AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                    30.06
      A-PB      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                    30.06
      P         CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg                    2.25
      Q         CCC-   CCC-/Watch Neg                    2.00

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C32

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                        30.06
            IO        AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-OA4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of residential mortgage pass-through certificates from
Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series
2007-OA4 Trust, including the ratings on classes B-3 and B-4,
which S&P lowered to 'D'.  S&P removed two of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades of classes B-3 and B-4 to 'D' reflect S&P's
assessment of principal write-downs on these classes during recent
remittance periods.

The remaining downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected
credit support for the affected classes is insufficient to
maintain the previous ratings, given S&P's current projected
losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its
base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P's also lowered S&P's ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls or write-downs in the final period of
particular cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have
experienced any principal shortfalls or write-downs in any of the
prior periods of the particular stress scenario; however, the
structural mechanics of the transaction created circumstances in
which one or more classes within a transaction may have relied on
principal proceeds to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier
periods, thus resulting in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group, or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance
that is insufficient to cover the necessary interest obligations
of the related liabilities.

Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, the available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final payment period, a situation may occur in which
available funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and
principal requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as
principal in prior periods was used to satisfy interest
obligations.  Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior
certificates can be exposed to this risk due to the fact that
structures may pay principal pro rata with senior support classes.
Although the senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any
of the prior periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

Subordination, overcollateralization (prior to its depletion), and
excess spread provide credit support for this transaction.  The
underlying pool of loans backing this transaction consists of
option adjustable-rate mortgage Alternative-A mortgage loans.

                          Rating Actions

    Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT
                      Series 2007-OA4 Trust

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1A       93936MAA3     B                    AAA
    A-1B       93936MAB1     CCC                  AA
    A-1C       93936MAC9     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    A-1D       93936MAD7     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    B-1        93936MAF2     CC                   CCC
    B-2        93936MAG0     CC                   CCC
    B-3        93936MAH8     D                    CCC
    B-4        93936MAJ4     D                    CCC


WATERFRONT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Waterfront CLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$19,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class D Overcollateralization Test.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 2776 versus a test level of
2430 as of the last trustee report, dated August 6, 2009.  Based
on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $13.2 million, accounting for roughly 4.5%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 12.7% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D
Overcollateralization Test was reported at 100.37% versus a test
level of 101.19%.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability (including certain stresses
pertaining to credit estimates) and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Waterfront CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in August of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from WAVE 2007-1.  Three of the lowered ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, and S&P removed two of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
S&P's rating actions on 17 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-1.
The certificates are from 11 transactions totaling $859.5 million
(43% of the pool balance).  Three of the ratings on WAVE 2007-1
remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure
to CMBS collateral that is currently on CreditWatch negative
($880 million, 44%).

According to the Aug. 31, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 is
collateralized by 31 CMBS certificates ($2 billion, 100%) from 31
distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  According to the trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 has
significant exposure to Standard & Poor's downgraded CMBS
including to these:

* CD 2007-CD4 Mortgage Trust (class A-J; $100 million, 5%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 (class A-J;
  $100 million, 5%);

* COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 (class A-J;
  $98.8 million, 4.9%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
  (class A-M; $89.9 million, 4.5%); and

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7 (class A-J;
  $84 million, 4.2%).

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on WAVE 2007-1 in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                            WAVE 2007-1

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              BBB/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
         A-2              B+/Watch Neg     AA/Watch Neg
         B                CCC/Watch Neg    A-/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                           WAVE 2007-1

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         C                CCC-             BBB+/Watch Neg
         D                CCC-             BB+/Watch Neg


WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from WAVE 2007-1's series 2007-2.  Seven of the lowered
ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, and S&P
removed two of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
S&P's rating actions on 26 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-2.
The certificates are from 13 transactions totaling $857.1 million
(28.6% of the pool balance).  Seven of the ratings on WAVE 2007-2
remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure
to CMBS collateral that is on CreditWatch negative ($1.61 billion,
54%).

According to the Aug. 31, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 is
collateralized by 31 CMBS certificates ($2 billion, 100%) from 31
distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  According to the trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 has
significant exposure to Standard & Poor's downgraded CMBS
including to these:

* CD 2007-CD4 Mortgage Trust (class A-J; $100 million, 5%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 (class A-J;
  $100 million, 5%);

* COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 (class A-J;
  $98.8 million, 4.9%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
  (class A-M; $89.9 million, 4.5%); and

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7 (class A-J;
  $84 million, 4.2%).

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on WAVE 2007-1 in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                            WAVE 2007-1
                           Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A-1              AA-/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
         A-2              A/Watch Neg      AA+/Watch Neg
         B                BBB+/Watch Neg   AA+/Watch Neg
         CFL              BB/Watch Neg     A-/Watch Neg
         CFX              BB/Watch Neg     A-/Watch Neg
         DFL              B-/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
         DFX              B-/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                            WAVE 2007-1
                           Series 2007-2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         EFL              CCC-             BB+/Watch Neg
         EFX              CCC-             BB+/Watch Neg


WAVE 2007-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Series 2007-3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from WAVE 2007-1's series 2007-3.  The lowered ratings
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
S&P's rating actions on six commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for WAVE 2007-3.
The certificates are from six transactions totaling $138.9 million
(13.9% of the pool balance).  The ratings on WAVE 2007-3 remain on
CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure to CMBS
collateral that is on CreditWatch negative ($755.4 million, 76%).

According to the Aug. 31, 2009, trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 is
collateralized by 31 CMBS certificates ($2 billion, 100%) from 31
distinct transactions issued in 2006 and 2007.  The transaction
failed its class A-1 overcollateralization test due to downgraded
CMBS collateral.  According to the trustee report, WAVE 2007-1 has
significant exposure to Standard & Poor's downgraded CMBS
including to these:

* CD 2007-CD4 Mortgage Trust (class A-J; $100 million, 5%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1 (class A-J;
  $100 million, 5%);

* COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 (class A-J;
  $98.8 million, 4.9%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
  (class A-M;

* $89.9 million, 4.5%); and

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7 (class A-J;
  $84 million, 4.2%).

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on WAVE 2007-1 in conjunction with S&P's CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.

       Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                            WAVE 2007-1
                           Series 2007-3

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          A-1              AA+/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
          A-2              A/Watch Neg      AA/Watch Neg
          B                BB/Watch Neg     A-/Watch Neg
          C                BB-/Watch Neg    BBB+/Watch Neg
          D                CCC/Watch Neg    BB/Watch Neg


JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two 2008-R4 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes of certificates from J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2008-R4.
S&P initially rated certificates for groups 2 and 3 out of the
three group structure within JPMorgan 2008-R4.  S&P lowered the
ratings on class 2-A-2 to 'CCC' from 'BBB', and S&P lowered the
rating on class 3-A-2 to 'CCC' from 'BB-'.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on classes 2-A-1 and 3-A-1.  The
downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in performance of
the loans backing the underlying certificates.  Although this
performance deterioration is severe, because classes 2-A-2 and 3-
A-2 provide additional credit enhancement to classes 2-A-1 and 3-
A-1, respectively, the credit enhancement within JPMorgan 2008-R4
is sufficient to maintain the ratings on classes 2-A-1 and 3-A-1.

JPMorgan 2008-R4, which closed in December 2008, is a re-
securitized real estate mortgage investment conduit RMBS
transaction, collateralized by four underlying classes that
support three independent groups within the re-REMIC.  On the
closing date, S&P only rated certificates for collateral groups 2
and 3 within JPMorgan 2008-R4.

Classes 2-A-1 and 2-A-2 from JPMorgan 2008-R4 are supported by
class III-A-1 from RFMSI Series 2006-SA4 Trust (currently rated
'CCC').  The collateral securing the III-A-1 certificate from this
trust consists predominantly of interest-only, adjustable-rate
prime mortgage loans.  This pool had experienced losses amounting
to 3.20% of the original pool balance as of the August 2009
distribution, and currently has delinquencies amounting to
approximately 21.70% of the current pool balance.  Based on the
losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.582 (58.2%), which
represents the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the
original pool balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's
current projected loss for this pool is 10.2%, which exceeds the
level of credit enhancement available to cover losses to the 2-A-2
class of the re-REMIC.

Classes 3-A-1 and 3-A-2 from JPMorgan 2008-R4 are supported by
classes 2-A-2 and 2-A-3 from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2007-HY6 Trust (both classes are currently
rated 'CCC').  The collateral securing the class 2-A-2 and 2-A-3
certificates from this trust consists predominantly of adjustable-
rate Alternative-A mortgage loans.  This pool had experienced
losses amounting to 1.18% of the original pool balance as of the
August 2009 distribution, and currently has delinquencies
amounting to approximately 20.73% of the current pool balance.
Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.81
(81.0%), and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current
projected loss for this pool is 10.6%, which exceeds the level of
credit enhancement available to cover losses to the 3-A-2 class of
the re-REMIC.

Over the past two years, S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S. RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Ratings Lowered

                J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2008-R4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A-2      46633AAD7     CCC                  BBB
        3-A-2      46633AAH8     CCC                  BB-

                         Ratings Affirmed

                J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2008-R4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-A-1      46633AAC9     AAA
                 3-A-1      46633AAG0     AAA


* Fitch Puts Ratings on 28 Classes by Eight CDOs on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed 28 classes in eight collateralized debt
obligations backed primarily by trust preferred securities and
subordinated debt issued by real estate investment trusts,
homebuilders, and specialty finance companies on Rating Watch
Negative.

Fitch's rating actions are the result of a combination of
deterioration of principal and interest coverage for some
transactions and negative portfolio credit migration in other
transactions.  Principal coverage has deteriorated primarily
through defaults while debt exchanges and defaults were
responsible for interest coverage deterioration.  Three of the
eight REIT TruPS CDOs placed on Rating Watch are currently failing
senior overcollateralization or interest coverage tests.

Negative credit migration has resulted from rating downgrades,
defaults and deferrals.  For the eight CDOs with notes placed on
Rating Watch, on average 9.8% of their portfolios has been
downgraded since January 2009.

Between January and July 2009, Fitch has observed 22 unique
issuers restructure or exchange their debt across these eight
Fitch-rated REIT TruPS CDOs.  On average, nearly 17.3% of the
portfolios have undergone an exchange, which have resulted in an
average increase in portfolio notional of $4.1 million.  At the
same time, the weighted average coupon for these portfolios
decreased from an average of 6.5% to 4.9% while the weighted
average spreads decreased from an average of 2.5% to 2.3%.
Issuers that participated in the exchanges have shadow ratings
centered in the 'CCC' category.

Resolution of the current Rating Watch Negative status will
consider the potential implications of observed defaults,
expectations for further debt exchanges undertaken by the asset
manager and additional ratings downgrades.

Fitch has taken these actions:

Attentus CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$237,211,012 class A-1 first priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due May 2036, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$20,000,000 class A-2 second priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due May 2036, 'B' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative.

Attentus CDO III, Ltd.

  -- US$124,960,315 class A-1A first priority delayed draw senior
     secured floating rate notes due 2042, 'A' placed on Rating
     Watch Negative;

  -- US$100,000,000 class A-2 third priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2042, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$34,335,562 class B fourth priority deferrable secured
     floating rate notes due 2042, 'B' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative.

Kodiak CDO I, Ltd./Corp

  -- US$276,106,781 class A-1 first priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2039, 'BBB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$103,500,000 class A-2 second priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2039, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$83,000,000 class B third priority senior secured floating
     rate notes due 2039, 'B' placed on Rating Watch Negative.

Kodiak CDO II, Ltd./Corp

  -- US$323,564,830 class A-1 senior secured floating rate notes
     due 2042, 'BBB' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$53,000,000 class A-2 senior secured floating rate notes
     due 2042, 'BB+' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$80,000,000 class A-3 senior secured floating rate notes
     due 2042, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$81,000,000 class B-1 senior secured floating rate notes
     due 2039, 'B' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$5,000,000 class B-2 senior secured fixed/floating rate
     notes due 2042, 'B' placed on Rating Watch Negative.

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING I, LTD

  -- US$303,296,877 class A-1A first priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2035, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$12,779,363 class A-1B first priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2035, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative.

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING V, LTD

  -- US$92,080,228 class A-1LA floating rate notes due August
     2036, 'BB+' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$230,200,567 class A-1LAD delayed draw floating rate notes
     due August 2036 , 'BB+' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$60,000,000 class A-1LB floating rate notes due August
     2036, 'B' placed on Rating Watch Negative.

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING VIII, LTD

  -- US$154,228,747 class A-1A first priority delayed draw senior
     secured floating rate notes due 2037, 'BBB' placed on Rating
     Watch Negative;

  -- US$207,244,881 class A-1B first priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2037, 'BBB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$120,000,000 class A-2 second priority senior secured
     floating rate notes due 2037, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$75,000,000 class B deferrable third priority secured
     floating rate notes due 2037, 'B' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$40,000,000 class C deferrable fourth priority secured
     floating rate notes due 2037, 'B-' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative.

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING IX, LTD

  -- US$267,969,723 class A-1LA first priority delayed draw
     floating rate notes due 2038, 'BBB' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative;

  -- US$97,443,536 class A-1LAD first priority floating rate notes
     due 2038, 'BBB' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$116,000,000 class A-1LB second priority floating rate
     notes due 2038, 'BB' placed on Rating Watch Negative

  -- US$25,000,000 class A-2LA third priority floating rate notes
     due 2038, 'B+' placed on Rating Watch Negative;

  -- US$53,325,440 class A-2LB deferrable fourth priority floating
     rate notes due 2038, 'B' placed on Rating Watch Negative.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches From Two CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
tranches from two U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligation
transactions.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on five tranches from
two transactions.  The ratings on four of the downgraded tranches
are on CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating a
significant likelihood of further downgrades.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including an
increase in the amount of defaulted assets in the transactions'
collateral pools, as well as deterioration in the overall credit
quality of the performing assets within the respective collateral
pools.  An increase in downgrades of speculative-grade U.S.
companies has resulted in an increase in the proportion of 'CCC'
and 'CC' rated assets in the underlying portfolios held within the
collateral pools.

The five downgraded U.S. cash flow CDO tranches have a total
issuance amount $1.167 billion.  One of the affected transactions
is a CDO of CDOs that was collateralized at origination primarily
by notes from collateralized loan obligation transactions.  The
other transaction is a cash flow collateralized bond obligation
transaction.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                                     Rating
                                                     ------
  Transaction                           Class  To             From
  -----------                           -----  --             ----
Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.     A-1    BBB/Watch Neg  AAA/Watch Neg
Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.     A-2    CCC/Watch Neg  AA/Watch Neg
Castle Hill III CLO Ltd.              RmkdCrt AAA/NR        AAA/A-1+
CBO Holdings III Series Angel CDO II  A-1    NR             AA
CBO Holdings III Series Angel CDO II  A-2    NR             A
CBO Holdings III Series Angel CDO II  B-1    NR             BBB
CBO Holdings III Series Angel CDO II  B-2    NR             BB
Pioneer Valley Struct Credit CDO I    A-1A   CCC-/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
Pioneer Valley Struct Credit CDO I    A-2    CC             CCC+/WatchNeg
Pioneer Valley Struct Credit CDO I    X      BB/Watch Neg   AAA

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

      Transaction                             Class  Rating
      -----------                             -----  ------
      Pioneer Valley Structured Credit CDO I  B      CC
      Pioneer Valley Structured Credit CDO I  C      CC
      Pioneer Valley Structured Credit CDO I  D      CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 Tranches From Seven Hybrid CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
tranches from seven U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed five of
the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
S&P's ratings on three of the downgraded tranches remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating a significant
likelihood of further downgrades.  These 10 tranches have a total
issuance amount of $4.273 billion.  At the same time, S&P lowered
its ratings on three tranches from one U.S. synthetic CDO
transaction, which have a total issuance amount of $337 million.

Four of the seven affected U.S. cash flow and hybrid CDO
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities and other SF
securities.  Two of the seven transactions are high-grade SF CDOs
of ABS that were collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA'
through 'A' rated tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The
other transaction is a retranching of other CDO tranches.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and recent negative rating actions on U.S. subprime
RMBS.  The CreditWatch placements primarily affect transactions
for which a significant portion of the collateral assets currently
have ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications or have
significant exposure to assets rated in the
'CCC' category.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
Transaction                   Class     To              From
-----------                   -----     --              ----
Commodore CDO II Ltd.         A-1MM     BB/A-1/WatchNeg AA/A-1/WatchNeg
Commodore CDO II Ltd.         A-2 (a)   CC              B+/Watch Neg
Commodore CDO II Ltd.         A-2 (b)   CC              B+/Watch Neg
Forge ABS High Grade CDO I    A1        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Ischus Synthetic              X         CCC             B+/Watch Neg
  ABS CDO 2006-1
Ixion HELD 2006-1             Series 1  CC              BBB
Ixion HELD 2006-1             Series 2  CC              BBB-
Ixion HELD 2006-1             Series 3  CC              BB
Klio Structured Investments   C         CC              BBB
  2005-1
Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.         S1VF      CCC/Watch Neg   B/Watch Neg
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.    A-1       CC              CCC-
Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.    F         CC              B-/Watch Neg
Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.         I         CCC-/Watch Neg  BB+/Watch Neg

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

        Transaction                       Class     Rating
        -----------                       -----     ------
        Commodore CDO II Ltd.             B         CC
        Commodore CDO II Ltd.             C         CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        A2        CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        A3        CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        A4        CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        B         CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        C         CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        D         CC
        Forge ABS High Grade CDO I        E         CC
        Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1   A-1LB     CC
        Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1   A-2L      CC
        Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1   A-3L      CC
        Ischus Synthetic ABS CDO 2006-1   B-1L      CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             A1        CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             A2        CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             A3        CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             B         CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             C         CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             Combo Nts CC
        Long Hill 2006-1 Ltd.             S2T       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        A-2       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        A3A       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        A3B       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        B1A       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        B1B       CC
        Tierra Alta Funding I Ltd.        C         CC
        Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.             II        CC
        Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.             III       CC
        Tourmaline CDO I Ltd.             IV        CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches From Tobacco Manufacturers
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
tranches and affirmed its ratings on 57 tranches from 19 trusts
backed by payments from participating tobacco manufacturers under
the Master Settlement Agreement.  At the same time, S&P removed
all of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications and
assigned negative outlooks to all of the affected ratings.  The
negative outlooks reflect S&P's opinion that significant industry
and litigation event risks will likely be present in these deals
for approximately five years or more.

The downgrades and affirmations follow Standard & Poor's revisions
of its base-case and stress-case volume decline assumptions for
U.S. cigarette sales and S&P's stress-case assumptions for
domestic cigarette manufacturer market share.  The revisions to
S&P's criteria assumptions followed the passage of federal
legislation that resulted in a $0.62-per-pack increase in the
federal tax on cigarettes, to $1.01 from $0.39.  The government
implemented the tax increase, which went into effect on April 1,
2009, to help expand funding for the Children's Health Insurance
Program.

In S&P's review of the underlying ratings, S&P considered
qualitative and quantitative factors, including its view of
current industry trends and developments; litigation event risks;
MSA payments due and made by the participating tobacco
manufacturers; actual annual volume declines in cigarette
consumption; and the current market share of the participating
manufacturers.  In addition, S&P ran various cash flow stress
scenarios using its revised volume decline and market share
assumptions.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the classes that were
able to withstand S&P's stress tests at their current rating
levels.  The classes that S&P downgraded exhibited an inability to
pay timely interest or full principal under the stresses
commensurate with their prior rating levels.  Consequently, S&P
downgraded these classes to rating levels commensurate with the
stress they could withstand.

S&P downgraded the A and B classes from California County Tobacco
Securitization Agency (Gold Country Settlement Funding Corp.) to
'B+' from 'BBB'.  In S&P's view, Gold Country Settlement Funding
Corp. is unlike the other affected transactions in that it has
payment priorities such that the B class capital appreciation bond
receives principal payments, while the A class current interest-
paying bond is locked out from any principal distributions until
the B class is paid in full.  Failure to pay principal at maturity
constitutes an event of default under the transaction's indenture,
and if an EOD occurs, principal payments are distributed pro rata
among the classes.  S&P's assessment of the combination of the
transaction's structure and more stressful assumptions resulted in
the downgrade of both classes to 'B+'.

   Negative Outlook On Remaining Tobacco Settlement-Backed Bonds

S&P's negative outlooks on all of the remaining rated tobacco
settlement-backed bonds reflect S&P's belief that significant
industry and litigation event risks will be likely present for
approximately five years or more, which could lead to downgrades
in the future.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

         Buckeye Tobacco Settlement Financing Authority
US$5,531 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2007

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
2007A-2   6/01/2024  200.000                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2024  949.530                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2030  687.600                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2034  505.200                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2042  250.000                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2047  750.000                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-2   6/01/2047  1383.72                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007A-3   6/01/2037  274.751                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg

         California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
              (Fresno County Tobacco Funding Corp.)
US$93 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2002

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
  2035     6/01/2035   35.265               BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2038     6/01/2038   18.500               BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg

          California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
             (Gold Country Settlement Funding Corp.)
US$59 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2006

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
  2006A    6/01/2046  45.000                B+/Negative    BBB/Watch Neg
  2006B    6/01/2033  14.372                B+/Negative    BBB/Watch Neg

         California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
               (Kern County Tobacco Funding Corp.)
       US$105 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                        series 2002 A B C

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
  2002A    6/01/2043  40.960                BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2002B    6/01/2037  29.010                BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg

         California County Tobacco Securitization Agency
         (Sonoma County Settlement Securitization Corp.)
US$83 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2005-1

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
  2005     6/01/2026  9.920                 BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005     6/01/2038  31.045                BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005     6/01/2045  27.260                BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg

              Erie Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.
US$83 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2005

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --             ----
  2005A    6/01/2038  74.685                BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005A    6/01/2045  111.480               BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg

             Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corp.
US$4,446 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2007

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
  2007A-1  6/01/2027  863.100               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007A-1  6/01/2033  610.525               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007A-2  6/01/2037  389.193               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007A-1  6/01/2047  1250.000              BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007A-1  6/01/2047  693.750               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007-B   6/01/2047  271.957               BB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2007-C   6/01/2047   78.547               BB-/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg

                Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa)
       US$839 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                       series 2005 A B C D

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)  To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------  --             ----
  2005A    6/01/2046  229.910              BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005B    6/01/2034  159.369              BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005C    6/01/2033  103.475              BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005C    6/01/2042  135.120              BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005C    6/01/2046  174.130              BBB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
  2005D    6/01/2046   15.775              BBB-/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg

          Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority
       US$490 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                        series 2006 A B C

                                                  Rating
                                                  ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)  To             From
  -----    --------    ---------------------  --             ----
  2006A    6/01/2034  363.115 mil          BBB/Negative    BBB/Watch Neg

           Michigan Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority
       US$523 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                         series 2007 A B C

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
2007A    6/01/2034   112.855                BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007A    6/01/2048   290.0855               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-B   6/01/2052   35.650                 BB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007-C   6/01/2052   7.217                  BB-/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg

                New York Counties Tobacco Trust IV
       US$539 million tobacco settlement pass-through bonds
                        series 2005 A B C

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
2005A    6/01/2042  84.975                  BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2005A    6/01/2045  83.875                  BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg

         Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp. (New Jersey)
      US$3,622 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                           series 2007-1

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
2007-1A  6/01/2023  623.710                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1A  6/01/2026  287.620                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1A  6/01/2029  332.270                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1A  6/01/2034  672.945                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1A  6/01/2041  1263.590                BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1B  6/01/2041  126.198                 BB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007-1C  6/01/2041  59.785                  BB-/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg

         Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp. (Rhode Island)
       US$685 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                      series 2002A and 2002B

                                                     Rating
                                                     ------
   Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To           From
   -----    --------    ---------------------   --           ----
2002-A   6/01/2042  371.700                 BBB/Negative BBB/Watch Neg

         Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp. (Rhode Island)
US$194 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2007

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To           From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --           ----
  2007A    6/01/2052  176.194                BB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2007B    6/01/2052  17.336                 BB-/Negative BBB-/Watch Neg

     Tobacco Securitization Corporation of Northern California
           US$255 million asset backed bonds series 2005

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
2005A-1  6/01/2023   45.825                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2005A-1  6/01/2038   87.290                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2005A-1  6/01/2045   86.570                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2005A-2  6/01/2027   12.469                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2005B    6/01/2045   11.674                 BB+/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg
2005C    6/01/2045   11.659                 BB-/Negative  BB/Watch Neg

        San Diego County Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.
US$558 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2006

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
  2006A    6/01/2025  111.860               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006A    6/01/2037  186.440               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006A    6/01/2046  236.310               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006B    6/01/2046  19.770                BBB-/Negative BBB/Watch Neg
  2006C    6/01/2046  8.686                 BB+/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg
  2006D    6/01/2046  20.565                BB-/Negative  BB/Watch Neg

                            TSASC Inc.
      US$1,361 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                           series 2006-1

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
  2006     6/01/2022  284.070               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006     6/01/2026  137.765               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006     6/01/2034  372.650               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2006     6/01/2042  559.025               BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg

              Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp. (VA)
$1,149 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2007

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
2007A-1  6/01/2046   682.650                BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007B-1  6/01/2047   335.625                BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007B-2  6/01/2047   26.808                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
2007-C   6/01/2047   77.104                 BB/Negative   BBB/Watch Neg
2007-D   6/01/2047   27.086                 BB-/Negative  BBB-/Watch Neg

          Westchester Tobacco Asset Securitization Corp.
  $216 million tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds series 2005

                                                    Rating
                                                    ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To            From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --            ----
  2005     6/01/2021   29.600                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2005     6/01/2026   24.100                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2005     6/01/2038   81.200                 BBB/Negative  BBB/Watch Neg
  2005     6/01/2045   81.700                 BBB-/Negative BBB/Watch Neg

       Tobacco Settlement Finance Authority (West Virginia)
   US$911 million taxable tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds
                           series 2007

                                                   Rating
                                                   ------
  Class    Maturity    Original bal.(mil. $)   To           From
  -----    --------    ---------------------   --           ----
  2007A    6/01/2047  845.810                 BBB/Negative BBB/Watch Neg
  2007B    6/01/2047  65.332                  BB+/Negative BBB-/Watch Neg


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 130 Classes From Four Prime Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 130
classes from four U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 2005 and 2006 and removed 23 of
the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine classes from
these transactions and removed six of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each prime
jumbo transaction rated in 2005 and 2006.  S&P derived these
losses using the criteria that S&P outlined in "Standard & Poor's
Revises U.S. Prime Jumbo RMBS Lifetime Loss Projections For
Transactions Issued In 2005, 2006, And 2007," published June 16,
2009.  S&P's lifetime projected losses have changed for each of
the transactions in this release:

                                    Orig. bal.       Lifetime
  Transaction                       (mil. $)         exp. loss (%)
  -----------                       ----------       -------------
CHL Mtg Pass-Through Trust 2006-16    1,000            6.40
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9F         686            4.90
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9F         138            7.61
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F         539            5.93
Structured Asset Sec. Corp.Trust
2005-15                               1,048            2.83

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the projected credit
support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.  For more
information about the methodology S&P used to review these
transactions, see the "Related Research" section of this press
release.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviews the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class.  In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assesses whether the class can withstand the base-case loss
assumptions S&P uses in its analysis.  To maintain an 'AAA'
rating, S&P assesses whether the class can withstand approximately
235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual
caps and qualitative factors applied to specific transactions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assesses whether the class can withstand losses
exceeding the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to
each rating category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
130% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 155% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance that is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the ndercollateralized
group, available interest may not be sufficient to satisfy the
undercollateralized group's interest requirement.  Therefore, the
principal portion of available funds may be used to satisfy
interest obligations based on the interest-principal payment
priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, the senior class could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien,
prime jumbo mortgage loans.

                          Rating Actions

                CHL Mtg Pass-Through Trust 2006-16

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      170257AA7     CCC                  B
        1-X        170257AB5     CCC                  B
        2-A-1      170257AC3     CCC                  B
        2-X        170257AD1     CCC                  B
        3-A-1      170257AE9     CCC                  B
        3-A-2      170257AF6     CCC                  B
        3-A-3      170257AG4     CCC                  B
        3-A-4      170257AH2     CCC                  B
        3-A-5      170257AJ8     CCC                  B
        3-A-6      170257AK5     CCC                  B
        3-A-7      170257AV1     CCC                  B
        3-X        170257AL3     CCC                  B
        PO         170257AM1     CCC                  B
        M-1        170257AP4     CC                   CCC

                  GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-9F

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1A-1       362341Q36     CCC                  AAA
        1A-2       362341Q44     CCC                  AAA
        1A-3       362341Q51     CCC                  AAA
        1A-4       362341Q69     CCC                  AAA
        1A-5       362341Q77     CCC                  AAA
        1A-6       362341Q85     CCC                  AAA
        1A-7       362341Q93     CCC                  AAA
        1A-9       362341R35     CCC                  AAA
        1A-10      362341R43     CCC                  AAA
        1A-11      362341R50     CCC                  AAA
        1A-12      362341R68     CCC                  AAA
        1A-13      362341R76     CCC                  AAA
        1A-14      362341R84     CCC                  AAA
        1A-15      362341R92     CCC                  AAA
        1A-16      362341X46     CCC                  AAA
        2A-1       362341S26     CCC                  AAA
        2A-2       362341S34     CCC                  AAA
        2A-3       362341S42     CCC                  AAA
        2A-4       362341S59     CCC                  AAA
        2A-5       362341S67     CCC                  AAA
        2A-6       362341S75     CCC                  AAA
        2A-7       362341S83     CCC                  AAA
        2A-8       362341S91     CCC                  AAA
        3A-1       362341T25     CCC                  AAA
        3A-2       362341T33     CCC                  AAA
        3A-3       362341T41     CCC                  AAA
        1A-P       362341U56     CCC                  AAA
        1A-X       362341U72     CCC                  AAA
        4A-1       362341T58     CCC                  AAA
        4A-2       362341T66     CCC                  AAA
        5A-1       362341T74     CCC                  AAA
        5A-2       362341T82     CCC                  AAA
        6A-1       362341T90     CCC                  AAA
        6A-2       362341U23     CCC                  AAA
        2A-X       362341U80     CCC                  AAA
        2A-P       362341U64     CCC                  AAA

                  GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1A-2       3623416J3     A                    AAA
        1A-3       3623416K0     B                    BBB-
        1A-5       3623416M6     B                    BBB-
        1A-6       3623416N4     B                    BBB-
        1A-7       3623416P9     B                    BBB-
        1A-8       3623416Q7     B                    BBB-
        1A-10      3623416S3     B                    BBB-
        1A-11      3623416T1     B                    BBB-
        1A-13      3623416V6     B                    BBB-
        1A-14      3623416W4     B                    BBB-
        1A-16      3623416Y0     B                    BBB-
        1A-17      3623418W2     B                    BBB-
        2A-2       3623417A1     B                    BBB-
        2A-3       3623417B9     B                    BBB-
        2A-4       3623417C7     B                    BBB-
        2A-5       3623417D5     B                    AAA
        2A-6       3623417000    B                    BBB-
        2A-7       3623417F0     B                    A
        2A-8       3623417G8     B                    A
        2A-9       3623417H6     B                    AAA
        2A-10      3623417J2     B                    BBB-
        2A-11      3623417K9     B                    BBB-
        2A-12      3623417L7     B                    BBB-
        2A-14      3623417N3     B                    BBB-
        2A-15      3623417P8     B                    BBB-
        2A-16      362334AN4     B                    AAA
        2A-17      362334AP9     B                    BBB-
        3A-1       3623417Q6     CCC                  BBB-
        3A-2       3623417R4     CCC                  BBB-
        7A-1       3623418J1     CCC                  BBB-
        7A-2       3623418K8     CCC                  BBB-
        1A-P       3623418L6     B                    BBB-
        2A-P       3623418M4     B                    BBB-
        1A-X       3623418N2     CCC                  AAA
        4A-1       3623417S2     BB                   A+
        4A-2       3623417T0     CCC                  B
        5A-1       3623417Z6     BBB                  AAA
        5A-2       3623418A0     CCC                  B
        5A-8       362334AQ7     B                    AAA
        6A-1       3623418F9     CCC                  B
        6A-2       3623418G7     CCC                  B
        6A-3       3623418H5     CCC                  B
        1A-1       3623416H7     B                    BBB-
        1A-4       3623416L8     B                    BBB-
        1A-12      3623416U8     B                    BBB-
        2A-1       3623416Z7     CCC                  BBB-
        2A-13      3623417M5     B                    BBB-
        4A-3       3623417U7     BB                   A+
        4A-4       3623417V5     BB                   A+
        4A-5       3623417W3     BB                   A+
        4A-6       3623417X1     BB                   A+
        4A-7       3623417Y9     BB                   A+
        5A-3       3623418B8     BB                   AAA
        5A-4       3623418C6     BB                   AAA
        5A-5       3623418D4     BB                   AAA
        5A-6       362341800     BB                   AAA
        5A-7       3623418X0     BB                   AAA

      Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-15

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       86359DND5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       86359DNE3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       86359DNF0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A4       86359DNG8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A5       86359DNH6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A6       86359DNJ2     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       86359DNK9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       86359DNL7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       86359DNM5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A4       86359DNN3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A5       86359DNP8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A6       86359DNQ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A7       86359DNR4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A8       86359DNS2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A9       86359DNT0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       86359DNU7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       86359DNV5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A1       86359DNW3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A2       86359DNX1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A1       86359DNY9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AP         86359DPC5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    AX         86359DPD3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    PAX        86359DPE1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M          86359DPF8     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    B1         86359DPG6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    B2         86359DPH4     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    B3         86359DPJ0     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B4         86359DPK7     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg
    B5         86359DLZ8     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  1A-9       3623416R5     AAA
                  1A-15      3623416X2     AAA
                  5A-9       362334AR5     B


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 204 Classes From 37 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 204
classes from 37 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2003 and 2005.  S&P removed one of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also downgraded
31 of these classes to 'D'.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 156 classes from 34 of the transactions with lowered ratings
and removed two of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

The downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of interest
shortfalls being consistently sustained on the affected classes
during previous remittance periods.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of its
base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance that is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, the senior class could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consist of
fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime mortgage loans that are
secured by first and second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.


* S&P Puts Ratings on 3,076 CDO Deals on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed 3,076 ratings on 957
U.S. corporate collateralized debt obligation transactions on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The aggregate issuance
amount of the affected tranches is $319.55 billion.  S&P took
these CreditWatch actions after S&P updated the criteria and
assumptions S&P use to rate corporate CDO transactions.  S&P
expects this update to result in downgrades of many rated CDOs
that are backed by, or reference, corporate debt.  The CreditWatch
placements affect nearly all of S&P's ratings on U.S. corporate
CDO transactions, including collateralized loan obligations,
collateralized bond obligations, CDOs of corporate CDOs, synthetic
corporate CDOs, CDOs backed by trust preferred assets, and other
CDO transactions collateralized by or referencing corporate
credits.

S&P did not place some ratings on tranches with credit support
provided by a monoline insurance company or other third-party on
CreditWatch negative.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on
some senior tranches from corporate CDO transactions because, in
S&P's opinion, the high level of credit enhancement available to
support these tranches indicates that these tranches are likely to
maintain their current ratings following the application of S&P's
updated criteria.  In all, S&P affirmed its ratings on 82 tranches
from 67 CDO transactions.

With respect to the tranches with affirmed ratings based on S&P's
assessment of the credit enhancement available to support them, it
is important to note that these tranche ratings will be subject to
a full review by surveillance committee in coming months as S&P
review the ratings on the other tranches within the transactions.
If, as a result of these reviews, S&P determine that a rating
assigned to one of these affirmed tranches is not, in S&P's view,
consistent with the rating indicated by analysis under S&P's
updated criteria, S&P will lower the rating at that time without
first placing it on CreditWatch negative.  Additionally, S&P has
not placed on CreditWatch negative the ratings on the CDO tranches
that S&P expects will be paid in full on or before Dec. 31, 2009.

This press release discusses CreditWatch placements affecting CDO
transactions monitored in the U.S.; S&P will publish separate
releases and rating action lists for transactions monitored in
Europe, Asia-Pacific (excluding Japan), and Japan.  The tables at
the end of this article provide a summary breakdown of the U.S.
CDO ratings placed on CreditWatch by year of transaction
origination and current rating.

S&P's process for reviewing cash flow and hybrid CDOs (which rely
on excess spread for credit support and require cash flow analysis
when assessing the ratings assigned) differs from the process S&P
use to review synthetic CDO transactions, which S&P monitor
through S&P's monthly synthetic rated overcollateralization ratio
review.

          Review Of Cash Flow And Hybrid Cdo Transactions

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements affecting each cash
flow and hybrid CDO transaction affected by the criteria update
after S&P completes its cash flow and credit analysis and conduct
a review via rating committee.  Given the volume of transactions
S&P will review in connection with the criteria update, S&P
anticipates that the reviews may require six months or more to
complete.  In general, S&P expects to issue multiple press
releases per week to resolve the CreditWatch placements as S&P
reviews the affected transactions.  Additionally, S&P will issue
periodic press releases summarizing the rating actions S&P has
taken to date in connection with the application of the updated
criteria.

When S&P reviews CDO transactions that are backed by tranches from
other corporate CDOs, S&P will adjust the ratings assigned to the
underlying CDO tranches as appropriate if they have not yet been
reviewed pursuant to the criteria update.  S&P will base these
adjustments on an abridged review that takes into account the
average rating impact of the updated corporate CDO criteria on
like-rated tranches from similar transactions, as well as the
performance of the specific CDO issuing the tranche held as
collateral.  S&P will review and update the rating actions that
result from this abridged review of the underlying CDO tranches,
as appropriate, once S&P completes its full review of those
tranches pursuant to the criteria update.

S&P will prioritize its reviews of cash flow and hybrid CDOs
according to several parameters, including:

* The frequency with which the tranches of a given CDO are held by
  other corporate CDO transactions.  S&P will review those CDOs
  with tranches held most widely earlier in the process;

* The proportion of underlying collateral consisting of other
  corporate CDO tranches.  S&P will review CDOs that hold greater
  numbers of tranches of other CDOs later in the process; and

* The event of default provisions in the transaction documents.
  S&P will review CDOs earlier in the process if they have par-
  based EOD triggers that include rating-based haircuts and
  provisions allowing controlling noteholders to liquidate the
  transaction.

Although S&P expects the rating changes that result from its
reviews to primarily reflect the application of its updated
criteria to existing corporate CDO transactions, the credit
quality of the collateral pools backing some CDO transactions have
deteriorated because of speculative-grade corporate loan issuer
downgrades and defaults.  Many tranche ratings from these CDO
transactions were on CreditWatch negative before S&P implemented
the updated criteria.  The rating actions resulting from its
reviews of these transactions will reflect both the application of
S&P's updated criteria and its views regarding the credit
deterioration that the CDO has experienced to date.

Trustees and collateral managers for the affected transactions
should continue to use their current version of CDO Monitor during
the review period and after.  Standard & Poor's CDO Monitor is a
model that helps to determine whether a given CDO transaction is
in compliance with its Standard & Poor's CDO Monitor test.
Trustees and collateral managers for actively managed cash flow
and hybrid CDO transactions typically run CDO Monitor on certain
dates during the reinvestment period.  If a transaction is failing
Standard & Poor's CDO Monitor test, the transaction documents
often provide for subsequent trades only if they "maintain or
improve" the test results.

S&P is keeping the current CDO Monitor test for the outstanding
transactions in order to maintain the link between a transaction's
test results (that is, whether the transaction is currently
passing or failing the CDO Monitor test) and the performance of
the transaction's collateral since origination.  This is
consistent with S&P's normal practice to not provide new CDO
Monitor models to transactions as a result of downgrades of the
CDO tranches.

  Review Of Synthetic Cdo Transactions Through S&P's Sroc Process

For synthetic CDO transactions that S&P monitor as part of its
monthly SROC review, S&P does not anticipate conducting extensive
cash flow analysis to resolve the CreditWatch placements.
Instead, S&P will focus on the revised SROC ratios incorporating
the updated criteria.  A rating committee will determine the final
rating decisions.

Once S&P has completed its review of synthetic CDO transactions,
S&P will publish a consolidated press release for the affected
transactions.  S&P expects to complete its reviews within the next
90 days.  Until that time, S&P will not include corporate CDO
transactions in its monthly SROC report, although S&P does intend
to continue publishing the SROC report for other (noncorporate)
synthetic CDO transactions, including synthetic CDOs of asset-
backed securities.

S&P's reviews of the affected synthetic CDOs will consider both
the updated criteria and also any credit deterioration the
transactions have experienced since their last review.  After S&P
completes its reviews, S&P expects to resume publishing the
monthly Global SROC Report, which will include SROC ratios for
synthetic corporate CDO transactions under the updated criteria.

          Summary Of U.S. Corporate Cdo Ratings Placed On
                       Creditwatch Negative

             U.S. Corporate CDO Tranches With Ratings
                Placed On CreditWatch Negative (No.)

                             RATING
                             ------
              AAA    AA      A    BBB     BB      B   CCC  Total
              ---    --      -    ---     --      -   ---  -----
  2000
   & Prior     18     3      2      6      3      5     4     41
  2001         20    12      1      6      3            3     45
  2002         30     4     23      6      9      4     2     78
  2003         74    32     32     21     20     18     4    201
  2004        118    45     52     25     31     24     3    298
  2005        205   118     82     46     40     23    23    537
  2006        381   157    121     78     47     23    43    850
  2007        367   153    117     96     58     30    52    873
  2008         61    30     24     15      8      1     3    142
  2009          9                   2                         11
  -----     -----   ---    ---    ---    ---    ---   ---  -----
  Total     1,283   554    454    301    219    128   137  3,076

             U.S. Corporate CDO Tranches With Ratings
   Placed On CreditWatch Negative (US$ billions issuance amount)

                             Rating
                             ------
             AAA     AA      A    BBB     BB      B   CCC  Total
             ---     --      -    ---     --      -   ---  -----
  2000
   & Prior  3.20   0.12   0.06   0.13   0.08   0.70  0.09   4.37
  2001      4.13   2.03   0.02   0.10   0.03         0.03   6.34
  2002      5.80   0.36   0.60   0.31   0.49   0.12  0.04   7.71
  2003     11.30   1.14   0.93   1.66   1.33   0.74  0.05  17.15
  2004     17.03   1.73   1.09   2.16   2.84   0.63  0.09  25.55
  2005     33.61   3.07   2.16   1.94   3.45   1.73  1.03  47.00
  2006     64.76   5.77   3.99   5.88   4.62   1.42  1.33  87.77
  2007     73.74   5.22   4.67   6.25   3.64   1.87  1.93  97.33
  2008     21.08   0.80   0.63   0.24   0.35   0.01  0.09  23.20
  2009      2.75                 0.38                       3.12
  -----   ------  -----  -----  -----  -----   ----  ---- ------
  Total   237.40  20.22  14.15  19.04  16.83   7.22  4.68 319.55



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
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Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
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                  *** End of Transmission ***