TCR_Public/090816.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 16, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 226

                            Headlines



AAA TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-3 2007-2 RMBS
ALTERNATIVE LOAN: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-1 Cert. From 'B'
AMMC VIII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
AMPSS 2007-5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Deals to 'D'
ARES XII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

ATRIUM CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
ATRIUM III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
ATRIUM V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-2 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch

BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two 2006-8T2 Securities
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2005-3 Certificates
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2006-6 Certs.
BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-3 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-TOP26 Certs.

BEAR STERNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-PWR9 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2004-TOP14 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-BBA7 Certificates
C-BASS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1997-1 Certificate
CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes

CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
CD 2007-CD4: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of CMBS
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2006-WF1 Securities
CLOVERIE PLC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
COBALT CMBS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2006-C1 Certificates

COBALT CMBS: S&P Cuts Ratings on 17 Classes of 2006-C1 Certs.
COMM 2006-FL12: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 33 2006-FL12 Certs.
CORTS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $36 Mil. Class A Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2008-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Correct Press Release on 2007-C3 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Securities
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-C3 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 2007-C3 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 19 2007-C4 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2007-C1 Certs.

DUCHESS I: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'Ca'
FIRST HORIZON: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2006-RE1 Resecuritizations
FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Rates Class D 2009-3 Notes at 'BB'
FIRST NATIONAL: S&P Assigns Initial Ratings on $690.79 Mil. Notes
FLAGSHIP CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

FLATIRON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-1 Notes
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of 2007-A Notes
FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
FRANKLIN AUTO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GALE FORCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-C1 Securities
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 14 2006-C1 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2003-C2 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 16 2005-GG5 Securities
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-FL3 Certs.

GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 2006-GG8 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-GG4 Certificates
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-GG10 Certificates
GSC CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
GSC INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Class A Notes
GUARDIAN SAVINGS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes
HARBOURVIEW CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTORCYCLE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Class C Notes
HOSPITAL AUTHORITY: Fitch Cuts Rating on $12.7 Mil. Bonds to 'BB-'

INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-AR27 Securities
INTEGRAL FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 25 2007-LDP10 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-CIBC15 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-LDP8 Certificates

JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2005-FL1 Certificates
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of CMBS
KATONAH III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
KENT FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
LANDMARK CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C2 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-C6 Certs.
LEHMAN BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-LLF C5 Certificates
LEHMAN BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
LEHMAN MANUFACTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Certs.

LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Securities
LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
MAPS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-MCP1 Certs.

MISSISSIPPI HIGHER: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Securities
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 14 2006-C3 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2007-XLF Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2004-TOP13 Certs.

MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Notes
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MT WILSON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Securities

NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Securities
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
NYLIM STRATFORD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-1 Notes

OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Securities
PARCS MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class 2006-16 Units
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on $48 Mil. Certs.
SATURN VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

RALI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2006-QS13 Security
RIVERSIDE PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A Notes
RYLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Certificates
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D-2 2007-1 D2 Notes
SHASTA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

SIERRA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SILVERADO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
SOUNDVIEW HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20065-WF1 Securities
ST JAMES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
STARTS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Series 2007-30 Notes

VERMEER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
WACHOVIA AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Class B 2005-B Notes
WACHOVIA AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Tranches
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-C18 Certificates
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C28 Certs.

WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-C20 Securities
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-5 Certs.
XVIII LEVERAGED: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'C'

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 13 Certs. From Three Resecuritizations
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches From 17 MV CLO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Classes From Three RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 74 Tranches From 34 Hybrid CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 1,050 Classes From 72 RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 232 Classes From 16 Alt-A RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four U.S. Asset-Backed Securities



                            *********

AAA TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-3 2007-2 RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the A-3
class from AAA Trust 2007-2, a U.S. re-REMIC (real estate mortgage
investment conduit) residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the remaining two
classes from this transaction.

The lowered rating reflects realized losses during recent
remittance periods.  These losses were passed through from one of
the underlying certificates (class II-2-A-3 from Nomura Home
Equity Loan Trust 2007-1) that incurred recent losses.  The losses
that passed through from this underlying class caused class A-3
from AAA Trust 2007-2 to default.

S&P affirmed the 'AAA' ratings on the A-1 and A-2 classes due to
the bond insurance provided by Assured Guaranty Corp. (Assured
Guaranty), which has a financial strength rating of 'AAA'.

Mortgage loans secured by first and second liens on one- to four-
family residential properties at issuance secure the underlying
certificates in this re-REMIC.  The class A-1 and A-2 notes have
the benefit of a financial guaranty insurance policy issued by
Assured Guaranty.  In addition, the class A-3 note provides
protection to the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

                          Rating Lowered

                         AAA Trust 2007-2

                                       Rating
                                       ------
              Class   CUSIP         To          From
              -----   -----         --          ----
              A-3     000292AC6     D           AAA

                         Ratings Affirmed

                         AAA Trust 2007-2

                   Class    CUSIP        Rating
                   -----    -----        ------
                   A-1      000292AA0    AAA
                   A-2      000292AB8    AAA


ALTERNATIVE LOAN: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-1 Cert. From 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
class A-1 certificate issued by Alternative Loan Trust's series
2007-15CB to 'BBB' from 'B'.  On March 24, 2009, as a result of an
administrative error, S&P lowered the rating on this class to 'B'
as part of a larger review of U.S. residential mortgage backed
securities backed by Alternative-A mortgage collateral.

MBIA Insurance Corp. ('BBB') insures the class A-1 certificate.
According to its criteria, the rating on an insured class is the
higher of its rating on the bond insurer or its underlying rating
on the class, which is based on its analysis of the class'
inherent credit support.  S&P therefore has corrected its rating
on the A-1 class to 'BBB' to reflect the current rating of the
insurer.

                         Rating Corrected

                 Alternative Loan Trust 2007-15CB
                         Series 2007-15CB

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class    CUSIP       Current     March 24    Pre-March 24
    -----    -----       -------     --------    ------------
    A-1      02151CAA4   BBB         B           AAA


AMMC VIII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AMMC VIII, Limited:

  -- US$337,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 25, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$37,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2022,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2022, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class D Par
Value Test.  The weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 3355 versus a test level of 2795 as
of the last trustee report, dated July 20, 2009.  Based on the
same report, defaulted securities total about $14.6 million,
accounting for roughly 3% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1/CCC or lower make up approximately 21% of
the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, the interest payment due
to the Class E Notes on the last payment date was deferred as a
result of the failure of the Class D Par Value Test.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

AMMC VIII, Limited, issued in October of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AMPSS 2007-5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Deals to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from four AMPSS 2007-5 SPC transactions to 'D' from 'BB-'.
The ratings were previously on CreditWatch negative.  S&P also
withdrew these ratings.

All of these transactions are total return swaps that are directly
linked to lower of the rating on the class A-1VF notes from
Knollwood CDO II Ltd. and the class A-1 notes from Tallships
Funding Ltd.

                   Ratings Lowered And Withdrawn

             AMPSS 2007-5 SPC I Segregated Portfolio

                                    Rating
                                    ------
      Class                 To                 From
      -----                 --                 ----
      Notes                 D                  BB-/Watch Neg
                            NR                 D

             AMPSS 2007-5 SPC II Segregated Portfolio

                                    Rating
                                    ------
      Class                 To                 From
      -----                 --                 ----
      Notes                 D                  BB-/Watch Neg
                            NR                 D

             AMPSS 2007-5 SPC III Segregated Portfolio

                                    Rating
                                    ------
      Class                 To                 From
      -----                 --                 ----
      Notes                 D                  BB-/Watch Neg
                            NR                 D

             AMPSS 2007-5 SPC IV Segregated Portfolio

                                    Rating
                                    ------
      Class                 To                 From
      -----                 --                 ----
      Notes                 D                  BB-/Watch Neg
                            NR                 D

                          NR - Not rated.


ARES XII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ares XII CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$479,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020;
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 13, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$52,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020;
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2020; Downgraded to B3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2020; Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these class of
notes:

  -- US$42,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class E
Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  The weighted average rating
factor has increased over the last year and is currently 2764 as
of the last trustee report dated June 18, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $25 million, accounting
for roughly 4% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up 16.8% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Ares XII CLO Ltd., issued in October of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ATRIUM CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Atrium CDO:

  -- US$243,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 (current
     balance of $230,165,255), Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     June 27, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class C-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded
     to B2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$2,500,000 Class D-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Confirmed
     at Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2715 versus a test level of 2365 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 20, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $31.1 million, accounting for roughly 10.2%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 13.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Atrium CDO, issued on June 27, 2002, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ATRIUM III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Atrium III:

  -- US$373,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on October 27, 2004 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class A-2b Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,750,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2782 versus a test level of 2310 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 25, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $55.5 million, accounting for
roughly 11.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.6% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class D-1 Notes and Class
D-2 Notes were deferred on the last payment date as a result of
the failure of the Class C overcollateralization test.  Moody's
also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in
debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real
estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more
strongly correlated in the current market environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Atrium III, issued on October 27, 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ATRIUM V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it downgraded the ratings
of these notes issued by Atrium V:

  -- Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on July 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class A-3a Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on July 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-3b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded
     to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded
     to Caa1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2947 versus a test level of 2650 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 15, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $97 million, accounting for roughly 11% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 12% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Atrium V, issued in July 20, 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 17 2007-2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative 17
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc
of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., series 2007-2.  In addition,
Fitch assigns Rating Outlooks and Recovery Ratings, as applicable.
A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this
release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
11.5% for this transaction should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 9.2%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 66.8% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 41% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 29.0% in 2012, 10.0% in 2013, and 1.7% in 2014.  In 2016
and 2017, the remaining 59.3% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 42 Loans of Concern (32%) within the pool, 15 of
which (4.7%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, four (0.9%) are current.  None of the specially serviced
loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (58%) by unpaid
principal balance.

Four of the top 15 loans (14.4%) are expected to default during
the term, with loss severities ranging from 13.2% to 37.1%.  The
largest contributors to loss are: Beacon DC and Seattle Portfolio
(12.5%), One Park Avenue (5.9%), and 575 Lexington Avenue (5.2%).

The Beacon DC and Seattle Portfolio (12.5%) loan is secured by 16
properties, the pledge of the mortgage and the borrower's
ownership interest in one property, as well as the pledge of cash
flows from three properties.  On the aggregate, the 20 properties
comprise approximately 9,848,859 square feet of space.  The
properties are located across several different submarkets,
including: Washington, DC Central Business District (CBD, 4),
Bellevue CBD (4), Bellevue Suburban (3), Seattle CBD (2), Reston
(2), Rosslyn (2), Tysons Corner (2), and Crystal City (1).  Across
the portfolio, occupancy stood at 94.0% as of YE 2008, compared to
96.9% at issuance.

The first mortgage loan corresponding to the Beacon DC and Seattle
Portfolio totals $2.7 billion, of which only the $394.5 million A-
4 note is an asset of the trust.  The A-4 note, together with the
A-5 note (held outside of the trust), benefit from additional
credit support in the form of a subordinate B note associated with
only those two notes.  In a loss scenario, the B-1 note would take
the first dollar of loss concurrently with notes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-
6, and A-7, while the A-4 trust component and the A-5 note would
remain unimpaired until the B-1 note suffered a total loss.  The
loan is performing to Fitch's expectation at issuance, with a
servicer reported debt service coverage ratio of 1.36 times (x) on
the A-4 trust component as of YE 2008.  At acquisition, the loan
sponsors, Beacon Capital Partners, LLC, and Beacon Capital
Strategic Partners V, L.P., contributed approximately $700 million
in cash equity.  An additional $205.0 million of mezzanine
financing was extended to the borrower at issuance, collateralized
by the pledges of cash flow from three properties.  The loan
matures May 7, 2012.

The pari passu One Park Avenue loan (5.9%) is secured by a 924,501
sf office property in New York, NY.  At issuance, the issuer
underwrote to a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation that
below market leases expiring during the term of the loan would be
re-signed at higher rates, providing for potential upside in
future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008 performance, the property is
behind the stabilization schedule.  The servicer reported YE 2008
DSCR was 0.88x with a reported May 2009 occupancy of 97.9%.
However, a tenant representing approximately 19% of the net
rentable area is expected to vacate its space at lease expiration
in December 2009.  The issuer underwritten DSCR and occupancy at
issuance were 1.16x and 98%, respectively.  Based on current
performance and anticipated declines, losses are expected upon the
loan's maturity in 2012.  At closing, the loan was structured with
an $18 million debt service reserve to cover interest shortfalls
for the first three years of the loan term.  As of June 2009, the
balance of the debt service reserve was approximately
$4.5 million.  The loan matures March 1, 2012.

The 575 Lexington Avenue loan (5.2%) is secured by a 637,685 sf
office property in New York, NY.  At issuance, the loan was
underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation
that below market leases expiring during the term of the loan
would be re-signed at higher rates, providing for potential upside
in future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008 performance, the property
is behind the stabilization schedule.  The servicer reported YE
DSCR and occupancy were 0.69x and 90%, respectively, as compared
to the issuer DSCR and occupancy at origination of 1.14x and 94%,
respectively.  Based on current performance and anticipated
declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity.  At
closing, the loan was structured with a $10 million debt service
reserve to cover full debt service payments for approximately 12
months.  As of February 2009, the balance of the debt service
reserve remains unchanged.  The first mortgage loan totals
$325 million, of which only the $162.5 million A2 note is an asset
of the trust.  The loan matures Oct. 1, 2013.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks or Recovery Ratings to these classes:

  -- $153.8 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $100 million class A-JFL to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $47.6 million class C to 'B' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31.7 million class D to 'B-' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class E to 'B-' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $27.8 million class F to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $27.8 million class G to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $43.6 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.7 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.7 million class K to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.9 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;


  -- $15.9 million class N to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $11.9 million class Q to 'CC/RR6' from 'CCC/DR1'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, removed the Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Rating Outlook to this class:

  -- $4 million class O at 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes, with a Stable
Outlook:

  -- $42.7 million class A-1 at 'AAA';
  -- $753 million class A-2 at 'AAA';
  -- $55 million class A-2FL at 'AAA';
  -- $162.6 million class A-3 at 'AAA';
  -- $61 million class A-AB at 'AAA';
  -- $602 million class A-4 at 'AAA';
  -- $525 million class A-1A at 'AAA';
  -- $317.3 million class A-M at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'.

Fitch does not rate the $39.7 million class S certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Puts Ratings on Notes on Negative Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings places 5 classes of Banc of America Large Loan,
Inc., series 2005-MIB1 on Watch Negative.

The Negative Watch is due to the transfer of three loans (12.5%)
to special servicing since Fitch's last rating action in January
2009.  These loans are: Liberty Properties (5.4%), La Cumbre Plaza
(3.7%), and Radisson Resort (3.3%).

The Liberty Properties loan is secured by a portfolio of five
industrial/office buildings located in Worchester and Dedham, MA.
Occupancy of the portfolio as of September 2008, the most recent
figure available, had declined to 63.8% from 81.1% at issuance.
The loan matured in March 2009 and has one remaining one-year
extension option.  Additionally there is a mezzanine loan which
has been in default since mid 2008 and several of the properties
reportedly have significant deferred maintenance.

The La Cumbre Plaza loan is secured by an open-air shopping center
located in Santa Barbara, CA.  While occupancy and revenues are
in-line with issuance, expenses have increased in excess of 25%
since issuance.  The loan matured in August of 2009 and the
borrower was not able to obtain refinancing.

The Radisson Resort is a 718-room resort hotel located in
Kissimmee, FL.  The hotel has experienced a decline in performance
as tourism in the area has suffered due to the economic downturn.
As of the trailing 12 months ended December 2008, occupancy had
declined to 52% from 75.8% at issuance.  Additionally, expenses
had increased approximately 20% from issuance.  The loan matures
in September 2009 and has no remaining extension options.  The
borrower has advised that it is unable to obtain refinancing.

Fitch places these classes on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $30.3 million class G 'A-';
  -- $25.3 million class H 'BBB+';
  -- $28.8 million class J 'BBB-';
  -- $30.9 million class K 'BB';
  -- $30 million class L 'B-/DR1';.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two 2006-8T2 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
securities issued by Banc of America Funding 2006-8T2 Trust.  The
collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006--8T2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2005-3 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed twelve classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-3 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 6% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  One of the six aforementioned
loans, representing 6% of the outstanding deal balance, is part of
this transaction.  As a result of imminent default, this loan,
Pacific Arts Plaza is likely to be transferred into special
servicing.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
("PSF") to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to
19.0%.  A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where
average rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF
and vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, one loan has been
liquidated from the trust resulting in an aggregate loss of
$1.1 million.  Currently there are five loans, representing 11% of
the pool, in special servicing.  Upon the transfer of Pacific Arts
Plaza into special servicing, there will be six loans (17% of the
pool balance) in special servicing.  Twelve loans, representing
11% of the pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Two
loans, representing 1% of the pool balance, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $132,364,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 3/19/2009

  -- Class B, $24,312,000, currently rated Aa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa1 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class C, $24,311,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class D, $21,611,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class E, $37,818,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class F, $21,611,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 3/19/2009

  -- Class G, $29,714,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1
     on 3/19/2009

  -- Class H, $27,013,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2
     on 3/19/2009

  -- Class J, $27,013,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 on
     3/19/2009

  -- Class K, $13,507,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Ba1 on
     3/19/2009

  -- Class L, $10,805,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Ba2 on
     3/19/2009

  -- Class M, $10,805,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on
     3/19/2009


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2006-6 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-6 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 11% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are five loans,
representing 2% of the pool, in special servicing.  Twenty-eight
loans, representing 42% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $193,900,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $49,244,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $24,622,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $30,778,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $30,777,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $27,700,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $27,700,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $30,778,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class J, $6,155,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class K, $9,233,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class L, $9,234,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $3,078,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/6/2009


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks to seven classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Bank of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc., series 2006-3.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 9.9% for this transaction should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
7.4%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 7.4% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 75.6% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 6.7% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 5.9% in 2010, 0% in 2011, 0% in 2012, 0.7% in 2013, and 0%
in 2014.  All losses associated with these loans are fully
recognized in the rating actions.

Fitch identified 19 Loans of Concern (17.5%) within the pool, nine
of which (8%) are specially serviced.

One of the loans (5.9%) within the top 15 is expected to default
at maturity in 2010, with a loss severity of approximately 6.2%.
The largest contributors to loss are: Fair Lakes Promenade (1.6%),
Boscov's Monroeville Mall (1%), and Boscov's South Hills Village
(1%).

Fair Lakes Promenade is a 137,107 square foot (SF) retail property
located in Fairfax, VA.  The property has experienced a
significant decline in occupancy since issuance as a result of
Linens and Thing's bankruptcy filing.  The servicer reported March
2009 debt service coverage ratio and occupancy were 0.42 times (x)
and 53%, respectively.  Based on current performance and
anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity in 2016.

Boscov's Monroeville Mall and Boscov's South Hills Village are two
of eight single-tenant retail loans, of which Boscov's Inc. is the
borrower and tenant.  There are eight Boscov's loans in this
transaction with total principal balance of $131.5 million (6.8%
of the pool).  Fitch expects significant losses on seven of the
eight loans with total exposure of $115.9 million (6%) that are
secured by stores which were closed after Boscov's filed Chapter
11 bankruptcy on Aug. 4, 2008.  The stores are attached to
shopping centers, four of which are owned by Simon Properties
Group, Inc., two by General Growth Properties and one CBL &
Associates Properties, Inc. The malls are not part of the
collateral for the loans.  When Boscov's acquired these stores
from Federated Department Stores in 2006, the company pledged each
individual asset as collateral to finance the purchases.  The
properties are located throughout Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $152.3 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $41.8 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.7 million class C to 'B' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31.9 million class D to 'B' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $17.2 million class E to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $22.1 million class F to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $17.2 million class G to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed and revised the Recovery Ratings:

  -- $22.1 million class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC/DR3';
  -- $196.5 million class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'CC/DR4';
  -- $152.3 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'C/DR6';
  -- $41.8 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'C/DR6';
  -- $19.7 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'C/DR6'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

  -- $22.5 million class A-1 at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- $43.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- $60 million class A-3 at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.01 billion class A-4 at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- $219.1 million class A-A1 at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- $196.5 million class A-M at 'AAA' Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

  -- $7.4 million class N;
  -- $4.9 million class O;
  -- $27 million class P.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-TOP26 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative 14
classes and revises Rating Outlooks on 14 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP26.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
2.8% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 2.1%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 40.8% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 14.2% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 1.3% in 2011, 9.6% in 2012, 1.3% in 2013, and 2% in 2014.
In 2017, 64.8% of the pool is scheduled to mature.  None of the
largest 15 loans are scheduled to mature before 2014.

Fitch identified 20 Loans of Concern (5.6%) within the pool, three
of which (3.7%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, one (0.3% of the pool) is current.  One of the Fitch Loans
of Concern (3.1%) is within the transaction's top 15 loans, and is
specially serviced.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Viad Corporate Center
loan (3.1% of the pool) which transferred to special servicing in
March 2009.  A major tenant vacated in April 2009, which resulted
in an approximate occupancy of 82%.  The property's DSCR (partial
year, through March 2009 adjusted to the new 82% occupancy) is
1.15 times (x).  The borrower has cited a substantial decrease in
market value of the property as reason for the default.  The
special servicer entered into a 90-day forbearance agreement in
June 2009 while the borrower continues its efforts to find a new
capital partner.

Thirteen of the loans within the top 15 (29.9%) are expected to
default at maturity, with loss severities ranging from less than
1% to 13.3%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Viad Corporate
Center (3.1% of the pool), 909 A Street (2.3%), and Overlook II
(1.5%).  Most of the transaction's recognized losses in this
review are attributed to the Viad Corporate Center.

The 909 A Street loan is secured by a 210,186 square foot (sf)
office property located in Tacoma, WA.  The property is 100%
occupied by the Russell Investment Group (RIG).  RIG's lease
expiration occurs in 2013 however, RIG has a five-year extension
option.  The servicer reported YE 2008 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 1.62x.

The Overlook II loan is secured by a 254,658 sf office property
located in Atlanta, GA.  The property is currently 90% occupied
which is in-line with occupancy at securitization (92.7%).  Major
tenants include Carecentric (8.6% of NRA), Insurance Office of
America (8.6%), and Nissan North America (8.5%).  The servicer
reported YE 2008 DSCR was 1.44x.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative these
classes:

  -- $160.6 million class A-J to 'AA' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $42.1 million class B to 'A' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class C to 'A' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29 million class D to 'BBB' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.8 million class E to 'BBB-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class F to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class G to 'B' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.4 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class J to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class K to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5.3 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $5.3 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2.6 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch also affirms these classes:

  -- $52 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $177 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $65.4 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $78 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $991.9 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $148.7 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $210.6 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $15.8 million class P.


BEAR STERNS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-PWR9 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 15 classes of Bear Sterns Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-PWR9.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for
the pool resulting from increased leverage and anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing.  On May 21, 2009, Moody's placed
15 classes on review for possible downgrade due to an increase in
loans in special servicing.  This action concludes the review

As of the July 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$2.1 billion from $2.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 198 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 30% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 1% of the
pool, have investment grade underlying ratings.  Nine loans,
representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. government securities.

Thirty-two loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Eleven loans, representing 10% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is Trilogy
Towers, the largest loan in the pool, which is now known as Towers
at Wyncote, ($135.7 million -- 6.6%).  This loan is secured by a
1,086 unit apartment complex located north of Philadelphia in
Wyncote, Pennsylvania.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2009 due to imminent default.  The borrowing
entity had been funding monthly cash flow deficits of upwards of
$300,000 since 2007.  The property's net operating income ("NOI")
has declined over 50% since securitization due to decreased rental
income and increased operating expenses.  The property was 87%
occupied as of February 2009 compared to 84% at last review and
92% at securitization.  The borrower is negotiating a possible
modification of the loan which could include a significant
infusion of equity.  Moody's estimates a potential $55.7 million
loss for this loan (41% loss severity) based on the property's
current performance.  However, this loss may not be realized if
the loan is modified and transferred back to the master servicer.
The remaining ten specially serviced loans are a mix of hotel,
industrial and retail.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of
approximately $16.8 million (41% loss severity on average) for the
remaining specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with year-end or partial year-end 2008
operating results for 96% of the pool.  Moody's loan to value
ratio is 102%, excluding specially serviced loans, compared to 97%
at Moody's last review in July 2007.  Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio, excluding specially serviced loans, is
1.02X compared to 1.03X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied
to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf score of 55, essentially the same
as last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Lakeside II Loan
($16.3 million -- 0.8%), which is secured by a 130,265 square foot
office property located in Chantilly, Virginia.  The property is
100.0% occupied by Integic Corporation through September 2012.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and
1.34X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.32X at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the 200 Glen Cove
Road Loan ($12.2 million -- 0.6%), which is secured by a 151,450
square foot retail center located in Carle Place (Nassau County),
New York.  The center was 83% occupied as of December 2008
compared to 85% at last review and 93% at securitization.
Financial performance has been negatively impacted by the decline
in occupancy.  Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Baa2 and 1.46X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.48X at last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 11% of the pool.
The largest loan is the DRA - Ahwatukee Foothill Towne Center Loan
($108.9 million -- 5.3%), which is secured by a 671,300 square
foot retail center located in Phoenix, Arizona.  The property was
97% leased as of December 2008, essentially the same as at last
review.  The center is shadow anchored by Target.  The loan is
interest only and matures in August 2010.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 111%
and 0.85X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Boston Design Center Loan
($70.1 million -- 3.4%), which is secured by a leasehold interest
in a 552,344 square foot retail/showroom/office design center
located in Boston, Massachusetts.  The property is subject to a
ground lease which expires in 2035 with renewal options for an
additional 25 years.  The property was 95% occupied as of February
2009, essentially the same as last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 91% and
1.04X at last review.

The third largest loan is Riverside at the James Loan
($55.3 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 263,000 Class A
office building located in Richmond, Virginia.  The property is
89% occupied as of December 2008.  The property was 88% leased as
of December 2008 compared to 91% at securitization.  The largest
tenant is Troutman Sanders LLP which leases 54% of the property
through April 2021.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and
1.00X, respectively, compared to 106% and 0.97X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $29,204,510, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-2, $358,810,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-3, $45,825,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $100,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-4A, $768,026,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-4B, $109,718,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-1-A, $222,917,563, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-J, $166,811,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class B, $13,452,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1; previously
     Aa1, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class C, $34,976,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa2; previously
     Aa2, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class D, $24,215,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa3; previously
     Aa3, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class E, $29,595,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2; previously
     A2, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class F, $21,524,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A3; previously
     A3, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class G, $26,905,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; previously
     Baa1, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class H, $21,524,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously
     Baa2, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class J, $24,214,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously
     Baa3, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class K, $5,381,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba1; previously
     Ba1, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class L, $8,072,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously
     Ba2, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class M, $10,716,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
     Ba3, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class N, $8,072,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     B1, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class P, $8,071,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B2; previously
     B2, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009

  -- Class Q, $5,381,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     B3, on review for possible downgrade on 5/21/2009


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2004-TOP14 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP14, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-TOP14 on review
for possible downgrade due to the credit uncertainty surrounding
Maguire Properties Inc., the sponsor of one loan representing 10%
of the outstanding deal balance, and higher anticipated losses
from a loan in special servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 13, 2009 distribution date, one loan has been
liquidated from the trust resulting in a loss of $0.7 million.
Currently there is one loan, representing 1% of the pool, in
special servicing.  Eleven loans, representing 12% of the pool,
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Six loans, representing
12% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class D, $17,890,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class E, $8,945,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class F, $10,064,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class G, $5,591,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class H, $7,827,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class J, $4,472,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class K, $4,473,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class L, $2,236,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class M, $2,236,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class N, $2,237,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 1/10/2008

  -- Class O, $2,236,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 1/10/2008


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2006-BBA7 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on all 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2006-BBA7.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's revaluation of the remaining
loans in the pool, which considered actual and potential property
performance declines, as well as concerns regarding the borrower's
ability to refinance the loan by its October 2010 final maturity.
S&P's analysis factored in S&P's expectation that average 2009
revenue per available room in the lodging industry would decline
between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a recent article, and also
considered conditions of the local lodging markets.

The distribution of interest proceeds to the interest-only classes
X-1B and X-3 from series 2006-BBA7 are made pro rata to class A-1.
S&P downgraded classes X-1B and X-3 accordingly.  S&P published a
request for comment proposing changes to S&P's interest-only
criteria on June 1, 2009.  After finalizing S&P's criteria review,
S&P may revise its current criteria.  Any change in S&P's criteria
may affect outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the X-1B
and X-3 certificates S&P lowered.

The larger of the two remaining loans in the pool is the Columbia
Sussex Portfolio loan, with a whole-loan and trust balance of
$550.0 million (93.1% of the remaining pool balance).  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests in the collateral
properties secure a $513.3 million mezzanine loan.  The floating-
rate loan provided for interest-only payments during the initial
two-year term and amortizes on a 25-year schedule thereafter.
Fourteen first mortgages encumbering full-service hotel
properties, including 11 fee interests and three leasehold
interests encompassing 5,821 rooms, secure the loan.  The
portfolio is diversified across 10 states, the District of
Columbia, and Canada.

At issuance the portfolio was branded by 10 Wyndham flags, two
Marriott flags, one Sheraton flag, and one Westin flag.  The
sponsor invested $175.5 million ($30,181 per key) as part of a
plan to reflag 13 of the 14 properties (six Westin flags, three
Hilton flags, two Sheraton flags, and two Marriott flags); the
Wyndham Chicago Downtown will continue to remain a Wyndham hotel.
The master servicer, Bank of America, reported a debt service
coverage (DSC) of 2.61x and 65% occupancy for the year ended
December 31, 2008.  Based on S&P's cash flow analysis on a review
of the borrower's operating statements for the 12 months ended
December 31, 2008, and the borrower's 2009 budget, S&P derived an
adjusted valuation that is 40% below S&P's value at issuance.  The
decline in S&P's adjusted valuation is due primarily to lower
actual and expected revenue.  The loan is scheduled to mature on
October 12, 2009, with one 12-month extension option.  According
to the master servicer, the loan is expected to meet its extension
requirements.

The Citigroup Property Investors Hilton portfolio is the second
remaining loan and has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$40.5 million (6.9% of the remaining pool).  In addition, the
borrower's equity interests in the collateral properties secure a
$28.0 million mezzanine loan.  The floating-rate loan provided for
interest-only payments during the initial two-year term and
amortizes on a 25-year schedule thereafter.  First mortgages
encumbering the fee interests in five cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted hotels encompassing a total of 944 rooms secure
this loan.  Four of the properties (767 rooms, 81.3% of total
rooms) are flagged largely as limited-service Hilton Garden Inns,
and the remaining property (177 rooms, 18.7%) is flagged as a
Homewood Suites, which is Hilton's upscale, extended-stay brand.
Built between 1999 and 2002, the properties are located in major
metropolitan markets in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, California,
and Colorado.

According to the master servicer, Bank of America, this loan was
transferred to the special servicer, also Bank of America, on
July 24, 2009, due to imminent default.  The borrower informed the
master servicer that it was unwilling to fund the July 2009
shortfall.  The special servicer did not provide details on the
workout given the date of the transfer.  The master servicer
reported a DSC of 2.80x and 72% occupancy for the year ended
December 31, 2008.  Based on S&P's cash flow analysis on a review
of the borrower's operating statements for the 12 months ended
December 31, 2008, and the borrower's 2009 budget, S&P derived an
adjusted valuation that is 31% below S&P's value at issuance.  The
decline in S&P's adjusted valuation is due primarily to lower
actual and expected revenue.  The loan is scheduled to mature on
October 12, 2009, with one 12-month extension option.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BBA7

                                 Rating
                                 ------
            Class              To       From
            -----              --       ----
            A-1                AA       AAA/Watch Neg
            A-2                BBB      AAA/Watch Neg
            B                  BB+      AA+/Watch Neg
            C                  BB       AA/Watch Neg
            D                  B+       AA-/Watch Neg
            E                  B        A+/Watch Neg
            F                  B        A/Watch Neg
            G                  B-       A-/Watch Neg
            H                  CCC+     BBB+/Watch Neg
            J                  CCC      BBB/Watch Neg
            K                  CCC-     BBB-/Watch Neg
            X-1B               AA       AAA/Watch Neg
            X-3                AA       AAA/Watch Neg


C-BASS ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1997-1 Certificate
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on one
certificate issued in C-BASS ABS, LLC 1997-1 resecuritized RMBS
transaction.  The tranche is supported by an insurance policy
issued by MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently rated B3 for
insurance financial strength).

The certificates in the resecuritization are backed by one or more
securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

  (1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
      pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities)
      and then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying
      securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, an expected
loss is derived by comparing the non-rated deal to a Moody's-rated
deal with similar current collateral and performance
characteristics.  An implicit rating is then determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

  (2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
      enhancement available to the portfolio security by
      evaluating the loss coverage level consistent with the
      ratings on the underlying securities and the underlying
      mortgage pool losses and weighting them based on the
      outstanding pledged balance of the underlying securities.

  (3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
      resecuritization are determined after taking into
      consideration additional structural aspects of the
      resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
      tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
      determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
      tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
      allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
      consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
      resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche
      and a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down
      to reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The
      rating on the super senior tranche is determined based on
      the total credit enhancement available i.e.  the credit
      enhancement assessed in step (2) and the additional
      enhancement from the support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: C-BASS ABS, LLC 1997-1

   -- Class A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/16/2008 A2
      Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII,
Ltd.:

  -- US$189,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 24, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class A-2-B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$28,750,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$34,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2021, Downgraded to
     Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D
overcollateralization test and the CCC/Caa concentration
limitation.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and is currently 2836 versus a test
level of 2721 as of the last trustee report, dated July 6, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about $20.58
million, accounting for roughly 4.25% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.81% of
the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Carlyle High Yield Partners VIII, Ltd., issued on May 24, 2006, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CARLYLE HIGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Carlyle High Yield Partners X,
Ltd.:

  -- US$128,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to A1; previously on April 12, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$155,000,000 Class A-2-A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on April 12, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class A-2-B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class D and
Class E overcollateralization test and the Caa concentration
limit.  The weighted average rating factor has increased over the
last year and is currently 2529 (adjusted) versus a test level of
2310 as of the last trustee report, dated July 6, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $20 million,
accounting for roughly 5.53% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 10.6% of the
underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Carlyle High Yield Partners X, Ltd., issued on April 12, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CD 2007-CD4: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of CMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from CD 2007-CD4
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where they were placed on April 7, 2009, and June 26, 2009.  In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight classes from the same
transaction and removed one of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.39x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 117.7%.  S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 0.81x and an LTV of 163.4%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 91.4% and 44.6%,
respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude 11 of the 19
specially serviced assets (6.1%).  S&P estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.
Any change in S&P's criteria may impact outstanding ratings,
including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Nineteen assets ($876.0 million, 13.3%) in the pool, including
two of the top 10 loans, are specially serviced.  Eighteen
($473.4 million, 7.2%) of the 19 specially serviced assets are
with CWCapital Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  Midland Loan
Services Inc. acts as the special servicer for the remaining
asset ($402.6 million, 6.1%).  Four ($20.6 million, 0.3%) of
the 19 specially serviced assets were transferred to the
special servicer after the July 13, 2009, remittance report.
The payment statuses of the specially serviced loans are: one
is in foreclosure ($225.0 million, 3.4%), six are more than
90 days delinquent ($34.9 million, 0.5%), three are 60 days
delinquent ($23.6 million, 0.4%), five are 30 days delinquent
($153.8 million, 2.3%), three are late but less than 30
days delinquent ($36.1 million, 0.6%), and one is current
($402.6 million, 6.1%).  Five of the specially serviced loans
have appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totaling
$124.6 million.  Two of the specially serviced assets have
balances that are greater than 3.0% of the total pool balance.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the July 13, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 378 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$6.61 billion, slightly lower than the balance of $6.64 billion at
issuance.  The master servicers for the transaction are Capmark
Finance Inc., Midland Loan Services Inc., and Wachovia Bank N.A.
Financial information was provided for 98.1% of the pool, and
93.9% of the available financial information was full-year 2008
data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.49x for the pool
based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.39x and 117.7%, respectively.  The transaction has not
experienced any principal losses to date.  Eighty-four loans
($1.6 billion, 23.8%) are on the master servicers' watchlists,
including two of the top 10 loans, as well as four loans
($20.6 million, 0.3%) that were transferred to the special
servicer after the July 13, 2009, remittance report.  Sixty-four
loans ($1.1 billion, 16.2%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and
48 of these loans ($873.2 million, 13.2%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $2.7 billion (40.1%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.65x,
compared with 1.85x at issuance.  The second-largest
($400.0 million, 6.1%) and sixth-largest ($250.0 million, 3.8%)
loans in the pool appear on the master servicers' watchlists.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top nine loans (i.e., top 10
loans, excluding the Riverton Apartments exposure) are 1.35x and
118.5%, respectively.

The largest loan in the pool, the Ala Moana Portfolio loan, has a
trust balance of $402.6 million and a whole-loan balance of
$1.5 billion.  The loan is secured by a portfolio of four
properties (two retail properties and two office buildings)
totaling 1,989,759 sq. ft. in Honolulu, Hawaii.  The reported DSC
for the portfolio in 2008 was 1.68x, and the occupancy was 97.3%.
The loan is current and was transferred to the special servicer on
April 22, 2009, due to General Growth Properties' (GGP's)
bankruptcy filing.  S&P continues to monitor the developments
relating to the GGP bankruptcy and will take rating actions as S&P
determine necessary.

The Riverton Apartments loan is the seventh-largest exposure in
the pool and the second-largest exposure with the special
servicer.  This asset has a balance of $225.0 million and is
secured by a 1,230-unit apartment complex in Harlem, N.Y.  The
loan exposure was transferred to CWCapital on August 8, 2008,
after the borrower gave notice that it would not be able to make
the September 1, 2008, debt service payment.  The reported DSC for
the 12 months ended June 30, 2008, was 0.29x.  CWCapital continues
to dual-track the foreclosure process along with other possible
workout options.  The loan has a $52.1 million ARA in effect.
Standard & Poor's adjusted valuation for the asset has declined
52.2% from its level at issuance, and S&P expects a significant
loss upon the liquidation of this asset.

The Loews Lake Las Vegas loan is the third-largest exposure with
the special servicer.  This asset has a balance of $117.0 million
and is secured by a 493-room, full-service hotel in Henderson,
Nev.  The asset was transferred to the special servicer on
March 4, 2009.  The property's net cash flow was negative as of
year-end 2008.  The borrower is cooperating with the lender in
terms of installing a receiver.  The loan has a $68.0 million ARA
in effect.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
liquidation of the asset.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                           CD 2007-CD4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
        Class  To    From            Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  --    ----            ----------------------
        A-4    A-    AAA/Watch Neg                    30.13
        A-1A   A-    AAA/Watch Neg                    30.13
        A-MFX  BBB-  AAA/Watch Neg                    20.09
        A-MFL  BBB-  AAA/Watch Neg                    20.09
        A-J    B+    AAA/Watch Neg                    11.17
        B      B+    AA+/Watch Neg                    10.55
        C      B     AA/Watch Neg                      9.17
        D      B     AA-/Watch Neg                     8.29
        E      B     A/Watch Neg                       7.66
        F      B-    A-/Watch Neg                      6.91
        G      B-    BBB+/Watch Neg                    5.90
        H      CCC+  BBB/Watch Neg                     4.77
        J      CCC   BB+/Watch Neg                     3.77
        K      CCC-  BB-/Watch Neg                     2.64

       Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                            CD 2007-CD4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
        Class  To    From            Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  --    ----            ----------------------
        A-SB   AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.13

                         Ratings Affirmed

                            CD 2007-CD4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

               Class  Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
               -----  ------  ----------------------
               A-1    AAA                      30.13
               A-2A   AAA                      30.13
               A-2B   AAA                      30.13
               A-3    AAA                      30.13
               XC     AAA                        N/A
               XP     AAA                        N/A
               XW     AAA                        N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2006-WF1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 1 security
issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WF1.  The
collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrade relates to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bond
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3


CLOVERIE PLC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of notes issued by Cloverie Plc and TIERS Derby Synthetic
CDO Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust, collateralized debt
obligation transactions referencing a managed portfolio of
corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration in the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  According to Moody's, the reference pool has suffered
a downward credit rating migration greater than what had been
anticipated in its February review.  The reference portfolio
includes exposures to CIT Group, Inc., and Ambac Financial Group,
Inc which have experienced substantial credit migration in the
past few months and are rated Ca as of August 8, 2009.  The
subordination of the tranches has also been reduced due to a
credit event on Syncora Guarantee, Inc.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology for CSOs as described
in Moody's Special Report below:

-- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
    Obligations (April 2009)

The rating actions are:

Class Description: US$80,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-17
(Derby Mezzanine 2007) Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2014

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa3
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B2 from Aa2

Class Description: US$10,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2014, Series
2007-17

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa3
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B2 from Aa2

Class Description: US$2,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-8 (Derby
Mezzanine 2007) Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2014

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa3
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B2 from Aa2

Class Description: US$75,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2014, Series
2007-4

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa3
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B2 from Aa2

Class Description: US$15,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2014, Series
2007-11

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa2 from A3

Class Description: US$10,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2014, Series
2007-18

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2

Class Description: EUR 6,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-2 (Derby
Mezzanine 2007) Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2014

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2

Class Description: US$20,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-29
(Derby Mezzanine 2007) Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2014

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2

Class Description: US$56,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2014, Series
2007-6

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2

Class Description: US$200,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-24
(Derby Mezzanine 2007) Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2017

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa2
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B1 from Aa1

Class Description: US$21,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDC
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-5

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Caa3
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to B3 from Aa3

Class Description: US$50,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-12

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa1 from A2

Class Description: US$27,500,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-15

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa2 from A3

Class Description: US$70,500,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-7

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa2 from A3

Class Description: US$6,500,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-8

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa2 from A3

Class Description: JPY 1,000,000,000 Cloverie Plc Series 2007-4
(Derby Mezzanine 2007) Fixed Rate Credit Linked Notes due 2017

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa2 from A3

Class Description: US$18,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-13

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1

Class Description: US$20,000,000 TIERS(R) Derby Synthetic CDO
Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust Certificates due 2017, Series
2007-16

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1

Class Description: Citibank N.A. US$10,000,000 CDS Reference
Number CA1121763 (Derby Mezzanine 2007 CDO)

  -- Current Rating Action: Downgrade to Ca
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: February 20, 2009
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2


COBALT CMBS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 14 2006-C1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative 14 classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Cobalt CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust series
2006-C1.  In addition, Fitch has assigned Rating Outlooks and
Recovery Ratings, as applicable.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
8.7% for this transaction should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 6.50%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 63.2% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 17% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 15.1% in 2011, 0.0% in 2012, 1.9% in 2013, and 0.0% in
2014.  In 2016, 79.1% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 24 Loans of Concern (31.7%) within the pool, nine
of which (15.9%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, one (10.9%) is current.  Two of the specially
serviced loans (10.9%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans
(44.0%) by unpaid principal balance.

Three of the top 15 loans (8.4%) are expected to default or have
already defaulted during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 16.7% to 17.5%.  The largest contributors to loss are:
Continental Towers (4.6%), Prime Retail Outlets Portfolio (4.0%),
and Timberlake and Glades Apartment Portfolio (2.17%).

The Continental Towers loan (4.6%) is secured by three 12-story
office buildings totaling approximately 932,854 square feet (sf).
The property is located in Rolling Meadows, IL.  Occupancy at the
property has decreased nearly 20% since issuance due to the loss
of two major office tenants and a portion of the retail space.  As
of March 2009, occupancy declined to 71.8%, compared to 90.2% at
issuance.  According to PPR, the Northwest Chicago submarket
reported a 23.5% vacancy as of third quarter 2009 (3Q'09).  The
loan sponsor and guarantor is Prime Realty Group Trust which is
owned by The Lightstone Group.  The loan remains current as of the
July 2009 payment date.

The Timberlake and Glades Apartment Portfolio loan is
collateralized by two adjacent multifamily properties in Altamonte
Springs, FL.  Timberlake Apartments consists of 716 units in 50
buildings and The Glades Apartments consists of 160 units in eight
buildings.  The properties began extensive renovations in 2007 and
as of March 19, 2009, there are approximately 601 of 716 units
completed at Timberlake and 141 of 160 units complete at The
Glades.  Timberlake is currently 90% occupied and 95% leased while
the glades is 91% occupied and 95% leased.  The borrower has had
to provide concessions to potential tenants given the
deterioration in the Orlando rental market.  The loan sponsors are
Greystar Real Estate Partners and Blackrock.

The San Lagos at Arrowhead Highlands loan is collateralized by a
39 building, 336 unit multifamily property in Glendale, AZ.
Market conditions have caused the property to offer significant
concessions.  As of March 2009, the property had occupancy of 89%
and a debt service coverage of 1.06 times (x) according to the
servicer.  The borrower has reported a very difficult leasing
environment within Phoenix, AZ.  PPR reported a 10.6% vacancy in
2Q'09 and forecasts continued rent declines for the next three
quarters.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks or Recovery Ratings to these classes:

  -- $208.8 million class AJ to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $50.6 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $28.5 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $34.8 million class D to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $22.1 million class E to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $28.5 million class F to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $25.3 million class G to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $34.8 million class H to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $6.3 million class J to 'B-' from 'B; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has also affirmed, removed from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigned Rating Outlooks or Recovery Ratings to these classes:

  -- $9.5 million class K at 'B-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $9.5 million class L at 'CCC/RR6'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.2 million class M at 'C/RR6' ;;
  -- $6.3 million class N at 'C/RR6';
  -- $6.3 million class O at 'C/RR6';
  -- $18 million class AMP-E1 at 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7 million class AMP-E2 at 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes, with a Stable
Outlook:

  -- $9.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA';
  -- $358.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA';
  -- $138.9 million class A-AB at 'AAA';
  -- $102.3 million class A-3 at 'AAA';
  -- $723.7 million class A-4 at 'AAA';
  -- $374.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA';
  -- $253.1 million class A-M at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class IO at 'AAA'.

Fitch does not rate the $29.4 million class P certificates.


COBALT CMBS: S&P Cuts Ratings on 17 Classes of 2006-C1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from COBALT CMBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
April 7 and June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on five classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow its analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  Its analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, excluding
loans that S&P stressed as credit concerns, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.38x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 110.9%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.86x and an LTV
of 150.3%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 71.3% and 39.7%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV
calculations exclude 11 specially serviced loans and one credit-
impaired loan (20.6%).  S&P estimated losses for these loans,
which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.  S&P lowered its rating on the class O certificates to
'D' due to ongoing and outstanding interest shortfalls, along with
its expectation that these shortfalls will continue for the
foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current
criteria.  Any change in S&P's criteria may impact outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P
affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Eleven assets ($398.6 million, 16.0%) in the pool, including the
largest and 10th-largest exposures in the pool, are with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  One of those
assets ($3.2 million, 0.1%) is REO; four ($69.2 million, 2.8%) are
more than 90 days delinquent; four ($79.2 million, 3.2%) are 30
days delinquent; and two ($247.0 million, 9.9%) are current.
Appraisal reduction amounts are currently in effect for five
assets ($25.8 million, 1.0%).

                        Transaction Summary

As of the July 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 164 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.49 billion, compared with 166 loans with an aggregate balance
of $2.53 billion at issuance.  The master servicer for the
transaction is Wells Fargo Bank N.A.  Financial information was
provided for 97.2% of the pool, and 90.5% of the servicer-provided
information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.38x and
110.9%, respectively.  To date, the transaction has experienced
$2.2 million of principal losses.  Thirty loans are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans.
Thirty-two loans ($661.3 million, 26.6%) have a reported DSC below
1.10x, and 18 of these loans ($421.6 million, 17.0%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                      Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$870.6 million (36.0%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.50x for the top 10 loans,
compared with 1.56x at issuance.  The largest and 10th-largest
loans in the pool ($247.0 million, 10.9%) are with the special
servicer.  The second-, fourth-, and eighth-largest loans in the
pool ($254.4 million, 10.2%) appear on the master servicer's
watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were
1.44x and 104.4%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

          COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
        Class  To    From            Credit enhancement (%)
        -----  --    ----            ----------------------
        A-1A   AA-   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.73
        A-4    AA-   AAA/Watch Neg                    30.73
        A-M    BBB+  AAA/Watch Neg                    20.45
        A-J    BB    AAA/Watch Neg                    11.98
        B      BB-   AA/Watch Neg                      9.92
        C      B+    AA-/Watch Neg                     8.77
        D      B     A/Watch Neg                       7.36
        E      B-    BBB+/Watch Neg                    6.46
        F      B-    BBB/Watch Neg                     5.30
        G      B-    BBB-/Watch Neg                    4.28
        H      CCC+  BB-/Watch Neg                     2.86
        J      CCC+  B+/Watch Neg                      2.61
        K      CCC   B/Watch Neg                       2.22
        L      CCC-  B-/Watch Neg                      1.84
        M      CCC-  CCC+/Watch Neg                    1.71
        N      CCC-  CCC/Watch Neg                     1.45
        O      D     CCC-/Watch Neg                    1.19

                         Ratings Affirmed

          COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

              Class  Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
              -----  ------   ----------------------
              A-1    AAA                       30.73
              A-2    AAA                       30.73
              A-AB   AAA                       30.73
              A-3    AAA                       30.73
              IO     AAA                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


COMM 2006-FL12: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 33 2006-FL12 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 33
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2006-FL12.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 11 other
classes from this transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its
ratings on three raked classes of commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Banc of America Large Loan Inc.'s series 2006-
BIX1 (BALL 2006-BIX1) and three raked classes of certificates from
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-FL2.  (A raked
certificate represents a subordinate, nonpooled component of the
senior participation interest in a particular loan.)  S&P also
affirmed its ratings on three classes from BALL 2006-BIX1.
Finally, S&P removed all 53 of these ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where they were placed on April 7, 2009.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.
Any change in S&P's criteria may affect outstanding ratings,
including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

Thirteen pooled loans have raked certificates rated by Standard &
Poor's.  Ten of these loans had various raked certificates that
S&P downgraded .  The affected raked certificates include the
'HDC', 'FSH', 'AN', 'MSH', 'LS', 'TC', 'CA', 'ES', 'AH', and 'CM'
classes.  The two largest loans with downgraded raked certificates
include:

The second-largest loan in the COMM 2006-FL12 pool, the Hotel Del
Coronado loan, which has a pooled trust balance of $255.0 million
(12%) and a whole-loan balance of $260.0 million.  A $5.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component supports the 'HDC1' raked
certificate.  In addition, there is a $350.0 million mezzanine
loan secured by the equity interests of the borrower.  The loan is
secured by the fee interest in a 679-room full-service resort
hotel in Coronado Island, Calif.  The master servicer, Capmark
Finance Inc., reported a December 2008 trailing-12-month revenue
per available room for the hotel of $259.24, which is comparable
to S&P's expectation at issuance.  However, the borrower's
budgeted RevPAR for 2009 is $217.66, a 16% decline from the 2008
performance figure.  The loan is scheduled to mature on Jan. 9,
2010, and has one 12-month extension option remaining.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has fallen 26% since issuance, resulting in the
downgrade of the 'HDC1' raked certificate.

The fourth-largest loan in the pool, the Four Seasons Hualalai
loan, has a whole-loan balance of $324.5 million.  The whole loan
consists of a $175.9 million senior participation interest and a
$148.6 million junior participation interest held outside of the
trust.  The senior participation interest is further split into a
$151.6 million senior pooled component (8% of the pool trust
balance) and subordinate nonpooled components totaling
$24.3 million that are raked to the 'FSH' certificates.  The loan
is secured by the fee interest in a 243-room full-service resort
hotel on the Kona-Kohala Coast of Hawaii's Big Island and situated
on over 400 acres.  In addition, the loan is partially secured by
the leasehold interest in single-family home lots and parcels
planned for condominium development.  Subsequent to issuance,
approximately 37 acres of this land was sold and released, with
the remaining land totaling roughly 83 acres.  The property also
includes two 18-hole golf courses.  Capmark reported a December
2008 trailing-12-month RevPAR for the hotel of $553.09, a decline
of 14% from December 2007 trailing-12-month performance.  The loan
is scheduled to mature on June 9, 2010, and has two 12-month
extension options remaining.  S&P's adjusted valuation has fallen
48% since issuance, resulting in the downgrade of the 'FSH' raked
certificates.

Other loans with raked certificates that S&P downgraded include:

The MSREF Hotel Portfolio, the Embassy Suites Lake Buena Vista,
the Algonquin Hotel, and the Charleston Marriott Town Center
loans, which have an aggregate pool balance of $109.2 million (6%)
and a whole-loan balance of $182.8 million.  Standard & Poor's
adjusted valuations for these assets resulted in declines of 41%,
48%, 36%, and 32% since issuance, respectively.  The downgrades of
the 'MSH', 'ES', 'AH', and 'CM' raked certificates reflect the
declines in operating performance at these properties.

The Legacy SoCal Portfolio, the Albertsons (Newkirk) Portfolio,
and the Avenue at Tower City loans, which have an aggregate pool
balance of $170.5 million (9%) and a whole-loan balance of
$294.1 million.  Standard & Poor's adjusted valuations for these
assets resulted in declines of 21%, 21%, and 61% since issuance,
respectively.  The downgrades of the 'LS', 'AN', and 'TC' raked
certificates reflect the decline in operating performance at these
properties.

Loans with pari passu notes included in other transactions are:

The largest loan in the pool is the Kerzner International loan.
The fee interest in two full-service resort hotels totaling 3,023
rooms secures this loan.  The collateral for this loan also
includes a water park, casino, 18-hole golf course, vacant land,
the assignment of the borrower's 50% joint-venture interest in
timeshare units, and a condo and marina project, all located on
Paradise Island, Bahamas.  To date, the whole-loan balance has
been paid down by $106.9 million to $2.582 billion, which is
bifurcated into a $1.373 billion senior participation interest and
a $1.209 billion subordinate junior participation interest.  The
senior participation interest is split into two pari passu notes.
The first note has a balance of $686.5 million that consists of a
$527.6 million senior pooled component (32% of the pool trust
balance) and a $158.9 million subordinate nonpooled component
raked to the 'KR' certificates.  The other pari passu note is in
the CSMC 2006-TFL2 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
transaction.  This includes a $384.1 million senior pooled
component and a $302.4 million subordinate nonpooled component.
S&P analyzed the Kerzner International loan during S&P's last
review of the CSMC 2006-TFL2 transaction in July 2009.  S&P
lowered its ratings on the KR1, KR2, and KR3 raked certificates
and removed them from CreditWatch at that time.  The master
servicer for this loan, Wachovia Bank N.A., reported debt service
coverage (DSC) of 2.46x and 70% occupancy for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2008.  The loan matures on Sept. 9, 2009.  Wachovia
informed us that the borrower intends to exercise one of its two
remaining 12-month extension options.  S&P's adjusted valuation
has fallen 38% since issuance.

The Blackstone/CarrAmerica National Portfolio loan is the fourth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by office properties.
Forty-one office properties have been released since issuance.
The remaining collateral consists of 32 office properties totaling
9.56 million sq. ft. in various locations throughout California,
Texas, and Washington.  This loan has a whole-loan balance of
$614.4 million, consisting of a $435.2 million senior
participation that is split into three pari passu pieces and a
$179.2 million junior participation that is held outside the
trust.  The senior participation is further divided into two
portions: a senior pooled component totaling $384.1 million and a
subordinate nonpooled component with a balance of $51.1 million.
The trust's portion of the pooled balance is $201.6 million (11%),
and its portion of the nonpooled balance is $26.8 million, which
is raked to the 'CN1', 'CN2', and 'CN3' certificates ('CN2' and
'CN3' are not rated by Standard & Poor's).  The BALL 2006-BIX1
transaction's portion of the pooled balance is $153.6 million, and
its portion of the nonpooled balance is $20.4 million, which
is raked to the 'J-CP', 'K-CP', and 'L-CP' certificates in that
transaction.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the
properties secure a $192.8 million mezzanine loan.  The trust
balance reflects $498.8 million in paydowns since issuance due to
collateral releases.  Capmark reported a 77% occupancy rate as of
June 2009, down from 89% at issuance.  The loan matures on Aug. 9,
2010, and has one 12-month extension option remaining.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has declined 15% since issuance, primarily due
to lower rent income and/or lower occupancy at the remaining
collateral properties.  However, the loan has experienced a
significant amount of deleveraging due to property releases.

The Blackstone/CarrAmerica CAR Portfolio loan is the 12th-largest
loan in the pool.  Seven of the 11 properties securing this loan
have been released; the remaining four properties total 719,027
sq. ft. and are located in California and Texas.  Capmark reported
an 82% overall occupancy rate as of June 2009, down from 92% at
issuance.  S&P's adjusted valuation has declined 25% since
issuance, resulting in the downgrade of the 'CA2' raked
certificate from COMM 2006-FL12, the 'CA' raked certificates from
BALL 2006-BIX1, and the 'CAC' raked certificates from CGCMT 2006-
FL2.

Eight loans in the COMM 2006-FL12 pool totaling $1,080.5 million
(62% of the pool trust balance) are secured by hotel properties.
These properties are located in Paradise Islands, The Bahamas (32%
of the pool trust balance), Southern Calif.  (13%), Ka`upulehu-
Kona, Hawaii (8%), Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (3%), Washington, D.C.
(1%), Framingham, Mass. (1%), Orlando, Fla. (1%), New York, N.Y.
(1%), and Charleston, W. Va. (1%).  The decline in business and
leisure travel has significantly affected lodging collateral
performance.  S&P's analysis factored in its assumption that
average 2009 RevPAR in the industry would decline between 14% and
16% and also factored in local lodging market conditions.

Office properties located primarily in northern and southern
California, Texas, and Washington secure four loans totaling
$298.5 million (16% of the pooled trust balance).  Many of these
properties have experienced lower rental rates and/or higher
vacancies since issuance.

According to the July 15, 2009, remittance report, pool statistics
for COMM 2006-FL12 are:

There are 15 loans in the pool, including senior participation
interests in 11 floating-rate mortgage loans, one floating-rate
whole-mortgage loan, and three floating-rate pari passu mortgage
loans.

There are mortgages on 12 full-service hotels, 39 office
properties, three anchored retail properties, and one multifamily
property.All of the loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR.
There are no specially serviced loans at this time.

Additional near-term maturities (within the next three months) for
the loans in the pool are:

The Superstition Springs Mall loan is the seventh-largest
remaining loan in the pool, with a trust and whole-loan balance of
$67.5 million (3%).  The loan is secured by the fee and leasehold
interest in 377,768 sq. ft. of in-line space within a 1.07
million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Mesa, Ariz.  The borrower
reported a 90% occupancy rate as of June 2009, down from 95% at
issuance.  S&P's adjusted valuation has declined 22% since
issuance.  The loan matures on Sept. 9, 2009, and has two 12-month
extension options remaining.  Capmark has indicated that the
borrower is exercising one of its two remaining 12-month extension
options.

The Avenue at Tower City loan is the 11th-largest remaining loan
in the pool (2%).  This loan also matures on Sept. 9, 2009, and
has two 12-month extension options remaining.  Capmark has
indicated that the borrower is exercising one of its two remaining
12-month extension options.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                          COMM 2006-FL12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class    To        From             Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----             ----------------------
     A-J      AA        AAA/Watch Neg                     25.66
     B        A         AAA/Watch Neg                     20.44
     C        BBB+      AA+/Watch Neg                     16.77
     D        BBB-      AA/Watch Neg                      12.72
     E        BB+       AA/Watch Neg                       9.71
     F        BB        AA-/Watch Neg                      6.70
     G        BB-       A+/Watch Neg                       3.83
     H        B+        A/Watch Neg                        2.04
     J        B-        BBB/Watch Neg                      0.00
     HDC1     BB-       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     FSH1     CCC-      BBB+/Watch Neg                      N/A
     FSH2     CCC-      BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     FSH3     CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     AN1      BBB-      A+/Watch Neg                        N/A
     AN2      BB+       A/Watch Neg                         N/A
     AN3      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     AN4      BB        BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     MSH1     CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     MSH2     CCC-      BB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
     MSH3     CCC-      BB/Watch Neg                        N/A
     MSH4     CCC-      B+/Watch Neg                        N/A
     LS1      BB        BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     LS2      B+        BB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
     TC1      CCC-      BB/Watch Neg                        N/A
     CA2      BB+       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     ES1      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     ES2      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     AH1      CCC-      A/Watch Neg                         N/A
     AH2      CCC-      A-/Watch Neg                        N/A
     AH3      CCC-      BBB+/Watch Neg                      N/A
     AH4      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     CM1      BB-       A-/Watch Neg                        N/A
     CM2      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A

                  Banc of America Large Loan Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BIX1

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class    To        From               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----               ----------------------
     J-CA     BB+       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     K-CA     BB+       BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     L-CA     BB        BB+/Watch Neg                       N/A

      Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-FL2
         Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class    To        From               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----               ----------------------
     CAC-1    BB+       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A
     CAC-2    BB+       BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     CAC-3    BB        BB+/Watch Neg                       N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                           COMM 2006-FL12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class    To        From               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----               ----------------------
     A-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                     53.76
     X-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     X-3-BC   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     X-3-DB   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     X-3-SG   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     X-5-BC   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     X-5-DB   AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       N/A
     IP1      BBB+      BBB+/Watch Neg                      N/A
     IP2      BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     IP3      BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      N/A
     CN1      A-        A-/Watch Neg                        N/A

                  Banc of America Large Loan Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-BIX1

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class    To        From                Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----                ----------------------
     J-CP     A+        A+/Watch Neg                        N/A
     K-CP     A-        A-/Watch Neg                        N/A
     L-CP     BBB       BBB/Watch Neg                       N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CORTS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on $36 Mil. Class A Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' rating on
the $36 million class A Allmerica corporate-backed trust
certificates from CorTS Trust For AFC Capital Trust I's series
2001-19.

The rating on the certificates is dependent solely on the rating
on the underlying security, Hanover Insurance Group Inc.'s 8.207%
debentures series B due February 3, 2027 ('BB-').

The rating action reflects the July 31, 2009, withdrawal of the
rating on the original underlying security, Hanover Insurance
Group Inc.'s AFC Capital Trust I 8.207% capital securities due
February 3, 2027, and the substitution of the underlying security
with Hanover Insurance Group Inc.'s 8.207% debentures series B due
February 3, 2027.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2008-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades 15 classes, removes 16 classes from
Rating Watch Negative and assigns Rating Outlooks for Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-C1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
9.9% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 6.8% including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 78.3% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 26.9% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature
within the next five years, with all occurring in 2012.  In 2017,
50.7% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 19 Loans of Concern (31.5%) within the pool, two
of which (1.0%) are specially serviced.  None of the specially
serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (75.6%)
by unpaid principal balance and one of the loans is current
(0.5%).  Four of the Fitch Loans of Concern (23.1%) are within the
transaction's top 15 loans.

Ten of the top 15 loans (49.6%) are expected to default and incur
losses during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from approximately 0.2% to 43%.  The largest contributors
to term losses by balance are: 1100 Executive Tower (10.2% of the
pool) and Radisson Hotel Dallas North (1.9%).  The two loans are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern.

1100 Executive Tower is a 372,814 square foot (sf) office property
located in Orange, CA.  At issuance, the loan was underwritten to
a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation that below-market
leases expiring during the term of the loan would be re-signed at
higher rates, providing for potential upside in future cash flows.
Based on March 2009 servicer reported financials, the property is
behind the stabilization schedule.  In 2010, 58.5% of subject's
leases expire.  In 2010, 58.5% of subject's leases, with an
average rent per square foot of $23.35, will expire.
Comparatively, the current submarket average is $19.09 psf per
Property and Portfolio Research.  The servicer reported a combined
March 2009 debt service coverage ratio and occupancy were 0.88
times (x) and 70.3%, respectively.  At issuance, occupancy at the
property was 85.0%.  The loan sponsor is Rockwood VII REIT, Inc.
and The Muller Company.  Based on current performance and
anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity in 2012.

Radisson Hotel Dallas North is secured by 294 room hotel in
Richardson, TX.  Since origination, revenue per available room has
decreased to $43.82 from $58.81.  Net operating income has also
declined 44.3% since issuance, driving DSCR to 0.90x from 1.61x.
The sponsor of the loan is the Alireza Mourirahimi and Parvin
Mosavi.  Based on current performance and further anticipated
declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in
2013.

The Fitch Loan of Concern with the largest expected loss at
maturity is Killeen Mall (9.3% of the deal), which is secured by a
386,759 sf retail mall located in Killeen, TX.  As of March 2009,
the servicer reported DSCR was 1.25x.  Occupancy has declined to
68.9% as of March 2009 from 92.4% at issuance.  The decline in
occupancy resulted from Steve & Barry's vacating their space (15%
of the net rentable area) due to corporate bankruptcy.  The
sponsor of this loan is Babcock & Brown Real Estate Holdings Inc.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative these
classes:

  -- $57.7 million class A-J to 'A' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class B to 'BBB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class C to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $12.2 million class D to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10 million class E to 'BB' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.7 million class F to 'BB' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class G to 'B' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $14.4 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.7 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $10 million class K to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.3 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.3 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.3 million class N to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $1.1 million class O to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.2 million class P to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

Fitch has affirmed this class and removed it from Rating Watch
Negative as indicated:

  -- $2.2 million class Q at 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $8.3 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $150.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $22.3 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $258 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $98.9 million class A-1-A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $367.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $78.5 million class A-2FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88.7 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class A-X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $16.7 million class S.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Correct Press Release on 2007-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier, Moody's Investors Service released a press release
regarding the Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C3 transaction.
In the press release, Moody's placed 18 classes on review for
possible downgrade citing the credit uncertainty surrounding
Maguire Properties Inc., the sponsor of one loan (Main Plaza) that
represents 6% of the outstanding deal balance, and higher
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.  Subsequently,
Moody's learned that ownership of Main Plaza was transferred from
Maguire to Shorenstein Properties LLC last year.  Due to the
elimination of exposure to Maguire, these three classes should not
have been included in the review for possible downgrade: A-M, A-J
and B.  The other 15 classes will remain on review for possible
downgrade due to higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

The corrected press release follows in its entirety:

Moody's Investors Service placed 15 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C3 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 20 loans,
representing 10% of the pool, in special servicing.  Forty-six
loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of
the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class C, $40,272,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class D, $26,847,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class E, $20,136,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class F, $23,492,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class G, $30,204,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class H, $33,560,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class J, $30,204,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class K, $30,204,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/9/2009

  -- Class L, $10,068,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class M, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class N, $10,068,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class O, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class P, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class Q, $10,068,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class S, $6,712,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/9/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
securities issued by Credit Suisse.  The collateral backing the
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed-rate Alt-A
mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: CSAB Mortgage Backed Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. A-1-B, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. A-1-C, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. A-1-D, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: CSAB MORTGAGE-BACKED TRUST 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-1-A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. A-1-B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. A-1-B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. A-1-C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. A-4-B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/22/2008
     Downgraded to B2


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-C3 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3 on review for possible
downgrade due to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire
Properties Inc., the sponsor of one loan representing 8% of the
outstanding deal balance.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a share
of interest expense plus deferred dividends and capitalized
interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high leverage (debt plus
preferred equity as a share of gross assets) of 96.2% and high
secured debt as a share of gross assets of 91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities ("CMBS") transactions and
advised them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls
associated with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loan
is not part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
(PSF) to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to
19.0%.  A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where
average rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF
and vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, one loan has been
liquidated from the pool resulting in a loss of $3.6 million.
Currently there are seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, in
special servicing.  Twenty-three loans, representing 9% of the
pool, are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Nine loans,
representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $135,048,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 7/23/2009

  -- Class B, $34,785,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 7/23/2009

  -- Class C, $16,370,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A1 on 7/23/2009

  -- Class D, $14,323,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 7/23/2009

  -- Class E, $16,370,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 7/23/2009

  -- Class F, $20,462,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1
     on 7/23/2009

  -- Class G, $16,369,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2
     on 7/23/2009

  -- Class H, $18,416,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class J, $6,138,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Ba1 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class K, $8,185,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Ba2 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class L, $6,139,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class M, $4,092,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from B1 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class N, $4,092,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B2 on
     7/23/2009

  -- Class O, $6,139,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     7/23/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 18 2007-C3 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 18 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C3 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 6% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 20 loans,
representing 10% of the pool, in special servicing.  Forty-six
loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $268,479,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/9/2009

  -- Class A-J, $201,359,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class B, $16,780,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class C, $40,272,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class D, $26,847,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class E, $20,136,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class F, $23,492,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class G, $30,204,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class H, $33,560,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class J, $30,204,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class K, $30,204,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/9/2009

  -- Class L, $10,068,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class M, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class N, $10,068,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class O, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class P, $6,712,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class Q, $10,068,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class S, $6,712,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/9/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 19 2007-C4 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 19 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C4 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of two loans representing 10% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009,
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  One of the six aforementioned
loans, representing 5% of the outstanding deal balance, is part of
this transaction.  As a result of imminent default, this loan,
2600 Michelson is likely to be transferred into special servicing.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
("PSF") to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to
19.0%.  A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where
average rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF
and vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 12 loans,
representing 3% of the pool, in special servicing.  Upon the
transfer of 2600 Michelson into special servicing, there will be
13 loans (8% of the pool balance) in special servicing.  Sixty-one
loans, representing 56% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1-AM, $158,126,000, currently rated Aaa, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class A-M, $50,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/9/2009

  -- Class A-1-AJ, $61,808,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class A-J, $50,000,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class B, $23,414,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class C, $28,618,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class D, $23,414,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class E, $18,211,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class F, $18,211,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class G, $20,813,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class H, $20,812,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class J, $26,016,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class K, $28,618,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/9/2009

  -- Class L, $20,812,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class M, $7,805,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class N, $5,203,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class O, $5,203,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class P, $5,203,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class Q, $7,805,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/9/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2007-C1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes,
confirmed two classes and downgraded 17 classes of Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C1.  The downgrades are due to interest
shortfalls and significantly higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.
The A-M and A-MFL classes were confirmed based on the existing key
parameters for the deal and the current estimated losses for the
loans in special servicing.  However, if Moody's estimated losses
from loans in special servicing were to increase by an additional
$75 million, the A-M and A-MFL classes would likely be downgraded
by one to three notches.  On June 25, 2009, Moody's placed 19
classes on review for possible downgrade due to an increase in the
concentration of specially serviced loans.  This action concludes
the review.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 1% to
$3.35 billion from $3.37 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 257 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 37% of the pool.

Seventy-five loans, representing 37% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist, including five of the top ten loans
in the pool.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the Commercial
Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting package.  As
part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Currently there are eighteen loans, representing 15% of the pool,
in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
CVI Multifamily Apartment Portfolio Loan ($177.6 million -- 5.3%),
which is secured by 20 multifamily properties totaling 2,990
units.  The properties are located in seven markets, with the
largest concentrations in Austin, Texas and Sacramento,
California.  The loan was transferred to special servicing on
April 17, 2009, due to imminent default.  The portfolio was 88%
occupied as of December 2008 compared to 93% at securitization.
The original analysis was predicated on the borrower increasing
rents based on a comprehensive renovation program and decreasing
expenses due to improved centralized management of the portfolio.
The borrower has not been able to achieve the upside they
originally expected.  The borrower has depleted the entire
interest reserve ($18 million at securitization) and the loan is
currently less than 30 days delinquent.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Mansions
Portfolio Loan ($160.0 million -- 4.8%), which is secured by four
multifamily properties totaling 1,417 units located in Austin and
Round Rock, Texas.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
on March 6, 2009 for imminent default.  The portfolio was 92%
occupied as of June 2009 compared to 95% at securitization.
Although occupancy has been relatively stable, financial
performance has been negatively impacted by increased rental
concessions due to Austin's weak multifamily market.  The loan is
currently 90+ days delinquent.  The remaining 16 specially
serviced loans are mostly 90+ days delinquent.  Moody's estimates
an aggregate loss of $207 million (41% severity on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$2.0 million affecting Classes M through T.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and
extraordinary trust expenses.  Appraisal reductions totaling
$46.2 million have been recognized for 11 of the specially
serviced loans.  Moody's anticipates that interest shortfalls will
increase when appraisals are obtained for the two largest
specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 91%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio is 132%
compared to 148% at Moody's last review in February 2009.  Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio is 0.84X compared to 0.74X at
last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40 and the pool has a Herf score of 52.

The top three performing loans represent 14% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Savoy Park Loan ($210.0 million -- 6.3%),
which is secured by seven adjacent apartment buildings totaling
1,802 units in Harlem, New York.  There is also $157.5 million of
mezzanine debt held outside the trust.  At securitization, the
borrower's plan was to increase value through renovations and the
deregulation of rent-stabilized units, which was expected to
increase rental income.  However, a slower than anticipated pace
of conversion and deterioration in market fundamentals have
challenged the borrower's original plan.  As of June 2009, 88% of
the units were rent stabilized compared to 91% at securitization.
As of July 2009, the remaining interest reserve was approximately
$2 million, down from $30 million at securitization.  The most
recent DSCR based on first quarter 2009 annualized net operating
income is 0.79X.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist
due to low DSCR.  Moody's expects that this loan will ultimately
be transferred to special servicing but Moody's are uncertain as
to when this might happen.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 155%
and 0.66X, respectively, compared to 140% and 0.77X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the City Place Loan ($145.1 million --
4.3%), which is secured by a mixed use property consisting of open
air retail (626,000 square feet), office (73,000 square feet),
multifamily (54 units), and a theater (50,000 square feet).  The
overall occupancy as of March 2009 was 86% compared to 95% at
securitization.  In addition to the decline in occupancy,
operating expenses have increased approximately 25% from 2007 to
2008.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to a
decrease in DSCR.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 198% and
0.52X, respectively, compared to 121% and 0.85X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Koger Center Loan ($115.5 million --
3.4%), which is secured by an 850,000 square foot office complex
in Tallahassee, Florida.  The largest tenant is the State of
Florida, occupying 68% of the net rentable area ("NRA") through
October 2019.  Although the property was fully occupied as of
March 2009, operating expenses are up 9% from 2007 to 2008.  The
loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 153% and 0.67X, respectively,
compared to 140% and 0.73X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $23,930,203, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-2, $139,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-AB, $98,301,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-3, $758,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-1-A, $1,320,717,691, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-M, $212,148,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $125,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class A-J, $286,576,000, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class B, $25,286,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class C, $37,929,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade 6/25/2009

  -- Class D, $33,715,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/25/2009

  -- Class E, $21,071,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class F, $29,501,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class G, $33,715,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class H, $37,929,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class J, $33,714,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class K, $37,930,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/25/2009

  -- Class L, $8,428,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class M, $12,643,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class N, $8,429,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class O, $8,429,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class P, $8,428,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class Q, $8,429,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009

  -- Class S, $12,643,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/25/2009


DUCHESS I: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Duchess I CDO S.A.:

  -- EUR37,000,000 Class B Second Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes due June 2017, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 4,
     2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has placed under review for possible
downgrade the ratings of these notes:

  -- Up to EUR175,000,000 Revolving Loan Facility, Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on January
     30, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- EUR10,000,000 Class A-1 Guaranteed First Priority Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due June 2017, Aa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3;

  -- EUR680,000,000 Class A-2 Guaranteed First Priority Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due June 2017, Aa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on January 30, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa3.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the amount of defaulted
securities, an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure to comply with the Class
A Overcollateralization Ratio Test, Moody's Diversity Test,
Minimum Weighted Average Spread Test and Minimum Weighted Average
Coupon Test.  The weighted average rating factor has increased
over the last year and is currently 2670 versus a test level of
2500 as of the last trustee report, dated June 30, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about EUR63 million,
accounting for roughly 6.7% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.9% of the
underlying portfolio.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for certain CEs updated between
12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for
certain CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months.
Additionally, as CEs do not carry credit indicators such as
ratings reviews and outlooks, a stress of a 0.25-0.5 notch-
equivalent assumed downgrade was applied to certain estimates.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, the ratings on Class A-1 Notes, Class A-2 Notes and
Revolving Loan Facility reflect the current insurance financial
strength rating of Financial Security Assurance (U.K.) Limited,
which was downgraded to Aa3 on November 21,2008 and placed on
review for possible downgrade on May 20, 2009.  The above action
is a result of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach
to rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors as described in the press release dated November 10,
2008, titled "Moody's modifies approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors."

Duchess I CDO S.A. issued in 2001, is a multicurrency
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans denominated in EURO and Sterling Pounds.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FIRST HORIZON: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2006-RE1 Resecuritizations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades the rating on First Horizon Alternative
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-RE1, which is a U.S. RMBS
resecuritization, as part of Fitch's ongoing review of Alt-A RMBS
transactions.  The affected class represents a beneficial
ownership interest in separate trust funds.

The underlying securities remaining in First Horizon Alternative
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-RE1 consist of First Horizon
Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-FA3 classes 1A1 (rated
'B/LS1' with a Negative Outlook by Fitch) and 1A3 (rated 'B' with
a Stable Outlook by Fitch).

The rating for First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust
2006-RE1 class A1 was based on the lowest rating of the underlying
classes, since class A1 does not have credit enhancement provided
by the re-remic structure.

Fitch has downgraded these:

First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-RE1

  -- Class A1 to 'B' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch recently revised its surveillance methodology for prime and
Alt-A RMBS to include the use of the ResiLogic mortgage loss and
default model to determine a base-case loss expectation in
conjunction with a transaction specific assessment of the pools'
actual performance.  The assessment helps determine the
adjustment, if any, to the ResiLogic base-case loss expectation
due to observed improvement or deterioration in the pools'
performance trends.


FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Rates Class D 2009-3 Notes at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates First National Master Note Trust series 2009-3
notes:

  -- $525,000,000 1mL+1.35% class A 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  -- $43,174,000 1mL class C 'BBB', Outlook Stable;
  -- $24,178,000 1mL class D 'BB', Outlook Stable.


FIRST NATIONAL: S&P Assigns Initial Ratings on $690.79 Mil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to First National Master Note Trust's $690.79 million
asset-backed notes series 2009-3.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of August 6,
2009.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.
The preliminary ratings are based on:

* S&P's view that the credit support for each class of notes is
  sufficient to withstand the simultaneous stresses S&P apply, for
  each rating category, to S&P's 8.5%-10.5% base case loss rate
  assumption, 12.0%-14.0% base case payment rate assumption, and
  14.0%-16.0% base case yield assumption.  In addition, S&P uses
  stressed purchase rate, excess spread, and note interest rate
  assumptions to determine if sufficient credit support is
  available for each rating category.  All of the stress
  assumptions outlined above are based on S&P's current criteria
  and assumptions;

* S&P's view of the credit risk inherent in the collateral loan
  pool, based on S&P's economic forecast, the trust portfolio's
  historical performance, the collateral characteristics, and
  vintage performance data;

* S&P's credit rating on First National Bank of Omaha (BBB-
  /Negative/--); its servicing experience; and S&P's opinion of
  the quality and consistency of its account origination,
  underwriting, account management, collections, and general
  operational practices;

* S&P's expectation of the timely payment of interest and ultimate
  payment of principal by July 15, 2015, the legal final maturity
  date, based on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios using
  assumptions commensurate with the respective preliminary rating
  categories; and

* The series 2009-3 notes' underlying payment structure and cash
  flow mechanics, and legal structure.

                   Preliminary Ratings Assigned

         First National Master Note Trust - Series 2009-3

       Class               Rating                Amount ($)
       -----               ------                ----------
       A                   AAA                  525,000,000
       B                   A                     98,438,000
       C                   BBB                   43,174,000
       D                   BB                    24,178,000


FLAGSHIP CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Flagship CLO V:

  -- US$365,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on September 7, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$33,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2019, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2019, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$22,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2604 versus a test level of 2585 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $32 million, accounting for roughly 6.7% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
8.4% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Flagship CLO V, issued in September of 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FLATIRON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Flatiron CLO 2007-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$25,400,000 Class A-1b Senior Term Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class B Senior Term Notes Due 2021, Downgraded
     to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Term Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Term Notes Due 2021,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2820 as of the last trustee report, dated July 7, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$14.3 million, accounting for roughly 4.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Flatiron CLO 2007-1 Ltd., issued on August 16, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of 2007-A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed six classes of Ford
Credit Auto Owner Trust 2007-A notes as part of its on going
surveillance process.

The upgrades are a result of continued available credit
enhancement in excess of stressed remaining losses.  The
collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base case
expectations.  Currently, under the credit enhancement structure,
the securities can withstand stress scenarios consistent with the
upgraded rating categories and still make full payments of
interest and principal in accordance with the terms of the
documents.

As before, the ratings reflect the quality of Ford Motor Credit
Co.'s retail auto loan originations, the sound financial and legal
structure of the transaction, and the servicing provided by FMCC.

The rating actions are:

  --  Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  --  Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  --  Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  --  Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
  --  Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A', Outlook Positive;
  --  Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB', Outlook Positive;
  --  Class D notes affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Positive.


FOUR CORNERS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Four Corners CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$232,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 30, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class E
overcollateralization test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2782 versus a
test level of 2372 as of the last trustee report, dated July 16,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$13.2 million, accounting for roughly 4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.8% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Four Corners CLO II, Ltd., issued in January of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FRANKLIN AUTO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class C notes issued by Franklin Auto Trust's series 2007-1 and
the class D notes issued by series 2008-A.  Concurrently, S&P
removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on April 8, 2009.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the remaining nine classes from these
two series.

The rating actions reflect weaker-than-expected collateral
performance, as evidenced by high cumulative net losses and lower
recovery rates.  As a result, Standard & Poor's revised its loss
expectations in April 2009 for series 2007-1 to 7.50%-8.00%, up
from 7.0%-7.5%, and to 10.0%-10.5% for series 2008-A, up from
9.75%-10.25%.  At issuance, S&P's loss expectations for series
2007-1 and 2008-A were 3.65%-3.85% and 6.0%-6.2%, respectively.

As of the June 2009 performance month, series 2007-1 was 27 months
seasoned and had experienced cumulative net losses totaling 5.52%
of the original pool balance with a pool factor of 41.07%.  Series
2008-A was 14 months seasoned, had experienced cumulative net
losses totaling 3.92% of the original pool balance, and had a pool
factor of 65.99%.  In addition, loans that are 60-plus-days
delinquent equaled 1.82% for series 2007-1 and 1.87% for series
2008-A, each measured as a percent of the current pool balance.

                             Table 1

                     Collateral Performance (%)

                                              Former       Revised
                Pool    Current  60-plus day  lifetime     lifetime
  Series   Mo.  factor  CNL      delinq.      CNL(i) exp.  CNL exp.(ii)
  ------   ---  ------  -------  -----------  -----------  ------------
  2007-1   27   41.07   5.52     1.82         7.00-7.50    7.50-8.00
  2008-A   14   65.99   3.92     1.87         9.75-10.25   10.00-10.50

    (i) CNL-cumulative net loss.

    (ii) Revised CNL expectations based on current performance
         data.

The issuer initially structured each transaction with credit
enhancement consisting of subordination for the higher-rated
tranches, a letter of credit commitment, and a spread account.  As
provided by the transaction documents, the spread account can
build by trapping monthly excess spread, and, combined with the
LOC commitment, reach a specified combined credit enhancement
target as shown in table 2.  The spread account is subject to a
0.50% floor and the LOC is subject to a 1.00% floor for a combined
floor of 1.50% of the initial collateral balance.  Also, as
provided by the transaction documents, the structure can benefit
from a cumulative net loss trigger that prevents any step-down of
the spread account and LOC in the event that losses exceed
prescribed levels in any given month.  If cumulative net losses
fall below the trigger for one month, the transaction documents
allow the spread account and LOC to step down to their respective
targets or floors.  As of the June 2009 performance month, the
issuer had replaced the series 2008-A LOC with a cash funded
account, as permitted by the transaction documents, due to the
lowering of the short term ratings of the LOC provider.  Series
2007-1 and 2008-A have also triggered their cumulative net loss
provisions, preventing any step-down of their spread accounts and
LOC or cash funded accounts unless cured.  Series 2007-1 has
depleted its spread account and has been drawing on its LOC.  For
series 2008-A, the triggering of its net loss provision has
prevented it from stepping down its enhancement despite the
enhancement being higher than its target enhancement level,
although it has been drawing on its spread account.

                             Table 2

                   Spread Account And LOC Levels

                              Combined     Current    Current LOC/
         Initial              enhancement  spread     cash funded
         spread   Initial     target       account(i) account(ii)
         account  LOC         (% of        (% of      (% of
  Series deposit  commitment  current)     current)   current)
  ------ -------  ----------  -----------  ---------- ------------
2007-1   0.00     3.25         5.00        0.00       3.99
2008-A   2.25     5.75        10.25        3.06       8.71

     (i) Spread account (% of current) is subject to a floor
         of 0.50% of initial collateral balance.

     (ii) LOC/cash funded account (% of current) is subject
          to a floor of 1.00% of initial collateral balance.

S&P's analysis of these Franklin Auto Trust series incorporated
cash flow analysis, which took into account current and historical
transaction performance.  Consequently, S&P used voluntary
prepayments and losses reported by the trusts.  S&P's various cash
flow scenarios and sensitivity analysis included assumptions on
recoveries of 45% and monthly prepayment speeds ranging between
1.2 and 1.3 ABS (absolute prepayment speed).  Additionally, in
applying the losses, S&P used various loss timing curves,
including Franklin Auto Trust's historical gross and net loss
curves, to simulate the timing of future losses.  The results
demonstrated that there remained adequate coverage of remaining
losses at their respective rating levels for all classes of the
two transactions except for the class C tranche in 2007-1 and
class D tranche in 2008-A.

Sensitivity analysis run at the base-case level of losses also
showed that for the most subordinate tranches, total available
credit enhancement relative to remaining expected losses does not
grow as quickly, over time, as the higher rated tranches.  As a
result, credit support available for class C from series 2007-1
and class D from series 2008-A were not commensurate with their
initial ratings.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view of the benefits of a
sequential principal payment structure and the growth in credit
support as a percent of the amortizing pool balance (see table 3).
The classes with affirmed ratings were able to withstand cash flow
stress scenarios at their respective rating levels despite S&P's
higher revised lifetime loss expectations.

                             Table 3

                        Hard Credit Support

                                                Current
                              Total hard        total hard
                   Pool       credit support    credit support(i)
   Series   Class  factor(%)  at issuance(i)    (% of current)
   ------   -----  ---------  ---------------   -----------------
   2007-1   A      41.07      14.25             30.77
   2007-1   B      41.07       7.75             14.95
   2007-1   C      41.07       3.25              3.99
   2008-A   A      65.99      26.77             40.22
   2008-A   B      65.99      24.01             36.03
   2008-A   C      65.99      16.68             24.30
   2008-A   D      65.99       8.00             11.77

     (i) Consists of spread account and LOC/cash funded account,
         as well as subordination for the higher rated tranches,
         and excludes excess spread that can also provide
         additional enhancement(as of the June 2009 performance
         period).

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of each
transaction to ensure that the credit enhancement remains
sufficient, in S&P's view, to cover its revised cumulative net
loss expectations under S&P's stress scenarios for each of the
rated classes.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                       Franklin Auto Trust

                                  Rating
                                  ------
          Series   Class    To             From
          -----    -----    --             ----
          2007-1   C        BB+            BBB/Watch Neg
          2008-A   D        BBB-           BBB/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                       Franklin Auto Trust

                     Series   Class    Rating
                     ------   -----    ------
                     2007-1   A-3      AAA
                     2007-1   A-4      AAA
                     2007-1   B        A
                     2008-A   A-2      AAA
                     2008-A   A-3      AAA
                     2008-A   A-4a     AAA
                     2008-A   A-4b     AAA
                     2008-A   B        AA
                     2008-A   C        A


GALE FORCE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gale Force 1 CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$262,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on November 22, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     November 22, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Aa3; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Fixed
     Rate Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class I Combination Notes Due 2017, Downgraded
     to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class II Combination Notes Due 2017, Downgraded
     to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability, the treatment of
ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative
Outlook," the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with certain Moody's credit
estimates, and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  The
revised assumptions that have been applied to all corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio are described in the press
release dated February 4, 2009, titled "Moody's updates key
assumptions for rating CLOs." Moody's analysis also reflects the
expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.  Moody's has also applied
resecuritization stress factors to default probability assumptions
for structured finance asset collateral as described in the press
release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating
structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.

Additionally, Moody's notes that a material proportion of the
collateral pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has
been assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates, and that Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain stresses with respect
to the default probabilities associated with such CEs.  These
additional stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in
credit market conditions and the default rate expectations in the
current economic cycle that are higher than the historical
averages.  Specifically, the default probability stresses include
(1) a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated
between 12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3
for CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months.
Additionally, as CEs do not carry credit indicators such as
ratings reviews and outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs is also applied to CEs provided between
6-12 months ago.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class A, Class B, and
Combination Notes reflect the adverse impact of the aforementioned
stresses, as well as credit deterioration in the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed for example
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2769 as of the last trustee report, dated July 2,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$18 million, accounting for roughly 4.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12.1% of the underlying portfolio.  (Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.)

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
Some of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-
grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may
herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Baa3;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on
     March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, confirmed at Caa2; previously
     on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class C and Class D
Notes and the rating confirmation on the Class E Notes have
incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the actions
reflect updated analysis indicating that the ratings impact of
these factors on the ratings of the Class C, Class D, and Class E
Notes is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of
the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach (see
press release dated March 4, 2009, titled "Moody's puts all but
senior-most CLO tranches on review for downgrade").  In concluding
its Stage II review of the deal, Moody's stated that after the
actions, the current ratings on all the rated notes are consistent
with the credit risk posed to holders of the notes as indicated by
the updated analysis.

Gale Force 1 CLO, Ltd., issued on November 22, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GE COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-C1 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GE
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2005-C1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on eight classes from the same transaction and removed
two of them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.58x and a loan-to-value ratio of 94.5%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.06x and an LTV of 120.7%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 52.1% and
29.5%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude two
credit-impaired loans (3.6%).  S&P estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss
figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only (IO) certificates
based on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its
current criteria.  Any change in S&P's criteria may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Six assets ($237.5 million, 14.9%) in the pool, including three of
the top 10 loans, are with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.
The payment statuses of the loans are: two are more than 90 days
delinquent ($56.6 million, 3.6%), one is 30 days delinquent
($16.0 million, 1.0%), and three are current ($164.9 million,
10.4%).  Two of the specially serviced loans have appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) in effect totalling $14.2 million.  Three
of the specially serviced assets have balances that are greater
than 2.5% of the total pool balance, while the remaining specially
serviced loan has a balance that is less than 1.1% of the total
pool balance.  The top 10 loans with the special servicer are
discussed below.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the July 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 126 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.59 billion, which represents approximately 95% of the trust
balance at issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is
GEMSA Loan Services L.P.  Financial information was provided for
97.6% of the pool, and 88.9% of the financial information was
full-year 2008 data.  Eleven loans (11.0% of the pool) have been
defeased.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.64x for the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.58x and 94.5%, respectively.  The transaction has not
experienced any principal losses to date.  Twenty loans (13.4%)
are on the master servicer's watchlist, including one of the top
10 loans.  Thirteen loans ($126.8 million, 8.0%) have a reported
DSC below 1.10x, and 10 of these loans ($99.7 million, 6.3%) have
a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$584.2 million (36.8%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.89x,
compared with 1.65x at issuance, excluding one credit-impaired
loan, the Washington Mutual Buildings loan, which is discussed
below.  The fourth-largest loan in the pool ($60.0 million, 3.8%)
appears on the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV for the top 10 loans, excluding the credit-impaired loan,
were 1.74x and 88.4%, respectively.

The Lakeside Mall loan, the second-largest loan in pool, is the
largest loan with the special servicer.  This loan has a total
exposure of $90.2 million and is secured by 643,375 sq. ft. of a
1.5 million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Sterling Heights, Mich.  The
reported DSC for the property in 2008 was 1.62x, and the occupancy
was 92.5%.  The loan is current and was transferred to the special
servicer on April 29, 2009, due to General Growth Properties'
bankruptcy filing.  S&P continues to monitor the developments
relating to the GGP bankruptcy and will take rating actions as
necessary.

The Ward Centers loan is the fifth-largest loan in pool and is the
second-largest loan with the special servicer.  This loan has a
total exposure of $58.3 million and is secured by two neighboring
retail properties totalling 270,961 sq. ft. in Honolulu, Hawaii.
The reported DSC for the properties for the nine months ended
September 30, 2008, was 2.34x and the occupancy was 91.0%.  The
loan is current and was transferred to the special servicer on
April 24, 2009, due to GGP's bankruptcy filing.

The Washington Mutual Buildings loan is the eighth-largest loan in
pool and is the third-largest loan with the special servicer.
This loan has a total exposure of $44.6 million and is secured by
three office properties in Los Angeles, Calif., totalling 257,336
sq. ft.  The loan is over 90 days delinquent and was transferred
to the special servicer on March 19, 2009, due to monetary
default.  The reported DSC for the properties in 2008 was 2.09x
and the occupancy was 100%.  The properties were 100% leased to
Washington Mutual, but the borrower received formal notice of the
lease rejection by the FDIC after the bank's closure.  There is a
$10.7 million ARA in effect for this asset.  Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To    From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --    ----            ----------------------
      A-J       AA-   AAA/Watch Neg                   14.09
      B         A-    AA/Watch Neg                    11.46
      C         BBB+  AA-/Watch Neg                   10.40
      D         BBB-  A/Watch Neg                      8.69
      E         BB+   A-/Watch Neg                     7.77
      F         BB    BBB+/Watch Neg                   6.32
      G         BB-   BBB/Watch Neg                    5.40
      H         B+    BBB-/Watch Neg                   3.82
      J         B     BB+/Watch Neg                    3.56
      K         B-    BB/Watch Neg                     3.03
      L         B-    B+/Watch Neg                     2.37
      M         CCC+  B/Watch Neg                      2.24
      N         CCC   B-/Watch Neg                     1.84
      O         CCC-  CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.58

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class     To    From            Credit enhancement (%)
      -----     --    ----            ----------------------
      A-5       AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    21.07
      A-1A      AAA   AAA/Watch Neg                    21.07

                         Ratings Affirmed

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

            Class     Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
            -----     ------    ----------------------
            A-2       AAA                        21.07
            A-3       AAA                        21.07
            A-4       AAA                        21.07
            A-AB      AAA                        21.07
            X-C       AAA                          N/A
            X-P       AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 14 2006-C1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks to 14 classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. series 2006-C1.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
10.3% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 8.2%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 56.1% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 16.5% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 15.6% in 2010, 0.9% in 2012.  In 2015, 69.4% of the pool is
scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 20 Loans of Concern (21.3%) within the pool,
seven of which (9.9%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, four (7.2%) are current.  Two of the specially
serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (54.0%)
by unpaid principal balance.

Four of the Loans of Concern (16.6%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 3% to 53%.  The largest contributors to loss are:
DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio (6.3%), Main Street Village
Apartments (1.57%), and Highline Club Apartments (0.9%).

The DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio loan was originally
collateralized by 35 retail stores located in California, Nevada,
Arizona, and Texas of which 32 remain.  The collateral was
previously 100% leased by Mervyn's under 20-year leases; however,
the tenant subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief,
rejected the leases and vacated each of the stores.  Two of the
stores have been leased, and three stores were sold to Kohl's in
February 2009.  The sale generated approximately $20 million pay
down to the floating-rate A3 note.  One store sale and two 50%
leases are pending.  Modification terms were negotiated by the
special servicer to provide for pending and future collateral
sales and reserves for future partial debt service.  Fitch losses
are based on recent appraised values.

The Main Street Village Apartments loan is collateralized by a 148
unit apartment complex located in Novi, MI.  The loan transferred
to the special servicer in March 2009 due to imminent default.
The economic downturn has put pressure on collections and
concessions at the property.  The sponsor has indicated that they
can no longer afford to advance funds to make the full debt
service payments, but continues to remit cash flow after operating
expenses.  The special servicer is in continuing negotiations with
the sponsor.  The servicer reported YE 2008 debt service coverage
ratio and occupancy were 0.93x and 86.5%, respectively.

The Highline Club Apartments loan is collateralized by a 160 unit
apartment complex located in Novi, MI.  The loan transferred to
the special servicer in December 2008 for imminent default.  The
initial three year interest-only period ended in November 2008.
Due to the deteriorating economic conditions in eastern Michigan,
the property has had to lower rents substantially in order to
maintain occupancy.  Currently, the special servicer is pursuing
foreclosure.  The servicer reported YE 2008 occupancy was 95.6%.
Fitch losses are based on a recent appraised value.

Classes FNB-1 through FNB-6 are secured by a $33 million non-
pooled B-note on the First National Bank Center.  The $65 million
A-note is a pooled component of the trust.  The property is a
547,785 square foot (sf) office property located in San Diego, CA.
Year-end 2006 occupancy was reported at 37.4% due to non-lease
renewals of several tenants, one of which was the largest tenant.
In early 2007, sponsorship changed and as of June 2009, occupancy
had increased to approximately 70%; however, the property's
occupancy has not managed to improve to the occupancy at issuance
of 86%.  6.8% of the net rentable area (NRA) expires throughout
the rest of 2009, 5.2% in 2010, 17% in 2011 and 2.2% in 2012.  The
YE 2008 servicer-reported DSCR was 1.11x.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $114.6 million class A-J to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $36.1 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.1 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $12.7 million class D to 'BB' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $21.2 million class E to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $17 million class F to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.1 million class G to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.1 million class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $23.3 million class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $6.4 million class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $6.4 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $8.5 million class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $2.1 million class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'B+'

  -- $4.2 million class O to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $6.4 million class P to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $5,100,000 class FNB-1 from 'BBB-' to 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $5,600,000 class FNB-2 from 'BB' to 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $2,100,000 class FNB-3 from 'BB-' to 'CCC/RR1';

Fitch has also downgraded these classes:

  -- $4,500,000 class FNB-4 from 'B' to 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $2,400,000 class FNB-5 from 'B-' to 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $13,300,000 class FNB-6 from 'CCC' to 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised the Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

  -- $15.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.5 million class A-1D at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $293.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $166 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $98 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $576.1 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class XP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $169.7 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- Interest-only class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate the $23.3 million class Q.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven 2003-C2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C2 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 8% of the outstanding deal
balance.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a share
of interest expense plus deferred dividends and capitalized
interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high leverage (debt plus
preferred equity as a share of gross assets) of 96.2% and high
secured debt as a share of gross assets of 91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the August 7, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are two loans,
representing 1.5% of the pool, in special servicing.  Fourteen
loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Eighteen loans, representing 35% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class H, $26,037,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class J, $23,868,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class K, $17,358,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class L, 10,849,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class M, $10,849,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class N, $10,848,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 7/23/2007

  -- Class O, $6,510,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 7/23/2007


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 16 2005-GG5 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2005-GG5 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
eight classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all of
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.41x and a loan-to-value ratio of 106.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 0.87x and an LTV of 138.7%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 82.6% and
37.3%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude five
credit impaired loans (1.7%).  S&P estimated losses for these
loans, which are included in the 'AAA' scenario implied default
and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalizes its criteria review, S&P may revise its current
criteria.  Any change in S&P's criteria may impact outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P
affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Nine loans ($419.4 million, 10.0%) in the pool are currently
with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  A breakdown of
the specially serviced loans by payment status is: two loans
are currently in foreclosure ($10.5 million, 0.3%); three are
90-plus-days delinquent ($22.8 million, 0.5%); one is 60 days
delinquent ($7.7, 0.2%); two are less than 30 days delinquent
($141.13 million, 3.4%); and one is current ($237.0 million,
5.6%).  Three loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect
totaling $6.7 million.  Two of the specially serviced assets
have balances greater than 1.0% of the total pool balance,
while the remaining nine loans have balances that are less than
1.0% of the total pool balance.  In addition, S&P consider one
asset ($17.2 million; 0.4%) to be credit impaired.  This asset
is current but has near-term default risk based on low DSC,
vacancy, or negative cash flow.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the July 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 173 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$4.21 billion, compared with 173 loans and $4.30 billion at
issuance.  The master servicer for the transaction is Wachovia
Bank N.A.  Financial information was provided for 97.8% of the
pool, and 91.1% of the financial information was either full-year
2008 data or March 2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.53x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.41x and 106.1%, respectively.  The
transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Thirty-nine loans are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Twenty-
four loans ($508.2 million, 12.1%) have a reported DSC below
1.10x, and 20 of these loans ($451.3 million, 10.7%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.76 billion (41.7%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.50x,
compared with 1.46x at issuance.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans were 1.34x and 106.7%, respectively.

The Lynhaven Mall loan, the third-largest loan in pool, is the
largest loan with the special servicer.  This loan has a total
exposure of $237.0 million and is secured by 776,371 sq. ft. of a
1.3 million-sq.-ft. super regional mall in Virginia Beach, Va.
The reported DSC for the property in 2008 was 1.26x, and the
occupancy was 87.5%.  The loan is current and was transferred to
the special servicer on April 29, 2009, due to General Growth
Properties'bankruptcy filing.  S&P continue to monitor the
developments relating to the GGP bankruptcy and will take rating
actions as necessary.

The Gateway at Lake Success loan is the sixth-largest loan in the
pool and the second-largest loan with the special servicer.  This
loan has a total exposure of $110.6 million and is secured by a
two-building, 671,794-sq.-ft. class A, multitenant office complex
in Lake Success Nassau County, Long Island, N.Y., 18 miles east of
downtown Manhattan and just south of the Northern State Parkway
and Long Island Expressway.  The reported DSC for the properties
in 2008 was 0.94x, and the occupancy was 86.0%.  The loan is less
than 30 days delinquent and was transferred to the special
servicer on April 8, 2009, due to monetary default.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG5

                  Rating
                  ------
        Class   To    From          Credit enhancement (%)
        -----   --    ----          ----------------------
        A-5     AA+   AAA/Watch Neg                 30.58
        A-M     A     AAA/Watch Neg                 20.39
        A-J     BBB   AAA/Watch Neg                 13.25
        B       BBB-  AA+/Watch Neg                 10.96
        C       BB+   AA/Watch Neg                  10.07
        D       BB    A/Watch Neg                    8.16
        E       BB-   A-/Watch Neg                   7.26
        F       B+    BBB+/Watch Neg                 5.99
        G       B+    BBB/Watch Neg                  4.97
        H       B     BBB-/Watch Neg                 3.82
        J       B     BB+/Watch Neg                  3.31
        K       B     BB/Watch Neg                   2.80
        L       B-    BB-/Watch Neg                  2.29
        M       B-    B+/Watch Neg                   2.17
        N       CCC+  B/Watch Neg                    1.78
        O       CCC   B-/Watch Neg                   1.53

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-GG5

              Class   Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
              -----   ------   ----------------------
              A-1     AAA                       30.58
              A-2     AAA                       30.58
              A-3     AAA                       30.58
              A-4-1   AAA                       30.58
              A-4-2   AAA                       30.58
              A-AB    AAA                       30.58
              XC      AAA                         N/A
              XP      AAA                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-FL3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2005-FL3.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on two other classes
from this series.  At the same time, S&P removed all five ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed April 7, 2009.

The lowered ratings follow S&P's analysis of the remaining loan in
the pool, the Lowell Hotel loan, which is secured by a 17-story,
70-room luxury hotel on the upper east side of Manhattan.  The
reduction in business and leisure travel has significantly
affected the lodging collateral performance.  S&P based its
analysis on a review of the borrower's operating statements for
the first five months of 2009, the 12 months ended December 31,
2008, and the borrower's 2009 budget.  S&P's adjusted valuation
has fallen 24% since S&P's last review, dated March 11, 2008.
S&P's analysis factored in its expectation that overall average
2009 revenue per available room in the lodging industry would
decline between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a recent article and
also considered conditions in the New York City lodging market.

According to Smith Travel, the New York City lodging market posted
a significant 33% decline in RevPAR in the first six months of
2009 compared with 2008, whereas the general U.S. hotel industry
reported a 19% decline in RevPAR.

As of the July 7, 2009, trustee remittance report, the Lowell
Hotel loan has a $60.0 million whole-loan balance that is split
into a $45.0 million in-trust senior participation interest and a
$15.0 million nontrust junior subordinate participation interest.
The senior participation interest is further divided into a
$30.0 million senior pooled component and a $15.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the 'LH'
certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's).  The master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., reported debt service coverage of
2.74x for the 12 months ended December 31, 2008, and 73% occupancy
as of May 2009.  The loan matures on September 1, 2009.  According
to Wachovia, the borrower plans to exercise its remaining one-year
extension option.  Wachovia indicated that if there are any
special servicing fees and/or workout fees, they will be absorbed
by the nontrust junior subordinate participation interest first.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-FL3

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    K           AA+      AAA/Watch Neg                    57.78
    L           A        A+/Watch Neg                     40.72
    M           B+       BBB-/Watch Neg                     N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-FL3

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    H           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    93.20
    J           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    72.31

                       N/A - Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 2006-GG8 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 16 classes of GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation II commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2006-GG8.  In addition, Fitch has
assigned Rating Outlooks, as applicable.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations on specially
serviced loans as well as Fitch's prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Two
of the top fifteen loans in the transaction are in special
servicing with significant losses expected.  Fitch forecasts
potential losses of 11.7% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
8.8% including 100% of the losses associated with term defaults
and any losses associated with maturities within the next five
years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's actions
only account for 25% of the losses associated with maturities
beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 65.1% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 24.8% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature
within the next five years, with 23% maturing in 2011 and 1.4%
maturing in 2013.  In 2016, 74.2% of the pool is scheduled to
mature.

Fitch identified 36 Loans of Concern (22.1%) within the pool, 12
of which (9.7%) are specially serviced.  Two of the specially
serviced loans (6.7%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans
(49.7%) by unpaid principal balance.  Two of the specially
serviced loans are current (1.4%) as of July 2009.

Twelve of the top 15 loans (36.9%) are expected to or have
defaulted during the term or at maturity, with loss severities
ranging from approximately 1% to 53%.  Of the top 15 loans, the
largest contributors (by loan balance) to term losses or expected
losses at maturity are: Pointe South Mountain Resort (4.5% of the
pool), The Alhambra (3.1%) and Ariel Preferred Portfolio (2.2%).
The Pointe South Mountain Resort and Ariel Preferred Portfolio
loans are in special servicing.

Pointe South Mountain Resort, now called the Arizona Grand Resort,
is a 640-key resort complex located in Phoenix, AZ.  The asset
transferred to special servicing when the sponsor indicated they
would no longer be able to service the debt.  The servicer
reported YE 2008 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.65 times
(x).  The property recently underwent a $39 million renovation;
however, due to the downturn in business and leisure travel, the
property does not generate sufficient cash flow to service its
debt.

The Alhambra is an 846,541-sf office campus located in Alhambra,
CA, northeast of downtown Los Angeles.  Occupancy as of YE 2008
was 88.6%, compared to 90.1% at issuance, with a servicer reported
YE 2008 DSCR of 1.27x.  Major tenants include Los Angeles County,
University of Southern California and Tenet Healthcare.
Approximately 4.5% of the leases expire prior to YE 2010, with the
majority of leases expiring between 2015 and 2017.  Based on
current and anticipated declines in performance, losses are
expected at the loan's maturity in 2016.

The Ariel Preferred Portfolio is secured by a six cross-
collateralized retail outlet center portfolio located in various
states.  The asset transferred to special servicing in June 2009
for imminent default.  The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR was
0.82x with declining occupancy in three of the six outlet centers,
two of which are located in Michigan and one in Georgia.  The most
recent occupancy reported from the servicer for the portfolio is a
combined 72%, compared to overall portfolio occupancy of 82.7% at
issuance.

These two loans are expected to have significant expected losses:
Gallery at CocoWalk (1.9%), which is secured by a mixed-use center
located in Coconut Grove, FL and is behind the stabilization
schedule contemplated at issuance; and Tower Place 200 (1.2%),
which is secured by an office building located in Atlanta, GA.
The Tower Place 200 loan transferred to the special servicer in
July 2009 and is approximately 60% occupied.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks or Recovery
Ratings to these classes:

  -- $302.3 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $26.5 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $53 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37.1 million class D to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37.1 million class E to 'B' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $42.4 million class F to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $53 million class G to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $47.7 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $53 million class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $42.4 million class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $26.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $15.9 million class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $15.9 million class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $10.6 million class O to 'CC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $10.6 million class P to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $15.9 million class Q to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch also removes the above classes from Rating Watch Negative.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $40.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $940.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $52.9 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $111.5 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.6 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $195.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms and revises the Rating Outlook for these class:

  -- $424.3 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $58.3 million class S.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-GG4 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of GS Mortgage
Securities Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-GG4 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of four loans representing 10% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a share
of interest expense plus deferred dividends and capitalized
interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high leverage (debt plus
preferred equity as a share of gross assets) of 96.2% and high
secured debt as a share of gross assets of 91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009,
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, one loan has been
liquidated from the trust resulting in a loss of $0.5 million.
Currently there are four loans, representing 4% of the pool, in
special servicing.  Thirty loans, representing 22% of the pool,
are on the master servicer's watchlist.  Ten loans, representing
8% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $300,060,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 4/30/2009

  -- Class B, $65,013,000, currently rated Aa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa1 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class C, $35,007,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class D, $75,015,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class E, $40,008,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class F, $55,011,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class G, $45,009,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 4/30/2009

  -- Class H, $40,008,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3
     4/30/2009

  -- Class J, $20,004,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Ba1 on
     4/30/2009

  -- Class K, $20,004,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Ba2 on
     4/30/2009

  -- Class L, $20,004,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on
     4/30/2009

  -- Class M, $10,002,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from B1 on
     4/30/2009

  -- Class N, $10,002,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B2 on
     4/30/2009

  -- Class O, $10,002,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     4/30/2009


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2007-GG10 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of GS Mortgage
Securities Corporation II, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-GG10 on review for possible downgrade due to the
credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of six loans representing 18% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009,
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  Two of the six aforementioned
loans, representing 3.6% of the outstanding deal balance, are part
of this transaction.  As a result of imminent default, these two
loans 550 South Hope and 500 Orange Tower (also known as Maguire
Anaheim Portfolio) are likely to be transferred into special
servicing.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are 13 loans,
representing 7% of the pool, in special servicing.  Upon the
transfer of the two Maguire loans into special servicing, there
will be 15 loans (11% of the pool balance) in special servicing.
Fifty loans, representing 42% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $756,277,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/9/2009

  -- Class A-J, $519,941,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class B, $75,628,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class C, $94,535,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class D, $56,720,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class E, $56,721,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class F, $75,628,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class G, $75,628,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class H, $103,988,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class J, $94,534,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class K, $75,628,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class L, $37,814,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class M, $18,907,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class N, $28,360,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class O, $18,907,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class P, $18,907,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/9/2009

  -- Class Q, $18,907,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/9/2009


GSC CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by GSC Capital Corp. Loan Funding
2005-1:

  -- US$ 25,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa1 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 16,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 16,200,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$ 12,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 21,300,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of
Overcollateralization Tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 3534
versus a test level of 3200 as of the last trustee report, dated
7/22/2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total
about $33 million, accounting for roughly 11% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
25% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in a small number of
obligors and industries.  This includes a significant
concentration in debt obligations of companies in the banking,
finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's
views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

GSC Capital Corp. Loan Funding 2005-1, issued in 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GSC INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by GSC Investment Corp. CLO 2007,
Ltd.:

  -- US$296,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/25/2008 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/20/2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/20/2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/20/2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class E
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 3075
versus a test level of 2945 as of the last trustee report, dated
July 20, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $31 million, accounting for roughly 8% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 16% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also
assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in a
small number of obligors and industries.  This includes a
significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs").  Moody's
analysis reflects the application of certain stresses with respect
to the default probabilities associated with CEs.  These
additional stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in
credit market conditions and the default rate expectations in the
current economic cycle that are higher than the historical
averages.  Specifically, the default probability stresses include
(1) a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated
between 12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3
for CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months.
Additionally, as CEs do not carry credit indicators such as
ratings reviews and outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent
assumed downgrade for CEs is also applied to CEs provided between
6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

GSC Investment Corp. CLO 2007, Ltd., issued on January 22, 2008,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Class A Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of this note issued by GSC Partners Gemini Fund Limited:

  -- US$436,300,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2012 (current
     balance of $349,792,912) Confirmed at Aa1; previously on
     March 21, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

Moody's has also upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,800,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2012, Upgraded to A3; previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$40,200,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2012, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

The actions reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Moody's notes that the rating confirmations on the Class A Notes
and the upgrade actions on the Class B and Class C Notes have
incorporated the aforementioned stresses as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  However, the actions
reflect updated analysis indicating that the impact of these
factors on the ratings of the Class A, Class B, and Class C Notes
is not as negative as previously assessed during Stage I of the
deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem from
comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II of the
ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach (see
press release dated March 4, 2009, titled "Moody's puts all but
senior-most CLO tranches on review for downgrade").  Additionally,
as of the last trustee report, dated July 3, 2009 the Class A
Notes have had a nearly 19.8% pay down resulting in a higher Class
A Par Value Ratio from the time the transaction was originally
rated.

The rating on Class A Notes reflects the actual underlying rating
of the Class A Notes.  This underlying rating is based solely on
the intrinsic credit quality of the Class A Notes in the absence
of the guarantee from Syncora Guarantee Inc., whose insurance
financial strength rating was downgraded from Caa1 to Ca on
March 9, 2009.  The above actions is a result of, and is
consistent with, Moody's modified approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors as described in
the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's
modifies approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped
by financial guarantors."

GSC Partners Gemini Fund Limited, issued in August 29, 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GUARDIAN SAVINGS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two classes
of notes from two transactions issued by Guardian Savings & Loan
due to the increased amount of credit enhancement available.

The ratings are based on the methodology applied to all
transactions with small pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool
factor deals as those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the
outstanding collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the
pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50
loans remaining

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool - greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-07 (Loans Remaining: 4)

  -- Cl. A, Current Balance: $73,128, Upgraded to Aa2; previously
     on 4/11/1996 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-10 (Loans Remaining: 4)

  -- Cl. A, Current Balance: $352,111, Upgraded to A1; previously
     on 4/11/1996 Downgraded to B3


HARBOURVIEW CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by HarbourView CLO 2006-1:

  -- US$337,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019
     (current balance of $329,048,229), Downgraded to Aa1;
     previously on November 7, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class J Blended Securities (current rated
     balance of $4,034,345) Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March
     4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Confirmed
     at B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Confirmed
     at Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D
overcollateralization test.  The amount of defaulted securities
has increased over the last year and is currently about
$25 million, accounting for roughly 6% of the collateral balance
as of the last trustee report, dated July 15, 2009.  Based on the
same report, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2549
versus a test level of 2475, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 5% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

HarbourView CLO 2006-1, issued in November of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTORCYCLE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class C notes issued by Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust's series
2008-1 and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on April 21, 2009.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class B and C notes from Harley-
Davidson Motorcycle Trust's series 2007-2 and 2007-3 and the class
A and B notes from series 2008-1 and removed all of these ratings
from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on April 21, 2009.  Furthermore, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class A-3 and A-4 notes from series 2007-2 and
2007-3, respectively.

Standard & Poor's has revised its loss expectations for series
2007-2 to a range of 6.75%-7.25%, down from 7.25%-7.75% in April
2009, when S&P last revised its loss expectations and placed 10
classes of notes on CreditWatch negative, and from 3.50%-3.75% at
the deal's inception.  Additionally, S&P revised its loss
expectations for series 2007-3 and 2008-1 to a range of 6.35%-
6.85%, down from 7.25%-7.75% and 7.20%-7.70% in April 2009,
respectively.  At issuance, S&P's loss expectations for series
2007-3 and 2008-1 were 3.50%-3.75% and 3.60%-4.10%, respectively
(see table 1).  The slight decrease in revised cumulative net
losses since April 2009 is based on S&P's view that the rate of
increase in losses has begun to slow, fueled by a healthy uptick
in recovery rates.

The downgrade of the class C notes from series 2008-1 reflects
S&P's current view of the weaker-than-expected collateral
performance for the transaction, as evidenced by higher-than-
expected default frequencies and lower-than-expected recovery
rates compared with S&P's view of the collateral performance at
the deal's inception.

As of the June 2009 distribution month, series 2007-2 was seasoned
26 months and had experienced cumulative net losses of 4.31% of
the initial pool balance, with a pool factor (percentage of the
original pool balance remaining) of 43.59%.  Series 2007-3 was
seasoned 23 months and had experienced cumulative net losses of
3.75% of the initial pool balance, with a pool factor of 50.21%.
Series 2008-1 was seasoned 17 months and had experienced
cumulative net losses of 2.65% of the initial pool balance, with a
pool factor of 56.54%.

                             Table 1

                      Collateral Performance
                (As of the June 2009 distribution)

                                   Cumulative  Former       Revised
                  Pool    Current  recovery    lifetime     lifetime
   Series  Month  Factor  CNL (i)  rate        CNL exp.     CNL exp.
   ------  -----  ------  -------  ----------  ---------    ---------
   2007-2  26     43.59%  4.31%    48.00%      7.25%-7.75%  6.75%-7.25%
   2007-3  23     50.21%  3.75%    46.79%      7.25%-7.75%  6.35%-6.85%
   2008-1  17     56.54%  2.65%    46.90%      7.20%-7.70%  6.35%-6.85%

                   (i) CNL-cumulative net loss.

All transactions have a sequential principal payment structure,
which pays principal to the senior classes of notes in full before
the subordinate classes receive principal.  The issuer initially
structured each transaction with credit enhancement in the form of
subordination for the higher-rated tranches, a reserve account,
and excess spread.  In addition, series 2007-3 was structured with
a yield-supplement account to cover interest payments on lower-
yielding loans.

Each transaction is structured with a reserve account funded
initially with 0.25% of the initial collateral balance.  The
reserve accounts grow to a target of 1.5% of the current
collateral balance for series 2007-2 and 2007-3 and a target of
2.25% of the current collateral balance for series 2008-1, with a
floor of 1.0% of the initial collateral balance for each
transaction.  However, each deal is also structured with three
performance triggers (average loss, average delinquency, and
cumulative net loss) that, if breached, require additional
trapping of excess spread, up to 6.0% of the current collateral
balance.  If at any point none of the three performance
triggers are breached for three consecutive months, the
transaction documents allow for all cash above and beyond the
initial required target to be released back to the seller.

Currently, according to the servicer reports for June 2009, series
2007-2 and 2007-3 are in violation of the cumulative net loss
performance trigger specified in the transaction documents.  As of
the June 2009 performance month, cumulative net losses for series
2007-2 were 4.31%, which is now higher than the highest trigger
threshold; as a result, the transaction documents provide that the
breach of the trigger may not be cured for the remainder of the
time the deal is outstanding.  Given its current loss level and
the pace at which it is incurring losses, S&P believes that the
series 2007-3 transaction will not be able to cure the breach of
the cumulative net loss trigger for the remainder of the
outstanding deal; thus, S&P expects that the required reserve
account amount will remain at 6.0% of the current collateral
balance for the remainder of the time that the deal remains
outstanding.

As of the June 2009 performance month, series 2008-1 had cured the
breach of its average net loss trigger, as S&P expected (and
stated in S&P's April 2009 press release).  The transaction has
released back to the seller approximately $5.3 million that was
trapped in the reserve account, the amount above 2.25% of the
current pool balance.  S&P believes that the deal will likely
breach its cumulative net loss trigger next month but will take
several months to build back the amount of cash that was released.
For the class C notes, S&P believes the total available credit
enhancement relative to remaining losses will not grow as quickly,
over time, as that for the senior classes; thus, class C does not
contain sufficient enhancement to maintain the current rating, in
S&P's view.

                             Table 2

                  Performance Trigger Information
             (As of the June 2009 distribution month)

                                                           Current
                   Initial  Average           Average  Current   reserve
                   target   net loss CNL      delinq.  required  account
           Initial (% of    trigger  trigger  trigger  reserve   (% of
   Series  deposit current) violated violated violated account   current)
   ------  ------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------  --------
   2007-2  0.25%   1.5%     No       Yes      No       6.0%(i)   3.88%
   2007-3  0.25%   1.5%     No       Yes      No       6.0%(i)   3.18%
   2008-1  0.25%   2.25%    No       No       No       2.25%(i)  2.25%

               (i) Percent of current pool balance.

S&P's analysis of these Harley-Davidson transactions incorporated
S&P's cash flow analysis, which took into account current and
historical deal performance in order to estimate future
performance for each transaction.  S&P created a voluntary
prepayment vector to account for the seasonality in Harley-
Davidson's voluntary prepayments, which are higher in the warmer
months and lower in the colder months.  In addition, S&P used loss
timing assumptions based on the historical Harley-Davidson loss
curves.  S&P's various cash flow scenarios and sensitivity
analyses included assumptions on monthly prepayment speeds ranging
between 1.0 to 1.3 ABS (absolute prepayment speed) based on actual
prepayments S&P has observed, taking into account seasonal trends.
The break-even cash flow results demonstrated that there remained
adequate coverage of remaining losses at the respective rating
levels for all classes that S&P affirmed.  However, for the class
C notes from series 2008-1, S&P's cash flow analysis exhibited
remaining coverage that is no longer sufficient to maintain the
current rating.

The affirmed ratings reflect increases in credit enhancement as a
percent of the amortizing pool balance for each transaction.  In
S&P's view, the classes with affirmed ratings are currently able
to withstand stress scenarios at their current rating levels
despite S&P's revised lifetime loss expectations.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of each
transaction to assess whether the credit enhancement remains
sufficient, in S&P's view, to cover its revised cumulative net
loss expectations under S&P's stress scenarios for each of the
rated classes.

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust

                                 Rating
                                 ------
              Series   Class   To       From
              ------   -----   --       ----
              2008-1   C       BB+      BBB/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust

                                 Rating
                                 ------
              Series   Class   To       From
              ------   -----   --       ----
              2007-2   B       A        A/Watch Neg
              2007-2   C       BBB      BBB/Watch Neg
              2007-3   B       A        A/Watch Neg
              2007-3   C       BBB      BBB/Watch Neg
              2008-1   A-2     AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
              2008-1   A-3a    AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
              2008-1   A-3b    AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
              2008-1   A-4     AAA      AAA/Watch Neg
              2008-1   B       A-       A-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust

                     Series   Class   Rating
                     ------   -----   ------
                     2007-2   A-3     AAA
                     2007-2   A-4     AAA
                     2007-3   A-3     AAA
                     2007-3   A-4     AAA


HOSPITAL AUTHORITY: Fitch Cuts Rating on $12.7 Mil. Bonds to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the rating on approximately
$12.7 million outstanding Hospital Authority of the City of
Royston, GA's revenue anticipation certificates (Ty Cobb
Healthcare System, Inc. Project) series 1999 to 'BB-' from 'BB'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The rating downgrade is based on Ty Cobb Healthcare System's (Ty
Cobb) worsened operating performance, weak debt service coverage,
and flat utilization trends.  Since Fitch's last review, Ty Cobb
recorded a $5 million loss in fiscal 2008 (negative 8.7% margin)
and has lost approximately $777,000 (negative 5% margin) through
three months ending March 31, 2009.  Fiscal 2008's operating
performance deteriorated significantly from the prior three fiscal
years, which is demonstrated by Ty Cobb's negative 0.9% operating
EBITDA margin in 2008 - the lowest since fiscal 2004.  Management
states that the operating losses observed in fiscal 2008 and 2009
are directly related to the poor performing economy in Hart and
Franklin counties.  Consequently, in fiscal 2008 Ty Cobb violated
its debt service coverage covenant as the system had 0.4 times (x)
coverage.  As a result from the coverage violation, Ty Cobb was
required to engage a management consultant, which has focused on
revenue-cycle enhancement.  Through the three-month interim
period, Ty Cobb had improved coverage of 2.2x.  Since fiscal 2007,
Ty Cobb has experienced flat inpatient utilization statistics,
while outpatient procedures have slightly declined.  For example,
inpatient admissions fell to 3,019 in 2008 from 3,120 in 2007,
while outpatient surgeries dropped to 1,328 in 2008 from 1,534 in
2007.

An ongoing credit concern is Ty Cobb's weak payor mix.  Located in
northeast Georgia and operating in Hart and Franklin counties, Ty
Cobb's two acute care facilities had a high percentage of gross
revenues coming from Medicaid in fiscal 2008, 14.6%.  Ty Cobb's
high Medicaid load exposes the organization to further revenue
pressure if reimbursement cuts are made at the state level.

Ty Cobb's primary credit strengths are the organization's
favorable liquidity position and strong market share.  In fiscal
2008, Ty Cobb had 152.8 days cash on hand ($22.7 million in
unrestricted cash), a cushion ratio of 12.0x, and cash to debt of
106.6%, which compare favorably for the rating category.  As of
March 31, 2009, Ty Cobb had approximately $24.5 million in
unrestricted cash and investments.  The organization maintains a
dominant inpatient market position of approximately 65%-68% in its
primary service area.  Additionally, management is beginning the
process of consolidating both hospital operations into one new
hospital.  On July 10, 2009, Ty Cobb's management team announced
plans to partner with physicians to build and operate a new 56-bed
hospital located in Lavonia, GA, which is approximately 15 miles
away from both of Ty Cobb's current locations.  The new hospital
will replace Ty Cobb's two current facilities, Cobb Memorial
Hospital and Hart County Hospital.  Management estimates that
there will be an approximate $5-$6 million positive impact to Ty
Cobb's operating income after the consolidation occurs.  Fitch
will continue to monitor Ty Cobb's consolidation plan as the
process moves forward.

The Stable Rating Outlook is based on the strength of Ty Cobb's
balance sheet metrics.  Additionally, over the medium term,
management expects hospital consolidation to occur, which will
ultimately improve bottom-line performance.  Negative rating
pressure may be warranted if the organization's balance sheet
declines, operational performance falls below management's
expectations of an approximate $1 million loss from operations,
and/or the organization fails to consolidate into one single
facility.

Ty Cobb Healthcare System consists of two hospitals (153 operated
beds) and three long-term care facilities (350 operated beds).
The two hospitals capture approximately 65%-68% of admissions in
the service area.  The system had $57.4 million in total operating
revenue in fiscal 2008.  While there is no covenant to do so in
their bond documents, management discloses to the Nationally
Recognized Municipal Securities Information Repositories quarterly
and annual audited financial information.


INDYMAC INDX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-AR27 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
security issued by IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR27.
The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrade relates to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bond
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR27

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 1/29/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3


INTEGRAL FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Integral Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$232,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$56,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$42,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Downgrade;

  -- US$46,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of this note:

  -- US$72,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and as of the last
trustee report, dated July 6, 2009, is 3024 versus a closing date
level of 2352.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $102 million, accounting for roughly 7.5% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 9.5% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Integral Funding Ltd., issued in September 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 25 2007-LDP10 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
revises Rating Outlooks on 25 classes of commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., series 2007-LDP10, commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates.  A detailed list of rating actions follows
at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 14.8% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
8.4%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 8.4% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 48.8% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

The deal consists of two loan groups, Group R and Group S.  Loans
are grouped according to whether they have a five to seven year
maturities, or 10 year and greater maturities.  Principal
proceeds, including unscheduled proceeds from liquidations, are
distributed according to their respective loan group: Group S pays
down the class S certificates and Group R pays down the
certificates not noted with an 'S.' Losses are allocated reverse
sequentially, then pro rata to each loan group's corresponding
class.  Fitch incorporated an analysis of the structural features
of this transaction, including the expected paydown of each loan
group with unscheduled principal proceeds based on projected
losses, into this review.

Approximately 32.7% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 5.8% in 2011, 15.8% in 2012, 7.2% in 2013, and 3.9% in
2014.  All losses associated with these loans are recognized in
the rating actions.

Fitch identified 67 Loans of Concern (35.9%) within the pool, 17
of which (13.5%) are specially serviced (including one loan which
will potentially be transferred and is expected to become
delinquent).  Of the specially serviced loans, six (7.7%) are
current.  Seven of the Fitch Loans of Concern (18.2%) are within
the transaction's top 15 loans (41.8%) by unpaid principal
balance.

Three of the Loans of Concern (6.5%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 9% to 49%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Solana
(2.6% of the pool), Outrigger Guam (1.9%), and the Orchard at
Saddleback (1.9%).  Solana consists of 1,793,290 square feet (sf)
of office space, 43,685 sf of retail, a 38,000 sf health club, and
a full-service Marriott hotel.  The property, located in Westlake,
TX, was built in 1988 and most recently renovated in 2006.  The
most recent servicer reported debt service coverage ratio is 1.15
times (x) as of June 2008.  The loan, sponsored by Maguire
Partners, transferred to the special servicer in March 2009 for
imminent default after a large tenant vacated a portion of their
space.  The tenant continues to occupy 375,000 sq with their lease
expiration in 2011.  Additionally, the borrower reported the
Marriott hotel within the complex is underperforming expectations.
The special servicer is discussing workout options with the
borrower.  Limited details are presently available on the workout
and current valuation of the asset due to the loan's recent
transfer to special servicing.

The Outrigger Guam loan is secured by a full-service hotel
consisting of 600-rooms and 37,215 sf of retail space in Tumon,
Guam.  The servicer reported year-end debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 1.07x, as compared to the issuer DSCR of 1.39x at
origination.  Occupancy was not reported.  Based on current
performance and anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to
the loan's maturity.

The Orchard at Saddleback is a two-phase community center located
in Lake Forest, Orange County, California.  The property's third
largest tenant, Shoe Pavilion (23,000 sf, 8.3% NRA), filed for
bankruptcy and liquidated in October 2008.  One additional tenant
filed for bankruptcy and two tenants have defaulted on their
leases.  Additionally, nine tenants requested rent reduction
ranges of up to 50%.  The loan will potentially be transferred to
the special servicer and is expected to become delinquent.  Per
the July remittance report, the servicer advanced the loan's July
debt service payment.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative these
classes:

  -- $200.7 million class A-J to 'BB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $145.8 million class A-JS to 'BB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $100.0 million class A-JFL to 'BB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $71.8 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $34.8 million class B-S to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.9 million class C to 'B' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.1 million class C-S to 'B' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $49.4 million class D to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $23.9 million class D-S to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $40.4 million class E to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.6 million class E-S to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $44.9 million class F to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $21.8 million class F-S to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $44.9 million class G to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $21.8 million class G-S to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $40.4 million class H to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $19.6 million class H-S to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20.0 million class J to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $20.0 million class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $13.3 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $6.7 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $6.7 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC';

  -- $13.3 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $25.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $197.9 million class A-1S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $250.0 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $688.9 million class A-2S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150.0 million class A-2SFL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,714.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $179.9 million class A-3S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $505.9 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $359.0 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $174.1 million class A-MS at 'AAA'; Outlook revised to
     Negative from Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $66.6 million class NR.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-CIBC15 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks to 14 classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. series 2006-CIBC15.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations on specially
serviced loans as well as Fitch's prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines.  Fitch
foresees potential losses could reach as high as 10.1% for this
transaction should market conditions not recover.  The rating
actions are based on losses of 7.5%, including 100% of the term
losses and 25% of the losses anticipated to occur at maturity; the
7.5% recognizes all of the losses anticipated in the next five
years.  Given the significant term to maturity, Fitch's actions
only account for 25% of the losses associated with maturities
beyond five years.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 71.7% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 4.2% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 0.0% in 2010, 0.5% in 2011, 0.0% in 2012, 3.7% in 2013, and
0.0% in 2014.  All losses associated with these loans are fully
recognized in the rating actions.

Fitch identified 23 Loans of Concern (25.6%) within the pool, nine
of which (16.9%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, four (10.6% of the pool) are current.  Six of the
Fitch Loans of Concern (18.5%) are within the transaction's top 15
loans by unpaid principal balance, four of which are in specially
servicing (13.2%).

Six of the loans within the top 15 (18.5%) are expected to default
during their term with loss severities ranging from 10.7% to
46.6%.  The largest contributors to recognized loss are:
Lightstone Portfolio (3.5%), FPG Portfolio 1 (3.8%), and The
Midwest Retail Portfolio (3.9%).

The Lightstone Portfolio consists of four regional malls totaling
1,905,421 square feet (sf).  The properties have experienced a
significant decline in performance and transferred to the special
servicer in October 2008.  The properties are being marketed for
sale by the receiver.  Based on initial offers, losses are
expected upon disposition.

FPG Portfolio 1 is a portfolio of 12 industrial and office
properties comprising approximately 1.8 million sf.  The loan
transferred to special servicing due to imminent default in June
2009 as several tenants have become delinquent in rental payments
and additional vacancies are expected.  Servicer is preparing the
assets for sale and losses are expected upon disposition.

The Midwest Retail Portfolio consists of 12 anchored and one
shadow-anchored shopping centers comprising 1,457,129 sf located
primarily throughout Nebraska.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in July 2009 due to a modification request.  Most recent
servicer reported occupancy and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
is 84.9% and 1.26 times (x), respectively.  Based on anticipated
declines in performance a default is anticipated prior to the
loan's maturity in 2016.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $164.2 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $37.1 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15.9 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31.8 million class D to 'B-' from 'A' Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.5 million class E to 'B-'; from 'A-'; Outlook Negative.

  -- $29.1 million class F to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';

  -- $26.5 million class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $21.2 million class H to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $7.9 million class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB+';

  -- $10.6 million class K to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $7.9 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $2.6 million class M to 'CC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $5.3 million class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $5.3 million class P to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

  -- $50 million class A-1 at 'AAA',; Outlook Stable;
  -- $73.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.00 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $101 million class A-SB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $227.9 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $211.8 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- interest-only class X1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- interest-only class X2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate this class:

  -- $31.8 million class NR.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2006-LDP8 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-LDP8 on review for possible
downgrade due to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire
Properties Inc., the sponsor of one loan representing 8% of the
outstanding deal balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans
in special servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a share
of interest expense plus deferred dividends and capitalized
interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high leverage (debt plus
preferred equity as a share of gross assets) of 96.2% and high
secured debt as a share of gross assets of 91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 15, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are six loans,
representing 8% of the pool, in special servicing.  Thirty loans,
representing 8% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $260,612,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $53,656,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $22,995,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $42,158,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $34,492,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $38,326,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $30,660,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $38,325,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $11,498,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $7,665,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $11,498,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $3,832,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $11,498,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class P, $11,497,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/11/2009


JP MORGAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2005-FL1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-
FL1.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on four classes from
this series.  At the same time, S&P removed all 13 ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed
April 7, 2009 (see list).

The reasons for the downgrades include:

     -- Higher vacancy rates and lower sales performance for the
        retail collateral properties since issuance, which, based
        on S&P's analysis, resulted in property valuations that
        were primarily between 8% and 16% below their levels at
        issuance;

     -- A revised valuation of the office loan, which considered
        actual and potential property performance declines,
        including a significant tenant vacating at lease
        expiration in February 2008; and

     -- Concerns regarding each borrower's ability to refinance
        its respective loan by the corresponding final maturity
        date (November 2009 or January 2010).

The affirmations reflect credit enhancement levels that provide
adequate support through various stress scenarios.  S&P affirmed
its rating on the X-2 interest-only certificates based on S&P's
current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment proposing
changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P finalize
its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.  Any
change in S&P's criteria may affect outstanding ratings, including
the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

The Meadowood Mall loan is the largest remaining loan in the pool.
This loan has a whole-loan balance of $182.0 million that consists
of a $130.0 million senior participation and a $52.0 million
junior participation that is held outside the trust.  The fee
interest in 404,876 sq. ft. of an 876,859-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Reno, Nev., collateralizes this whole loan.  The master servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc. (Midland), reported a debt service
coverage of 3.42x for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2008.  As of
March 2009, in-line occupancy and rent were 82% and $52.44 per sq.
ft, compared with 94% and $47.04, respectively, at issuance.
Standard & Poor's adjusted value for this loan is down 8% from its
level at issuance, driven by lower actual and projected sales
figures at the property.  The loan is scheduled to mature on
Nov. 9, 2009, its final maturity date.

The DRA Portfolio loan is the second-largest remaining loan in the
pool, with a whole-loan balance of $54.4 million that consists of
a $37.5 million senior participation and a $16.9 million nontrust
junior participation.  The fee interests in two anchored retail
properties totaling 718,750 sq. ft. in San Diego, Calif., and
Mesa, Ariz., collateralize this loan.  At issuance, the fee
interests in seven retail properties totaling 1,657,487 sq. ft.
secured this loan; however, five of the properties have been
released, and the balance of the senior participation has paid
down by $63.5 million.  For the two remaining properties, Standard
& Poor's adjusted net cash flow is down 14% from its level at
issuance, which was driven by Circuit City's bankruptcy filing and
the company rejecting its lease for the 33,234 sq. ft. space at
the Mesa property.  The loan is scheduled to mature on Jan. 9,
2010, its final maturity date.

The 57 West 57th Street (Leasehold) loan is the third-largest
remaining loan in the pool, with a trust and whole-loan balance of
$26.5 million.  The leasehold interest in a 160,036-sq.-ft. office
building in Midtown Manhattan secures this loan.  While the
collateral property is currently 55% occupied, as the largest
tenant (39% of net rentable area) vacated the property in February
2008, Standard & Poor's stabilized value of the asset is
comparable to its level at issuance.  The loan is scheduled to
mature on Nov. 9, 2009, its final maturity date.

The smallest loan remaining in the pool has a balance of
$8.5 million and is secured by the fee interest on the 57 West
57th Street property.  The ground lease matures in 2012 and has
two 24-year extension options.  The loan is scheduled to mature on
Nov. 9, 2009, its final maturity date.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-FL1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From              Credit Enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----              ----------------------
    C          AA+     AAA/Watch Neg                      31.51
    D          AA      AAA/Watch Neg                      27.43
    E          AA-     AAA/Watch Neg                      23.73
    F          A+      AA+/Watch Neg                      19.26
    G          A-      AA-/Watch Neg                      15.56
    H          BBB     A/Watch Neg                        11.67
    J          BBB-    BBB+/Watch Neg                      8.75
    K          BB+     BBB/Watch Neg                       5.06
    L          B       BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-FL1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class      To      From              Credit Enhancement (%)
    -----      --      ----              ----------------------
    A-1        AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      96.60
    A-2        AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      42.60
    B          AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                      36.57
    X-2        AAA     AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of CMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-C1 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on five other classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades follow its analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  Its analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the pool.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.21x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 113.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.86x and an LTV
of 154.7%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 72.1% and 41.2%, respectively.  The lowered ratings
on the mezzanine and subordinate classes also reflect its
expectation that credit support will erode when the two specially
serviced assets are resolved.  S&P has lowered its ratings on
classes M, N, P, Q, T, to 'D' to reflect recurring interest
shortfalls resulting from two appraisal reduction amounts totaling
$27.5 million in effect for the assets with the special servicer.
S&P expects the shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
Classes K and L are susceptible to future shortfalls based on
recent appraisals of the Westin portfolio loan (9%).  The
appraisal values may result in increased ARAs, which would prompt
higher appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts.

The affirmed ratings on the principal and interest certificates
reflect credit enhancement levels that, in its opinion, provide
adequate support through various stress scenarios.  S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based on
its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.

Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may revise its current
criteria.  Any change in its criteria may affect outstanding
ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P
affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Two assets ($113.4 million; 9.4%) in the pool are with the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.  Both loans are 90-plus days
delinquent and have ARAs totaling $27.5 million.  The larger of
the two assets is the third-largest asset in the pool and is
described further below.  In addition S&P consider three loans
($88.9 million; 7.6%) to be credit impaired.  These assets are
current but have near-term default risk based on low DSC, vacancy,
or negative cash flow.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the July 15, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 59 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.2 billion, down from 60 loans at issuance.  Capmark Finance
Inc., the master servicer, reported financial information for 91%
of the pool; 99% of the financial information was full-year 2008
data.  Financial information was not provided for the Westin
portfolio loan ($105 million; 9%).  S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.32x for the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.21x and 113.4%, respectively,
excluding the two delinquent loans with the special servicer and
the three credit-impaired loans (17.0% in the aggregate).  The
transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Fourteen loans are on the servicer's watchlist ($324.5 million;
28%).  Three loans ($25.9 million, 2.2%) have reported DSC between
1.10x and 1.0x, and six loans ($113.6 million, 9.7%) have reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$741.7 million (63.3%).  Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the top 10 loans
(excluding one loan with the special servicer and one loan S&P
consider credit impaired; 14.7%).  One of the top 10 loans (3.3%)
has a reported DSC above 2.0x, and one top 10 loan (5.8%) has a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans were 1.12x and 118.0% (excluding the one loan
with the special servicer and one loan considered credit impaired;
14.7%), respectively.

The Westin portfolio loan ($105 million; 9.0%) is the third-
largest loan in the pool and is the largest loan with Midland.  In
addition to the $105 million note contributed to the subject
transaction, a $104 million pari passu note that was contributed
to the JPMC 2008-C2 transaction.  The loan is secured by the 487-
room Westin La Paloma in Tucson, Ariz., built in 1984, and the
412-room Westin in Hilton Head, S.C., built in 1985.  This loan
was transferred to Midland on Oct. 16, 2008, and is currently 90-
plus days delinquent.  Currently, there is a $26.5 million ARA in
effect on this loan; however, based on a recently updated
appraisal, S&P expects the ARA to increase in the near future.  If
the ARA increases, the related interest shortfalls will likely
cause classes K and L to experience interest shortfalls.

The Stamford Marriott loan ($67.5 million; 5.8%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 507-room Marriott in
Stamford, Conn., built in 1975 and recently renovated.  The
servicer reported DSC of 0.12x for the trailing-12-month period as
of March 31, 2009, and this loan has no significant reserves.  S&P
consider this loan a credit concern and S&P estimate a moderate
loss on this asset upon its resolution.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

    JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-C1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     A-4       A-        AAA/Watch Neg                   30.16
     A-SB      A-        AAA/Watch Neg                   30.16
     A-M       BB        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.11
     A-J       B+        AAA/Watch Neg                   15.58
     B         B+        AA+/Watch Neg                   14.20
     C         B         AA/Watch Neg                    12.94
     D         B         AA-/Watch Neg                   11.94
     E         B-        A+/Watch Neg                    10.81
     F         B-        A/Watch Neg                      9.93
     G         B-        A-/Watch Neg                     8.80
     H         CCC+      BBB+/Watch Neg                   7.54
     J         CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                    6.16
     K         CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                   5.03
     L         CCC-      BB+/Watch Neg                    4.40
     M         D         BB/Watch Neg                     3.64
     N         D         BB-/Watch Neg                    3.27
     P         D         B+/Watch Neg                     2.76
     Q         D         B/Watch Neg                      2.39
     T         D         B-/Watch Neg                     2.14

                         Ratings Affirmed

    JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

             Class   Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------    ----------------------
             A-1     AAA                        30.16
             A-2     AAA                        30.16
             A-3     AAA                        30.16
             X-1     AAA                          N/A
             X-2     AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KATONAH III: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Katonah III, Ltd.:

  -- US$321,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on April 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$2,500,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
     confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes due 2015, confirmed
     at Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the weighted average rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 3022 versus a test level of 2505 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $43 million, accounting for roughly 12.1%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 13.1% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Katonah III, Ltd., issued in April of 2002, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


KENT FUNDING: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
four classes of notes issued by Kent Funding Ltd., a cash flow
high-grade structured finance collateralized debt obligation
transaction, following the liquidation of the collateral in the
portfolio.  S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on these
tranches.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' because the proceeds from the
liquidation have not been sufficient to make par payments to the
noteholders.

The deal had triggered an event of default, after which the
controlling noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of the
notes and liquidate the collateral assets.

The rating actions follow notice from the trustee that the
liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

                           Rating Actions

                          Kent Funding Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                Class      To    Interim    From
                -----      --    -------    ----
                ABCP       NR    D          CC
                A-1        NR    D          CC
                A-2        NR    D          CC
                B          NR    D          CC

                          NR - Not rated.


LANDMARK CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Landmark CDO LTD.:

  -- $10,000,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2013, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $16,000,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Fixed Rate Notes, Due
     2013, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $7,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2013, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $2,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2013, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Minimum
Weighted Average Spread Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 3554 versus a
test level of 2220 as of the last trustee report, dated June 30,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$14.5 million, accounting for roughly 17.8% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
29.9% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Landmark CDO LTD., issued in July of 2001, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and revises Rating Outlooks on 13 classes
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2007-C2.  A detailed list of
rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
10.4% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 7.6%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 65.4% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 16.9% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 3.7% in 2011 and 13.3% in 2012.  In 2017, 74% of the pool
is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 27 Loans of Concern (14.7%) within the pool, 13
of which (11.4%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, two (6.8% of the pool) are current.  Four of the
Fitch Loans of Concern (13.9%) are within the transaction's top 15
loans by unpaid principal balance.

Four of the loans within the top 15 (13.9%) are expected to
default during their term with loss severities ranging from 1.2%
through 31.5%.  Three of the top 15 loans (10.2%) are expected to
default at maturity, with loss severities ranging from 13% to 22%.
The largest contributors to loss are: Bethany Maryland Portfolio
(6.1% of the pool), Watergate 600 (3.7% of the pool), Duke
Cleveland East Suburban Portfolio (3.8% of the pool) and One
Alliance Center (4.7% of the pool).

The Bethany Maryland Portfolio is secured by three multifamily
properties, totaling 1909 units.  The properties are located
across the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria Metropolitan Statistic
Area (MSA) and the Baltimore MSA.  The sponsor is a joint venture
between Bethany Holdings Group, LLC, and CORE Realty Holdings,
LLC.  The loan transferred to the special servicer in April 2009
when the borrower made a request to modify payment terms for the
B-note, which is held outside the trust.  The borrower also
requested a modification to the disbursement requirements for the
reserve allocated for capital improvements at the property.  In
addition to the modification requests, the borrower has requested
consent for the replacement of the sub-property management
agreement.

The Watergate 600 loan is secured by a 283,336 square foot (sf)
office building, built in 1971, located in Washington, D.C.  Based
on the YE 2008 performance, the property continues to be 100%
occupied, however, the servicer reported debt service coverage
ratio has declined to 1.11 times (x) from 1.18x at issuance.  The
decline in DSCR is attributed to general increases in operating
expenses since issuance.  According to the July 2009 rent roll,
there is no major rollover expected at the property until year
2018.

The Duke Cleveland East Suburban Portfolio is secured by a
portfolio of eight office properties totaling 895,487 sf located
in the Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor MSA of Ohio.  As of YE 2008
occupancy has slightly increased to 95% from 94% at issuance with
servicer reported DSCR at 1.35x compared to 1.05 at issuance.  The
higher DSCR reflects leasing activity that was executed at higher
rental rates post issuance.  According to the July 2009 rent
rolls, the portfolio has above average lease expirations with
205,129 sf (22.7%) expiring in 2010, 194,061 sf (18.2%) expiring
in 2011, 253,969 sf (24.8%) expiring in 2012.

The One Alliance Center loan is secured by a 20-story, 553,017 sf
Class A office building located in the Buckhead submarket of
Atlanta, GA.  The occupancy and DSCR as of YE 2008 were 95% and
1.12x below 99.7% and 1.14x at issuance.  Based on the April 2009
rent roll, the building has significant rollover risk with 49.2%
of the net rentable area expiring in 2011.  An additional 20.8% of
the NRA expires in 2012.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $315.5 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $26.7 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $53.3 million class C to 'B' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $40 million class D to 'B' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $13.3 million class E to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.7 million class F to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.5 million class G to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $31.1 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.5 million class J to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $40 million class K to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $17.8 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $8.9 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $4.4 million class N to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes

  -- $20.1 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $447 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $78 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.3 billion class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $659.4 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $355.4 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-CP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-W at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class X-CL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The $8.9 million class P, $4.4 million class Q, $13.3 million
class S and $35.5 class T are not rated by Fitch.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-C6 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 16 classes of
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2007-C6.  In addition, Fitch has
assigned Rating Outlooks, as applicable.  A detailed list of
rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
10.3% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 6.8% including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 78.6% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 27.4% of the mortgages are scheduled to mature
within the next five years, with 20.5% maturing in 2012 and 6.5%
maturing in 2014.  In 2017, 69.7% of the pool is scheduled to
mature.

Fitch identified 37 Loans of Concern (32.3%) within the pool, six
of which (2.1%) are specially serviced.  None of the specially
serviced loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (65.7%)
by unpaid principal balance and two of the specially serviced
loans are current (0.9%).  Five of the Fitch Loans of Concern
(19.5%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans.

Eleven of the top 15 loans (52%) are expected to default during
the term or at maturity, with loss severities ranging from
approximately 2% to 34%.  Of the top 15 loans, the largest
contributors to term losses by balance are: McCandless Towers
(3.9% of the pool), Westview Shopping Center (1.9%) and Irish
Hills Plaza (1.1%).

McCandless Towers is collateralized by a two-building, 418,003
square foot office complex located in Santa Clara, CA.  Occupancy
as of June 2009 was 68.1%, compared to 95.5% at issuance, with a
servicer reported YE 2008 debt service coverage ratio of 1.02x.
At issuance, the loan was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow
based on the expectation that below-market leases expiring during
the term of the loan would be re-signed at higher rates, providing
for potential upside in future cash flows; however, the property
is behind the stabilization schedule.  Based on current
performance and anticipated declines in performance, losses are
expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Westview Shopping Center is collateralized by a 610,103 sf
anchored-retail mall located in Baltimore, MD.  Occupancy as of
April 2009 was 78.6%, compared to 92.4% at issuance, with a
servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR of 1.10x.  Major tenants include
Sam's Club, Ross Dress for Less and Lowe's.  A large tenant, Value
City, filed for bankruptcy in 2008 and closed all its stores.
Based on current and anticipated declines in performance, losses
are expected prior to the loan's maturity in 2017.

Irish Hills Plaza is secured by a retail center located in San
Luis Obispo, CA, totaling 139,856 sf.  The property is shadow
anchored by Costco and Home Depot.  Circuit City, which occupied
22.6% of the net rentable area and Linens 'n Things, 20.2% of NRA,
both closed after bankruptcy filings.  As of June 2009, occupancy
is at 57.2%, a decline from 100% in 2008 due to the store
closures.  The borrower has been working with prospective tenants
on leasing the vacant space.  Based on current and anticipated
declines in performance, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity in 2017.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
assigns Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $156.4 million class A-J to 'AA' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $33.5 million class B to 'A' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37.2 million class C to 'BBB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $33.5 million class D to 'BBB-' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29.8 million class E to 'BB' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29.8 million class F to 'BB' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $33.5 million class G to 'BB' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37.2 million class H to 'B' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $41 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $29.8 million class K to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $44.7 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $14.9 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11.2 million class N to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.7 million class P to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.4 million class Q to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed this class, removed it from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned it a Negative Outlook:

  -- $7.4 million class S at 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes, with a Stable Outlook:

  -- $18.7 million class A-1 at 'AAA';
  -- $455 million class A-2 at 'AAA';
  -- $40 million class A-2FL at 'AAA';
  -- $169 million class A-3 at 'AAA';
  -- $67 million class A-AB at 'AAA';
  -- $910.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA';
  -- $422.2 million class A-1A at 'AAA';
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA';
  -- $227.9 million class A-M at 'AAA';
  -- $70 million class A-MFL at 'AAA'.

Fitch does not rate the $44.7 million class T.


LEHMAN BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-LLF C5 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2007-LLF C5.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on four other
classes from this transaction.  Finally, S&P removed all 23 of its
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on its current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.
Any change in its criteria may affect outstanding ratings,
including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

Based on its discussions with KeyBank Real Estate Capital Markets
Inc., the master servicer, special servicing fees related to three
loans are expected to affect the trust as of the August remittance
report.  As a result of these fees, interest shortfalls will
likely affect class J.  If S&P expects the shortfalls to continue
for the foreseeable future, S&P will likely lower its rating on
class J to 'D'.

There are seven pooled loans that have raked certificates rated by
Standard & Poor's.  S&P downgraded the 'NOP', 'DMC', 'FTC', 'ONA',
'VIS', and 'HRH' raked certificates and affirmed its rating on the
'FBS' raked certificates.  Details are:

The Normandy Office Portfolio loan has a whole-loan balance of
$109.9 million that consists of a $97.4 million senior pooled
component and a $12.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the 'NOP' certificates.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the property secure a mezzanine loan totaling
$66.1 million.  Ten cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted
office and industrial properties totaling 1,378,196 sq. ft.
located throughout Massachusetts and New Jersey secure this loan.
The portfolio was 67% occupied as of March 31, 2009, and its
adjusted value is down 70% since issuance.  The loan matures on
Dec. 9, 2009, and has two 12-month extension options remaining.

The Denver Marriott loan has a whole-loan balance of $46.8 million
that consists of a $40.9 million senior pooled component and a
$5.9 million subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the
'DMC' certificates.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests
in the property secure a mezzanine loan totaling $45.0 million.  A
613-room, full-service hotel in Denver, Colo., secures this loan.
Its adjusted valuation has fallen 41% since issuance.  The loan
matures on July 9, 2010, and has two 12-month extension options
remaining.

The Fifth Third Center loan has a whole-loan balance of
$37.0 million that consists of a $30.5 million senior pooled
component and a $6.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the 'FTC' certificates.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the property secure a mezzanine loan totaling
$18.5 million.  A 489,592-sq.-ft. office building in Nashville,
Tenn., secures this loan.  The property was 60% occupied as of
May 31, 2009, and its adjusted value is down 57% since issuance.
The loan matures on March 9, 2010, and has two 12-month extension
options remaining.

The Omni Austin & Austin Centre loan has a whole-loan balance of
$28.4 million that consists of a $26.7 million senior pooled
component and a $1.8 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the 'ONA' certificate.  The Omni Austin portion of the
loan has been released and the loan was partially paid down due to
that release.  A 360,686-sq.-ft. office building in Austin, Texas,
secures this loan.  Its adjusted value is down 14% since issuance.
The loan matures on June 9, 2010, and has two 12-month extension
options remaining.

The Ventana Inn and Spa loan has a whole-loan balance of
$26.0 million that consists of a $21.6 million senior pooled
component and a $4.4 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the 'VIS' certificate.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the property secure a mezzanine loan totaling
$28.8 million.  A 60-room, luxury hotel in Big Sur, Calif.,
secures this loan.  Its adjusted valuation has fallen 65% since
issuance.  The loan matures on June 9, 2010, and has two 12-month
extension options remaining.

Details of the three specially serviced loans in the pool are:

The 120 Howard Street loan was transferred to the special
servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors Inc., on May 14, 2009, due
to a maturity default.  According to TriMont, the extension terms
of the loan required the borrower to provide additional funding
into a debt service reserve escrow, which the borrower did not
satisfy.  This loan has a trust and whole loan balance of
$23.9 million (1.1% of the pooled trust balance).  In addition,
the borrower's equity interests in the property secure a
$49.2 million mezzanine loan.  The master servicer reported that
the property's net cash flow was slightly negative for the 12
months ending December 31, 2008.  The loan was current as of the
July 15, 2009, remittance report.  Standard & Poor's expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of this loan.

The Sienna at Riverview Apartments loan and the La Reserve loan
were both transferred to TriMont on February 24, 2009, due to a
maturity default.  According to TriMont, the loans are sponsored
by SJM Company, which is seeking to sell the properties prior to
the August 18, 2009, foreclosure date.  The Sienna at Riverview
Apartments loan has a trust and whole loan balance of
$17.99 million (0.8% of the pooled trust balance), and the
borrower's equity interests in the property secure a $24.7 million
mezzanine loan.  The La Reserve loan has a trust and whole loan
balance of $12.0 million (0.6% of the pooled trust balance), and
the borrower's equity interests in the property secure a
$16.3 million mezzanine loan.  Standard & Poor's expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of these two loans.

Office and industrial properties secure 21 loans (67% of the pool
trust balance).  The properties are geographically concentrated,
with over 40% of the pool trust balance located in California.
S&P based its analysis on a review of the borrowers' most recent
operating statements as well as their 2009 budgets.

The Calwest Industrial Portfolio loan is the largest loan secured
by industrial properties and the largest loan in the pool.  The
loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 95 cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted class A industrial properties
comprising 23,307,379 sq. ft. and located in six states.  The loan
has a trust balance of $275 million (14% of the pooled trust
balance) and a whole-loan balance of $1.1 billion.  The whole-loan
consists of the $275 million pari passu A-1 note that is included
in this transaction and two pari passu notes totaling $825 million
held outside of the trust.  In addition, the borrower's equity
interests in the properties secure a mezzanine loan totaling
$1.4 billion.  The master servicer, KeyBank, reported a debt
service coverage of 2.82x for the 12 months ended December 31,
2008, with the portfolio 80% occupied.  The loan matures on
June 8, 2010, and has two one-year extension options remaining.
Its adjusted valuation has fallen 20% since issuance.

Hotel properties secure 12 loans totaling $521.4 million (24% of
the pool trust balance).  The largest property concentrations are
in Texas (7% of the pool trust balance), California (5%), Colorado
(5%), and New York (3%).  S&P based its hotel analysis on a review
of the borrowers' operating statements for the three months ended
March 31, 2009, and the year ended Dec. 31, 2008, as well as their
2009 budgets.  The lodging collateral performance has been
significantly affected by the reduction in business and leisure
travel.  Its analysis factored in its assumption that average 2009
revenue per available room in the industry would decline between
14% and 16% and also considered local lodging market conditions.
The details of its lodging forecast can be found in a recent
article.

The Whitehall/Highgate Hotel Portfolio loan is the largest loan
secured by hotel properties and the fifth-largest loan in the
pool.  Nine hotels totaling 2,262 rooms and located in eight
states secure this loan.  The loan has a pooled trust balance of
$102.8 million and a whole-loan balance of $108.4 million.  The
whole-loan consists of a senior $102.8 million component that is
pooled and a subordinate $5.6 million nonpooled component that is
raked to the 'WHH' certificate (not rated by Standard & Poor's).
In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the properties
secure a mezzanine loan totaling $91 million.

According to the July 15, 2009, remittance report, pool statistics
are:

There are 35 loans in the pool, consisting of 13 whole loans,
senior interests in 18 participated whole loans with nonpooled
junior components included in the trust, three senior interests in
A/B loans (two of which also have nonpooled junior components
included in the trust), and one whole loan with pari passu
companion loans held outside of the trust.

All of the loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR.

Near-term maturities (within the next three months and not
discussed above) for the loans in the pool are:

The PHOV Hotel Portfolio loan, the eighth-largest loan in the
pool, has a trust balance of $82.9 million (4% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $91.3 million whole-loan balance.  In addition, the
borrower's equity interests in the properties secure a mezzanine
loan totaling $78.7 million.  This loan, secured by three hotels
totaling 1,132 units located in Burbank, Calif., Denver, and
Pleasanton, Calif., matures September 9, 2009.  The borrower has
given notice that they will be extending the loan, and they have
two 12-month extension options remaining.  KeyBank reported a DSC
of 1.88x for the 12 months ended March 31, 2009.  Its adjusted
valuation has fallen 45% since issuance.

The Hyatt Regency Houston loan, the 10th-largest loan in the pool,
has a trust balance of $54.1 million (3%) and a whole-loan balance
of $57.0 million.  The whole-loan includes the $54.1 million
senior pooled component and a $2.9 million junior nonpooled
component that secures the 'HRH' certificate.  In addition, the
borrower's equity interests in the property secure a mezzanine
loan totaling $26.8 million.  The loan, secured by a hotel with
977 rooms in Houston, matures November 9, 2009.  The borrower has
given notice that they will be extending the loan, and they have
two 12-month extension options remaining.  KeyBank reported a DSC
of 4.69x for the 12 months ended March 31, 2009.  Its adjusted
valuation has fallen 19% since issuance.

The Interstate North Office Park loan, the 11th-largest loan in
the pool, has a trust balance of $53.1 million (3%) and a whole-
loan balance of $56.1 million.  In addition, the borrower's equity
interests in the properties secure a mezzanine loan totaling
$44.9 million.  The loan, secured by 11 office buildings located
in Atlanta, matures October 6, 2009.  The borrower has given
notice that it will extend the loan, and two 12-month extension
options remain.  KeyBank reported a 2.71x DSC for the 12 months
ended March 31, 2009.  Its adjusted valuation has fallen 33% since
issuance.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    A-2      BBB       AAA/Watch Neg                      20.53
    B        BB+       AA/Watch Neg                       13.85
    C        BB        AA-/Watch Neg                      11.41
    D        BB-       A+/Watch Neg                        9.81
    E        B+        A/Watch Neg                         8.37
    F        B-        A-/Watch Neg                        6.93
    G        CCC+      BBB+/Watch Neg                      5.48
    H        CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                       2.89
    J        CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                      0.00
    NOP-1    CCC-      A-/Watch Neg                         N/A
    NOP-2    CCC-      BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    NOP-3    CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    HRH      B+        BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    DMC-1    CCC-      BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    DMC-2    CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    FTC-1    CCC-      A/Watch Neg                          N/A
    FTC-2    CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    ONA      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    VIS      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A

     Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                      44.26
    FBS-1    BBB       BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    FBS-2    BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    X-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A


LEHMAN BROS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-LLF C5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of multiclass pass-through certificates from Lehman Bros.
Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2004-LLF C5.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on seven other
classes from this series.  At the same time, S&P removed all 12
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed April 7, 2009.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the Sheraton Chicago Hotel
& Towers loan and the Hilton in the Walt Disney World Resort loan.
Both loans are secured by hotel properties, which have been
affected by the reduction in business and leisure travel.  S&P's
analysis factored in S&P's expectation that overall average 2009
revenue per available room in the lodging industry would decline
between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a recent article and also
considered conditions in the local lodging markets.

According to Smith Travel, the Chicago and Orlando lodging markets
posted significant declines in RevPAR of 27% and 21%,
respectively, in the first six months of 2009 compared with 2008,
whereas the general U.S. hotel industry reported a 19% decline in
RevPAR.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.
Any change in S&P's criteria may affect outstanding ratings,
including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

The largest loan remaining in the pool, the Sheraton Chicago Hotel
& Towers loan, has a $157.0 million whole-loan balance that
consists of a $141.7 million senior note that makes up 49% of the
pooled trust balance (as of the July 15, 2009, trustee remittance
report) and a $15.3 million nontrust subordinate B note.  This
loan is secured by a 34-story, 1,209-room, full-service
convention-oriented hotel in Chicago.  The master servicer,
Wachovia Bank N.A., reported a debt service coverage of 4.79x for
the 12 months ended December 31, 2008, and 78% occupancy for the
period ended March 31, 2009.  S&P based its analysis on the
borrower's operating statements for the first three months of
2009, the 12 months ended December 31, 2008, and the borrower's
2009 budget.  S&P's adjusted valuation has fallen 20% since S&P's
last review, dated January 29, 2008.  The loan's final maturity
date is January 13, 2010.  The borrower is currently seeking to
refinance the loan.  According to Wachovia, any special servicing
and workout fees incurred on this loan will be absorbed by the
nontrust subordinate B note first.

The second-largest loan in the pool, the Hilton in the Walt Disney
World Resort loan, has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$100.0 million (35% of the pooled trust balance).  In addition,
the borrower's equity interests in the property secure a
$30.0 million mezzanine loan.  This loan is secured by an 814-
room, full-service upscale resort hotel located within the Walt
Disney World resort in Lake Buena Vista, Fla.  Wachovia reported a
5.85x DSC for the 12 months ended March 31, 2009, and 85%
occupancy as of May 2009.  Standard & Poor's used the borrower's
operating statements for the first five months of 2009, the 12
months ended December 31, 2008, and the borrower's 2009 budget to
derive an adjusted valuation that has declined 32% from S&P's last
review.  The loan matures on October 13, 2009.  The borrower has
indicated that it plans to exercise its remaining one-year
extension option.

The smallest loan in the pool, the specially serviced Westin Oaks
& Westin Galleria loan, has a whole-loan balance of $52.0 million
that is split into a $47.1 million senior pooled component (16% of
the pooled trust balance) and a $4.9 million subordinate nonpooled
component that is raked to the class 'WO' certificates (not rated
by Standard & Poor's).  This loan is secured by two adjacent full-
service hotels in Houston totaling 893 rooms.

According to the special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisors
Inc., this loan was paid in full on July 23, 2009.  As part of the
loan payoff, the borrower also paid the special servicing and
liquidation fees.  Wachovia indicated that the payoff of this loan
may be reflected as early as the August 17, 2009, trustee
remittance report.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
     Multiclass pass-through certificates series 2004-LLF C5

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    F           AA-      AA+/Watch Neg                    37.13
    G           BBB+     AA/Watch Neg                     27.50
    H           BBB-     A/Watch Neg                      19.61
    J           BB       BBB+/Watch Neg                   10.92
    K           B        BBB-/Watch Neg                     N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Lehman Bros. Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
     Multiclass pass-through certificates series 2004-LLF C5

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To       From            Credit enhancement (%)
    -----       --       ----            ----------------------
    A-2         AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    98.00
    B           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    83.25
    C           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    67.81
    D           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    56.90
    E           AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                    47.14
    X-2         AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                      N/A
    X1-WO       AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                      N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LEHMAN MANUFACTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 5
certificates issued in Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed
Trust 1998-1 resecuritized transaction.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by manufactured housing
mortgage loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by
changes in performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying
residential mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).
The ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization are based
on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e.  the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Lehman Manufactured Housing Asset-Backed Trust 1998-1

  -- I-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/13/2004 Downgraded
     to A1

  -- I-IO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/13/2004 Downgraded
     to Aa3

  -- II-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/13/2004
     Downgraded to B3

  -- II-A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/13/2004
     Downgraded to B3

  -- II-IO, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/13/2004
     Downgraded to B2


LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Securities
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
securities issued by two Lehman XS Trust deals.  The collateral
backing the transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed
and adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust 2006-17

  -- Cl. WF-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2006-5

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2


LIGHTPOINT CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Lightpoint CLO IV, Ltd.:

  -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on April 5, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on April 5, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 17, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Confirmed at
     B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook", and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs".
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2687 as of the last trustee report, dated July 8, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$22.3 million, accounting for roughly 6.1% the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.75% of
the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Lightpoint CLO IV, Ltd., issued on April 5, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MAPS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by MAPS CLO Fund I LLC:

  -- US$31,000,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Subordinate
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Baa1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,950,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Junior Subordinate
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba2;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,800,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Junior Subordinate
     Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba2;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Junior Subordinate
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2017, Upgraded to Caa1;
     previously on March 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class C, Class D-1,
Class D-2 and Class E Notes, and the rating confirmation on the
Class B Notes, largely reflect updated analysis indicating that
the impact of certain assumption stresses incorporated in Moody's
rating analysis is not as negative as previously assessed during
Stage I of the deal review in March.  The current conclusions stem
from comprehensive deal-level analysis completed during Stage II
of the ongoing CLO surveillance review, which included an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an examination of deal-specific qualitative factors.
By way of comparison, during Stage I Moody's took rating actions
that were largely the result of a parameter-based approach (see
press release dated March 4, 2009, titled "Moody's puts all but
senior-most CLO tranches on review for downgrade").

Additionally, the actions consider the positive implications of
performance stabilization in certain deal collateral quality
measurements since the time of the previous rating actions.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor has increased over
the last year and is currently 3201, but is lower than the test
level of 3440, based on the last trustee report dated July 10,
2009.  According to the same report, the aggregate outstanding par
amount of the collateral is $399.2 million, and the Class A/B
overcollateralization test ratio is 139.47%, versus a par amount
of $397.8 million and a Class A/B overcollateralization test ratio
of 138.09%, respectively, as of the trustee report dated March 11,
2009.  Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the rating actions also reflect Moody's
revised assumptions as described in the press release dated
February 4, 2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for
rating CLOs," and the expectation that recoveries for high-yield
corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Moody's also notes that a significant proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates ("CEs"), and that
Moody's analysis reflects the application of certain stresses with
respect to the default probabilities associated with such CEs.
For example, as CEs do not carry credit indicators such as ratings
reviews and outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs was applied to a limited number of obligations
in the pool with CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

MAPS CLO Fund I LLC, issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans issued by both large as well as small to medium size
enterprises.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MASTR RESECURITIZATION: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 4
certificates issued in MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2007-1
resecuritized transaction.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, an expected
loss is derived by comparing the non-rated deal to a Moody's-rated
deal with similar current collateral and performance
characteristics.  An implicit rating is then determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non-rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/13/2007 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/13/2007 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/13/2007 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/13/2007 Assigned
     Aa1


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2005-MCP1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-MCP1 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing, increased loan concentration and
a decline in the pool's overall credit quality.  Since Moody's
prior review in July 2008, the pool's exposure to specially
serviced loans has increased from 6% to 9%.  The rating action is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the July 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$1.66 billion from $1.74 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 109 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 47% of the pool.  The pool includes three loans with
underlying ratings, representing 15% of the pool.  Four loans,
representing 4% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty four loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  Eight loans,
representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the HSA Industrial
Portfolio ($61.3 million -- 3.7%), which is secured by nine
industrial properties totaling 2.3 million square feet which are
located in Ohio and Kentucky.  The loan has been in special
servicing since June 2008 due payment default.  In July 2009 the
special servicer recognized an appraisal reduction of
$17.0 million for this loan.  The special servicer has also
recognized an aggregate appraisal reduction of $17.6 million for
four other specially serviced loans.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $115,142,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 7/24/2008

  -- Class B, $36,932,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class C, $15,208,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class D, $32,587,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class E, $19,553,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class F, $28,242,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class G, $17,380,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class H, $21,725,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class J, $6,518,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class K, $8,690,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class L, $6,517,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class M, $4,345,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class N, $4,345,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgraded; previously affirmed at B2 on 7/24/2008

  -- Class P, $8,690,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 7/24/2008


MISSISSIPPI HIGHER: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
upgrade seven classes of subordinate securities issued by
Mississippi Higher Education Assistance Corporation.  The
securities are auction rate and fixed-rate and the underlying pool
consists of government guaranteed student loans.

The subordinate securities were downgraded in December 2008 from
A2 to B3.  The action was prompted by the increase of funding
costs due to the continuing and prolonged dislocation of the
auction rate securities market and the trust's
undercollateralization at the time.  As most student loan
collateral is indexed to the Financial Commercial Paper rate and
the securities are primarily auction rate securities, the yield on
the assets has not increased in tandem with the cost of the
liabilities.  Consequently, the trust has suffered significant
excess spread compression.  At the time of the December 2008
action, the subordinate securities were undercollateralized and
the trust was expected to generate zero to slightly negative
excess spread.

Since the last rating action, the trust's parity levels have
improved significantly as a result of the issuer purchasing
securities at a discount in the secondary market and canceling
them.  The total parity, or the ratio of total assets to total
liabilities, has increased from 99.62% to 103.32% from
September 30, 2008, to June 30, 2009.  The senior parity, or the
ratio of total assets to total senior securities, increased from
109.21% to 115.47% during the same period.  At the failed auction
rate, the trust is expected to generate approximately 15bps of
excess spread per annum.  Although under Moody's stress scenarios
the trust is expected to generate slightly negative excess spread,
the current level of credit enhancement protecting the subordinate
securities, including overcollateralization, reserve fund and
other cash accounts, mitigates the impact of the negative excess
spread.  In other words, the subordinate securities would be able
to sustain the stress of a higher rating level, which prompted us
to place them under review for possible upgrade.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Mississippi Higher Education Assistance Corporation (1999
Indenture)

  -- Student Loan Revenue Bonds, Subordinate Series 1999B-1, B3
     Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on 12/5/2008
     8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Asset-Backed Notes, Subordinate Series 2000-B-1,
     B3 Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on
     12/5/2008 8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Revenue Bonds, Subordinate Series 2000-B-2, B3
     Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on 12/5/2008
     8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Revenue Bonds, Subordinate Series 2000-B-3, B3
     Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on 12/5/2008
     8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Asset-Backed Notes, Subordinate Series 2003-B-1,
     B3 Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on
     12/5/2008 8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Revenue Bonds, Subordinate Series 2005-B1, B3
     Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on 12/5/2008
     8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2

  -- Student Loan Revenue Bonds, Subordinate Series 2006-B1, B3
     Place on Review for possible Upgrade; previously on 12/5/2008
     8/27/2008 Downgraded to B3 from A2


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 14 2006-C3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on 14 classes of ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2006-C3 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.  In addition, Fitch has assigned Rating
Outlooks, as applicable.  A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
3.8% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 3.3%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans
representing 53% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised based
on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 9.3% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 7.9% in 2011 and 1.5% in 2013.  In 2016, 86.3% of the pool
is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 42 Loans of Concern (18.6%) within the pool, 15
of which (11.3%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, two (7.3% of the pool) are current.  Two of the
Fitch Loans of Concern (7.7%) are within the transaction's top 15
loans (42.2%) by unpaid principal balance.

Four of the loans within the top 15 (6%) are expected to default,
with losses expected during the term for one (1.1%) loan, and
maturity losses expected for the remaining three (4.9%) loans.
Loss severities associated with these defaults range from 7% to
15%.

The largest Loan of Concern, Stonestown Mall (6.6%), is sponsored
by General Growth Properties and was transferred to the special
servicer in April 2009 after GGP filed for bankruptcy and included
the property in the filing.  At a minimum, commercial mortgage-
backed securities trusts which include GGP loans will incur
additional servicing fees.  The mall has experienced performance
declines since origination.  Occupancy as of December 2008
decreased to 81% from 96% at issuance.  As a result, the net
operating income DSCR has declined to 1.87 times (x) from 2.17x at
issuance.  GGP continues to face difficulty leasing vacant space.
At issuance, the pooled shadow rating was 'A+', which was several
notches above the standalone rating.  Due to the challenges the
property faces, the loan's standalone rating is no longer
considered investment grade and therefore does not continue to
receive pooling benefit.

The largest contributors to loss by loan balance are: Howthorne
Groves Apartments (1.1%), The Seasons (0.84%), and Northern Point
Apartments (0.65%).

Hawthorne Gardens (1.1%) consists of a class-A complex located in
Orlando, FL, containing 41 two-story apartment buildings built in
2001.  Although occupancy remains stable at 95%, the property's
debt service coverage ratio is low, with a year-end 2008 value of
1.10x.  Orlando is forecasted to be one of the most volatile
apartment markets in the U.S. over the next five years, with
employment declines expected to be almost twice as severe as the
nation average, according to PPR.  Based on current performance
and anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity in 2016.

The Seasons (0.84%) is secured by a 142-unit multifamily property
located in Tucson, AZ.  The loan transferred to the special
servicer in December 2008 due to payment default.  The property
has underperformed expectations since origination due to the
bankruptcy of a tenant who was expected to lease more than 10% of
the units.  The borrower and special servicer continue to discuss
workout options.

Northern Point Apartments (0.65%) is secured by a 486-unit
multifamily property located in Phoenix, AZ.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in November 2008 due to monetary default.  A
receiver was appointed in July 2009, and the special servicer is
moving forward with foreclosure.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $191 million class AJ to 'AA' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $18.2 million class C to 'A' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $48.5 million class D to 'BBB-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $21.2 million class E to 'BBB-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $36.4 million class F to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $24.3 million class G to 'B' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $21.2 million class H to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $12.1 million class J to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6 million class K to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $9 million class L to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B+';
  -- $6 million class M to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $6 million class N to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-';
  -- $3 million class P to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Fitch also removes the above classes from Rating Watch Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms this class and assigns an Outlook:

  -- $48.5 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch also affirms these classes and Outlooks:

  -- $39 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $163 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $34 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $118 million class ASB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $971.8 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $319.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $242.5 million class AM at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XC at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XP at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class Q.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2007-XLF Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2007-XLF.  Concurrently,
S&P affirmed its rating on class A-1 from this series.  At the
same time, S&P removed all 11 ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The reasons for the downgrades included:

* S&P's expectation that revenue per available room for the hotel
  properties will decline in 2009.  Based on its analysis, its
  resulting property valuations were between 14% and 64% below its
  levels at issuance.

* Depressed rental rates and higher vacancy rates for the office
  collateral properties since issuance, which, based on its
  analysis, resulted in property valuations that were primarily
  between 1% and 23% below issuance levels.

* Hotel properties secure three loans in the pool totaling
  $311.4 million (40% of the pooled trust balance).  These
  properties are located in Manhattan (20% of the pooled trust
  balance), Stamford, Conn.  (5%), Norfolk, Va.  (3%), Atlanta
  (3%), Cancun, Mexico (3%), Southfield, Mich.  (3%), Santa Rosa,
  Calif.  (2%), and Danbury, Conn.  (1%).

S&P based its hotel analysis on a review of the borrowers'
available operating statements for 2009 and for the 12 months
ended December 31, 2008, as well as their 2009 budgets.  The
reduction in business and leisure travel has significantly
affected the lodging collateral performance.  its analysis
factored in its assumption that overall average 2009 RevPAR in the
industry would decline between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a
recent article and also considered conditions in the local lodging
markets.

According to Smith Travel, the New York City lodging market (the
largest submarket concentration in this pool) posted a 33% decline
in RevPAR in the first six months of 2009 compared with 2008,
whereas the general U.S. hotel industry reported a 19% decline in
RevPAR.

The Crowne Plaza Times Square loan is the largest loan secured by
a hotel property and the largest loan in the pool.  The loan,
secured by a 770-room full-service hotel in Manhattan, which also
includes 180,300 sq. ft. of class A office space and 42,100 sq.
ft. of retail space within the hotel, has a trust balance of
$151.8 million (20% of the pooled trust balance) and a whole-loan
balance of $184.0 million.  In addition, the borrower's equity
interests in the property secure three mezzanine loans totaling
$147.0 million.  The master servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.,
reported a debt service coverage of 1.60x for the 12 months ended
December 31, 2008.  As of March 2009, occupancy rates were 68% for
the hotel portion of the collateral and 100% for the commercial
space.  The loan matures on December 9, 2009, and has two one-year
extension options.  Its adjusted valuation has fallen 14% from its
levels at issuance.

Office properties secure five loans totaling $290.1 million (37%
of the pooled trust balance).  These properties are in various
locations throughout the U.S.  Most of the office properties have
experienced lower rental rates and/or higher vacancies since
issuance.

The JPMorgan Office Portfolio loan, the fourth-largest loan in the
pool, is the largest loan secured by office properties.
Subsequent to issuance, 14 office properties have been released.
The remaining collateral consists of 19 office properties totaling
3.27 million sq. ft. in various locations throughout the U.S. This
loan currently has a whole-loan balance of $126.2 million that
consists of a $101.2 million in-trust senior participation
interest and a $25.0 million nontrust junior participation
interest.  The senior participation interest is further split into
a $98.0 million senior pooled component (13% of the pooled trust
balance) and a $3.2 million subordinate nonpooled component that
is raked to the 'M-JPM' certificates (not rated by Standard &
Poor's).  The borrower's equity interests in the properties secure
three mezzanine loans totaling $113.7 million.  Midland reported a
combined DSC of 1.26x for the 12 months ended Dec. 31, 2008, and
81% occupancy as of March 2009.  The loan matures on Oct. 9, 2009.
Midland stated that the borrower has submitted a request to
exercise one of its two 12-month extension options.  Its adjusted
valuation has declined 13% since issuance, primarily due to lower
rent income and/or lower occupancy at the remaining collateral
properties.

According to the July 15, 2009, trustee remittance report, pool
statistics are:

There are 10 loans in the pool, including senior participation
interests in six floating-rate mortgage loans, three FR whole-
mortgage loans, and one FR mortgage loan that is split into pari
passu notes.  There are mortgages on 35 office buildings; eight
full-service hotels; three research and development buildings;
three land parcels; and one telecommunications facility.

All of the loans are indexed to one-month LIBOR.

Details of the two specially serviced loans in the pool that
previously prompted downgrades are:

The HRO Hotel Portfolio loan is the largest loan with the special
servicer, also Midland, and the second-largest loan in the pool.
Six full-service hotels totaling 2,152 rooms in various locations
throughout the U.S.  secure this loan.  This loan has a whole-loan
balance of $146.7 million that is split into a $133.3 million
senior pooled component (17% of the pooled trust balance) and a
$13.4 million subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the
'HRO' certificates (not rated by Standard & Poor's).  In addition,
the borrower's equity interests in the properties secure three
mezzanine loans totaling $116.6 million.  This loan, which is
current, was transferred to Midland on April 14, 2009, due to
imminent default.  According to Midland, the borrower expressed
difficulty in continuing to cover operating and debt service
shortfalls.

The June 2009 appraisals value the properties on an 'as is' basis
at a level that exceeds the outstanding debt on the senior trust
balance.  According to Midland, one of the hotel properties
is under contract for sale and is expected to close this month.
Midland indicated that, although the borrower has not yet provided
its plans regarding the loan's upcoming Oct. 9, 2009, maturity
date, it is required to submit a request to exercise one of its
remaining two 12-month extension options by Sept. 1, 2009.

The Le Meridien Cancun loan is the other loan with the special
servicer and the ninth-largest loan in the pool.  A 213-room full-
service hotel in Cancun, Mexico, secures this loan.  The loan has
a whole-loan balance of $56.2 million, which consists of a $26.3
million in-trust senior note (3% of the pooled trust balance), a
$14.9 million nontrust subordinate B note, and a $15.0 million
nontrust subordinate C note.  This loan, which is currently 30-
plus days delinquent, was transferred to Midland on March 27,
2009, due to imminent default.

Near-term maturities (within the next three months) for the loans
in the pool are:

The Babcock Ranch loan, the third-largest loan in the pool, has a
trust and whole-loan balance of $100.0 million (13% of the pooled
trust balance).  This loan, secured by a 17,900-acre parcel of
vacant land in Charlotte County and Lee County, Fla., matures on
August 9, 2009.  Midland indicated that it has recently approved
the borrower's request to exercise one of its two remaining 12-
month extension options.  The borrower is drawing down on its
reserve balance to make debt service payments.  Its adjusted
valuation has fallen 49% since issuance.  The Atlanta Tech Centre
loan, the fifth-largest loan in the pool, has a whole-loan balance
of $100.0 million that is split into two pari passu pieces, of
which $80.0 million makes up 10% of the pooled trust balance.  The
other $20.0 million pari passu participation is held outside the
trust.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the
property secure two mezzanine loans totaling $15.0 million.  This
loan, secured by a 376,000-sq.-ft.  telecommunications facility in
Suwanee, Ga., matures on October 9, 2009.  According to Midland,
the borrower has requested to exercise one of its three remaining
12-month extension options.  Midland reported a 4.82x DSC for the
12 months ended December 31, 2008, and 94% occupancy as of March
2009.  Its adjusted valuation has increased significantly from
issuance due to greater electrical power capacity at the property.

The Capitol Records Tower loan, the smallest loan in the pool, has
a trust balance of $21.9 million (3% of the pooled trust balance)
and a $46.4 million whole-loan balance.  Two office buildings
totaling 105,700 sq. ft. and two development parcels used as
parking lots totaling 57,100 sq. ft. in Hollywood, Calif., secure
this loan, which matures on October 9, 2009.  According to
Midland, the borrower has not yet indicated if it intends to
exercise one of its two remaining 12-month extension options.
Midland reported a 1.03x DSC and 100% occupancy for the 12 months
ended December 31, 2008.  Its adjusted valuation is comparable to
its levels at issuance.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    A-2      AA+       AAA/Watch Neg                      33.74
    B        A+        AA+/Watch Neg                      28.47
    C        BBB+      AA/Watch Neg                       23.20
    D        BBB       AA-/Watch Neg                      19.97
    E        BBB-      A+/Watch Neg                       16.46
    F        BB+       A/Watch Neg                        13.10
    G        BB        A-/Watch Neg                        9.70
    H        BB-       BBB+/Watch Neg                      7.97
    J        B         BBB/Watch Neg                       5.34
    K        CCC+      BBB-/Watch Neg                      2.70

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                      63.14


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 16
securities issued by Morgan Stanley.  The collateral backing the
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

In the Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6AR transaction,
the Cl. 1-A-2 bond has a tranche factor of 1.6%.  The tranche has
benefited from a sequential pay structure where it receives the
combined share of principal proceeds due to Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4 and
Cl. A-5.  However, in recent months, the realized losses in this
transaction have depleted the credit enhancement at a fast pace.
In the event that the monthly loss trend continues, Cl. 1-A-2 may
have a small outstanding balance at the credit support depletion
date, and may suffer a principal shortfall, as principal
distribution will go pro rata after mezzanine certificates are
completely written down.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-12XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 10/12/2006 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B2

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-15XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on
     2/4/2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on 6/25/2009)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-17XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
     further Possible Downgrade; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9AR

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3XS

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B2


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2004-TOP13 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 10 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2004-TOP13, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-TOP13 on review for possible downgrade
due to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc.,
the sponsor of one loan representing 7% of the outstanding deal
balance.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009,
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
(PSF) to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to
19.0%.  A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where
average rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF
and vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 13, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses and there are no loans in special
servicing.  Fifteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist.  Fourteen loans, representing 17%
of the pool balance, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class E, $12,109,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class F, $9,083,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class G, $10,596,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class H, $9,082,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class J, $9,083,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class K, $3,027,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class L, $3,028,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class M, $3,027,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class N, $4,542,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 2/14/2007

  -- Class O, $3,027,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 2/14/2007


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.:

  -- US$301,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes due April
     2019, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 28, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes due April
     2019, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Mezzanine Deferrable
     Notes due April 2019, Downgraded to B3; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Junior Deferrable Notes
     due April 2019, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Mezzanine Deferrable
     Notes due April 2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class E
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2917 versus a
test level of 2750 as of the last trustee report, dated July 17,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$21.5 million, accounting for roughly 5.5% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.1% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd.:

  -- US$134,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on December 20, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B-2L
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2881
versus a test level of 2600 as of the last trustee report, dated
July 2, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $21 million, accounting for roughly 7% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 11% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd., issued on December 20, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd.:

  -- US$51,000,000 Class A-1LB Notes due 2016, Downgraded A2;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,500,000 Class A-2L Notes due 2016, Downgraded Ba1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class A-3L Notes due 2016, Downgraded B2;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class A-3F Notes due 2016, Downgraded B2;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-1L Notes due 2016, Downgraded Ca;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B-1L
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2688 versus a
test level of 2400 as of the last trustee report, dated July 2,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$25 million, accounting for roughly 8% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 10% of
the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mountain Capital CLO III Ltd., issued on May 26, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MT WILSON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mt. Wilson CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$32,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed
     at Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 3065 versus a test level of 2605 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 2, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $22.2 million, accounting for roughly 5.6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mt. Wilson CLO II, Ltd., issued in July of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NEW CENTURY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Securities
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 4
securities issued by New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust.
The collateral backing the transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-ALT1

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/29/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 1/29/2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: New Century Alternative Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-ALT2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/29/2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 1/29/2009
     Downgraded to Caa1


NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9
securities issued by 3 Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation,
Alternative Loan Trust deals.  The collateral backing the
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AF1

  -- Cl. I-A-1A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. I-A-1B, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Aa3

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AF2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to B3


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Northwoods Capital V, Limited:

  -- US$251,750,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on December 28, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Revolving Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     December 28, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$31,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$24,300,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March
     18, 2009 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Discount
     Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,800,000 Type I Composite Obligations Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Type II Composite Obligations Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,550,000 Type III Composite Obligations Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$38,850,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Reinvestment
Diversion Ratio Test.  The weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 3165 versus a test
level of 2993 as of the last trustee report, dated July 10, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$44.7 million, accounting for roughly 8.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
19.5% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Northwoods Capital V, Limited, issued in 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Northwoods Capital IV, Limited:

  -- US$260,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 19, 2004
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$73,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Revolving Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 19,
     2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$32,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B3; previously on March
     18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,500,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the rating of this note:

  -- US$38,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Overcollateralization Ratio Threshold Test.  The weighted average
rating factor has increased over the last year and is currently
3098 versus a test level of 2900 as of the last trustee report,
dated July 24, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $53.8 million, accounting for roughly 10.7%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 15.1% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Northwoods Capital IV, Limited, issued in 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NYLIM FLATIRON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2006-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$301,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on July 28, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-2B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Subordinate
     Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

The downgrade actions taken on the Class A-1, A-2B, A-3, and D
Notes reflect the adverse impact of the aforementioned stresses,
as well as credit deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  Such
credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor has
increased over the last year and is currently 2606 versus a test
level of 2305 as of the last trustee report, dated August 10,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$24.3 million, accounting for roughly 4.15% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
13% of the underlying portfolio.  (Due to the impact of all
aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.)

Additionally, Moody's has upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$28,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Senior Notes
     Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Finally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$36,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

Moody's notes that the upgrade actions on the Class B Notes and
the rating confirmation on the Class C Notes have incorporated the
aforementioned stresses as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  However, the actions reflect updated
analysis indicating that the impact of these factors on the
ratings of the Class B Notes and Class C Notes is not as negative
as previously assessed during Stage I of the deal review in March.
The current conclusions stem from comprehensive deal-level
analysis completed during Stage II of the ongoing CLO surveillance
review, which included an in-depth assessment of results from
Moody's quantitative CLO rating model along with an examination of
deal-specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, during
Stage I Moody's took rating actions that were largely the result
of a parameter-based approach.  In concluding its Stage II review
of the deal, Moody's stated that after the actions, the current
ratings on all the rated notes are consistent with the credit risk
posed to holders of the notes as indicated by the updated
analysis.

NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued on July 25, 2006 is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NYLIM STRATFORD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by NYLIM Stratford CDO
2001-1, Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$312,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2031,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to Aa2

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2036,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to Baa3

NYLIM Stratford CDO 2001-1, Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed by a diversified portfolio with the highest
concentrations in REITs (31.7%) and Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (19%).  The underlying collateral pool has significant
concentration in 2001 vintage securities.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio due to the recent rating
actions taken with respect to seasoned (pre-2005) RMBS.  Credit
deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a decline
in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The ratings of
approximately 13% of the underlying assets have been downgraded
since Moody's last review of the transaction in February 2009.
The trustee reports that the WARF of the portfolio is 1190 as of
July 20, 2009 and also reports defaulted assets in the amount of
$3.5million.  Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
7.9% of the underlying portfolio.  Coverage tests are failing,
including the Class A/B Interest Coverage Test.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Section II of the Trust Deed dated April 12, 2001 during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OPTEUM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
securities issued by Opteum.  The collateral backing the
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

It should be noted that, in general, Alt-A and Option ARM
delinquency trends in the past six months have closely tracked
Moody's Q1 projections.  If the pace of modifications picks up,
delinquencies may be lower than Moody's projections.  Severity
trends, however, have worsened, with current severities trending
higher than Moody's lifetime average severity assumptions by 5-9
percentage points in many pools.  Given that recent data on the
housing markets has been mixed and there are early indications of
home prices potentially bottoming, it is unclear whether the
recent higher severities represent peak severities, and to what
extent they might alter the average lifetime expected severity.
Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2006-1

  -- Cl. I-A1B, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed Pass-
Through Certificates 2006-2

  -- Cl. A1A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/4/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. A1B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/4/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2


PARCS MASTER: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class 2006-16 Units
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating of the Class 2006-16 JAYHAWKS Fixed Recovery Units issued
by PARCS (SM) Master Trust, a collateralized debt obligation
transaction referencing a portfolio of corporate obligations.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is primarily due to
the deterioration of the credit quality of the transaction's
reference portfolio.  19% of the assets in the reference portfolio
are rated at a non investment grade level (Ba1 or below) versus 9%
by the time of the previous rating action on March 20, 2009.  In
particular, the recent rating migration of Ambac Financial Group
Inc. and CIT Group Inc. to Ca was greater than had been
anticipated by their forward looking measures in the previous
rating action.  Ambac, CIT and Thomson S.A. are modeled at Ca and
represent approximately 3.3% of the notional of the portfolio.  As
the CDS of the transaction is forward starting on September 20,
2009, i.e.  the credit protection is effective on and after this
date, only a potential occurrence of a credit event on these
entities after this date will have a material impact on the
transaction.  On the other hand, a credit event triggered before
this date would be beneficial to the noteholders by removing the
credit risk of these entities from the reference portfolio.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology for CSOs as described
in Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (December 2008)

The rating action is:

Class Description: Class 2006-16 JAYHAWKS Fixed Recovery Units

  -- Current Rating: Caa2
  -- Prior Rating Action: Downgrade to B3 from Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Action Date: March 20, 2009


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on $48 Mil. Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' ratings on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series ALL-1's $48 million class A and B trust
certificates.

The ratings on the certificates are dependent solely on the rating
on the underlying security, Hanover Insurance Group Inc.'s 8.207%
debentures series B due February 3, 2027 ('BB-').

The rating actions reflect the July 31, 2009, withdrawal of the
rating on the original underlying securities, AFC Capital Trust
I's 8.207% capital securities due February 3, 2027, issued by
Hanover Insurance Group Inc. and the substitution of the
underlying securities with Hanover Insurance Group Inc.'s 8.207%
debentures series B due February 3, 2027.


SATURN VENTURES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of three classes of notes issued by Saturn Ventures I, Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Downgraded at A1;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Confirmed to Aa2

  -- Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Downgraded to B2;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 3/6/2009 Downgraded to Caa1

Saturn Ventures I, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities, residential mortgage backed securities and other types
of assets backed securities.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor) and a failure of one or more coverage tests, among
other measures.  Moody's notes that in the case of Saturn Ventures
I more than 18% of its assets have been the subject of ratings
downgrade since Moody's last review of the transaction in March
2009.  The trustee reports the WARF of the portfolio has increased
to 981 from 391 since March 2009.  In addition, the Trustee
reports that the transaction is currently failing all of its
coverage tests.

Moody's explained that in addition to the quantitative factors
that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the
Moody's rating committee considerations.  These qualitative
factors include but are not limited to the structural protections
in the transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in
the current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision


PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Primus CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$56,000,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on December 19, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$28,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2997 versus a test level of 2581 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 7, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $2.8 million, accounting for
roughly 0.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 18.1% of the underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Primus CLO I, Ltd., issued in December of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RALI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2006-QS13 Security
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
security issued by RALI Series 2006-QS13 Trust.  The collateral
backing the transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed-
rateAlt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrade relates to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bond
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

In general, Alt-A and Option ARM delinquency trends in the past
six months have closely tracked Moody's Q1 projections.  If the
pace of modifications picks up, delinquencies may be lower than
Moody's projections.  Severity trends, however, have worsened,
with current severities trending higher than Moody's lifetime
average severity assumptions by 5-9 percentage points in many
pools.  Given that recent data on the housing markets has been
mixed and there are early indications of home prices potentially
bottoming, it is unclear whether the recent higher severities
represent peak severities, and to what extent they might alter the
average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QS13 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009
     Downgraded to Baa2


RIVERSIDE PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Riverside Park CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$380,250,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on April 15, 2008 Assigned Aaa.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$32,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2018, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2018, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2018, Upgraded to B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect Moody's revised
assumptions with respect to default probability, the treatment of
ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative
Outlook," the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with certain Moody's credit
estimates, and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  The
revised assumptions that have been applied to all corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio are described in the press
release dated February 4, 2009, titled "Moody's updates key
assumptions for rating CLOs."  Moody's analysis also reflects the
expectation that recoveries for high-yield corporate bonds and
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

The downgrade action taken on the Class A Notes reflects the
adverse impact of the foregoing stresses, as well as credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio, which is offset to some
extent by the additional Subordinated Notes issuance.  Such credit
deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a decline
in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2547 as of the
last trustee report, dated July 16, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $20.3 million, accounting
for roughly 4.2% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 5.5% of the underlying
portfolio (due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers).  In
taking action on the Class A Notes, Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations
of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

The upgrade actions on the Class B Notes, Class C Notes and Class
D Notes are largely a result of the issuance of additional
Subordinated Notes in the aggregate principal amount of
$37,396,093 at a purchase price of 36.5% of par on July 15, 2009,
which provides the positive benefit of increased
collateralization.

Riverside Park CLO Ltd., issued on April 15, 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RYLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 11
certificates from eight transactions issued by Ryland Mortgage
Securities.  Six of the transactions are supported by pool
insurance policies provided by Genworth Mortgage Insurance
Corporation.

The transactions are backed by small number of loans.  Should a
default occur on any of those loans, protection from loss to the
subordinate bond is completely dependant on payments made from the
pool policy provided by Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation
(Baa2).  Due to the low likelihood of default given the long pay
history of the remaining borrowers, Moody's concludes that the
joint probability of default and loss given default for those
deals is consistent with a Baa1 rating.

The rating is based on the methodology applied to all transactions
with small pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as
those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding
collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is
less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining

Moody's uses These methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current.  The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Ryland-American Home Funding Trust 1988-1 (Loans Remaining: 13)

  -- Cl. A, Current Balance: $676,132, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 8/30/1995 Upgraded to Aaa

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1990-05 (Loans Remaining: 1)

  -- Cl. B-1, Current Balance: $63,523, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 12/20/1990 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Current Balance: $10, Downgraded to Baa1; previously
     on 12/20/1990 Assigned Aaa

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1991-14 (Loans Remaining: 1)

  -- Cl. 14-B-1, Current Balance: $46,439, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 8/29/1991 Assigned Aaa

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1991-15 (Loans Remaining: 8)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance: $789,463, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 9/29/1995 Downgraded to A3

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1991-16 (Loans Remaining: 12)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance: $1,055,824, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 9/29/1995 Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. I, Current Balance: $184, Downgraded to Baa1; previously
     on 9/29/1995 Downgraded to A3

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1991-19 (Loans Remaining: 12)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance: $985,015, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 9/29/1995 Downgraded to A3

Ryland Mortgage Securities 1992-04 (Loans Remaining: 16)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance: $1,592,530, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 9/29/1995 Downgraded to A3

Ryland-FBS 1992-1 (Loans Remaining: 1)

  -- Cl. F, Current Balance: $215,930, Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on 3/25/1992 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Current Balance: $23,951, Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on 3/25/1992 Assigned Aa1


SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D-2 2007-1 D2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
D-2 notes issued by Seawall SPC's series 2007-1 D2 (CDO bond).

The collateralized debt obligation transaction is a total return
swap that is directly linked to the rating on the class D-2 notes
issued by Seawall 2007-1 Ltd., which Standard & Poor's lowered to
'CCC' and left on CreditWatch with negative implications on
August 7, 2009.

       Rating Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                           Seawall SPC
                    Series 2007-1 D2 (CDO bond)

                               Rating
                               ------
          Class         To                 From
          -----         --                 ----
          D-2           CCC/Watch Neg      B-/Watch Neg


SHASTA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Shasta CLO I Ltd.:

  -- US$296,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 24, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$45,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
     April 2021, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 24, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$38,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
     Downgraded to B2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B-2L
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2934 versus a
test level of 2500 as of the last trustee report, dated July 9,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$41.08 million, accounting for roughly 8.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
14.2% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the
collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in a small number of
obligors and industries.  This includes a significant
concentration in debt obligations of companies in the banking,
finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's
views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Shasta CLO I Ltd., issued in January 24, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SIERRA CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Sierra CLO II Ltd.:

  -- US$260,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021 (current balance of $256,033,487), Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on November 21, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due
     January 2021 (current balance of $38,792,952), Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on November 21, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due January
     2021, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
will be below their historical averages, consistent with Moody's
research.

The rating actions reflect the adverse impact of the
aforementioned stresses, as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class
B-2L Overcollateralization Test.  In particular, the weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 3007 versus a test level of 2475 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 13, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $33.5 million, accounting for roughly 8% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 15.97% of the underlying portfolio.  (Due to the
impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.)

Sierra CLO II Ltd., issued on November 21, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SILVERADO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Silverado CLO 2006-I Limited:

  -- US$144,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to Aa1, previously on April 11, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$7,500,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to Aa3, previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Place Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to A2, previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Place Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,375,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2020 (current Rated
     Balance of $4,856,077), Downgraded to A1, previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Place Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1, previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at B1, previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Confirmed at Caa2, previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

The rating actions reflect the adverse impact of the
aforementioned stresses, as well as credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, the
weighted average rating factor has increased over the last year
and is currently 2800 as of the last trustee report, dated June
15, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total
about $10 million, accounting for roughly 4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

Silverado CLO 2006-I Limited, issued on April 11, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SOUNDVIEW HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20065-WF1 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one
security issued by Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1.  The
collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrade relates to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bond
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

In general, Alt-A and Option ARM delinquency trends in the past
six months have closely tracked Moody's Q1 projections.  If the
pace of modifications picks up, delinquencies may be lower than
Moody's projections.  Severity trends, however, have worsened,
with current severities trending higher than Moody's lifetime
average severity assumptions by 5-9 percentage points in many
pools.  Given that recent data on the housing markets has been
mixed and there are early indications of home prices potentially
bottoming, it is unclear whether the recent higher severities
represent peak severities, and to what extent they might alter the
average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2


ST JAMES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by St. James River CLO, Ltd:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-R First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on July 12, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$255,500,000 Class A-T First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on July 12, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$27,500,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Ba1;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at B1;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Confirmed at Caa2;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class E
overcollateralization test.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2685 versus a
test level of 2475 as of the last trustee report, dated July 2,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$4.3 million, accounting for roughly 1.1% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower by Moody's or CCC+ or
lower by S&P make up approximately 10.4% of the underlying
portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

St.  James River CLO, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


STARTS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Series 2007-30 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
notes issued by STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.'s series 2007-30, a synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation
transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the repurchase of the notes
according to the repurchase notice dated August 3, 2009.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                        STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
                Maple Hill II managed synthetic CDO

                                         Rating
                                         ------
              Series          Class    To      From
              ------          -----    --      ----
              2007-30         B3-J3    NR      B+

                         NR - Not rated.


VERMEER FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes issued by Vermeer Funding, Limited.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due 2039,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/22/2008 Downgraded to Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due 2039,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/20/2009 Downgraded to Baa2

Vermeer Funding, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of Residential ABS Securities.
RMBS are approximately 53% of the underlying portfolio, of which
the majority are from 2004 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio due to the recent actions
taken upon seasoned (pre-2005) RMBS.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  More than 30% of the underlying
assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  The trustee reports that the WARF of
the portfolio is 1,377 as of June 30, 2009, and also reports
defaulted assets in the amount of $25.6 million.  Securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 23.4% of the underlying
portfolio.  The Class A/B and Class C Overcollateralization Tests
are currently failing.

The actions also take into consideration the risk of the
transaction experiencing an Event of Default.  As provided in
Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence and continuance
of an Event of Default, certain parties to the transaction may be
entitled to direct the Trustee to take particular actions with
respect to the Collateral and the Notes, including the sale and
liquidation of the assets.  The severity of losses of certain
tranches may be different depending on the timing and outcome of a
liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WACHOVIA AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Class B 2005-B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed the Class B notes from the Wachovia Auto Owner
Trust 2005-B transaction on review for possible upgrade.  The
transaction is sponsored and serviced by Wachovia Bank, which, as
of December 31, 2008, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wells
Fargo & Company.  The action reflects the stronger credit profile
of the security based on the actual performance of the transaction
and credit enhancement relative to expected future losses in the
underlying receivables pool.

Although Moody's currently projects the transaction to incur
cumulative lifetime net losses between 2.00% and 2.25% versus
initial expectation of 1.00% to 1.50%, hard credit enhancement
(excluding excess spread and a yield supplement account) relative
to future expected losses has increased substantially as the
transaction has paid down and a significant portion of the
expected lifetime losses have already been incurred.  Hard credit
support at closing for the class B was 1.50% of the initial pool
balance compared to future expected losses of 1.00%-1.50%.
Currently, hard credit support is approximately 1.00% compared to
future expected losses of approximately 0.25%-0.50%, both measured
as a percentage of the initial pool balance.  The pool factor of
the transaction is approximately 15% and both the
overcollateralization and the reserve account are at or close to
the required floor levels.  Principal payments are allocated
sequentially between the Class A and B notes to maintain the Class
B at approximately 4.00% of the outstanding pool balance.  Within
the Class A notes, principal is further allocated sequentially
between the Class A-4 and A-5.

During its review, Moody's will continue to refine its assessment
of the transaction relative to the credit enhancement available.
The principal methodology used in taking these actions was
"Moody's Approach to Rating U.S.  Auto Loan-Backed Securities",
which can be found at www.moodys.com in the Credit Policy &
Methodologies directory, in the Ratings Methodologies
subdirectory.  Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of monitoring this issue can also be
found in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.

Complete Rating Action:

Issuer: Wachovia Auto Owner Trust 2005-B

  -- Cl. B, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on 10/8/2005 Assigned Baa3


WACHOVIA AUTO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed certain subordinate tranches from the Wachovia
Auto Loan Owner Trust 2006-1 and Wachovia Auto Loan Owner Trust
2006-2 near-prime auto loan transactions on review for possible
upgrade.  The transactions are serviced by Wachovia Bank, which,
as of December 31, 2008, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wells
Fargo & Company.  The actions reflect the stronger credit profile
of the securities, based on the actual performance of the
transactions and the build up of credit enhancement relative to
expected future losses in the underlying receivable pools.

The actions were prompted by Moody's updated cumulative lifetime
loss expectations of 7.50%-8.50% for the two transactions, which
are at the lower end of Moody's range of 8.00%-9.50% previously
published in February 2009.  Six additional months of performance
for the underlying pools have demonstrated signs of stabilization
in both delinquencies and losses.  Cumulative losses as a
percentage of the pool that has liquidated (original pool balance
- current pool balance), an indicator of projected lifetime loss
trajectories, have also shown signs of leveling off for both
transactions.  While these trends are positive, part of the
improvement can be attributed to seasonality and the rebound in
the used car market.

During its review, Moody's will continue to closely monitor
performance as well as used car recoveries, and refine its
assessment of these transactions relative to the credit
enhancement available.  The principal methodology used in taking
these actions was "Moody's Approach to Rating U.S.  Auto Loan-
Backed Securities", which can be found at www.moodys.com in the
Credit Policy & Methodologies directory, in the Ratings
Methodologies subdirectory.  Other methodologies and factors that
may have been considered in the process of monitoring this issue
can also be found in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wachovia Auto Loan Owner Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 9/29/2006 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, Baa3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Baa3 from A1

Issuer: Wachovia Auto Loan Owner Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. B, Aa2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 10/20/2006 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Baa1 from A1

  -- Cl. D, Ba3 Placed on review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-C18 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C18 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 7% of the outstanding deal
balance.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a share
of interest expense plus deferred dividends and capitalized
interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high leverage (debt plus
preferred equity as a share of gross assets) of 96.2% and high
secured debt as a share of gross assets of 91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  One of the six aforementioned
loans, representing 7% of the outstanding deal balance, is part of
this transaction.  As a result of imminent default, this loan
(Park Place II) is likely to be transferred into special
servicing.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
(PSF) to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to
19.0%.  A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where
average rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF
and vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are two loans,
representing 1% of the pool, in special servicing.  Upon the
transfer of the additional Maguire loan into special servicing,
there will be three loans (8% of the pool balance) in special
servicing.  Four loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  Six loans, representing 14% of the
pool balance, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J-2, $89,592,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 5/4/2007

  -- Class B, $31,621,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class C, $12,297,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class D, $28,107,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class E, $14,054,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class F, $19,324,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class G, $12,297,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class H, $24,594,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class J, $5,270,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class K, $7,027,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class L, $5,270,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class M, $3,514,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class N, $3,513,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 5/4/2007

  -- Class O, $5,270,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 5/4/2007


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 15 2006-C28 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed fifteen classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C28 on review for possible downgrade due
to the credit uncertainty surrounding Maguire Properties Inc., the
sponsor of one loan representing 6% of the outstanding deal
balance, and higher anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.

Maguire continues to experience ongoing levels of high effective
leverage, declining operating performance, and an inability to
cover dividends from operating cash flow.  Currently, Maguire has
a low fixed coverage ratio of 0.87x (recurring EBITDA as a
percentage of interest expense plus deferred dividends and
capitalized interest) as of June 30, 2009, as well as high
leverage (debt plus preferred equity as a share of gross assets)
of 96.2% and high secured debt as a share of gross assets of
91.2%.

As part of a plan to put the company back on track with a focus on
a smaller core portfolio, Maguire announced on August 10, 2009
that they had disposed of one property and its associated debt
from their wholly owned portfolio.  In addition, Maguire announced
that they had contacted the master servicer for six mortgage loans
in commercial mortgage backed securities transactions and advised
them that they would no longer fund cash shortfalls associated
with the respective mortgages.  The aforementioned loans are not
part of this transaction.

Most Maguire properties are located in California in either Los
Angeles or Orange Counties, both of which have experienced
significant rent and occupancy declines over the last year.  Over
the next two years, Torto Wheaton Research has forecasted Los
Angeles County office rents to decline from $26.67 per square foot
to $23.85 PSF and vacancy rates to increase from 14.4% to 19.0%.
A similar outcome is forecast for Orange County where average
rents are expected to decline from $25.10 to $20.75 PSF and
vacancy rates are expected to increase from 19.1% to 20.2%.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the pool has not
experienced any losses.  Currently there are seven loans,
representing 3% of the pool, in special servicing.  Forty-seven
loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of Maguire
Properties Inc. as well as the overall credit quality of the deal.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $278,628,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class B, $22,470,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class C, $58,422,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class D, $31,458,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class E, $49,433,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class F, $40,446,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class G, $40,446,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class H, $40,446,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class J, $44,940,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class K, $17,976,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class L, $8,988,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class M, $13,482,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class N, $4,494,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class O, $8,988,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class P, $8,988,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/10/2009


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-C20 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C20 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were place
June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10
classes from the same transaction.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.80x and a loan-to-value ratio of 89.1%.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.11x and an LTV of 123%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 63.6% and
32.4%, respectively.  The DSC and LTV calculations exclude one of
three specially serviced assets (4.1%).  S&P estimated losses for
these loans, which are factored into the 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.

S&P affirmed the ratings on the interest-only certificates based
on S&P's current criteria.  S&P published a request for comment
proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.  After S&P
finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current criteria.
Any change in S&P's criteria may affect outstanding ratings,
including the ratings on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.

                          Credit Concerns

Three assets ($148.5 million, 4.5%) in the pool, including
the fifth-largest exposure, were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC, as of the July 17, 2009,
remittance date.  Two of the three assets with the special
servicer ($142.2 million, 4.3%) are more than 90-plus-days
delinquent, and one ($7.4 million, 0.2%) is less than 30 days
delinquent.  The largest specially serviced loan has an appraisal
reduction amount in effect totalling $113.7 million and represents
4% of the total pool balance.  Subsequent to the July remittance
date, an additional loan ($2.5 million) was transferred to the
special servicer due to imminent monetary default.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the July 17, 2009, remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 206 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$3.3 billion, compared with $3.7 billion at issuance.  The master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., provided financial information for
93.8% of the pool; 92.5% of the available financial information
was full-year 2008 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.88x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV were 1.80x and 89.1%, respectively.  The transaction
has not experienced any principal losses to date.  There are 28
loans on the master servicer's watchlist, including two of the top
10 loans.  Eighteen ($194 million, 5.9%) have a reported DSC below
1.10x, and 11 of these loans ($76.4 million, 2.3%) have a reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $1.3 billion (39.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers and
excluding the Macon & Burlington Mall Pool loan, S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 2.17x for the top 10 loans, compared with
1.90x at issuance.  The sixth-largest ($113.4 million, 3.4%) and
10th-largest ($85.0 million, 2.6%) loans in the pool appear on the
master servicers' watchlist.  Details are:

The Public Square loan is the sixth-largest loan and is secured by
a 1.3 million-sq.-ft. office building in the central business
district of Cleveland.  The loan appears on the watchlist due to a
low DSC.  As of the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2009, the
DSC was 1.16x and occupancy was 78%.

The Forum at Carlsbad is the 10th-largest loan and is secured by a
233,056-sq.-ft. retail center built in 2003 in Carlsbad, Calif.
The loan appears on the watchlist because it is 30-plus days
delinquent.  As of year-end December 31, 2008, the DSC was 1.47x
and occupancy was 100%.

Details regarding the specially serviced exposures are:

The fifth-largest loan, the Macon and Burlington Mall Pool loan,
has a total exposure of $147.8 million and unpaid principal
balance of $135.8 million.  The loan was transferred to CWCapital
on February 28, 2008, due to imminent default.  The loan is
secured by the fee and leasehold interests in two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted regional malls.  The Burlington
Mall is a 419,194-sq.-ft. mall in Burlington, N.C., and the Macon
Mall is a 762,398-sq.-ft. mall in Macon, Ga.  A third-party
receiver was put in place at both properties in June 2008.  An ARA
of $113.6 million is in effect related to this loan.  The related
appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction reported in the
July 17, 2009, remittance report was $462,551.  CWCapital has
commenced foreclosure.  Standard & Poor's expects a significant
loss to the trust upon the liquidation of this asset.

The two remaining loans with the special servicer are the Country
Inn & Suites loan the Azalea Hill Apartments loan.

The Country Inn & Suites loan has a total exposure of $7.4 million
and is secured by a 101-room limited-service hotel, built in 2003
in Sarasota, Fla.  The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in April 2009 due to nonpayment of its monthly reserve.
The borrower has brought the reserves current, and the loan has
been returned to the master servicer.

The Azalea Hill Apartments loan has a total exposure of
$6.5 million and is secured by a 144-unit multifamily property in
Montgomery, Ala.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
in March 2009 due to monetary default.  The property was 90%
occupied as of June 30, 2009, and CWCapital expects the borrower
to satisfy its past-due payments to third-party vendors by the end
of September.  CWCapital is negotiating with the borrower for a
possible loan modification and forbearance.

The Kelly Garden Apartments loan has an unpaid principal balance
of $2.5 million and is secured by a 66-unit student housing
apartment property built in 1970 in New Britain, Ct.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer after the July remittance date
due to imminent monetary default.  As of December 31, 2008,
occupancy was 83% and the reported cash flow was negative.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to
S&P's updated conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit
enhancement levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20

                  Rating
                  ------
       Class    To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    --     ----           ----------------------
       A-MFL    A+     AAA/Watch Neg             22.05
       A-MFX    A+     AAA/Watch Neg             22.05
       A-J      BBB-   AAA/Watch Neg             13.78
       B        BB     AA/Watch Neg              11.44
       C        BB-    AA-/Watch Neg             10.61
       D        B+     A-Watch Neg                8.55
       E        B      BBB+/Watch Neg             7.31
       F        B-     BBB/Watch Neg              6.06
       G        CCC+   BB+/Watch Neg              5.10
       H        CCC-   B-/Watch Neg               3.86

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20

              Class    Rating  Credit enhancement (%)
              -----    ------  ----------------------
              A-3SF    AAA                     33.08
              A-4      AAA                     33.08
              A-5      AAA                     33.08
              A-6A     AAA                     33.08
              A-6B     AAA                     33.08
              A-PB     AAA                     33.08
              A-7      AAA                     33.08
              A-1A     AAA                     33.08
              X-P      AAA                       N/A
              X-C      AAA                       N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-5 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
securities issued by WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
WMALT Series 2006-5 Trust.  The collateral backing the transaction
consists primarily of first-lien, fixed-rate Alt-A mortgage loans.

The downgrades relate to structural features, such as sequential
pay structures, whereby certain senior bonds are entitled to
receive more than their pro-rata share of principal payments.  In
the event that subordinate bonds are written down entirely, these
bonds are subject to structural features that redirect principal
payments to be paid pro rata to all senior bonds, and/or direct
losses to be allocated pro rata to each of the outstanding senior
bonds.  In either of those cases, given the recent increase in the
pace of credit support erosion relative to amortization of the
bonds, there is an increased likelihood that the downgraded bonds
may not be completely paid off before subordinate bonds are
completely written down.

In its analysis, Moody's has considered current available credit
enhancement and recent CPR, CDR, and severity trends.  The
cashflows were run on the basis of pool loss expectations in line
with those published in Q1 2009, although Moody's incorporated
short-term cashflow stresses to assess the resiliency of the bonds
impacted in the actions.

In general, Alt-A and Option ARM delinquency trends in the past
six months have closely tracked Moody's Q1 projections.  If the
pace of modifications picks up, delinquencies may be lower than
Moody's projections.  Severity trends, however, have worsened,
with current severities trending higher than Moody's lifetime
average severity assumptions by 5-9 percentage points in many
pools.  Given that recent data on the housing markets has been
mixed and there are early indications of home prices potentially
bottoming, it is unclear whether the recent higher severities
represent peak severities, and to what extent they might alter the
average lifetime expected severity.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, WMALT Series
2006-5 Trust

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. 3-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. 3-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/11/2009
     Downgraded to B1


XVIII LEVERAGED: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it downgraded the rating
of this note issued by XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2019, Downgraded to C; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class A Par
Value Test and Class B Par Value Test.  The weighted average
rating factor has steadily increased over the last year and is
currently 2628 versus a test level of 2600 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 12, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $30 million, accounting for roughly 7.9% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 13% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class B Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class A Par Value Test.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should an Event of Default
occur and continue.  As provided in Section 5 of the Indenture,
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, a
Majority of the Controlling Class directing acceleration may vote
to accelerate the payments on the Notes by declaring the principal
of all the Notes to be immediately due and payable.  In addition,
the Class A Lender may direct the trustee to proceed with the sale
and liquidation of the collateral.  The severity of any potential
losses to the Notes may depend on the timing and choice of these
remedies following an Event of Default.  As a result of these
uncertainties, the Class B Notes were downgraded.  In concluding
its review, Moody's expects to analyze the likelihood of an Event
of Default that results in subsequent acceleration and
liquidation.

Dryden XVIII Leveraged Loan 2007 Limited, issued in October 11,
2007, is a collateralized loan obligation, backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 13 Certs. From Three Resecuritizations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 13
certificates issued in three resecuritized RMBS transactions from
1992 and 1997.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

    (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
        underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
        the underlying securities portfolio

   (ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
        securities, and

  (iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, an expected
loss is derived by comparing the non-rated deal to a Moody's-rated
deal with similar current collateral and performance
characteristics.  An implicit rating is then determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp 1997-1R

  -- 1-B1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 8/21/1997 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- 1-B2, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/21/1997 Assigned Ba3

  -- 1-B3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/18/2005 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- 1-B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/18/2005 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Prudential Home Mtg Co 1992-A

  -- B2-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 10/10/1994 Downgraded
     to A1

  -- B3-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/1998 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- B3-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/1998 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- B3-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/1998 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- B3-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/1998 Downgraded to
     Ca

Prudential Home Mtg Co 1992-C

  -- B2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/5/1996 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- B3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/5/1996 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/24/1997 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/11/2000 Downgraded to
     Baa2


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches From 17 MV CLO Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of 92 tranches across 17 market value collateralized loan
obligation transactions and confirmed the rating of three tranches
of two MV CLOs.  Moody's said the rating actions reflect the
implementation of more conservative parameter estimates for price
volatility and illiquidity following the extreme turbulence
experienced by global debt markets since 2007.

Moody's first proposed the revised volatility and liquidity
parameters in a request for comment, "Moody's Proposes Revision to
Its Parameters for Corporate Assets Held in Market Value CDO
Transaction", published in April 2009.  After incorporating market
participants' comments, the revised modeling assumptions and
revised monitoring approach were published in the Moody's report
"Moody's Modifies Its Modeling Assumptions for Market-Value
Collateralized Loan Obligations" on July 9, 2009.

In market value transactions, noteholders' protection against
losses are built upon advance rates, which determine the minimum
amount of cushion required before a transaction has to be
delevered.  In Moody's analysis, advance rates are assessed so
that the expected loss to a class of noteholders is consistent
with the idealized expected loss of a desired rating level.  The
primary drivers of advance rates are historical volatility and the
liquidity profile of the assets.  While loan prices have improved
over recent months, the volatility and illiquidity parameters
outlined in the July report are appropriate to assess the cushions
required for various target rating levels.  They ensure that the
risk of market turbulence of similar or somewhat worse magnitude
as that experienced over the past two years is adequately
accounted for in the rating analysis,

The revised, more conservative volatility and liquidity
assumptions imply that lower advance rates are required in order
to achieve the same target rating levels for any given
transaction.  Advance rates that were set at issuance for
transactions prior to the extreme conditions the market has
witnessed since 2007 are therefore no longer adequate to maintain
existing rating levels.  Accordingly, the rating actions are based
on consideration of (i) quantitative analysis focusing on the new
and more conservative advance rates and maintenance of collateral
cushions in excess of those implied by existing advance rates and
(ii) qualitative factors that might be relevant to assess a
transaction, such as manager strategy and deal structural
features.

The quantitative analysis mainly focuses on several scenarios
where market value overcollateralization with the existing advance
rates is set at either 110% or 100% (i.e., 10% cushion or no
cushion, respectively).  Many managers have managed their
portfolios defensively through the most recent crisis by paying
down liabilities, accumulating significant portions of cash, and
maintaining market value cushions well above what is required by
deal advance rates.  However, Moody's remains concerned that there
is no contractual obligation for managers to keep all excess
overcollateralization in their transactions.  Therefore, for deals
that have maintained overcollateralization levels consistently
above 110%, using the existing advance rates to calculate the
cushion, Moody's starts by assuming that the transactions will
benefit from a 10% cushion.  Moody's also analyzes the scenario
where no cushion is available (i.e., 100% overcollateralization).
Specifically, to arrive at the scenario of a portfolio with 10% or
no cushion, (i) the liabilities are assumed to be fully drawn and
cash is reinvested in a hypothetical portfolio that is based on
the composition of a deal's existing portfolio until the market
value overcollateralization is at 110% or 100% or (ii) the
liabilities are assumed to remain at their current levels and cash
is distributed to equity holders until the market value
overcollateralization is at 110% or 100%.  These scenarios, in
combination with revised advance rates, produced a range of
ratings outcomes that were considered by Moody's rating
committees.

To arrive at the final rating levels, the rating committees also
considered factors such as i) a manager's behavior and deal
performance during the most recent credit crisis; ii) the
controlling rights of certain classes of noteholders and the
potential implications of exercising those rights under various
scenarios including events of default; iii) current and potential
portfolio composition; iv) existing advance rates in the
transaction and v) the maturity of the transaction.

Furthermore, Moody's took into consideration the fact that
subordinated tranches without the control rights may not fully
benefit from the market value cushion implied by the advance rates
during liquidation.  This is because the controlling parties may
seek to maximize their returns without regard for the returns to
subordinated classes and because there is inherent "cherry
picking" in the liquidation process that may protect the interests
of the controlling parties while exposing subordinated classes to
greater losses.  Moody's found that the risks posed to such
subordinated tranches in these transactions were not consistent
with investment grade ratings.

Moody's notes that the MV CLOs that are the subjects of the rating
actions are primarily backed by portfolios of bank loans and
corporate bonds.

Moody's has downgraded 92 debt tranches and confirmed three debt
tranches:

Anchorage Crossover Credit Finance, Ltd.

  -- US$160,000,000 Class A-1a First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Delayed Draw Notes Due 2013, Downgraded to A3; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1b First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2013, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ares Enhanced Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd.

  -- US$675,000,000 Class A-1a First Senior Secured Multi-Currency
     Variable Funding Notes due 2014, Downgraded to A1; previously
     on 10/24/2008 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1b First Senior Secured Variable
     Funding Swingline Notes due 2014, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on 10/24/2008 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$450,000,000 Class A-2 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/24/2008
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$225,000,000 Class A-3 First Senior Secured Variable
     Funding Notes due 2014, Downgraded to A1; previously on
     10/24/2008 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 10/24/2008
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2014, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/24/2008 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Up to US$35,000,000 in loans under the Second Senior Credit
     Agreement, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 10/24/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Up to US$35,000,000 in loans under the Mezzanine Credit
     Agreement, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/24/2008 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Avoca Credit Opportunities PLC

  -- EUR70,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2014, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/14/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  -- EUR200,000,000 VF-1 Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes due
     2014, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/14/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR8,750,000 Class C-1 Third Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/14/2008 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR4,500,000 Class D-1 Fourth Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/14/2008
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Denali Capital Credit Opportunity Fund Financing Ltd.

  -- Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded
     to B3; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- First Senior Secured Revolving Loans, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Second Senior Term Loans, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Geer Mountain Financing, Ltd.

  -- $180,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2014, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $180,000,000 Class A-2 First Senior Secured Variable Funding
     Notes Due 2014, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $40,000,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2014, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GoldenTree Credit Opportunities Second Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/15/2008
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2014, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/15/2008
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GoldenTree Credit Opportunities Financing I, Ltd.

  -- Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 10/15/2008 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Floating Rate Notes, Confirmed
     at A2; previously on 10/15/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-3 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-4 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-5 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Swingline
     Notes-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-6 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/15/2008
     Assigned Aaa and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A-7 First Senior Secured Variable
     Funding Dual Currency Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A3;
     previously on 10/15/2008 Assigned Aaa and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Secured Floating
     Rate Notes due 2013, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     10/15/2008 Assigned A2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C-3 Senior Subordinated Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/15/2008
     Assigned A2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Senior Secured Credit Revolving Facility, Downgraded to A3;
     previously on 10/15/2008 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- 2005-1 Second Senior Secured Loans, Downgraded to B1;
     previously on 10/15/2008 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$20,000,000 Mezzanine Secured Term Loans, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 10/15/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

GoldenTree Leverage Loan Financing I, Ltd.

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Jay Street Market Value CLO I Ltd.

  -- Class A Variable Funding Notes, Downgraded to Aa1; previously
     on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B Term Notes, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/9/2009
     A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Kinney Hill Credit Opportunities Fund, Ltd.

  -- US$385,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Variable Funding
     Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/22/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3 and remains on Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$16,500,000 Class B-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/22/2008 Downgraded to A2
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$19,250,000 Class C-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/22/2008 Downgraded to Ba2
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$19,250,000 Class D-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/22/2008 Downgraded to B3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

McDonnell Loan Opportunity Ltd. 2006-2

  -- Class A-5 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-6 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-7 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Swingline
     Notes, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on 10/10/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- 2006-2 Second Senior Credit, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- 2006-2 Mezzanine Credit, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     10/10/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

McDonnell Loan Opportunity Ltd.

  -- Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-3 First Senior Secured Variable Funding Swingline
     Notes, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded
     to Caa2; previously on 10/10/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Second Senior Credit, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Mezzanine Credit, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     10/10/2008 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Oak Hill Credit Opportunities Financing, Ltd.

  -- $487,500,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes, due 2013, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $450,000,000 Class A-2a First Senior Secured Multi-currency
     Variable Funding Notes, due 2013, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- $25,000,000 Class A-2b First Senior Secured Variable Funding
     Swingline Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A2; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $46,000,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floati,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $47,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2013, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $48,000,000 Second Senior Term Loans, Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- $46,500,000 Mezzanine Term Loans, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

OHA Finlandia Credit Fund

  -- $450,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Variable Funding
     Notes Due 2015, Confirmed at A2; previously on 7/9/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

OHSF Financing, Ltd.

  -- US$$89,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$17,500,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$7,250,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2013, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$10,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes
     due 2013, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Senior Revolving Credit Facility, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

OHSF II Financing, Ltd.

  -- US$$210,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$230,000,000 Class A-2a First Senior Secured Multi-
     currency Variable Funding Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$$10,000,000 Class A-2b First Senior Secured Variable
     Funding Swingline Notes due 2013, Downgraded to A1;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$$6,500,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$14,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2013, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/9/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$$10,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes
     due 2013, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Senior Term Loan, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/9/2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Second Senior Term Loan, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Mezzanine Term Loan, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/9/2009
     A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Shiprock Finance, SPC SF-3 Segregated Portfolio

  -- US$150,000,000 Variable Funding Notes, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Stone Tower Credit Funding I Ltd.

  -- Series 2006-1 Revolving Notes, Downgraded to A3; previously
     on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-2 Term Notes, Downgraded to A3; previously on
     7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-3 Delayed Funding Notes, Downgraded to A3;
     previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Series 2006-4 Delayed Funding, Downgraded to A3; previously
     on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2007-1 Senior Secured Delayed Funding Notes due 2016,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2007-2 Senior Secured Delayed Funding Notes due 2016,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Series 2007-3 Senior Secured Revolving Notes due 2016,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Symphony Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd.

  -- $364,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes
     Due 2015, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/29/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $8,000,000 Class B Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/29/2008 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $5,000,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2008 A2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $19,000,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/29/2008 Downgraded to B2
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $10,000,000 Loans under the Second Senior Credit Agreement,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/29/2008 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $10,000,000 Loans under the Mezzanine Credit Agreement,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2008 A2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Classes From Three RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 37
classes from three residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo, Alternative-A, and
subprime mortgage loan collateral issued in 2004 and 2006.  S&P
removed 22 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 13 classes
from the same transactions.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's assessment of current losses as well as
projected losses based on S&P's methodology and assumptions.  The
lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels.  Although
cumulative losses were generally low compared with S&P's projected
lifetime losses for the transactions reviewed, S&P is projecting
an increase in losses due to increases in delinquencies and the
current negative condition of the U.S. housing market.   The
affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the classes is sufficient to cover
losses associated with the existing rating levels.

For a list of articles detailing how S&P derived its lifetime
losses for the transactions S&P reviewed, see the "Related
Research" section below.

To maintain a 'AAA' rating for classes in Alt-A and subprime RMBS
transactions, S&P considers whether a bond is able to withstand
approximately 150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors assumed on specific
transactions.  For a class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating,
S&P consider whether a bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case
loss assumptions.  Other rating categories are dispersed,
approximately equally, between these two loss assumptions.  For
example, to maintain a 'BB' rating on one class, S&P may consider
whether the class is able to withstand approximately 110% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions, while, in connection with a different
class, S&P may consider whether it is able to withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

For a class in a prime jumbo RMBS transaction to maintain a rating
higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether, in its view, a bond could
absorb losses in excess of the base-case loss assumptions S&P
assumed in its analysis.  For example, S&P assessed whether one
class could, in its view, withstand approximately 130% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P assessed whether a different class could withstand 155%
of S&P's base-case loss assumption to maintain a 'BBB' rating.
Each class that has an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view,
withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
under S&P's analysis.

The subordination of more-junior classes within each applicable
structure, as well as excess interest for some structures,
provides credit support for the affected transactions.  In
addition, some of the reviewed transactions may be collateralized
by loans that are generally insured by third parties that cover a
certain amount, up to a maximum, based on the insurer's
regulations.  The collateral backing these transactions originally
consisted predominantly of fixed- or adjustable-rate, Alt-A, prime
jumbo, or subprime residential mortgage loans secured by one- to
four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated performance
information to assess whether, in S&P's view, the applicable
credit enhancement is sufficient to support the current ratings.
S&P will continue to monitor these transactions and take
additional rating actions as S&P thinks appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

              CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12
                        Series      2004-12

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      12669FL76     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      12669FL84     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      12669FL92     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      12669FM26     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      12669FM34     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      12669FM42     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      12669FM59     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    7-A-1      12669FM67     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    7-A-2      12669FM75     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    8-A-1      12669FM83     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    8-A-2      12669FM91     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    9-A-1      12669FN25     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    9-A-2      12669FN33     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    10-A-1     12669FN41     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-1     12669FN58     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-2     12669FN66     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-3     12669FN74     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    12-A-1     12669FN82     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    13-A-1     12669FN90     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-M        12669FP23     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    II-M       12669FQ30     A                    AA
    I-B-1      12669FP31     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    II-B-1     12669FQ48     B                    A
    I-B-2      12669FP49     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    II-B-2     12669FQ55     CCC                  BBB
    II-B-3     12669FU92     CC                   B

                Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
                     Series      2004-HYB4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-M        17307GMP0     A                    AA+
        2-B2       17307GMF2     CCC                  B
        1-B3       17307GMA3     D                    CC

        Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A        31659EAA6     BB                   BBB
        2-A2       31659EAC2     B                    BBB
        2-A3       31659EAD0     B                    BBB
        M1         31659EAE8     CC                   B
        M2         31659EAF5     CC                   CCC
        M4         31659EAH1     D                    CC
        M5         31659EAJ7     D                    CC
        M6         31659EAK4     D                    CC

                         Ratings Affirmed

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-12
                       Series      2004-12

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  14-A-1     12669FP56     AAA
                  14-A-3     12669FP72     AAA
                  15-A-1     12669FP80     AAA
                  16-A-1     12669FP98     AAA
                  16-A-2     12669FV42     AAA
                  II-X       12669FQ22     AAA

                Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
                      Series      2004-HYB4

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  H-AI       17307GLW6     AAA
                  H-AII      17307GLX4     AAA
                  A-A        17307GMC9     AAA
                  A-X        17307GMD7     AAA
                  1-B1       17307GLY2     CCC
                  2-B1       17307GME5     AA

        Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust Series 2006-2
                        Series      2006-2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  2-A1       31659EAB4     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 74 Tranches From 34 Hybrid CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 74
tranches from 34 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 63 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
ratings on seven of the downgraded tranches are on CreditWatch
with negative implications, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrades.  S&P withdrew one short-term rating because
the commercial paper program has been placed with the liquidity
bank.  S&P also withdrew other short-term ratings on tranches from
transactions that have converted to long-term notes.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and recent negative rating actions on U.S. subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities.  The CreditWatch
placements primarily affect transactions for which a significant
portion of the collateral assets currently have ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications or have significant
exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

The 74 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $26.104 billion.  Eighteen of the 34 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The other sixteen
transactions are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were
collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.

In addition, Standard & Poor's reviewed the rating assigned to New
World Funding 2008-1 Ltd. and, based on the current credit support
available to the tranche, has left the rating at its current
level.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                              Rating
                                              ------
  Transaction                 Class      To              From
  -----------                 -----      --              ----
ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         A-R        CC              BB-/Watch Neg
ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         A-T        CC              BB-/Watch Neg
BFC Genesee CDO Ltd.        A-1LA      CC              B/Watch Neg
BFC Genesee CDO Ltd.        A-1LB      CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      A-1        CC              BB/Watch Neg
Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      A-2        CC              CCC+/Watch Neg
Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      A-3        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      B-1        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      B-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        A-1NVA     CC              BB+/Watch Neg
Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        A-1NVB     CC              BB+/Watch Neg
Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        A-1V       CC              BB+/Watch Neg
Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Buckingham CDO Ltd.         ACP        CC/NR           BBB-/A-3/WatchNeg
Buckingham CDO Ltd.         B          CC              B+/Watch Neg
Buckingham CDO II Ltd.      A LT       CC/NR           BB/B/Watch Neg
Buckingham CDO II Ltd.      B          CC              CCC+/Watch Neg
Capella Funding Ltd.        1          BB+             A
Capella Funding Ltd.        A          NR              AAA
Capella Funding Ltd.        B          BBB             AA
C-BASS CBO XIX Ltd.         A-1        CC              B/Watch Neg
Crystal Cove CDO Ltd.       A1         CC              B-/Watch Neg
Duke Funding VII Ltd.       I-A1       CCC-/Watch Neg  BB/Watch Neg
Duke Funding VII Ltd.       I-A2       CCC-/Watch Neg  BB/Watch Neg
Duke Funding VII Ltd.       I-A2v      CCC-/Watch Neg  BB/Watch Neg
Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         A-1        CC              BB-/Watch Neg
Harp High Grade CDO I Ltd.  A-1        CC              BB/Watch Neg
Kent Funding III Ltd.       A-1        CC              B-/Watch Neg
Klio II Funding Ltd.        A LT       B-/NR/Watch Neg B-/B/Watch Neg
Klio III Funding Ltd.       A-1        CC              B+/Watch Neg
Klio III Funding Ltd.       A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Klio III Funding Ltd.       ABCP       CCC-/NR         BBB/A-2/Watch Neg
Lexington Capital Funding   A-1ANV     CCC-            B/Watch Neg
Lexington Capital Funding   A-1AV      CCC-            B/Watch Neg
Lexington Capital Funding   A-1B       CCC-            B/Watch Neg
Libertas Preferred Funding
I Ltd.                     A-1        CC              B+/Watch Neg
Libertas Preferred Funding
I Ltd                      A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Liberty Harbour II CDO Ltd. ACP        NR/NR           CCC/C
Marathon Structured Funding
I LLC                      A-1        CC              B/Watch Neg
McKinley Funding Ltd.       ABCP       CC/NR           BB/B/Watch Neg
McKinley Funding Ltd.       A-1        CC              B-/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO III Ltd.        A-1        CC              B-/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO III Ltd.        A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Millstone III CDO Ltd.      A-1A       CC              BB+/Watch Neg
Millstone III CDO Ltd.      A-1B       CC              B-/Watch Neg
Millstone III CDO Ltd.      A-2        CC              CCC+/Watch Neg
Millstone III CDO Ltd.      B          CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
MKP CBO III Ltd.            B          BBB/Watch Neg   A+
MKP CBO III Ltd.            B/C Combo  CCC+/Watch Neg  B+
MKP CBO III Ltd.            C          CC              CCC-
Monroe Harbor CDO 2005-1    A-1A       CC              B+/Watch Neg
Monroe Harbor CDO 2005-1    A-1B       CC              B+/Watch Neg
Monroe Harbor CDO 2005-1    A-2        CC              CCC/Watch Neg
Northlake CDO I Ltd.        I-A        CC              B/Watch Neg
Northlake CDO I Ltd.        I-MM       A-/NR/Watch Neg AAA/A-1+
Pinnacle Point Funding Ltd. A-1        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Pinnacle Point Funding Ltd. ABCP       B-/NR/Watch Neg AA-/A-1+/WatchNeg
RFC CDO IV Ltd.             A-2        CC              CCC/Watch Neg
Ridgeway Court Funding I    A1M        CC              B/Watch Neg
Ridgeway Court Funding I    A1Q        CC              B/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures II Ltd.     A-1        AA/NR/Watch Neg AA/A-1+/Watch Neg
Sherwood Funding CDO II     A-1        CC              B/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding I Ltd.  A-1        CC              B/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding III     A 1B       CC              B-/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding III     A-1A       CC              B-/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding III     A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           I          CC              B-/Watch Neg
Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           II         CC              CCC/Watch Neg
Summer Street 2005-1 Ltd.   A-1        CC              BB+/Watch Neg
Summer Street 2005-1 Ltd.   A-2        CC              CCC-
Tazlina Funding CDO I Ltd.  A-1        CC              B-/Watch Neg
Tazlina Funding CDO I Ltd.  A-2        CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Topanga CDO Ltd.            A-1        CC              BB-/Watch Neg
Topanga CDO Ltd.            A-2        CC              CCC+/Watch Neg
West Trade Funding CDO I    A-1        CC              B/Watch Neg
West Trade Funding CDO I    A-2        CC              CCC+/Watch Neg
West Trade Funding CDO I    B          CC              CCC/Watch Neg
West Trade Funding CDO I    C          CC              CCC-/Watch Neg
Whitehawk CDO Funding Ltd.  A-1MT-g    NR              AA

                     Other Ratings Reviewed

          Transaction                 Class      Rating
          -----------                 -----      ------
          ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         A-M        CC
          ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         B          CC
          ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         C          CC
          ACA ABS 2003-1 Ltd.         D          CC
          BFC Genesee CDO Ltd.        A-2L       CC
          BFC Genesee CDO Ltd.        A-3L       CC
          BFC Genesee CDO Ltd.        B-1L       CC
          Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      C          CC
          Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      D-1        CC
          Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      D-2        CC
          Blue Edge ABS CDO Ltd.      E          CC
          Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        B          CC
          Broderick CDO 1 Ltd.        C          CC
          C-BASS CBO XIX Ltd.         A-2        CC
          C-BASS CBO XIX Ltd.         B          CC
          C-BASS CBO XIX Ltd.         C          CC
          C-BASS CBO XIX Ltd.         D          CC
          Crystal Cove CDO Ltd.       A2         CC
          Crystal Cove CDO Ltd.       B          CC
          Crystal Cove CDO Ltd.       C1         CC
          Crystal Cove CDO Ltd.       C2         CC
          Duke Funding VII Ltd.       II         CC
          Duke Funding VII Ltd.       III-A      CC
          Duke Funding VII Ltd.       III-B      CC
          Duke Funding VII Ltd.       IV-A       CC
          Duke Funding VII Ltd.       IV-B       CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         A-2        CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         A-3        CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         A-4        CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         B          CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         C          CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         D          CC
          Gemstone CDO V Ltd.         E          CC
          Harp High Grade CDO I Ltd.  A-2        CC
          Harp High Grade CDO I Ltd.  B          CC
          Harp High Grade CDO I Ltd.  C          CC
          Harp High Grade CDO I Ltd.  D          CC
          Kent Funding III Ltd.       A-2        CC
          Kent Funding III Ltd.       A-3        CC
          Kent Funding III Ltd.       B          CC
          Kent Funding III Ltd.       C          CC
          Kent Funding III Ltd.       D          CC
          Klio III Funding Ltd.       B          CC
          Klio III Funding Ltd.       C          CC
          Klio III Funding Ltd.       Pref Shrs  CC
          Lexington Capital Funding   A-2        CC
          Lexington Capital Funding   B          CC
          Lexington Capital Funding   C          CC
          Lexington Capital Funding   D          CC
          Lexington Capital Funding   E          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     B          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     C          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     D          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     E          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     F          CC
          Libertas Preferred Funding
           I Ltd.                     G          CC
          Mercury CDO III Ltd.        B          CC
          Mercury CDO III Ltd.        C          CC
          Mercury CDO III Ltd.        D          CC
          Millstone III CDO Ltd.      C          CC
          Millstone III CDO Ltd.      D-1        CC
          Millstone III CDO Ltd.      D-2        CC
          MKP CBO III Ltd.            A Combo    AAA
          MKP CBO III Ltd.            A-1        AAA
          MKP CBO III Ltd.            A-2        AAA
          Monroe Harbor CDO 2005-1    B          CC
          New World Funding 2008-1    A-1S       AA
          Northlake CDO I Ltd.        II         CC
          Northlake CDO I Ltd.        III        CC
          Pinnacle Point Funding Ltd. A-2        CC
          Pinnacle Point Funding Ltd. B          CC
          RFC CDO IV Ltd.             A-3        CC
          RFC CDO IV Ltd.             B          CC
          RFC CDO IV Ltd.             C          CC
          RFC CDO IV Ltd.             D          CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    A2         CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    A3         CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    A4         CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    B          CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    C          CC
          Ridgeway Court Funding I    Q          CC
          Sherwood Funding CDO II     A-2        CC
          Sherwood Funding CDO II     B          CC
          Sherwood Funding CDO II     C          CC
          Sherwood Funding CDO II     D          CC
          South Coast Funding I Ltd.  A-2        CC
          South Coast Funding III     A-3A       CC
          South Coast Funding III     A-3B       CC
          South Coast Funding III     B          CC
          South Coast Funding III     C          CC
          Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           III        CC
          Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           IV         CC
          Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           V          CC
          Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           VI         CC
          Stack 2006-1 Ltd.           VII        CC
          Summer Street 2005-1 Ltd.   A-3        CC
          Summer Street 2005-1 Ltd.   B          CC
          Summer Street 2005-1 Ltd.   C          CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO I Ltd.  B          CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO I Ltd.  C          CC
          Tazlina Funding CDO I Ltd.  D          CC
          Topanga CDO Ltd.            B          CC
          Topanga CDO Ltd.            C          CC
          West Trade Funding CDO I    D          CC
          West Trade Funding CDO I    E          CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 1,050 Classes From 72 RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 1,050
classes from 72 U.S. prime jumbo and Alterative-a residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions issued from 2005 to 2007
and removed 717 of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 285
classes from 37 of these transactions, as well as two additional
transactions, and removed 122 of the ratings from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the projected credit
support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.  For more
information about the methodology S&P used to review these
transactions, see the "Related Research" section at the end of
this press release.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration, and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class.  In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assesses whether the class can withstand the base-case loss
assumptions S&P uses in its analysis.  For transactions backed by
prime-jumbo collateral, to maintain an 'AAA' rating, S&P assesses
whether the class can withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-
case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and qualitative
factors applied to specific transactions.  To maintain a rating in
categories between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P assesses
whether the class can withstand losses exceeding the base-case
assumption at a percentage specific to each rating category, up to
235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would assesses whether
one class could withstand approximately 130% of S&P's base-case
loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 155% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

For transactions backed by Alt-A collateral, to maintain a 'AAA'
rating, S&P assesses whether the class can withstand approximately
150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual
caps and qualitative factors applied to specific transactions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while
S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios.  These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.

The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups.  Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s).  Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class(es), interest
shortfalls may occur due to a group collateral balance that is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.  Generally, cross-collateralization is
designed to allow overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow
to undercollateralized groups in order to mitigate this issue.
However, if the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate
that is lower than the pass-through rate of the
undercollateralized group, available interest may not be
sufficient to satisfy the undercollateralized group's interest
requirement.  Therefore, the principal portion of available
funds may be used to satisfy interest obligations based on the
interest-principal payment priority within the structure.

In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this issue due to the fact that structures may pay
principal pro rata with senior support classes.  Although the
senior class was not exposed to a write-down in any of the prior
periods, the senior class could be susceptible to a write-down in
the final period due to the aforementioned issues.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien,
prime jumbo and Alt-A mortgage loans.

                          Rating Actions

               Banc of America Funding 2005-3 Trust
                        Series      2005-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05946XVH3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05946XVJ9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      05946XVK6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05946XVL4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      05946XVM2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      05946XVN0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      05946XVP5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      05946XVQ3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      05946XVR1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     05946XVS9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     05946XVV2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     05946XVW0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-15     05946XVX8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-16     05946XVY6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-17     05946XVZ3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-18     05946XWA7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-19     05946XWB5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-20     05946XWC3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-21     05946XWD1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-22     05946XWE9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-23     05946XWF6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-24     05946XWG4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-25     05946XWH2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    30-PO      05946XWM1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        05946XWX7     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    B-2        05946XWY5     BBB                  A/Watch Neg
    B-3        05946XWZ2     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    B-4        05946XXA6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    B-5        05946XXB4     CC                   B/Watch Neg

               Banc of America Funding 2006-7 Trust
                        Series      2006-7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05951KAB9     BBB                  AAA
    1-A-2      05951KAC7     CCC                  AAA
    1-A-3      05951KAD5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      05951KAE3     BBB                  AAA
    1-A-5      05951KAF0     CCC                  AAA
    1-A-7      05951KAH6     BBB                  AAA
    1-A-8      05951KAJ2     BBB                  AAA
    1-A-9      05951KAK9     CCC                  AAA
    1-A-10     05951KAL7     CCC                  AAA
    1-A-11     05951KAM5     CCC                  AAA
    1-A-12     05951KAN3     CCC                  AAA
    30-IO      05951KAP8     BBB                  AAA
    30-PO      05951KAQ6     CCC                  AAA
    T2-A-1     05951KAX1     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-2     05951KAY9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-3     05951KAZ6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-4     05951KBA0     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-5     05951KBB8     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    T2-A-6     05951KBC6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-7     05951KBD4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    T2-A-8     05951KBE2     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-A     05951KBF9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-A-B     05951KBG7     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    T2-M-1     05951KBH5     CC                   CCC
    T2-M-2     05951KBJ1     CC                   CCC
    T2-M-3     05951KBK8     CC                   CCC
    T2-M-4     05951KBL6     D                    CCC
    T2-M-5     05951KBM4     D                    CCC
    T2-M-6     05951KBN2     D                    CCC

              Banc of America Mortgage 2006-3 Trust
                        Series      2006-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-13     05950LAN2     BBB+                 AA
        1-A-15     05950LAQ5     BBB+                 AA
        30-IO      05950LAT9     BBB+                 AA

               Banc of America Mortgage 2007-3 Trust
                        Series      2007-3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      05954CAA6     CCC                  BBB
        1-A-2      05954CAB4     CCC                  B
        1-PO       05954CAD0     CCC                  B
        2-A-1      05954CAE8     B-                   BBB
        2-A-2      05954CAF5     B-                   BBB
        2-A-3      05954CAG3     CCC                  B
        2-A-4      05954CAH1     B-                   BBB
        2-A-5      05954CAJ7     B-                   BBB
        2-A-6      05954CAK4     B-                   BBB
        2-A-7      05954CAL2     B-                   BBB
        2-A-8      05954CAM0     CCC                  BBB
        2-A-9      05954CAN8     CCC                  B
        2-A-10     05954CAP3     B-                   BBB
        2-A-11     05954CAQ1     B-                   BBB
        2-A-12     05954CAR9     B-                   BBB
        2-A-13     05954CAS7     B-                   BBB
        2-A-14     05954CAT5     B-                   BBB
        2-A-15     05954CAU2     B-                   BBB
        2-A-16     05954CAV0     B-                   BBB
        2-A-17     05954CAW8     B-                   BBB
        2-A-18     05954CAX6     B-                   BBB
        2-A-19     05954CAY4     B-                   BBB
        2-A-20     05954CAZ1     B-                   BBB
        2-A-21     05954CBA5     B-                   BBB
        2-A-22     05954CBB3     B-                   BBB
        2-A-23     05954CBC1     B-                   BBB
        2-IO       05954CBD9     B-                   BBB

             Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc
                        Series      2005-L

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      05949CPD2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      05949CPE0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      05949CPG5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      05949CPH3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      05949CPJ9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      05949CPK6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      05949CPL4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      05949CPM2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      05949CPN0     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      05949CPP5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      05949CPQ3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg

            Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2005-A1
                       Series      2005-A-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      16162WPB9     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       16162WPC7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       16162WPD5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       16162WPE3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       16162WPF0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A4       16162WPG8     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A5       16162WPH6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       16162WPJ2     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       16162WPK9     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A3       16162WPL7     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A4       16162WPM5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

           Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2006-S3
                        Series      2006-S3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       16162XAA5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A2       16162XAB3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A3       16162XAC1     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A4       16162XAD9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A5       16162XAE7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A6       16162XAF4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A7       16162XAG2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-AX       16162XAL1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       16162XAH0     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A2       16162XAJ6     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       16162XAK3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-AX       16162XAM9     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    A-P        16162XAW7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-M        16162XAP2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg

           Chase Mortgage Finance Trust Series 2007-S2
                       Series      2007-S2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       16163EAA6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       16163EAB4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A3       16163EAC2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A4       16163EAD0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A5       16163EAE8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A6       16163EAF5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A7       16163EAG3     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A8       16163EAH1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1-A9       16163EAJ7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-AX       16163EAK4     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       16163EAL2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    2-A2       16163EAM0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    2-A3       16163EAN8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    2-AX       16163EAT5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    A-P        16163EAU2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    A-M        16163EAW8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-17
                       Series      2005-17

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      12669G5M9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      12669G5N7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      12669G5P2     B                    AAA
    1-A-4      12669G5Q0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      12669G5R8     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-6      12669G5S6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      12669G5T4     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      12669G5U1     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      12669G5V9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     12669G5W7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     12669G5X5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     12669G5Y3     B                    AAA
    PO         12669G6B2     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      12669G5Z0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      12669G6A4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB5
                       Series      2005-HYB5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      12669GX97     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      12669GY21     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-IO     12669GY39     B+                   AAA
    2-A-1      12669GY47     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      12669GY54     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-IO     12669GY62     BB+                  AAA
    3-A-1      12669GY70     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      12669G6K2     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      12669G6L0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-IO     12669G6M8     BB-                  AAA
    M          12669GZ20     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    B-1        12669GZ38     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    B-2        12669GZ46     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

             CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-10
                        Series      2006-10

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      126694Z76     CCC                  B
        1-A-2      126694Z84     CCC                  B
        1-A-3      126694Z92     CCC                  B
        1-A-4      1266942A5     CCC                  B
        1-A-5      1266942B3     CCC                  B
        1-A-6      1266942C1     CCC                  B
        1-A-7      1266942D9     CCC                  B
        1-A-9      1266942F4     CCC                  B
        1-A-11     1266942H0     CCC                  B
        1-A-12     1266942J6     CCC                  B
        1-A-13     1266942K3     CCC                  B
        1-A-14     1266942L1     CCC                  B
        1-A-15     1266942M9     CCC                  B
        1-A-16     1266942N7     CCC                  B
        2-A-1      1266942Q0     CCC                  B
        2-A-2      1266943A4     CCC                  B
        2-X        1266942R8     CCC                  B
        PO         1266942S6     CCC                  B

          Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust Series 2007-4
                       Series      2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-11      17312XAL8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

        Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2006-4
                        Series      2006-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-4       17310DAD2     AA                   AAA
    IA-5       17310DAE0     AA                   AAA
    IA-9       17310DAJ9     AA                   AAA

        Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust, Series 2007-3
                       Series      2007-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    IA-3       17312FAC7     BB+                  AAA/Watch Neg

                Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
                       Series      2005-7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A-1B     17307GD62     B                    BB
        2-A-2A     17307GB72     B+                   AA
        2-A-2B     17307GD70     B                    BB
        2-A-3A     17307GB80     B-                   AA
        2-A-3B     17307GD88     CCC                  BB
        2-A4       17307GB98     B                    BB
        2-A-5A     17307GC22     B+                   AA
        2-A-5B     17307GD96     B                    BB

                    Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
                       Series      2005-10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A1A      17307GT40     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A2A      17307GT57     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A12B     17307GT65     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A3A      17307GT73     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A4A      17307GT81     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A34B     17307GT99     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A5A      17307GU22     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A5B      17307GU30     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-B1       17307GU48     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                 CSMC Mortgage Backed Trust 2006-7
                        Series      2006-7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2-A-1      22942KAD2     B                    BBB+
        3-A-1      22942KAK6     CCC                  B
        3-A-2      22942KAL4     CCC                  B
        3-A-4      22942KAN0     CCC                  B
        D-X        22942KCQ1     B                    BBB+
        DB3        22942KCX6     D                    CC

            CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2006-1
                       Series      2006-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      225470UH4     B-                   B
        1-A-2      225470UJ0     B-                   B
        1-A-3      225470UK7     B-                   B
        1-A-6      225470UN1     B-                   B
        1-A-7      225470UP6     B-                   B
        2-A-1      225470UQ4     B-                   BBB
        2-A-2      225470VN0     B-                   B
        5-A-1      225470WC3     B-                   AAA
        5-A-2      225470WD1     B-                   B
        D-X        225470WF6     BBB+                 AAA
        A-P        225470WG4     B-                   B
        3-A-1      225470UR2     BB+                  AA
        3-A-2      225470US0     BB+                  AA
        3-A-3      225470UT8     BB+                  AA
        3-A-4      225470UU5     BB+                  AA
        3-A-5      225470UV3     BB+                  AA
        3-A-6      225470UW1     BB+                  AA
        3-A-7      225470UX9     BB+                  AA
        3-A-8      225470UY7     BB+                  AA
        3-A-9      225470UZ4     BB+                  AA
        3-A-10     225470VA8     BB+                  AA
        3-A-11     225470VB6     BB+                  AA
        3-A-12     225470VC4     BB+                  AA
        3-A-13     225470VD2     BB+                  AA
        3-A-14     225470VE0     BB+                  AA
        3-A-15     225470VF7     BB+                  AA
        3-A-16     225470VG5     BB+                  AA
        3-A-17     225470VH3     BB+                  AA
        3-A-18     225470VJ9     BB+                  AA
        3-A-19     225470VK6     BB+                  AA
        3-A-21     225470VM2     BB+                  AA
        4-A-1      225470VQ3     BB+                  AA
        4-A-2      225470VR1     BB+                  AA
        4-A-3      225470VS9     BB+                  AA
        4-A-4      225470VT7     BB+                  AA
        4-A-5      225470VU4     BB+                  AA
        4-A-6      225470VV2     BB+                  AA
        4-A-7      225470VW0     BB+                  AA
        4-A-8      225470VX8     BB+                  AA
        4-A-9      225470VY6     BB+                  AA
        4-A-10     225470VZ3     BB+                  AA
        4-A-11     225470WA7     BB+                  AA
        4-A-12     225470WB5     BB+                  AA
        4-A-13     225470VP5     BB+                  AA
        4-A-14     225470WW9     BB+                  AA
        D-B-2      225470WN9     CC                   CCC
        D-B-3      225470WP4     D                    CC

         First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-3
                        Series      2006-3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-4      32052RAD2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-5      32052RAE0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-6      32052RAF7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-7      32052RAG5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-8      32052RAH3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-10     32052RAK6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-11     32052RAL4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-12     32052RAM2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-13     32052RAN0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-14     32052RAP5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-15     32052RAQ3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-PO     32052RAT7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     32052RAV2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-PO    32052RAW0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

         First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-4
                        Series      2007-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    I-A-1      32056CAA7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      32056CAB5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      32056CAC3     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-4      32056CAD1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-5      32056CAE9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-6      32056CAF6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-7      32056CAG4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-8      32056CAH2     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-9      32056CAJ8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-10     32056CAK5     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-11     32056CAL3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-13     32056CAN9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-14     32056CAP4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-15     32056CAQ2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-16     32056CAR0     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-17     32056CAS8     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-PO     32056CAT6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     32056CAV1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     32056CAW9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3
                      Series      2005-AR3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        36185N6Y1     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      36185N6Z8     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      36185N7A2     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      36185N7B0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      36185N7C8     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      36185N7D6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-4      36185N7E4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      36185N7F1     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      36185N7G9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-5      36185N7K0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      36185N7L8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      36185N7M6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        36185N7P9     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        36185N7Q7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        36185N7R5     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    4-A-3      36185N7H7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR4
                      Series      2005-AR4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        76112BUD0     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      76112BUE8     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      76112BUF5     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      76112BUG3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      76112BUH1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      76112BUJ7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      76112BUK4     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      76112BUL2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      76112BUM0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76112BUP3     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        76112BUQ1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        76112BUR9     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR5
                       Series      2005-AR5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      76112BXX3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      76112BXY1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      76112BXZ8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      76112BYA2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      76112BYB0     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      76112BYC8     BB-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      76112BYD6     AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      76112BYE4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      76112BYF1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6
                       Series      2005-AR6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      36185MBG6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      36185MBH4     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      36185MBJ0     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      36185MBK7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      36185MBL5     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      36185MBM3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      36185MBN1     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      36185MBP6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        36185MBR2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        36185MBS0     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    M-3        36185MBT8     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2
                      Series      2006-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      36185MET5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      36185MEU2     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      36185MEV0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      36185MEW8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      36185MEX6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      36185MEY4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      36185MEZ1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      36185MFA5     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    5-A-1A     36185MFB3     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1B     36185MFC1     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-2      36185MFD9     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-1        36185MFE7     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-2        36185MFF4     CC                   CCC

                GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-J1
                       Series      2006-J1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-1        36185MEB4     B                    BB
        A-2        36185MEC2     B                    BB
        A-3        36185MED0     B-                   BB
        A-4        36185MEE8     B                    BB
        A-6        36185MEG3     AA-                  AAA
        A-7        36185MEH1     B-                   BB
        PO         36185MEJ7     B-                   BB
        IO         36185MEK4     AA-                  AAA

                  GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F
                       Series      2005-4F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-1       36242DV91     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-1       36242DW25     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-1       36242DW33     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-1       36242DW41     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-2       36242DW58     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-3       36242DW66     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A4       36242DW74     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A5       36242DW82     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-6       36242DW90     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-7       36242DX24     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-8       36242DX32     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-9       36242DX40     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-10      36242DX57     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-11      36242DX65     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-12      36242DX73     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-13      36242DX81     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-1       36242DX99     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-2       36242DY23     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-1       36242DY31     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        36242DY56     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         36242DY64     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    B2         36242DY72     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    B3         36242DY80     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    B4         36242DZ48     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    B5         36242DZ55     CC                   B/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR2
                       Series      2005-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A1        36242DH48     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A2        36242DH55     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A3        36242DH63     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2A1        36242DH71     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A1        36242DH89     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4A1        36242DH97     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5A1        36242DJ20     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2B1        36242DJ61     BBB-                 AA+/Watch Neg
    1B1        36242DJ38     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    2B2        36242DJ79     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1B2        36242DJ46     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
    2B3        36242DJ87     CC                   CCC
    1B3        36242DJ53     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    1B4        36242DK44     CC                   B/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3
                       Series      2005-AR3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A1        36242D4R1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3A1        36242D4T7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3A2        362341AL3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4A1        36242D4U4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5A1        36242D4V2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6A1        36242D4W0     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    6A2        36242D4X8     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    7A1        36242D4Y6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    8A1        36242D4Z3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    8A2        36242D5A7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2B1        36242D5F6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    1B1        36242D5C3     BBB-                 AA+/Watch Neg
    2B2        36242D5G4     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    1B2        36242D5D1     B-                   A+/Watch Neg
    1B3        36242D5E9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2B3        36242D5H2     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    1B4        36242D5M1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    2B4        36242D5Q2     D                    BB/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5F
                       Series      2006-5F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-1       36297XAA1     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-1       36297XAB9     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-2       36297XAC7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-3       36297XAD5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-4       36297XAE3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-5       36297XAF0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-6       36297XAW3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-1       36297XAG8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-2       36297XAH6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-3       36297XAX1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-4       36297XAY9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-5       36297XAZ6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-6       36297XBA0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-7       36297XBB8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-1       36297XAJ2     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-2       36297XBC6     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-1       36297XAK9     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        36297XAL7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR2
                       Series      2006-AR2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        2A1        36297TAB8     A                    AAA
        2A2        36297TAC6     B-                   BBB
        2A3        36297TAD4     CCC                  B
        3A1        36297TAE2     B-                   BBB
        3A2        36297TAF9     CCC                  B
        4A1        36297TAG7     B-                   BBB
        4A2        36297TAH5     CCC                  B
        5A2        36297TAK8     CCC                  B
        2B1        36297TAQ5     CC                   CCC
        1B2        36297TAN2     B                    BBB
        2B4        36297TAY8     D                    CC

              HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
                        Series      2005-4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A        41161PMV2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A        41161PMW0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       41161PMX8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       41161PMY6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A        41161PMZ3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A        41161PNA7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        41161PNC3     B-                   AA/Watch Neg
    B-2        41161PND1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    B-3        41161PNE9     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B-4        41161PNF6     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3
                       Series      2005-A3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      466247PV9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      466247PW7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      466247PX5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      466247PY3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      466247PZ0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-4      466247QA4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-5      466247QB2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      466247QC0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      466247QD8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-1      466247QE6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A-3      466247QG1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      466247QH9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-2      466247QJ5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-3      466247QK2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-4      466247QL0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-5      466247QM8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-6      466247RM7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-7      466247QN6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    7CA1       466247QP1     AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    7CA2       466247QQ9     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    8JA1       466247QR7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    8JA2       466247QS5     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    9CA1       466247QT3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    9CA2       466247QU0     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    10-J-1     466247QV8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    10-J-2     466247QW6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-1     466247QX4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-2     466247QY2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-3     466247QZ9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    11-A-4     466247RA3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-B-1      466247RC9     BB+                  AA/Watch Neg
    II-BA-1    466247RF2     B                    AA/Watch Neg
    III-B-1    466247RJ4     AA                   AA/Watch Neg
    I-B-2      466247RD7     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    II-BA-2    466247RG0     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    III-B-2    466247RK1     A                    A/Watch Neg
    I-B-3      466247RE5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    II-BA-3    466247RH8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    III-B-3    466247RL9     BBB                  BBB/Watch Neg
    I-B-4      466247PL1     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    II-BA-4    466247PP2     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    III-B-4    466247PS6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
    I-B-5      466247PM9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    II-BA-5    466247PQ0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    III-B-5    466247PT4     B                    B/Watch Neg

                  JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A8
                       Series      2005-A8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      466247YH0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      466247YJ6     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      466247YK3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      466247YL1     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      466247YM9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      466247YN7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      466247YP2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      466247YR8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      466247YS6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-7      466247YT4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-8      466247YU1     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      466247YV9     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      466247YW7     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      466247YX5     AA-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-4      466247YY3     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      466247YZ0     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-1      466247ZB2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-2      466247ZC0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-3      466247ZD8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A-4      466247ZE6     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        466247ZF3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    B-2        466247ZG1     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
    B-3        466247ZH9     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    B-4        466247ZJ5     CC                   BB/Watch Neg

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-S2
                       Series      2005-S2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      466247UM3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      466247UN1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      466247UP6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      466247UQ4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-5      466247UR2     BBB                  AAA
    1-A-6      466247US0     BBB                  AAA
    2-A-1      466247UT8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      466247UU5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      466247UV3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      466247UW1     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      466247UX9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      466247UY7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-7      466247UZ4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-8      466247VA8     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-9      466247VB6     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-10     466247VC4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-11     466247VD2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-12     466247VE0     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-13     466247VF7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-14     466247VG5     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-15     466247VH3     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-16     466247VJ9     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-X      466247VK6     BBB                  AAA
    A-P        466247VL4     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      466247VM2     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      466247VN0     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      466247VP5     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-3      466247VQ3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-4      466247VR1     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-P      466247VT7     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-X      466247VS9     B-                   AAA
    4-B-1      466247VX8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    4-B-2      466247VY6     CC                   A/Watch Neg
    4-B-3      466247VZ3     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
    4-B-4      466247WE9     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    4-B-5      466247WF6     CC                   CCC

                  JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S3
                       Series      2006-S3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      46629AAA9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      46629AAB7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-3      46629AAC5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-4      46629AAD3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-7      46629AAG6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-8      46629AAH4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-9      46629AAJ0     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-10     46629AAK7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-11     46629AAL5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-12     46629AAM3     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-13     46629AAN1     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-14     46629AAP6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-15     46629AAQ4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-16     46629AAR2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-17     46629AAS0     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-18     46629AAT8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-19     46629AAU5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-21     46629AAW1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-22     46629AAX9     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-23     46629AAY7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-24     46629AAZ4     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-25     46629ABA8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-26     46629ABB6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-27     46629ABC4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-28     46629ABD2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-29     46629ABE0     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-30     46629ABF7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A-31     46629ABG5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      46629ABR1     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      46629ABS9     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      46629ABT7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      46629ABU4     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      46629ABV2     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-6      46629ABW0     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-7      46629ABX8     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A-8      46629ABY6     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    A-X        46629ABZ3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-P        46629ACA7     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-A2
                       Series      2007-A2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A-1      46630PAA3     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-1M     46630PAB1     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-1S     46630PAC9     B-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      46630PAD7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-1      46630PAE5     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-2      46630PAF2     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3      46630PAG0     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3M     46630PAH8     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3S     46630PAJ4     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3L     46630PAK1     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-3F     46630PAL9     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-4      46630PAM7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5      46630PAN5     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5M     46630PBS3     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A-5S     46630PBT1     B+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-1      46630PAP0     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-2      46630PAQ8     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3      46630PAR6     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3M     46630PAS4     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3S     46630PAT2     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3L     46630PAU9     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-3F     46630PAV7     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-4      46630PAW5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A-5      46630PAX3     BBB+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1      46630PAY1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1M     46630PAZ8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-1S     46630PBA2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2      46630PBB0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2M     46630PBC8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2S     46630PBD6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A-2L     46630PBE4     BBB-             &nb