TCR_Public/090906.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

            Sunday, September 6, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 247

                            Headlines



505 CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
1776 CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $33.5 Mil. Senior Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-4 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 2007-3 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-PWR16 Securities

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-PWR18 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-BBA7 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2005-TOP18 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 2007-PWR18 Securities
BLACKROCK SENIOR: S&P Withdraws Rating on Senior Facility

BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-1 Notes
CAPITAL ONE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

CD 2006-CD2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of Securities
CD 2006-CD3: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 Classes of Securities
CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-CD4 Certs.
CENTURION CDO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $15 Mil. Notes to 'Caa3'
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

CHRYSLER RETAIL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 22 2007-C6 Securities
CITY OF SALEM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Bonds to 'Ba1'
CLEAR LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-3 Notes

COBALT CMBS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 17 2007-C2 Certs.
COLLATERALIZED LOAN: Moody's Takes Rating Action on Two Tranches
COLISEUM SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class I Notes to 'CC'
COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-C8 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-C6 Certificates

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C2 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C3 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C4 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C5 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-C5 Securities

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-C4 Securities
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2006-C5 Securities
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-TFL1 Certificates
CSMC MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on 79 Senior Classes
DUANE STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

EL PASO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Junior Subordinate Series
EQUITY ONE: Moody's Upgrades Underlying Ratings on Two Classes
FM LEVERAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2004-GG2 Securities
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Pooled Classes

HIGHLAND LEGACY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
HOUSE OF EUROPE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
INLAND EMPIRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007 Tobacco Bonds
INWOOD PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes
JFIN CLO: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various 2007 Notes

JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Series 2008-R1 Certs.
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 15 2006-CIBC14 Securities
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-LDP3 Securities
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 26 2006-LDP9 Securities
LANDMARK IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2004-C8 Securities
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-C1 Securities
LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2008-5 Certs.
LIBERTY HARBOUR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
LONG HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes

MADISON PARK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
MADISON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2006-4 Securities
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-5 Certs.
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-6 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2007-IQ14 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $3.5 Mil. Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Corrects Rating on JuniorSuperSenior Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-IQ12 Securities
MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

NAUTIQUE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Notes
NUCO2 FUNDING: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2008-1 Notes
OAK HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

OFSI FUND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
OHA PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
PONTIAC: Fitch Junks General Building Authority's $4.4MM Bonds

PONTIAC GBA: Fitch Corrects Ratings; Retains Negative Watch
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on BLC-1 Cert. to 'B'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on BLC-2 Cert. to 'B'
RYLAND MTG: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B-1 Tranche
SALISBURY INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-14 Notes

SARGAS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2004-CCF1 Certificates
SIERRA KINGS: S&P Corrects Long-Term Ratings on GO Bonds to 'B'
SOUTH COAST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes to 'D'
STANFIELD BRISTOL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

STANFIELD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
STANFIELD/RMF TRANSATLANTIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes
STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SYSTEMS 2001: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class G Certificates
TRIMARAN VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-FL1 Certs.
UNION SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
US CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
VEGA CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
VENTURE II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

VENTURE IV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
VENTURE V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
VENTURE VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-ESH Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 10 2007-C30 Certs.

WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2005-C22 Certs.
WHITEHORSE IV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
WILSON COUNTY: S&P Changes Rating on $13.7 Mil. Bonds to 'B-'
ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Four Classes

* Fitch Changes Recovery Ratings on 153 U.S. CMBS Bonds
* Moody's Withdraw Ratings on 66 Structured Finance Securities
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches From Nine CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Classes From Five Prime Jumbo RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 864 Classes From 75 RMBS Transactions

* S&P Puts Ratings on 120 Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
* S&P Withdraws Swap Risk Ratings on Two Credit Default Swaps



                            *********

505 CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by 505 CLO I Ltd.:

  -- US$562,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2015 (current balance
     of $527,300,773), Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     September 4, 2008 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$67,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000Class D Deferrable Junior Notes due 2015
     (current balance of $19,346,758), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class C and D overcollateralization
tests.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3566 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$45.4 million, accounting for roughly 5.9% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
17.67% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class C
overcollateralization test was reported at 114.49% versus a test
level of 115.63%, and the Class D overcollateralization test was
reported at 111.01% versus a test level of 113.38%.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
overcollateralization test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

505 CLO I Ltd., issued in September of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


1776 CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on $33.5 Mil. Senior Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by 1776 CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$33,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2597 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 3, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$22 million, accounting for roughly 4% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9% of the
underlying portfolio.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class B Notes also reflect
Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default probability
and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised
assumptions are described in the publication "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Type I Composite Obligations Due 2021 (current
     balance of $2,111,670), Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Mar
     4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class C Notes and
the rating confirmations on the Class D Notes, Class E Notes and
Type I Composite Obligations have incorporated the aforementioned
stresses as well as credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated analysis
indicating that the impact of these factors on the ratings of the
Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Type I Composite
Obligations is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage
I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

1776 CLO I, Ltd., issued on April 26, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks to 13 classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Trust, series 2007-4.  A detailed list of rating actions follows
at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
10% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 7.5%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 69.1% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
Of the recognized losses, approximately 82% are derived from loans
which Fitch examined in detail.

Approximately 19.3% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 4.9% in 2012 and 13.8% in 2014.  In 2017, 76.9% of the pool
is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 34 Loans of Concern (20.5%) within the pool, six
of which (3.4%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, three (2.1%) are current.  One of the specially serviced
loans (1.8%) is within the transaction's top 15 loans (57.3%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Five of the Loans of Concern (11.2%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 3% to 31%.  The largest contributors to loss are: La Jolla
Executive Tower (4.8%), Manzanita Gate (1.8%) and East Market at
Fair Lakes (1.8%).

The La Jolla Executive Tower loan is collateralized by a 231,500
SF office building located in La Jolla, CA.  The loan was made
with the expectation that capital improvements, leasing of vacant
space and that below market leases expiring during the loan term
would be re-signed at higher rates would improve cash flow at the
property.  The property is behind its stabilization schedule as
these expectations have not been met.  Occupancy has declined from
82% it issuance to 63% as of March 2009.  Major tenants include
Covance Inc. (13% NRA), General Electric (8% NRA) and Ortiva
Wireless (5% NRA).  Significant lease rollover during the loan
term consists of 15% of the NRA in 2009, 22% in 2010 and 19% in
2011.  The Irvine Company, LLC is the sponsor.

The Manzanita Gate loan is collateralized by a 324 unit
multifamily property located in Reno, NV.  The original sponsor
defaulted on the operating agreement and the preferred equity
partner, LEM Capital LLC, stepped in as the new sponsor.  Loan
transferred to Special Servicing in October 2008 due to default.
The original sponsor had incurred additional debt secured by the
property and ownership interests in the borrower which is an event
of default under the loan documents.

Property performance has been in continuous decline over the last
year as class A rents in the market have deteriorated and expenses
have increased.  While the loan remains contractually current the
sponsors have indicated that they will no longer continue to fund
debt service shortfalls.  The servicer-reported debt service
coverage ratio has declined from 1.21 at YE 2007 to 0.78 as of
June 30, 2009.

The East Market at Fair Lakes loan is collateralized by an 88,000
SF retail center located in Fairfax, VA.  At issuance the property
was 100% occupied.  Two tenants, including the second largest,
vacated their spaces prior to lease expiration.  Additionally, YE
2008 expenses were approximately 50% higher than issuance.  Whole
Foods (70% NRA) is the anchor tenant.  Additional tenants include
Jus Massage (4% NRA) and Pei Wei Asian Diner (3% NRA).
Significant lease rollover during the loan term consists of 7% of
the NRA in 2016 and 13% in 2017.  The Peterson Companies is the
sponsor.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to these
classes:

  -- $178.5 million class A-J to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22.3 million class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.5 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22.3 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22.3 million class E to 'B/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.9 million class F to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.7 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27.9 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $22.3 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19.5 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.9 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.6 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.6 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.6 million class O to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.6 million class P to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Rating Outlook and LS Rating to this class:

  -- $5.6 million class Q at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and assigned LS ratings:

  -- $25.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $77.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $287.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $73.7 million class A-SB at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $817.6 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $277.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $223.1 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $39 million class S.


BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 2007-3 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on six classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.21x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 127.0%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.73x and an LTV of 180.7%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 98.2% and 47.3%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude four of the 10
specially serviced loans (8.2%).  S&P separately estimated losses
for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes N, O, P, and Q to 'D' to
reflect recurring interest shortfalls resulting from appraisal
reduction amounts totaling $51.3 million.  The ARAs are in effect
on four assets with the special servicer.  S&P expects the related
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the class XW interest-only certificate
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Ten assets ($528.7 million, 15.1%) in the pool, including two of
the top 10 loans, are with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services L.P.  Five of those assets ($148.6 million, 4.2%) are
more than 90 days delinquent; one ($9.9 million, 0.3%) is 30 days
delinquent; and four ($370.2 million, 10.6%) are in their grace
periods.  Four of the specially serviced loans have ARAs in effect
totaling $51.3 million.  Three specially serviced loans have
balances exceeding 2% of the total pool balance.  The remaining
specially serviced assets have balances below 1% of the total pool
balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $3.51 billion, slightly down from $3.52 billion at
issuance.  The number of loans in the pool, at 151, is unchanged
since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is Bank
of America N.A. The master servicer provided financial information
for 99.6% of the pool, and 96.4% of the servicer-provided
information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.30x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.21x and
127.0%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
four specially serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses separately
for these loans ($287.7 million, 8.2%).  These loans had a
weighted average servicer-reported DSC of 0.78x.  The transaction
has not experienced any principal losses to date.  Twenty-four
loans ($818.1 million, 23.3%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans.  Nine loans
($133.3 million, 3.8%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x,
and 16 loans ($1.1 billion, 31.4%) have reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.81 billion (51.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.20x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.02x and
139.3%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude the
two top 10 loans that are with the special servicer, which S&P
discuss below.

The Rockwood Ross Multifamily loan is the sixth-largest exposure
in the pool and the largest exposure with the special servicer.
The loan was current in its debt service payments as of the August
2009 remittance report.  This asset has a trust balance of
$175.0 million (5.0%) and a whole-loan balance of $275.0 million.
The loan is secured by a first mortgage encumbering seven cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted class B/C apartment properties
containing 2,508 units.  All of the properties are located close
to Washington, D.C.; six are in Prince George's County, Md., and
the seventh property is in Alexandria, Va.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 31, 2009, due to
mechanics liens, unpaid payables, and risk of imminent default.
Midland and the borrower are pursuing a loan modification.  Year-
end 2008 DSC was 0.95x, while portfolio occupancy was 90% as of
April 17, 2009.

The Second & Seneca loan is the seventh-largest exposure in the
pool and the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.
The loan is in its grace period.  This asset has a balance of
$175.0 million (5.0%) and is secured by two office buildings in
Seattle aggregating 497,271 sq. ft.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on June 24, 2009, due to imminent default
resulting from the recent loss of a large tenant that had occupied
16% of the net rentable area.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 0.80x, while
occupancy was 91.6% at March 31, 2009.  Midland is currently
considering different resolution strategies.  Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the resolution of this loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
      Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --      ----            ----------------------
      A-4       A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.05
      A-5       A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.05
      A-1A      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.05
      A-M       BB+     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.04
      A-MF      BB+     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.04
      A-MFL     BB+     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.04
      A-J       B+      AAA/Watch Neg                    13.15
      B         B       AA+/Watch Neg                    12.15
      C         B       AA/Watch Neg                     10.77
      D         B       AA-/Watch Neg                    10.02
      E         B       A+/Watch Neg                      9.27
      F         B       A/Watch Neg                       8.26
      G         B-      A-/Watch Neg                      7.39
      H         B-      BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.01
      J         B-      BBB-/Watch Neg                    5.01
      K         CCC+    BB/Watch Neg                      3.76
      L         CCC     BB-/Watch Neg                     3.01
      M         CCC-    B+/Watch Neg                      2.88
      N         D       B/Watch Neg                       2.38
      O         D       B-/Watch Neg                      2.25
      P         D       CCC+/Watch Neg                    2.00
      Q         D       CCC/Watch Neg                     1.63

                        Ratings Affirmed

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
          -----      ------      ----------------------
          A-1        AAA                          30.05
          A-2        AAA                          30.05
          A-2FL      AAA                          30.05
          A-3        AAA                          30.05
          A-AB       AAA                          30.05
          XW         AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-PWR16 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative 16 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust, Series 2007-PWR16, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  Fitch has also assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity Ratings, and Recovery Ratings as indicated.  A detailed
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 7.4% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
5.3%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 5.3% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 50.1% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 25.6% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 0.5% in 2011, 23.0% in 2012, 0.1% in 2013, and 1.9% in
2014.  All losses associated with these loans are recognized in
the rating actions.

Fitch identified 45 Loans of Concern (17.3%) within the pool,
eight of which (2.7%) are specially serviced.  None of the
specially serviced loans are current.  Five of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (7.5%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans (47.4%)
by unpaid principal balance.

Two of the Loans of Concern (3.7%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 16% to 20%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Beacon DC
and Seattle Portfolio (14.8% of the pool), PGA Design Center
(0.9%), and Airpark Business Center (2.2%).

The Beacon DC and Seattle Portfolio loan is secured by 16
properties, the pledge of the mortgage and the borrower's
ownership interest in one property, as well as the pledge of cash
flows from three properties.  On the aggregate, the 20 properties
comprise approximately 9,848,859 square feet (sf) of space.  The
properties are located across several different submarkets,
including: Washington, DC Central Business District (CBD) (4),
Bellevue CBD (4), Bellevue Suburban (3), Seattle CBD (2), Reston
(2), Rosslyn (2), Tysons Corner (2), and Crystal City (1).  Across
the portfolio, occupancy stood at 94.0% as of year-end (YE) 2008,
compared to 96.9% at issuance.

The first mortgage loan corresponding to the Beacon DC and Seattle
Portfolio totals $2.7 billion, of which only the $485.5 million A-
5 note is an asset of the trust.  The A-5 note, together with the
A-4 note (held outside of the trust), benefit from additional
credit support in the form of a subordinate B note associated with
only those two notes.  In a loss scenario, the B-1 note would take
the first dollar of loss concurrently with notes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-
6, and A-7, while the A-5 trust component and the A-4 note would
remain unimpaired until the B-1 note suffered a total loss.  The
loan is performing to Fitch's expectation at issuance, with a
servicer reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.14 times
(x) on the A-5 trust component as of YE 2008.  At acquisition, the
loan sponsors, Beacon Capital Partners, LLC and Beacon Capital
Strategic Partners V, L.P., contributed approximately $700 million
in cash equity.  An additional $205 million of mezzanine financing
was extended to the borrower at issuance, collateralized by the
pledges of cash flow from three properties.  The loan matures in
May 2012.

PGA Design Center is secured by a 145,536 sf, three-building
anchored retail space located near the intersection of PGA
Boulevard and I-95 in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.  The loan
transferred to the special servicer in February 2009 due to
borrower's failure to make scheduled payments for January 2009 and
thereafter.  The borrower indicated two tenants that comprised 15%
of the net rentable area had vacated their spaces and that the
remaining three tenants' leases contain co-tenancy clauses
permitting tenants to vacate their spaces or receive rental
reductions in event vacancy drops below a certain level.
Foreclosure is being pursued.

The Airpark Business Center consists of a 13-building master-
planned business park located in Nashville, TN.  The buildings
contain 1.2 million sf and were constructed between 1985 and 1998.
The servicer-reported YE 2008 and first-quarter 2009 DSCR was
1.47x and 1.41x, respectively.  Occupancy has improved to 88% as
of March 2009, compared to 83% at issuance.  The loan matures in
May 2012.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
LS and RRs to these classes:

  -- $273.4 million class A-J to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class B to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.7 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.9 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $41.4 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16.6 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $12.4 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $12.4 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $8.3 million class O to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.3 million class P to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.3 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $64.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $681 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $58.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $130.7 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $954.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $408.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $331.4 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $41.4 million class S.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-PWR18 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 16 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18.  In
addition, Fitch has assigned Rating Outlooks as applicable.  A
detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this press
release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
6.8% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 6.5%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.  Fitch
considers the Outlooks on the super-senior classes to be Stable
due to projected losses having limited impact on credit
enhancement when associated paydown is factored into the analysis.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 63.7% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 27.4% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 7.3% in 2012, 7.2% in 2013, and 12.9% in 2014.  In 2017,
68.9% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 32 Loans of Concern (21.1%) within the pool, 10
of which (15.5%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, two (9.1% of the pool) are current.  Seven of the
Fitch Loans of Concern (20.2%) are within the transaction's top 15
loans (47.3%) by unpaid principal balance, two of which are 90
days delinquent.

Losses are expected on seven of the loans within the top 15: three
(6.8%) of these loans are expected to default the term, while
losses on the remaining four loans (16.5%) are expected at
maturity.  Loss severities associated with these loans range from
1% to 45%.

The largest contributors to loss on a pool level basis (by
outstanding balance) are: DRA/Colonial Office Portfolio (9.9%),
RRI Hotel Portfolio (3.1%), and Marketplace at Four Corners
(1.8%).

The DRA/Colonial Office Portfolio consists of 19 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted office and retail properties
located in six cities and five states.  Most of the properties are
located in small, tertiary markets; however, a majority of the
assets are in excellent condition and among the best quality in
their respective markets.  Approximately 47% of the net rentable
area expires over the next five years, with the majority of
rollover (32%) occurring between 2011 and 2012.  The high level of
rollover in combination with the loans' July 2014 maturity may
present refinancing challenges.

The RRI Portfolio is secured by 79 Red Roof Inn flagged hotels
located in 24 states.  The loan transferred to special servicing
in June 2009 for imminent default after the borrower indicated
they would be unable to pay debt service obligations going
forward.  The special servicer continues to negotiate with the
borrower; however, there is limited detail on the direction of any
workout at this point.  As of March 2009, the Occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR were 50.1%, $55.5, and $27.8, respectively, compared with
61.5%, $60, and $36.9, respectively, at issuance.  Losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity.

Marketplace at Four Corners is secured by a 478,000 square foot
(sf) retail center in Bainbridge, OH, built in 2003.  As of April
2009, the property was 91% occupied, with limited rollover in the
next two years.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
June 2009 for payment default.  The property has been negatively
affected by the exits of tenants Linens 'n' Things, Dollar USA,
Dinners by the Dozen, and Wine Warehouse.  Additionally, the loan
sponsor filed for personal bankruptcy protection in May 2009.  The
servicer continues to negotiate with the borrower.  Losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity.

Two loans within the pool's top 15 (9.1%) are performing specially
serviced loans: GGP Portfolio (6.3%) and Southlake Mall (2.8%).
These loans transferred due to the sponsor, General Growth
Properties, filing for bankruptcy in April 2009 along with the
single purpose entities which own the collateral.  The loans
remain current, although legal fees from protecting the interests
of the trust are likely to ultimately create interest shortfalls
or losses to the trust.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $182.5 million class A-J to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.6 million class A-JA to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $25 million class B to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $25 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $25 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class F to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $25 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $21.9 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $25 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $9.4 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigns Recovery Ratings to these classes:

  -- $9.4 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $9.4 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $6.3 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';
  -- $3.1 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $3.1 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch also affirms these classes and assigns LS ratings and Stable
Outlooks:

  -- $271.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $61.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $291.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $269.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $131.9 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $710 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $211.6 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $38.9 million class A-MA at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class S.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2006-BBA7 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eight classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-BBA7 due to the decline in
performance of the two remaining loans, the Columbia Sussex
Portfolio Loan ($549.0 million -- 93.1% of the pool) and the CPI
Hilton Portfolio Loan ($40.5 million -- 6.9%), and a negative
outlook for the lodging sector.  Moody's also affirmed four
classes.  This action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.  Moody's placed the eight classes on review for
possible downgrade on August 27, 2009.  This action concludes
Moody's review.

The Columbia Sussex Loan is secured by fourteen full-service hotel
properties in ten states, Washington, D.C. and Toronto, Canada
with a total of 5,821 rooms.  The portfolio is branded by six
Westin flags, two Sheraton flags, three Hilton flags, two Marriott
flags and one Wyndham flag.  At securitization, ten of the
properties in the portfolio had Wyndham flags.  RevPAR for the
portfolio declined approximately 19%, from $107.90 (year-to-date
ending June 2008) to $87.03 (year-to-date ending June 2009),
compared to Moody's RevPAR of $107.34 at securitization.  Income
from operations declined approximately 29% during the same period.
The properties have been negatively impacted by the global
recession, and the improvement in portfolio performance expected
at securitization from re-branding all but one of the properties,
in conjunction with extensive capital spending projects, has not
materialized.  The loan matured in October 2007 and is in the
third of four loan extensions with final maturity in October 2010.
Moody's loan to value ratio is 85.1%, compared to 79.7% at Moody's
last full review.  Moody's stressed debt service coverage is
1.38X, compared to 1.50X at last review.  There is additional debt
in the form of a mezzanine loan with an original balance of
$532.0 million.  Moody's underlying rating is B1, compared to Ba2
at Moody's last review.  The loan sponsor is Columbia Sussex
Corporation.

The CPI Hilton Portfolio Loan is secured by five limited service
hotel properties including four Hilton Garden Inns and one
Homewood Suites.  The properties are located in five states and
have a total of 944 rooms.  RevPAR for the portfolio declined
approximately 20%, from $80.10 (year-too-date ending July 2008) to
$63.73 (year-to-date ending July 2009).  Moody's RevPAR at
securitization was $71.10.  The loan matured in October 2007 and
is in the second of three, one-year loan extensions with final
maturity in October 2010.  Moody's LTV is 97.3%, compared to 83.5%
at Moody's last full review.  Moody's stressed debt service
coverage is 0.98X, compared to 1.43X at last review.  There is
additional debt in the form of a mezzanine loan with an original
balance of $29.0 million.  Moody's underlying rating is Caa1,
compared to Ba3 at Moody's last review.  The loan was transferred
to Special Servicing on July 24, 2009.  The loan sponsor is
Citigroup Property Investors NS Equity I LLC and Sage Hospitality
Resources, LLC.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 16%
to $589.5 million from $700.0 million at securitization as a
result of the pay off of three loans originally in the pool and
scheduled amortization.

Moody's current weighted average pooled LTV is 85.9%, compared to
80.0% at Moody's last review on February 24, 2009.  Moody's pooled
stressed debt service coverage is 1.35X, compared to 1.50X
at last review.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $273,778,459, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/24/09

  -- Class X-1B, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/24/09

  -- Class X-3, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/24/09

  -- Class A-2, $128,106,291, affirmed at Aa2; previously
     downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa on 2/24/09

  -- Class B, $30,900,138, downgraded to A2 from A1; previously on
     8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $22,799,698, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously on
     8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $21,000,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously
     on 8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $21,000,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1;
     previously on 8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class F, $20,125,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2; previously
     on 8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $36,823,448, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     on 8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $16,551,552, downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously
     on 8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $8,803,668, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously on
     8/27/09 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2005-TOP18 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed ten classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-TOP18 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from loans in special servicing, increased
leverage from the remainder of the pool and increased loan
concentration.  Since Moody's prior review in May 2007, six loans,
representing 3% of the pool, have transferred to special
servicing.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$1.06 billion from $1.12 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 157 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 43% of the pool.

Twenty three loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  Six loans,
representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of multi-family,
industrial and retail properties.  One loan is 30+ days
delinquent, three loans are 90+ days delinquent and two loans are
in foreclosure.

Based on Moody's preliminary analysis, the pool's weighted average
loan to value ratio has increased since last review due to a
decline in performance of a portion of the pool.  Moody's review
will focus on potential losses from specially serviced loans and
the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class E, $11,216,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class F, $9,814,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class G, $9,814,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class H, $8,412,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class J, $4,206,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class K, $4,206,000 currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class L, $4,206,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class M, $1,402,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class N, $1,403,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 5/2/2007

  -- Class O, $2,804,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 5/2/2007


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 21 2007-PWR18 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 21
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed
the ratings on six additional classes from the same series.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  The
downgrades of the subordinate and lower mezzanine classes also
reflect anticipated credit support erosion upon the eventual
resolution of the specially serviced loans.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.26x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 112.2%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 0.86x and an LTV of 161.7%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 85.4% and 41.1%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude five of the nine specially serviced assets (5.6%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for these loans, and these losses are
included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Nine assets ($375.3 million, 15.1%) in the pool, including the
second-, sixth-, and seventh-largest exposures, are with the
special servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc. Three of the
specially serviced assets ($58.9 million, 2.4%) are more than
90 days delinquent, two ($9.4 million, 0.4%) are 60 days
delinquent, two ($81.5 million, 3.3%) are 30 days delinquent, one
($70.0 million, 2.8%) is late, but less than 30 days delinquent,
and one ($155.5 million, 6.3%) is current.  Six of the specially
serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$73.9 million.  Three of the specially serviced assets have
balances comprising more than 2.5% of the total pool balance,
while the remaining specially serviced assets all have balances
that are less than 2.0% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $2.49 billion, down slightly from $2.50 billion at
issuance.  There are 185 loans in the pool, unchanged since
issuance.  The master servicers for the transaction are Wells
Fargo Bank N.A. and Prudential Asset Resources Inc. The master
servicers provided financial information for 100% of the pool,
89.5% of which was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.26x and
112.2%, respectively.  The transaction has not experienced any
principal loss to date.  Thirty-six loans ($532.1 million, 21.4%)
are on the master servicers' watchlists, including two of the top
10 exposures.  Fifteen loans ($162.7 million, 6.5%) have reported
DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 21 loans ($256.7 million, 10.3%)
have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                 Summary Of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$981.7 million (39.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.44x for the top 10 assets.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.19x and
106.6%, respectively.  These calculations exclude the RRI Hotel
Portfolio loan.  The RRI Hotel Portfolio loan, the GGP Portfolio
loan, and the Southlake Mall exposure (the three top 10 assets
currently with the special servicer) are all discussed below.

The second- and seventh-largest loans in the pool were transferred
to the special servicer in April 2009 due to General Growth
Properties' bankruptcy filing.  The GGP Portfolio loan, the
second-largest loan in the trust, has a balance of $155.5 million
(6.3%) and is secured by two regional malls, the Marketplace
Shopping Center (796,718 square feet, located in Champaign, Ill.)
and the Columbia Mall (399,211 square feet, located in Columbia,
Mo.).  The loan reported DSC of 2.01x at year-end 2007, and was
reported as current as of the August 2009 remittance report.  The
Southlake Mall loan, the seventh-largest asset in the trust, has a
trust balance of $70.0 million (2.8%) and is secured by a 273,997-
square-foot retail property in Morrow, Ga.  The asset reported DSC
of 1.38x at year-end 2008, and was reported as being late, but
less than 30 days delinquent, as of the August 2009 remittance
report.  ARAs in the amounts of $38.9 million and $17.5 million
are in effect against the GGP Portfolio loan and the Southlake
Mall loan, respectively.  S&P continue to monitor the developments
relating to these loans and will take rating actions on this
transaction as necessary.

The RRI Hotel Portfolio loan is the sixth-largest exposure in
the pool, and the second-largest asset with the special servicer.
The loan is 30 days delinquent and has a trust balance of
$76.5 million (3.1%).  The asset is secured by 79 Red Roof Inn
hotels comprising 9,423 rooms across 24 states.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in June 2009.  The special
servicer is awaiting a formal workout proposal from the borrower.
The year-end 2008 DSC for the loan was 1.17x.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of the asset at this
time.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-4      AA-     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.20
      A-1A     AA-     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.20
      A-M      BBB+    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.14
      AM-A     BBB+    AAA/Watch Neg                    20.14
      A-J      BB      AAA/Watch Neg                    11.45
      AJ-A     BB      AAA/Watch Neg                    11.45
      B        BB-     AA+/Watch Neg                    10.45
      C        BB-     AA/Watch Neg                      9.44
      D        BB-     AA-/Watch Neg                     8.68
      E        B+      A+/Watch Neg                      7.68
      F        B+      A/Watch Neg                       6.92
      G        B       A-/Watch Neg                      5.92
      H        B       BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.03
      J        B-      BBB/Watch Neg                     4.28
      K        B-      BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.27
      L        CCC+    BB+/Watch Neg                     2.89
      M        CCC     BB/Watch Neg                      2.52
      N        CCC-    BB-/Watch Neg                     2.14
      O        CCC-    B+/Watch Neg                      1.89
      P        CCC-    B/Watch Neg                       1.76
      Q        CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      1.64

                         Ratings Affirmed

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-PWR18
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class   Rating To       Credit enhancement (%)
          -----   ---------       ----------------------
          A-1     AAA                       30.20
          A-2     AAA                       30.20
          A-3     AAA                       30.20
          A-AB    AAA                       30.20
          X-1     AAA                        N/A
          X-2     AAA                        N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


BLACKROCK SENIOR: S&P Withdraws Rating on Senior Facility
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on a
tranche from BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC, a market
value collateralized loan obligation originated in 2006, following
the complete paydown of the tranche balance on the most recent
payment date.  In addition, the ratings on class B and C remain on
CreditWatch negative.  Lastly, S&P affirmed its ratings on classes
D and E.

The rating actions follow S&P's most recent monthly review of
market value collateralized debt obligation performance.  S&P will
continue to monitor these transactions through S&P's monthly
review process and take rating actions as appropriate, including
negative rating actions if S&P see declines in the O/C levels.

                          Rating Actions

              BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                      Class      To    From
                      -----      --    ----
                      SrSecFac   NR    AAA

                          NR - Not rated.

             Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

              BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC

                    Class      Rating
                    -----      ------
                    B          BB/Watch Neg
                    C          CCC-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

              BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        D          CC
                        E          CC


BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Bridgeport CLO Ltd:

  -- US$387,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes (current
     balance of $381,171,488), Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     June 30, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes (current balance of $14,459,054), Confirmed at B3;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of Class C overcollateralization test and
Class D overcollateralization test.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2798 versus a test level of 2540 as of the last trustee
report, dated August 10, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$28.8 million, accounting for roughly 6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
17% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Bridgeport CLO Ltd., issued in June 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2002-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$222,100,000 Class A Senior Secured Notes due 2014 (current
     balance of $170,230,944), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on
     Dec 8, 2008 Confirmed at Aa3;

  -- US$11,100,000 Class B Senior Secured Notes due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Dec 8, 2008 Downgraded to
     Baa3;

  -- US$11,200,000 Class C Senior Secured Notes due 2014,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Dec 8, 2008 Downgraded to
     Ba3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Maximum Weighted Average Life Test.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 3597 versus a test level of
2640 as of the last trustee report, dated July 15, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $14 million,
accounting for roughly 6% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 29% of the
underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, the rating on Class A Notes reflects the actual
underlying rating of the Class A Notes.  This underlying rating is
based solely on the intrinsic credit quality of the Class A Notes
in the absence of the guarantee from Ambac Assurance Corporation,
whose insurance financial strength rating was downgraded from Ba3
to Caa2 on July 29, 2009.  The above action is a result of, and is
consistent with, Moody's modified approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors as described in
the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's
modifies approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped
by financial guarantors."

Canyon Capital CDO 2002-1 Ltd., issued on December 19, 2002, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CAPITAL ONE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class B, C, and D-1 notes from Capital One Mainstreet Master Note
Trust's series 2008-1 and 2008-2 to 'A-', 'BB+', and 'BB-',
respectively.  S&P removed the lowered ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications, where they were placed on May 1, 2009.

The May 1, 2009, CreditWatch placements affecting the three
classes reflected an increase in the trust's charge-off and
delinquency rates, S&P's loss-rate forecast, and a decrease in the
total payment rate.

The downgrades of the class B, C, and D-1 notes from series 2008-1
and 2008-2 reflect S&P's revised base-case net losses, which are
15%-20% higher than S&P's previous assumptions; S&P's revised
base-case total payment rates, which are 10%-15% lower than its
previous assumptions; and S&P's revised purchase-rate assumption.
S&P believes that the current available credit support is not
adequate to support the previous ratings.

The downgrades also reflect the lowering of the counterparty
credit rating on Capital One Bank (USA) N.A.  to 'BBB+/A-2' from
'A-/A-2'.  Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., a wholly owned subsidiary
of Capital One Financial Corp., is the originator and servicer of
the underlying credit card receivables.

When S&P rates credit card securitizations, it considers the
likely ability of the originator to continue generating and
transferring receivables to the trust, which it believes is partly
reflected by the unsecured credit rating on the originator.
Purchases and the continued generation of receivables affect the
level of principal receivables in the trust.  S&P believes that
the additional principal receivables generated from a higher-rated
originator with a higher purchase rate is likely to increase the
monthly principal collection amount available to pay down the
notes.

S&P's ratings review focused on the fundamentals of credit
analysis, including both quantitative and qualitative assessments
of the pool's performance and each performance variable, S&P's
opinion of the quality of the collateral, and the
sponsor/servicer's general operations.

     Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Capital One Mainstreet Master Note Trust

                                       Rating
                                       ------
      Series         Class          To        From
      ------         -----          --        ----
      2008-1         B              A-        A/Watch Neg
      2008-1         C              BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
      2008-1         D-1            BB-       BB/Watch Neg
      2008-2         B              A-        A/Watch Neg
      2008-2         C              BB+       BBB/Watch Neg
      2008-2         D-1            BB-       BB/Watch Neg


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners IX,
Ltd.:

  -- US$167.5M Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on Sep 21, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$165M Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on Sep 21, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$41.25M Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on Sep 21, 2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$26.25M Class B Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$26.25M Class C Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ba3;
     previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$32.5M Class D Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on Mar 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Remained On
     Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3155 versus a test
level of 2385 as of the last trustee report, dated August 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $29.8 million, accounting for roughly
6.1% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 23.6% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Carlyle High Yield Partners IX, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners IV,
Ltd.:

  -- US$215,300,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2014 Notes (current balance of $192.31MM), Downgraded to
     A1; previously on April 17, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$130,000,000 Class A-2 Delay Settle Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes (current balance of $116.12MM),
     Downgraded to A1; previously on April 17, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-3 Revolving Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2014 Notes (current balance of $17.86MM),
     Downgraded to A1; previously on April 17, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$3,200,000 Combination Notes Due 2014 Notes (rated balance
     of $0.18MM), Downgraded to A3; previously on September 10,
     2008 Upgraded to Aa3;

  -- US$11,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2014 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,500,000 Class C-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2014
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C-2 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2014
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the WARF test, diversity test, WAL test,
long dated limitation, and Caa limitation.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3079 versus a test level of 2603 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 6, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$23.8 million, accounting for roughly 7.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
18.6% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of investments
in securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
These investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Carlyle High Yield Partners IV, Ltd., issued on April 17, 2002, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CD 2006-CD2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from CD 2006-CD2
Mortgage Trust and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P affirmed 10 ratings from the same transaction,
three of which S&P removed from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  Included in the affirmed ratings were the VPM-1 and
VPM-2 raked certificates.  A raked certificate represents a
subordinate, nonpooled component of the senior participation
interest in a particular loan.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.46x and a loan-to-value ratio of 106.0%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.89x and an LTV of 138.7%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 89.3% and
32.0%, respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations exclude
six of the seven specially serviced loans (5.5%) and the one
defeased loan, which accounts for 0.2% of the pool.  S&P
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced loans,
which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

The affirmations of the ratings on classes A-1 through A-AB
reflect credit enhancements that adequately support the current
ratings.  The affirmations of the 'VPM-1' and 'VPM-2' raked
certificates reflect S&P's analysis of the credit characteristics
of the Villas Parkmerced loan, which is the sole source of cash
flow for these classes.  The loan is performing in line with S&P's
expectations and has a reported DSC of 1.34x as of Dec. 31, 2008.
S&P affirmed the ratings on the class X interest-only certificate
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise S&P's IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Seven assets ($197.7 million, 6.6%) in the pool, including two of
the top 10 loans, are with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.
The top 10 loans are described further below.  One of the
specially serviced assets ($5.5 million, 0.2%) is considered real
estate owned, two ($16.4 million, 0.5%) are in foreclosure, one
($65.0 million, 2.2%) is more than 90 days delinquent, one is
more than 60 days delinquent ($66.9 million, 2.2%), and two
($43.9 million, 1.5%) are current.  Four of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$19.7 million.  Three specially serviced assets have balances
representing more than 1.0% of the total pool balance.  The
remaining four specially serviced assets have balances below 1% of
the total pool balance.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $3.01 billion, down from $3.06 billion at issuance.
The number of loans in the pool, at 197, is unchanged since
issuance.  The master servicers for the transaction are Wachovia
Bank N.A. (with respect to all of the mortgage loans sold to the
depositor by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.) and Midland
Loan Services Inc. (with respect to all of the mortgage loans
sold to the depositor by German American Capital Corp. and PNC
Bank N.A.) The master servicers provided financial information
for 99.1% of the pool, and 97.0% of the servicer-provided
information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.46x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.46x and
106.0%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
six specially serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses separately
for these loans ($164.9 million, 5.5%).  These loans had a
weighted average servicer-reported DSC of 1.16x.  The transaction
has not experienced any principal losses to date.  Thirty loans
($843.5 million, 28.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including four of the top 10 loans.  Twelve loans ($216.2 million,
7.2%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 10 loans
($114.0 million, 3.8%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                    Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$934.5 million (32.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.42x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.42x and
106.9%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude the
two top 10 loans that are with the special servicer and are
discussed below.

The Rock Pointe Corporate Center loan is the fifth-largest
exposure in the pool and the largest exposure with the special
servicer.  The loan is 60-plus-days delinquent.  This asset has a
balance of $66.9 million (2.2%) and is secured by a 565,746-sq.-
ft. office property in Spokane, Wash.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on July 15, 2009, due to payment default.
Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.13x, while occupancy was 91.4% at Dec. 31,
2008.  Partial-year 2009 DSC is not reported but, as S&P has
learned through S&P's conversations with LNR, the borrower has
stated that tenants have fallen behind on rent payments.  LNR is
considering different resolution strategies at this time.
Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of the loan.

The Woodbury Lakes loan is the sixth-largest loan in the pool
and the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
loan is 90-plus-days delinquent.  This loan has a balance of
$65.0 million (2.2%) and is secured by a 304,445-sq.-ft. retail
property in Woodbury, N.J.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on May 6, 2009.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.08x,
while occupancy was 79.6% at March 31, 2009.  LNR is considering
different resolution strategies at this time.   The loan has a
$16.25 million ARA in effect.  Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of the loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

  Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative (Pooled)

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CD2

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To       From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --       ----           ----------------------
      A-M      A+       AAA/Watch Neg                   20.30
      A-J      BBB+     AAA/Watch Neg                   13.07
      B        BBB      AA+/Watch Neg                   12.31
      C        BBB-     AA/Watch Neg                    11.16
      D        BB+      AA-/Watch Neg                    9.90
      E        BB       A/Watch Neg                      8.25
      F        BB-      A-/Watch Neg                     6.85
      G        B+       BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.58
      H        B        BBB/Watch Neg                    4.44
      J        B-       BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.30
      K        B-       BB+/Watch Neg                    2.79
      L        CCC+     BB/Watch Neg                     2.41
      M        CCC+     BB-/Watch Neg                    2.03
      N        CCC      B+/Watch Neg                     1.78
      O        CCC      B/Watch Neg                      1.52
      P        CCC-     CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.27

  Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative (Pooled)

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CD2

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To       From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --       ----           ----------------------
      A-4      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.45
      A-1A     AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.45
      A-1B     AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.45

                     Ratings Affirmed (Pooled)

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CD2

             Class  Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
             -----  ------      ----------------------
             A-1    AAA                          30.45
             A-2    AAA                          30.45
             A-3    AAA                          30.45
             A-AB   AAA                          30.45
             X      AAA                            N/A

                   Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled)

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CD2

             Class  Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
             -----  ------      ----------------------
             VPM-1    BBB                          N/A
             VPM-2    BBB-                         N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CD 2006-CD3: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 18 Classes of Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from CD 2006-CD3
Mortgage Trust and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 10 classes from
the same transaction and removed five of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.40x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 109.1%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.88x and an LTV of 151.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 84.3% and 35.9%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude nine of the 14 specially serviced loans (2.3%) and three
loans S&P deemed to be credit-impaired (0.9%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the class X interest-only certificates
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Fourteen assets ($410.25 million, 11.63%) in the pool, including
the largest exposure in the pool, are with the special servicer.
J.E. Robert Co. Inc. is the special servicer for all of these
loans except the Ala Moana Portfolio loan, for which Midland
Loan Services Inc. is the special servicer.  One of those assets
($5.4 million, 0.15%) is in foreclosure; eight ($66.8 million,
1.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent; two ($22.45 million, 0.6%)
are 30 days delinquent; one ($13.5 million, 0.38%) is in its grace
period; and two ($302.1 million, 8.6%) are current.  One of the
specially serviced loans has a $1.85 million appraisal reduction
amount in effect.  The balance of one specially serviced asset,
the Ala Moana Portfolio loan, represents 8.5% of the total pool
balance.  All of the other specially serviced assets have balances
below 1% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 191 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$3.53 billion, compared with 192 loans with an aggregate balance
of $3.57 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Wachovia Bank N.A.  The master servicer provided
financial information for 99.85% of the pool, and 82.0% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.44x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.40x and 109.1%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
figures exclude nine specially serviced loans and three loans that
S&P deemed to be credit impaired.  S&P estimated losses separately
for these loans ($113.4 million, 3.2%).  These loans had a
weighted average servicer-reported DSC of 0.86x.  To date, the
transaction has experienced $1.9 million of principal losses.
Forty-six loans ($703.6 million, 20.0%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including two of the top 10 loans.  Eighteen
loans ($197.8 million, 5.6%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and
1.0x, and 24 loans ($298.6 million, 8.46%) have reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.51 billion (42.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.54x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.41x and
101.7%, respectively.

The Ala Moana Portfolio loan, which is the largest exposure in the
pool, is in special servicing.  The loan has a trust balance of
$298.6 million and a whole-loan balance of $1.5 billion.  The
whole loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interests (totaling
2.0 million sq. ft.) in four properties: a regional mall, two
office buildings, and a retail property located in Honolulu.  The
reported DSC for the property as of year-end 2008 was 1.70x, and
the occupancy was 97.3%.  The loan was reported as current on the
August 2009 remittance report and was transferred to the special
servicer on April 21, 2009, due to General Growth Properties'
bankruptcy filing.  S&P will continue to monitor the developments
relating to the GGP bankruptcy and will take rating actions as
necessary.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-M      A+      AAA/Watch Neg                    26.70
      A-J      BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    11.84
      A-1A     BBB-    AAA/Watch Neg                    11.84
      B        BB+     AA+/Watch Neg                    11.21
      C        BB      AA/Watch Neg                      9.69
      D        BB-     AA-/Watch Neg                     8.80
      E        BB-     A+/Watch Neg                      8.17
      F        B+      A/Watch Neg                       7.41
      G        B+      A-/Watch Neg                      6.15
      H        B       BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.01
      J        B       BBB/Watch Neg                     3.87
      K        B-      BBB-/Watch Neg                    2.73
      L        B-      BB+/Watch Neg                     2.35
      M        CCC+    BB/Watch Neg                      2.10
      N        CCC+    B+/Watch Neg                      1.72
      O        CCC+    B/Watch Neg                       1.59
      P        CCC     B-/Watch Neg                      1.21
      Q        CCC     CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.08

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-2      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    36.01
      A-3      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    36.01
      A-AB     AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    36.01
      A-4      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    36.01
      A-5      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    36.01

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

          Class       Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
          -----       ------      ----------------------
          A-1         AAA                          36.01
          A-1D        AAA                          36.01
          A-1S        AAA                          36.01
          XP          AAA                            N/A
          XS          AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CD COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 13 2007-CD4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from rating watch
negative 13 classes of CD Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-
CD4, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  In addition,
Fitch assigns Loss Severity ratings, Recovery Ratings and Rating
Outlooks to 12 classes.  A detailed list of rating actions follows
at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations for current
specially serviced loans and reflect Fitch's prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of 8.2% for this
transaction, should market conditions not recover.  The rating
actions are based on losses of 6.3% including 100% of the losses
associated with term defaults and any losses associated with
maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant term
to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the losses
associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with
Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in the
future should full potential losses be realized.  Fitch considers
the Outlooks on the super-senior classes to be Stable due to
projected losses having limited impact on credit enhancement when
associated paydown is factored into the analysis.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 50% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised based
on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 8.6% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature within
the next five years: 8.6% in 2011.  In 2016 and 2017, 21.52% and
46.5% of the pool is scheduled to mature; respectively.

Fitch identified 61 loans of concern (31%) within the pool, 16 of
which (13%) are specially serviced.  Three of the 16 specially
serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (48.4%).
Of the specially serviced loans, five (10.2% of the pool) are
current.  Three (25%) of the transaction's top 15 loans are Fitch
loans of concern.

Eleven of the top 15 loans (29.9%) are expected to default during
the term or at maturity, with loss severities ranging from
approximately 1% to 64%.  The largest contributors to recognized
loss are: Riverton Apartments (3.4%), Loews Lake Las Vegas (1.7%),
and Mall of America (4.6%).

Riverton Apartments (3.4%) is a 1,230-unit; class B, rent-
stabilized, multifamily housing project located in Harlem, NY.
The loan sponsors are Rockpoint Group and Stellar Management.  The
borrower was unable to convert rent-stabilized units to
deregulated units as quickly as expected and as of July 2008 had
converted only 128 units (10%) to fair market rents.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2008 for imminent
default.  Workout negotiations ensued resulting in several rounds
of modification proposals between the Lender and Borrower;
however, no agreement was reached.  The Note was accelerated in
January 2009.

Foreclosure and receivership actions on the trust's mortgage loan
were filed with the court in February 2009.  A rent receiver was
appointed on February 17 by the Supreme Court of New York.  On
February 20, the Mezzanine Lender was to hold a public sale to
foreclose on all of its pledged collateral, but cancelled the sale
on February 17 and reserved the right to reschedule.  The loan is
current and there is approximately $7 million in reserves
remaining which should cover debt service for another six months.
The special servicer continues to dual track the foreclosure
process along with possible workout options.  Fitch expects the
property to incur a significant loss upon liquidation based on a
recent appraisal of the asset.

Loews Lake Las Vegas is a 493-room full-service hotel located in
Henderson, NV, and situated within Lake Las Vegas, a planned,
luxury community.  The borrower is Loews LLV Hotel, LLC, a
bankruptcy remote entity sponsored by LH Investments I LLC, a
joint venture between Loews Hotels (25%) and the NYSCRF (75%).
The property relies heavily on group travel which has slowed
significantly due to the current market conditions of the in the
Las Vegas area.  In March 2009 the loan transferred to special
servicing.  Borrower requested a cashflow loan and was unwilling
to invest any additional equity.  A receiver was appointed to the
property in June 2009.  The special servicer continues with
foreclosure efforts with the borrower's cooperation.  Per the
April 2009 STAR report, the property is underperforming its
competitive set with occupancy at 47% compared to 56%, ADR of $175
compared to $202 and RevPAR at $83 compared to $114.  YE 2008
occupancy was 54% and RevPAR $99.90, down from $58% and $103.24 at
YE 2007 and 69% and $138.47 at issuance.  Fitch expects the
property to incur a significant loss upon liquidation based on an
April 2009 appraisal of the asset.

Mall of America (4.6%) is the largest super-regional mall with the
highest customer draw in the country located in Minneapolis, MN.
The mall is anchored by Nordstrom, Macy's and Bloomingdales and
has 326 in-line retail shops, an amusement center, Underwater
World, LEGO Imagination Center, Gold Mountain, 20 full-service
restaurants, 36 specialty food stores, eight night clubs, and a
14-screen movie theatre.  The sponsor is Triple Five National
Development Corp.  The loan is interest-only.  As of Dec. 31, 2008
the property is 90% occupied with a DSCR of 1.45x.  YE 2008 in-
line sales were: $383.17/per square foot and anchor sales were
$235.53/psf.  Losses are expected at the loan's maturity in 2016.
Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity ratings and Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $585.7 million class A-J to 'BB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $41,2 million class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $90.7 million class C to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $57.7 million class D to 'B/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $41.2 million class E to 'B-/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $49.5 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $66 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $74.2 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
RRs to these classes:

  -- $66 million Class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';
  -- $74.2 million Class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $24.7 million Class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB+';
  -- $16.5 million Class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $16.5 million Class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-'.

Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings to these classes:

  -- $65.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-2A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.1 billion class A-2B at 'AAA'/LS2; Outlook Stable;
  -- $464.2 million class A-3 at 'AAA'/LS2; Outlook Stable;
  -- $161.9 million class A-SB at 'AAA';LS2; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.7 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $996.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $595 million class A-MFX at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $65 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Interest-only class XP at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.5 million class WFC-X at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.7 million class WFC-1 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.7 million class WFC-2 at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $24.1 million class WFC-3 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

  -- $16.5 million class O;
  -- $8.2 million class P;
  -- $16.5 million Q;
  -- $74.2 million class S.


CENTURION CDO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $15 Mil. Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Centurion CDO IV Limited:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on January 14, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa1.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor of
the high yield bonds in the portfolio has increased over the last
year and is currently 3564 versus a test level of 2720, and the
weighted average rating factor of the structured finance
securities is 7083 versus a test level of 1780, both as of the
last trustee report, dated August 10, 2009.  Based on same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$9.3 million, accounting for roughly 4.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
36.5% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating action also reflects Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Moody's has also applied resecuritization
stress factors to default probability assumptions for structured
finance asset collateral as described in the press release titled
"Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance
CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

Centurion CDO IV Limited, issued in 2001, is a collateralized bond
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of high yield bonds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$381,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     August 2019 (current balance of $377,282,262), Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on August 4, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due August
     2019, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 13, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due August 2019, Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes due August 2019 (current balance of $17,568,975),
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due August 2019, Confirmed at Baa3;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class D OC test.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2900 versus a test level of 2753 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 20, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$45.9 million, accounting for roughly 8.52% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
14.0% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Chatham Light II CLO, Ltd., issued on August 4, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


CHRYSLER RETAIL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A notes issued
by Chrysler Retail Trust II.  The notes are backed by 1) an
amortizing pool of prime auto loans originated by Chrysler
Financial Services America LLC and 2) certain amortizing asset
backed notes that in turn are secured by prime auto loans also
originated by Chrysler Financial.  The notes were placed under
review for possible downgrade due to Moody's updated higher loss
expectations relative to the current levels of credit enhancement
as well as the additional stress that a bankruptcy of Chrysler
LLC, the manufacturer of the underlying vehicles, could have on
the recoveries of vehicles backing defaulted accounts.  This
action concludes the review of the notes that began on April 29,
2009.

The downgrade was primarily driven by Moody's updated higher loss
expectations relative to original projections, and in particular
by higher expected defaults, rather than lower projected
recoveries on repossessed vehicles.  In fact, Chrysler's Chapter
11 bankruptcy filing on April 30, 2009, has not resulted in a
dramatic decline in recoveries to date.  During the last few
months, and since the bankruptcy filing by Chrysler, used vehicle
values have shown signs of improvement for the auto sector at
large as well as for Chrysler.  However, this transaction is
expected to incur higher total defaults than originally estimated,
mainly due to the impact of the difficult macroeconomic
environment on a pool which has weaker characteristics compared to
the transactions sponsored by Chrysler Financial in 2005-2006.
The weakness in performance is consistent with that of the 2007
and 2008 transactions.  As is the case in the 2007 and 2008 deals,
the collateral in the Chrysler Retail Trust II includes a higher
proportion of longer term loans (i.e. maturities greater than 60
months) and used vehicles than in earlier securitizations.

Complete rating actions is:

Issuer: Chrysler Retail Trust II

  -- Cl. A, Aaa downgraded to Aa1; previously on April 29, 2009
     Aaa Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

                     ORIGINATOR AND SERVICER

Chrysler Financial is a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of CGI
Holdings, formerly Chrysler Holdings.  The Corporate Family Rating
for Chrysler Financial is Ca, with a negative outlook.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 22 2007-C6 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from the
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 transaction and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.53x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 105.81%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.88x and an LTV of 149.1%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 83.2% and 37.4%,
respectively.  To maintain the consistency of this data for
comparative purposes, S&P excluded eight specially serviced loans
and one credit impaired loan (4.2%) from S&P's DSC and LTV
calculations.  S&P separately estimated losses for these loans,
which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.  These numbers include the fourth-largest loan in the
pool, the Hyde Park Apartment Portfolio, which is discussed in
greater detail below.  The lowered ratings on the subordinate
classes also reflect S&P's expectations for credit support erosion
upon the eventual resolution of 10 of the loans ($79.9 million,
2%) with the special servicer.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in S&P's view, provide
adequate credit support through various stress scenarios.  S&P
affirmed the ratings on the class X interest-only (IO) certificate
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO
criteria, which may impact outstanding ratings, including the
rating on IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Fifteen loans ($314.4 million, 7%) in the pool are currently with
the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  A breakdown
of the specially serviced loans by payment status is: one asset is
an REO ($1.8 million); three assets are bankrupt ($193.8 million);
eight loans are 90-plus days delinquent ($72.8 million); one loan
is 60-plus days delinquent ($5.3 million); and two loans are 30-
plus days delinquent ($40.7 million).  Eight loans have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect in the amount of $21.5 million.  Two
of the specially serviced assets have a balance greater than or
equal to 1% of the total pool balance, while the remaining 13
loans have balances that are less than 0.8% of the total pool
balance.  The sixth- and seventh-largest loans in the pool, the
Ala Moana Porftolio ($99.5 million, 2%) and the Moreno Valley Mall
($87.1 million, 1.8%) loans, were both transferred to the special
servicer in April 2009 following General Growth Properties'
bankruptcy filing.  S&P continue to monitor the developments
relating to the GGP bankruptcy and will take rating actions as S&P
determine necessary.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 318 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$4.74 billion, compared with a balance of $4.76 billion at
issuance.  The master servicers for the transaction are Midland
Loan Services Inc., Wachovia Bank N.A, and Capmark Finance Inc.
Financial information was provided for 97.3% of the pool; 92.6% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.53x and
105.81%, respectively.  Fifteen loans ($147.9 million, 3.1%) in
the pool are delinquent, and 15 are currently with the special
servicer.  The transaction has not experienced any principal
losses to date.  Forty-three loans are on the master servicers'
watchlists ($651.9 million, 14%).  Forty-three loans
($517.5 million, 11%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, and 30 of
these loans ($414.9 million, 9%) have reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

                    Summary Of The Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.4 billion (29%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.51x for the top 10 loans.
The DSC calculation for the top 10 loans excludes the fourth-
largest loan in the pool, the Hyde Park Apartment Portfolio
($123.2 million, 3%), because the loan has negative net cash flow
due to extensive property renovations.  The $4.0 million debt
service reserve that was established at issuance has been
depleted.  The loan is secured by 43 multifamily properties built
between 1889 and 1924 (renovated between 1992 and 2007) and
located in Chicago, Ill., in the Hyde Park neighborhood.  The
sixth- and seventh-largest loans in the pool, as previously
discussed, are with the special servicer.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.55x and 104.4%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

            Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     A-4       AA        AAA/Watch Neg                   30.11
     A-4FL     AA        AAA/Watch Neg                   30.11
     A-1A      AA        AAA/Watch Neg                   30.11
     A-M       A         AAA/Watch Neg                   20.08
     A-MFL     A         AAA/Watch Neg                   20.08
     A-J       BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                   11.67
     A-JFL     BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                   11.67
     B         BB+       AA+/Watch Neg                   11.17
     C         BB        AA/Watch Neg                     9.66
     D         BB        AA-/Watch Neg                    8.91
     E         BB-       A+/Watch Neg                     8.28
     F         BB-       A/Watch Neg                      7.53
     G         B+        A-/Watch Neg                     6.52
     H         B         BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.39
     J         B         BBB/Watch Neg                    4.01
     K         B-        BBB-/Watch Neg                   2.89
     L         B-        BB+/Watch Neg                    2.63
     M         CCC+      BB/Watch Neg                     2.38
     N         CCC+      BB-/Watch Neg                    2.01
     O         CCC       B+/Watch Neg                     1.76
     P         CCC       B/Watch Neg                      1.63
     Q         CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                     1.50

                         Ratings Affirmed

           Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C7
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class       Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
            -----       ------   ----------------------
            A-1         AAA                       30.11
            A-2         AAA                       30.11
            A-3         AAA                       30.11
            A-3B        AAA                       30.11
            A-SB        AAA                       30.11
            X           AAA                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CITY OF SALEM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Bonds to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 the
rating on $1.3 million of City of Salem (NJ) General Obligation
Bonds and $19.5 million of Revenue Bonds (Finlaw State Office
Building Project), Series 2007 issued through the Salem County
Improvement Authority.  The downgrade reflects pressures put on
the city by the responsibility for the Finlaw State Office
Building Project, on which the city has guaranteed debt service
payments.  The debt service reserve fund has been needed to pay
the first two debt service payments.  Given that the city is
obligated to pay debt service on the bonds once the debt service
fund is exhausted, the draws on the reserve fund increase the
likelihood that the city's guarantee will be called upon.  Moody's
believes, given the city's already narrow financial position,
strained liquidity position and limited taxbase, that if this, as
yet contingent liability, were to become a full or partial
liability, the city's finances would be stressed to meet this
additional burden.  Additionally, the city's currently average
debt burden would grow to very high levels.

             Finlaw Project Underperforms Projections;
        Use Of Debt Service Reserve Increases Likelihood Of
                       Use Of City Guarantee

In 2007 the city guaranteed bonds, issued by the Salem County
Improvement Authority, to finance a downtown office building.  The
bonds, while ultimately secured by the city's general obligation
tax pledge, were expected to be supported by revenues generated by
leasing the office space.  Construction delays of the facility
resulted in delayed lease payments and as such, the last two debt
service payments have been paid, in part, with funds in the Debt
Service Reserve Fund.  The Debt Service Reserve Fund was
originally sized at $1.8 million and following the two draws
($488,000 in February and $127,000 in August) has been reduced to
$1.23 million.

The anchor tenant (leasing 84% of office space) of the office
building is the State of New Jersey (GO rated Aa3/negative).
Additional leases are with the Salem County Improvement Authority
and a State Senator.  Moody's views the lease revenue stream
supporting the bonds as some what speculative, given tenants
ability to terminate the leases under certain circumstances, which
are unrelated to credit events.  Most notably, the state lease is
subject to annual appropriation.  Additionally, the revenue
associated with signed leases, $1.1 million, is insufficient to
cover debt ($1.06 million over the next four years) and
maintenance on the building, estimated at $130,000.  Additional
risks in the structure, as Moody's identified when Moody's first
assigned a rating to the bonds, include that fact that the state
lease is for 20 years and the bonds amortize over 30 years,
leaving funding uncertainties in the out years.

The on-going risks to the revenue stream associated with a
termination of the leases, particularly the state lease which
accounts for the majority of revenue ($914,000 or 82% of the total
revenue identified), coupled with the recent draws on reserves
increase the likelihood that the city would have to make debt
service payments.  Given the size of the debt, as compared to the
city's resources as reflected in the limited taxbase, narrow
financial position and already strained liquidity, the need of
city to step up to debt service would have a material impact on
the city's financial position (outlined below).

        City Guarantee Is Called On After The Debt Service
                      Reserve Is Liquidated

The city guarantee calls for the Debt Service Reserve, initially
funded at 125% of average annual debt service or $1.8 million, to
be used first for any deficiency.  Then once the Debt Service
Reserve Fund has been exhausted, the city is obligated to pay debt
service for the life of the bonds as there is no replenishment
mechanism for the Debt Service reserve.  Under the terms of the
Guaranty Agreement between the city, the SCIA and Fulton Financial
Advisors, N.A. (the trustee for the transaction) if the SCIA has
not deposited with the trustee sufficient funds to pay debt
service 20 days into the month preceding the month in which debt
service is due (February and August 15), the trustee will
immediately inform the city of the deficiency.  The city is then
obligated to remit to the trustee an amount equal to the
deficiency one business day before debt service is due.  The city
is obligated to take any action required for timely payment of
debt service including adoption of an emergency appropriation.

               City's Financial Position Is Narrow;
                Cash Flow Borrowing For Operations

The city has a narrow financial position and limited liquidity.
At the end of fiscal 2008, on an unaudited basis, the Current Fund
balance equaled $823,000 or 9.93% of revenues, a level reserves
have approximated over the last five years.  Included on the
balance sheet are $150,000 of deferred charges, booked to amortize
the cost of a revaluation, net of this non-cash asset Current Fund
balance is just $673,000 or 8% of revenues.  Slim reserves have
resulted in the need for cash flow borrowing for operations.  The
unaudited 2008 balance sheet shows $600,000 in Tax Anticipation
Notes (issued June 19, 2008; paid in March 2, 2009) for operations
as well as a $150,000 Revaluation Note Payable to liquidate the
non-cash deferred charges.  Additionally, the city defers
$1 million of school taxes, which Moody's views as an off balance
sheet liability.  The Current Fund balance net of these New Jersey
accounting only assets is a negative $359,000.

Payment Of Debt Service On Scia Finlaw Bonds Would Have Material
Impact On Financial Position; Limited Liquidity Threatens City's
                Ability To Make Timely Debt Service

Highlighting the sizable liability the city has taken on by
guaranteeing the SCIA Finlaw bonds, 2010 debt service
($1.06 million) is more than the city's $823,000 Current Fund
balance.  Additionally, if the city were to have to absorb the
full debt service on the debt, the levy would need to be raised
26%.  Moody's believes this level of increase would be
unmanageable given the city's limited $268 million taxbase, which
is has wealth levels well below the state and nation.  Median
family income of $29,699 and per capita income of $13,559 as
reported in the 2000 Census are 45.4% and 50.2% of state medians,
respectively.

If the city were to need to subsidize debt service payments to a
level in line with the August 2009 use of the Debt Service Reserve
Fund, a likely scenario given the cash flow associated with the
leases as compared to debt service and maintenance, the property
tax required to raise $150,000 would be approximately 4% and debt
service would increase by 35% from the 2007 level.  Favorably,
2010 principal and interest payments can be made out of the
remaining Debt Service Reserve Fund.  Assuming no additional
revenues from the project, the first time the city would
possibility need to make a payment for the debt would be in
February of 2011.  However given that there is no replenishment
mechanism on the debt service reserve, once the reserve has been
exhausted, the city will continually be on notice to make debt
service payments in a case where revenues associated with the
leases are insufficient to pay debt service.

Further, Moody's believes the city's slim liquidity position could
hinder the city from making good on its General Obligation Pledge
on a timely basis.  The city's guarantee requires just 22 days
notice to cure a deficiency a time frame in which sufficient cash
may not be immediately available.  The city would have to borrow
externally to fund the debt service payment, which would expose
the city to market and third party risk.

        Very High Debt Burden Reflects City's Guarantee Of
                         Scia Finlaw Debt

Moody's believes the city has taken on a liability which is
disproportionate to the city's sizable and ability to pay, this is
reflected in the very high debt burden of 14.3% of equalized
value.  Included in the debt burden is the entire $19.5 million
associated with the Finlaw project and a $2.5 million Bond
Anticipation Note that the city borrowed in order to complete the
project.  Debt service was 5.71% of 2007 Current Fund
expenditures.  If the city were required to make-up a deficiency
of $150,000 on the current project, debt service would grow to
7.3% and at $1 million would be 17.94% of the budget.

Key Statistics:

* 2007 Population: 5,678 (-3.1% since 2000)

* 2009 Equalized Valuation: $267 million

* 2009 Equalized Value Per Capita: $47,124

* 1999 Per Capita Income (as % of NJ and US): $13,559 (50.2% and
  62.8%)

* 1999 Median Family Income (as % of NY and US): $29,699 (45.4%
  and 59.3%)

* Overall Debt Burden (including SCIA debt): 14.3%

* Payout of Principal (10 years; including SCIA debt): 14.4%

* 2007 Current Fund Balance: $541,000 (8.54% of Current Fund
  revenue)

* 2008 unaudited Current Fund Balance: $823,000 (9.9% of Current
  Fund revenue)

* 2008 unaudited Current Fund Balance, net of deferred charges and
  school tax deferals: -$359,000 (-4.3% of Current Fund revenue)

* Long-term G.O. Debt Outstanding: $1.3 million

* G.O. and Guaranteed Debt Outstanding: $20.8 million

The last rating action was on July 9, 2009, when Moody's assigned
a Baa3 rating to the Salem County Improvement Authority's City-
Guaranteed Revenue Bonds (Finlaw State Office Building Project)
Series 2007 and affirmed the City of Salem's Baa3 GO rating.


CLEAR LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Clear Lake CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$343,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 18, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$21,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$27,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes Due 2020 (current balance of $14,747,398), Confirmed at
     B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
are a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class C and Class D
overcollateralization tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
2837 versus a test level of 2500 as of the last trustee report,
dated August 11, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$16 million, accounting for roughly 3.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
13.6% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Clear Lake CLO, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned a Recovery Rating to the
sole class of notes issued by Cloverie Plc 2006-3.

Cloverie 2006-3 experienced multiple Failure to Pay Principal
Credit Events with respect to obligations within the reference
portfolio.  The cumulative cash settlement amount is
$38,907,373.16 and was due Aug. 24, 2009.  The cash settlement
represents a 96.4% current write down or loss to the notes.  The
notes have been downgraded to 'D' which is consistent with Fitch's
definition of Structured Finance Writedowns: Where an instrument
has experienced an involuntary and, in the agency's opinion,
irreversible 'writedown' of principal a credit rating of 'D' will
be assigned to the instrument.  'RR6' is assigned as the recovery
will be consistent with the 'RR6' range of 0%-10%.

Cloverie 2006-3 is a partially funded, static synthetic
collateralized debt obligation that closed in January 2006.  The
transaction represents leveraged exposure to a diversified
portfolio of asset-backed securities.  The note proceeds from the
class D notes collateralize a credit default swap with Citigroup
Global Markets Limited as the Swap Counterparty.  A modified 'Pay-
As-You-Go' template is utilized to define the terms of the credit
default swap.  The reference portfolio is comprised primarily of
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities

Fitch has taken this rating action:

  -- $1,092,627 class D notes downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'CC'.


COBALT CMBS: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 17 2007-C2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative 17 classes of COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C2.
Fitch has also assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity Ratings and
Recovery Ratings.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
11.9% for this transaction should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 7.7%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 60.4% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
Of the recognized losses, 62.4% were from the loans reviewed in
more detail.

Approximately 12% of the mortgages mature or are anticipated to
repay:

  -- 4.2% in 2011;
  -- 7.4% in 2012.

In 2016 and 2017, an additional 87.4% of the pool is scheduled to
mature or anticipated to repay.

Fitch identified 33 Loans of Concern (27.6%) within the pool, 11
of which (7.2%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, three (5.1%) are current.  Of the specially serviced loans,
one (4.1%) is within the transaction's top 15 loans (50.5%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Four of the top 15 loans (15.1%) are expected to default during
the term and incur losses, with loss severities ranging from 16.8%
to 37.2%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Stuyvesant Town
/Peter Cooper Village (10.4%), Westin - Fort Lauderdale (1.7%),
and Storage Xxtra Portfolio (1.4%).

Additional information on the performance of Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village loan is available in a separate press release
issued ('Fitch: Stuy Town/Peter Cooper Loan Performance Continues
to Lag'), available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

The Westin - Ft. Lauderdale loan (1.7%) is secured by a 293-key
full service hotel property located in Fort Lauderdale, FL.
Amenities at the property include 18,721 sf of meeting and banquet
space, an outdoor swimming pool, an outdoor hot tub, a sundries
shop, a fitness center, and a business center.  Since issuance,
approximately $12.8 million ($43,815 per key) was spent on capital
improvements completed in 2009, including extensive guest room,
guest bathroom, and public space renovations.  However, the Fort
Lauderdale market continues to suffer from decreased travel to the
area due to economic conditions, reflected in a 28% year-over-year
decline in gross operating income (as of May 2009).  The actual
reported occupancy, average daily rate, and RevPAR for May 2009
year-to-date of 67.5%, $124.18 and $83.85, respectively, lag the
underwritten proforma figures of 72.6%, $150.05, and $108.94,
respectively.  The servicer-reported year-end 2008 DSCR was 1.14x.
Approximately $508,000 in reserves remained as of the July
remittance.  The loan sponsor, The Procaccianti Group, contributed
$14 million of cash equity (25%) upon acquisition.

The Storage Xxtra Portfolio loan (1.4%) is secured by a portfolio
of seven self-storage properties comprising a total of 3,397
units.  The properties are located across Hoffman Estates, IL,
Highland Park, IL, Macon, GA (2), LaGrange, GA, and Columbus, GA
(2).  The properties enjoy good frontage and access to local
highways and thoroughfares.  Across the portfolio, occupancy has
declined to 70.2%, from 79.5% at issuance.  The two properties
which had not yet stabilized as of issuance --  1505 Old Deerfield
Road and 4500 Billy Williamson Drive --  have not demonstrated
measurable improvements in performance.  The servicer-reported
year-end 2008 DSCR was 1.22x.  The loan sponsor, Kurt O'Brien of
The OB Companies, contributed $3.5 million of cash equity (8.5%)
upon acquisition.  An additional $4.2 million of mezzanine
financing was obtained at closing.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and RRs to these classes:

  -- $102.6 million class A-JFX to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $100 million class A-JFL to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21.2 million class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27.2 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21.2 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.1 million class E to 'B/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.1 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $30.2 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.2 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.2 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $30.2 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $12.1 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $9.1 million class N to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6 million class O to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class P to 'B-/LS5' from 'B-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6 million class Q to 'B-/LS5' from 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes and Outlooks, and
also assigned LS ratings:

  -- $26 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $241.1 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $71.9 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $857.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $485.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $221.9 million class A-MFX at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $30.2 million class S certificates.


COLLATERALIZED LOAN: Moody's Takes Rating Action on Two Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken a rating
action with respect to the ratings of two tranches of a
Collateralized Loan Obligation transaction.  This action results
in a correction to two ratings announced on August 27, which were
based on an incorrect priority of payments waterfall.
Specifically, the August 27 rating action assumed a sequential pay
structure; payments in this transaction are in fact made pro-rata
between the Class A-1A, A-1B-1 and A-1B-2 Notes, and Moody's has
adjusted its ratings accordingly.

The adjusted rating action is:

  -- US$563,000,000 Class A-1B-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa on August 27, 2009; Changed
     to Aa2 on September 1, 2009;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-1B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa on August 27, 2009; Changed to Aa2
     on September 1, 2009.

Revised release and complete rating actions are:

Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Babson CLO Ltd.  2005-I:

  -- US$85,000,000 Class A-1A Revolving Senior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$563,000,000 Class A-1B-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-1B-2 Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$46,800,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019
     (current balance of $42,454,066), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Remains On
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,200,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019
     (current balance of $8,345,671), Downgraded to B2; previously
     on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Remains On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class Q-1 Combination Notes Due 2019 (current
     balance of $13,678,112), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on
     March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class Q-2 Combination Notes Due 2019 (current
     balance of $4,283,602), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class Q-3 Combination Notes Due 2019 (current
     balance of $1,702,991), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Mezzanine
     Notes Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Mezzanine Notes
     Due 2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class C overcollateralization test.
In particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 2988 versus a test level of
2530 as of the last trustee report, dated July 3, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $66.5 million, accounting for roughly 7.6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 14% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Babson CLO Ltd. 2005-I, issued in March of 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COLISEUM SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class I Notes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
I notes issued from Coliseum SPC, acting for the account of
Chalfont 2007-1 Segregated Portfolio to 'CC' from 'CCC+'.

The transaction is a total return swap that is directly linked to
the rating on the class I notes issued from Stack 2006-1 Ltd.,
which Standard & Poor's lowered to 'CC' on Aug. 10, 2009.


COMM MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-C8 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 14 classes of
COMM Mortgage Trust 2006-C8, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  In addition, Fitch has assigned Rating Outlooks, as
applicable.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on
specially serviced loans as well as prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
forecasts potential losses of 10.5% for this transaction, should
market conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on
losses of 8.3% including 100% of the losses associated with term
defaults and any losses associated with maturities within the next
five years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's
actions only account for 25% of the losses associated with
maturities beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks
indicate classes that may be downgraded in the future should full
potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 67.4% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.
The remaining loans represent 15.2% of potential losses.

Approximately 23.2% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature
within the next five years, with 15.4% maturing in 2011 and 6.61%
maturing in 2013.  In 2016, 67.5% of the pool is scheduled to
mature.

Fitch identified 53 Loans of Concern (40%) within the pool, 15 of
which (10.6%) are specially serviced.  Two of the specially
serviced loans (4.0%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans,
which comprises 43.4% of the total pool's unpaid principal
balance.

Twelve of the top 15 loans (33.8% of the pool) are expected to
default during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from approximately 2% to 33%.  Of the top 15 loans, the
largest contributors (by loan balance) to term losses are: EZ
Storage Portfolio (4% of the pool balance), Sierra Vista Mall
(2.1%) and the JPIM Self Storage Portfolio (1.8%).

The EZ Storage Portfolio is secured by a 48 self storage
facilities located in various states.  The most recent servicer
reported combined occupancy is a combined 66.4%, compared to 76.8%
at issuance.  As of August 2009, $1.7 million remains in the debt
service reserve with no releases remaining until the property
achieves a trailing six month debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.20 times (x).  The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR was 1.09x.
At issuance, the loan was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow
based on increased occupancy at market rent providing for
potential upside in future cash flows, however, the property is
behind the stabilization schedule.  Based on current performance
and anticipated declines in performance, losses are expected prior
to the loan's maturity in 2016.

Sierra Vista Mall is collateralized by approximately 405,000
square feet (sf) of a 689,601 sf regional mall located in Clovis,
CA.  Total occupancy as of June 2009 was 62.7% compared to 87.9%
at issuance.  Per a review of the recent rent roll, approximately
14.8% of the leases are scheduled to expire prior to YE 2011.
Major tenants remaining at the property include Target and Sears.
In the past year, the property has lost Mervyn's and Gottschalk's,
together consisting of 27.3% of the net rentable area (NRA), to
bankruptcy filings and subsequent closure of all stores.  Mervyn's
continues to pay rent.  The borrower has been working with
prospective tenants on leasing the vacant space.  Based on current
and anticipated declines in performance, losses are expected prior
to the loan's maturity in 2016.

The JPIM Self Storage Portfolio transferred to special servicing
in April 2009 for payment default.  The asset consists of 14 self
storage facilities located in eight states.  At issuance, the loan
was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on increased
occupancy at market rent providing for potential upside in future
cash flows, however, the property is significantly behind the
stabilization schedule.  The reported combined YE 2008 DSCR was
0.71x.

The largest specially serviced asset in the pool is Victoria Ward
Industrial, Gateway & Village (2.3%), which consists of over
250,000 sf of retail space located in Honolulu, HI.  The sponsor
is General Growth Properties, Inc.  (GGP) which filed for
bankruptcy in April 2009 and included this asset in the parent
company filing.  The loan is current as of the August 2009
distribution date.  The reported occupancy as of December 2008 was
96.3% compared to 94.7% at issuance with a YE 2008 DSCR of 1.35x.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Loss Severity ratings and Negative Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $302.1 million class A-J to 'BB/LS-4' from 'AAA';
  -- $28.3 million class B to 'BB/LS-5' from 'AA+';
  -- $42.5 million class C to 'BB/LS-5' from 'AA';
  -- $37.8 million class D to 'B/LS-5' from 'AA-';
  -- $23.6 million class E to 'B/LS-5' from 'A+';
  -- $28.3 million class F to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A';
  -- $51.9 million class G to 'B-/LS-5' from 'A-';
  -- $37.8 million class H to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB+';
  -- $42.5 million class J to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BBB-';
  -- $42.5 million class K to 'B-/LS-5' from 'BB+'.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
recovery ratings to these classes:

  -- $18.9 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $18.9 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';
  -- $4.7 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $9.4 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns LS rating
and Stable Outlooks:

  -- $11.2 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $100 million class A-2A at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $366 million class A-2B at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $244.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $92.5 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $1.1 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- $666.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS-2';
  -- Interest-only class X-P at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X-S at 'AAA'.

Fitch affirms this class, assigns a Loss Severity Rating and
revises its Rating Outlook:

  -- $377.6 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS-3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

The $14.2 million class P, $9.4 million class Q, and $35.9 million
class S are not rated by Fitch.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-C6 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eleven pooled classes of Credit
Suisse First Boston Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C6 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from loans in special servicing and an overall increase in
leverage.  Since Moody's prior review in July 2007, the pool's
exposure to specially serviced loans has increased from less than
1% to 8%.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $2.41 billion
from $2.50 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 229 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans representing 33%
of the pool.

Forty-five loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Ten loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Fashion
Place Mall ($143.7 million -- 6.0%), which is secured by an
889,950 square foot regional mall located in Murray, Utah.  The
loan is owned by an affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc.
The loan was transferred to special servicing due to GGP's
bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  The remaining specially
serviced loans are secured by multifamily properties.  Eight of
the loans are 90+ days delinquent and the ninth loan is 60 days
delinquent.  The special servicer has recognized appraisal
reductions totaling $17.2 million on five of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- Class B, $43,830,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Aa2 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class C, $28,177,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Aa3 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class D, $18,785,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed A1 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class E, $25,046,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed A2 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class F, $31,307,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed A3 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class G, $31,308,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa1 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class H, $25,046,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa2 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class J, $28,176,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Baa3 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class K, $12,523,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba1 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class L, $12,523,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba2 on 7/6/2007

  -- Class M, $6,262,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Ba3 on 7/6/2007


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C2 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C2 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Babcock & Brown Limited, the
sponsor of the largest loan in the pool, as well as potential
losses from other loans in special servicing.

On August 24, 2009, the creditors of BBL voted to place the
company into liquidation.  According to information provided on
BBL's web site, this is not expected to have any material impact
on the main operating and asset owning entity, Babcock & Brown
International Pty Ltd.  BIBIPL will continue to operate and will
proceed with the orderly realization of assets over an approximate
two to three year time horizon to reduce debt.

The Babcock & Brown FX1 loan ($157.4 Million -- 11.2%) is backed
by a geographically diverse pool of multi-family properties.
These properties are generally older, Class B and C properties and
as such, may require more capital to remain competitive.  In
addition, the loan is encumbered by mezzanine debt, which adds
increased stress on the loan's ability to service its debt.  The
loan is structured with a hard lockbox, which enables greater cash
flow control for the servicer.  Moody's will consider all of these
factors as it monitors the performance of the loan.

As of the August 11, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are eight loans,
representing 17.9% of the pool, in special servicing.  The Babcock
& Brown FX1 loan was transferred to special servicing in March
2009 for imminent default and is currently 30 days delinquent.
Fifty-one loans, representing 17.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.

Moody's review will focus on the progress of the Babcock & Brown
Ltd. liquidation, potential losses from specially serviced loans
and the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $143,946,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/9/2009

  -- Class A-J, $100,762,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class B, $30,588,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class C, $12,595,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class D, $23,391,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class E, $17,994,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class F, $16,193,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class G, $19,793,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class H, $16,194,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class J, $5,398,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class K, $5,398,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class L, $5,398,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class M, $1,799,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class N, $7,197,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class O, $5,398,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/9/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C3 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C3 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Babcock & Brown Limited, the
sponsor of the second largest loan, as well as potential losses
from other loans in special servicing.

On August 24, 2009, the creditors of BBL voted to place the
company into liquidation.  According to information provided on
BBL's web site, this is not expected to have any material impact
on the main operating and asset owning entity, Babcock & Brown
International Pty Ltd.  BIBIPL will continue to operate and will
proceed with the orderly realization of assets over an approximate
two to three year time horizon to reduce debt.

The Babcock & Brown FX2 loan ($197.9 Million -- 10.4%) is backed
by a geographically diverse pool of multi-family properties.
These properties are generally older, Class B and C properties
which typically require more capital to remain competitive.  In
addition, the loan is encumbered by mezzanine debt, which adds
increased stress on the loan's ability to service its debt.  The
loan is structured with a hard lockbox, which enables greater cash
flow control for the servicer.  Moody's will consider all of these
factors as it monitors the performance of the loan.

As of the August 11, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are eight loans,
representing 12.8% of the pool, in special servicing.  The Babcock
& Brown FX2 loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2009 for imminent default and is 30 days delinquent.  Twenty-five
loans, representing 6.4% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's review will focus on the progress of the BBL liquidation,
potential losses from specially serviced loans and the performance
of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $137,802,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $43,517,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $16,923,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $31,429,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $19,340,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $24,176,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $24,176,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $21,758,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class J, $7,253,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Ba1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class K, $7,253,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class L, $7,253,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $4,835,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class N, $7,253,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class O, $7,252,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class P, $9,671,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2
     on 2/6/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C4 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C4 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Babcock & Brown Limited, the
sponsor of two loans representing 5.5% of the outstanding deal
balance, as well as potential losses from loans in special
servicing.

On August 24, 2009, the creditors of BBL voted to place the
company into liquidation.  According to information provided on
BBL's web site, this is not expected to have any material impact
on the main operating and asset owning entity, Babcock & Brown
International Pty Ltd.  BIBIPL will continue to operate and will
proceed with the orderly realization of assets over an approximate
two to three year time horizon to reduce debt.

The Babcock & Brown FX3 loan ($195.1 Million -- 4.6%) and the
Babcock & Brown FX5 loan ($39.9 Million -- 0.9%) are backed by a
geographically diverse pool of multi-family properties.  The
properties are generally older, Class B and C properties which
typically require more capital to remain competitive.  In
addition, both loans are encumbered by mezzanine debt, which adds
increased stress on the loans' ability to service their debt.  The
loans are structured with a hard lockbox, which enables greater
cash flow control for the servicer.  Moody's will consider all of
these factors as it monitors the performance of the loans.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 32 loans,
representing 13.5% of the pool, in special servicing.  The Babcock
& Brown FX3 loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2009 due to imminent default and is in its grace period.  The
Babcock & Brown FX5 loan is not in special servicing and is
current.  One hundred-three loans, representing 17.8% of the pool,
are on the master servicer's watchlist.

Moody's review will focus on the progress of the Babcock & Brown
Ltd. liquidation, potential losses from specially serviced loans
and the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $427,309,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-J, $341,847,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $26,707,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $64,097,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $37,389,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $21,366,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $48,072,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $42,731,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $48,072,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $48,072,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $53,414,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $10,683,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $16,024,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $16,024,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class O, $5,341,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class P, $10,683,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class Q, $10,683,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/11/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C5 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C5 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Babcock & Brown Limited, the
sponsor of the largest loan in the pool, as well as potential
losses from other loans in special servicing.

On August 24, 2009, the creditors of BBL voted to place the
company into liquidation.  According to information provided on
BBL's web site, this is not expected to have any material impact
on the main operating and asset owning entity, Babcock & Brown
International Pty Ltd.  BIBIPL will continue to operate and will
proceed with the orderly realization of assets over an approximate
two to three year time horizon to reduce debt.

The Babcock & Brown FX4 loan ($193.9 Million -- 5.7%) is backed by
a geographically diverse pool of multi-family properties.  These
properties are generally older, Class B and C properties and as
such, may require more capital to remain competitive.  In
addition, the loan is encumbered by mezzanine debt, which adds
increased stress on the loan's ability to service its debt.  The
loan is structured with a hard lockbox, which enables greater cash
flow control for the servicer.  Moody's will consider all of these
factors as it monitors the performance of the loan.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 15 loans,
representing 9.8% of the pool, in special servicing.  The Babcock
& Brown FX4 loan was transferred to special servicing in February
2006 for imminent default but is current at this time.  At Moody's
prior review in February 2009 there were five loans, representing
than 1.0%, in special servicing.  Seventy-four loans, representing
21.2% of the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.

Moody's review will focus on the progress of the BBL liquidation,
potential losses from specially serviced loans and the performance
of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-MFL, $100,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/10/2009

  -- Class A-M, $242,977,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class A-J, $287,244,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class B, $12,861,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class C, $60,021,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class D, $38,585,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class E, $38,585,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class F, $34,298,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class G, $42,872,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class H, $34,298,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class J, $42,872,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class K, $4,287,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class L, $12,862,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class M, $12,862,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class N, $8,574,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class O, $4,287,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class P, $12,862,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/10/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-C5 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C5 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on five other classes from
the same transaction and removed three of them from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.33x and a loan-to-value ratio of 101.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.00x and an LTV of 126.8%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 68.0% and
33.5%, respectively.  All of these DSC and LTV calculations
exclude eight of the 10 specially serviced loans (1.6%) in the
pool and the loans that have been defeased (2.6%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced and credit-impaired
loans, and these losses are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO
criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its criteria review,
S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the two IO certificate classes
that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Ten assets ($33.6 million, 1.9%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  Three assets ($9.9 million, 0.6%)
have matured balloon balances; one ($1.6 million, 0.1%) is in
foreclosure; two ($11.3 million, 0.6%) are more than 90 days
delinquent; three ($6.2 million, 0.4%) are 60 days delinquent; and
one ($4.6 million, 0.2%) is less than 30 days delinquent.  Four of
the specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $6.7 million.  All of the specially serviced
assets have current pooled loan balances of less than $11 million.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 216 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.74
billion, compared with 228 loans with an aggregate trust balance
of $1.87 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is KeyBank Real Estate Capital.  The master servicer
provided financial information for 99.7% of the pool, and 98.8% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.33x and 101.1%, respectively.  Standard & Poor's adjusted
DSC and LTV figures exclude eight specially serviced loans.  S&P
estimated losses separately for these loans ($27.3 million, 1.6%).
The servicer provided DSC figures for seven of these loans
($25.7 million, 1.5%), and these loans had a weighted average DSC
of 1.00x.  To date, the transaction has experienced $2.6 million
of principal losses.  Forty-three loans ($570.9 million, 32.8%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist, including one of the top
10 loans.  Five loans ($11.8 million, 0.7%) have reported DSC
between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 31 loans ($190.3 million, 10.9%) have
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$681.8 million (39.2%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.27x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.26x and
108.2%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
  
       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-4      AA      AAA/Watch Neg                    21.31
      A-1A     AA      AAA/Watch Neg                    21.31
      A-J      A-      AAA/Watch Neg                    15.54
      B        BBB     AA/Watch Neg                     12.19
      C        BBB-    AA-/Watch Neg                    11.25
      D        BB+     A/Watch Neg                       9.37
      E        BB      A-/Watch Neg                      7.90
      F        BB-     BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.56
      G        B+      BBB/Watch Neg                     5.48
      H        B+      BBB-/Watch Neg                    4.01
      J        B       BB+/Watch Neg                     3.74
      K        B       BB/Watch Neg                      3.07
      L        B-      BB-/Watch Neg                     2.53

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-2      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    21.31
      A-3      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    21.31
      A-AB     AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    21.31

                         Ratings Affirmed

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C5

           Class     Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
           -----     ------      ----------------------
           A-X       AAA                            N/A
           A-SP      AAA                            N/A

                     N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2006-C4 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed
its ratings on nine classes from the same transaction and removed
three of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the specially
serviced loans in the pool, as well as concerns about loans that
S&P deemed to be credit-impaired.  S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.23x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 121.2%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.89x and an LTV of 143.4%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 87.1% and 37.2%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude 29 of the 33 specially serviced loans (7.9%), five loans
that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired (3.7%), and 40 co-op loans
that account for 2.2% of the pool.  S&P separately estimated
losses for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes N, O, P, and Q to 'D' due to
recurring interest shortfalls.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Thirty-three assets ($587.6 million, 13.9%) in the pool are with a
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. or National Consumer
Cooperative Bank.  Four of those assets ($13.5 million, 0.3%) are
real estate owned; five ($11.9 million, 0.3%) are in foreclosure;
15 ($209.1 million, 4.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent; three
($26.9 million, 0.6%) are more than 60 days delinquent; two
($10.9 million, 0.3%) are more than 30 days delinquent; two
($98.4 million, 2.3%) are in their grace periods; and two
($216.8 million, 5.1%) are current.  Thirteen of the specially
serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts totaling
$44.0 million.  Three specially serviced assets are top 10 loans:
the Babcock & Brown FX 3 loan (4.6%), The Dream Hotel loan (2.4%),
and the Harwood Center loan (1.9%).  S&P discuss these loans in
further detail below.  All the other specially serviced assets
have balances below 1% of the total pool balance.

S&P deemed five loans ($156.8 million, 3.7%) secured by lodging,
multifamily, office, and retail properties to be at an increased
risk of default.  These include the fifth-largest loan in the
pool, secured by the Carlton Hotel on Madison ($100.0 million,
2.4%).  As a result of declines in occupancy and the average daily
rate, as well as increased repairs and maintenance expenses, the
property has not been generating enough cash flow to cover debt
service.  The remaining four assets posted significant decreases
in DSC driven by declining occupancies.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 356 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$4.23 billion, compared with 360 loans with an aggregate balance
of $4.27 billion at issuance.  The master servicers for the
transaction are KeyBank Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. and
National Consumer Cooperative Bank.  The master servicers provided
financial information for 99.1% of the pool, and 95.8% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.23x and 121.2%, respectively.  To date, the transaction has not
experienced any principal losses.  One hundred two loans
($905.5 million, 21.4%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Twenty-seven loans ($184.3 million, 4.4%) have reported DSC
between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 80 loans ($647.4 million, 15.3%) have
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.97 billion (46.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.39x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.26x and
111.0%, respectively.  The third-, sixth-, and seventh-largest
loans are with the special servicer and are described below.  S&P
also have concerns about the fifth-largest asset, Carlton Hotel on
Madison, as noted above.

The Babcock & Brown FX 3 loan is the third-largest loan in the
pool and the largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
loan's payment status was reported to be current on the August
2009 remittance report.  This asset has a balance of
$195.1 million (4.6%) and is secured by a 14-property, 3,719-unit
multifamily portfolio located in the states of Texas, Nevada,
Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, and Florida.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 5, 2009, due to
imminent default.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.14x.  Despite the
referenced DSC, the borrower indicated to the special servicer
that it may not be able to meet debt service obligation due to
deteriorating market conditions.  The special servicer has ordered
third-party reports and is considering a loan modification request
that the borrower has submitted.  Standard & Poor's expects a
significant loss upon the resolution of the loan.

The Dream Hotel loan is the sixth-largest loan in the pool and
the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
loan is 90-plus-days delinquent.  This asset has a balance of
$100.0 million (2.4%) and is secured by a 220-room, full-service,
boutique hotel in New York City.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on April 13, 2009, due to imminent default.
Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.16x, with an occupancy of 83.6% and an
average daily rate of $322.99 at Dec. 31, 2008.  The special
servicer and the borrower are pursuing a loan modification, and
the special servicer has ordered an appraisal.  Standard & Poor's
expects a significant loss upon the resolution of the loan.

The Harwood Center loan is the seventh-largest loan in the pool
and the third-largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
loan payment status was reported to be in its grace period on the
August 2009 remittance report.  This asset has a balance of
$80.9 million (1.9%) and is secured by a 731,716-sq.-ft. office
property in Dallas.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on April 24, 2009, due to imminent default.  Year-end
2008 DSC was 0.56x, while occupancy was 73.5% at March 31, 2009.
The special servicer and borrower are in the process of discussing
a loan modification, and together they have executed a
prenegotiation agreement.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant
loss upon the resolution of the loan.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
          Class  To     From        Credit enhancement (%)
          -----  --     ----        ----------------------
          A-M    BBB    AAA/Watch Neg                20.19
          A-J    B+     AAA/Watch Neg                12.11
          B      B      AA+/Watch Neg                11.48
          C      B      AA/Watch Neg                  9.97
          D      B-     AA-/Watch Neg                 9.09
          E      B-     A+/Watch Neg                  8.58
          F      CCC+   A/Watch Neg                   7.45
          G      CCC    A-/Watch Neg                  6.44
          H      CCC    BBB+/Watch Neg                5.30
          J      CCC-   BBB-/Watch Neg                4.16
          K      CCC-   BB/Watch Neg                  2.90
          L      CCC-   BB-/Watch Neg                 2.65
          M      CCC-   B/Watch Neg                   2.27
          N      D      B-/Watch Neg                  1.89
          O      D      CCC+/Watch Neg                1.77
          P      D      CCC/Watch Neg                 1.51
          Q      D      CCC-/Watch Neg                1.26

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
          Class  To     From        Credit enhancement (%)
          -----  --     ----        ----------------------
          A-3      AAA    AAA/Watch Neg               30.29
          A-4FL    AAA    AAA/Watch Neg               30.29
          A-1-A    AAA    AAA/Watch Neg               30.29

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Class  Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
               -----  ------  ----------------------
               A-1    AAA                      30.29
               A-2    AAA                      30.29
               A-AB   AAA                      30.29
               A-X    AAA                        N/A
               A-SP   AAA                        N/A
               A-Y    AAA                        N/A


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2006-C5 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed
its ratings on five additional classes.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  The
downgrades of the subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect
anticipated credit support erosion upon the eventual resolution of
the specially serviced loans, as well as concerns with one of the
loans that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.35x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 117.6%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 0.85x and an LTV of 158.6%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 85.0% and 41.1%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude 13 of the 14 specially serviced assets (9.7%), as well as
one of the loans that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired (0.3%).
S&P separately estimated losses for these loans, which are
included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

In addition, S&P downgraded class P to 'D' due to recurring
interest shortfalls.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Fourteen assets ($332.0 million, 9.8%) in the pool, including the
largest and ninth-largest exposures in the pool by balance, are
with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. One of the specially
serviced assets ($3.9 million, 0.1%) is real estate owned; four
($31.0 million, 0.9%) are in foreclosure; four ($88.3 million,
2.6%) are more than 90 days delinquent; one ($3.4 million, 0.1%)
is 60 days delinquent; two ($9.9 million, 0.3%) are late, but less
than 30 days delinquent; and two ($195.4 million, 5.7%) are
current.  Nine of the specially serviced loans have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect totaling $26.1 million.  Two of the
specially serviced assets have balances representing more than 2%
of the total pool balance, while the remaining specially serviced
assets all have balances that are less than 1% of the total pool
balance.

The loan that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired and at an increased
risk of default (noted above) is the Holiday Inn Select Dallas
asset ($9.4 million, 0.3%).  The loan is secured by a 375-room
hotel in Farmers Branch, Texas.  The year-end 2008 DSC for this
asset was 0.41x, down from 1.22x at issuance.  The decreased DSC
is due to declines in both occupancy and the average daily rate
(ADR), as well as an increase in operating expenses, driven
primarily by an increase in franchise fees.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $3.40 billion, down slightly from $3.43 billion at
issuance.  The number of loans in the pool, at 304, is unchanged
since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is
KeyCorp Real Estate Capital Markets Inc. The master servicer
provided financial information for 99.5% of the pool; 97.8% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim 2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.35x and 117.6%, respectively.  The adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude 13 of the 14 specially serviced loans, as well as one of
the loans that S&P deemed to be credit-impaired ($338.2 million
combined balance, 9.9%).  S&P estimated losses separately for
these loans.  The weighted average servicer-reported DSC for these
loans was 1.07x.  The transaction has not experienced any
principal losses to date.  Seventy-four loans ($754.0 million,
22.1%) are on the master servicer's watchlist, including two of
the top 10 exposures.  Twenty-four loans ($348.7 million, 10.2%)
have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 41 loans
($594.6 million, 17.5%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                 Summary Of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.3 billion (37.8%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.32x for the top 10 assets.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 assets were 1.21x and
121.7%, respectively.  These calculations exclude the Babcock &
Brown FX 4 loan and West Covina Village Community Shopping
Center/Wells Fargo Bank Tower cross-collateralized/cross-defaulted
loan exposure, which are two top 10 assets currently with the
special servicer.  S&P discuss these two assets immediately below.

The Babcock & Brown FX 4 loan, which is the largest loan in the
pool, is with the special servicer but is classified as current.
This asset has a balance of $193.9 million (5.7%) and is secured
by 20 multifamily properties comprising 4,958 units.  Twelve of
the properties are in Texas, five are in Georgia, and three are in
South Carolina.  The year-end 2008 reported DSC was 1.19x.
Despite the referenced DSC, the loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Feb. 9, 2009, for imminent default.  The
special servicer is evaluating workout options.  Standard & Poor's
expects a loss upon the resolution of the loan.

The West Covina Village Community Shopping Center/Wells Fargo Bank
Tower cross-collateralized/cross-defaulted loan exposure is the
ninth-largest exposure in the pool, and the second-largest asset
with the special servicer.  The asset is more than 90 days
delinquent and has a balance of $79.4 million (2.3%).  The
exposure is secured by the West Covina Village Community Shopping
Center, which is a 229,324-sq.-ft. retail property, and the Wells
Fargo Bank Tower, which is a 215,189-sq.-ft. office building.
Both properties are located in West Covina, Calif.  The asset was
transferred to the special servicer after the borrower failed to
make the April 2009 debt service payment.  The year-end 2008 DSC
was 0.94x, while the March 2009 occupancy was 88.5%.  There is a
$9.9 million ARA in effect against the exposure.  Standard &
Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution of the
asset.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
     Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --      ----            ----------------------
     A-3      A+      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.22
     A-1-A    A+      AAA/Watch Neg                    30.22
     A-MFL    BBB     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.15
     A-M      BBB     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.15
     A-J      BB-     AAA/Watch Neg                    11.71
     B        BB-     AA+/Watch Neg                    11.33
     C        B+      AA/Watch Neg                      9.57
     D        B       AA-/Watch Neg                     8.44
     E        B       A/Watch Neg                       7.30
     F        B-      A-/Watch Neg                      6.30
     G        CCC+    BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.04
     H        CCC     BBB/Watch Neg                     4.03
     J        CCC-    BBB-/Watch Neg                    2.77
     K        CCC-    BB+/Watch Neg                     2.64
     L        CCC-    BB/Watch Neg                      2.27
     M        CCC-    B+/Watch Neg                      1.89
     N        CCC-    B/Watch Neg                       1.64
     O        CCC-    B-/Watch Neg                      1.51
     P        D       CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.13

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

            Class   Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
            -----   ------      ----------------------
            A-1     AAA                      30.22
            A-2     AAA                      30.22
            A-AB    AAA                      30.22
            A-X     AAA                        N/A
            A-SP    AAA                        N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-TFL1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class K and L commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-TFL1.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on two 'AAA'
rated classes from this series and removed all four ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades and affirmation follow S&P's continuing analysis of
the properties that serve as collateral for the remaining loan in
the pool, the Galleria Office Towers loan.  The properties
recently lost a tenant that occupied approximately 15% of the
gross leasable area, which resulted in the occupancy dropping to
69%.  The corresponding net cash flow decline caused S&P's
adjusted property value to be 16% lower than at the time of S&P's
last review.  The loan's final maturity date is Dec. 9, 2009.  S&P
also considered the related refinance risk in S&P's analysis.

S&P affirmed the rating on the class A-X-1 interest-only
certificate based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may
revise its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings,
including the rating on the IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, trustee remittance report, the Galleria
Office Towers loan had a $71.0 million whole-loan balance that is
split into a $45.0 million in-trust senior participation interest
and a $26.0 million nontrust junior subordinate participation
interest.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the
properties secure a $10.0 million mezzanine loan.  The master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., reported debt service coverage on
the trust balance of 4.56x for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2008.
The occupancy dropped from 89% in S&P's last review to 69% for the
period ended June 30, 2009.  Much of the decline was due to the
early termination of Stanford Capital Management's tenant lease,
which comprised approximately 15% of the GLA.

S&P based its analysis in part on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the first six months of 2009, the 12
months ended Dec. 31, 2008, and the borrower's 2009 budget.  The
loan has a final maturity of Dec. 9, 2009.  According to Wachovia,
the borrower is having difficulty obtaining refinancing, which may
cause the transfer of the loan to special servicing in the future.

The Galleria Office Towers loan is secured by a three-building,
class A office complex totaling 1.07 million sq. ft. in Houston,
Texas.  The complex is part of the greater Houston Galleria
Complex, which includes a 2.4 million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall
and two hotels.  The complex is six miles west of the central
business district in Houston's Uptown District.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TFL1

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    K           AA+      AAA/Watch Neg                    50.00
    L           BB       BBB-/Watch Neg                     N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-TFL1

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    J           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    83.33
    A-X-1       AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                      N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CSMC MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on 79 Senior Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on 79
senior classes from CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-5: 69 were
raised to 'AAA' and 10 were raised to 'AA' based on the projected
credit support for this transaction.

On July 24, 2009, as a result of an administrative error, S&P
incorrectly lowered its ratings on these classes to 'CCC' as part
of a larger review of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
secured by Alternative-A mortgage collateral.

This transaction contains two separate and distinct structures and
has 10 distinct loan groups: Loan group 1 makes up one structure,
and is performing poorly, in S&P's view; loan groups 2 through 10
(collectively, mortgage group B) make up the second structure,
which pursuant to S&P's criteria, is currently exhibiting stronger
performance.  During S&P's recent surveillance review, however,
S&P used a default assumption that was based on the combined
delinquency pipeline of the two structures.  As a result, S&P's
analysis incorrectly penalized the classes from the better-
performing structure by incorporating an inapplicable loss
projection.

Accordingly, S&P is revising its loss projection for mortgage
group B to 5.11% from the previously published projection of
17.70%.  Mortgage group B had an original pool balance of $680.9
million.  In reviewing this loan group using the revised loss
projection, S&P determined that 69 of the classes have adequate
credit support, under S&P's criteria, to maintain 'AAA' ratings,
while the other 10 classes have adequate credit support for 'AA'
ratings.

To maintain a rating between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P
assess whether a class can withstand losses exceeding the base-
case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating category,
up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P assess whether a
class could withstand approximately 140% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain an 'AA' rating.

                         Ratings Corrected

                CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2007-5
                        Series      2007-5

                                             Rating
                                             ------
  Class      CUSIP         Current           July 24        Pre-July 24
  -----      -----         -------           -------        -----------
  D-X        22944BDT2     AAA               CCC            AAA
  D-P        22944BDU9     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  2-A-1      22944BAN8     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  2-A-2      22944BAP3     AAA               CCC            AAA
  2-A-3      22944BAQ1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  2-A-4      22944BAR9     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  2-A-5      22944BAS7     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  2-A-6      22944BAT5     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-1      22944BAU2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-2      22944BAV0     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-3      22944BAW8     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-4      22944BAX6     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-5      22944BAY4     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-6      22944BAZ1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-7      22944BBA5     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-8      22944BBB3     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-9      22944BBC1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-10     22944BBD9     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-11     22944BBE7     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-12     22944BBF4     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-13     22944BBG2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-14     22944BBH0     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-15     22944BBJ6     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-16     22944BBK3     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-17     22944BBL1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  3-A-18     22944BBM9     AAA               CCC            AAA
  3-A-19     22944BBN7     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-1      22944BBP2     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-2      22944BBQ0     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-3      22944BBR8     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-4      22944BBS6     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-5      22944BBT4     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-6      22944BBU1     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-7      22944BBV9     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-8      22944BBW7     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-9      22944BBX5     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-10     22944BBY3     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-11     22944BBZ0     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-12     22944BCA4     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-13     22944BCB2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-14     22944BCC0     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-15     22944BCD8     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-16     22944BCE6     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-17     22944BCF3     AAA               CCC            AAA
  4-A-18     22944BCG1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-19     22944BCH9     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-20     22944BCJ5     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-21     22944BCK2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-22     22944BCL0     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-23     22944BCM8     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-24     22944BCN6     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-25     22944BCP1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-26     22944BCQ9     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-27     22944BCR7     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-28     22944BCS5     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-29     22944BCT3     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-30     22944BCU0     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-31     22944BCV8     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-32     22944BCW6     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  4-A-33     22944BCX4     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  5-A-1      22944BCY2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  5-A-2      22944BCZ9     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  5-A-3      22944BDA3     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  5-A-4      22944BDB1     AAA               CCC            AAA
  5-A-5      22944BDC9     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  6-A-1      22944BDD7     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  6-A-2      22944BDE5     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  6-A-3      22944BDF2     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  6-A-4      22944BDG0     AAA               CCC            AAA
  6-A-5      22944BDH8     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  7-A-1      22944BDJ4     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  7-A-2      22944BDK1     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  8-A-1      22944BDL9     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  8-A-2      22944BDM7     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  9-A-1      22944BDN5     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  9-A-2      22944BDP0     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  10-A-1     22944BDQ8     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  10-A-2     22944BDR6     AAA               CCC            AAA/Watch Neg
  A-M        22944BDS4     AA                CCC            AAA/Watch Neg


DUANE STREET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Duane Street CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- $185,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017
     (current balance of $183,306,540), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on Oct 6, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $65,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2017 (current balance of $64,405,000), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on Oct 6, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $36,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $15,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2017, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- $15,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2017, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- $7,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017 (current balance of $7,100,806), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $9,000,000 Class Z-1 Combination Notes Due 2017 (current
     balance of $5,361,030), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar
     4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $5,000,000 Class Z-2 Combination Notes Due 2017 (current
     balance of $3,566,684), Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar
     4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $2,000,000 Class Z-3 Combination Notes Due 2017 (current
     balance of $1,145,747), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar
     4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $3,000,000 Class Z-4 Combination Notes Due 2017 (current
     balance of $2,250,117), Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar
     4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Mezzanine Coverage Test.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2578 versus a test level of 2488 as
of the last trustee report, dated July 30, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $33.4 million, accounting for roughly 9.8% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 12.3% of the underlying portfolio.  The Mezzanine
Coverage Test was reported at 100.48% versus a test level of
103.7%.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class E Notes are
presently being deferred as a result of the failure of the
Mezzanine Coverage Test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Duane Street CLO I, Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


EL PASO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Junior Subordinate Series
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on El Paso
Housing Corporation, Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (La Plaza
Apartments): Baa1 on the Series 2000 A and B; Baa3 on the
Subordinate Series C; and Ba3 on the Junior Subordinate Series D.
The outlook is stable.

Use of Proceeds: The bonds were issued for the purpose of
financing the acquisition, rehabilitation and equipping of a 129
unit multifamily housing development located in El Paso, Texas and
occupied by persons of low and moderate income.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations of the issuer
payable solely from and secured, to the extent and as provided in
the indenture, by pledge of: 1) all right and title interest of
the issuer; 2) funds, including monies and investments held by the
trustee pursuant to the indenture.

Strengths:

* Strong reserve balances with maximum annual debt service reserve
  fully funded.  As of December 31, 2008, the senior, junior and
  junior subordinate funds are fully funded.

* The project consistently maintains strong debt service coverage
   (1.82/1.57/1.36) senior, junior and junior subordinate
  respectively.

* The project consistently maintains high occupancy levels (99% as
  of July 2009).

Challenges:

* Growing expenses charged to reserve and replacement balances may
  become recurring expenses, thereby reducing net operating income

* Small size of the projects make cash flow somewhat volatile, as
  small swings in revenues or expenses can have a
  disproportionately large impact on NOI;

* Potential market competition arising from increased multifamily
  building may attract tenants, possible increasing vacancy.

* Market forecast indicates slow or stagnant rental revenue growth
  which may necessitate prolonged concessions as well as limiting
  rental increases

                            Outlook

The outlook remains stable for the Senior, Subordinate and Junior
Subordinate Bonds.  This reflects Moody's expectation that the
bonds will continue to provide sufficient pledged revenue to
bondholders, given the properties demonstrated ability to maintain
strong debt service coverage and low vacancy rates.

               What Could Cause the rating to go UP

Significant improvement in debt service coverage.

              What Could Cause the rating to go DOWN

The deterioration of occupancy levels or declines in debt service
coverage.

Capital expenditures becoming more frequent, thereby reducing net
operating income.

The last rating action was on April 17, 2009, when the ratings
were affirmed.


EQUITY ONE: Moody's Upgrades Underlying Ratings on Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the underlying rating for
the Cl. A-1 and downgraded the underlying rating for the Cl. A-2
issued by Equity One ABS, Inc. 1998-1.  These rating actions
result in changes to the ratings previously assigned on April 13,
2009.

The rating actions are being taken to correct an error identified
by Moody's in analyzing the credit enhancement for these
securities.  The previous underlying ratings did not incorporate
the benefit from credit enhancement due to a spread account.  The
rating actions taken incorporate that credit enhancement as well
as the further deterioration in the performance of the collateral
in recent months.

While these securities are insured by Ambac Assurance Corporation,
the current ratings on the securities are consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.
The insured rating on these securities is unaffected by the rating
actions and remains Caa2.  However, because that rating is lower
than the underlying ratings assigned, the underlying rating for
each of these securities is the operative rating.

Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e.  prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions.  The results of these two
calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are weighted
to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Equity One ABS, Inc. 1998-1

Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 1.2% (as a percentage
of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Cl. A-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Apr 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. A-2 Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Apr 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3


FM LEVERAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating on this class of notes issued by FM Leverage Capital Fund
I:

  -- US$35,300,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$24,600,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017 (current balance of $24,741,156) Confirmed at
     Ba1, previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,600,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017 (current balance of $25,050,759)
     Confirmed at B3, previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,200,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017 (current balance of $12,661,186) Confirmed at
     Caa3, previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class A/B Principal Coverage Ratio,
Class C Principal Coverage Ratio, Class D Principal Coverage
Ratio, and Class E Principal Coverage Ratio.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3137 as of the last trustee report, dated
July 20, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
currently held in the portfolio total about $44 million,
accounting for roughly 11.95% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 14.3% of the
underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

FM Leverage Capital Fund I, issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2004-GG2 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven pooled
classes and downgraded 13 pooled classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Corp. II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-GG2.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for
the pool resulting from anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing, increased leverage and credit quality dispersion and
increased loan concentration.  On August 27, 2009, Moody's placed
13 classes on review for possible downgrade.  This action
concludes that review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 13%
to $2.3 billion from $2.6 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 126 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 47% of the pool.  The pool includes
four loans with underlying ratings, representing 23% of the pool.
Nine loans, representing 15% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-four loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the trust resulting in an
aggregate loss of $2.2 million.  There are currently six loans,
representing 11% of the pool, in special servicing.  The largest
specially serviced loan is the Grand Canal Shoppes at the Venetian
Loan ($175.2 million -- 7.7%).  This loan is secured by a regional
mall owned by affiliates of General Growth Properties, Inc.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing after GGP's bankruptcy
filing on April 16, 2009.  Moody's does not expect a loss on this
loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the University Mall
Loan ($37.5 million -- 1.6%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 560,000 square foot mall located in Carbondale,
Illinois.  The loan was transferred to special servicing on
July 25, 2008, due to imminent default.  The two largest tenants
at the center were Steve and Barry's and Goody's, both of which
filed for bankruptcy protection in 2008 and subsequently vacated
the center.  The loan was appraised in September 2008 for
$27.3 million, representing a 48% decline in value.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate loss of $34.2 million (41% severity on
average) for the non-GGP specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 96%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
conduit component, excluding the specially serviced loans with
estimated losses, is 105% compared to 92% at Moody's prior full
review in March 2007.  In addition to the increase in overall LTV,
credit quality dispersion has increased since last review.  Based
on Moody's analysis, 15% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120%
compared to 4% at last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit pool
is 1.08X, compared to 1.11X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances, unless addressed by extra
credit enhancement.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with underlying ratings,
has a Herf of 41 compared to 49 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Grand Canal
Shops at the Venetian Loan ($175.2 million - 7.7%), which
represents a 44.5% participation interest in a first mortgage
loan.  The loan is secured by a 537,000 square foot mall located
within the Venetian Casino Resort in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The mall
shop occupancy as of March 2009 was 99% compared to 96% at last
review.  The comparable inline sales for the trailing twelve month
period ending February 2009 were $932 per square foot compared to
$1,046 PSF at last review.  The loan sponsor is GGP.  Moody's
analysis reflects the elimination of certain tranching benefits
associated with the nature of the collateral and the sponsorship
of the mall.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR
are A3 and 1.32X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.20X at last
review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Daily
News Building Loan ($146.0 million -- 6.4%), which is secured by a
1.1 million square foot office building located in the Grand
Central area of New York City.  The property was 99% occupied as
of January 2009, essentially the same as at last review.  Major
tenants include Omnicom Group (38% NRA; lease expiration April
2017), WPIX, Inc. / Tribune (11% NRA; lease expiration March 2010)
and United Nations Population Fund (8% NRA; lease expiration in
December 2012).  Performance at the property has been stable since
securitization.  There is near term rollover risk, however, this
is partially mitigated by low in place average rents compared to
current market rents.  The property is also encumbered by a
$56 million B Note.  The loan sponsor is SL Green Realty Corp.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and
1.60X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.61X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the Garden
State Plaza Loan ($130.0 million -- 5.7%), which represents a 25%
pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured
by the borrower's interest in a 2.0 million square foot super-
regional mall located in Paramus, New Jersey.  The mall is
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, J.C.  Penney, Neiman Marcus and
Lord & Taylor.  The in-line space was 96% leased as of July 2008.
In 2007, a 149,000 square foot expansion was completed consisting
of a 99,000 square foot cinema complex and 35,000 square feet of
new in-line mall shop space.  The loan is interest-only for its
entire 10-year term.  The loan sponsors are Westfield America Inc.
and affiliates of Prudential Assurance Co.  Ltd. Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.53X at last review.

The fourth largest loan with an underlying rating is the 111
Eighth Avenue Loan ($76.5 million -- 3.4%), which represents a
17.8% interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
2.9 million square foot office and telecom building located in the
Chelsea area of New York City.  The property was 99% occupied as
of January 2009, essentially the same as at last review.  Major
tenants include Google (8% NRA; lease expiration February 2021),
Sprint (9% NRA; lease expiration December 2014) and CCH Legal
Information (6% NRA; lease expirations in July 2015 and February
2019).  Performance has improved since last review due to
increased rental revenues and amortization.  The property is also
encumbered by a B Note, a portion of which is the collateral for
the non-pooled and non-Moody's rated Classes OEA-B1 and OEA-B2.
The loan sponsors are Jamestown and the New York Common Retirement
Fund.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Baa1 and 1.49X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.39X at last
review.

The three largest non-defeased conduit loans comprise 11.0% of the
pool.  The largest loan is the Stoney Point Fashion Park Loan
($107.8 million -- 4.7%), which is secured by a 665,000 square
foot regional mall located in Richmond, Virginia.  The mall is
anchored by Dillard's, Dick Sporting Goods, and Saks Fifth Ave.
The in-line space was 84% leased as of January 2009 compared to
98% at last review.  The mall was constructed in 2003 and
performance has declined as the leases for several of the original
tenants expired in 2008 and they did not renew their leases.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.80X, respectively,
compared to 87% and 1.06X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Destin Commons Loan ($78.9 million
-- 3.5%), which is secured by a 480,000 square foot regional
shopping center located in Destin, Florida.  The shopping center
is anchored by Belk Resort Store, Rave Motion Pictures, and Bass
Pro Shops.  The in-line space was 100% leased as of February 2009.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 0.98X, respectively,
compared to 94% and 0.98X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Town and Country Resort Loan New Roc
City Loan ($65.0 million -- 2.9%), which is secured by a 966-room
full service hotel located in San Diego, California.  Occupancy as
of December 2008 was 65% compared to 67% at last review.
Performance has declined due to an increase in operating expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and 1.18X, respectively,
compared to 96% and 1.30X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1A, $85,256,396, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class A-3, $171,644,441, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class A-4, $208,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class A-5, $173,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class A-6, $1,299,650,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class B, $65,110,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class C, $29,299,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class D, $52,088,000, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously on
     review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class E, $29,300,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3, previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class F, $26,044,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1;
     previously on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class G, $22,789,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class H, $29,299,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class J, $6,511,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously on
     review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class K, $13,022,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class L, $13,022,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class M, $9,767,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class N, $6,511,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class O, $9,766,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five Pooled Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed five pooled classes and one non-
pooled, or rake, class of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-GSFL
VIII on review for possible downgrade due to concerns about the
CarrAmerica Corporate Center Loan and The Hardage Portfolio Loan,
which is currently in special servicing.  Combined, the two loans
represent 93% of the pool balance and both loans are secured by
properties that have experienced a material decline in net cash
flow.  Moody's is also concerned about potential non-reimbursed
trust expenses and interest shortfalls associated with The Hardage
Portfolio Loan, particularly as they impact the rake Class H-HP.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the August 6, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased by 77% to $151 million
from $661 million at securitization due to the payoff of loans.
The Certificates are collateralized by three mortgage loans
ranging in size from 8% to 50% of the pool.

The largest loan in the pool, the CarrAmerica Corporate Center
Loan ($75.0 million -- 50% of the pool), is secured by a campus of
eight Class A office buildings totaling 1,013,280 square feet in
Pleasanton, California.  The year end 2008 reported net cash flow
has decreased 27% from 2007 and the occupancy rate has fallen to
66% from 75%.  The loan is interest-only for the full term with
extension options through November 2010.

The second largest loan in the pool, representing 43% of the pool,
is currently in special servicing.  The Hardage Portfolio Loan
($47.1 million pooled balance and $4.9 million rake balance) is
secured by eight extended stay hotel properties located in
California, Maryland, Florida, Utah and Louisiana.  The year end
2008 reported net cash flow has decreased 11% from 2007 and is 47%
below the underwritten cash flow at securitization.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing on February 23, 2009.  The loan
is interest-only for the full term with an original maturity date
of April 2009 that has been extended to October 2009 with one
additional six-month extension.

The rake class H-HP has experienced $16,906 in principal losses
since Moody's last review associated with the payment of
outstanding trust expenses.  As of August 6, 2009, cumulative
unpaid interest totaled $9,698, resulting in interest shortfalls
to the rake class H-HP.  In general, interest shortfalls are
caused by trust expenses associated with specially serviced loans,
including special servicing fees, legal expenses and other
expenses associated with the resolution of a loan.  Interest
shortfalls can also result when the servicer advances only a
portion of the monthly principal and interest payment for a
specially serviced loan because of a decline in the value of the
underlying property (based on an appraisal reduction
determination), or when the servicer recovers previous P&I over-
advances prior to a loan being liquidated.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, currently rated Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/11/2009

  -- Class A-2, $351,836, currently rated Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/11/2009

  -- Class B, $30,366,000, currently rated Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 3/11/2009

  -- Class C, $22,075,000, currently rated Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 3/11/2009

  -- Class D, $30,765,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3 on
     3/11/2009

  -- Class E, $14,983,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa3 from A1 on
     3/11/2009

  -- Class F, $14,983,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 3/11/2009

  -- Class G, $13,884,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 3/11/2009

  -- Class H, $7,391,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 3/11/2009

  -- Class H-HP, $4,729,387, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Ba1 on
     3/11/2009


HIGHLAND LEGACY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Highland Legacy Limited CLO:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Fixed Rate Notes, Due 2011, Downgraded
     to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes, Due 2011,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes, Due 2011 (current
     balance of $10,673,886), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes, Due 2011 (current
     balance of $20,749,446), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of Class C and Class D interest coverage
tests.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3966 versus a test
level of 2850 as of the last trustee report, dated July 27, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $11.6 million, accounting for roughly
9.6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 29% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class
C interest coverage test was reported at 99.65% versus a test
level of 120.0%, and the Class D interest coverage test was
reported at 58.62% versus a test level of 110.0%.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C interest
coverage test.

Moody's also noted that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.  In addition, Moody's observes that the transaction is
exposed to a large concentration of assets in the buildings and
real estate industry.  These investments may herald poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Highland Legacy Limited CLO, issued in August 1999, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HOUSE OF EUROPE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of three classes of Notes issued by House of Europe Funding
IV PLC, the Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- EUR740,000,000 Class A1 House of Europe Funding IV PLC
     Floating Rate Notes due 2090, Downgraded to A2; previously on
     12/17/2008 Downgraded to Aa3, on Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR130,000,000 Class A2 House of Europe Funding IV PLC
     Floating Rate Notes due 2090, Downgraded to Caa3; previously
     on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Caa1, on Review for Possible
     Downgrade

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's notes that in the
case of House of Europe Funding IV PLC more than 22% of its assets
have been the subject of ratings downgrade since Moody's last
review of the transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reports
that defaults rose by more than $13 million since February 2009.
Both the Class A/B/C Overcollateralization Ratio Test and the
Class D Overcollateralization Ratio Test are continuously failing.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to a missed interest payment with respect to the
Class A, B or C Notes.  As provided in Article V of the Indenture
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default,
certain parties to the transaction may be entitled to direct the
Trustee to take particular actions with respect to the Collateral
and the Notes, including the sale and liquidation of the assets.
The severity of losses of certain tranches may be different
depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


INLAND EMPIRE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007 Tobacco Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Negative Rating Outlooks to
Inland Empire Tobacco Securitization Corporation's series 2007
tobacco settlement asset-backed securities bonds.  The downgrades
follow Fitch's re-evaluation of the relative population growth
assumption for Riverside County and the output of the cash flow
model.  The model output indicates that, for the bonds to payoff
in full on each due date, they would require much higher increases
in the trust cash receipt relative to other comparable tobacco ABS
bonds.

Although the trust will benefit from an increase in cash flow
should the county's population share grow, the assumption that it
will experience significant population growth relative to other
counties in California is no longer deemed appropriate.  Key
factors incorporated into population growth assumptions include
the county's economic growth projection, trends in migration, and
the real estate market.  With the recent economic developments
negatively affecting these variables for the county, Fitch is
concerned that the relative population growth may fall short of
the initial projection.  The trust cash flow is based on the
Master Settlement Agreement payments allocated to the county, the
allocation of which is increased or decreased every 10 years
depending on the county's population share in the state.

The cash flow model indicates, for each class of bonds, the level
of the annual cash inflow change the trust would be able to
sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final date.
For all the bonds, the model indicated that it would require more
than the 1% annual increase in cash flow, a 'B' base case, to the
trust.  The model is neutral with respect to population share and
does not account for any possible increases.  Fitch then applied
qualitative consideration in adjusting ratings.  With respect to
the turbo bonds, they were downgraded to 'BB' accounting for their
shorter maturity and the fact that they are affected by mainly one
population share adjustment in 2011.  Depending on the new
population share at the time, the ratings may further be
downgraded.  The capital appreciation bonds including the
convertible CAB are downgraded to the 'B' category, reflecting the
higher breakeven increase produced by the model and the longer
tenor.  These bonds require higher and consistent relative
population growth over a longer horizon.  The convertible CAB is
rated lower than some of the other CABs because of the higher
breakeven increase produced by the model.  The Negative Outlooks
reflects the pressure these bonds are under as evidenced by the
model output.

Inland Empire Tobacco Securitization Authority bonds are secured
by the payments made under the MSA.  The pledged payments consist
of California's share of perpetual annual payments and strategic
contribution payments by the original participating manufacturers
and subsequent participating manufacturers.  The OPMs at the time
of the original agreement were Philip Morris USA, Inc.; R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation;
and Lorillard Tobacco Company.  The amount of annual MSA payments
received by the trust are mainly affected by the tobacco
consumption level and inflation rate, as well as state specific
adjustments, as specified in the MSA.

Fitch downgrades Inland Empire Tobacco Securitization
Corporation's series 2007 tobacco settlement ABS bonds:

Current interest turbo term bonds:

  -- $55,150,000 due June 1, 2021 to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $32,500,000 due June 1, 2021 to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

Convertible capital appreciation turbo term bond:

  -- $53,757,703 due June 1, 2026 to 'B' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative.

Capital appreciation bonds:

  -- 2007C-1 to 'B+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2007C-2 to 'B+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2007D to 'B' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2007E to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.


INWOOD PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Inwood Park CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$90,625,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$141,375,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Confirmed at Aaa; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$68,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2021, Confirmed at B3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Moody's notes that as of the latest trustee report dated August 8,
2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2672, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$39.2 million, accounting for roughly 3.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
9.5% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations
of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Inwood Park CDO Ltd., issued in January of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


JFIN CLO: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various 2007 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd:

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at
     Aaa; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at
     Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$33,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$26,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to B1; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B2
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation on the Class A-1B and
Class B Notes and the upgrade actions on the Class C and Class D
Notes consider updated analysis incorporating certain rating
stresses assumed by Moody's (discussed below) and credit
deterioration, but reflect Moody's conclusion that the impact of
these factors on the ratings of the notes is not as negative as
previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.  In its analysis, Moody's also
considered the positive implications of the continued deleveraging
of the transaction as a result of the partial paydown of the Class
A-1A and Class A-2 Notes.  Over the course of the last three
payment dates, the principal balances of the Class A-1A and Class
A-2 Notes have been reduced by about 7% and 6%, respectively.

Moody's rating analysis applies certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

JFIN CLO 2007 Ltd., issued in July of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Series 2008-R1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of certificates from JP Morgan Alternative Loan Trust
Series 2008-R1.  S&P lowered the ratings on classes 1-A-1, 2-A-1,
and 3-A-1 to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.  S&P lowered the ratings on classes
1-A-2, 2-A-2, and 3-A-2 to 'CC' from 'AAA'.  The downgrades
reflect the significant deterioration in performance of the loans
backing the underlying certificates.  This performance
deterioration is so severe that the credit enhancement for JPALT
2008-R1 is insufficient to maintain the ratings on the re-REMIC
classes.

JPALT 2008-R1, which closed in June 2008, is a resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction collateralized by four underlying classes
that support three independent groups within the re-REMIC.  The
loans securing the four underlying classes, which are included in
four different trusts, consist predominantly of fixed-rate and
long-reset adjustable-rate Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage loans.

The class 1-A-1 and 1-A-2 bonds from JPALT 2008-R1 are supported
by the A-1 class from Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-
A13 (current rating 'CCC').  The performance of the loans
underlying this trust has declined precipitously in recent months.
This pool had experienced losses of 3.04% of the original pool
balance as of the August 2009 distribution, and currently has
approximately 28% (of the current pool balance) in delinquent
loans.  Based on the losses to date, the current pool factor of
0.675 (67.5%), which represents the outstanding pool balance as a
proportion of the original balance, and the pipeline of delinquent
loans, S&P's current projected loss for this pool is 20.9%, which
exceeds the level of credit enhancement available to cover losses.

The class 2-A-1 and 2-A-2 bonds from JPALT 2008-R1 are supported
by the 2A1 class from IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR5
(current rating 'CCC') and the 1A1 class from IndyMac INDX
Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR11 (current rating 'CCC').  The
performance of the loans securing these certificates continues to
erode beyond reasonable expectations.  These pools had experienced
losses of 5.22% (the 2007-AR5 trust) and 7.81% (the 2007-AR11
trust) as of the August 2009 distribution, and currently have
approximately 45% and 51% in delinquent loans, respectively.
Based on the losses to date, the current pool factors of 0.775
(77.5%) and 0.744 (74.4%), respectively, and the pipeline of
delinquent loans, S&P's current projected losses for these pools
are 38.8% and 35.4%, respectively, which exceed the level of
credit enhancement available to cover losses.

The class 3-A-1 and 3-A-2 bonds from JPALT 2008-R1 are supported
by the A23 class from Alternative Loan Trust 2007-11T1 (current
rating 'CCC').  The performance of the loans securing this trust
has continued to decline in recent months.  This pool had
experienced losses of 1.40% as of the August 2009 distribution,
and currently has approximately 29% in delinquent loans.  Based on
the losses to date, the current pool factor of 0.840 (84.0%), and
the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current projected loss for
this pool is 19.6%, which exceeds the level of credit enhancement
available to cover losses.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S.  RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                          Ratings Lowered

         JP Morgan Alternative Loan Trust Series 2008-R1
                          Series 2008-R1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      466276AA0     CCC                  AAA
        1-A-2      466276AB8     CC                   BBB
        2-A-1      466276AC6     CCC                  AAA
        2-A-2      466276AD4     CC                   AAA
        3-A-1      466276AE2     CCC                  AAA
        3-A-2      466276AF9     CC                   AAA


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 15 2006-CIBC14 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on nine classes from the same transaction
and removed three of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.60x and a loan-to-value ratio of 101.5%.  S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield
a weighted average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV of 136.1%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 68.5% and
33.2%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude eight
of the 18 specially serviced loans (2.7%).  S&P estimated losses
for these loans, which are included in S&P's 'AAA' scenario
implied default and loss figures.

Classes H through P are currently experiencing interest
shortfalls, primarily due to appraisal subordinate entitlement
reductions.  However, several of the related appraisal reduction
amounts are not based on final appraisals and are subject to
change.  A change in the resulting ASERs could affect the future
interest shortfalls for each class.  S&P will continue to monitor
the interest shortfalls and may lower the ratings to 'D' if S&P
determines that the interest shortfalls are likely to continue for
the foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the class X-1 and X-2 interest-only
certificates based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on
June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may
revise S&P's IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings,
including the rating on IO certificate that S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Eighteen assets ($176.1 million, 6.5%) in the pool, including one
of the top 10 loans, are with the special servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc. The payment status of the loans is: one is in
foreclosure ($6.8 million, 0.3%), nine are more than 90 days
delinquent ($109.3 million, 4.1%), two are 60 days delinquent
($15.8 million, 0.6%), and six are 30 days delinquent
($44.2 million, 1.6%).  Twelve of the specially serviced loans
have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totalling
$52.4 million.  One of the specially serviced assets has a balance
that is greater than 1.0% of the total pool balance, while the
remaining specially serviced loan has a balance that is less than
0.7% of the total pool balance.  The top 10 loan with the special
servicer is discussed below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 198 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.69 billion, which represents approximately 98.0% of the trust
balance at issuance.  No loans have paid off or been liquidated
since issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction, Capmark
Finance Inc., provided financial information for 99.4% of the
pool, and 90.0% of the financial information was full-year 2008
data or interim 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.63x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.60x and 101.5%, respectively.  The
transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Forty-five loans (17.6%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including two of the top 10 loans.  Forty-three loans
($351.9 million, 13.1%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and 36 of
these loans ($267.3 million, 9.9%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.17 billion (43.6%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.95x.
One of the top 10 loans ($31.2 million, 1.2%) is with the special
servicer, and two of the top 10 loans ($138.4 million, 5.1%)
appear on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
TV for the top 10 loans are 1.84x and 89.7%, respectively.

The Concord Commons loan, the 10th-largest loan in pool, is the
largest loan with the special servicer.  This loan has a total
exposure of $31.9 million and is secured by a 306,250-sq.-ft.
retail property in Concord, North Carolina.  The reported DSC for
the property in 2008 was 1.13x, and occupancy was 77.4%.  The loan
is over 90 days delinquent and was transferred to the special
servicer on April 17, 2009, because the borrower requested a loan
modification.  The property has lost several tenants, including
Goody's, which filed for bankruptcy.  There is a $16.9 million ARA
in effect for this asset, and S&P expects a minimal loss upon its
resolution.

The Avion Business Park Portfolio loan is the sixth-largest loan
in pool and the largest loan on the watchlist.  This loan is
secured by a 586,466-sq.-ft. cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted portfolio of three office buildings and four flex/office
buildings constructed between 1988 and 2000 in Chantilly, Va.  The
reported DSC for the properties was 1.19x for the trailing six
months ended June 30, 2009, down from 1.20x at issuance, and
occupancy was 84.0%, down from 100% at issuance.  Occupancy
declined during the fourth quarter of 2008 because two tenants
(165,498 total sq.  ft., 28% of net rentable area) vacated when
their leases expired.  A new tenant has signed a 10-year lease for
88,273 sq. ft. (15% of NRA) that commenced July 1, 2009.  Capmark
plans to remove this loan from its September 2009 watchlist.

The Park Center loan is the eighth-largest loan in pool and the
second-largest loan on the watchlist.  This loan is secured by a
253,341-sq.-ft. office property in Plano, Texas, built in 2000.
The reported DSC for the property was 1.28x in 2008, up from 1.27x
at issuance, and occupancy was 74.5%, down from 100% at issuance.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC14

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----            ----------------------
      A-M       A+     AAA/Watch Neg                    20.30
      A-J       BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg                    12.52
      B         BBB-   AA/Watch Neg                     10.23
      C         BB+    AA-/Watch Neg                     9.21
      D         BB     A/Watch Neg                       7.67
      E         BB-    A-/Watch Neg                      6.78
      F         B+     BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.51
      G         B      BBB/Watch Neg                     4.49
      H         B-     BBB-/Watch Neg                    2.95
      J         CCC+   BB+/Watch Neg                     2.44
      K         CCC    BB/Watch Neg                      1.93
      L         CCC-   B+/Watch Neg                      1.68
      M         CCC-   B/Watch Neg                       1.55
      N         CCC-   B-/Watch Neg                      1.30
      P         CCC-   CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.04

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC14

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To     From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --     ----            ----------------------
      A-4       AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.51
      A-SB      AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.51
      A-1A      AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.51

                         Ratings Affirmed

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC14

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-1       AAA                        30.51
            A-2       AAA                        30.51
            A-3A      AAA                        30.51
            A-3B      AAA                        30.51
            X-1       AAA                          N/A
            X-2       AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-LDP3 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-LDP3 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six other classes from the
same transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.55x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 98.7%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.95x and an LTV of 121.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 68.2% and 33.2%,
respectively.  The lowered ratings on the mezzanine and
subordinate classes also reflect S&P's expectation of credit
support erosion upon the resolution of eight (5.0%) of the nine
specially serviced loans.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in S&P's opinion, provide
adequate support through various stress scenarios.  S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based on
S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to S&P's IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  Once the
criteria review is finalized, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Nine loans ($159.0 million; 8.1%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Three of these loans
are in foreclosure (1.7%), three are 90-plus-days delinquent
(1.3%), one is 60-plus-days delinquent (1.8%), and two are less
than 30 days delinquent (3.3%).  No appraisal reduction amounts
are in effect for these loans.  The fourth- and 10th-largest loans
in the pool are with the special servicer and are described below.
In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P consider seven
loans ($29.2 million; 1.5%) to be credit impaired.  All of the
loans are on the servicer's watchlist and, based on low DSC and/or
vacancy issues, S&P consider them to have near-term default risk.
One of these loans is less than 30 days delinquent and the
remaining six are current.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 232 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.96 billion.  Capmark Finance Inc., the master servicer,
reported financial information for 99.9% of the pool; 97.6% of the
financial information was either full-year 2008 or interim 2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.55x and 98.7%, respectively, excluding eight of the nine loans
with the special servicer, seven credit-impaired loans, three
defeased loans, and one loan not reporting financial results
(10.6% in the aggregate).  The transaction has not experienced any
principal losses to date.  Fifty-two loans are on the servicer's
watchlist ($356.1 million; 18%).  Eighteen loans ($127.0 million,
6.5%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 28 loans
($142.4 million, 7.3%) have reported DSCs of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $647.9 million (33.0%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.59x for these loans, excluding one loan with the special
servicer (1.8%).  S&P expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this loan ($35.4 million; 1.8%), which is described
below.  The fourth-largest loan (3.2%) has been defeased.  Two of
the top 10 loans (4.9%) are with the special servicer, while
another (8.4%) is on the servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.36x and 101.8%, respectively.
The calculations exclude the defeased loan (3.2%).

The Sikes Center loan ($61.4 million; 3.1%) is the fourth-largest
loan in the pool and is the largest loan with the special
servicer.  The loan is secured by a 668,086-sq.-ft.  regional mall
in Wichita Falls, Texas, approximately 140 miles north of Dallas.
The subject was constructed in 1974 and renovated in 2002.  This
loan was transferred to CWCapital on April 20, 2009, following
the borrower's (a General Growth Properties entity) chapter 11
bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  The servicer reported a DSC
of 1.09x for year-end 2008 and a DSC of 0.95x and a 99% occupancy
for the three months ending March 31, 2009.

The Brownstones Apartments loan ($35.4 million; 1.8%) is the 10th-
largest loan in the pool and is the second-largest loan with
CWCapital.  The loan is secured by a 260-unit apartment building
in Novi, Mich., built in 2001.  The servicer reported a DSC of
0.73x and an 82% occupancy for year-end 2008.  The borrower has
indicated that the property is experiencing financial hardship due
to the deteriorating Michigan economy.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings in S&P's opinion.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----      --        ----           ----------------------
    A-4B       A+        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.63
    A-SB       A+        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.63
    A-1A       A+        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.63
    A-J        BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                   12.90
    B          BBB-      AA/Watch Neg                    10.96
    C          BB+       AA-/Watch Neg                   10.06
    D          BB-       A/Watch Neg                      8.12
    E          B+        A-/Watch Neg                     7.22
    F          B         BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.80
    G          B-        BBB/Watch Neg                    4.77
    H          B-        BB+/Watch Neg                    3.48
    J          CCC       BB/Watch Neg                     2.97
    K          CCC       B+/Watch Neg                     2.45
    L          CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                     2.06
    M          CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.93
    N          CCC-      CCC/Watch Neg                    1.55
    O          CCC-      CCC/Watch Neg                    1.29

                         Ratings Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3

             Class   Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------    ----------------------
             A-1     AAA                        20.63
             A-2     AAA                        20.63
             A-3     AAA                        20.63
             A-4A    AAA                        30.55
             X-1     AAA                          N/A
             X-2     AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 26 2006-LDP9 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 26
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P affirmed
its ratings on seven classes from the same transaction and removed
three of them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.38x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 124.0%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.83x and an LTV of 162.7%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 86.9% and 43.6%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude 15 of the 17 specially serviced loans (2.4%) and one loan
that S&P deemed to be credit impaired (0.1%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Seventeen assets ($168.3 million, 3.5%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners, Inc. Four of those assets
($29.6 million, 0.6%) are real estate owned, two ($30.7 million,
0.64%) are in foreclosure, 10 ($58.0 million, 1.2%) are more than
90 days delinquent, and one ($49.9 million, 1.0%) is current.
Eleven of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction
amounts totaling $34.5 million.  All of the specially serviced
assets have balances below 1% of the total pool balance, with the
exception of the Tyson's Galleria loan, which has a trust balance
of $49.9 million (1.04%).

The Tyson's Galleria loan has whole-loan balance of
$254.5 million.  The whole loan is divided into two pari passu
notes: a $173.2 million A-1 note that was included in the JPMCC
2006-LDP8 transaction and a $49.9 million A-2 note contributed to
this transaction.  In addition, there is a $31.4 million
subordinate B note that was not included in this transaction.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing on April 22, 2009, due
to General Growth Properties' bankruptcy filing.  The loan has a
payment status reported as current on the August 2009 remittance
report.  S&P continues to monitor the developments relating to
this loan and will take rating actions on this transaction as
necessary.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the total pool balance
was $4.81 billion, down slightly from $4.85 billion at issuance.
The number of loans in the pool (273) is unchanged since issuance.
The master servicers for the transaction are Capmark Finance Inc.,
Midland Loan Services Inc., and Wachovia Bank N.A.  The master
servicers provided financial information for 97.9% of the pool,
and 95.6% of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008
or interim-2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.50x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.38x and 124.0%, respectively.  To date, the
transaction has not experienced principal losses.  Fifty-two loans
($1.39 billion, 29.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.
Eighteen loans ($283.1 million, 5.9%) have reported DSC between
1.10x and 1.0x, and 26 loans ($768.4 million, 16.0%) have reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.98 billion (41.2%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.59x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.36x and
140.1%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

  JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class      To        From          Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --        ----          ----------------------
     A-3        A         AAA/Watch Neg                  30.08
     A-3SFL     A         AAA/Watch Neg                  30.08
     A-1A       A         AAA/Watch Neg                  30.08
     A-M        BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                  20.00
     A-MS       BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                  20.00
     A-J        BB-       AAA/Watch Neg                  11.17
     A-JS       BB-       AAA/Watch Neg                  11.17
     B          B+        AA/Watch Neg                    9.15
     B-S        B+        AA/Watch Neg                    9.15
     C          B+        AA-/Watch Neg                   8.52
     C-S        B+        AA-/Watch Neg                   8.52
     D          B         A/Watch Neg                     7.14
     D-S        B         A/Watch Neg                     7.14
     E          B         A-/Watch Neg                    6.00
     E-S        B         A-/Watch Neg                    6.00
     F          B-        BBB+/Watch Neg                  4.87
     F-S        B-        BBB+/Watch Neg                  4.87
     G          B-        BBB/Watch Neg                   3.86
     G-S        B-        BBB/Watch Neg                   3.86
     H          B-        BB+/Watch Neg                   2.60
     H-S        B-        BB+/Watch Neg                   2.60
     J          CCC+      B+/Watch Neg                    2.22
     K          CCC+      B/Watch Neg                     1.84
     L          CCC+      B-/Watch Neg                    1.59
     M          CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg                  1.34
     N          CCC-      CCC/Watch Neg                   1.21

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

   JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class       To        From          Credit enhancement (%)
     -----       --        ----          ----------------------
     A-2S        AAA  AAA/Watch Neg                       30.08
     A-2SFL      AAA  AAA/Watch Neg                       30.08
     P           CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg                       0.96

                         Ratings Affirmed

   JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP9
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

         Class       Rating        Credit enhancement (%)
         -----       ------        ----------------------
         A-1         AAA                            30.08
         A-1S        AAA                            30.08
         A-2         AAA                            30.08
         X           AAA                              N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LANDMARK IX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Landmark IX CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$68,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 Notes,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     Notes, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2021 Notes, Downgraded to
     Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     Notes, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     Notes, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions taken on the notes are a result of credit
deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such credit
deterioration is observed through a decline in the average credit
rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor), an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3116 versus a test
level of 2970 as of the last trustee report, dated July 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $25 million, accounting for roughly 5.5%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 16.0% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Landmark IX CDO Ltd., issued in April of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2004-C8 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on eight classes from the same transaction and removed
six of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.42x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 95.7%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.02x and an LTV of 119.7%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 42.2% and 28.9%,
respectively.  All of the above calculations exclude defeased
loans which account for 20% of the pool balance.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes N,P,Q, and S to 'D' to reflect
recurring interest shortfalls resulting from appraisal reduction
amounts totaling $46.7 million that are in effect on 11 assets
with the special servicer.  As of the August 2009 remittance
report, all of the ARAs were not based on final appraisals.  At
this time, S&P believes the final appraisal amounts for many
assets will approximate the debt amounts.  In addition, S&P
believes shortfalls that have affected classes H through M may
repay.  Revised ARAs, coupled with special servicer fees, will
likely cause classes N through S to experience shortfalls for the
foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the rating on the
two IO certificates that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Twelve exposures ($207.8 million, 17.8%) in the pool, including
three of the top 10, are with the special servicer, LNR Partners
Inc.  The Lembi Portfolio ($113.9 million, 9.8%), the largest
exposure in the trust, is with the special servicer.  The
portfolio consists of nine cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted loans.  The Lembi loans have been reported as being more
than 90 days delinquent in the August remittance report.  Through
conversations with LNR, however, S&P has learned that the cash
flow from the properties, which is currently held in a clearing
account, is sufficient to cover debt service.  The cash will be
released in the near future to pay past-due debt service.  The
Houston Portfolio ($40.0 million, 3.4%) is classified as real
estate owned.  The Hunt Portfolio ($33.1 million, 2.8%) consists
of 11 properties, six of which are classified as REO and the other
five properties are in foreclosure.  The remaining loan, the
Latsko Portfolio loan ($20.8 million, 1.8%), is more than 90 days
delinquent.  Eleven of the 12 specially serviced loans have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $46.7 million.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 87 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.16 billion, compared with 91 loans with an aggregate balance of
$1.31 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Wachovia Bank N.A.  The master servicer provided
financial information for 99.6% of the pool, and 94.5% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.43x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.42x and 95.7%, respectively.  To date, the transaction has
experienced $32,380 of principal losses.  Twenty-three loans
($159.0 million, 13.7%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including two of the top 10 loans.  Two loans ($15.9 million,
1.4%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 10 loans
($103.0 million, 8.9%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

Excluding specially serviced assets, there are 13 loans set to
mature in the next 24 months ($147.4 million, 12.7%).  Eleven of
these loans ($123.3 million, 10.6%) are scheduled to mature within
the next three months, including one defeased loan ($10.5 million,
0.9%) that is scheduled to mature in September 2009.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$537.4 million (46.2%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.41x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.40x and
99.4%, respectively.  The three exposures with the special
servicer are discussed below.

The Lembi Portfolio loan consists of nine cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans ($113.9 million, 9.8%) and is secured by 29
multifamily properties totaling 822 units in San Francisco, Calif.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on May 13, 2009,
due to imminent default.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.25x and
occupancy was 96.3%.  The aggregate ARA is $28.5 million.  This
ARA is not based on final appraisals and is subject to change.
LNR is currently negotiating a workout with the borrower.

The Houston Apartments asset is the fifth-largest exposure in the
pool and the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.
The asset ($40.0 million, 3.4%) consists of three apartment
complexes totaling 1,151 units in Houston, Texas, that were built
from 1983 to 1985.  Occupancies at the properties currently range
from 70% to 93%.  The ARA for this asset of $10.0 million is not
based on a finalized appraisal and is subject to change.  LNR is
in the process of disposing of the assets.

The Hunt Retail Portfolio asset is the seventh-largest exposure in
the pool and the third-largest exposure with the special servicer.
The asset ($33.1 million, 2.8%) comprises 11 retail properties
totaling 225,614 sq. ft. in Georgia, Florida, Texas, South
Carolina, and Oklahoma.  The 2008 portfolio average occupancy was
74%.  The ARA for this asset of $8.3 million is not based on a
finalized appraisal and is subject to change.  LNR is in the
process of disposing of the assets.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     B         AA      AA+/Watch Neg                    13.53
     C         A+      AA/Watch Neg                     11.84
     D         A       AA-/Watch Neg                    10.57
     E         A-      A+/Watch Neg                      9.30
     F         BBB     A/Watch Neg                       7.89
     G         BBB-    A-/Watch Neg                      6.91
     H         BB+     BBB/Watch Neg                     5.78
     J         BB      BBB-/Watch Neg                    4.93
     K         B+      BB-/Watch Neg                     3.52
     L         B       B+/Watch Neg                      2.96
     M         CCC     B-/Watch Neg                      2.54
     N         D       CCC+/Watch Neg                    2.11
     P         D       CCC/Watch Neg                     1.83
     Q         D       CCC-/Watch Neg                    1.55
     S         D       CCC-/Watch Neg                    1.41

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-2     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     22.56
     A-3     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     22.56
     A-4     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     22.56
     A-5     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     22.56
     A-6     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     22.56
     A-J     AAA    AAA/Watch Neg                     15.22

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates


         Class         Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
         -----         ------      ----------------------
         X-CL          AAA                            N/A
         X-CP          AAA                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-C1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed the
ratings on seven additional classes and removed one of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.83x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 92.7%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.06x and an LTV of 133.5%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 66.8% and 41.7%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude five of the eight specially serviced assets (0.7%).  S&P
separately estimated losses for these loans, which are included in
the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009 (see "Request
For Comment: Methodology For Rating Interest-Only Certificates,"
published June 1, 2009).  After S&P finalizes its criteria review,
S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Eight assets ($146.1 million, 6.0%) in the pool, including the
largest exposure (discussed in more detail below), are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. One of these assets
($4.1 million, 0.2%) is real estate owned, three ($14.6 million,
0.6%) are in foreclosure, one ($1.5 million, 0.1%) is more than 90
days delinquent, one ($4.2 million, 0.2%) is 30 days delinquent,
one ($6.0 million, 0.3%) is late but less than 30 days delinquent,
and one ($115.7 million, 4.8%) is in its grace period.  Seven of
the specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in
effect totaling $10.6 million.  The largest specially serviced
asset accounts for 4.8% of the trust balance, while the remaining
specially serviced assets each account for less than 0.5% of the
total trust balance.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 143 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.43 billion, compared with 145 loans with an aggregate trust
balance of $2.48 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Wachovia Bank N.A.  The master servicer provided
financial information for 96.4% of the deal, and 98.2% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim 2009
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.90x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.83x and 92.7%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude the five specially serviced loans ($16.3 million, 0.7%)
for which S&P estimated a loss.  Of these loans, the four
($12.1 million, 0.5%) with servicer reported DSC figures had a
weighted average DSC of 0.90x.  To date, the transaction has
experienced aggregate realized losses totaling $11.2 million, on
three assets.  The master servicer reported a watchlist of 27
loans ($298.6 million, 12.3%), including one of the top 10
exposures.  Five loans ($20.8 million, 0.9%) have reported DSC
between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 12 loans ($112.4 million, 4.6%) have
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                 Summary Of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.4 billion (56.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.30x for the top 10 assets.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 2.15x and
79.7%, respectively.

The Chapel Hills Mall loan, which is the largest loan in the pool,
is with the special servicer.  This asset has a balance of
$115.7 million (4.8%) and is secured by a 1,169,876-sq.-ft. retail
property in Colorado Springs, Colo.  The reported DSC for the loan
in 2008 was 1.23x.  The loan was reported as being in its grace
period on the August 2009 remittance report and was transferred to
the special servicer on April 21, 2009, due to General Growth
Properties' bankruptcy filing.  S&P will continue to monitor
developments relating to this loan and will take rating actions on
this transaction as necessary.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-M      A       AAA/Watch Neg                    19.90
      A-J      BBB     AAA/Watch Neg                    10.69
      B        BBB     AA+/Watch Neg                    10.05
      C        BBB-    AA/Watch Neg                      8.89
      D        BB+     AA-/Watch Neg                     7.87
      E        BB      A+/Watch Neg                      7.10
      F        BB-     A/Watch Neg                       6.21
      G        B+      A-/Watch Neg                      5.31
      H        B+      BBB+/Watch Neg                    4.29
      J        B       BBB/Watch Neg                     3.52
      K        B       BBB-/Watch Neg                    2.50
      L        B-      BB+/Watch Neg                     1.99
      M        B-      BB/Watch Neg                      1.60
      N        CCC+    B+/Watch Neg                      1.22
      P        CCC     B-/Watch Neg                      0.96

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----            ----------------------
      A-4      AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                    30.13

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C1


          Class   Rating To      Credit enhancement (%)
          -----   ---------      ----------------------
          A-1     AAA                      30.13
          A-2     AAA                      30.13
          A-3     AAA                      30.13
          A-AB    AAA                      30.13
          X-CL    AAA                        N/A
          X-CP    AAA                        N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2008-5 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the five
classes of certificates from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-5.  S&P
lowered the rating on class A1 to 'B' from 'AAA' and S&P lowered
the ratings on classes A2, A3, A4, and A5 to 'CCC' from 'AAA'.

The downgrades reflect the significant deterioration in
performance of the loans backing the underlying certificates.
This performance deterioration is so severe that the credit
enhancement for LMT 2008-5 is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings on the re-REMIC classes.

LMT 2008-5, which closed in July 2008, is a resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction, collateralized by one underlying class.
The underlying class, A-4 from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2007-HY7 (current rating of 'CCC'), supports one group within the
re-REMIC.  The loans securing the underlying class consist
predominately of long-reset, interest only adjustable-rate
mortgage loans classified as prime jumbo.

The performance of the loans securing this trust has declined
precipitously in recent months.  This pool had experienced losses
of 1.73% as of the August 2009 distribution, and currently has
approximately 30% in delinquent loans.  Based on the losses to
date, the current pool factor of 0.792 (79.2%), which represents
the outstanding pool balance as a proportion of the original
balance, and the pipeline of delinquent loans, S&P's current
projected loss for this pool is 24.9%, which exceeds the level of
credit enhancement available to cover losses.

Over the past two years S&P has revised its RMBS default and loss
assumptions, and consequently S&P's projected losses, to reflect
the continuing decline in mortgage loan performance and the
housing market.  The performance deterioration of most U.S.  RMBS
has continued to outpace the market's expectation.

                          Ratings Lowered

                   Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-5
                           Series 2008-5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A1         52524SAA4     B                    AAA
        A2         52524SAB2     CCC                  AAA
        A3         52524SAC0     CCC                  AAA
        A4         52524SAD8     CCC                  AAA
        A5         52524SAJ5     CCC                  AAA


LIBERTY HARBOUR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
four classes of notes issued by Liberty Harbour II CDO Ltd., a
cash flow mezzanine structured finance collateralized debt
obligation transaction, following the liquidation of the
collateral in the portfolio.  S&P subsequently withdrew its
ratings on these tranches.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' because the proceeds from the
liquidation have not been sufficient to make par payments to the
rated notes.

The deal triggered an event of default, after which, the
controlling noteholders subsequently voted to accelerate the
maturity of the notes and liquidate the collateral assets.

The current rating actions follow notice from the trustees that
the liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

                   Ratings Lowered And Withdrawn

                    Liberty Harbour CDO II Ltd.

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                Class      To    Interim    From
                -----      --    -------    ----
                A-1        NR    D          CC
                A-2        NR    D          CC
                B          NR    D          CC
                C          NR    D          CC

                          NR - Not rated.


LONG HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of Notes issued by Long Hill 2006-1 CDO,
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$410,000,000 Class A-S1VF Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2045, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- US$125,000,000 Class A-S2T Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2045, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Ca

Long Hill 2006-1 CDO, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of Residential ABS Securities.
RMBS is approximately 60% of the underlying portfolio of which the
majority is from 2004-2005 vintages.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio due to the recent rating
actions taken with respect to seasoned (pre-2005) RMBS.  Credit
deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a decline
in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  More than 60% of
the underlying assets have been downgraded since Moody's last
review of the transaction in April 2009.  The trustee reports that
the WARF of the portfolio is 2,429 as August 3, 2009 and also
reports defaulted assets in the amount of $388.5 million.
Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 22% of the
underlying performing portfolio.  The Class A2, Class A3 and Class
B Overcollateralization Tests are all currently failing according
to the Trustee.

The actions also take into consideration the occurrence on
April 6, 2009, as reported by the Trustee, of an Event of Default
described in Section 5.1 (h) of the Indenture dated March 7, 2006.
Moreover, Moody's received notice from the Trustee on July 30,
2009 that, in accordance with Section 5.2(a) of the Indenture, a
Majority of the Controlling Class declared the Outstanding Class
A-S1VF Funded Amount and the principal of all of the Secured Notes
to be immediately due and payable.  Also, the Trustee has been
directed to sell the Collateral.  The liquidation of the CDO
collateral may result in a probability of repayment and a severity
of loss that are inconsistent with the Moody's rating that was in
effect prior to the rating action.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


MADISON PARK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Madison Park Funding IV, Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$110,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on February 22, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$31,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class Y Combination Notes Due 2021 (current
     Rated Principal Amount of $2,460,909), Downgraded to B1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
     (current balance of $17,944,196), Confirmed at Caa2;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3035 versus a test
level of 2700 as of the last trustee report, dated August 10,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $35.3 million, accounting for
roughly 7.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 9.7% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Madison Park Funding IV, Ltd., issued in February of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MADISON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Madison Park Funding V, Ltd.:

  -- US$49,500,000 Class A--1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$28,500,000 Class A--2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$43,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$23,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2954 versus a test
level of 2750 as of the last trustee report, dated July 10, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $41.8 million, accounting for roughly
6.4%of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 8.8% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Madison Park Funding V, Ltd., issued in April of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 2006-4 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4 and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on five
classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.31x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 109.3%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.85x and an LTV of 146.2%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 93.5% and 37.5%,
respectively.  All of the DSC and LTV calculations noted above
exclude 10 of the 16 specially serviced loans (2.6%) and one loan
that S&P deemed to be credit impaired (0.04%).  S&P separately
estimated losses for these loans, which are included in the 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current IO
criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                         Credit Concerns

Twenty-one assets ($413.3 million, 9.22%) in the pool are with
the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  Three of those assets
($13.7 million, 0.31%) are real estate owned; one ($22.5 million,
0.50%) is in foreclosure; six ($157.3 million, 3.51%) are more
than 90 days delinquent; one ($5.1 million, 0.11%) is 60 days
delinquent; two ($19.9 million, 0.44%) are 30 days delinquent;
seven ($189.2 million, 4.22%) are in their grace periods; and one
($5.6 million, 0.13%) is current.  Eight of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts totaling $22.1 million.
One specially serviced asset, the YPI Transwestern Portfolio loan,
has a balance representing 5.0% of the total pool balance.  This
loan is the third-largest in the pool and is discussed in the
"Summary of Top 10 Loans" section.  None of the other specially
serviced assets have balances that exceed 1% of the total pool
balance.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the total pool balance
was $4.48 billion, down slightly from $4.52 billion at issuance.
The number of loans in the pool, at 277, is unchanged since
issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is Midland Loan
Services Inc. Midland provided financial information for 99.04% of
the pool, and 92.4% of the servicer-provided information was full-
year 2008 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.37x
for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV were 1.31x and 109.3%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures exclude the 11 loans for which S&P estimated a
loss ($119.3 million, 2.6%).  To date, the transaction has not
experienced any principal losses.  Forty loans ($918.1 million,
20.5%) are on the master servicer's watchlist, including four of
the top 10 loans.  Thirteen loans ($582.0 million, 13.0%) have
reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and 34 loans ($229.8 million,
5.1%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.57 billion (35.1%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.24x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.07x and
116.8%, respectively.

The YPI Transwestern Portfolio is the third-largest exposure in
the pool and the largest exposure with the special servicer.  The
portfolio consists of six cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
loans, one of which ($92.0 million, 41.0%) is more than 90 days
delinquent.  The remaining five loans ($132.4 million, 59.0%) were
reported to be in their grace periods on the August 2009
remittance report.  This portfolio has a balance of $224.4 million
(5.0%) and is secured by seven office buildings totaling 2,083,585
sq. ft.  in Chicago (four buildings; 1,174,997 sq. ft.; 56.4% of
net rentable area) and Dallas (three buildings; 908,588 sq. ft.;
43.6% of NRA).  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on Jan. 23, 2009, after the borrower failed to provide debt
service payments for the past three months as a result of an
ongoing dispute with the master servicer concerning reserves for
tenant improvements and leasing commissions.  Year-end 2007 DSC
was 1.37x.  Discussions with the borrower regarding potential
resolution scenarios are ongoing.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
        Class  To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  --     ----           ----------------------
        A-3    AA-    AAA/Watch Neg                 30.25
        A-SB   AA-    AAA/Watch Neg                 30.25
        A-1A   AA-    AAA/Watch Neg                 30.25
        AM     A-     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.17
        AJ     BBB    AAA/Watch Neg                 11.72
        AJ-FL  BBB    AAA/Watch Neg                 11.72
        B      BBB-   AA+/Watch Neg                 11.47
        C      BB     AA/Watch Neg                   9.71
        D      BB     AA-/Watch Neg                  8.95
        E      BB-    A/Watch Neg                    7.44
        F      B+     A-/Watch Neg                   6.56
        G      B+     BBB+/Watch Neg                 5.42
        H      B      BBB/Watch Neg                  4.41
        J      B-     BB+/Watch Neg                  3.03
        K      B-     BB/Watch Neg                   2.65
        L      B-     BB-/Watch Neg                  2.52
        M      CCC+   B/Watch Neg                    2.02
        N      CCC+   B-/Watch Neg                   1.89
        P      CCC    CCC+/Watch Neg                 1.51
        Q      CCC-   CCC/Watch Neg                  1.39

                         Ratings Affirmed

             ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class    Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------  ----------------------
             A-1      AAA                      30.25
             A-2      AAA                      30.25
             A-2FL    AAA                      30.25
             XP       AAA                        N/A
             XC       AAA                        N/A


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative
and revised Rating Outlooks on 12 classes of ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2007-5.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 8.5% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
4.6%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 4.6% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 44.3% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 7% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years:

  -- 1.2% in 2011;
  -- 2.6% in 2012;
  -- 0.3% in 2013;
  -- 2.9% in 2014.

All losses associated with these loans are recognized in the
rating actions.

Fitch identified 55 Loans of Concern (32.1%) within the pool,
eight of which (1.7%) are specially serviced (including one loan
which will potentially be transferred and is expected to become
delinquent).  None of the specially serviced loans are current.
Five of the Fitch Loans of Concern (22.7%) are within the
transaction's top 15 loans (42.6%) by unpaid principal balance.

Four of the Loans of Concern (21.2%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 1% to 28%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Stuyvesant
Town /Peter Cooper Village (18.3% of the pool), East Thunderbird
Square North (1.1%), and Renaissance Dallas (0.9%).

Additional information on the performance of Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village loan is available in a separate press release
issued ('Fitch: Stuy Town/Peter Cooper Loan Performance Continues
to Lag'), available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

East Thunderbird Square North, a 163,000 sf neighborhood retail
center that is a part of a larger shopping center with a total of
327,000 sf.  The subject includes five buildings and is anchored
by Ashley Furniture and Spencer's TV & Appliances.  The center has
several furniture or furniture-related tenants.  The property is
situated at the northwest corner of Scottsdale Road and
Thunderbird Road and has regional access with the 101 Loop located
both three miles south and two miles west.  The servicer reported
debt service coverage ratio and occupancy for the first quarter of
2009 were 1.16x and 78.4%, respectively.

Renaissance Dallas is secured by a 518-room full service
Renaissance Hotel located in the Dallas Market center, 15 miles
from the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, 5 miles from
Dallas Love Field Airport, and 3.5 miles from Dallas CBD.  Hotel
amenities include two restaurants, thirteen meeting rooms, a
lounge, an outdoor rooftop pool and whirlpool, a fitness center
and sauna, a gift shop, and business center.  The servicer
reported YE debt service coverage ratio, occupancy, average daily
rate, and revenue per available room were 0.36x, 60%, $108, and
$65, respectively.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity to these classes:

  -- $211.5 million class AJ to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $175 million class AJ-FL to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $77.3 million class B to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.1 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $77.3 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $38.6 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $55.2 million class F to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $49.7 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $49.7 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16.6 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms and removes this class from Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $5.5 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes and Outlooks:

  -- $50 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $63.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $60 million class A-2FL at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $153.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $187.1 million class A-SB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.2002 billion class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.0902 billion class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $245 million class A-4FL at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $341.7 million class AM at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class AM-FL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $11 million class M, $11 million class P
or $44.1 million class Q certificates.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-6 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative
and revised Rating Outlooks on 16 classes of ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2007-6.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 10.3% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
7%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 7% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 57.3% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 17.3% of the mortgages mature:

  -- 0.6% in 2010;
  -- 0.1% in 2011;
  -- 16.2% in 2012;
  -- 0.4% in 2014.

All losses associated with these loans are recognized in the
rating actions.

Fitch identified 26 Loans of Concern (31.9%) within the pool,
three of which (1.6%) are specially serviced.  None of the
specially serviced loans are current.  Three of the Fitch Loans of
Concern (22.7%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans (54.3%)
by unpaid principal balance.

Three of the Loans of Concern (22.7%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 17% to 20%.  The largest contributors to loss are: MKSP
Retail Portfolio - A (10.5% of the pool), Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village (9.5%), and MKSP Retail Portfolio - B (2.8%).

MKSP Retail Portfolio - A is secured by eight neighborhood,
regional, and power centers located in four distinct markets in
Florida.  Five properties are located in the Orlando MSA, one in
the Palm Beach MSA, one in the Ft.  Lauderdale MSA, and one in
Port Charlotte in southwest Florida.  Significant tenants include
Publix, Bed Bath & Beyond, Bealls, and Ross Dress for Less.
Linens N Things formerly occupied 17% of the NRA of one property,
and that space is currently vacant.  The servicer reported YE debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 0.99x and 80.8%,
respectively.

Additional information on the performance of Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village loan is available in a separate press release
issued ('Fitch: Stuy Town/Peter Cooper Loan Performance Continues
to Lag'), available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

MKSP Retail Portfolio - B is secured by one grocery-anchored and
one unanchored retail center in two distinct markets in Florida.
The grocery-anchored center is located in Ft.  Lauderdale, and the
unanchored center is located in Palm Beach County.  Significant
tenants include Winn Dixie and CVS.  The servicer reported YE debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.08x and 86.7%,
respectively.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity to these classes:

  -- $107.4 million class AJ to 'BBB-/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $75.0 million class AJ-FL to 'BBB-/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $42.9 million class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16.1 million class C to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $34.9 million class D to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.8 million class E to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.1 million class F to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $24.1 million class G to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $26.8 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.4 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.4 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.4 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.4 million class M to 'B-/LS5' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Fitch affirms and removes from Rating Watch Negative this class:

  -- $5.4 million class N at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.4 million class P at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $16.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $170.4 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150.0 million class A-2FL at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $60.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $729.0 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $363.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $214.6 million class AM at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $26.8 million class Q certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2007-IQ14 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine pooled
classes, confirmed two pooled classes and downgraded 17 pooled
classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ14.  The downgrades are
due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing, interest
shortfalls and concerns about refinancing risk associated with
five year loans maturing in three years.  Excluding specially
serviced loans, eleven loans, representing 24% of the pool, mature
within the next three years and have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio below 1.0X.  The A-M and A-MFL classes were
confirmed based on the key parameters for the deal and the current
estimated losses for the loans in special servicing.  However, if
Moody's estimated losses from loans in special servicing were to
increase by an additional $50 million, the A-M and A-MFL classes
would likely be downgraded by one to three notches.  Moody's had
placed 19 classes on review for possible downgrade on August 27,
2009.  This action concludes the review.  The action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$4.87 billion from $4.90 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 424 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 41% of the pool.

Eighty-one loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There are fifteen loans currently in special servicing, including
the pool's fourth and eighth largest loans.  The specially
serviced loans represent 8% of the pool.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the New York City Apartment Portfolio
($195.0 million -- 4.0%), which is secured by 37 multifamily
properties (1,299 units) located in East Harlem, New York.  This
proforma loan was transferred to special servicing in September
2008 due to the Voluntary Administrative Receivership filing of
the loan's U.K.-based guarantors, Insureprofit Limited and
Starlight Investments Limited.  The properties are undergoing a
renovation and conversion of rent regulated units to market rents
that is proceeding at a pace that is slower than originally
projected.  The $5.0 million interest reserve that was established
at securitization was depleted in June 2009 and the loan is now in
monetary default.  In addition to the first mortgage loan, there
is a $20.0 million mezzanine loan secured by a pledge of equity
interests in the borrower which is also currently in payment
default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the City View Center
Loan ($81.0 million -- 1.7%), which is secured by a 506,000 square
foot retail center located in Garfield Heights, Ohio.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing on November 12, 2008 due to a
monetary default.  The largest tenant, Wal-Mart, leased 29% of the
GLA through 2027, but vacated in September 2008 because of
environmental issues.  The property had previously been utilized
as a quarry and later as a landfill that ceased operations in the
1970's.  The landfill was subsequently capped and a gas extraction
system was installed.  The property was operating a remediation
program under the supervision of the Ohio EPA, which filed a suit
in July 2008 against the developer and borrower over alleged
failures to comply with EPA provisions.  The litigation was
settled in early December 2008 and a consent order had been
entered into which required the previous owner/developer of the
property to install supplementary gas extraction and monitoring
systems.  The developer began the project, but filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy in May 2009 and all work appears to have ceased.  The
property is currently 44% occupied as of April 2009 compared to
100% at securitization.  A February 2009 appraisal valued the
property at $22.3 million (compared to $103.4 million at
securitization), leading the special servicer to recognize a $66.3
million appraisal reduction in August 2009.

Of the remaining 13 specially serviced loans, seven are 90+ days
delinquent, two are either real estate owned or in the process of
foreclosure and four are current.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
loss for all the specially serviced loans of $196.8 million (55%
loss severity on average).

The special servicer has recognized aggregate appraisal reductions
of $80 million for five of the specially serviced loans.  As a
result of special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and other
trust expenses, the transaction is experiencing interest
shortfalls.  As of the most recent remittance date, classes N
through S have experienced interest shortfalls totaling
$2.2 million.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 87%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value (LTV) ratio
is 145% compared to 157% at Moody's last review in February 2009.
The previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS transactions.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 0.80X compared to
0.78X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 27, essentially the same as
at last review.

The three largest loan exposures represent 26% of the pool.  The
largest exposure is the Beacon Seattle & DC Portfolio
($775.0 million -- 15.9%), which represents a pari passu interest
in a $2.7 billion first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 20
office properties located in Washington, Virginia and Washington,
DC.  The buildings range from 103,000 to 1.1 million square feet
and total 9.8 million square feet.  The portfolio was 93% occupied
as of December 2008 compared to 97% at securitization.  The
portfolio's performance has declined due to a drop in occupancy
and increased operating expenses.  The loan is interest-only
throughout its entire five year term.  Given the decline in the
financial performance of the collateral supporting the loan and
the adverse economic environment, Moody's is concerned about
refinance risk of this loan at maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 174% and 0.58X, respectively, compared to 152% and 0.61X
at last review.

The second largest exposure is the Tabor Center and U.S. Bank
Tower Loan ($300.0 million -- 6.1%), which is secured by two Class
A office properties totaling 1.2 million square feet located in
downtown Denver, Colorado.  The two properties were 82% occupied
as of June 2009 compared to 95% at securitization.  Part of the
occupancy decline is due to the August 2008 lease expiration of
Encana Oil & Gas, which occupied 8% of the total net rentable area
at securitization.  The loan is interest-only for its entire five
year term.  Given the decline in the financial performance of the
collateral supporting the loan and the adverse economic
environment, Moody's is concerned about refinance risk of this
loan at maturity.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 180% and
0.53X, respectively, compared to 238% and 0.40X at last review.

The third largest exposure is the PDG Portfolio Loan
($212.0 million -- 4.4%), which is secured by 11 retail properties
located in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA.  The properties range from
35,000 to 288,000 square feet and total 1.5 million square feet.
At securitization, several of the properties were leased at below
market occupancy levels.  It was anticipated that the occupancy of
these properties would increase, but this has not been achieved.
The portfolio was 77% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 86%
at securitization.  The loan is interest-only for its entire 10-
year term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 163% and 0.63X,
respectively, compared to 154% and 0.64X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $91,102,350, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-2, $682,300,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-2FL, $500,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-3, $53,800,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-AB, $140,800,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-4, $1,062,242,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-5FL, $150,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-1A, $721,127,544, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed Aaa
     on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-M, $420,487,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $70,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class A-J, $200,000,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/27/2009

  -- Class A-JFL, $192,389,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/27/2009

  -- Class B, $18,394,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class C, $79,704,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class D, $55,179,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class E, $12,263,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class F, $42,917,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class G, $42,918,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class H, $73,573,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class J, $49,049,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class K, $55,179,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class L, $18,394,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class M, $12,262,000, downgraded to C from Ca previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class N, $24,524,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     8/27/2009

  -- Class O, $12,262,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class P, $12,262,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009

  -- Class Q, $18,394,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 8/27/2009


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $3.5 Mil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' rating on
Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-8 $3.5 million class A-15
secured fixed-rate notes and removed it from CreditWatch, where it
was placed with negative implications on July 7, 2009.

The rating on the class A-15 notes is dependent on the lowest of
(i) the rating on the reference entity, Navistar International
Corp. ('BB-'); (ii) the rating on Morgan Stanley (A/Negative/A-1),
the swap payments guarantor; and (iii) the rating on the
underlying security, BA Master Credit Card Trust II's series 2001-
B class A certificates due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA').

The rating action reflects the Aug. 26, 2009, removal of S&P's
rating on the reference obligation, Navistar International Corp.,
from CreditWatch with negative implications.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Corrects Rating on JuniorSuperSenior Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
JuniorSuperSenior notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
series 2006-11 by removing it from Credit Watch negative and then
withdrawing it.

Due to an administrative error, the rating on the notes was
inadvertently reinstated and placed on CreditWatch negative on
Aug. 24, 2009, following Standard & Poor's July review of
synthetic collateralized debt obligation transactions.  The rating
on the notes had been withdrawn on Aug. 21, 2009, due to a
redemption.  S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch negative and
withdrew it.

                         Rating Corrected

                  Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2006-11

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class           To      Interim     From
        -----           --      -------     ----
        JrSuperSr       NR      CCC+        CCC+/Watch Neg

                         NR - Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-IQ12 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 10 classes from the same transaction and removed
two of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  The downgrades of the
subordinate and mezzanine classes also reflect anticipated credit
support erosion upon the eventual resolution of the pooled
specially serviced loans, as well as concerns with loans that S&P
deemed to be credit impaired.  S&P's analysis included a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.54x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 97.8%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV
of 129.6%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 74.3% and 34.5%, respectively.  All of the DSC and
LTV calculations noted above exclude 17 of the 24 specially
serviced loans (8.2%).  S&P separately estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes K, L, M, and N to 'D' to
reflect recurring interest shortfalls resulting from appraisal
reduction amounts totaling $35.5 million.  The ARAs are in effect
on 11 assets with the special servicer.  S&P expects the related
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria,
which may affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on IO
certificates that S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Twenty-four assets ($299.4 million, 11.1%) in the pool, including
two of the top 10 loans, are with the special servicer, Centerline
Capital Group (Centerline).  Two of those assets ($31.5 million,
1.2%) are classified as real estate owned; four are in foreclosure
($31.8 million, 1.2%); 10 ($59.6 million, 2.2%) are more than 90
days delinquent; two ($7.4 million, 0.2%) are 60 days delinquent;
two ($11.0 million, 0.4%) are 30 days delinquent; and four
($158.1 million, 5.9%) are less than 30 days delinquent.  Eleven
of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction amounts
in effect totaling $35.5 million.  Three specially serviced assets
have balances in excess of 1.0% of the total pool balance.  The
three assets include two of the top 10 loans, which are described
below.  The remaining specially serviced assets have balances
below 1% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 268 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.69 billion, compared with 269 loans with an aggregate balance
of $2.73 billion at issuance.  The master servicers for the
transaction are Capmark Finance Inc. and Prudential Asset
Resources Inc. The master servicers provided financial information
for 97.6% of the pool, and 96.4% of the servicer-provided
information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.51x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.54x and
97.8%, respectively.  The S&P adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude
17 specially serviced loans.  S&P estimated losses separately for
these loans ($221.0 million, 8.2%).  Of these loans, 11
($165 million, 6.2%) had servicer reported DSC figures, with a
weighted average DSC of 0.76x.  The transaction has not
experienced any principal losses to date.  Seventy-one loans
($573.8 million, 21.3%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including two of the top 10 loans.  Twenty loans ($189.7 million,
7.1%) have reported DSC between 1.10x and 1.0x, and forty-two
loans ($300.5 million, 11.2%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.06 billion (39.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.69x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.75x and
93.2%, respectively.  The two top 10 loans with the special
servicer are discussed below.

The Westin O'Hare Hotel loan is the fourth-largest exposure in the
pool and the largest exposure with the special servicer.  The loan
is less than 30 days delinquent.  This asset has a balance of
$101.0 million (3.8%) and is secured by a 525-room, full service
hotel in Rosemont, Ill.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on June 19, 2009, due to imminent default.  As of
April 30, 2009, DSC was 0.70x.  As of May 31, 2009, occupancy
averaged 53%, compared with 69% in 2008, and the average daily
rate has fallen to $117 vs. $145 in 2008.  Centerline is currently
evaluating different resolution strategies.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of the loan.

The Harbour Centre loan is the ninth-largest loan in the pool and
the second-largest exposure with the special servicer.  The loan
is less than 30 days delinquent.  This loan has a balance of
$51.2 million (1.9%) and is secured by a 217,056-sq.-ft.  office
property in Aventura, Fl.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on April 28, 2009, due to imminent default.  The property
has lost numerous tenants.  Year-end 2008 DSC was 1.09x, while
occupancy was 70.3% as of March 31, 2009.  Centerline and the
borrower are pursuing a loan modification.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
     Class     To      From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --      ----            ----------------------
     A-M       A       AAA/Watch Neg                    20.30
     A-MFL     A       AAA/Watch Neg                    20.30
     A-J       BB+     AAA/Watch Neg                    11.29
     B         BB      AA+/Watch Neg                    10.66
     C         B+      AA/Watch Neg                      9.01
     D         B       AA-/Watch Neg                     7.99
     E         B-      A+/Watch Neg                      7.49
     F         B-      A/Watch Neg                       6.60
     G         CCC     BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.71
     H         CCC-    BBB/Watch Neg                     4.69
     J         CCC-    BBB-/Watch Neg                    3.68
     K         D       BB/Watch Neg                      2.41
     L         D       BB-/Watch Neg                     2.28
     M         D       B+/Watch Neg                      2.03
     N         D       CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.52

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Class   Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
              -----   ------  ----------------------
              A-1A    AAA                      30.45
              A-4     AAA                      30.45

                          Ratings Affirmed

              Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ12
              Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Class   Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
              -----   ------  ----------------------
              A-1    AAA                        30.45
              A-2    AAA                        30.45
              A-NM   AAA                        30.45
              A-3    AAA                        30.45
              A-AB   AAA                        30.45
              X-1    AAA                          N/A
              X-2    AAA                          N/A
              X-W    AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain View CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$217,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 7, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$118,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
     January 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 7,
     2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class A-3 Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
     January 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 7,
     2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due January 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,700,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     January 2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$24,100,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     January 2021, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,700,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     January 2021, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below.  In particular, defaulted securities currently
held in the portfolio total about $15.3 million, accounting for
roughly 3.4% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 9.8% of the underlying portfolio,
based on the latest trustee report dated July 31, 2009.  Moody's
also notes that according to the same report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2673.

Mountain View CLO II Ltd., issued in December of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NAUTIQUE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Nautique Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$310,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
     (current balance of $301,030,699), Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on April 12, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
     (current balance of $38,842,671), Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on April 12, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$67,500,000 Class A-2A Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
     (current balance of $65,330,008), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on April 12, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$7,500,000 Class A-2B Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2020 (current balance of $31,439,974),
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,700,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2020 (current balance of $13,028,572),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B, Class
C, and Class D overcollateralization ratio tests.  In particular,
the weighted average rating factor has increased over the last
year and is currently 2781 versus a test level of 2430 as of the
last trustee report, dated August 10, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $49.7 million, accounting for roughly 9.3% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 13% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class B
overcollateralization ratio test was reported at 105.82% versus
a test level of 108.1%, the Class C overcollateralizaton ratio
test was reported at 99.12% versus a test level of 103.1%, and
the Class D overcollateralization ratio test was reported at
96.59% versus a test level of 101.4%.  Additionally, interest
payments on the Class C and Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratio tests.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also
applied resecuritization stress factors to default probability
assumptions for structured finance asset collateral as described
in the press release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions
for rating structured finance CDOs," published on December 11,
2008.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's has also downgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$12,500,000 Class P Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to A3;
     previously on April 12, 2006 Assigned Aa1.

The rating action on the Class P notes reflects the change to
Moody's rating of the Class P EMTN Component, which consists of
$12,500,000 in face value of Citigroup Funding Inc. zero coupon
Euro Medium Term Notes due April 29, 2016.  Moody's downgraded the
senior unsecured rating of Citigroup Funding Inc. to A3 on
February 27, 2009.

Nautique Funding Ltd., issued in April of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust
2006-1:

  -- US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on June 8, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Revolving Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on June 8, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     dues 2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     dues 2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,750,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     dues 2022, Confirmed at B2; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor) and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3606 versus a test level of 3507 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 13, 2009.  Based on the same report,
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 20.3% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1, issued in June 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NewStar Commercial Loan Trust
2007-1:

  -- US$336,500,000 Class A-1 Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on June 5, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-2 Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on June 5, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class B Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$58,500,000 Class C Notes Due 2022, Confirmed at Ba1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$27,000,000 Class D Notes Due 2022, Confirmed at Ba3;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$29,100,000 Class E Notes Due 2022, Confirmed at Caa2;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for second lien loans
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are
described in the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief -
Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of
all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in
its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
also a result of moderate credit deterioration of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
charged-off securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3590 versus a test level of 3340 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 13, 2009.  Based on the same report,
charged-off securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$12.75 million, accounting for roughly 2% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
21.3% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest
payments on the Class E Notes are presently being deferred.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1, issued on June 5, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans of middle market issuers.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NUCO2 FUNDING: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on 2008-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns a Rating Outlook to NuCO2
Funding LLC, series 2008-1 notes:

  -- $75,000,000 class B-1 at 'BB'; Outlook Stable.

The notes are backed by cash flows generated by substantially all
of NuCO2, Inc.'s business activities, which are primarily the
leasing of bulk carbon dioxide systems and the distribution of
carbon dioxide to quick service restaurants and other retailers of
fountain beverages in the United States.

Fitch's affirmation reflects trust performance within initial
rating expectations.  Since issuance, NuCO has strengthened its
industry position and improved trust interest coverage and
leverage.  The rating affirmation also reflects the trust's
ability to withstand various stress scenarios that test customer
location, attrition and growth rate assumptions.

As of March 31, 2009, customer locations have increased by 10.2%
to 127,999 and trailing 12-month revenues have increased 12.6% to
$151.8 million when compared to Dec. 31, 2007.  As of the most
recent servicing report dated July 31, 2009, NuCO's three-month
interest coverage ratio on the senior debt was 3.63 times (x),
which compares favorably to 2.59x when first reported in June
2008.  Fitch expects trust performance to continue to improve as
NuCO will recognize a full year of additional revenues
attributable to its NexAir acquisition that occurred on Dec. 31,
2008.

Fitch's Stable Outlook reflects the trust's expected continued
performance despite the challenging economic and restaurant
environment due to the unique nature of its product and business
model.

Over the remaining term of the securitization, Fitch will
continually monitor NuCO's performance.  Any material change in
Fitch's assessment or assumptions could affect the ratings of the
trust.


OAK HILL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners V,
Limited:

  -- US$400,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due April 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on September
     20, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$29,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due April 2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$31,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due April 2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$36,250,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due April 2021, Confirmed at B2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2662, as of the
trustee report dated August 1, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$27.3 million, accounting for roughly 4.8% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
15.57% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also notes that the
underlying portfolio has a relatively high concentration of
corporate bonds.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Oak Hill Credit Partners V, Limited, issued in September 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


OFSI FUND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by OFSI Fund III, Ltd.:

  -- US$200M Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     Sept. 28, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$140.625M Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     Sept. 28, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$39.5M Class B Notes, Downgraded to A1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25.5M Class I Combination Notes, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Ba3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$36.5M Class C Notes, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$28.75M Class D Notes, Confirmed at B1; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11.5M Class E-1 Notes, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9.125M Class E-2 Notes, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16.67M Class III Combination Notes, Confirmed at A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

The rating actions reflect the adverse impact of the
aforementioned stresses, as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 3504 as of the last trustee report, dated
July 31, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
held in the portfolio total about $34 million, accounting for
roughly 6.9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to mezzanine
and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  The majority
of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade
ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor
recovery prospects in the event of default.

OFSI Fund III, Ltd., issued on September 20, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OHA PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by OHA Park Avenue CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March
     20, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$346,560,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 20, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,940,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2022, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$36,560,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,310,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$28,130,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2022, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2507 as of the last
trustee report, dated August 1, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$15.0 million, accounting for roughly 2.9% of the collateral
balance, and securities with ratings Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 6% of the underlying portfolio (computed based on
facility ratings, not default probability ratings of Caa1 or
lower).

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

OHA Park Avenue CLO I, Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Pacifica CDO V, Ltd.:

  -- US$361,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020 (current balance of $352,864,237), Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on March 31, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$28,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020 (current balance of $19,578,327), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$500,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2020 (current balance
     of $329,552), Downgraded to B1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2020 (current
     balance of $4,518,375), Downgraded to A2; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Type III Composite Notes due 2020 (current
     balance of $3,929,192), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Type IV Composite Notes due 2020 (current
     balance of $8,186,530), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$25,650,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
     17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,850,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$18,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020 (current balance of $19,037,901), Confirmed at
     B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class B, Class C, and Class D
Overcollateralization Tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
3039 versus a test level of 2724 as of the last trustee report,
dated July 31, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $38.8 million, accounting for roughly 8.0%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 11.6% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class C and Class D notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B
Overcollateralization Test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Pacifica CDO V, Ltd., issued in 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PACIFICA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd.:

  -- US$266,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021 (current balance of $262,722,337), Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on August 9, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2021 (current balance of $18,123,431),
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2021 (current balance of $7,127,190), Downgraded to
     Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021 (current balance of $11,638,610), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$12,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2021 (current
     balance of $8,153,121), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March
     4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization tests.  In particular, the weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
3008 versus a test level of 2843 as of the last trustee report,
dated August 3, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$39.8 million, accounting for roughly 8.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.2% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments
on the Class C notes are presently being deferred as a result of
the failure of the Class B overcollateralization test.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Pacifica CDO VI, Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PONTIAC: Fitch Junks General Building Authority's $4.4MM Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on securities issued
by the Pontiac, Michigan General Building Authority and its
related Tax Increment Finance Authority:

Pontiac TIFA (Development Area No. 3)

  -- $4.4 million tax increment revenue bonds, series 2002 (2002
     TIFA No. 3 bonds) downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'; remains on
     Rating Watch Negative.

Pontiac GBA

  -- $900,000 limited tax general obligation bonds, series
     2002 (2002 GBA LTGO bonds) affirmed at 'CCC'; remains on
     Rating Watch Negative.

Pontiac TIFA (Development Area No. 2):

  -- $3.9 million tax increment revenue and refunding bonds,
     series 2002 (2002 TIFA No. 2 bonds) affirmed at 'CCC';
     remains on Rating Watch Negative.

The Negative Watch for all three credits is tied to the likely
acceleration of near-term tax base declines, primarily due to
General Motors' recent appeal of 80% of its property assessments
nationwide, and the announcement of the closure of a truck
assembly plant within TIFA Area No. 2.  In addition, the city is
attempting to achieve substantial labor concessions in order to
balance its fiscal 2010 budget.  Failure to reach agreement, or
otherwise achieve significant recurring budgetary reductions,
could leave the city even more vulnerable to declines in tax
revenues.  The ratings also reflect that TIFA No. 2 and No. 3 tax
increment revenues are paying debt service on the 2002 GBA LTGO
bonds and various other bonds, on a parity basis with the 2002
TIFA No. 2 and No. 3 bonds.

In March 2009, the governor declared a local fiscal emergency and
appointed an emergency fiscal manager.  The EFM has broad
operational and financial authority over the city, including the
ability to control budgeting and expenditures, consolidate or
reorganize city departments, and negotiate collective bargaining
agreements.  Fitch notes that the quality of disclosure has
improved with the EFM's appointment.

The downgrade of Pontiac's 2002 TIFA No. 3 bonds reflects the
accelerating decline in the captured tax base, and the likelihood
of further declines as the city's housing market continues to
weaken.  While audited fiscal 2008 tax revenues and investment
income provided a satisfactory 1.3 times (x) coverage of maximum
annual debt service (occurring in 2023), coverage is weakening.
TIFA No. 3's captured value for 2010 declined 12.3%, to
$114.6 million, from 2009 levels.  Fitch expects the declines to
continue for several more years, reflecting the high proportion of
residential properties in TIFA No. 3 (42% of the fiscal 2007 tax
base), and pressuring the ability to meet various parity debt
service obligations.  LoanPerformance data for the entire city as
of the first quarter of 2009 indicates nearly twice the national
exposure to subprime loans (48.6% vs. 24.9%), and a foreclosure
rate of 15.1% (versus 12.2% nationally).

The rating on the 2002 GBA LTGO bonds reflects the city's
extremely stressed economic profile and precarious financial
position.  Unemployment is one-third of the city's labor force
(33.2% in June 2009), and conditions could worsen with the
official closing of a GM truck assembly plant later this fall.
The FY 2010 general fund budget, while balanced, relies on
$8 million (nearly 20% of the budget) in labor concessions and
asset sales that are not yet finalized.  Fitch expects further
budgetary challenges in fiscal 2011 as the city continues to
absorb the impacts of GM's restructuring.

The rating on the 2002 TIFA No. 2 bonds reflects the significant
exposure to GM, and a sharp decline of 15.2% in captured value for
the current fiscal year.  Audited fiscal 2008 tax revenues and
investment income provided a sound 1.7x coverage of MADS
(occurring in 2011), but coverage will weaken considerably in 2010
and beyond.  Further reductions in GM's assessments, nearly one-
third of 2010 captured value, are likely over the next one to two
years, pressuring TIFA No. 2's ability to meet its various parity
debt service obligations.  Partially offsetting this significant
concern, debt service declines notably in 2010 to $2.6 million
from $3.6 million in 2009, and remains relatively stable through
2017 when it declines further until final maturity in 2027.

Located 31 miles from Detroit in Oakland County, Michigan,
Pontiac's debt levels are moderately high with direct debt equal
to $1,253 per capita, or 2.3% of 2010 market value.  These ratios
include all tax-supported debt of the city secured with city's
LTGO pledge or the city's share of Distributable State Aid, but
currently paid by TIFA No.  2.


PONTIAC GBA: Fitch Corrects Ratings; Retains Negative Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has revised a release it issued on Pontiac GBA and Pontiac
TIFA [Development Area No. 2] on Sept. 1, 2009.  It clarifies that
Pontiac GBA and Pontiac TIFA remain on Rating Watch Negative only
and are not being affirmed.  Fitch Ratings has taken these actions
on securities issued by the Pontiac, MI General Building Authority
and its related Tax Increment Finance Authority:

Pontiac TIFA (Development Area No. 3)

  -- $4.4 million tax increment revenue bonds, series 2002 (2002
     TIFA No. 3 bonds) downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'; remains on
     Rating Watch Negative.

Pontiac GBA

  -- $900,000 limited tax general obligation (LTGO) bonds, series
     2002 (2002 GBA LTGO bonds) 'CCC'; remains on Rating Watch
     Negative.

Pontiac TIFA (Development Area No. 2):

  -- $3.9 million tax increment revenue and refunding bonds,
     series 2002 (2002 TIFA No. 2 bonds) 'CCC'; remains on Rating
     Watch Negative.

The Negative Watch for all three credits is tied to the likely
acceleration of near-term tax base declines, primarily due to
General Motors' recent appeal of 80% of its property assessments
nationwide, and the announcement of the closure of a truck
assembly plant within TIFA Area No. 2.  In addition, the city is
attempting to achieve substantial labor concessions in order to
balance its fiscal 2010 budget.  Failure to reach agreement, or
otherwise achieve significant recurring budgetary reductions,
could leave the city even more vulnerable to declines in tax
revenues.  The ratings also reflect that TIFA No. 2 and No. 3 tax
increment revenues are paying debt service on the 2002 GBA LTGO
bonds and various other bonds, on a parity basis with the 2002
TIFA No. 2 and No. 3 bonds.

In March 2009, the governor declared a local fiscal emergency and
appointed an emergency fiscal manager.  The EFM has broad
operational and financial authority over the city, including the
ability to control budgeting and expenditures, consolidate or
reorganize city departments, and negotiate collective bargaining
agreements.  Fitch notes that the quality of disclosure has
improved with the EFM's appointment.

The downgrade of Pontiac's 2002 TIFA No. 3 bonds reflects the
accelerating decline in the captured tax base, and the likelihood
of further declines as the city's housing market continues to
weaken.  While audited fiscal 2008 tax revenues and investment
income provided a satisfactory 1.3 times (x) coverage of maximum
annual debt service (occurring in 2023), coverage is weakening.
TIFA No. 3's captured value for 2010 declined 12.3%, to $114.6
million, from 2009 levels.  Fitch expects the declines to continue
for several more years, reflecting the high proportion of
residential properties in TIFA No.  3 (42% of the fiscal 2007 tax
base), and pressuring the ability to meet various parity debt
service obligations.  LoanPerformance data for the entire city as
of the first quarter of 2009 indicates nearly twice the national
exposure to subprime loans (48.6% vs. 24.9%), and a foreclosure
rate of 15.1% (versus 12.2% nationally).

The rating on the 2002 GBA LTGO bonds reflects the city's
extremely stressed economic profile and precarious financial
position.  Unemployment is one-third of the city's labor force
(33.2% in June 2009), and conditions could worsen with the
official closing of a GM truck assembly plant later this fall.
The FY 2010 general fund budget, while balanced, relies on
$8 million (nearly 20% of the budget) in labor concessions and
asset sales that are not yet finalized.  Fitch expects further
budgetary challenges in fiscal 2011 as the city continues to
absorb the impacts of GM's restructuring.

The rating on the 2002 TIFA No. 2 bonds reflects the significant
exposure to GM, and a sharp decline of 15.2% in captured value for
the current fiscal year.  Audited fiscal 2008 tax revenues and
investment income provided a sound 1.7x coverage of MADS
(occurring in 2011), but coverage will weaken considerably in 2010
and beyond.  Further reductions in GM's assessments, nearly one-
third of 2010 captured value, are likely over the next one to two
years, pressuring TIFA No. 2's ability to meet its various parity
debt service obligations.  Partially offsetting this significant
concern, debt service declines notably in 2010 to $2.6 million
from $3.6 million in 2009, and remains relatively stable through
2017 when it declines further until final maturity in 2027.

Located 31 miles from Detroit in Oakland County, Michigan,
Pontiac's debt levels are moderately high with direct debt equal
to $1,253 per capita, or 2.3% of 2010 market value.  These ratios
include all tax-supported debt of the city secured with city's
LTGO pledge or the city's share of Distributable State Aid, but
currently paid by TIFA No.  2.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on BLC-1 Cert. to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the
PreferredPLUS Trust Series BLC-1's $33.146 million 7.875% trust
certificates to 'B' from 'B+'.

The rating on the certificates is dependent solely on the rating
on the underlying security, Belo Corp.'s $250 million 7.25%
debentures due 2027.

The rating action reflects the Aug. 27, 2009, lowering of the
rating on the underlying security to 'B' from 'B+'.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on BLC-2 Cert. to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series BLC-2's $33.53 million 8.0% trust
certificates to 'B' from 'B+'.

The rating on the certificates is dependent solely on the rating
of the underlying security, Belo Corp.'s $250 million 7.25%
debentures due 2027.

The rating action reflects the Aug. 27, 2009, lowering of the
rating on the underlying security to 'B' from 'B+'.


RYLAND MTG: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B-1 Tranche
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the Class
B-1 tranche from Ryland Mtg Sec 1994-05.  The collateral backing
this transaction consists primarily of first-lien, adjustable-
rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

The downgrade is based on $4.037 million of losses allocated to
the certificates (original balance of $154.7 million) due to
losses on the underlying collateral in the transaction.  The Class
B-1 certificate has incurred $1.8 million of losses and the
current outstanding balance is $ 769,014.15 (original balance
$3.9 million).  The Classes B-2 and B-3 certificates have been
completely written-off.

This action is a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities from more seasoned pools
takes into account the annualized loss rate from the last 12
months and the projected loss rate over the next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor for the previous year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, in
foreclosure, and in REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 25% to 35%.  The
results of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses -- are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

List of action:

Issuer: Ryland Mtg Sec 1994-05

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 21, 2005 Downgraded
     to B2


SALISBURY INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-14 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns a Recovery Rating to the sole
class of notes issued by Salisbury International Investments
Limited, series No: 2005-14.

Salisbury 2005-14 experienced multiple Failure to Pay Principal
Credit Events with respect to obligations within the reference
portfolio.  The cumulative cash settlement amount is
$31,821,149.74.  The cash settlement represents a 96.4% current
write down or loss to the notes.  The notes have been downgraded
to 'D' which is consistent with Fitch's definition of Structured
Finance Writedowns: Where an instrument has experienced an
involuntary and, in the agency's opinion, irreversible 'writedown'
of principal a credit rating of 'D' will be assigned to the
instrument.  'RR6' is assigned as the recovery will be consistent
with the 'RR6' range of 0%-10%.

Salisbury 2005-14 is a partially funded, static synthetic
collateralized debt obligation that closed on Dec. 8, 2005.  The
transaction represents leveraged exposure to a diversified
portfolio of asset-backed securities.  The note proceeds from the
class D notes collateralize a credit default swap with Citigroup
Global Markets Limited as the Swap Counterparty.  A modified 'Pay-
As-You-Go' template is utilized to define the terms of the credit
default swap.  The reference portfolio is comprised primarily of
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  -- $1,178,850 class D credit linked note to 'D/RR6' from 'CC'.


SARGAS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Sargas CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$34,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $29,141,486), Upgraded to Baa1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $16,113,528), Upgraded to Ba1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$82,800,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $70,968,089), Confirmed at Aaa;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,800,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2018 (current balance of $9,256,707), Confirmed at
     Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,400,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2018 (current balance of $19,319,277), Confirmed at B3;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmation actions on the Class A-
2, Class B and Class E Notes and the rating upgrades of the Class
C and Class D Notes largely reflect updated analysis indicating
that the inpact of certain assumptions incorporated in Moody's
rating analysis as discussed below is not as negative as
previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.

Additionally, the actions consider the credit deterioration of the
underlying portfolio.  According to the last trustee report dated
July 31, 2009, the weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 3427 versus a test level of
3259 and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 29%
of the underlying portfolio.

However, the deterioration of the collateral pool is mitigated by
the amortization of the Class A-1 Notes by roughly 40% and the
resulting improvement in the Class A Overcollateralization ratio
to 148.7% from its required level of 144.9% as of the effective
date.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are
described in the publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries will be
below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Sargas CLO II Ltd., issued in August of 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2004-CCF1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 pooled
classes and upgraded three pooled classes of Schooner Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CCF1.
The upgrades are due to increased subordination due to
amortization and payoffs and overall stable pool performance.  The
pool balance has decreased by 20% since Moody's last review in
April 2007.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 31%
to $325.6 million from $474.0 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 55 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 45% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 2% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with Canadian
Government securities.

Moody's was provided with partial-year or year-end 2008 operating
statements for 93% of the pool.  Moody's loan to value ratio is
75%, essentially the same as at Moody's prior full review.
However, some improvement in cash flow has been recognized.
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.56X compared to
1.38X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf score
of 27 compared to 40 at last review.

There have been no losses since securitization and currently there
are no loans in special servicing.  Eleven loans, representing 17%
of the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

The three largest loans represent 23% of the outstanding pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Merivale/Gateway Mall Portfolio
Loan ($34.0 million -- 10.5%), which is secured by two retail
centers totaling 552,000 square feet.  The Gateway Mall is located
in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (327,000 square feet) and the
Merivale Mall is in Ottawa, Ontario (225,000 square feet).  The
combined occupancy for the two centers was 92% as of December 2008
compared to 89% at last review.  Moody's valuation of these
properties incorporates a stressed cash flow due to concerns about
the retail sector as well as upcoming lease expirations of several
of the larger tenants.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and
1.35X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.41X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Cherry Lane Shopping Centre Loan
($23.8 million -- 7.3%), which is secured by a 236,000 square foot
retail center located in Penticton, British Columbia.  The center
is anchored by The Bay and Save-on-Foods.  The center was 99%
occupied as of December 2008, essentially the same as at last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and 1.50X,
respectively, compared to 75% and 1.40X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Merivale Place Loan ($15.6 million -
-4.8%), which is secured by a 147,000 square foot retail center
located in Ottawa, Ontario.  The center was 100% occupied as of
December 2008.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.40X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.30X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, 59,358,521, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 4/18/2007

  -- Class A-2, $199,800,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 4/18/2007

  -- Class IO-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 4/18/2007

  -- Class IO-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 4/18/2007

  -- Class B, $9,500,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class C, $14,255,000, upgraded to Aa2 from A1; previously
     upgraded to A1 from A2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class D-1, $6,220,000, upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2; previously
     affirmed at Baa2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class D-2, $6,220,000, upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2; previously
     affirmed at Baa2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class E, $4,740,149, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed at
     Baa3 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class F, $3,555,112, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class G, $3,555,112, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class H, $2,370,075, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
     Ba3 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class J, $6,517,706, affirmed at B2; previously affirmed at
     B2 on 4/18/2007

  -- Class K, $2,370,075, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
     B3 on 4/18/2007


SIERRA KINGS: S&P Corrects Long-Term Ratings on GO Bonds to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected and lowered its long-
term rating on Sierra Kings Health Care District, California's
general obligation bonds to 'B/Stable' from 'BB/Negative'.

The revised rating reflects the 'B' underlying rating on the
bonds.  On April 21, 2008, the long-term rating was incorrectly
changed to 'BB' with a negative outlook due to an administrative
error.


SOUTH COAST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
eight classes of notes issued by South Coast Funding IX Ltd., a
hybrid mezzanine structured finance collateralized debt obligation
transaction, following the liquidation of the collateral in the
portfolio.  One of the ratings was previously on CreditWatch
negative.  S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on these
tranches.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' because the transaction did not
have sufficient proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payments on the credit
default swap contract.

The deal had triggered an event of default, after which the
controlling noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of the
notes and liquidate the collateral assets.

The current rating actions follow notice from the trustee that the
liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

                  Ratings Lowered And Withdrawn

                   South Coast Funding IX Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
           Class      To    Interim    From
           -----      --    -------    ----
           A1A        NR    D          CCC+/Watch Neg
           A1B        NR    D          CC
           A2         NR    D          CC
           B          NR    D          CC
           C          NR    D          CC
           D          NR    D          CC
           E          NR    D          CC
           F          NR    D          CC

                         NR - Not rated.


STANFIELD BRISTOL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stanfield Bristol CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$382,000,000 Class A-l Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019 (current balance of $374,926,270), Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on October 26, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019 (current balance of $4,117,565), Downgraded to Caa3;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2019 (rated balance
     of $5,898,214), Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2019 (rated balance
     of $2,761,551), Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4,
     2009 A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-l Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March
     18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$28,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2019, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of certain overcollateralization tests.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 2531 versus a test level of 2500 as
of the last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $10.5 million, accounting for roughly 2.3% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1/CCC or lower make up
approximately 11.4% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C and D
overcollateralization tests.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Stanfield Bristol CLO, Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STANFIELD CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stanfield CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2014 (current
     balance of $9,110,465), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2014 (current
     balance of $8,574,555), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through an increase in the
proportion of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of
the Class D interest coverage test.  Based on the last trustee
report, dated August 14, 2009, defaulted securities currently held
in the portfolio total about $14 million, accounting for roughly
49% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 7% of the underlying portfolio.  The Class D
interest coverage test was reported at 15.34% versus a test level
of 115% and on the last payment date, some of the principal
proceeds were used to pay the interest due on the Class D notes.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in one obligor and one industry.  Based on the same trustee
report, one debt obligation constitutes about 50% of the
collateral balance and is concentrated in the leisure, amusement,
and entertainment industry.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should an Event of Default
occur and continue.  In Moody's view, there is a potential for an
Event of Default arising from the default in the payment of
interest on Class D Notes, as described in Section 5.1 (a) of the
Indenture, dated June 24, 1999.  As provided in Article V of the
Indenture, during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of
Default, a majority of the Controlling Class directing
acceleration may vote to accelerate the payments on the Notes by
declaring the principal of all the Notes to be immediately due and
payable.  In addition, the majority of each Class of Notes may
direct the trustee to proceed with the sale and liquidation of the
collateral.  The severity of any potential losses to the Notes may
depend on the timing and choice of these remedies following an
Event of Default.

Stanfield CLO Ltd., issued in June of 1999, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STANFIELD/RMF TRANSATLANTIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stanfield/RMF Transatlantic CDO
LTD.:

  -- US$19,500,000 Class D-1 Notes due 2015 (current balance of
     $14,931,452), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class D-2 Notes due 2015 (current balance of
     $6,891,439), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-3 Notes due 2015 (current balance of
     $3,828,577), Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, as of the last trustee report, dated
June 22, 2009, defaulted securities currently held in the
portfolio total about $15 million, accounting for roughly 33% of
the current collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 10% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Stanfield / RMF Transatlantic CDO LTD., issued on May 4, 2000, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


STONE TOWER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Stone Tower CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2013,
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2387 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 17, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$9 million, accounting for roughly 7% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 5.9% of
the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Finally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

The downgrade rating actions taken on the Class C and Class D
Notes also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability and the calculation of the Diversity Score.
These revised assumptions are described in the publication
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations,"
dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also reflects the
expectation that recoveries for second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in
the publication "CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter
2009," dated July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2013,
     Confirmed at Aa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2013, Confirmed
     at Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa3 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class A-2 and
Class B Notes have incorporated the aforementioned stresses as
well as credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.
However, the actions reflect updated analysis indicating that the
impact of these factors on the ratings of the Class A-2 and Class
B Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I
of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach.

Stone Tower CLO II Ltd., issued on August 26, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SYSTEMS 2001: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class G Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the Class G
Certificates issued by Systems 2001 Asset Trust.  Systems 2001
Trust is a securitization backed by secured equipment notes issued
by each of SYSTEMS 2001 A.T.  LLC, a Cayman Islands limited
liability company, and SYSTEMS 2001 Asset Trust Ireland Finance
plc, an Irish public limited company.  The sources of payments on
the equipment notes are essentially: (i) cash flows generated from
leasing a pool of 155 (as of June 30, 2009) regional aircraft
manufactured by British Aerospace; and (ii) certain payment
obligations of BAE Systems Plc. or one of its subsidiaries under
certain bonds, notes and an insurance policy, all issued with
respect to the aircraft portfolio.  The Class G Certificates are
supported by an insurance policy issued by MBIA Insurance
Corporation.  The rating action is prompted by rating actions
affecting the insurer and is part of an ongoing review of ABS.

The current rating on the security is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

As part of evaluating the current rating for the security, Moody's
Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.  The
underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
security in the absence of the guarantee.

The main factor determining the underlying rating of the Class G
certificate is the Baa2 rating of BAE Systems Plc.  To date, the
Class G Certificates were paid according to expectations.
However, the cash flows that are generated by the pool of
aircraft, on their own, are not sufficient to pay the obligations
under the secured equipment notes, and therefore insufficient to
pay the Class G Certificates.  In addition, the value of the
aircraft portfolio is lower than the outstanding amount of the
Class G Certificates, as evidenced by the loan-to-value ratio
which is more than 100%.

In order to meet its obligations, the issuer is using funds that
are paid directly or indirectly by BAE Systems Plc or one of its
subsidiaries.  As mentioned, the Class G Certificates are Pass-
Throughs of the equipment notes.  The primary source of payments
on the equipment notes is the lease income from the aircraft
portfolio.  However, since rental and other income on the aircraft
portfolio are insufficient to make payments on the equipment notes
according to the schedule, the deficiency is made up by payments
from Systems 2001 Asset Trust Funding Limited (Funding Co.).
Funding Co., in turn, draws its funds from one of these: (i) BAE
Systems Operations Limited (BAE Systems Ops) under its liquidity
facility agreement with Funding Co, (ii) BAE Systems Ops
promissory notes, and (iii) BAE Systems Ops indemnity.  BAE
Systems Ops obligations under the liquidity reserve and promissory
notes are guaranteed by BAE Systems Plc.

In addition, Funding Co. may fund its obligations under the
equipment notes by drawing on an insurance policy that is provided
by BAE Systems Insurance.  The payments under the insurance policy
are unconditionally guaranteed by BAE Systems Plc.

Moody's reviewed the total amount of funds available to Funding Co
through the liquidity reserve, the promissory notes, the indemnity
and the insurance policy.  Moody's concluded that such amount
should allow Funding Co. to pay the equipment notes, and thus the
Class G Certificates, in full.  Based on the fact that the above
supporting cash flows are ultimately guaranteed by BAE Systems
Plc, the ratings on the Class G Certificates are directly linked
to the ratings of BAE Systems Plc.

The complete rating action is as follow:

Issuer: SYSTEMS 2001 Asset Trust Pass Through Trust, Class G

  -- Class G, 6.664% Pass Through Certificates, maturing in
     September 15, 2013, Downgraded to Baa2, Previously on Nov 16,
     2008, A2 Placed on Watch Direction Uncertain.

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation, Insurance
     Financial Strength Rating of B3; Previously on 18 Feb 2009
     Downgraded from Baa1


TRIMARAN VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Trimaran VII CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$333,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due June 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Revolving Notes due
     June 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 22, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due June 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due June 2021,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,500,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes due June 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due June 2021,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The rating actions primarily reflect Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for bonds and second lien
loans will be below their historical averages, consistent with
Moody's research.  Other assumptions used in Moody's CLO
monitoring are described in the publication "CLO Ratings
Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17, 2009.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes also
reflect the underlying portfolio's moderate credit deterioration.
Moody's notes that as of the latest trustee report dated August 5,
2009, the weighted average rating factor is 2594, defaulted
securities total about $16 million, accounting for roughly 3.3% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 9.43% of the underlying portfolio.

Trimaran VII CLO Ltd., issued in March of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-FL1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four pooled
classes and five non-pooled, or rake, classes of UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-FL1 due to loans transferring to special servicing,
the increase in expected loss assumptions due to negative credit
drift and potential interest shortfalls.  Additionally, Class E
and Class F are placed on review for possible downgrade due to
recent negative developments affecting the second largest loan in
the pool.  Moody's also affirmed six pooled Classes.  This action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a fee interest in
Jumeirah Essex House ($187.4 million, or 12% of the trust balance)
located in Midtown Manhattan on Central Park South.  The sponsor
for the 515-room full-service hotel and 26 condominium units is
Dubai Investment Group Limited and Dubai Holdings LLC (Long Term
Issuer Rating, A3).  The property completed a $91 million
renovation ($176,700 per room) in the fourth quarter of 2007.
This is a flagship property for the Jumeirah brand in the US.  The
loan is scheduled to mature on September 9, 2009, and is currently
in the process of extending its maturity.  The final maturity date
including extension options is September 9, 2012.  There is an
additional $117 million non-trust junior component and $32 million
of mezzanine debt.

Hotels located in New York City have suffered significant declines
in operating performance much like the rest of the US.  However,
New York City assets still achieves the highest Revenue per
Available Room in the country, and as a destination, New York City
continues to be highly desirable locale for corporate, group and
leisure demand.  The hotel's renovation impacted its operating
performance, and unfortunately, its completion coincided with
softening demand in the lodging sector.  Moody's value is
$179 million, down 45% from a value of $326 million at
securitization.  The current underlying rating is Ba3, down from
Baa2 at securitization.

The Maui Prince Resort Loan ($162 million pooled balance plus
$30 million in three rake bonds) is the second largest loan (12%
of the trust balance) in the pool, and is currently in payment and
maturity default.  The sponsors are Morgan Stanley Real Estate
Fund V U.S., LP and The Dowling Companies, a Maui based developer.
The loan is secured by fee simple interest in Maui Prince Resort
(310 guestrooms), a 36-hole golf course and 1,136 acres of
undeveloped land located in Makena (Maui), HI.  There is an
additional mezzanine ldebt of $227.5 million.  Moody's value is
$195 million, down 20% from a value of $244 million at
securitization.  The current underlying rating is C, down from
Baa2 at securitization.

Wells Fargo Bank, the trustee of the mortgage lender, and a
consortium of lenders filed a foreclosure complaint on August 24,
2009.  Prince Resorts Hawaii, the resort's manager, announced that
the current management contract will expire September 16, 2009 due
to shortage of funds from the owners and/or the mezzanine lenders.
On September 1, 2009, Wells Fargo Bank and the lenders filed for a
motion in local court for a receiver to take over operations of
the resort and transition to new management.  An interruption in
hotel operations would be detrimental to the value, and its
ability to generate new business in the future.  A Circuit Court
judge is being asked to hear the matter on an emergency basis.
Due to the uncertainties of the outcome, Moody's have placed Class
E and Class F on review for possible downgrade.  Moody's does not
rate the three rake bonds associated with this loan (Classes M-MP,
N-MP and O-MP).

The third largest loan ($110 million or 7.2% of the trust balance)
is secured by fee interest in six multifamily property portfolio
located in Florida.  The Magazine Multifamily Portfolio totals
2,120 units and was built between 1987 and 1992.  The properties
are located in Palm Beach Gardens, Orlando, Sarasota and
Bradenton.  The sponsors are Morgan Stanley Real Estate Fund V
U.S., LP and Onex Real Estate Partners LP.  Florida has been hard
hit by the residential mortgage crisis, and a glut of failed
condominium projects in the market is a source of shadow supply.
There is a $10 million junior component and a $60 million
mezzanine debt outside of the trust.  Moody's value is
$126 million, down 18% from a value of $153 million at
securitization.  The current underlying rating is B2, down from
Baa3 at securitization.

As of the August 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 2% to
$1.57 billion from securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 12%
of the pool, with the top three loans representing 30% of the
pool.  Hotels account for 56% of the trust balance.  There is
additional exposure to volatile property types such as land (3% of
the trust balance) and healthcare (2% of the trust balance).

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is 88%
compared to 84% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio is 1.12X compared to 1.14X at last review.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There are two loans totaling $41.6 million, or approximately 4% of
the trust balance, currently in special servicing.  Le Meridian
San Francisco Loan ($40 million, or 3% of the trust balance)
transferred to special servicing on May 14, 2009.  The initial
maturity date was May 9, 2009, and the final maturity date
including extension options is May 9, 2011.  The borrower made a
prepayment of $7 million in August 2009, lowering the trust debt
amount to $40 million from $47 million.  The loan must meet Debt
Service Coverage Ratio and Loan to Value tests in order to
exercise its extension options.  Moody's anticipate that the loan
will be extended.  Moody's value is $48 million, down 33% from a
value of $72 million at securitization.

The second loan in special servicing, Altantic Towers Loan
($21.6 million, or 1% of the trust balance) transferred to special
servicing on May 1, 2009.  The loan is secured by two acres of
land located in Washington, D.C., which was slated for a
multifamily development.  The final maturity date for this loan
was May 9, 2009.  The new appraised value is significantly below
the appraised value at securitization, and is expected to result
in an appraisal reduction determination.  The special servicer is
awaiting the receipt of the Phase II environmental report.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $892,522,971, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     Aaa on 3/5/2009

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed Aaa
     on 3/5/2009

  -- Class A-2, $309,526,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously
     downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa on 3/5/2009

  -- Class B, $57,309,000, affirmed at A1; previously downgraded
     to A1 from Aa1 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class C, $31,074,000, affirmed at A3; previously downgraded
     to A3 from Aa2 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class D, $27,190,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously downgraded
     to Baa1 from Aa3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class E, $27,191,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A1 on
     3/5/2009

  -- Class F, $27,190,000, currently rated Baa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     3/5/2009

  -- Class G, $27,190,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1; previously
     downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class H, $29,132,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class J, $27,190,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class K, $27,190,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     downgraded to B1 from Baa3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class O-HW, $5,000,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class O-MD, $1,900,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1;
     previously assigned to Ba1 on 1/15/2008

  -- Class O-WC, $4,500,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class O-SA, $2,000,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3 on 3/5/2009

  -- Class O-HA, $1,500,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1;
     previously downgraded to B1 from Baa3 on 3/5/2009


UNION SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Union Square CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 18,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 MTN
     Program, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Remains On Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2683 versus a test
level of 2380 as of the last trustee report, dated August 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $11 million, accounting for roughly 3%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 6.4% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.
Finally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Union Square CDO Ltd., issued on September 25, 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


US CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by US Capital Funding III, Ltd., a
trust preferred CDO:

  -- US$111,000,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on 3/27/2009 confirmed at Aa3

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on 3/27/2009 Downgraded to Baa2

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of larger than anticipated par loss and credit
deterioration in the collateral pool as well as an increase on the
assumed defaulted amount.

Moody's took its last rating action on this deal on March 27,
2009.  Since then, Moody's has reported an increase on the assumed
defaulted amount (from $30 mm to $39 mm).  In addition, the
transaction has experienced a failure of its Senior Subordinate
Principal Coverage Test (91.72% actual as reported by trustee vs
103.98% the trigger).

Moody's considers the likelihood that this transaction would
trigger an Event of Default on its analysis.  The reason for this
transaction to trigger an EOD is non-payment of interest on a non-
deferrable tranches.  For this rating action, Moody's assumed
liquidation would not result if EOD occurs because of lack of
trading activities of the underlying securities in the secondary
market.  Instead, if EOD occurs, Moody's assumed the controlling
class would rather elect to accelerate cash flows from the
underlying performing securities.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, the
collateral manager's impact and the potential for selection bias
in the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


VEGA CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Vega Capital Ltd.:

  -- US$21,000,000 Series 2008-1 Class A Principal At-Risk
     Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to A1;
     previously on June 27, 2008 Assigned A3;

  -- US$22,500,000 Series 2008-1 Class B Principal At-Risk
     Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to A3;
     previously on June 27, 2008 Assigned Baa2;

  -- US$63,900,000 Series 2008-I Class C Principal At-Risk
     Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to Ba1;
     previously on June 27, 2008 Assigned Ba3;

Vega Capital Ltd. is a catastrophe bond program that can issue
notes in different series to cover a portfolio of natural
catastrophe risks over specific risk periods.  Investors in the
Series 2008-I Notes, issued on June 27, 2008, provide protection
to Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. against losses that may result
from the occurrence of up to five individual perils over a risk
period of three years, i.e. until June 24, 2011.  The perils
covered by the Series 2008-I issuance includes: European
windstorms, Japan typhoons, Japan earthquakes, California
earthquakes and North Atlantic Hurricane.

Moody's indicated that the upgrades are due in large part to the
fact that no qualified events that can trigger losses to the
transaction have occurred in the first year of the risk period
covered.  With less than two years remaining in the transaction,
the likelihood of occurrence of the number of qualified events
required to attach the different classes of rated Notes has been
significantly reduced as well as the expected losses for each of
them.  Additionally, the transaction receives reserve account
payments from Swiss Re on each payment date which has resulted in
a buildup of a significant first loss position in the capital
structure, in addition to the $42.6 million of unrated Class D
Notes that sits below the rated Notes.  The Trustee Calculation
Report dated as of June 24, 2009, indicates a balance of
approximately $38 million in this reserve account.

In reaching its opinion, Moody's examined other factors that may
contribute to a lower probability of attachment and lower expected
losses to the rated Notes.  Some of these additional factors
include recent research from the World Meteorological Organization
and other research entities that indicate a potentially milder
hurricane activity this year due to a weak to moderate El Nio.
Additionally, Moody's is also aware that the U.S.  Geological
Survey has updated the National Seismic Hazard Maps incorporating
the most recent seismic, geologic, and geodetic information on
earthquake rates and associated ground shaking.  According to the
cat modeling firms that have implemented these changes in their
models, the changes may result in reduced loss estimates for
California earthquakes.

The ratings issued are mainly based on Moody's analysis of the
probability of occurrence of qualifying events, their timing, and
the severity of losses experienced by investors should those
events occur during the risk period.  In addition to the
quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee consideration.  These
qualitative factors include the collateral protection mechanisms
in the transaction, structural features and other specific
documentation provisions and the financial strength of the various
parties to the transaction.


VENTURE II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Venture II CDO 2002, Limited:

  -- US$187,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2014
     (current balance of $150,450,630), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on November 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2014, Downgraded
     to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2014, Downgraded
     to Ba3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2996 versus a test
level of 2350 as of the last trustee report, dated August 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $18 million, accounting for roughly 9%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also noted that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Venture II CDO 2002, Limited, issued in November 26, 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


VENTURE IV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Venture IV CDO Limited:

  -- US$373,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016
     (current balance of $370,875,584), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on Aug 26, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$27,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Series J Blended Securities (current balance of
     $2,617,500), Downgraded to B1; previously on Aug 26, 2004
     Assigned Baa2;

  -- US$5,000,000 Series K Blended Securities (current balance of
     $2,630,494), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Aug 26, 2004
     Assigned Baa2;

  -- US$5,000,000 Series L Blended Securities (current balance of
     $2,630,494), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Aug 26, 2004
     Assigned Baa2.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$ 20,500,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 8,500,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Confirmed
     at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Confirmed
     at B1; previously on Mar 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D Par
Value Test.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2583 as of the
last trustee report, dated August 5, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio
total about $31 million, accounting for roughly 6.8% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 11.8% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Venture IV CDO, Limited, issued in August 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


VENTURE V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Venture V CDO Limited:

  -- US$27,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class J Blended Securities Due 2018 Notes
     (current balance of $17.9MM), Downgraded to Baa1; previously
     on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class K Blended Securities Due 2018 Notes
     (current balance of $2.7MM), Downgraded to Caa1; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes,
     Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2648 versus a test
level of 2550 as of the last trustee report, dated August 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $23 million, accounting for roughly 6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 13% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Venture V CDO Limited, issued on December 22, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


VENTURE VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Venture VII CDO Limited:

  -- US$53,125,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$49,775,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on Dec 14, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$ 31,250,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$ 32,350,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$ 23,700,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$ 11,400,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2551 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 3, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities currently held in the portfolio total about
$38 million, accounting for roughly 5.2% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
13.4% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Moody's analysis also
reflects the expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate
bonds and second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Other assumptions
used in Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication
"CLO Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated
July 17, 2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses,
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Venture VII CDO Limited, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the
structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal
performance in the current market environment, the legal
environment, specific documentation features, the collateral
manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in
the portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-ESH Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative 14
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-ESH.

The downgrades reflect the receipt of the updated valuation of the
portfolio and the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate resolution
of the loan.

TriMont Real Estate Advisors serves as the special servicer under
the loan and had ordered appraisals on the mortgaged properties
outlined in the Trust and Servicing Agreement.  The appraisals
were delivered to the special servicer on Aug. 18, 2009.  The
appraisals value the properties significantly below the
outstanding loan amount of $4.1 billion and result in an appraisal
reduction amount.  The current valuation represents a significant
decline from the original purchase price of approximately
$8.2 billion.  The appraisal reduction could affect the amount of
future advances made by the servicer in respect to any delinquent
interest payments on the mortgage loan, and could affect the
determination of which certificateholders are the controlling
interest under the TSA.

On July 23, 2009, the bankruptcy court approved the cash
collateral order authorizing the use of cash collateral pursuant
to an approved budget.  The approved use of cash includes adequate
protection payments in an amount equal to the monthly interest
expense on the loan, operating expenses for the properties and
manager and certain capital expenditures and professional fees for
the debtors, the trust and certain other parties.  The cash
collateral budget is to be approved every 13 weeks.

Litigation concerning the bankruptcy continues.  At the hearing
currently scheduled for Sept. 22, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court will
consider (1) the Application of the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors for Order Authorizing Discovery Pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rules 2004 and 9016, and (2) the Motion of the United
States Trustee for the Appointment of an Examiner Pursuant to
Section 1104(c).  The hearings on these motions were initially
scheduled for Aug.  12, 2009, but have been adjourned to the Sept.
22, 2009, omnibus hearing as the Committee, U.S. Trustee, Debtors
and the Special Servicer work to consensually resolve these
matters.

Performance of the portfolio continues to decline.  For the
trailing twelve months ended June 2009, the occupancy and revenue
per available room were 62.0% and $32.19, respectively, compared
to 64.5% and $36.51, respectively as of year-end 2008.  Year-to-
date for the six months ended June 30, 2009 the occupancy and
RevPAR were 60.3% and $29.20, respectively.

The mortgage loan held by the trust is a single $4.1 billion non-
recourse loan with fixed- and floating-rate components secured by
664 owned hotel properties, certain rights to cash flow from 17
leased hotels, one office building and one vacant land parcel
located in 44 states and two Canadian provinces.  In addition,
there is $3.3 billion of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.
The fixed-rate components mature in June 2012, while the floating-
rate components have a maturity in June 2010, with two one-year
extension options remaining.  As of the July 2009 distribution
date, the total trust balance has paid down slightly to
$4.09 billion due to the release of one property.

Fitch will continue to monitor the loan status, including the
workout strategy and any updated valuations or bankruptcy
proceedings that would negatively impact the ultimate resolution.
The special servicer instructed the appraiser to prepare the
appraisals solely in accordance with the requirements of the TSA
for the sole purpose of calculating any appraisal reduction
amount.  Accordingly, it is possible that a business valuation of
the properties utilizing methodologies different than those
required by the TSA could result in a different conclusion than
that reached in the appraisals.  Given the complexity of the
issues facing the loan as well as the large number of assets in
the portfolio, a workout could be lengthy and additional
downgrades are possible.

Fitch has downgraded and revised the Outlook on this class:

  -- $800 million class A-3 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $250 million class A-4FL to 'B-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $525 million class A-4FX to 'B-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $125.4 million class B to 'C/RR6' from 'AA+';

  -- $85.9 million class C-FL to 'C/RR6' from 'AA';

  -- $92 million class C-FX to 'C/RR6' from 'AA';

  -- $107.6 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'AA-';

  -- $114.2 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'A+';

  -- $124.5 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $131 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $130.4 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $100 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $214 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $200 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $100 million class M at to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised the Outlooks on these classes:

  -- $600 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $121 million class A-2FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $279 million class A-2FX at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Interest only class X-A at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Interest only class X-B at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 10 2007-C30 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and revised Rating Outlooks on 10 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2007-C30.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 11.2% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
5.3%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 5.3% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 59.3% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 17.2% of the mortgages mature:

  -- 0.3% in 2011;
  -- 14.4% in 2012;
  -- 0.1% in 2013;
  -- 2.4% in 2014.

All losses associated with these loans are recognized in the
rating actions.

Fitch identified 50 Loans of Concern (44.0%) within the pool, 13
of which (2%) are specially serviced (including one loan which
will potentially be transferred and is expected to become
delinquent).  Of the specially serviced loans, one (0.3%) is
current.  Six of the Fitch Loans of Concern (36.8%) are within the
transaction's top 16 loans (57.3%) by unpaid principal balance.

Three of the Loans of Concern (23.8%) within the top 16 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 12% to 18%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Stuyvesant
Town/Peter Cooper Village (19% of the pool), One Congress Street
(2.4%), and Four Seasons Aviara Resort - Carlsbad, CA (2.4%).

Additional information on the performance of Stuyvesant Town/Peter
Cooper Village loan is available in a separate press release
issued ('Fitch: Stuy Town/Peter Cooper Loan Performance Continues
to Lag'), available at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

One Congress Street is a 1.2 million sf mixed-use building located
within the Boston CBD.  The top two stories of the building are
comprised of class B office space, while the lower floors house a
2,310-stall parking facility, as well as retail and storage space.
The site is adjacent to the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway, a
27-acre stretch of parks and green space that was constructed in
association with Boston's 'Big Dig' project.  In addition, the
property serves as the Haymarket Station for two of Boston's
subway lines and is within walking distance of the North Station
Commuter Railway line.  The GSA occupies 82.6% of the
office/storage space; however, the tenant has indicated its
intention to vacate upon lease expiration in 2010.  The servicer
reported YE debt service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.21x
and 82%, respectively.

Four Seasons Aviara Resort - Carlsbad, CA is a full service hotel
with 329 rooms that offers amenities including a championship 18-
hole golf course designed by Arnold Palmer, a clubhouse, meeting
facilities, two outdoor swimming pools, a full-service spa, a
fitness center, and six outdoor-lighted tennis courts.  An
affiliate of the borrower recently served notice on Four Seasons
terminating management agreement due to claims of breach of
fiduciary and contractual duties.  However, Four Seasons and the
Borrower have entered into arbitration, and Four Seasons continues
to operate the property.  The servicer reported YE debt service
coverage ratio was 1.02x.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and assigns
Outlooks and Loss Severity (LS) to these classes:

  -- $671.8 million class A-J to 'A/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $49.4 million class B to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $79 million class C to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $69.2 million class D to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $59.3 million class E to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $69.2 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $98.8 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $79 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $88.9 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $79 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $22.6 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $908.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $195.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $126.9 million class A-PB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1.8764 billion class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $2.2885 billion class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable

  -- Interest-only class X-P at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X-W at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $540.3 million class A-M at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $250 million class A-MFL at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $39.5 million class L, $19.8 million class
M, $29.6 million class N, $19.8 million class O, $9.9 million
class P, $19.8 million class Q and $98.8 million class S
certificates.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2005-C22 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight pooled
classes and downgraded nine pooled classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C22.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from increased leverage and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.  On June 17,
2009, Moody's placed nine classes on review for possible downgrade
due to an increase in loans in special servicing.  This action
concludes the review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the August 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 1% to
$2.50 billion from $2.53 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 149 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 40% of the pool.  Three loans, representing 4% of the
pool, have investment grade underlying ratings.  Two loans,
representing less than 1% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. government securities.

Twenty-five loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Two of the loans, representing 4% of the pool, are
secured by malls owned by affiliates of General Growth Properties,
Inc.  These loans were transferred to special servicing due to
GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  Both loans are
current, although their performance has declined since
securitization.  Moody's is not expecting a loss from either of
these properties at this time.  The remaining five specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of office, industrial and
retail properties.  Three of the loans (4% of the pool) are 90+
days delinquent, one is 60 days delinquent and the fifth loan in
special servicing is current.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss
of approximately $64 million (46% loss severity on average) for
the non-GGP specially serviced loans.  The special servicer has
recognized an aggregate appraisal reduction of $17.2 million for
two of the five non-GGP specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with year-end 2008 operating results for 93%
of the pool.  Moody's loan to value ratio for the conduit
component is 108%, excluding specially serviced loans with
estimated losses, compared to 100% at Moody's last review in July
2007.  Based on Moody's analysis, 62% of the pool has an LTV in
excess of 100% compared to 53% at Moody's last review and 24% of
the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to less than 1% at
last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, excluding specially
serviced loans, is 0.95X compared to 0.98X at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf score of 41, essentially the same
as last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Metro Pointe at
South Coast Loan ($53.9 million -- 2.2%), which is secured by a
leasehold interest on a 386,000 square foot retail center located
on Costa Mesa (Orange County), California.  The property was 99%
occupied as of March 2009, the same as last review.  Performance
has been stable.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed
DSCR are A1 and 1.82X, respectively, compared to A1 and 1.64X at
last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Shoppes at East
Chase Loan ($26.3 million -- 1.1%), which is secured by a 375,000
square foot retail center located in Montgomery, Alabama.  The
property was 85% leased as of March 2009 compared to 95% at last
review.  The decline in occupancy is largely attributable to the
closing of Linen 'N Things, which declared bankruptcy in 2008 and
closed all its stores.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.90X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and
2.16X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the 1201
Broadway Loan ($11.2 million -- 0.5%), which is secured by a
132,000 square foot office building located in New York City.  The
property was 89% leased as of May 2009 compared to 98% at last
review.  Despite the decline in occupancy, performance has been
stable.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Baa3 and 1.43X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.41X at last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Hyatt Center Loan ($162.5 million --
6.5%), which represents a 50% participation interest in a first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 1.5 million square foot
Class A office building located in Chicago, Illinois.  The
property was 95% leased as of April 2009 compared to 92% at last
review.  Moody's original analysis reflected a stabilized
occupancy level, which has been achieved.  However, the property
is operating below Moody's original projections because of
increased operating expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
107% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 93% and 0.99X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Westin Casuarina Hotel and
Spa Loan ($151.6 million -- 6.1%), which is secured by an 826-room
luxury hotel spa and casino located in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Performance has declined since last review and Moody's valuation
incorporates a stressed cash flow because of Moody's concerns
about the Las Vegas hospitality market.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 142% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to 109% and 1.07X
at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Abbey Pool II Loan
($148.9 million -- 6.0%), which is secured by a portfolio of 16
retail, office, industrial and mixed-use properties totaling
1.4 million square feet.  All of the properties are located in
California.  The portfolio was 91% occupied as of December 2008
compared to 93% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
105% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 104% and 0.98X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $15,786,626, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-2, $93,894,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-3, $164,597,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-PB, $148,538,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-4, $940,984,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-1A, $373,684,815, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-M, $253,412,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class IO, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/10/2007

  -- Class A-J, $152,047,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class B, $22,174,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aa1; previously
     Aa1, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class C, $31,676,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2; previously
     Aa2, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class D, $25,341,000, downgraded to A3 from Aa3; previously
     Aa3, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class E, $47,515,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2; previously
     A2, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class F, $31,676,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
     A3, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class G, $28,509,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously
     Baa1, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class H, $28,509,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa2; previously
     Baa2, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class J, $34,844,000, downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously
     Baa3, on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009


WHITEHORSE IV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Whitehorse IV Ltd.:

  -- US$330,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 18, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$ 28,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 Notes,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$ 25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$ 16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 Notes,
     Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 Notes,
     Confirmed at B3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2855 versus a test
level of 2685 as of the last trustee report, dated August 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities currently held in
the portfolio total about $25.4 million, accounting for roughly
5.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1/CCC or
lower make up approximately 12.4% of the underlying portfolio.

The rating actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability and the calculation of the
Diversity Score.  These revised assumptions are described in the
publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," dated August 12, 2009.  Other assumptions used in
Moody's CLO monitoring are described in the publication "CLO
Ratings Surveillance Brief - Second Quarter 2009," dated July 17,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.

Whitehorse IV Ltd., issued on January 18, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WILSON COUNTY: S&P Changes Rating on $13.7 Mil. Bonds to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its underlying rating
to 'B-' from 'B' on Wilson County Memorial Hospital, Texas'
$13.7 million series 2003 general obligation (GO) bonds.  The
outlook is negative.

The speculative-grade rating reflects a May 2007 criteria change
in Standard & Poor's approach to tax-secured hospital district
debt.  In cases where the credit of the hospital district is
considered speculative, the rating will be driven increasingly by
the hospital's financial and operating profile.

"While the district's financial and operating profile did improve
in both fiscals 2007 and 2008, the district is experiencing
financial stress in fiscal 2009 (unaudited 10-month results
through July 31, 2009), with excess losses of almost $1.0 million,
approximately $1.5 million below both budget and last year's
results," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Kevin Holloran.

Management attributes losses in fiscal 2009 year to date to
increases in both bad debt and charity expenses associated with
the economic downturn, and lower-than-expected volumes,
specifically compared to budget.

While the district enjoys a new inpatient facility and its
population growth is generally favorable, volumes dropped
precipitously in fiscal 2008 by 27% to only 1,169 admissions after
the district lost a general surgeon.  Thus far in fiscal 2009,
volumes are relatively steady compared to last year (956
admissions, or an incremental decline of 1.6%) but are noticeably
behind budget (a decline of 28%) for the same time period.  The
district will replace its lost general surgeon in December of this
year and will open a new clinic in the far north Wilson
County/south Bexar County area in October of this year.
Management expects both events will improve volumes over the near
term.

The district has a very weak liquidity position, highlighted by
unrestricted cash and investments of about $1.0 million, equaling
approximately 17 days' cash on hand and less than 10% outstanding
long-term debt based on fiscal 2009 results (unaudited year-to-
date results through July 31, 2009).  As a result, the district
has little financial flexibility.  Management expects absolute
cash levels will remain about level or decline over the next year.
The district has stated it has no additional debt plans over the
next several years.  However, it has recently completed several
large-scale projects (a Meditech installation, a new pharmacy
dispensing system, a PACS system and the previously mentioned
clinic), and operational expenses associated with these projects,
in light of the challenging economic environment the district is
in, could contribute to a continued drain of cash this year.


ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of four classes of Notes issued by ZAIS Investment Grade
Limited II.  The Notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

ZAIS Investment Grade Limited II is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor).  Moody's notes that in the case of ZAIS Investment
Grade Limited II more than 35% of its assets have been the subject
of ratings downgrade since Moody's last review of the transaction
in March 2009.  The trustee reports that WARF is 4986 as compared
to a WARF of 3611 reported by the Trustee in March 2009.

The action also takes into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  An Event of Default
may occur due to the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of the
Controlling Class exceeding the Aggregate Principal Balance of the
Pledged Securities and the amount of Cash in the Collateral .  As
provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence and
continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


* Fitch Changes Recovery Ratings on 153 U.S. CMBS Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Recovery Ratings for 153 U.S. CMBS
bonds.  The RR revisions are the result of Fitch's updated
methodology for RRs.  RRs provide a forward looking estimate of
recoveries for distressed and defaulted securities.  Fitch has
also affirmed and removed RRs from two bonds which remain highly
speculative but a default is not imminent at 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch has downgraded 78 distressed U.S. CMBS bonds
due to incurred losses or higher probability of future losses.
The downgrades are the result of a revision of Fitch's rating
methodology for distressed securities.  Bonds downgraded were
originally rated 'B+' or lower.


* Moody's Withdraw Ratings on 66 Structured Finance Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn its
ratings of 66 securities listed below subsequent to the modified
rating methodology it applies to structured finance securities
insured by financial guarantors.  Specifically, starting
September 1, 2009, Moody's will withdraw the ratings on those
structured finance securities insured by guarantors that have
financial strength ratings below Baa3 (that is non-investment
grade) if either of two conditions are met: Moody's is unable to
determine an underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the
guaranty) on the security or the issuer has requested that the
guaranty constitute the sole credit consideration.

Moody's rating on a structured finance security insured by a
financial guarantor will continue to be at the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) providing that an
underlying rating can be determined the current underlying rating
on the security, regardless of whether the underlying rating is
published or not.  If the underlying rating cannot be determined
or if the issuer has requested that the guaranty constitute the
sole credit consideration, and a) providing the guarantor's
financial strength rating is Baa3 or higher, Moody's rating on a
structured finance security shall continue to be equal to the
guarantors financial strength rating, otherwise, b) as detailed
above, Moody's will withdraw the rating.

Complete list of rating actions

Issuer: Aleutian Investment LLC, 2002 Series B

  -- 2002 Series B, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2001 Series A and B

  -- 2001 Ser. A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

  -- Medium Term Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2002 Series A

  -- 2002 Series A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2003 Series A

  -- 2003 Ser. A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

Issuer: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2004 Series A

  -- 2004 Ser. A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

Issuer: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2006 Series A

  -- 2006 Ser. A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

Issuer: GESB plc

  -- GESB plc, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Issuer: Juneau Investment LLC 2000A

  -- Ser. 2001-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Ser. 2001-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Juneau Investments LLC 2000 B

  -- Ser. 2000-B, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

Issuer: Juneau Investments LLC

  -- MTN Programme Medium Term Note Programme, Withdrawn;
     previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Long Beach Asset Holdings Corp.  CI 2006-WL2 NIM Notes,
Series 2006-WL2

  -- Cl. N-2, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

Issuer: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note Program

  -- Global Medium-Term Note Program, Withdrawn; previously on Feb
     18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Ser. EMTN, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 (18 tranches)

  -- Ser. MTN, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 (23 tranches)

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company LLC, Series 2006-B

  -- 2006-B, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company LLC, Series 2007-B

  -- Ser. 2007-B, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC

  -- Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 1999-C

  -- Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 2000-B

  -- Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 2000-E

  -- Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC MTN Programme

  -- Class A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2002-E

  -- Float Rate Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2004-B

  -- Float Rate Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2006-A

  -- Flt Rt Notes, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2007-A

  -- Ser. 2007-A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches From Nine CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 27
tranches from nine U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 11 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
ratings on 14 of the downgraded tranches are on CreditWatch with
negative implications, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrades.  These tranches have a total issuance amount
of $6.03 billion.  S&P also withdrew the rating on a retranched
pass-through note based on the note's paydown.

Of the cash flow CDO ratings that were lowered, five of the nine
affected transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of
asset-backed securities, which are collateralized in large part by
mezzanine tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  Three of the
nine transactions are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were
collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The other transaction
is a CDO of CDOs that was collateralized at origination primarily
by notes from other CDOs, as well as by tranches from RMBS and
other SF transactions.

At the same time, S&P lowered its rating on one tranche from one
U.S. synthetic CDO transaction and removed it from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The U.S. synthetic CDO tranche rating
has a direct link to the rating on its respective reference
obligation, which S&P lowered as part of the CDO of ABS rating
actions.  The downgraded tranche has a total issuance amount of
$125 million.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and recent negative rating actions on U.S.  subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities.  The CreditWatch
placements primarily affect transactions for which a significant
portion of the collateral assets currently have ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications or have significant
exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

In addition, Standard & Poor's reviewed the ratings assigned to 32
tranches, and based on S&P's assessment of current credit support
available to them, has left them at their current levels.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
   Transaction                 Class     To               From
   -----------                 -----     --               ----
   Ajax Two Combination        Pass Thru NR               BBB
    (PS/ABS) Trust
   Altius II Funding, Ltd.     A-1       B-/Watch Neg     BBB/Watch Neg
   Altius II Funding, Ltd.     A-2       CC               B+/Watch Neg
   Altius IV Funding Ltd       A-1F      CCC-             BBB/Watch Neg
   Barramundi CDO I Ltd        A-1       CC               BB+/Watch Neg
   Barramundi CDO I Ltd        A-2       CC               BB-/Watch Neg
   Barramundi CDO I Ltd        B         CC               B-/Watch Neg
   Barramundi CDO I Ltd        C         CC               CCC-/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      A-1       BBB+/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      A-2       B+/Watch Neg     A/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      B         CC               BB+/Watch Neg
   Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      C         CC               B/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        A-1       AA/Watch Neg     AAA/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        A-2       A/Watch Neg      AA/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        A-3       A/Watch Neg      AA/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        B         BB+/Watch Neg    A-/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        C         B-/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg
   Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        D         CCC-/Watch Neg   B-/Watch Neg
   Glacier Funding CDO I, Ltd. A-2       A/Watch Neg      AA
   Glacier Funding CDO I, Ltd. B         CCC/Watch Neg    BB
   Glacier Funding CDO I, Ltd. C         CC               CCC-
   Independence VI CDO Ltd     A1        CCC-/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
   Independence VI CDO Ltd     A2        CC               CCC-
   Lancer Funding Ltd.         A1S1      CC               BB-/Watch Neg
   Lancer Funding Ltd.         A1S2      CC               CCC-
   Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      A-1LA     BBB/Watch Neg    A/Watch Neg
   Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      A-2L      CCC-/Watch Neg   CCC+/Watch Neg
   Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      A-3L      CC               CCC-/Watch Neg
   Coriolanus Ltd - Barramundi CLN       CC               BB+/Watch Neg
    Super Senior Repack

                      Other Ratings Reviewed

         Transaction                 Class     Rating
         -----------                 -----     ------
         Altius II Funding, Ltd.     B         CC
         Altius II Funding, Ltd.     C         CC
         Altius II Funding, Ltd.     D         CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       A-1B      CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       A-1V      CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       A-2a      CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       A-2b      CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       B         CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       C         CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       D         CC
         Altius IV Funding Ltd       E         CC
         Barramundi CDO I Ltd        D         CC
         Barramundi CDO I Ltd        E         CC
         Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      D         CC
         Coolidge Funding, Ltd.      E         CC
         Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        E         CC
         Gemstone CDO II Ltd.        F         CC
         Glacier Funding CDO I, Ltd. A-1       AAA
         Glacier Funding CDO I, Ltd. Pref Shrs CC
         Independence VI CDO Ltd     B         CC
         Independence VI CDO Ltd     C         CC
         Independence VI CDO Ltd     D         CC
         Independence VI CDO Ltd     E         CC
         Lancer Funding Ltd.         A1J       CC
         Lancer Funding Ltd.         A2        CC
         Lancer Funding Ltd.         A3        CC
         Lancer Funding Ltd.         B         CC
         Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      A-1LB     B/Watch Neg
         Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      B-1L      CC
         Stone Tower CDO II Ltd      X         AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Classes From Five Prime Jumbo RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 30
classes from five U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 2003, 2004, and 2006.
Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on 27 classes from four of
the transactions.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, S&P's assessment of the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default
projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and
the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss severity
assumptions.  Furthermore, for each deal, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations based on upward trends in delinquencies.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each prime
jumbo transaction rated in 2006 based on a forward-looking default
curve.  Due to continuing deterioration in performance, S&P's
lifetime projected losses have changed for one of the transactions
in this release:

                                         Original        Loss
  Transaction                            bal. (mil. $)   proj. (%)
  -----------                            -------------   ---------
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
2006-AR2 Trust                          4,177.0         4.62

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given out current
projected losses.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.

A class may have to withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-
case loss assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while a
different class may have to withstand approximately 154% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  An
affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects S&P's opinion that the class can
withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of prime jumbo fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage
loans secured by one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

              Banc of America Mortgage 2004-D Trust
                        Series      2004-D

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        05949ADS6     B+                   A+
        B-3        05949ADT4     CCC                  BBB
        B-4        05949ADY3     CC                   BB
        B-5        05949ADZ0     CC                   CCC

             Bank of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
                        Series      2004-A

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      05948XS69     AA+                  AAA
        2-A-1      05948XS93     AA-                  AAA
        2-A-2      05948XT27     AA-                  AAA
        2-A-3      05948XT35     AA-                  AAA
        2-A-4      05948XT43     AA-                  AAA
        B-1        05948XT68     B+                   AA
        B-2        05948XT76     CCC                  A
        B-3        05948XT84     CCC                  BBB
        B-4        05948XU58     CC                   BB
        B-5        05948XU66     CC                   B

                   Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-6
                        Series      2003-6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-B-2      07384MXG2     A                    AA-
        I-B-3      07384MXH0     CCC                  BBB
        I-B-4      07384MYA4     CC                   BB
        I-B-5      07384MYB2     CC                   CCC

                   RFMSI Series 2004-SA1 Trust
                       Series      2004-SA1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        M-2        76111XLJ0     BB                   A+
        M-3        76111XLK7     CCC                  BBB
        B-1        76111XLL5     CC                   BB
        B-2        76111XLM3     CC                   B

       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR2 Trust
                       Series      2006-AR2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-A-1      94983KAA7     CCC                  B-
        II-A-1     94983KAC3     A                    AAA
        II-A-2     94983KAD1     CCC                  B-
        II-A-3     94983KAE9     A                    AA
        II-A-4     94983KAF6     CCC                  B-
        II-A-5     94983KAG4     BB                   BBB+
        II-A-6     94983KAH2     CCC                  B-
        II-A-IO    94983KAJ8     A                    AAA

                         Ratings Affirmed
  
              Banc of America Mortgage 2004-D Trust
                        Series      2004-D

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-1      05949ADA5     AAA
                 1-A-2      05949ADB3     AAA
                 2-A-1      05949ADF4     AAA
                 2-A-6      05949ADL1     AAA
                 2-A-7      05949ADM9     AAA
                 2-A-8      05949ADN7     AAA
                 2-A-IO     05949ADP2     AAA
                 3-A-1      05949ADQ0     AAA
                 B-1        05949ADR8     AA
                 2-A2       05949ADG2     AAA

             Bank of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
                        Series      2004-A

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 3-A-1      05948XT50     AAA

                  Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2003-6
                        Series      2003-6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-A-1      07384MWW8     AAA
                 I-A-2      07384MWX6     AAA
                 I-X-2      07384MWY4     AAA
                 I-A-3      07384MWZ1     AAA
                 I-X-3      07384MXA5     AAA
                 II-A-1     07384MXB3     AAA
                 I-B-1      07384MXF4     AA+
                 II-B-1     07384MXJ6     AA+
                 II-B-2     07384MXK3     A+
                 II-B-3     07384MXL1     BBB+
                 II-B-4     07384MYD8     BB+
                 II-B-5     07384MYE6     B

                   RFMSI Series 2004-SA1 Trust
                       Series      2004-SA1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-I        76111XLC5     AAA
                 A-II       76111XLD3     AAA
                 A-III      76111XLE1     AAA
                 M-1        76111XLH4     AA+


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 864 Classes From 75 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 864
classes from 75 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  S&P removed 495 of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on 197 classes from 42 of the
downgraded transactions and from two additional deals and removed
37 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.  In total,
the downgrades affected $39.5 billion (original balance at
issuance) of RMBS certificates.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, in general,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB'
rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class could
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 150% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

S&P also lowered the ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls or write-downs in the final period of
particular cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have
experienced any principal shortfalls or write-downs in any of the
prior periods of the particular stress scenario; however, the
structural mechanics of the transaction created circumstances in
which one or more classes within a transaction may have relied on
principal proceeds to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier
periods, thus resulting in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group, or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance
that is insufficient to cover the necessary interest obligations
of the related liabilities.

Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
ndercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, the available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available funds
may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the interest-
principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final payment period, a situation may occur in which
available funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and
principal requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as
principal in prior periods was used to satisfy interest
obligations.  Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior
certificates can be exposed to this risk due to the fact that
structures may pay principal pro rata with senior support classes.
Although the senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any
of the prior periods, it could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization and excess spread.  The underlying pool of
loans backing these transactions consists of different
combinations of fixed- and adjustable-rate, hybrid, and option
adjustable-rate mortgage Alt-A mortgage loans.


* S&P Puts Ratings on 120 Tranches on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 120
tranches from 81 U.S cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.
The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's monthly review of U.S.
cash flow and hybrid CDO transaction performance.

Seventy-four of the affected transactions (91%) are CDOs backed by
corporate loans.  The remaining transactions are backed by
corporate bonds (three), mezzanine structured finance securities
(three), and commercial mortgage-backed securities (one).  In
aggregate, the affected tranches have a total issuance amount of
$5.598 billion.

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's most recent monthly review
of U.S. cash flow and hybrid CDO performance.  The rationale for
the rating actions are based on both quantitative and qualitative
performance parameters, including transaction structural features,
manager purchase patterns, and a broad view of the underlying
collateral within each transaction, including these:

* A change in Standard & Poor's rated overcollateralization
  metric.  This ratio, reviewed monthly based on current
  collateral ratings, provides an estimate of the stability of the
  current rating on a given cash flow CDO tranche;

* A deterioration in the credit quality of the performing assets
  within the collateral pools, including negative rating migration
  of the underlying securities to ratings in the 'CCC' range;

* An increase in the proportion of securities in the collateral
  pool with ratings on CreditWatch negative, which serves as a
  forward-looking indicator of rating actions that will affect the
  assets in the pools;

* A change in the level of overcollateralization available
  to support each tranche since origination, or since S&P's last
  rating action.  Many of the affected CLO transactions have
  experienced declines in their O/C ratios as a result of defaults
  or rating-based "haircuts" for the calculation of par coverage
  tests.  This may cause some transactions to begin breaching
  mezzanine O/C ratio tests, which would cut off subordinate
  classes from receiving current interest; and

* An increase in the level of defaulted assets held in the CDO
  transactions' portfolios.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after S&P complete a
comprehensive cash flow analysis for each of the affected
transactions, and after S&P evaluate additional information S&P
may receive during discussions with the relevant collateral
managers.  S&P expects to resolve these CreditWatch placements
within 90 days.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the
CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions, including
CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                                                        Rating
                                                        ------
  Transaction                              Class    To              From
  -----------                              -----    --              ----
505 CLO III Ltd.                           D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
505 CLO III Ltd.                           E        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd.                 B        AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1            D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1            D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Airlie LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1) Ltd.  B        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Airlie LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1) Ltd.  C        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Airlie LCDO II (Pebble Creek 2007-1) Ltd.  D        CCC/Watch Neg   CCC
AMMC CLO III Ltd.                          C        A+/Watch Neg    A+
ARCC Commercial Loan Trust 2006            C        A/Watch Neg     A
ARCC Commercial Loan Trust 2006            D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Ares IX CLO Ltd.                           C        A/Watch Neg     A
Atrium CDO                                 C-1      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Atrium CDO                                 C-2      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Avenue CLO II Ltd.                         A-3L     A-/Watch Neg    A-
Babson CLO Ltd. 2004-I                     D        BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
Bridgeport CLO II Ltd.                     C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Bryant Park CDO Ltd.                       B        A/Watch Neg     A
Canaras Summit CLO Ltd.                    C        A/Watch Neg     A
CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-2 D        BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd.         D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Carlyle High Yield Partners X Ltd.         E        BB-/Watch Neg   BB-
Castle Garden Funding                      C-1      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Castle Garden Funding                      C-2      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd.                       D-1      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
C-Bass CBO VIII Ltd.                       D-2      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Celerity CLO Ltd.                          D        BB+/Watch Neg   BB+
Celerity CLO Ltd.                          E        B+/Watch Neg    B+
Cent CDO 10 Ltd.                           D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Cent CDO 15 Ltd.                           B        A/Watch Neg     A
Centurion CDO 8 Ltd.                       C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd.                  D        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.                   B        A/Watch Neg     A
Cratos CLO I Ltd.                          C        A/Watch Neg     A
Cratos CLO I Ltd.                          D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Crest 2003-1 Ltd.                          D-1      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Crest 2003-1 Ltd.                          D-2      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd.                 B-1L     BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Denali Capital CLO VI Ltd.                 B-2L     BB/Watch Neg    BB
Flagship CLO V                             C        A/Watch Neg     A
FM Leveraged Capital Fund II               D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Forest Creek CLO Ltd.                      B-1L     BB+/Watch Neg   BB+
Forest Creek CLO Ltd.                      B-2L     B+/Watch Neg    B+
Fortress Credit Funding I L.P.             B        A/Watch Neg     A
Fortress Credit Funding II L.P.            B        A/Watch Neg     A
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-1New   AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-1Orig  AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-2Aug07 AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-2Dec05 AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-2New   AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-2Orig  AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fortress Credit Opportunities I L.P.       A-3      AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd.                C        A/Watch Neg     A
Gale Force 1 CLO Ltd.                      D1       BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Gale Force 1 CLO Ltd.                      D2       BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Gallatin CLO III 2007-1 Ltd.               B-1L     BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Gemstone CDO Ltd.                          C        BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
GIA Investment Grade CDO 2001 Ltd.         A-2      BB/Watch Neg    BB
GIA Investment Grade CDO 2001 Ltd.         B        B/Watch Neg     B
Global Leveraged Capital Credit
Opportunity Fund I                        B        AA/Watch Neg    AA
Global Leveraged Capital Credit
Opportunity Fund I                        C        A/Watch Neg     A
Global Leveraged Capital Credit
Opportunity Fund I                        D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.      C-1      A/Watch Neg     A
GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.      C-2      A/Watch Neg     A
GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.      D-1      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
GoldenTree Capital Opportunities L.P.      D-2      BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Granite Ventures I Ltd.                    C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Granite Ventures I Ltd.                    D        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.               A-II-B   AA/Watch Neg    AA
ING Investment Management CLO IV Ltd.      D        BB/Watch Neg    BB
ING Investment Management CLO V Ltd.       D        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Katonah IV Ltd.                            B        A-/Watch Neg    A-
Katonah IX CLO Ltd.                        A-3L     A-/Watch Neg    A-
Knightsbridge CLO 2008-1 Ltd.              E        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Landmark IX CDO Ltd.                       D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Liberty CLO Ltd.                           A-4      AA/Watch Neg    AA
Morgan Stanley Investment Management
Croton Ltd.                               D        BB+/Watch Neg   BB+
Morgan Stanley Investment Management
Croton Ltd.                               E        B/Watch Neg     B
Mt.  Wilson CLO II Ltd.                    C         A/Watch Neg     A
Navigator CDO 2004 Ltd.                    B-1      A/Watch Neg     A
Navigator CDO 2004 Ltd.                    B-2      A/Watch Neg     A
NewStar Trust 2005-1                       D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
NewStar Trust 2005-1                       E        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Nicholas-Applegate CBO II Ltd.            A         AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Oak Hill Credit Partners II Ltd.           D-1      BB/Watch Neg    BB
Oak Hill Credit Partners II Ltd.           D-2      BB/Watch Neg    BB
Oak Hill Credit Partners II Ltd.           D-3      BB/Watch Neg    BB
Ocean Trails CLO II                        C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
OFSI Fund III Ltd.                         D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Pacifica CDO IV Ltd.                       B-1L     BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
Pacifica CDO IV Ltd.                       B-2L     BB-/Watch Neg   BB-
Pacifica CDO VI Ltd.                       B        A/Watch Neg     A
PPM Grayhawk CLO Ltd.                      B        A/Watch Neg     A
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            B-1      AA/Watch Neg    AA
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            B-2      AA/Watch Neg    AA
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            C        A-/Watch Neg    A-
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            E        BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
RFC CDO II Ltd.                            F        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Rockwall CDO II Ltd.                       A-2L     AA/Watch Neg    AA
Sagamore CLO Ltd.                          A-3      AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd.              E        BB/Watch Neg    BB
Saratoga CLO I Ltd.                        C        BBB-/Watch Neg  BBB-
Saratoga CLO I Ltd.                        D        BB-/Watch Neg   BB-
Signature 7 L.P.                           C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Southport CLO Ltd.                         C        BB+/Watch Neg   BB+
Spring Road CLO 2007-1 Ltd.                D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Stanfield Arnage CLO Ltd.                  B-2L     BB/Watch Neg    BB
Stanfield Azure CLO Ltd.                   B-1L     BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Stanfield Daytona CLO Ltd.                 B-1L     BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Stanfield McLaren CLO Ltd.                 B-2L     BB/Watch Neg    BB
Stanfield Veyron CLO Ltd.                  D(Def)   BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Symphony Credit Partners I Ltd.            C        A/Watch Neg     A
Symphony Credit Partners II Ltd.           C        A/Watch Neg     A
TCW Global Project Fund III Ltd.           C        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
TCW Select Loan Fund Ltd.                  C        A/Watch Neg     A
Telos CLO 2007-2 Ltd.                      D        BBB/Watch Neg   BBB
Westwood CDO I Ltd.                        B        A/Watch Neg     A
Westwood CDO II Ltd.                       A-2      AAA/Watch Neg   AAA
WhiteHorse II Ltd.                         B-1L     BBB/Watch Neg   BBB


* S&P Withdraws Swap Risk Ratings on Two Credit Default Swaps
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its swap risk ratings
on two credit default swaps, which are unfunded synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

The ratings were withdrawn following Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Ltd.'s entry into two replacement unfunded credit
default swaps referencing the same portfolios, but facing a new
swap counterparty.  The new swaps replace these existing swaps and
have new swap confirmation numbers.  S&P will continue to monitor
the performance of the replacement swaps.

                         Ratings Withdrawn

                        Credit Default Swap

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Deal Name                     Class      To     From
  ---------                     -----      --     ----
Swap Risk Rating " Vizzavona"   Tranche    NR     BB-srp/Watch Neg
Swap Risk Rating " Zicavo"      Tranche    NR     Bsrp

                         NR - Not rated.



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
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A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
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includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Danilo Munnoz, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie
Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
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are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
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                  *** End of Transmission ***