TCR_Public/090802.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, August 2, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 212

                            Headlines



ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2003-HS1 Securities
ANCHOR NATIONAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two 1994-1 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 20 2004-2 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-2 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-3 Certs.

BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Securities
BELLE HAVEN: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Actions on Notes
BXG RECEIVABLES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes
CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CALLIDUS DEBT PARTNERS: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Classes

CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Notes
CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
CAPITALSOURCE REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2006-A Notes
CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-CB4 Tranche

CHARLIE MAC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-2 Tranches
CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-OPT1 Notes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-4 Tranches
CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-III Notes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2005-EMG Certs.

COAST FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 1999-C1 Notes
CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
COPPER RIVER: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
CORTS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $25 Mil. Certificates

COUNTRYWIDE FHA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Tranches
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 140 Tranches
CSFB 2007-TFL2: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 Pooled Classes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C3 Certs.

CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
E*TRADE RV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches

FIFTH THIRD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2002-FTB1 Certs.
FIRST UNION: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Six 2001-C1 Certificates
FIRSTPLUS HOME: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 1996-A Certificate
FOOTHILL CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class SL-A to 'C'
GALAXY V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GALAXY VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GALLATIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
GMAC INC: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Classes of Securities

GOLDENTREE MULTISTRATEGY: S&P Affirms Ratings on Four Tranches
GRAYSTON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-GG9 Certs.
GSC GROUP: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GSMPS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 81 Tranches

GULF STREAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2004-1 Notes
GULF STREAM-RASHINBAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
HCA INC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on $750 Million Senior Notes
HOME RE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
HSBC BANK: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2004-11 Securities From 'BB-'

HUNTINGTON CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
ISCHUS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
IXIS REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-HE4 Securities
KKR FINANCIAL: S&P Puts Ratings on 2005-1 Notes on Negative Watch
LOCHSONG LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes to 'D'

LOOMIS SAYLES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
MADISON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
MADISON PARK FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes
MARATHON FINANCING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MASTR REPERFORMING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 39 Tranches

MAX FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'B1'
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1998-C1-CTL Certs.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2005-ACR1 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2005-CIP1 Certs.
MESA TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-2 Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on $3 Million Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Raises Rating on EUR43 Million Notes to 'B'
MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
NAAC REPERFORMING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 26 Tranches
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes

NAVIGARE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
NAVIGARE FUNDING: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2007-1 Notes
PAMCO CAYMAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'Ca'
PHH MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 24 2008-CIM1 Tranches

PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions
PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
PROSPECT PARK: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
PRUDENTIAL STRUCTURED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes
PUNTO VERDE: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on $40 Million Tax-Exempt Notes

RACE POINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
RAFFLES PLACE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
RBSGC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-RP1 Tranches
SACO I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2000-3 Certificates
SASCO 2005: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches

SASCO FHA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches
SATURN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
SAXON MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 121 Tranches
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Tranche

SFA CABS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
SHEFFIELD CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
SILVERADO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-II Notes
SLATE CDO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
SMART HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-1 Tranches

SOLSTICE ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2005-4 Certs.
SUPERIOR WHOLESALE: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Class C & D Notes
SUPERIOR WHOLESALE INENTORY: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on 2 Classes
SVO 2005-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes

SWIFT MASTER: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Class C & D Notes
SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
T2 INCOME: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Notes
TERRA CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A1 2007-2 Notes

TERRA CDO: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes of 2007-5 Notes
TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2004-EQR1 Cert.
USAA CREDIT: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
VELOCITY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings 14 2004-RP1 Tranches

WAMU MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 115 Tranches
WASI FINANCE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-HES1 Notes

* Moody's Assigns Ratings on Two Participation Interests
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certs. by Resecuritizations
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 47 Classes From Seven RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 52 Tranches From 26 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 62 Classes From Six Alt-A Transactions

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 166 Classes From 10 Alt-A RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 6,198 Classes From 611 RMBS Deals



                            *********

ACE SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2003-HS1 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of three
securities issued by ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2003-HS1.  These actions are part of an ongoing review of
subprime RMBS transactions.

The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections.  The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months.

Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions.  The results of these two
calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are weighted
to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp.  Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-
HS1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/31/2007 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/1/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/20/2007 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ANCHOR NATIONAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two 1994-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed these classes of Anchor National Life
Insurance 1994-1.  The classes represent a beneficial ownership
interest in separate trust funds.

Anchor National Life Insurance 1994-1

  -- $55.4 million class A at 'C/RR6';
  -- $101,919 class G at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative.

The rating actions were taken as part of Fitch's ongoing
surveillance process of existing transactions.

Fitch reviewed the performance of the remaining underlying
securities which consist of Daiwa Mortgage Acceptance Corporation
1991-A C, which is the collateral for class A, and a pool of
residential mortgage loans which is the collateral for class G.
In addition, consideration was given to the limited guaranty
provided by AIG with a remaining balance of $9.5 million.  The
limited guaranty provided by AIG provides credit protection for
both class A and class G.

In addition to the long-term rating for each bond, Fitch assigns
Recovery Ratings for bonds rated below 'B'.  The Recovery Rating
scale is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics
of an obligation.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 20 2004-2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 20 classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-2 due to increased
subordination due to principal amoritization payoffs and overall
stable pool performance.  The pool has paid down by 13% since
Moody's last review in June 2008.  The action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 27%
to $833.1 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 62 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 50% of the pool.  The pool includes
one loan, representing 5% of the pool, with an investment grade
underlying rating.  The PPG Place Loan ($108.4 million -- 13%)
formerly had an investment grade underlying rating, but due to a
decline in performance it is now analyzed as part of the conduit
pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 98% of the pool, excluding defeased loans.  Moody's
weighted average loan to value ratio is 87%, essentially the same
as at Moody's prior review in June 2008.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit
component is 1.23X compared to 1.14X at last review.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf score of 16 compared to 24 at last
review.

Nine loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

There have been no realized losses since securitization.
Currently three of pool's top ten loans, representing 20% of the
pool, are in special servicing.  Moody's estimates an $8.2 million
loss (18% loss severity) from one of the specially serviced loans.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Eden Prairie Mall Loan
($78.8 million -- 9.6%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.1 million square foot regional mall located in
suburban Minneapolis, Minnesota.  The mall is owned by an
affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc.  The in-line space
was 99% occupied as of March 2009, similar to last review.  Anchor
tenants include Sears, Target, Von Maur and Kohl's. The loan was
transferred to special servicing due to GGP's bankruptcy filing on
April 16, 2009.  Property performance has been stable, but Moody's
analysis reflects a stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns
about the weak retail environment and the potential negative
impact of GPP's bankruptcy on property performance.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to 79%
and 1.20X at last review.

The second specially serviced loan is the Broward Financial Loan
($46.5 million -- 5.6%), which is secured by a 325,500 square foot
Class A office tower located in downtown Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
The loan was transferred to special servicing for maturity default
in March 2009.  The borrower's efforts to refinance the loan have
been hampered by the short lease term remaining for the property's
largest tenant, Franklin Templeton, which leases 42% of the
building through June 2011.  The property was 79% occupied in
April 2009 compared to 77% at last review. The Borrower has
requested an extension of maturity to provide time to secure
refinancing.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 1.03X at last review.

The third specially serviced loan is Prince Kuhio Plaza Loan
($37.8 million -- 4.5%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 504,000 square foot regional mall located in Hilo,
Hawaii.  The mall is owned by an affiliate of General Growth
Properties, Inc.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
due a maturity default and GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16,
2009.  The loan matured on April 1, 2009.  The mall was 85%
occupied as of March 2009 compared to 89% at last review.  Anchor
tenants include Sears, Macy's, Safeway and Long's Drugs.  Property
performance has declined since last review.  Moody's analysis of
this loan reflects a stressed cash flow and tranching adjustments
due to Moody's concerns about the weak retail environment, the
property's declining performance trend and the potential negative
impact of GPP's bankruptcy on property performance.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.34X at last review.

The loan which formerly had an underlying rating was the PPG Place
Loan ($108.3 million -- 13.0%), which is secured by a 1.5 million
square foot office complex located in downtown Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.  The property was 88% occupied as of May 2008, the
same as at last review.  The largest tenant is PPG Industries,
Inc. (25% NRA; lease expiration June 2021; Moody's senior
unsecured rating A3 -- stable outlook).  Property performance has
declined since last review due to increased operating expenses.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.33X, respectively,
compared to 68% and 1.44X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans, excluding the specially serviced
loans, represent 10.3% of the outstanding pool balance.  The
largest conduit loan is the MHC Portfolio-Waterford Estates Loan
($30.0 million -- 3.6%), which is secured by a 731-pad
manufactured housing community located approximately ten miles
south of Wilmington in Bear, Delaware.  The property was 93%
occupied as of December 2008 compared to 96% at last review.
Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
96% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 95% and 0.97X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is MHC Portfolio-Lake Fairways
Country Club ($29.5 million -- 3.5%), which is secured by an 896-
pad manufactured housing community located in North Fort Myers,
Florida.  The property was 93% occupied as of December 2008,
essentially the same as at last review.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.08X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is MHC Portfolio- The Meadows at
Countrywood/The Lakes at Countrywood ($26.2 million -- 3.1%),
which is secured by two adjacent manufactured housing communities
totaling 1,159-pads.  The properties are located approximately 20
miles northeast of downtown Tampa in Plant, Florida.  The overall
occupancy was 97% as of December 2008, essentially the same as at
last review.  Performance has improved due to increased rental
revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 90% and 1.04X at last review.

Moody's rating actions is:

  -- Class A-2, $7,667,143, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class A-3, $283,402,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class A-4, $125,682,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class A-5, $254,120,181, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class XP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 6/26/2008

  -- Class B, $27,045,564, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class C, $12,811,056, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class D, $24,198,662, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
     A1 from A2 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class E, $11,387,606, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class F, $15,657,957, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class G, $9,964,155, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed at
     Baa2 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class H, $15,657,958, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
     at Baa3 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class J, $4,270,352, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class K, $5,693,803, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class L, $5,693,803, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
     Ba3 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class M, $7,117,253, affirmed at B1; previously affirmed at
     B1 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class N, $2,846,901, affirmed at B2; previously affirmed at
     B2 on 6/26/2008

  -- Class O, $2,846,901, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
     B3 on 6/26/2008


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through, Series
2005-2 on review for possible downgrade due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses from loans
in special servicing, increased leverage from the remainder of the
pool and a decline in the pool's diversity.  Since Moody's prior
review in June 2007, three loans, representing 4% of the pool,
have transferred to special servicing.  The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the July 10, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 11%
to $1.4 billion from $1.6 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 85 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 47% of the pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch-list.  The watch-list includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watch-list to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  Three loans,
representing 4% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loans are secured by two office properties
and one multifamily property.

Based on Moody's preliminary analysis, the pool's weighted average
loan to value ratio has increased since last review due to a
decline in performance of a portion of the pool.  Moody's review
will focus on potential losses from specially serviced loans and
the performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-J, $108,805,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 6/11/2007

  -- Class B, $43,111,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class C, $16,423,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class D, $28,741,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class E, $16,423,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class F, $20,530,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class G, $18,477,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class H, $18,476,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class J, $8,212,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class K, $6,159,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class L, $6,159,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class M, $4,106,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class N, $2,053,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 6/11/2007

  -- Class P, $10,265,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 6/1/2007


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative 16
classes and revises Rating Outlooks on 15 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., series 2007-3.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch forecasts potential losses of
10.9% for this transaction, should market conditions not recover.
The rating actions are based on losses of 8.6%, including 100% of
the losses associated with term defaults and any losses associated
with maturities within the next five years.  Given the significant
term to maturity, Fitch's actions only account for 25% of the
losses associated with maturities beyond five years.  The bonds
with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be downgraded in
the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance. These
loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for loans representing
67.6% of the pool and, in certain cases, revised based on
additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 24.9% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 20.8% in 2012, 0.5% in 2013, and 3.5% in 2014.  In 2017,
70% of the pool is scheduled to mature.

Fitch identified 27 Loans of Concern (36.7%) within the pool, 10
of which (15.1%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially
serviced loans, five (10.8% of the pool) are current.  Seven of
the Fitch Loans of Concern (29.8%) are within the transaction's
top 15 loans (60.2%) by unpaid principal balance, one of which is
90 days delinquent.

The delinquent specially serviced loan is the Metropolis Shopping
Center loan (2.5% of the pool) which transferred to special
servicing in December 2008.  A recent appraisal indicated a value
significantly below the debt amount.  The occupancy has remained
stable at 88%, however, the initial sponsor filed for bankruptcy
in 2008 and a receiver is in place in order to stabilize the
property.

Ten of the loans within the top 15 (36.2%) are expected to default
at maturity, with loss severities ranging from 6% to 40%.  The
largest contributors to loss are:  One Park Avenue (5.3% of the
pool), Rockwood Ross Multifamily Portfolio (5%), Second & Seneca
(5%) and Pacifica Tower (4.7%).  Both the Rockwood Ross
Multifamily Portfolio loan and Second & Seneca loans are current
and in special servicing.

The pari passu One Park Avenue loan is secured by a 924,501 square
foot (sf) office property in New York, NY.  At issuance, the
issuer underwrote to a stabilized cash flow based on the
expectation that below market leases expiring during the term of
the loan would be re-signed at higher rates, providing for
potential upside in future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008
performance, the property is behind the stabilization schedule.
The servicer reported YE 2008 debt service coverage ratio was 0.88
times (x) with a reported May 2009 occupancy of 97.9%. However, a
tenant representing approximately 19% of the net rentable area is
expected to vacate its space at lease expiration in December 2009.
Issuer underwritten DSCR and occupancy at issuance was 1.16x and
98%, respectively.  Based on current performance and anticipated
declines, losses are expected upon the loan's maturity in 2012.
At closing, the loan was structured with an $18 million debt
service reserve to cover interest shortfalls for the first three
years of the loan term.  As of June 2009, the balance of the debt
service reserve is approximately $4.5 million.

The Rockwood Ross Multifamily Portfolio (5%) and Second & Seneca
property (5%) are the two largest specially serviced assets in the
pool.  Both loans transferred to special servicing for imminent
default, however, they remain current as of July 2009 distribution
date. Losses are expected upon each loan's scheduled maturity.
The Rockwood Ross Portfolio consists of seven multifamily
properties in Maryland and Virginia in counties surrounding
Washington, D.C.  Occupancy has increased to a combined 90% as of
April 2009 with a YE 2008 DSCR of 1.01x and has not met its
performance targets from issuance.  The borrower is seeking a loan
modification in order to stabilize performance of the property.
The sponsor is Rockwood VI REIT.  There is also a significant
amount of mezzanine debt held outside of the trust.

The Second & Seneca loan transferred to special servicing June
2009 as the space occupied by Washington Mutual representing 15.1%
of the NRA is being vacated as Washington Mutual's receiver, the
FDIC, has rejected the lease after Washington Mutual was seized by
federal regulators in 2008.  The property consists of a 497,271 sf
two-building office complex located in downtown Seattle, WA and
the sponsor is Tishman Speyer.  The borrower has asked for a loan
modification.  The special servicer is discussing workout options
with the borrower.  Limited details are presently available on the
workout and current valuation of the asset due to the loan's
recent transfer to special servicing.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative these
classes:

  -- $241.7 million class A-J to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $35.2 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $48.3 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.4 million class D to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.4 million class E to 'B' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.2 million class F to 'B-' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $30.8 million class G to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $48.3 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.2 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $43.9 million class K to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $26.4 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.4 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $17.6 million class N to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.4 million class O to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.8 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $13.2 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC/DR1'.

Fitch also affirms these classes:

  -- $45 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $334 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150 million class A-2FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $133 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $78.9 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50 million class A-5 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $647.1 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $116.6 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-MF at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $135 million class A-MFL at 'AAA'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $57.1 million class S.


BANK OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Outlooks to Bank of America
Commercial Mortgage Securities, series 2004-1.

The downgrades and Negative Outlook assignments are due to
expected losses on two of the three loans currently in special
servicing, as well as an increased concentration of Fitch Loans of
Concern.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any
rating changes over the next one to two years.  As of the July
2009 distribution date, the pool has been reduced 20.4% to
$1.05 billion from $1.32 billion at issuance.  Nine loans, 7.4% of
the pool, have defeased.

There are currently three loans (2.9%) in special servicing with
losses expected on the two largest loans.  The largest loan in
special servicing (1.3%), is collateralized by 181,596 square foot
office building in Glendale, AZ.  The property is fully vacant
after losing the single tenant.  The property has been real estate
owned as of June 12, 2009 and the special servicer is working to
increase the occupancy before marketing the property.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.0%) is
collateralized by a 76,573 sf office building located in Concord,
CA.  The asset transferred to the special servicer June 17, 2009
due to imminent default.  The third specially serviced loan (0.4%)
is secured by a manufactured housing community located in
Columbus, IN.  The loan was unable to refinance at its scheduled
maturity and is in the process of being modified by the special
servicer.

Exclusive of the three specially serviced loans, an additional 10
loans (5.5%) have been identified as Fitch Loans of Concern.  The
largest non-specially serviced loan of concern (1.3%) is secured
by a retail property in Tracy, CA.  The most recent servicer
reported debt service coverage ratio is 0.90 times (x), with
occupancy at 68%.  The property lost a major tenant due to
bankruptcy and the borrower is currently negotiating a lease for
that vacant space.

Fitch maintains investment grade shadow ratings on two loans in
the trust: the Leo Burnett Building (11.4%) and the Hines Sumitomo
Life Office Portfolio (9.9%) loans.

The Leo Burnett Building is a 1.1 million sf class A office
building located in Chicago, IL.  Occupancy as of year-end 2008
was 99.9% compared to 98.2% at issuance.

The Hines Sumitomo Life Office Portfolio is secured by three
central business district office buildings containing a total of
1.2 million sf.  Two of the office buildings are located in New
York, NY, and one is located in Washington, DC.  The whole loan
consists of two senior pari-passu notes and one junior note.  Only
the A2 pari-passu note is held in the trust.  The A2 note reflects
a loan per square foot of $88 with a total A note debt per foot of
$223, and total loan debt of $266.  As of March 31, 2009, the
overall occupancy dropped to 75.1% compared to 97.7% at issuance
as a result of the loss of a tenant at one of the New York
properties and a major renovation at the Washington, DC property.
Renovations at the Washington property included the addition of
three floors (approximately 80,000 sf), a green roof, rooftop
terrace and a fitness center.  The renovations were completed in
the second quarter of 2009 and the property is currently leasing
up.  The DSCR as of December 31, 2008, is 2.52x on the total debt
stack down from 2.66x at issuance.

The deal has minimal near term maturities with 2.1% of the loans
maturing in 2009 through 2011.

Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Outlooks to Bank of America
Commercial Mortgage Securities, series 2004-1:

  -- $29.9 million class E to 'AA-' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.3 million class F to 'A- from 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class G at 'BBB+' from A-'; Outlook Stable
  -- $19.9 million class H to 'BBB-'from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.6 million class J to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.6 million class K to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.3 million class L to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns recovery ratings to
these classes:

  -- $8.3 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-';
  -- $3.3 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B+';
  -- $3.3 million class O to 'CC/RR2' from 'B'.

Also, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $233.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 100.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- 521.9 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-P at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $31.5 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.3 million class C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.3 million class D at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $14.9 million class P. Class A-1 has been
paid in full.


BELLE HAVEN: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Actions on Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by Belle Haven ABS CDO,
Ltd., as the "Issuer" as a result of the entry into and execution
of a novation agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp.
as "Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 22,
2009, as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under two
cash flow swap transaction to Transferee:

  -- US$344,000,000 Class A1ST Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2044, Currently Rated Caa2; previously on 3/18/09
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- US$0 Class A1SB-1 Notes Due November 3, 2044, Currently Rated
     Caa2; previously on 3/18/09 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- US$0 Class A1SB-2 Notes Due November 3, 2044, Currently Rated
     Caa2; previously on 3/18/09 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- US$48,000,000 Class A1J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2044, Currently Rated C; previously on 3/18/09 Downgraded
     to C

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2044, Currently Rated C; previously on 3/18/09 Downgraded to
     C

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A3 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2044, Currently Rated C; previously
     on 3/18/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Securities Due 2044, Currently
     Rated Aaa; previously on 12/14/04 Rated Aaa

Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.

Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment.  This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC".  Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.

Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO.  A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings.  In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration.  Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have.  Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.


BXG RECEIVABLES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 21 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded twenty one classes of notes
issued by five BXG Receivables Note trusts issued in 2004 through
2008.  The ratings of notes were placed under review for possible
downgrade in April 2009.  The underlying collateral consists of
timeshare loan receivables.

Moody's analysis primarily focuses on the ratio of credit
enhancement to expected gross charge-offs on the remaining pool,
which are calculated as the difference between the expected
lifetime charge-offs and the actual cumulative gross charge-offs
to date.  Lifetime gross charge-offs are assessed based on the
level and shape of the cumulative gross charge-off curves and
cumulative gross charge-off to liquidation curves, with additional
consideration given to the current economic environment and the
nature of the asset class.  The level where the two curves
converge will be the lifetime gross charge-offs of the pool. In
cases where the gross charge-off to liquidation curve is still
above the cumulative charge-off curve, or where the expected
convergence point of the curves is not clear, issuer specific loss
curves, actual cumulative gross charge-offs on each pool and
seasoning of each pool, as well as recent delinquency trends and
consideration of the current economic environment, are used to
derive the level of expected lifetime gross charge-offs.  The
representative loss curves for each issuer are generated from
their respective historical vintage performance data.  The total
credit enhancement available to these deals includes
overcollateralization, reserve funds and excess spread.  The ratio
of credit enhancement to expected remaining net losses is then
compared with similar timeshare transactions to determine the
appropriate ratings.

The actions were mainly driven by worse than expected performance
of the underlying collateral pools, which is seen in the deals'
rising defaults and delinquencies.  Additionally, principal
distribution of all trusts is expected to remain pro rata among
rated classes of notes and the overcollateralization of the trust
will continue to be paid down proportionally with the rated notes.

As of June 30, 2009, overcollateralization of BXG 2004-B, 2005-A,
2006-B, 2007-A and 2008-A represented 9.00%, 10.00%, 9.00%, 11.50%
and 12.50% of the outstanding pool balances, respectively.  In
addition, 2004-B, 2005-A, and 2006-B each had reserves at their
floors of 1.50% of the initial pool balance.  2007-A and 2008-A
had reserves at 5% and 7.5% of the initial pool balances,
respectively, both of which are expected to decline over time to
their reserve floors of 1.50% of initial pool balance.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2004-B

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 28.5% (as
     a percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substituion amount to date)

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2005-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 30% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substituion amount to date)

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class C, Downgraded to A3 from A2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class E, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2006-B

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 32% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substituion amount to date)

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class C, Downgraded to A3 from A2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class E, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2007-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 32% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substituion amount to date)

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; previously Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class G, Downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

Issuer: BXG Receivables Note Trust 2008-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 25% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substituion amount to date)

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; previously Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class F, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009

  -- Class G, Downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/23/2009


CALLIDUS DEBT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund
IV, Ltd.

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-1A Revolving Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on
     5/8/2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$327,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/8/2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2724 versus a test level of 2705 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 7, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $15 million, accounting for
roughly 3.09% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 8.2% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund IV, Ltd., issued on April 12,
2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CALLIDUS DEBT PARTNERS: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund
V, Ltd.:

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class Q-1 Securities Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ba3; previously on 3/4/2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class Q-2 Securities Due 2020, Downgraded to B1;
     previously on 3/4/2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2814.  Based on the last trustee report, dated
July 10, 2009, defaulted securities total about $10.7 million,
accounting for roughly 2.7% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9.1% of the
underlying portfolio.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund V, Ltd., issued on December 6,
2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2004-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Canyon Capital CLO 2004-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1-A Senior Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/1/2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1-B Senior Insured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2016, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/1/2004 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Class A-2-A Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016 with an aggregate principal amount not to exceed
     $40,000,000, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/1/2004
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2-B Senior Insured Variable Funding Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2016 with an aggregate principal amount not to
     exceed $40,000,000, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/1/2004
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
     Due 2016, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/18/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$36,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
     Due 2016, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on 3/18/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class C Senior Floating Rate Deferrable Notes
     Due 2016, Confirmed at B1; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 3106 versus a test level of 2845 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 1, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $9.6 million, accounting for
roughly 2.4% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 4.5% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to mezzanine
and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  Some of
these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade
ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor
recovery prospects in the event of default.  Additionally, Moody's
noted that the portfolio includes a material concentration in CLO
securities that are issued by affiliates of the collateral
manager, which Moody's views as potentially exposing the notes to
additional correlation risk.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

In addition, the ratings on Class A-1-B Notes and Class A-2-B
Notes reflect the actual underlying rating of the Class A-1-B
Notes and Class A-2-B.  This underlying rating is based solely on
the intrinsic credit quality of these Notes in the absence of the
guarantee from Ambac Assurance Corporation, whose insurance
financial strength rating was downgraded from Baa1, on Review for
Possible Downgrade, to Ba3 on April 13, 2009.  The above actions
is a result of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach
to rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors as described in the press release dated November 10,
2008, titled "Moody's modifies approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors."

Canyon Capital CLO 2004-1, Ltd., issued on June 24, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CANYON CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Canyon Capital 2006-1 Ltd:

  -- US$226,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/31/2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/31/2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$15,200,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,300,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,800,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,800,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D
Overcollateralization Test and the Class E Overcollateralization
Test.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased
over the last year and is currently 3074 versus a test level of
2750 as of the last trustee report, dated July 9, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $15.9 million,
accounting for roughly 4.3% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 20% of the
underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments on the
Class E Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class D Overcollateralization Test.  Interest
proceeds are diverted to pay the principal balance of the Class A1
and Class A2 Notes as a result of this test failure.  Moody's also
assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in a
small number of obligors and industries.  This includes a
significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to mezzanine
and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  The majority
of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade
ratings and carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor
recovery prospects in the event of default.  Additionally, Moody's
noted that the portfolio includes a material concentration in CLO
securities that are issued by affiliates of the collateral
manager, which Moody's views as potentially exposing the notes to
additional correlation risk.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Canyon Capital 2006-1 Ltd, issued on August 16, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CAPITALSOURCE REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 12 2006-A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 12 classes of Notes issued by
CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A on review for possible
downgrade:

  -- Class A-1A, $63,972,269, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

  -- Class A-1R, $200,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

  -- Class A-2A, $443,137,377, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009
     downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa

  -- Class A-2B, $125,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009
     downgraded to A3 from Aaa

  -- Class B, $82,875,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     Baa3 from Aa2

  -- Class C, $62,682,146, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     Ba2 from A1

  -- Class D, $30,369,304, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     B1 from A2

  -- Class E, $30,376,945, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     B2 from A3

  -- Class F, $26,954,903, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     B3 from Baa1

  -- Class G, $33,562,432, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     Caa1 from Baa2

  -- Class H, $31,627,207, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     Caa2 from Baa3

  -- Class J, $49,224,047, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 4/15/2009 downgraded to
     Caa3 from Ba2

Moody's is placing all rated classes on review for possible
downgrade due to deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and the occurrence of a Tax Event on June 18,
2009.  The Tax Event was due to the decision by CapitalSource
Inc., the parent company of the Collateral Manager (CapitalSource
Finance LCC), to elect to revoke its Real Estate Investment Trust
status.  As a consequence, CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust
2006-A as the "Issuer" is no longer treated as a qualified REIT
subsidiary or other "pass through" entity for federal income tax
purposes.  The Issuer has become a taxable mortgage pool subject
to federal and state income taxes which will be payable by the
Issuer for 2009.  First and second quarter 2009 taxes due were
approximately $7.5 million.  The Collateral Manager estimated that
third quarter taxes due will be approximately $3.5 million.  Based
upon the July 14, 2009 Trustee Report, approximately $10.8 million
of $14.5 million in Scheduled Interest Receipts were classified as
a Tax, Filing, and Registration Fee. As a result of this change in
status, all federal and state income taxes are payable pursuant to
Article 11, "Application of Monies", per the Indenture dated as of
December 20, 2006.

As of the July 14, 2009 Trustee Report, the current collateral
includes 98% whole loan debt and 2% B-note debt.

Deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio is
observed through numerous factors including, but not limited to,
the failings of the Class C/D/E Par Value Test and Class F/G/H Par
Value Test due to $99.5 million in defaulted collateral, and the
failings of the Class A/B Interest Coverage Test, Class C/D/E
Interest Coverage Test, and Class F/G/H Interest Coverage Test.
The interest coverage tests failed due to the need to pay federal
and state income taxes.

The action takes into consideration the Issuer's change in its tax
status resulting in federal and state income taxes becoming due
and payable.  This will have a materially adverse impact on the
likelihood of the ultimate receipt of principal and interest by
the noteholders of each of the rated classes by the legal final
maturity date.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated April 15, 2009.


CASTLE GARDEN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Castle Garden Funding:

  -- $379,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $150,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- $105,000,000 Class A-3a Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/29/2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $12,000,000 Class A-3b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa1 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $39,500,000 Class A-4 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $25,500,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $20,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded to Ba1
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $22,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded to B1
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $12,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded
     to Caa1; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $15,000,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded to Caa2
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $1,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on 3/18/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $3,000,000 Class J Combination Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ba1; previously on 3/4/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- $4,500,000 Class K Combination Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ba3; previously on 3/4/2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- $5,000,000 Class L Combination Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ba3; previously on 3/4/2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- $12,000,000 Class M Combination Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Ba1; previously on 3/4/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2950 versus a test level of 2430 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 25, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $77 million, accounting for
roughly 9% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 8.9% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk
in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes a
significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to 2.4% CLO
tranches in the underlying portfolio.  The majority of these CLO
tranches are currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and
carry depressed market valuations that may herald poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Castle Garden Funding, issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-CB4 Tranche
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued in C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2001-CB4
transaction due to higher expected pool losses in relation to
available credit enhancement.  Underlying securities' collateral
consists primarily of closed-end second lien residential mortgage
loans (CES).

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2001-CB4

  -- Cl. IIB-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 1/4/2002 Assigned
     Baa2


CHARLIE MAC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches from one RMBS transaction, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Charlie Mac Trust 2004-2.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed -rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.  These
actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

The A3 rating for the Class L certificates also reflects the
credit enhancement provided by a standby letter of credit issued
by U.S. Central. U.S. Central (currently rated A3 with a stable
outlook) is primarily responsible for the servicing of the
mortgage loans. However, Navy Federal Credit Union will be
performing the day-to-day servicing functions with respect to the
mortgage loans.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., acts as master servicer.

List of actions:

Issuer: Charlie Mac Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 1/6/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/6/2005 Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/6/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/6/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/6/2005 Assigned
     Baa2


CHASE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2004-OPT1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of five
securities from Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2004-OPT1.
These actions are part of an ongoing review of subprime RMBS
transactions.

The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to the updated collateral loss projection.
The revised loss projection generally results from a deterioration
in collateral performance in recent months.  Additionally, the
affected transaction has, at some point, passed performance
triggers and released portions of credit enhancement.

Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year. For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case 80%.  The results of
these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are
weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

The complete rating actions:

Issuer: Chase Funding Loan Acquisition Trust 2004-OPT1

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned A3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Ba1


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-4 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded two tranches from CHL
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-4.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans.  The actions are
triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance -- marked by
rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with concerns
about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide and the
rising unemployment levels.  The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector announced in a
press release on March 19th, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-
going review process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:

  i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
     performance information available for the asset class as well
     as for the transaction sponsor,

ii) collateral analysis,

iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
     interests of the key parties to the transaction, most notably
     the originator and the servicer,

iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
     cashflow and capital structure,

  v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
     structure, and

vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
     similar transactions.


CIFC FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2007-III Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of 2 notes and confirmed the ratings of 3 notes issued by
CIFC Funding 2007-III, Ltd.:

  -- US$64,750,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due July 2021, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due July 2021, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due July 2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
     13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due July 2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$17,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due July 2021, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
3200 versus a test level of 3100 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $ 25.5 million, accounting for roughly 5.8%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 14% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CIFC Funding 2007-III, Ltd., issued in July 31, 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 2005-EMG Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes and
downgraded two classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
EMG.  The downgrades are due to concerns about potential declines
in credit quality from non-reporting loans, more significant
exposure to New York City and a decline in diversity.  At
securitization there was no historical or current financial
information for approximately 5% of the pool.  At this time,
Moody's was not provided with current financial information for
approximately 9% of the pool.  Moody's is concerned that the
transaction's credit support may not be sufficient for the current
ratings given the stresses on property performance caused by the
economic recession.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 22, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 49%
to $371 million from $722 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 141 seasoned loans, ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 30% of the pool.  The pool includes seven loans,
representing 31% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings.  No loans have defeased.

Seventeen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch-list.  The master servicer's watch-list includes
loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established
as part of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's on-going monitoring
of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watch-list to assess which
loans have material issues that could impact performance.  Not all
loans on the watch-list are delinquent or have significant issues.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a
minimal $12,000 realized loss.  Currently, one loan, representing
less than 1% of the pool, is in special servicing.  Moody's is not
estimating a loss from this loan at this time.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 91%
of the pool.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
conduit component is 37% compared to 43% at Moody's prior full
review in November 2007.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 3.79X compared to
3.16X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding loans with underlying ratings,
has a Herf score of 62 compared to 90 at last review.

The loans with underlying ratings represent 31% of the pool.  The
240 Central Park South Loan ($30.0 million - 6.1%) is secured by a
304-unit apartment complex located in New York City.  The property
was 91% occupied as of December 2008, the same as last review.
Property's performance has been stable.  The underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.38X, respectively, compared to Baa3
and 1.28X at last review.

The 17-19 West 34th Street Loan ($17.0 million - 4.6%) is secured
by a 224,000 square foot office/retail building located in midtown
Manhattan, New York City.  The property was 95% occupied as of
April 2009 compared to 98% at last review.  The underlying rating
and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.28X, respectively, compared to Aaa
and 2.16X at last review.

The 52 Vanderbilt Avenue Loan ($17.5 million - 3.5%) is secured by
a 184,000 square foot Class B office/retail building located in
midtown Manhattan, New York City.  The property was 96% leased as
of April 2009, essentially the same as at last review.
Performance has improved due to increased rental revenues.  The
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are to Baa1 and 1.71X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.38X at last review.

The 50 East 42nd Street Loan ($15.0 million - 4.0%) is secured by
a 144,378 square foot mixed use property located in midtown
Manhattan.  The property was 84% occupied as of December 2008
compared to 96% at last review.  Moody's analysis of this loan
reflects a stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about the
decline in occupancy and lease rollover risk during the next year.
The underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.59X,
respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.77X at last review.

The 1001 Central Park Avenue Loan ($14.0 million; - 3.8%) is
secured by a 238,700 square foot retail center located in
Scarsdale, New York.  The property was 68% occupied as of March
2009 compared to 85% at last review.  The increase in vacancy is
largely attributable to Linen N' Things vacating the center as a
result of its bankruptcy.  Moody's analysis of the loan reflects a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about the retail sector
in general and the impact of the loss of an anchor tenant on
property performance.  The underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
A3 and 1.95X, respectively, compared to Aa2 and 2.18X at last
review.

The 6 West 32nd Street Loan ($11.8 million - 3.2%) is secured by a
171-room hotel located in midtown Manhattan.  Performance has been
stable.  The underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
2.28X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.99X at last review.

The 295 Park Avenue South Loan ($9.3 million; - 2.5%) is secured
by a 179 unit multifamily property located in midtown Manhattan.
The property was 99% occupied as of March 2009.  Performance has
been strong due to increasing rental revenues.  The underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 4.36X, compared to Aaa and
1.99X at last review.

Moody's rating actions is:

  -- Class A-2, $43,077,040, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 11/13/2007

  -- Class A-3, $42,513,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 11/13/2007

  -- Class A-4, $199,016,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 11/13/2007

  -- Class A-J, $46,036,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 11/13/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 11/13/2007

  -- Class B, $7,222,000; affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa2 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class C, $2,708,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded to
     Aa2 from Aa3 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class D, $5,416,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class E, $1,805,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class F, $3,611,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed at
     Baa1 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class G, $1,805,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed at
     Baa2 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class H, $3,611,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed at
     Baa3 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class J, $8,124,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class K, $2,708,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 11/13/2007

  -- Class L, $1,806,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 11/13/2007


COAST FUNDING: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes issued by South
Coast Funding VI, Ltd., and assigned Loss Severity ratings.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration experienced since Fitch's last rating action.
Approximately 69.8% of the portfolio carries a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade, with 50.1% rated in the 'CCC'
category or lower.  These are up from 30% rated below investment
grade and 8% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.

Beginning with the December 2008 payment date, interest proceeds
available for distribution in the interest waterfall have been
insufficient to fully pay the interest due the class B notes.
Since that time, a portion of the class B interest payment has
been made using principal proceeds, and as of the July 7, 2009
payment date, $102,047 of the $169,889 interest payment due to the
class B notes was paid through principal proceeds.  All remaining
principal proceeds are being used to pay down the class A-1 notes.
The class A-1 notes have paid down approximately 75.7% since
closing. As of the June 26, 2009 trustee report, the class A/B
overcollateralization ratio was at 91.8%, failing its covenant of
104%.

Fitch expects the class A-1 notes to continue to receive interest
and full principal repayment.  The class A-2 notes have been
downgraded to 'CCC' as they continue to receive interest payments
but eventual principal impairment is expected.  The class B notes
have been downgraded to 'CC' as they continue to receive interest
payments, but Fitch does not expect any principal recovery.  The
class C notes are receiving interest paid in kind whereby the
principal amount of the notes is written up by the amount of
interest due.  The class C notes have been downgraded to 'C' as
Fitch does not expect this class to receive any future payments.

The class A-1 notes were assigned a Stable Rating Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable
over the next one to two years.  The class A-1 notes were also
assigned a 'LS3' Loss Severity Rating.  A rating of 'LS3'
indicates that a tranche has a medium risk of severe loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base case loss expectation for the collateral in the range of 1.1
to 4.  The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

South Coast VI is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
that closed on Sept. 29, 2004 and is managed by TCW Investment
Management Company.  The reinvestment period ended in September
2007.  The reference portfolio is composed of 68.1% residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), 17.6% commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), 7.8% CDOs and, 6.5% asset-backed
securities (ABS).

Fitch downgrades four classes of notes issued by South Coast
Funding VI, Ltd., and assigns Loss Severity ratings:

  -- $50,929,156 class A-1 notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $36,000,000 class A-2 notes to 'CCC' from 'A';

  -- $30,000,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'B';

  -- $ 12,355,223 class C notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 1999-C1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of six classes,
upgraded one class and downgraded four classes of Commercial
Mortgage Acceptance Corp, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates 1999-C1.  The upgrade is due to increased credit
enhancement due to loan payoffs and amortization.  The pool has
paid down 84% since Moody's last full review in May 2007.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from increased leverage, a decrease in pool diversity
and realized and anticipated losses from loans in special
servicing.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the July 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 88%
to $86.8 million from $733.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 54% of the pool.  The average loan size is
$2.3 million.  Five loans, representing 9% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Eight loans, representing 29% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $5.4 million realized loss.  There are sixteen loans,
representing 49% of the pool, currently in special servicing,
including five of the pool's top ten loans.  The largest specially
serviced loan is The Place Apartments ($7.6 million -- 8.8%),
which is secured by 230-unit multifamily property in Fort Myers,
Florida.  Although the property has been well occupied, its
performance has been negatively impacted by increased expenses.
The loan matured on June 1, 2009.  The property was transferred to
special servicing in December 2008 and is in the process of
foreclosure.  The second largest specially serviced loan is The
Piers ($6.7 million -- 7.7%), which is secured by a 103,294 square
foot retail property in Port Richey, Florida.  The property is
currently only 31% leased as a result of several major tenants
leaving the property in 2008.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2009 and it matured on June 1, 2009.  The
third largest specially serviced loan is Plaza De Colores
($4.7 million -- 5.4%), which is secured by a 43,500 square foot
retail property in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2009 and it matured on May 1, 2009.

The remainder of the specially serviced loans are a secured by a
mix of property types, including retail (5 loans - 17%)
multifamily (6 - 7%) and office or mixed use (2 - 3%).  The
majority of these loans were transferred to special servicing due
to maturity defaults.  Moody's estimates a $17.4 million aggregate
loss (41% loss severity on average) for all of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 86% of the pool, excluding defeased loans.  Moody's
weighted average loan to value ratio, excluding the specially
serviced loans, is 91% compared to 73% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.66X compared to
1.80X at Moody's prior review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool's Herf, excluding defeased loans, is 21
compared to 105 at Moody's prior review.

The three largest non-defeased performing loans comprise 15.7% of
the pool.  The largest loan is the Holiday Inn Express and Suites
Loan ($5.8 million - 6.7%), which is secured by a 120 key hotel
located in Eagan, Minnesota.  The loan has been on the master
servicer's watchlist since February 2006 due to low DSCR.
Performance has weakened since last review due to lower occupancy
rates and increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
156% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 104% and 1.23X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Avenue C Apartments Loan
($4.3 million -- 4.9%), which is secured by several multifamily
properties located in the East Village of New York City and
totaling 28 units.  As of June 2009, the properties were 100%
leased.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because it
has passed its June 1, 2009 Anticipated Repayment Date ("ARD").
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.43X, respectively,
compared to 60% and 1.53X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Monarch Beach Plaza Loan
($3.5 million -- 4.1%), which is secured by a 31,377 square foot
retail property located in Dana Point, California.  The property
was 86% occupied as of March 2009 by a mix of local and regional
tenants. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because it
has passed it had an ARD of April 1, 2009.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.76X, respectively, compared to 58% and
2.00X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at ]
     Aaa on 5/24/2007

  -- Class E, $4,158,721, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A1 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class F, $12,842,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A3 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class G, $1,834,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 12/20/2007

  -- Class H, $12,842,000, upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3; previously
     upgraded to Aa3 from A1 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class J, $20,179,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously upgraded
     to Baa3 from Ba2 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class K, $5,504,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously upgraded to
     Ba2 from Ba3 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class L, $7,338,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     affirmed at B1 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class M, $9,172,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class N, $5,504,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
     affirmed at Caa1 on 5/24/2007

  -- Class O, $3,669,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     affirmed at Caa3 on 5/24/2007


CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded ratings
of five classes of notes issued by Connecticut Valley CLO Funding
IV, Ltd., Limited and left on review for possible further
downgrade the ratings of two of these classes.  The notes affected
by the rating action are:

  -- US$225,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,
     Downgraded to Caa1 and remains on Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and
     remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$43,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,
     Downgraded to Caa3 and remains on Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to B3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$28,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$29,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2027,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to Ca

Connecticut Valley CLO Funding IV, Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.  CLOs consist approximately 70% of the portfolio.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor,
an increase in the proportion of securities rated Caa1 and below,
an increase in dollar amount of defaulted assets and failure of
the coverage tests, among other measures.  More than 78% of its
assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  According to the Trustee, the deal has
a WARF of 4146 as of June 25, 2009. Securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 16% of the underlying portfolio.  The
trustee reports 61 million defaulted assets.  In addition, the
Trustee reports that the transaction is currently failing one or
more coverage tests, including the Class A Par Value Ratio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  Since the last review of this
transaction in April 2009, Moody's has completed the first stage
of its two-stage review of U.S. and EMEA CLOs.  Some of the
underlying securities in the portfolio experienced more severe
rating action than was anticipated at the time of last review.
Moody's is currently in Stage II of its CLO review and performing
comprehensive analysis by modeling each CLO individually.
Additional rating actions will be taken as necessary for all rated
liabilities.  As a result, the ratings assigned to Class A-1 and
Class A-2 remain on watch for possible downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


COPPER RIVER: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Copper River CLO Ltd:

  -- US$49,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 16, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also upgraded the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$47,600,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$23,800,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, Upgraded to B3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$18,330,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2021, confirmed at Aa1; previously on January 16, 2009
     Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  As of the last trustee report, dated June 19, 2009,
defaulted securities total about $28.6 million, accounting for
roughly 3.98% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 20.55% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Classes C, D, and E
Notes is the result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis
including an in-depth assessment of results from Moody's
quantitative CLO rating model along with an evaluation of deal-
specific qualitative factors.  By way of comparison, rating
actions taken by Moody's in its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep
were largely based on a parameter-based approach.

Copper River CLO Ltd. issued in January of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CORTS TRUST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $25 Mil. Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' rating on
CorTS Trust For PECO Energy Capital Trust III's $25 million
certificates and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed
with negative implications on October 22, 2008.

The rating on the certificates is dependent solely on the rating
on the underlying security, PECO Energy Capital Trust III's 7.38%
capital trust pass-through securities due April 6, 2028 ('BB+').

The rating action reflects the July 22, 2009, affirmation of S&P's
'BB+' rating on the underlying security and its removal from
CreditWatch with negative implications.


COUNTRYWIDE FHA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 97 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 97 tranches and confirmed
7 tranches from 11 Countrywide FHA - VA deals issued from 2002 to
2007 due to higher expected pool losses in relation to available
credit enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009. Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

CWMBS Re-Performing Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2002-1

  -- Cl. 1A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Confirmed at A2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R1

  -- Cl. 1A-F, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-S, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PT, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R2

  -- Cl. 1A-F1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-F2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-S, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2005-R1

  -- Cl. 1A-F1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-F2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-S, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-PO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2005-R2

  -- Cl. 1A-F1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-F2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-S, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2005-R3

  -- Cl. A-F, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-S, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2006-R1

  -- Cl. A-F-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-F-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-S, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2006-R2

  -- Cl. A-F-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-F-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-S, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CWMBS, Inc. Structured pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-R3.

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R2

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R4

  -- Cl. 1A-1X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2S, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-IO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-PO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 140 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 140
tranches from 21 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo and Alt-
A loans, issued by CSFB.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Jumbo and Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.  These actions are a result of Moody's updated
loss expectations on the underlying collateral relative to
available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of Jumbo
or Alt-A mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively.  Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% for Jumbo transactions and
severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55% for Alt-A
transactions on the loans that are projected to default,.  The
roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above can vary from
deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

These pools consist of Jumbo mortgages:

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Pass-Through
Certificates, 2002-P1

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-26/
  Group I

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-34

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-1/
  Group III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-17/
  Group I-30 II--15 Year Jumbo A

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-19

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-21/
  Group I II

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-21/
  Group III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-27

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-8/
  Group I II III IV Mortgage Loans

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR12/ Group I II III Mortgage Loans

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR18/ Group I II III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR2/
  Group I II III IV

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR20/ Group I II III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR22/ Group I II III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR24/ Group I II III IV V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR28/ Group I II III IV V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR30/ Group I II III IV V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4/
  Group II III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR2/
  Group I II III IV V Mortgage mortgage Loans

These pools consist of Alt-A loans:

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-26/
  Group III

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-26/
  Group IV

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-5/
  Group IV

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-1/
  Group I II

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-17/
  Group V-Alt. VI-Alt. A

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-17/
  Group III-Alt. IV VII A

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-21/
  Group IV V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-8/
  Group V VI Mortgage Loans

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR2/
  Group V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR28/ Group VI

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-
  AR30/ Group VI

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4/
  Group I

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4/
  Group IV V

* CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR2/
  Group VI Mortgage Loans

List of actions:

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Pass-Through
Certificates, 2002-P1

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/25/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-26

  -- Cl. III-M-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/24/2006
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. III-B, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/24/2006
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IV-B-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/7/2005
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 1/7/2005
     Upgraded to A2

  -- Cl. IV-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/7/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-34

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/7/2005
     Upgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned
     Ba3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-5

  -- Cl. IV-B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/18/2002
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. IV-B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/18/2002
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. IV-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/13/2007
     Downgraded to Ba1

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-1

  -- Cl. III-B-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. III-B-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/1/2006 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/1/2006 Upgraded
     to Baa2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-17

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to A3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-19

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-19, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-23, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-P, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-21

  -- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/1/2006 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/1/2004
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/1/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-27

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/16/2004
     Assigned Baa3

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/16/2004 Assigned
     Ba2


  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 12/1/2006 Upgraded
     to A3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-8

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/1/2006
     Upgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/29/2003 Assigned
     Ba3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR12

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-X-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to A3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR18

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to A3

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Baa3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR2

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/24/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR20

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to A3

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Baa3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR22

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to A1

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 12/29/2003
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/29/2003
     Assigned Ba2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR24

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to A3

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/25/2003
     Assigned B2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR28

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/22/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/22/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/22/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/22/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/22/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/22/2004
     Assigned A3

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/22/2004 Assigned
     Baa1

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/22/2004 Assigned
     Ba1

  -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/22/2004 Assigned
     B3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR30

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/27/2006
     Upgraded to A2

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded
     to Baa3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. D-P-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. D-P-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. D-X-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. D-X-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned A3

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-11, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-12, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-13, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-14, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/28/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned A3

  -- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/28/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

  -- Cl. D-B-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/28/2004
     Assigned Ba2

CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned A1

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/27/2007
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Ba2


CSFB 2007-TFL2: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 Pooled Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed ten pooled classes and two rake
classes of CSFB 2007-TFL2 on review for possible downgrade due to
increased risk of default on the pool's largest loan and increased
loss severities associated with two other loans, which combined
represent 61.7% of the pool's outstanding loan balance.  The
largest loan, Planet Hollywood, is secured by a hotel-casino in
Las Vegas which has experienced declining performance due to
significant market deterioration.  Additionally, the loan's debt
service reserve account has recently been depleted.  The other
troubled loans are the Resorts Atlantic City (hotel-casino) and
Biscanye Landing (land) which are both anticipated to become real
estate owned in the near future.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class B, $45,700,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa1 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class C, $42,600,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa2 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class D, $33,500,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class E, $36,600,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class F, $36,500,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class G, $33,500,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class H, $39,600,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade, previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on March
     4,2009;

  -- Class J, $36,600,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade, previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class K, $39,600,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade, previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3 on March
     4,2009;

  -- Class L, $33,467,897, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class BSL-A, $8,900,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on March 4,
     2009;

  -- Class BSL-B, $9,000,000, Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2 on March 4,
     2009.

The largest loan, Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino
($460.0 million -- 38.1% of the pooled trust balance) is secured
by a 40-story hotel-casino property, with 2,519 rooms on the Strip
in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The property was constructed in 2000 as the
Aladdin Hotel and Casino.  The current sponsors (Robert Earl, Bay
Harbor, and Starwood) completed a $178.4 million renovation and
transformation project to re-brand the property as the Planet
Hollywood Hotel & Casino in 2006.  However, the slowing U.S.
economy has led to reduced convention bookings and leisure/gaming
demand.  As a result, initial cash flow projections have not been
reached.  For the trailing twelve months ending March 2009, the
net cash flow was $28.9 million with a debt service coverage ratio
of 0.59x.  The asset's debt service reserve became fully depleted
in July 2009.

The Resorts Atlantic City Loan ($175.0 million -- 14.5% of the
pooled trust balance) is secured by a hotel-casino with 310 feet
of Boardwalk frontage at the northern end of the Atlantic City
Boardwalk.  On November 11 2008, the master servicer sent a notice
of monetary default to the borrower with a cure date of
November 26, 2008.  The borrower subsequently indicated that it
would not cure the monetary default and the loan was transferred
to special servicing on December 1, 2008.  It is anticipated that
the loan will become REO in the near future.

Biscayne Landing ($110.0 million - 9.1% of the pooled trust
balance and six rake classes) is secured by a 188-acre site
located in North Miami, Florida and was intended to fund pre-
development of the site to accommodate a mixed-use project
encompassing condominiums, multifamily, hotel, office, and retail
development.  The original plan called for a heavy residential
component with completion prior to a smaller commercial component.
In December 2007, the borrower, Boca Developers, failed to make a
$20.0 million amortization payment which was required if release
proceed targets were not met.  In March of 2008, the loan was
moved to special servicing. Since the monetary default, the
borrower explored a revised plan calling for a much larger
commercial development followed by a smaller residential component
when market conditions improve.  However, the Borrower's revised
strategy was unsuccessful and the lender group is now preparing
for foreclosure.

In the coming weeks, Moody's will conduct a detailed review of the
Planet Hollywood Hotel & Casino, Resorts Atlantic City, Biscayne
Landing and the recent financial performance of the remaining
assets in the pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two classes,
affirmed eight classes, and downgraded 14 classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corporation, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C2.  The downgrades are due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from increased
credit quality dispersion, realized and anticipated losses from
loans in special servicing.  On May 26, 2009, the pool's third
largest loan, Washington Mutual Irvine Campus, was transferred to
special servicing.  On June 16, 2009, Moody's placed 16 classes on
review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes the review.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$1.54 billion from $1.61 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 168 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 45% of the pool.  Sixteen loans,
representing 10% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. government securities.

Forty-one loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust resulting in a loss of
$4.0 million.  Seven loans, representing 12% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is Washington Mutual Irvine Campus Loan ($106.0 million --
6.9%), which is secured by a 415,000 square foot office complex
located in Irvine, California.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing for imminent default.  At securitization the
property was 100% leased to Washington Mutual through November
2014.  Upon acquiring Washington Mutual in September 2008,
JPMorgan Chase reached an agreement with regulators to reject two
leases representing 58% of the net rentable area.  The property is
currently 42% leased, including a short term lease with JPMorgan
for 29% of the NRA through November 2009, with a one-year renewal
option.  The loan sponsors, Macquarie and Maguire Properties LP,
have indicated that they are not prepared to invest additional
capital and will pursue a cooperative sale of the property with
the special servicer.  Moody's is estimating a loss of
approximately $45 million (42% severity) for this loan.  The
remaining five specially serviced loans are either 90+ days
delinquent or in foreclosure.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss
of $40 million (49% severity on average) for these loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and partial year 2009
operating results for 99% and 65% of the pool, respectively,
excluding the defeased loans.  Moody's loan to value ratio,
excluding the specially serviced loans, is 102% compared to 100%
at Moody's last full review in July 2007.  In addition to the
increase in overall LTV, credit quality dispersion has increased
since last review.  Based on Moody's analysis, 10% of the pool has
an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 1.5% at last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit
component is 1.00X compared to 0.99X at last review.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf score
of 28 compared to 36 at last review.

The top three performing loans represent 22% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Tri-County Mall Loan ($144.7 million -- 9.4%),
which is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.1 million
square foot regional mall (595,600 square feet of collateral)
located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  There is also a junior non-pooled
loan of $8.7 million included in the trust and $12.0 million of
mezzanine debt held outside the trust.  Total mall occupancy as of
March 2009 was 92% compared to 90% at last review.  In-line
occupancy as of March 2009 was 81%.  Comparable in-line sales for
the 12-month period ending June 2009 were $290 per square foot,
down 5% from the prior period.  Moody's analysis of the loan
incorporates a higher capitalization rate to reflect current
market conditions.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and
0.83X, respectively, compared to 110% and 0.84X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 390 Park Avenue Loan
($108.1 million -- 7.1%), which is secured by a 234,000 square
foot office building located in New York City.  The property was
100% occupied as of February 2009 compared to 96% at last review.
Property performance has improved due to the lease-up of vacant
space as well as increased rental revenues.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 115%
and 0.79X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Spectrum Office Portfolio Loan
($84.2 million -- 5.5%), which is secured by six office properties
located in the North Rivers submarket of Chicago.  The portfolio
was 85% occupied as of March 2009, the same as at last review.
Portfolio performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 104% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.95X
at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $9,116,522, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-2, $75,897,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-3, $107,275,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-4, $365,026,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $74,464,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-1-A, $424,249,343, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/23/2007

  -- Class A-MFL, $80,000,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class A-MFX, $80,508,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class A-J, $110,350,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/16/2009

  -- Class B, $30,095,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class C, $16,051,000, downgraded to A3 from Aa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class D, $28,089,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class E, $18,057,000, downgraded to Ba1 from A3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009


  -- Class F, $20,064,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class G, $16,050,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class H, $20,064,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class J, $8,025,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class K, $8,026,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class L, $8,025,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class M, $2,007,000, downgraded to Ca from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class N, $6,019,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009

  -- Class O, $6,019,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/16/2009


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2005-C3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes and
downgraded nine classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C3.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from increased leverage,
increased credit quality dispersion and realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans.  On July 14, 2009, Moody's
placed nine classes on review for possible downgrade.  The action
concludes that review.  The action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the July 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$1.57 billion from $1.64 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 198 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 35% of the pool.  The pool includes 53 loans,
representing 12% of the outstanding loan balance, which are
secured by residential co-ops.  These loans have underlying
ratings of Aaa.  Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$3.6 million loss.  Seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan, Southland Center Mall ($108.4 million -- 7%), is secured by
a mall owned by an affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc.
(GGP).  This loan was transferred to special servicing due to
GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  The second largest
specially serviced loan is Longford Plaza ($18.1 million -- 1.1%),
which is secured by a 101,000 square foot office property building
located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in December 2008 due to monetary default.  The
property's performance has declined since securitization due to
increased vacancy caused by lease rollovers.  Moody's does not
anticipate a loss from the Southland Center Mall loan but
estimates a $19.3 million aggregate loss (51% loss severity on
average) from the remaining specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 71% of the pool, excluding defeased loans and loans
secured by residential co-ops.  Moody's weighted average loan to
value ratio, excluding the specially serviced loans with
anticipated losses, is 105% compared to 98% at Moody's prior
review in June 2007.  In addition to the higher overall LTV, the
pool has experienced increased credit quality dispersion.  Based
on Moody's analysis, 63% of the conduit pool has an LTV in excess
of 100% compared to 50% at last review.  Approximately 10% of the
conduit pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 0.0% at last
review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit
component is 1.29X compared to 1.38X at last review.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 32 compared to 38 at last
review.

At securitization, one loan, 635 Madison Avenue ($8.3 million --
0.5%), had an underlying rating.  The loan has defeased and is
collateralized by U.S. Government Securities.

The three largest conduit loans represent 17.6% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest conduit loan is the San Diego Office
Park Loan ($133.0 million -- 8.5%), which is secured by an 11-
building Class A office complex totaling 645,000 square feet
located in San Diego, California.  The loan is interest only for
the entire term.  The largest tenant is Sony Computer
Entertainment which occupies 40% of net rentable area through
December 2014.  The property was 97% occupied as of December 2008,
the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
117% and 0.81X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.74X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 80-90 Maiden Lane Loan
($92.9 million -- 5.7%), which is secured by two Class B office
buildings totaling 545,000 square feet.  The properties are
located in the Insurance submarket in New York City.  The
properties were 99% occupied as of September 2008 compared to 97%
at last review.  Performance has improved due to increased rental
revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.94X,
respectively, compared to 112% and 0.84X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Och Ziff Portfolio
($52.9 million -- 3.4%), which is secured by eight limited-service
hotels located in Columbus, Ohio and Covington, Kentucky.
Performance has declined since last review due to lower revenues
and increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117%
and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 81% and 1.43X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $7,245,373, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-2, $176,757,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-3, $79,635,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-AB, $61,470,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-4, $372,531,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-1-A, $385,036,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-J, $135,048,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-M, $163,695,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-Y, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 6/14/2007

  -- Class B, $34,785,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously affirmed at
     Aa2 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class C, $16,370,000, affirmed at A1; previously affirmed at
     A1 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class D, $14,323,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class E, $16,370,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class F, $20,462,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
     previously Baa1, placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/14/2009

  -- Class G, $16,369,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2;
     previously Baa2, placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/14/2009

  -- Class H, $18,416,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3; previously
     Baa3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class J, $6,138,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class K, $8,185,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously
     Ba2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class L, $6,139,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     Ba3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class M, $4,092,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     B1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class N, $4,092,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     B2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009

  -- Class O, $6,139,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     B3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/14/2009


CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CSAM Funding IV:

  -- US$319,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 14, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$100,000 Class A-1V Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 14, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$129,900,000 Class A-1NV Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on June 14, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$32,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2016, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$7,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded
     to Caa1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,750,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2016,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,250,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D Par
Value Test.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and is currently 2806 versus a test
level of 2340 as of the last trustee report, dated July 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$43.5 million, accounting for roughly 7.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
11.3% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CSAM Funding IV, issued in 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CSAM Funding I:

  -- US$10,500,000 Class A-1 Notes, Downgraded Aa3; previously on
     March 29, 2001 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$563,500,000 Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded Aa3; previously on
     March 29, 2001 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class B-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C-1 Notes, Downgraded to B3; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,700,000 Class C-2 Notes, Downgraded to B3; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,800,000 Class D-1 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
2944 versus a test level of 2719 as of the last trustee report,
dated Jun 23, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $75.13 million, accounting for roughly
11.78% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 17.7% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CSAM Funding I, issued in March 29, 2001, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CSAM Funding III:

  -- US$292,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on July 30, 2003 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$26,250,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded
     to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,850,000 Class B Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Confirmed at
     Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,900,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Confirmed
     at B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2900 versus a test level of 2330 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 7, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $25.75 million, accounting for
roughly 6.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 13.8% of the underlying portfolio.
Finally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CSAM Funding III, issued in 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CSAM FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CSAM Funding II:

  -- US$346,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded A1; previously on May 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class B-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,250,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Class C-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C-2 Floating Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D-1 Fixed Rate Notes Due October 2016,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class K Blended Securities due 2016, Downgraded
     to Ba2; previously on May 29, 2002 Assigned Baa1.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
2898 versus a test level of 2450 as of the last trustee report,
dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $51.78 million, accounting for roughly
13.61% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 15.3% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

CSAM Funding II, issued in May 28, 2002, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


E*TRADE RV: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the Class A-5 and three subordinate tranches
from E*Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1 transaction.  The
downgrade was prompted by the deterioration in performance of the
collateral pool over and above Moody's original expectations.  The
weak performance of the Marine and RV transactions have coincided
with the challenging economic environment that has put pressure on
the performance of the pools of loans related to luxury and non-
essential goods in general.  Moody's currently anticipates that
the collateral pool will incur lifetime cumulative net losses of
8.50%, up from approximately 2.00%-to-3.00% at the time of
closing.  The rating action concludes the evaluation of the
securities that were previously placed on review for possible
downgrade on April 2, 2009.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: E* Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1

Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 8.50% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class A-5, Downgraded to A2 from Aaa; previously on April 2,
     2009, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Baa2 from Aa2; previously on April 2,
     2009, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba2 from A2; previously on April 2,
     2009, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously on April 2,
     2009, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FIFTH THIRD: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2002-FTB1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
certificates issued by Fifth Third Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FTB1
due to higher expected pool losses in relation to remaining
tranche-specific credit protection.

The transaction is backed by less than 50 loans.  The ratings are
based on the methodology applied to all transactions with small
pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as those that
meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral
balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is less than
5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining.

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Fifth Third Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FTB1 (Loans
Remaining: 46)

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Current Balance: $529,132, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Current Balance: $462,992, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 3/9/2009 Downgraded to Ca


FIRST UNION: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Six 2001-C1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings on six classes,
affirmed the ratings on six classes, and downgraded the ratings on
six classes of First Union National Bank - Bank of America, N.A.
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-C1.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from increased credit
quality dispersion and realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans.  On June 17, 2009, Moody's placed the
ratings of twelve classes on review for possible downgrade.  The
action concludes that review.  The action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 23%
to $1.0 billion from $1.31 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 154 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
non-defeased loans representing 24% of the pool.  Fifty-nine
loans, representing 37% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Thrirty-three loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$30.2 million loss.  Seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest loan in special
servicing is EmeryTech ($37.0 million -- 3.6%), which is secured
by a 224,000 square foot office building located in Emeryville,
California.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in June
2009 due to imminent default resulting from a decline in
occupancy.  The property was only 67% occupied as of March 2009
due to several large tenants vacating the building, including
Washington Mutual (18% net rentable area) and LV Sensor (6%).  The
Borrower has indicated that he has a potential tenant for some of
Washington Mutual's former space, however, the prospective tenant
would not move in until next year.  The second largest specially
serviced loan is Midway Mall ($21.8 million -- 2.2%), which is
secured by a 471,000 square foot retail center located in Sherman,
Texas.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in July
2008. The property has suffered from the loss of several major
tenants. Moody's estimates a $45.6 million aggregate loss (50%
loss severity on average) from the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 80% of the pool, excluding the defeased loans.
Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio, excluding the
specially serviced loans with anticipated losses, is 79% compared
to 83% at Moody's prior review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.46X compared to
1.36X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 42 compared to 49 at last
review.

The three largest performing loans represent 9.3% of the
outstanding pool balance.  The largest loan is the Crystal Square
Four Loan ($45.7 million -- 4.5%), which is secured by a 354,000
square foot office building located in Arlington, Virginia.  The
property is largely occupied by government agencies and was 97%
occupied as of February 2009, similar to last review.  The
property's performance has been stable, however, Moody's stressed
the cash flow due to concerns about near-term lease rollover risk
in the current environment.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89%
and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.45X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Sierra III Office Building Loan
($24.9 million -- 2.5%), which is secured by a 248,000 square foot
office building located in Irving, Texas.  The property was 100%
leased to Temerlin McClain, a subsidiary of True North
Communications, through January 2010. However, the tenant vacated
in 2007 and a new tenant, TXU Energy Retail Company, LLC, only
occupies 73% of the total net rentable area.  The decline in
occupancy has negatively impacted performance.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 105% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 74%
and 1.43X at last review.

The third largest loan is Brown & Williamson Tower Loan
($23.3 million -- 2.3%) which is secured by an office tower
located in Louisville, Kentucky.  The property is part of the
Galleria mixed-use complex and is connected to the Hyatt Regency
Hotel.  The property was 100% occupied as of January 2009 to two
major tenants -- R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Fifth Third
Bank of Kentucky.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 84% and
1.36X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $700,546,233, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class A-2F, $52,989,190, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class IO-I, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class IO-II, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class IO-III, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class B, $52,331,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 8/13/2007

  -- Class C, $26,166,000, confirmed at Aaa; previously Aaa,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class D, $26,165,000, confirmed at Aa1; previously Aa1,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class E, $16,354,000, confirmed at Aa3; previously Aa3,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class F, $13,082,000, confirmed at A1; previously A1, placed
     on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class G, $26,166,000, confirmed at Baa1; previously Baa1,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class H, $16,354,000, confirmed at Baa3; previously Baa3,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class J, $19,624,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1; previously
     Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class L, $13,083,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
     Ba3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class M, $6,541,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     B1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class N, $9,812,000, downgraded to Ca from B3; previously B3,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class O, $13,083,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     Caa3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009

  -- Class P, $2,480,935, downgraded to C from Ca; previously Ca,
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2009


FIRSTPLUS HOME: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 1996-A Certificate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of a certificate
issued by FirstPlus Home Improvement Loan Trust 1996-A due to 100%
cash collateralization in the form of the reserve fund supporting
the certificate.  The security is also supported by an insurance
policy issued by MBIA Insurance Corporation.

The current ratings on the securities are consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

As part of evaluating the current ratings for the securities,
Moody's Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.
The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
security in the absence of the guarantee.

The underlying rating on the security is based on the methodology
applied to all transactions with small pool factors.  Moody's
defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of these two
criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less than
$1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool
has fewer than 50 loans remaining

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: FirstPlus Home Improvement Loan Trust 1996-A (Loans
remaining: 3)

  -- Cl. A, Current Balance: $3,940, Upgraded to Aaa; previously
     on 11/16/2008 A2 Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3,
     previously on 2/18/2009 downgraded from Baa1)


FOOTHILL CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Foothill CLO I, Ltd:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,000,000 Type I Class Q Notes, Due 2021; Downgraded to
     B2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Type II Class Q Notes, Due 2021; Downgraded to
     Caa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Type IV Class Q Notes, Due 2021; Downgraded to
     B1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$28,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2021; Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2021; Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2021; Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 3104 versus a test level of 2710 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 30, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $36 million, accounting for
roughly 7.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 16.3% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Foothill CLO I, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Franklin CLO IV, Ltd.:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2015, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 20, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Senior Secured Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Senior Secured Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Caa3; previously
     on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Senior
     Secured Notes due 2015, Downgraded to C; previously on March
     20, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D OC
and Class E OC Ratio Tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2507
versus a test level of 2300 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 11, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $17 million, accounting for roughly 6% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 6% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class E Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class D OC Ratio test.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in a small number of obligors and industries.  This includes
a significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Franklin CLO IV, Ltd., issued on August 28, 2003 is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


FREMONT HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class SL-A to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
issued in Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-B transaction due to higher
expected losses in relation to available credit enhancement.
Underlying securities' collateral consists primarily of closed-end
second lien residential mortgage loans (CES).

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing. Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-B

  -- Cl. SL-A, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GALAXY V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Galaxy V CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$270,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on September 8, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$110,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on September 8, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$29,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$32,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$4,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2017, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class W Combination Notes Due 2017, Downgraded
     to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class Y Combination Notes Due 2017, Downgraded
     to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$5,500,000 Class Z Combination Notes Due 2017, Downgraded
     to Caa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2954 versus a test level of 2586 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 9, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $30 million, accounting for
roughly 6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 12% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Galaxy V CLO Ltd., issued on September 8, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GALAXY VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Galaxy VII CLO, Ltd.:

  -- $270,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2018, Downgraded
     to Aa1; previously on September 12, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $60,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on September 12, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- $29,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class X Combination Notes, Downgraded to A2; previously on
     March 4, 2009 A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class Y Combination Notes, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- $26,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- $19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- $13,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
     2018, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2995 as of the last trustee report, dated July 1, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$18.8 million, accounting for roughly 4.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
11.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Galaxy VII CLO, Ltd., issued in September of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GALLATIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gallatin CLO II 2005-1, Limited:

  -- US$365,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due August
     2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on September 22, 2005
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$36,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$26,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2017,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B-2L
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2776
versus a test level of 2500 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 2, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $41.8 million, accounting for roughly 8.3% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 10.9% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gallatin CLO II 2005-1, Limited, issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GMAC INC: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 13 Classes of Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed ratings of thirteen classes
of securities from nine auto lease transactions sponsored by GMAC
Inc. on review for possible upgrade.  The actions reflect the
improving trend in vehicle residual value recoveries, including no
observed material adverse impact to date of "old" General Motors
Corporation's bankruptcy on residual values; a swift and
successful emergence of "new" General Motors Company from
bankruptcy; reduced uncertainty of disruption in servicing
operations resulting from the U.S. government's support and
partial ownership of GMAC that have improved its liquidity and
capital positions; and build up in credit enhancement available to
the rated notes relative to the remaining securitized residual
value.

The affected securities had previously been downgraded due to
concern over the unprecedented volatility in residual values,
particularly during the latter half of 2008, as well as the
broader macroeconomic environment and the deteriorating financial
condition of the auto industry.  Conversely, the current actions
were motivated by the continued improvement in vehicle residual
values for the sector, including those values realized on vehicles
backing the affected transactions.  Moody's believe the improving
trends are not a result of seasonality, but a combination of
increased consumer demand for used vehicles as a cheaper
alternative to buying a new vehicle and the swift emergence of
General Motors Company and Chrysler from their respective
bankruptcy filings on June 1, 2009, and April 30, 2009.  Support
from the U.S. government seems to have mitigated downward pressure
on industry residual values which have rebounded from historical
lows.  During the review, Moody's will continue to monitor
residual value performance as well as further developments in the
sector.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-SN2

  -- Cl. A-3, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

  -- Cl. A-4 Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

  -- Cl. B, Baa3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa3 from A1;

  -- Cl. C, Ba3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Ba3 from A3;

  -- Cl. D, B3 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to B3 from Ba1;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-SNE

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2007-SNG

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SNA

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SNB

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SND

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SNE

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SNF

  -- Cl. A, Baa1 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3;

Issuer: Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust 2008-SNH

  -- Cl. A, A2 Placed on Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on 1/28/2009, Downgraded to A2 from Aa2;

GMAC Inc. provides wholesale, retail, and lease financing,
primarily to GM dealers and is one of the world's largest auto
finance companies.  GMAC's senior unsecured rating was upgraded
from C to Ca on June 10, 2009.  The rating remains under review
for further possible upgrade.  The upgrade reflects the firm's
lower bankruptcy risk resulting from the U.S. government's support
of the firm, including significant capital injections that have
improved its liquidity and capital positions, partial U.S.
government ownership, and GMAC's role in the U.S. government's
efforts to reinvigorate the U.S. domestic auto industry.  Of
continuing concern, GMAC must yet raise substantial additional
equity to comply with the requirements of the recently concluded
stress tests under the U.S. government's Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program.  General Motors Company, headquartered in
Detroit, Michigan, is one the world's largest auto manufacturers.


GOLDENTREE MULTISTRATEGY: S&P Affirms Ratings on Four Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on four
tranches from two market value collateralized debt obligation
transactions and removed them from CreditWatch negative.  At the
same time, S&P withdrew one rating on a tranche from GoldenTree
MultiStrategy Financing Ltd. following the complete paydown of the
tranche balance.  The rating actions follow S&P's monthly review
of market value CDO performance.

The CreditWatch removals reflect several months of stable or
improving overcollateralization ratios for these classes as a
result of pay downs to the senior notes.  S&P affirmed the ratings
on the corresponding senior classes from these transactions.

S&P will continue to monitor these transactions through its
monthly review process.  S&P will take negative rating actions
when appropriate if S&P sees declines in the O/C levels, and S&P
will remove the ratings from CreditWatch if tranches reestablish
an appropriate cushion above the minimum O/C requirement for
several consecutive months.

                          Rating Actions

                                                       Rating
                                                       ------
  Transaction                              Class      To    From
  -----------                              -----      --    ----
  GoldenTree MultiStrategy Financing Ltd.  A-1        NR    AAA
  Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      B Fixed    BB    BB/Watch Neg
  Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      B Float    BB    BB/Watch Neg
  Sankaty High Yield Partners III          B          B     B/Watch Neg
  Sankaty High Yield Partners III          B          B     B/Watch Neg


                         Ratings Affirmed

    Transaction                              Class      Rating
    -----------                              -----      ------
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      A-2 Fixed  AA
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P       A-2 Float  AA
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      C Fixed    CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      C Float    CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      D Fixed    CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      D Float    CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners II L.P.      E Float    CC
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          A-2        A
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          Sr Sec Ln  A
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          C          CCC
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          C          CCC
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          D          CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          D          CCC-
    Sankaty High Yield Partners III          E          CC


GRAYSTON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Grayston CLO II 2004-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$283,750,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due August
     2016, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on June 30, 2004 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2016,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,750,000 Class B-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due August
     2016, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded B1 and Placed under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$24,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due August 2016,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2935 versus a test level of 2065 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 2, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $14.5 million, accounting for
roughly 4% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 8% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Grayston CLO II 2004-1 Ltd., issued in June 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-GG9 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned Rating Outlooks to 15 classes of commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates from Greenwich Capital Commercial
Funding Corp. series 2007-GG9.  A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 8.8% for this transaction should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
6.8%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 6.8% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.

Given the significant remaining term to maturity, Fitch's actions
do not account for the full magnitude of possible maturity losses.
The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate classes that may be
downgraded in the future should full potential losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for certain
loans representing 52.1% of the pool and, in some cases, revised
based on additional information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 23% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 0.1% in 2010, 5.3% in 2011, 14.3% in 2012, 2.1% in 2013,
and 1.4% in 2014.  All losses associated with these loans are
fully recognized in the rating actions.

Fitch identified 18 Loans of Concern (12.4%) within the pool, four
of which (1.6%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, two (1.2%) are current.  None of the specially serviced
loans are within the transaction's top 15 loans (50.6%) by unpaid
principal balance.

Two of the Loans of Concern (7.8%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 1% to 32%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Schron
Industrial Portfolio (4.7%), Peachtree Center (3.2%), and Apollo
Portfolio (0.66%).

The Schron Industrial Portfolio is collateralized by a diversified
pool of 36 industrial/flex properties located on Long Island, New
York.  The Portfolio contains approximately 3.5 million square
feet of rentable space, occupied by 269 tenants. Three of the 36
properties are single tenant buildings and most properties have
three to eight tenants.  At issuance, the loan was underwritten to
a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation that below market
leases expiring during the term of the loan would be re-signed at
higher rates, providing for potential upside in future cash flows.
Based on year-end 2008 performance, the property is behind the
stabilization schedule.  The servicer reported YE 2008 debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.13 times (x) and 89%
respectively.  Based on current performance and anticipated
declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in
2016.

Peachtree Center is located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.  The
collateral includes six office buildings totaling approximately
2.4 million SF, three parking garages, and a 134,000 SF retail
center.  The project spans three blocks along the east side of
Peachtree Street.  The properties had an overall occupancy of
65.5% at issuance.  To mitigate the vacancy, $26.6 million was
held in escrow as a leasing reserve, $8.6 million for a debt
service reserve and $9.3 million for a capital improvement
reserve.  Currently the reserve accounts have these balances:
Capital Improvement $4.6 million; Debt Service $8.8 million;
Leasing Reserve $11.1 million.

The sponsors purchased the properties with the intent of
implementing an aggressive lease-up strategy and eventually
selling off the various properties to outside investors upon each
property's stabilization.  Current economic conditions have
negatively impacted leasing velocity and the property is behind
its stabilization schedule.  The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR
and occupancy were 0.88x and 65%, respectively.  Based on current
performance and anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to
the loan's maturity in 2012.

The Apollo Portfolio is collateralized by a 557 unit apartment
complex located in Los Angeles, California.  At issuance, the loan
was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the
expectation that renovations to the units would result in
increased rental rates, providing for potential upside in future
cash flows. Turnover rates at the property were higher than
anticipated which accelerated the pace of unit renovations but
also was more disruptive to property cash flows.  At issuance an
$11 million capital improvement reserve was established.  This
reserve currently has an $8.5 million balance.

The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR and occupancy were 0.22x and
67%, respectively.  The sponsor has indicated that it is no longer
able to fund the operational shortfall at the property and is
seeking a loan modification.  Fitch considers it likely that this
loan will transfer to the special servicer in the near future.
Based on current performance, losses are expected prior to the
loan's maturity in 2014.

Fitch has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $575.3 million class A-J to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $32.9 million class B to 'BBB-' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $98.6 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $41.1 million class D to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $41.1 million class E to 'BB' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $57.5 million class F to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $57.5 million class G to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $82.2 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $65.8 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $65.8 million class K to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $32.9 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.4 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $24.7 million class N to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.4 million class O to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16.4 million class P to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has affirmed this class, removed it from Rating Watch
Negative and assigned a Rating Outlook as indicated:

  -- $8.2 million class Q at 'B-'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed these classes and Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

  -- $64.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.18 billion class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $86 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $88 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.67 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $493.5 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $557.6 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-MFL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $82.2 million class S.


GSC GROUP: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by GSC Group CDO Fund VIII, Limited:

  -- US$267,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on March 28, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$19,400,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$17,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test and the Class D Overcollateralization
Test .  The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased
over the last year and is currently 3199 versus a test level of
2457 as of the last trustee report, dated June 19, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $30 million,
accounting for roughly 8.5% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 20% of the
underlying portfolio.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, and insurance industries, which Moody's
views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

GSC Group CDO Fund VIII, Limited, issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GSMPS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 81 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 81 tranches and confirmed
3 tranches from 9 GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust FHA - VA deals issued
from 2002 to 2006 due to higher expected pool losses in relation
to available credit enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase. Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-1

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-LT1

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP2

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-RP1

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-RP2

  -- Cl. 1AF1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AF2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1AS2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GULF STREAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2004-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1,
Ltd.:

  -- US$320,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2016,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 18, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$34,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes due 2016,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Bal and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2016, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Bl and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2836 versus a test level of 2400 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $30 million, accounting for
roughly 8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration
risk in debt obligations of companies in the banking, finance,
real estate, and insurance industries, which Moody's views to be
more strongly correlated in the current market environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gulf Stream - Compass CLO 2004-1, Ltd., issued in August of 2004,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GULF STREAM-RASHINBAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I,
Ltd.:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Variable Funding
     Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously
     on November 30, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$284,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 30, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook", and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below their
historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2703 as of the last trustee report, dated June
15, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total
about $18.3 million, accounting for roughly 4.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
8.5% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gulf Stream-Rashinban CLO 2006-I, Ltd., issued in November 2006,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HCA INC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on $750 Million Senior Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 (LGD3, 32%) rating to HCA
Inc.'s proposed offering of $750 million of first lien senior
secured notes.  Moody's also affirmed the existing ratings of HCA,
including the B2 Corporate Family and Probability of Default
Ratings.  The outlook for the ratings is stable.

"The current transaction continues the company's efforts to
proactively address the considerable amount of bank debt scheduled
to mature in the 2012 and 2013 time frame," said Dean Diaz, Vice
President -- Senior Credit Officer at Moody's.  As such, the
proposed issuance is not expected to result in any change in the
company's leverage as the proceeds of the notes will be used to
prepay a like amount of first lien bank debt.  Additionally, while
the current offering and the April 2009 issuance of secured notes
is expected to increase interest expense, it is not expected to
materially affect cash flow and interest coverage metrics.

HCA's B2 Corporate Family Rating continues to reflect the
significant leverage of the company resulting from the November
2006 leveraged buyout.  The considerable interest cost associated
with the debt load continues to constrain interest coverage
metrics and limits free cash flow.  The rating also reflects the
anticipation that HCA's scale, market strength and recent focus on
cost containment should aid in weathering the unfavorable trends
in bad debt expense and weak volumes that have been and are
expected to continue to plague the industry as a whole.
Additionally, the company is expected to maintain good liquidity
over the next year.

Moody's rating actions are summarized below.

Ratings assigned:

* $750 million first lien secured notes due 2020, Ba3 (LGD3, 32%)

Ratings affirmed:

* $2,000 million ABL Revolver due 2012, Ba2 (LGD2, 12%)

* $2,000 million Revolving Credit Facility due 2012, Ba3 (LGD3,
  32%)

* $2,750 million Term Loan A due 2012, Ba3 (LGD3, 32%)

* $8,800 million Term Loan B due 2013, to Ba3 (LGD3, 32%)

* $1,250 million Euro Term Loan due 2013, Ba3 (LGD2, 23%)

* $1,500 million first lien secured notes due 2019, Ba3 (LGD3,
  32%)

* $1,000 million Second Lien Notes due 2014, B2 (LGD4, 57%)

* $3,200 million Second Lien Notes due 2016, B2 (LGD4, 57%)

* $1,500 million Second Lien PIK Notes due 2016, B2 (LGD4, 57%)

Senior unsecured notes (various), Caa1 (LGD6, 90%)

* Corporate Family Rating, B2
* Probability of Default Rating, B2
* Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, SGL-2

Moody's last rating action was on April 14, 2009, when Moody's
assigned a Ba3 rating to HCA's first lien senior secured notes
offering and affirmed the existing ratings of the company.

Headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, HCA is the nation's largest
acute care hospital company with 163 hospitals and 105
freestanding surgery centers (including eight hospitals and eight
freestanding surgery centers that are accounted for using the
equity method) as of June 30, 2009.  For the twelve months ended
June 30, 2009, the company recognized revenue in excess of
$29 billion.


HOME RE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various 2005-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms these classes of Home Re 2005-2 Limited:

  -- Class M2 at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class M3 at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class M4 at 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class M5 at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class M6 at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class M7 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M8 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class M9 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B1 at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Class B2 at 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative.

In addition, Fitch places class B2 on Rating Watch Negative.

Home RE 2005-2 is a synthetic transaction which references the
mortgage insurance provided by Mortgage Guaranty Insurance
Corporation on a static pool of first lien, fixed- and adjustable-
rate fully-amortizing residential mortgage loans.  Home RE Limited
and Home RE Credit Limited as the Issuers and MGIC entered into a
reinsurance agreement reinsuring loss amounts incurred by MGIC
relating to the mortgage insurance on the mortgage loans.

The actions taken are based on an analysis of the exposure to
claims on the mortgage insurance policies on the underlying pool
relative to each notes enhancement.  Fitch calculated the claims
exposure by assigning performance adjusted pre-2005 vintage
average subprime frequency of foreclosure percentage to the
portfolio.  Fitch then assumed that 100% of the exposure would be
realized as impairment to the notes.

Losses are allocated to the notes in reverse order of priority.
The notes are not written down by losses, however an impairment
amount is calculated for each note equal to the amount of losses
that have been allocated to it.  The ratings on the notes address
the timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal
upon maturity.


HSBC BANK: S&P Corrects Ratings on 2004-11 Securities From 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
Tranched Investment-Grade Enhanced Return Securities 2004-11
credit-linked notes issued by HSBC Bank USA N.A., a synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation
ransaction, by raising it to 'BBB+' from 'BB-'.

Due to an administrative error, Standard & Poor's lowered its
rating on the notes on June 26, 2009, after S&P analyzed the
transaction using a lower subordination level than what was
reported to us by the manager of the transaction.  The current
rating reflects S&P's revised analysis, which applies the correct
current subordination level as reported to us by the manager.

                         Rating Corrected

                        HSBC Bank USA N.A.
   Tranched Investment-Grade Enhanced Return Securities 2004-11

                                   Rating
                                   ------
                   Class       To          From
                   -----       --          ----
                   Notes       BBB+        BB-


HUNTINGTON CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes of notes issued by
Huntington CDO Ltd./Inc., and assigned Loss Severity ratings.

These rating actions are the result of continued credit
deterioration experienced since Fitch's rating action in July
2008.  Approximately 58.1% of the portfolio carries a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade, with 42.9% rated 'CCC' or
lower.  This is up from 25.1% rated below investment grade and
10.3% rated 'CCC' and lower at the last review.

As of the June 30, 2009 trustee report, the class A/B
overcollateralization (OC) ratio was at 86.6% and is failing the
covenant of 103.7%.  Consequently, interest proceeds that would
otherwise pay classes C-1 and C-2 (class C) interest are being
diverted to pay down the class A-1 notes.  Class A-1 has paid down
approximately 20% since closing.  At the last payment date in May
2009, approximately $1.5 million in excess spread was diverted
from class C in the interest waterfall to pay down class A-1
principal in an attempt to cure the failing OC test.
Additionally, all principal proceeds are being exhausted to pay
down the class A-1 notes also due to the failing OC test.

Fitch expects the class A-1 notes to continue to receive interest
and full principal repayment.  The class A-2 notes have been
downgraded to 'CCC' as they continue to receive interest payments
but minimal principal recovery is expected.  The class B notes
have been downgraded to 'CC' as they continue to receive interest
payments, but Fitch does not expect any principal recovery.  The
class C notes are receiving interest paid in kind (PIK) whereby
the principal amount of the notes is written up by the amount of
interest due.  The class C notes have been downgraded to 'C' as
Fitch does not expect this class to receive any future payments.

The classes A-1A and A-1B notes were assigned a Stable Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable
over the next one to two years.  The classes A-1A and A-1B notes
were also assigned a Loss Severity Rating of LS3.  An LS3 Rating
indicates that a tranche has a medium risk of severe loss severity
given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the
base case loss expectation for the collateral in the range of 1.1
to 4.  The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class's long-term
credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks and LS
ratings to classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Huntington is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
that closed on March 29, 2005, and is managed by Western Asset
Management Company.  The reinvestment period ended in May 2008.
The reference portfolio is composed of 87.3% residential mortgage
backed securities, 8.3% asset backed securities (ABS), 3.3%
commercial mortgage backed securities, and 1.1% CDOs.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned LS ratings:

  -- $369,494,614 class A-1A to 'B/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $200,051 class A-1B to 'B/LS3' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $112,000,000 class A-2 to 'CCC' from 'BB+';

  -- $70,000,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'BB-';

  -- $16,289,390 class C-1 notes to 'C' from 'B-';

  -- $5,273,568 class C-2 notes to 'C' from 'B-'.


ISCHUS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Ischus CDO I, Limited.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2040-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/6/2009 A3

  -- Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2040, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/6/2009 Ba3

  -- Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2040, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/6/2009 Caa3

Ischus CDO I, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of Residential ABS securities.
Residential ABS Securities attribute to approximately 98% of the
outstanding portfolio, of which the majority are from a 2004
vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio due to the recent actions
taken upon seasoned (pre-2005) RMBS deals.  Credit deterioration
of the collateral pool is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor, an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and an increase in the proportion of securities rated Caa1 and
below, among other measures.  More than 43% of its assets have
been downgraded since Moody's last review of the transaction in
February 2009.  The trustee reported the WARF of the portfolio is
2310 as of June 29, 2009.  The Trustee currently reports defaulted
assets in the amount of $55.9 million.  Securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 23% of the underlying portfolio.  The
deal is currently failing a variety of coverage tests including
the Class A/B Overcollateralization Ratio Test.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


IXIS REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2004-HE4 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
securities issued by IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2004-HE4.
These actions are part of an ongoing review of subprime RMBS
transactions.

The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections.  The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months.  Additionally, the
affected transaction continues to pass performance triggers and
released portions of credit enhancement.

Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools i.e. prior
to 2H 2005 takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case 75-80%.  The results
of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses --
are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

Complete list of rating actions follows:

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2004-HE4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/6/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 4/9/2008 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/9/2008 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/9/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/9/2008 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/9/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa2


KKR FINANCIAL: S&P Puts Ratings on 2005-1 Notes on Negative Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 13
classes of notes issued by KKR Financial CLO 2005-1 Ltd., KKR
Financial CLO 2005-2 Ltd., and KKR Financial CLO 2006-1 Ltd. on
CreditWatch with negative implications following the decision by
KKR Financial Holdings LLC, an affiliate of the transaction's
collateral manager, to deliver certain rated notes to the trustee
for cancellation without payment.  In addition, S&P had previously
placed S&P's ratings on nine other classes of notes from these
transactions on CreditWatch negative in light of credit
deterioration S&P observed in the underlying collateral; these
ratings remain on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch placements indicate a significant likelihood that
S&P will take negative rating actions on these classes of notes.
KKR Financial Advisors II LLC is the collateral manager for the
three transactions.

S&P understands, based on the information contained in the most
recent trustee report and other relevant transaction documents,
that the note cancellations have resulted in an increase in the
subordinate overcollateralization ratios for the three
transactions, which had previously been failing their subordinate
O/C ratio tests but are now passing.  Based on S&P's understanding
of the transaction structure, this may result in excess spread
being distributed to equity and subordinate noteholders rather
than being used to pay down the balance of the senior notes,
thereby reducing the credit enhancement available to support the
senior notes.

S&P will be reviewing the impact of the note cancellations on
these transactions to determine whether, in S&P's view, the
ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
level of creditworthiness of each class.

              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                   KKR Financial CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

                           Rating
                                       ------
            Class                To               From
            -----                --               ----
            Class A-1 Notes      AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class A-2 Notes      AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class B Notes        AA/Watch Neg     AA
            Class C Notes        A/Watch Neg      A
            Class D Notes        BBB-/Watch Neg   BBB-

                   KKR Financial CLO 2005-2 Ltd.

                                       Rating
                                       ------
            Class                To               From
            -----                --               ----
            Class A-1 Notes      AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class A-2 Notes      AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class B Notes        AA/Watch Neg     AA
            Class C Notes        A/Watch Neg      A
            Class D Notes        BBB-/Watch Neg   BBB-

                   KKR Financial CLO 2006-1 Ltd.

                                       Rating
                                       ------
            Class                To               From
            -----                --               ----
            Class A-1 Notes      AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class A-2a Notes     AAA/Watch Neg    AAA
            Class A-2b Notes     AAA/Watch Neg    AAA

        Ratings Previously Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                   KKR Financial CLO 2005-1 Ltd.

                Class                Rating
                -----                ------
                Class E Notes        BB-/Watch Neg
                Class F Notes        B-/Watch Neg

                   KKR Financial CLO 2005-2 Ltd.

                Class                Rating
                -----                ------
                Class E Notes        BB-/Watch Neg
                Class F Notes        B-/Watch Neg

                   KKR Financial CLO 2006-1 Ltd.

                Class                Rating
                -----                ------
                Class B Notes        AA/Watch Neg
                Class C Notes        A/Watch Neg
                Class D Notes        BBB/Watch Neg
                Class E Notes        BB/Watch Neg
                Class F Notes        B/Watch Neg


LOCHSONG LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
seven classes of notes issued by Lochsong Ltd., a hybrid
collateralized debt obligation transaction, following the
liquidation of the collateral in the portfolio.  S&P subsequently
withdrew its ratings on these tranches.

S&P lowered its ratings to 'D' because the transaction did not
have sufficient proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payments on the credit
default swap contract.

The deal had triggered an event of default, after which the
controlling noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of the
notes and liquidate the collateral assets.

The current rating actions follow notice from the trustee that the
liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

                          Rating Actions
                           Lochsong Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
             Class      To    Interim    From
             -----      --    -------    ----
             Super Sr.  NR    Dsrp       CCsrp
             S          NR    D          CCC/Watch Neg
             A          NR    D          CC
             B          NR    D          CC
             C          NR    D          CC
             D          NR    D          CC
             E          NR    D          CC

                          NR - Not rated.


LOOMIS SAYLES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Loomis Sayles CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$296,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 26, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A2, previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Downgraded to Caa3, previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D and
Class E Par Value Tests.  The weighted average rating factor has
steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2781 as of
the last trustee report, dated June 26, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $15 million, accounting
for roughly 4% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 7.4% of the underlying
portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class E Notes
are presently being deferred as a result of the failure of the
Class D Par Value Test.  Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Loomis Sayles CLO I, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MADISON PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Madison Park Funding VI, Ltd.:

  -- US$76,000,000 Class A--2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$28,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2946 versus a test level of 2700 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 10, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $36.4 million, accounting for
roughly 7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 11.8% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Madison Park Funding VI, Ltd., issued in September of 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MADISON PARK FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Madison Park Funding II, Ltd.:

  -- US$509,750,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on February 16, 2009 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$11,250,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$38,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25, 000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D Par
Value Test.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and is currently 2929 versus a test
level of 2650 as of the last trustee report, dated June 18, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$77 million, accounting for roughly 9.4% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
9.5% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Madison Park Funding II, Ltd., issued in February of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MARATHON FINANCING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Marathon Financing I, B.V.:

  -- $245,000,000 Class A-1 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2026, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 16,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- EUR75,000,000 Class A-2 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2026, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 16,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $80,000,000 Class A-3 First Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2026, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on January 16,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Up to $250,000,000 drawable in U.S. Dollars, Pounds Sterling
     and Euro Senior Lender Indebtedness, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on January 16, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $80,000,000 Class B-1 Second Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2026, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $20,000,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2026, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $60,000,000 Mezzanine Lender Indebtedness, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on March 4, 2009 A2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 3394 as of the last trustee report, dated June
22, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total
about $211 million, accounting for roughly 19% of the collateral
balance.

Moody's notes that a significant proportion of the collateral pool
is concentrated in non-U.S. dollar denominated obligations from
issuers in a relatively limited number of industries.  As a result
of failure of the Rating Agency Model Test, certain cash flows
have been diverted to pay down the principal balance of the Class
A Notes and the Senior Revolving Credit Facility.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Marathon Financing I, B.V., issued on December 14, 2006, is a
multi-currency collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by
a portfolio of senior secured loans denominated in U.S. dollars,
euros, and pounds sterling.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MASTR REPERFORMING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 39 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 39 tranches from 4 MASTR
Reperforming Loan Trust FHA - VA deals issued in 2005 and 2006 due
to higher expected pool losses in relation to available credit
enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006. While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A5, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1A1F, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A1S, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 1A1F, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A1S, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MAX FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded ratings
of one class of notes issued by Max Funding I, Limited.  The notes
affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class B Floating Rate Second Priority Senior Secured Term
     Notes due January 22, 2013, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     2/26/2009 Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

Max Funding I, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation backed
by a portfolio of collateralized loan obligations and ABS CDOs.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor),
an increase in the proportion of securities rated Ca and below,
among other measures.  The trustee is currently reporting a WARF
of 6876 and approximately 70% of the portfolio is currently rated
Ca or C by Moody's.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to mezzanine
and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.  Since the
last review of this transaction in February 2009, Moody's has
completed the first stage of its two-stage review of U.S. and EMEA
CLOs.  Some of the underlying securities in the portfolio
experienced more severe rating action than was anticipated at the
time of last review.  Moody's is currently in Stage II of its CLO
review and performing comprehensive analysis by modeling each CLO
individually.  Additional rating actions will be taken as
necessary for all rated liabilities.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four 1998-C1-CTL Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes and
downgraded the ratings of three classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-
C1-CTL.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from an overall decline in the pool's credit
quality and anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.
The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 16, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 38%
to $389.7 million from $630.4 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 34% of the pool.  Eighty four of the
loans are credit tenant lease loans secured by properties leased
to 12 corporate credits.  Eleven loans, representing 25% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Forty eight loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  Forty-seven of the loans on the watchlist are secured by
properties leased to Rite Aid.  These loans are performing but are
on the watchlist due to Rite Aid's low credit rating.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $10.8 million.  Eight
loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  All of the specially serviced loans are secured by
retail properties previously occupied by Circuit City, which
declared bankruptcy in late 2008 and subsequently closed all its
stores.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $16.4 million (40%
loss severity on average) for the specially serviced loans.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation
($93.2 million -- 24%; Moody's senior unsecured rating Caa3/Ca --
stable outlook), Georgia Power Company ($59.1 million -- 15%;
Moody's senior unsecured rating A2 -- stable outlook), Circuit
City ($41.1 million -- 15%) and Kroger Co. ($31.3 million -- 8%;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook).
Approximately 69% of the pool, excluding defeased loans, has a
published Moody's rating.  All of the ratings have remained stable
since last review except for Rite Aid Corporation, which had a
senior unsecured rating of Caa2/Caa3 at last review, one notch
higher than its current rating.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-3, $205,528,295, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 12/16/2008

  -- Class A-PO, $1,144,751, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 12/16/2008

  -- Class IO, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 12/16/2008

  -- Class B, $38,765,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously affirmed at
     Aa1 on 12/16/2008

  -- Class C, $32,304,000, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously
     affirmed at A2 on 12/16/2008

  -- Class D, $38,765,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1; previously
     affirmed at Ba1 on 12/16/2008

  -- Class E, $9,691,000, downgraded to B3 from B2; previously
     downgraded to B2 from B1 on 12/16/2008

Moody's prior full review is summarized in a press release dated
December 16, 2008.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology for single tenants.  Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenant, usually an investment
grade rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting
the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

For deals that consist of a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.5 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Eight 2005-ACR1 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eight
tranches issued by the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Synthetic Credit-
Linked Notes Series 2005-ACR1 transaction due to higher expected
losses in relation to remaining tranche-specific credit
protection.

The Merrill Lynch 2005-ACR1 transaction is a synthetic
securitization backed by a reference portfolio of approximately
$272 million of subprime mortgage loans.  The reference portfolio
was securitized as FBR Securitization Trust 2005-1, which issued
two tranches wrapped by Financial Security Assurance, currently
rated Aa3, under review for possible downgrade.  The riskiness of
the Merrill Lynch 2005-ACR1 credit-linked notes is a function of
the credit performance of the underlying reference portfolio of
mortgage loans.  Credit enhancement for the notes is provided
through subordination and excess spread.  The actions do not
affect the ratings of the two tranches of securities issued by FBR
Securitization Trust 2005-1.

The actions are triggered by a combination of factors that include
increased delinquencies, higher loss severities, slower
prepayments and mounting losses in the underlying collateral.

The continued deterioration of the housing market has also
contributed to the increased loss expectations for subprime pools.

The ratings on the securities are monitored by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the
securities, such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
historical performance information regarding the asset class ii)
an analysis of the underlying collateral, iii) an analysis of the
transaction's allocation of cash flow and capital structure, and
(iv) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and, as a result,
realized losses could ultimately turn out higher or lower than
Moody's current expectations.  Moody's will continue to evaluate
performance data as it becomes available and will assess the
pattern of potential future defaults and adjust loss expectations
accordingly if necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Synthetic Credit Linked Notes
Series 2005-ACR1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     Aa3

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     A1

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     Baa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/30/2005 Assigned
     Baa3


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2005-CIP1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-CIP1 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing.  Since Moody's prior review in
June 2007, five loans, representing 14% of the pool, have
transferred to special servicing.  The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the July 13, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 3% to
$1.99 billion from $2.05 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 135 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 38% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 9% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Nineteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date.  Five loans,
representing 14% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Two of the specially serviced loans, comprising 10% of the pool,
are secured by retail properties owned by affiliates of General
Growth Properties.  Glenbrook Square Mall ($176.4 million - 9%) is
an 868,000 square foot regional mall located in Fort Wayne,
Indiana.  Burlington Town Center ($26.0 million -- 1%) is a
223,000 square foot retail property located in Burlington,
Vermont.  The loans were transferred to special servicing in April
2009 due to GGP's bankruptcy filing.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class AJ, $138,830,000, currently Aaa, on review for possible
     downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 6/22/2007

  -- Class B, $43,706,000, currently Aa2, on review for possible
     downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class C, $17,997,000, currently Aa3, on review for possible
     downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class D, $38,564,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class E, $25,709,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class F, $33,423,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class G, $20,567,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class H, $25,709,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class J, $10,284,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class K, $5,142,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 6/22/2007

  -- Class L, $7,713,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 6/22/2007


MESA TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
certificates issued by MESA Trust 2001-2 due to higher expected
pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-specific credit
protection.

The transaction is backed by less than 50 loans.  The ratings are
based on the methodology applied to all transactions with small
pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as those that
meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral
balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is less than
5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining.

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: MESA Trust 2001-2 (Loans Remaining: 28)

  -- Cl. M, Current Balance $1,126,517, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on 2/15/2001 Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance $273,539, Downgraded to C; previously
     on 4/23/2007 Downgraded to Caa3


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on $3 Million Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' rating on
Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-8 $3 million class A-7
secured fixed-rate notes and removed it from CreditWatch, where it
was placed with negative implications on April 13, 2009.

The rating on the class A-7 notes is dependent on the lowest of
(i) the rating on the reference obligation, Huntsman International
LLC's 7.375% senior subordinated notes due Jan. 1, 2015 ('CCC+');
(ii) the rating on Morgan Stanley (A/Negative/A-1), which acts as
the swap payments guarantor; and (iii) the rating on the
underlying security, BA Master Credit Card Trust II's series
2001-B class A certificates due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA').

The rating action reflects the July 17, 2009, removal of S&P's
rating on the reference obligation, Huntsman International LLC,
from CreditWatch with negative implications.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Raises Rating on EUR43 Million Notes to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Morgan
Stanley Managed ACES SPC's EUR43.0 million notional class IA
floating-rate notes series 2006-10 to 'B' from 'CCC-' and removed
the rating from CreditWatch with negative implications, where it
was placed April 22, 2009.

The rating actions reflect the transaction restructuring that
increased the class IA notes' subordination level.  As a result,
the class IA notes' synthetic rated overcollateralization ratio
increased to more than 100% (at a 'B' rating level).

The two other tranches in this deal, the class IB and IC notes,
were not affected by this restructuring.


MOUNTAIN VIEW: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1,
Ltd.:

  -- US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on May 23, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes
     Due April 2019, Downgraded to A1; previously on May 23, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due April 2019,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Downgrade to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Notes Due April
     2019, Downgrade to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Downgrade to Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     April 2019, Downgrade to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2722 versus a test level of 2710 as of the last
trustee report, dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $13.6 million, accounting for
roughly 3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 8.3% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class E Notes were deferred
as a result of the failure of the Class D Par Value Test as of the
last payment date in April 2009.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mountain View Funding CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NAAC REPERFORMING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 26 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 26 tranches from 3 NAAC
Reperforming Loan Remic Trust deals issued in 2004 due to higher
expected pool losses in relation to available credit enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%. As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust 2004-R3

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AS, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PT, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R1

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PT, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R2

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PT, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Class B note issued by
National Collegiate Trust 1997-S1.  The underlying collateral
consists of private credit student loans that were generated under
the First Marblehead's Guaranteed Access to Education program.
he loans in the securitization are neither privately nor federally
insured.  The action concludes the review for downgrade of the
note initiated on April 9, 2009.

The downgrade of National Collegiate Trust 1997-S1 is primarily
driven by negative gross excess spread (i.e. excess spread pre-
losses).  Gross excess spread in the past six months has been
approximately -1.0% (annualized).  Excess spread post-losses has
decreased parity (i.e. ratio of total assets to total liabilities)
to 100.63% as of the May 31, 2009 collection period from 101.66%
as of the December 31, 2008 collection period.  The continued
negative excess spread will result in the trust becoming
undercollateralized in the near future, increasing the risk that
the outstanding principal balance will not be fully repaid by the
legal final maturity date on September 20, 2013.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: National Collegiate Trust 1997-S1

Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 17.5% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class B, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
     placed under review for possible downgrade


NAVIGARE FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Navigare Funding I CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$16,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$27,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2019, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$9,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2641 as of the last trustee report, dated June 20, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$10.2 million, accounting for roughly 3.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
6.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Navigare Funding I CLO Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


NAVIGARE FUNDING: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Navigare Funding II CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$11,250,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also upgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$16,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2690 versus a test level of 2674 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 8, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $6.3 million, accounting for roughly 2.2%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class C Notes is the
result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis, including an in-
depth assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating
model along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative
factors.  By way of comparison, rating actions taken by Moody's in
its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely based on a
parameter-based approach.

Navigare Funding II CLO Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2007-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
securities issued by Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1.
Additionally Moody's has confirmed the rating of the Class II-A-1
from this transaction as Aaa.

The collateral backing this transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, subprime residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are triggered by a combination of
factors including increased delinquencies, higher loss severities,
slower prepayments and mounting losses in the underlying
collateral.  The actions listed below reflect Moody's updated loss
projections for the subprime RMBS sector first announced in a
press release on February 29, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-
going surveillance process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on collateral performance
and updated pool-level loss expectations relative to current
levels of tranche-specific credit enhancement.  Moody's took into
account credit enhancement provided by subordination, cross-
collateralization, excess spread, time tranching, and other
structural features.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to B1

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/30/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca


PAMCO CAYMAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Notes to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by PAMCO Cayman Ltd:

* $90,000,000 Class B Second Senior Secured Notes due August 6,
  2009, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 4, 2009, Caa2 Placed
  Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

PAMCO Cayman Ltd., issued in August 1997, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.  As reported by the trustee, on July 22, 2009, the
transaction experienced an "Event of Default" caused by a failure
of the overcollateralization ratio with respect to the Class A
Notes and Class B Notes to be at least equal to 100%, as required
under Section 5.1(d) of the Indenture dated August 6, 1997.  This
Event of Default is continuing.

The rating actions taken reflect the occurrence of the Event of
Default and consideration of credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolio.  Based on the latest trustee report dated
July 10, 2009, the Class B overcollateralization test stood at
79.08%.  The weighted average rating factor as reported by the
trustee is 5770 versus a test level of 2720 based on the same
report.  In addition, the portfolio includes a large number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

As provided in Article V of the Indenture, during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, the Holders of at least
66-2/3% of the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of each Class of Notes
may direct the trustee to proceed with the sale and liquidation of
the collateral.  The severity of losses may depend on the timing
and choice of remedy to be pursued following the Event of Default.
The rating action reflects increased concerns about potential
losses arising from liquidation.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PHH MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 24 2008-CIM1 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 24
tranches and confirmed the rating of 1 tranche issued by PHH
Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM1.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans.  The
actions are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance --
marked by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with
concerns about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide
and the rising unemployment levels.  The actions listed below
reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector
announced in a press release on March 19th, 2009, and are part of
Moody's on-going review process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM1

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-3A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-4A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-4A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1-PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:

  i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
     performance information available for the asset class as well
     as for the transaction sponsor,

ii) collateral analysis,

iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
     interests of the key parties to the transaction, most notably
     the originator and the servicer,

iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
     cashflow and capital structure,

  v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
     structure, and

vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
     similar transactions.


PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions
----------------------------------------------------------
Following the company's second quarter 2009 (Q2'09) results, the
amendment to its bank debt agreement, the increased senior debt
availability, and the proposed issuance of $375 million of senior
unsecured notes due 2017, Fitch Ratings has taken these rating
actions for Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc.:

  -- Issuer Default Rating affirmed at 'B';
  -- Bank facility affirmed at 'BB/RR1';
  -- Senior unsecured notes rated 'BB/RR1';
  -- Subordinated notes downgraded to 'B-/RR5' from 'BB-/RR2'.

The ratings apply to its $531 million bank credit facility, the
proposed $375 million senior unsecured notes, and to $795 million
of subordinated notes.  The Rating Outlook is revised to Stable
from Negative.

Proceeds from the $375 million senior unsecured issuance will fund
a tender offer of its $135 million 8.75% subordinated notes due
2013 and repay $206 million in revolver borrowings.

The company's bank debt amendment and improved liquidity were
final factors related to Fitch's Outlook revision to Stable from
Negative and affirmation of the 'B' IDR.  The 'BB/RR1' rating on
the proposed $375 million senior unsecured note issuance and the
downgrade of the subordinated notes reflects the changes in the
capital structure and senior debt availability, which impacts
estimated recovery levels in the event of default.

Fitch's previous revision of Pinnacle's Outlook to Negative in
October 2008 was based primarily on these factors:

  -- The deepening of the U.S. recession.

  -- Fitch's expectation that following a surge in energy prices
     supporting the regional economy, Louisiana operating results
     would weaken as energy prices retreated.

  -- The slower-than-expected ramp up of Lumiere Place.

  -- The shutdown of credit markets raising concern about debt
     covenant violations and tight liquidity prior to the River
     City opening.

Fitch's Outlook revision to Stable reflects:

  -- Better-than-expected performance in Louisiana.

  -- The acceleration of Lumiere Place's ramp up, fueled by
     regulatory changes that removed restrictive loss limits.

  -- The completion of an amendment to its bank facility providing
     covenant relief through the opening of River City.

  -- Increased liquidity that supports the completion of River
     City and the development pipeline.

Pinnacle's Q2'09 consolidated adjusted EBITDA increased 18% to
$48.9 million, due primarily to the ramp up of Lumiere Place
fueled by the Missouri loss limit removal.  On a latest 12 months
basis as of June 30, 2009, adjusted EBITDA was $189 million
compared to nearly $975 million in debt for a leverage ratio of
5.2 times, which is solid for the 'B' IDR.  Leverage may increase
slightly as spending continues toward the completion of River City
in the first half 2010 (1H'10).  Pinnacle's free cash flow profile
should improve by mid-2010 following the River City opening, but
the additional capital and increased liquidity also moves the
company closer to progressing on Sugarcane Bay, which is the next
project in its development pipeline.

Through June 30, 2009, Pinnacle has spent roughly $202 million of
River City's total budget of around $390 million-$395 million
(including capitalized interest and operating cash).  So the
company will spend another $190 million to complete the project
over the next 9-12 months.

The company's cash balance was $134 million as of June 30, 2009,
consisting of roughly $64 million of available cash and
$70 million of cage cash.  The reclassification of roughly
$200 million of credit facility debt noted below, allows the
company to access significantly more of its $531 million credit
facility, which had $206 million outstanding as of July 23, 2009,
but will be paid down with the unsecured issuance.  As a result,
any concerns related to tight liquidity around the River City
completion have been removed.  In addition, Pinnacle amended its
credit agreement that provided for relaxed financial covenants,
removing concern that financial covenants could be breached prior
to the River City opening.

Changes in Capital Structure and Senior Debt Availability Impact
Recovery Waterfall Analysis:

Fitch had previously indicated that a change in capital structure
and senior debt availability was likely to occur at some point,
and would result in a downgrade to the subordinated debt rating.
Senior debt availability had been limited largely due to a
$350 million covenant in the 8.75% subordinated notes due 2013,
which is being taken out with the senior unsecured issuance.
Based on improved operational performance and the recent inclusion
of the company's Argentina's operations into the restricted group,
Pinnacle announced on July 24, 2009, that it reclassified roughly
$200 million of bank debt as 2:1 debt rather than permitted senior
debt.  As a result, Pinnacle's senior debt availability with
respect to the covenant increased by roughly $200 million as
result of the reclassification, prior to the transactions
announced.

Based on the transactions announced, senior debt availability will
increase further.  The tender for the 8.75% subordinated notes due
2013 will remove the $350 million senior debt limit, which is the
most restrictive among the company's three subordinated note
issues.  The 8.25% subordinated notes due 2012 have a $475 million
senior debt limit, which will become the most restrictive after
the tender offer is completed.  Most of the proposed $375 million
senior unsecured issuance will not go against this limit because
it is refinancing existing debt.  Therefore, nearly all of the
$475 million senior debt capacity under that covenant will be
available.  So accounting for the transactions announced, solidly
more than $800 million of higher ranking senior debt (consisting
of the $375 million senior unsecured issuance and future
availability under the additional senior debt covenant) will be
able to sit in front of the subordinated debt, which is reflected
in Fitch's revised recovery waterfall analysis.

Based on Fitch's revised analysis, and Pinnacle's prudent bottom
heavy capital structure, estimated recovery values are solid
relative to their ranking in the capital structure.  Fitch rates
both the bank facility and senior unsecured debt 'BB/RR1',
estimating full recovery in the event of default based on the
current capital structure.  The subordinated debt rating was
downgraded to 'B-/RR5' (11%-30% recovery estimate) from 'BB-/RR2'
(71%-90% recovery estimate) as a result of the senior unsecured
issuance and increased senior debt availability.  As senior debt
availability increases (i.e. if PNK takes out the 8.25%
subordinated notes due 2012, the 7.5% subordinated notes senior
debt limit is $1.5 billion), there could be additional rating
pressure on the subordinated debt rating, and possibly the senior
unsecured rating.


PRIMUS CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Primus CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$302,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to A1; previously on July 10, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$8,500,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,500,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of all OC tests.
The weighted average rating factor has increased over the last
year and is currently 2772 versus a test level of 2572 as of the
last trustee report, dated June 16, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $16 million, accounting
for roughly 4.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 16.4% of the underlying
portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments on the Class D and
Class E Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class A/B and Class C overcollateralization tests.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Primus CLO II, Ltd., issued on July 10, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PROSPECT PARK: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Prospect Park CDO Ltd.:

  -- US$373,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on June 22, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa.

Moody's has also upgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March
     17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Moderate credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed
through a decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor is currently 2398 as of the last trustee
report, dated as of July 6, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $24 million, accounting for
roughly 5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 7.16% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class B Notes is the
result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis including an in-
depth assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating
model along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative
factors.  By way of comparison, rating actions previously taken by
Moody's in its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely based
on a parameter-based approach.

Prospect Park CDO Ltd, issued on June 22, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


PRUDENTIAL STRUCTURED: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed four classes of
notes issued by Prudential Structured Finance CBO I, Ltd., and
assigned a Loss Severity rating.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this press release.

The rating actions reflect the continued credit deterioration
experienced by the portfolio since Fitch's last rating action.  As
a result of the negative rating migration, assets with a Fitch
derived rating below investment grade comprise 59.6% of the
current portfolio, of which 52.0% is rated 'CCC' or lower.
Additionally, as of the June 2009 trustee report, 29.2%, or $5.7
million, of the current portfolio is now considered defaulted per
the transaction's governing documents.

The negative credit migration of the portfolio has also caused
each of the overcollateralization ratios to further decline,
triggering an event of default in November 2007 when the class B
OC ratio fell below 90%.  The class A OC test continues to fail
the required condition, which as defined in the transaction's
governing documents, is met when the class A OC ratio is equal to
at least 105.0% and when the difference between the numerator and
the denominator of the class A OC ratio equal to at least $10.0
million.  On the June 2, 2009 measurement date, this difference
was equal to $9.0 million.

As the most senior class outstanding, the class A-2L is the only
class of notes that is currently receiving interest and principal
payments.  Since the class A OC test failure, all available excess
interest and principal proceeds have been used to reduce the
outstanding balance of the class A-2L notes.  To date,
approximately 50% of the notes' original principal balance has
paid down.  The benefit of the delevering of the class A-2L notes
is countered by increased defaults and negative credit migration
of the underlying portfolio.  Based on the composition and vintage
of the portfolio, Fitch expects the class A-2L notes to be the
only class of notes to receive full repayment of principal.

Interest due to the class B-1 and B-1L (class B-1) notes has been
deferring since the February 2008 payment date.  As of the May
2009 payment date, the cumulative deferred interest on the class
B-1 notes was $1.3 million.  Fitch expects the class B-1 notes to
receive some interest payments but minimal principal recovery.
Similarly, interest payments due to the class B-2 and B-2L (class
B-2) notes continue to defer.  Given their positioning in payment
priority, Fitch does not expect the class B-2 notes to receive any
payments in the future.

The class A-2L notes were assigned a Stable Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable over the
next one to two years.  The class A notes were also assigned a
Loss Severity Rating (LS) of 'LS3'.  An 'LS3' rating indicates
that a tranche has a medium risk of severe loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base
case loss expectation for the collateral in the range of 1.1 to 4.
The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class's long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Prudential SF CBO I is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation,
which closed on Oct. 26, 2000 and is managed by the Prudential
Investment Corporation. The reinvestment period ended in November
2005.  The current portfolio is comprised of: 53.6% of subprime
and manufactured housing residential mortgage-backed securities
issued between 1996 and 2005, 30.1% commercial asset-backed
securities and 16.3% of consumer ABS.  Payments are made quarterly
in February, May, August and November of each year.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.

Fitch downgrades, assigns Outlook and a Loss Severity rating:

  -- $10,154,809 class A-2L notes downgraded to 'B' from 'BB+';
     Outlook Stable; assigned 'LS3'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $4,200,000 class B-1 notes affirmed at 'C', withdrew 'DR3';
  -- $8,000,000 class B-1L notes affirmed at 'C', withdrew 'DR3';
  -- $2,500,000 class B-2 notes affirmed at 'C', withdrew 'DR5';
  -- $5,000,000 class B-2L notes affirmed at 'C', withdrew 'DR5'.


PUNTO VERDE: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on $40 Million Tax-Exempt Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB' rating on Punto
Verde Grantor Trust 2006-1's $40 million secured tax-exempt class
A notes on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The rating on the class A notes is dependent on the lower of the
rating on the two underlying securities: (i) Morgan Stanley ACES
SPC's 6.92% notes series 2006-19 due Aug. 2, 2021 ('BB/Watch Neg')
and (ii) Fannie Mae's $6.47 million interest strip due May 15,
2021, which is an interest payment that has been stripped from
Fannie Mae's $4.25 billion global notes due May 15, 2029 ('AAA').

The rating action reflects the July 20, 2009, placement of S&P's
'BB' rating on Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's 6.92% notes series 2006-
19 on CreditWatch with negative implications.


RACE POINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Race Point III CLO:

  -- US$451,200,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to A3; previously on April 27, 2006 assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$25,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$42,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 4, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$31,200,000 Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$10,800,000 Class E Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 4, 2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the amount of defaulted
securities, and an increase in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 3172
versus a test level of 2945 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 16, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $54.89 million, accounting for roughly 9.0% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 19.69% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's notes that a significant proportion of the collateral pool
is concentrated in non-U.S. dollar denominated obligations from
issuers in a relatively limited number of industries.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for certain CEs updated between
12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for
certain CEs that were not updated within the last 15 months.
Additionally, as CEs do not carry credit indicators such as
ratings reviews and outlooks, a stress of a 0.25-0.5 notch-
equivalent assumed downgrade was applied to certain estimates.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Race Point III CLO, issued on April 13, 2006, is a multi-currency
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans denominated in U.S. dollars, euros, and
pounds sterling.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RAFFLES PLACE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
five classes of notes from Raffles Place Funding Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation transaction, and on six classes
from Tower Hill CDO Ltd., a hybrid CDO transaction, following the
liquidation of the collateral in their portfolios.

The affected tranches have a combined issuance amount of
$1.38 billion.  S&P lowered its ratings on Raffles Place Funding
Ltd. to 'D' because the proceeds from the liquidation have not
been sufficient to make par payments to the rated notes.  S&P
lowered S&P's ratings on Tower Hill CDO Ltd. to 'D' because the
transaction did not have proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payment on the credit
default swap contract.

Tower Hill CDO Ltd. was backed predominantly by synthetic
investment-grade corporate CDOs, and Raffles Place Funding Ltd.
was backed predominantly by high-grade residential mortgage-backed
securities.  Both deals triggered events of default, after which
the controlling noteholders voted to accelerate the maturity of
the notes and liquidate the collateral assets.

The rating actions follow notice from the trustees that the
liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.

                          Rating Actions

                                                Rating
                                                ------
Transaction                 Class      To    Interim       From
-----------                 -----      --    -------       ----
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         A-1        NR    D             B-/Watch Neg
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         A-2        NR    D             CCC-
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         B          NR    D             CC
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         C          NR    D             CC
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         D          NR    D             CC
Tower Hill CDO Ltd.         Sub notes  NR    D             CC
Raffles Place Funding Ltd.  CP notes   NR    D/NR          CCC/C
Raffles Place Funding Ltd.  A-1a       NR    D             CC
Raffles Place Funding Ltd.  A-1b       NR    D             CC
Raffles Place Funding Ltd.  A-2        NR    D             CC
Raffles Place Funding Ltd.  B          NR    D             CC

                             NR - Not rated.


RBSGC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2005-RP1 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 10 tranches and confirmed
4 tranches issued by RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1 due to
higher pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-specific
credit protection.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.

Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP1

  -- Cl. I-F, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-SB, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-SF, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on 5/15/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SACO I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2000-3 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
certificates issued by SACO I Inc. Series 2000-3 due to higher
expected pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-specific
credit protection.  These actions are part of an ongoing review of
subprime RMBS transactions.

Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case 65%.  The results of
these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are
weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

Additionally, one pool in this transaction is backed by less than
50 loans.  Moody's therefore used these methodology to estimate
losses on the low pool factor pool.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: SACO I Inc. Series 2000-3 (Loans Remaining: Group 2 -- 42)

  -- Cl. 1-B-3, Current Balance: $1,254,970, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 9/1/2000 Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. 2-B-2, Current Balance: $1,243,598, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 9/1/2000 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. 2-B-3, Current Balance: $428,373, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 9/1/2000 Assigned Baa2


SASCO 2005: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 7 tranches from SASCO
2005 - RF2 FHA - VA due to higher expected pool losses in relation
to available credit enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009. Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Structured Asset Securities Corp 2005-RF2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SASCO FHA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 101 tranches from 11
SASCO FHA - VA deals issued from 2002 to 2007 due to higher
expected pool losses in relation to available credit enhancement.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006.  While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee.
Nevertheless, for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses
have risen from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For
FHA - VA pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than
doubled from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase. Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and change in the debenture rate
applied by FHA to pay interest claims, future loss severities on
these pools are expected to be higher.  Moody's now expects loss
severities on FHA loans originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and
on FHA loans originated in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is
due to change in debenture rate application by FHA for loans
originated after 2004 which results in a lower interest expense
being paid by the FHA and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss
severities on VA loans are expected to average 20%.  As a result,
Moody's now projects cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued
between 2002 and 2007 to average 1.42% as a percentage of original
balance securitized (3.00% as a percentage of current balance)
versus Moody's original expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Structured Asset Securities Corp 2005-RF1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/28/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/28/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/28/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/28/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/28/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/28/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/28/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp 2007-RF1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2005-RF3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2005-RF4

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2005-RF5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2006-RF1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-RF6

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2005-RF7

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp. 2006-RF2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AIO, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-RF3

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AP, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AP, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-I, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-II, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2-I, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2-II, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 5/15/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-I, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-II, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4-I, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4-II, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5-I, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5-II, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-RF4

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AIO, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AP, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SATURN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Saturn CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$135,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on May 23, 2007
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$24,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$27,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's has also confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2022, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's concentration risk in
debt obligations of companies in the finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D
Overcollateralization Test and the Interest Reinvestment Test.
The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased over the
last year and is currently 3064 versus the test level of 2850 as
of the last trustee report, dated as of July 1, 2009.  Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $19.48 million,
accounting for roughly 4% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 14.24%
of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Saturn CLO, Ltd. issued on May 23, 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SAXON MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
classes of notes from three transactions issued by Saxon Mortgage
Securities due to higher expected pool losses in relation to
available credit enhancement.  Moody's has also confirmed the
ratings of one class of notes from a Saxon Mortgage Securities
transaction.

These transactions are currently backed by small number of loans.
Should a default occur on any of the loans in the 1992-1 or the
1992-6 transactions, protection from loss to the notes is
completely dependant on payments made from pool policies provided
by Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation (Baa2) and PMI Mortgage
Insurance Company (Ba3).  Due to the low likelihood of default
given the long pay history of the remaining borrowers, Moody's
concludes that the joint probability of default and loss given
default is consistent with the Ba1 rating.  The Notes in the 1992-
3 transaction do not have protection from the Genworth and PMI
pool policies.

The current ratings on the securities issued by the Saxon Mortgage
Securities 1992-03 transaction are consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

The ratings are based on the methodology applied to all
transactions with small pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool
factor deals as those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the
outstanding collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the
pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50
loans remaining

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Saxon Mortgage Securities 1992-01(Loans Remaining: 19)

  -- Cl. B-1, Current Balance $2,103,791, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 8/26/1992 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Current Balance $338,931, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 8/26/1992 Assigned Aa2

Issuer: Saxon Mortgage Securities 1992-03 (Loans Remaining: 15)

  -- Cl. R, Current Balance $23,368, Confirmed at Aaa; previously
     on 7/21/2008 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc. (Aa3,
     under review for possible downgrade, previously on 11/21/2008
     downgraded from Aaa)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance $2,059,525, Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on 7/21/2008 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc. (Aa3,
     under review for possible downgrade, previously on 11/21/2008
     downgraded from Aaa)

Issuer: Saxon Mortgage Securities 1992-06 (Loans Remaining: 14)

  -- Cl. B, Current Balance $1,088,961, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 12/30/1992 Assigned Aa2


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 121 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 121
tranches from 19 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Sequoia.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively.  Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 10

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/30/2002 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 11

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/23/2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/18/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/18/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/18/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/18/2003 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-1B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa


  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/16/2003 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-4

  -- Cl. 1-X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/18/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/18/2003
     Assigned Aaa

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-5

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/1/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 10/1/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/1/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/1/2003 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2003-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/3/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/3/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/3/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 10/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 10/26/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 10/26/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/26/2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/26/2004
     Assigned Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/26/2004 Assigned
     B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/15/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/15/2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/15/2004
     Assigned Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/15/2004
     Assigned B2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/31/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/31/2001 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 10/31/2001 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/31/2001
     Assigned Baa2

Sequoia Mortgage Trust 9

  -- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/5/2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/5/2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/5/2002 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/5/2002 Assigned
     Baa2


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class B Tranche
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the Class B
tranche from the Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2000-4.  The collateral
backing this transaction consists primarily of first-lien,
adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

This action is a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 35% to 45%.  The
results of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses -- are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 4

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/21/2000 Assigned Ba2


SFA CABS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes and assigned Loss Severity
ratings to one class of notes issued by SFA CABS II CDO, Ltd.

The affirmations are a result of the continued delevering of the
class A notes offset by negative credit migration of the
underlying portfolio.  A detailed list of rating actions follows
at the end of this press release.

To date, approximately 88% of the class A original principal
balance has paid down, thereby increasing the credit support
provided by the subordinate classes to the class A notes, as this
class becomes a smaller portion of the overall capital structure.
The benefit of the delevering of the class A notes is countered by
increased defaults and negative credit migration of the underlying
portfolio.  Since the last rating action, 38.1% of the portfolio
was downgraded, resulting in 56.9% of the portfolio rated below
investment grade.  Per the governing documents of the transaction,
37.3% of the portfolio is deemed to be defaulted.

The class A/B overcollateralization test continues to fail. As of
the trustee report dated July 1, 2009, the class A/B ratio was
61.9%, significantly below the trigger of 105%.  As a result of
the failing OC test, all interest proceeds available after
payments of transaction related fees, the interest rate swap
payment, and distributions of current interest to the class A and
B notes, have been used to amortize the class A notes.  The
transaction entered an event of default in February 2004, as a
result of the total collateral balance falling below the aggregate
outstanding balance of the notes.  As of July 24, the controlling
class has not accelerated the maturity of the notes.

Based on the composition, vintage and amortization profiles of the
portfolio's assets, Fitch expects eventual full repayment of
principal on the class A notes.  Additionally, the expiration of
the existing interest rate swap in September 2009 will result in
more interest proceeds available to pay down class A notes.

The class B notes continue to receive their timely interest
payments due to their positioning in the payment waterfall ahead
of the class A/B OC test.  Although the class B notes have not
received any payments of principal to date, Fitch expects this
class of notes to receive some repayments in the future, after the
class A notes are paid in full.

The class A notes were assigned a Stable Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable over the
next one to two years.  The class A notes were also assigned a
Loss Severity Rating of LS4.  An LS4 Rating indicates that a
tranche has a medium to high risk of severe loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base
case loss expectation for the collateral in the range of 0.51 to
1.  The LS rating should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class's long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

SFA CABS II is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO),
which closed on May 21, 2001, and is managed by Structured Finance
Advisors.  The portfolio is comprised of: 34.0% commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities, 31.7% of residential mortgage-
backed securities, including 16.5% subprime RMBS bonds.  The
remaining 28.8% is invested in commercial mortgage-backed
securities.

Fitch has take these rating actions:

  -- $21,454,684 class A notes affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
     assigned 'LS4';

  -- $50,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'CCC'.


SHEFFIELD CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded ratings
of five classes of notes issued by Sheffield CDO II, Limited.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$9,000,000 Class S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2051, Downgraded to B1; previously on February 24, 2009 Aa2
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$169,300,000 Class A-1 Variable Funding Notes Due 2051,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on February 24, 2009 Ba2 Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$32,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2051, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 24, 2009
     B1 Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$32,500,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2051, Downgraded to Ca; previously on February 24, 2009
     B2 Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$31,600,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2051, Downgraded to C; previously on February 24, 2009 B3
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sheffield CDO II, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of structured finance securities,
the majority of which are Collateralized Loan Obligations
originated in 2006.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating, as measured by the weighted average rating factor
(WARF), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
an increase in the proportion of securities rated Caa1 and below,
and failure of the coverage tests, among other measures.  More
than 80% of the assets in the portfolio have been downgraded since
Moody's last review of the transaction in February 2009.  The
Trustee reported WARF of the portfolio is 2706 as of July 10,
2009.  Also, the Trustee reports a total $81.5 million of non-
performing assets.  Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 23.5% of the underlying portfolio.  In addition, the
Trustee reports that the transaction is currently failing one or
more coverage tests, including the Senior Overcollateralization
Test.

The actions also take into consideration the occurrence on July
21, 2009, as reported by the Trustee, of an Event of Default
described in Section 10.a (viii) of theTrust Deed dated December
16, 2006.  As provided in Article X of the Trust Deed, during the
occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties
to the transaction may direct the Trustee to take particular
actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities and the
Notes.  The actions also take into consideration the risk that
liquidation of the Collateral may be selected as the post-Event of
Default remedy.  The liquidation of the CDO collateral may result
in a probability of repayment and a severity of loss that are
inconsistent with an investment-grade rating.

Moody's observes that the transaction is exposed to a significant
concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the
underlying portfolio.  Since the last review of this transaction
in February 2009, Moody's has completed the first stage of its
two-stage review of U.S. and EMEA CLOs.  Some of the underlying
securities in the portfolio experienced more severe rating action
than was anticipated at the time of last review.  Moody's is
currently in Stage II of its CLO review and performing
comprehensive analysis by modeling each CLO individually.
Additional rating actions will be taken as necessary for all rated
liabilities.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SILVERADO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-II Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Silverado CLO 2006-II Limited:

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2020, Confirmed at B2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2020, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2810 versus a test level of 2432 as of the last
trustee report, dated as of June 11, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $13 million, accounting
for roughly 3.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11.7% of the underlying
portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Silverado CLO 2006-II Limited, issued on October 30, 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


SLATE CDO: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed seven classes of Notes issued by
Slate CDO 2007-1, Ltd. on review for possible downgrade:

  -- Class A1SA, $267,327,116, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa

  -- Class A1SB, $130,693,257, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa

  -- Class A1J, $67,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Ba1 from Aaa

  -- Class A2, $38,200,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Ba2 from Aa2

  -- Class A3, $27,800,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to B2 from A2

  -- Class B1, $18,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Caa1 from Baa2

  -- Class B2, $13,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, on
     review for possible downgrade; previously on 3/30/2009
     downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3

Moody's is placing all rated classes on review for possible
downgrade due to deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio as well as the occurrence of an Event of
Default on March 31, 2009.  This EOD was due to the Senior Test
(Senior Test Adjusted Credit Ratio) breaching its trigger, as set
forth in the indenture.  This resulted in the Majority of the
Controlling Class directing the Acceleration of Maturity on
July 2, 2009, per Section 5.2(a) of the indenture.

Slate CDO 2007-1, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of CMBS assets and CRE CDOs.  CMBS assets
comprise approximately 63% of the portfolio and the majority of
these securities are 2006 and 2007 vintage.  The CRE CDOs
constitute approximately 37% of the portfolio.

Deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio is
observed through numerous factors including but not limited to a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase
in the weighted average rating factor or WARF), an increase in the
proportion of securities rated below Baa3, failure of the coverage
tests and an increase in dollar amount of defaulted assets.
Several key indicators of declining credit quality of the
portfolio have become evident since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  The Trustee reports a WARF of 3259 as
of June 30, 2009 in contrast to a reported WARF of 2182 at last
review.  More than 10% of the underlying assets have been
downgraded since Moody's last review of the transaction.
Securities rated Baa3 or lower now make up approximately 92% of
the underlying portfolio resulting in a significant Moody's
Haircut amount in the par value which is factored into the
calculation of the Overcollateralization Test.  The Trustee
reports that the transaction is currently failing one or more
coverage tests, including the Class A2 and B3
Overcollateralization Test.  In addition, The Trustee currently
reports that $74.5 million in assets have defaulted.

As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities
and the Notes, including liquidation.  Moody's notes that he
transaction is exposed to a significant concentration of CMBS
assets, the majority of which have low speculative-grade ratings.
It is also exposed to CRE CDOs with low speculative-grade ratings.
Both types of assets have shown depressed market valuations
recently and thus may herald poor recovery prospects in a sale and
liquidation of the Collateral.

The actions reflect the increased expected loss associated with
each tranche.  Losses are attributed to diminished credit quality
on the underlying portfolio.  The severity of losses may vary
depending on the timing and outcome of a liquidation of the
Collateral, should the Controlling Class direct the Trustee to
dispose of the Collateral.  The risk that a liquidation of the
Collateral may result in a probability of Note principal repayment
and a severity of loss that in Moody's view are inconsistent with
an investment-grade rating.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March, 30 2009.


SMART HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-1 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
tranches issued by Smart Home Reinsurance 2006-1 Limited due to
higher expected losses in relation to remaining tranche-specific
credit protection.

This transaction is a synthetic securitization backed by mortgage
insurance exposure on a reference portfolio of approximately
$2.4 billion of subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans.  The mortgage
insurance is provided by Radian Guaranty Inc.  Noteholders are
exposed to the risk of future claims under the mortgage insurance
policies.  The riskiness of the notes is a function of the credit
performance of the underlying reference portfolio of mortgage
loans and the amount of risk assumed.  Credit enhancement for the
note is provided primarily through subordination.

The actions are triggered by higher than anticipated delinquency
levels as well as slower than anticipated voluntary prepayments
for the reference portfolio, resulting in higher updated loss
expectation for the underlying collateral.  This translates into
higher expected losses for the synthetic transaction and lower
coverage for the rated debt given available credit enhancement.

The ratings on the securities are monitored by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the
securities, such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
historical performance information regarding the asset class ii)
an analysis of the underlying collateral, iii) an analysis of the
transaction's allocation of cash flow and capital structure, and
(iv) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.

General loss estimation methodology for the reference portfolio is
outlined below.

For recent vintages (2005 and later), Moody's calculates estimated
losses for residential mortgage pools in a two-step process.
First, serious delinquencies are projected through late 2009,
primarily based upon recent performance.  These projected
delinquencies are converted into projected losses using lifetime
roll rates (the probability of transition to default) averaging
85% for 60-day delinquencies, 90% for 90-day or longer
delinquencies, 100% for loans in foreclosure and REO, and 100%
severity assumption for the mortgage insurance exposure
securitized in this transaction.  Severity takes into account
accrued interest during the liquidation period, rescission rates
as well as the effect of modifications on underlying mortgages.

The second step is to determine losses beyond 2009.  Depending on
a deal's performance, as well as collateral credit
characteristics, such as loan type, loan-to-value ratios and
geographic concentrations of remaining current loans, Moody's
assumes varying degrees of slowing in the loss rate (which is
measured by loss-to-liquidation) for the remaining life of the
deal.  Typical degrees of slowing in loss rate after late 2009
range from 15% to 25%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and, as a result,
realized losses could ultimately turn out higher or lower than
Moody's current expectations.  Moody's will continue to evaluate
performance data as it becomes available and will assess the
pattern of potential future defaults and adjust loss expectations
accordingly if necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Smart Home Reinsurance 2006-1 Limited

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/9/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/9/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/9/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/9/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/9/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/9/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/9/2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/9/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SOLSTICE ABS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Solstice ABS III,
Ltd., and left on review for possible further downgrade the
ratings of one of these classes.  The notes affected by the rating
action are:

  -- US$346,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2033, Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 2/18/2009 Confirmed at Aaa

  -- US$107,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2033, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- US$47,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2039, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Solstice ABS III, Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of RMBS assets and CLOs.  RMBS assets
comprise approximately 47% of the portfolio and the majority of
these securities are 2003 vintage.  The CLOs constitute
approximately 30% of the portfolio.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio, as well as the occurrence, as
reported by the Trustee on July 20, 2009, of an event of default
under Indenture Section 5.1(j) because on a Measurement Date the
ratio expressed by dividing (a) the Net Outstanding Portfolio
Collateral Balance on the Measurement Date by (b) the Aggregate
Outstanding Amount of the Class A Notes on such Measurement Date
was less than 100%.

Deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio is
observed through numerous factors including but not limited to a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by an increase
in the weighted average rating factor or WARF), an increase in the
proportion of securities rated Caa1 and below, an increase in
dollar amount of defaulted assets and failure of the coverage
tests.  Several key indicators of declining credit quality of the
portfolio have become evident since Moody's last review of the
transaction in February 2009.  The Trustee reports a WARF of 1830
as of June 28, 2009 in contrast to a reported WARF of 870 as of
March 2009.  More than 51% of the underlying assets have been
downgraded since Moody's last review of the transaction in
February 2009.  Securities rated Caa1or lower now make up
approximately 30% of the underlying portfolio whereas such assets
were 23% of the portfolio at the time of Moody's most recent
review.  The Trustee currently reports that $54 million in assets
have defaulted.  In addition, the Trustee reports that the
transaction is currently failing one or more coverage tests,
including the Class A/B Overcollateralization Test.

As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral Debt Securities
and the Notes, including liquidation.  Moody's notes that he
transaction is exposed to a significant concentration of RMBS
assets, the majority of which are currently in default or have low
speculative-grade ratings.  It is also exposed to mezzanine and
junior CLO tranches with low speculative-grade ratings.  Both
types of assets have shown depressed market valuations recently
and thus may herald poor recovery prospects in a sale and
liquidation of the Collateral.

The actions take into consideration the risk that a liquidation of
the Collateral may result in a probability of Note principal
repayment and a severity of loss that in Moody's view are
inconsistent with an investment-grade rating.

The severity of losses of certain tranches may be different,
however, depending on the timing and choice of remedy to be
pursued following the event of default.  Because of this
uncertainty, the ratings assigned to the Class A-1 Notes remain on
review for possible further action.


STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2005-4 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
certificates issued by Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan
Trust 2005-4 due to higher expected pool losses in relation to
remaining tranche-specific credit protection.

The transaction is backed by less than 50 loans.  The ratings are
based on the methodology applied to all transactions with small
pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as those that
meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral
balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is less than
5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining.

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
(Loans Remaining: Pool 6 -- 34)

  -- Cl. 6-A1, Current Balance: $2,754,390, Downgraded to Baa1;
     previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. 6-A2, Current Balance: $4,394,783, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. 6-AX1, IO Class, Downgraded to A2; previously on
     2/20/2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. 6-AX2, IO Class, Downgraded to A2; previously on
     2/20/2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. B1-II, Current Balance: $1,408,694, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B2-II, Current Balance: $406,536, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to B3


SUPERIOR WHOLESALE: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Class C & D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. auto-related dealer floorplan ABS transactions entering early
amortization due to manufacturer or finance company bankruptcy are
largely performing within expectations, though material concerns
remain over valuation declines in a still challenged macro
environment, according to Fitch Ratings.  Related pressures remain
particularly acute for the domestic OEMs with GM and Chrysler
continuing to reposition after emergence from bankruptcy.

While underlying asset performance has generally remained within
expectations, Fitch believes dealer floorplan ABS performance has
benefited materially from direct and indirect support as well as
the facilitation of new alliances.  The deterioration in the
financial profile of the domestic auto manufacturers and
challenges of working through significant inventory levels has
brought into sharper focus the material connections of
manufacturers to their dealers and the dealer's material role in
this financing chain.

Observing the relationship between dealers, the manufacturer and
the finance company before and during bankruptcy has demonstrated
operating and logistical links uncommon in other structured
finance asset classes, according to Senior Director Ravi Gupta.
Fitch believes that these linkages will make achieving 'AAA'
ratings on dealer floorplan ABS associated with manufacturers with
weak credit profiles unattainable.  'Other asset classes commonly
feature more granularity of their pools and direct access to the
assets, significantly influencing their ability to achieve the
highest rating levels,' said Gupta.

Positively, the structural triggers tied to the recent bankruptcy
filings of General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC have resulted in
the Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust XI and Master
Chrysler Financial Owner Trust transactions entering rapid
amortization and paying out monthly collections prior to their
scheduled termination dates.

In the case of the SWIFT XI trust, which began rapid amortization
following the June 1, 2009 bankruptcy filing of General Motors
Corp., in accordance with the transaction documentation, principal
is being allocated sequentially amongst the outstanding notes.
Through the July 2009 distribution period, the class A notes have
paid down to approximately $1.05 billion from an original balance
of $2 billion.  Subordinate notes remain at their original
balances and will begin to receive principal following the payout
of the class A notes.  From a collateral performance perspective,
losses have remained low and consistent with historical averages
while monthly payment rates, improved to 32.60% for the July 2009
distribution period from 22.7% for June.  Even with the improved
new vehicle sales demonstrated by the increasing MPRs, evidence of
bloated dealer inventories remains.  Aging of vehicle inventory
over 180 days reached approximately 33% of the portfolio during
the July period, the highest levels Fitch has witnessed for this
transaction and a material increase from the first quarter 2009
averages of approximately 13%.

The MCFOT trust entered rapid amortization following the April 30,
2009 bankruptcy filing of Chrysler LLC.  The Class A notes are
receiving 100% of the principal allocations and the bonds have
paid down to approximately $345 million through the July 2009
distribution period from their original balance of $1 billion.
Losses, which trended to their highest levels following the
bankruptcy filing, averaging .38% per month for the April through
June 2009 distribution periods, still remain low on a nominal
basis and have improved through the July period.  MPRs showed
improvement during the July 2009 distribution period, increasing
to 42.6% from 26% in June benefiting materially from the impact of
trust balance declines on the MPR calculations.  Inventory aging,
similar to the General Motors case, remains a concern, with
approximately 5% of the pool being supported by vehicle inventory
that has aged beyond 360 days.

The other remaining transactions continue to revolve in accordance
with their transaction documents.

Should monthly payment rates and losses not materially deteriorate
from current levels, the SWIFT XI and MCFOT transactions should
repay full principal within the next few months.  Key potential
impacts to performance would include new developments that would
infringe on the support provided to the sector, disorderly unwinds
of dealers that have been targeted for closure or economic
conditions deteriorating further and creating additional
constraint on consumer interest in automotive purchasing.

Fitch currently rates five outstanding U.S. auto-related dealer
floorplan ABS transactions, all of which are associated with the
three U.S. domestic auto manufacturers and are detailed below.
Fitch downgraded all transactions on April 14, 2009 and placed
each of them on Rating Watch Negative following continued system-
wide deterioration in the domestic auto industry and the
heightened financial risk of each of the auto manufacturers.  Each
transaction remains on Rating Watch Negative.

These classes are fixed- and floating-rate notes issued by
Chrysler Financial LLC (MCFOT), Ford Motor Credit Company (FCFMOT)
and GMAC LLC (SWIFT and SMART) secured by loans made by each
company to franchised vehicle dealerships to support their
purchase and flooring of vehicles manufactured by the related
manufacturer:

Master Chrysler Financial Owner Trust:

  -- Series 2006-A term 'A'.

Ford Credit Floorplan Master Owner Trust A:

  -- Series 2006-4 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2006-4 class B 'BBB'.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT XI):

  -- Series 2005-A class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2005-A class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2005-A class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2005-A class D 'B''.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT 2007-AE-1):

  -- Class A notes 'AA';
  -- Class B notes 'BBB';
  -- Class C notes 'BB';
  -- Class D notes 'B''.

SWIFT Master Auto Receivables Trust:

  -- Series 2007-2 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2007-2 class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class D 'B'.

All transactions remain on Rating Watch Negative by Fitch.


SUPERIOR WHOLESALE INENTORY: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on 2 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. auto-related dealer floorplan ABS transactions entering early
amortization due to manufacturer or finance company bankruptcy are
largely performing within expectations, though material concerns
remain over valuation declines in a still challenged macro
environment, according to Fitch Ratings.  Related pressures remain
particularly acute for the domestic OEMs with GM and Chrysler
continuing to reposition after emergence from bankruptcy.

While underlying asset performance has generally remained within
expectations, Fitch believes dealer floorplan ABS performance has
benefited materially from direct and indirect support as well as
the facilitation of new alliances.  The deterioration in the
financial profile of the domestic auto manufacturers and
challenges of working through significant inventory levels has
brought into sharper focus the material connections of
manufacturers to their dealers and the dealer's material role in
this financing chain.

Observing the relationship between dealers, the manufacturer and
the finance company before and during bankruptcy has demonstrated
operating and logistical links uncommon in other structured
finance asset classes, according to Senior Director Ravi Gupta.
Fitch believes that these linkages will make achieving 'AAA'
ratings on dealer floorplan ABS associated with manufacturers with
weak credit profiles unattainable.  'Other asset classes commonly
feature more granularity of their pools and direct access to the
assets, significantly influencing their ability to achieve the
highest rating levels,' said Gupta.

Positively, the structural triggers tied to the recent bankruptcy
filings of General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC have resulted in
the Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust XI and Master
Chrysler Financial Owner Trust transactions entering rapid
amortization and paying out monthly collections prior to their
scheduled termination dates.

In the case of the SWIFT XI trust, which began rapid amortization
following the June 1, 2009 bankruptcy filing of General Motors
Corp., in accordance with the transaction documentation, principal
is being allocated sequentially amongst the outstanding notes.
Through the July 2009 distribution period, the class A notes have
paid down to approximately $1.05 billion from an original balance
of $2 billion.  Subordinate notes remain at their original
balances and will begin to receive principal following the payout
of the class A notes.  From a collateral performance perspective,
losses have remained low and consistent with historical averages
while monthly payment rates, improved to 32.60% for the July 2009
distribution period from 22.7% for June.  Even with the improved
new vehicle sales demonstrated by the increasing MPRs, evidence of
bloated dealer inventories remains.  Aging of vehicle inventory
over 180 days reached approximately 33% of the portfolio during
the July period, the highest levels Fitch has witnessed for this
transaction and a material increase from the first quarter 2009
averages of approximately 13%.

The MCFOT trust entered rapid amortization following the April 30,
2009 bankruptcy filing of Chrysler LLC.  The Class A notes are
receiving 100% of the principal allocations and the bonds have
paid down to approximately $345 million through the July 2009
distribution period from their original balance of $1 billion.
Losses, which trended to their highest levels following the
bankruptcy filing, averaging .38% per month for the April through
June 2009 distribution periods, still remain low on a nominal
basis and have improved through the July period.  MPRs showed
improvement during the July 2009 distribution period, increasing
to 42.6% from 26% in June benefiting materially from the impact of
trust balance declines on the MPR calculations.  Inventory aging,
similar to the General Motors case, remains a concern, with
approximately 5% of the pool being supported by vehicle inventory
that has aged beyond 360 days.

The other remaining transactions continue to revolve in accordance
with their transaction documents.

Should monthly payment rates and losses not materially deteriorate
from current levels, the SWIFT XI and MCFOT transactions should
repay full principal within the next few months.  Key potential
impacts to performance would include new developments that would
infringe on the support provided to the sector, disorderly unwinds
of dealers that have been targeted for closure or economic
conditions deteriorating further and creating additional
constraint on consumer interest in automotive purchasing.

Fitch currently rates five outstanding U.S. auto-related dealer
floorplan ABS transactions, all of which are associated with the
three U.S. domestic auto manufacturers and are detailed below.
Fitch downgraded all transactions on April 14, 2009 and placed
each of them on Rating Watch Negative following continued system-
wide deterioration in the domestic auto industry and the
heightened financial risk of each of the auto manufacturers.  Each
transaction remains on Rating Watch Negative.

These classes are fixed- and floating-rate notes issued by
Chrysler Financial LLC (MCFOT), Ford Motor Credit Company (FCFMOT)
and GMAC LLC (SWIFT and SMART) secured by loans made by each
company to franchised vehicle dealerships to support their
purchase and flooring of vehicles manufactured by the related
manufacturer:

Master Chrysler Financial Owner Trust:

  -- Series 2006-A term 'A'.

Ford Credit Floorplan Master Owner Trust A:

  -- Series 2006-4 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2006-4 class B 'BBB'.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT XI):

  -- Series 2005-A class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2005-A class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2005-A class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2005-A class D 'B''.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT 2007-AE-1):

  -- Class A notes 'AA';
  -- Class B notes 'BBB';
  -- Class C notes 'BB';
  -- Class D notes 'B''.

SWIFT Master Auto Receivables Trust:

  -- Series 2007-2 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2007-2 class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class D 'B'.

All transactions remain on Rating Watch Negative by Fitch.


SVO 2005-A: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of notes issued
by SVO 2005-A VOI Mortgage Corp. and SVO 2006-A VOI Mortgage Corp.
The ratings of the Class C and D notes from both trusts were
placed under review for possible downgrade in April 2009, and were
downgraded along with two Class A and Class B notes from SVO 2006-
A.  The underlying collateral consists of timeshare loan
receivables originated by Starwood in relation to their Sheraton
and Westin resorts.

Moody's analysis primarily focuses on the ratio of credit
enhancement to expected gross charge-offs on the remaining pool,
which are calculated as the difference between the expected
lifetime charge-offs and the actual cumulative gross charge-offs
to date.  Lifetime gross charge-offs are assessed based on the
level and shape of the cumulative gross charge-off curves and
cumulative gross charge-off to liquidation curves, with additional
consideration given to the current economic environment and the
nature of the asset class.  The level where the two curves
converge will be the lifetime gross charge-offs of the pool.  In
cases where the gross charge-off to liquidation curve is still
above the cumulative charge-off curve, or where the expected
convergence point of the curves is not clear, issuer specific loss
curves, actual cumulative gross charge-offs on each pool and
seasoning of each pool, as well as recent delinquency trends and
consideration of the current economic environment, are used to
derive the level of expected lifetime gross charge-offs.  The
representative loss curves for each issuer are generated from
their respective historical vintage performance data.  The total
credit enhancement available to these deals includes
overcollateralization, reserve funds and excess spread.  The ratio
of credit enhancement to expected remaining net losses is then
compared with similar timeshare transactions to determine the
appropriate ratings.

The actions were mainly driven by worse than expected performance
of the underlying collateral pools, which is seen in the deals'
rising defaults and delinquencies.  In addition, principal
distribution of both trusts is expected to remain pro rata among
rated classes of notes and the overcollateralization of the trust
will continue to be paid down proportionally with the rated notes.

As of June 30, 2009, SVO 2005-A and 2006-A had
overcollateralization of 7.25% and 6% of their outstanding pool
balances, respectively.  Additionally, 2005-A had a reserve at its
floor of 0.50% of the initial pool balance, and 2006-A had a
reserve at 1% of the outstanding pool balance, which is expected
to decline over time to its floor of 0.50% of initial pool
balance.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: SVO 2005-A VOI Mortgage Corp.

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 20% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substitution amount to date)

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa1 from A2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/16/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B1 from Baa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/16/2009

Issuer: SVO 2006-A VOI Mortgage Corp.

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Gross Charge-offs: 22% (as a
     percentage of the sum of the original loan pool balance and
     cumulative loan substitution amount to date)

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously on 12/04/2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, Downgraded to A1 from Aa2; previously on 12/04/2006
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Baa2 from A2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/16/2009

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 4/16/2009


SWIFT MASTER: Fitch Puts Low-B Ratings on Class C & D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
U.S. auto-related dealer floorplan ABS transactions entering early
amortization due to manufacturer or finance company bankruptcy are
largely performing within expectations, though material concerns
remain over valuation declines in a still challenged macro
environment, according to Fitch Ratings.  Related pressures remain
particularly acute for the domestic OEMs with GM and Chrysler
continuing to reposition after emergence from bankruptcy.

While underlying asset performance has generally remained within
expectations, Fitch believes dealer floorplan ABS performance has
benefited materially from direct and indirect support as well as
the facilitation of new alliances.  The deterioration in the
financial profile of the domestic auto manufacturers and
challenges of working through significant inventory levels has
brought into sharper focus the material connections of
manufacturers to their dealers and the dealer's material role in
this financing chain.

Observing the relationship between dealers, the manufacturer and
the finance company before and during bankruptcy has demonstrated
operating and logistical links uncommon in other structured
finance asset classes, according to Senior Director Ravi Gupta.
Fitch believes that these linkages will make achieving 'AAA'
ratings on dealer floorplan ABS associated with manufacturers with
weak credit profiles unattainable.  'Other asset classes commonly
feature more granularity of their pools and direct access to the
assets, significantly influencing their ability to achieve the
highest rating levels,' said Gupta.

Positively, the structural triggers tied to the recent bankruptcy
filings of General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC have resulted in
the Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust XI and Master
Chrysler Financial Owner Trust transactions entering rapid
amortization and paying out monthly collections prior to their
scheduled termination dates.

In the case of the SWIFT XI trust, which began rapid amortization
following the June 1, 2009 bankruptcy filing of General Motors
Corp., in accordance with the transaction documentation, principal
is being allocated sequentially amongst the outstanding notes.
Through the July 2009 distribution period, the class A notes have
paid down to approximately $1.05 billion from an original balance
of $2 billion.  Subordinate notes remain at their original
balances and will begin to receive principal following the payout
of the class A notes.  From a collateral performance perspective,
losses have remained low and consistent with historical averages
while monthly payment rates, improved to 32.60% for the July 2009
distribution period from 22.7% for June.  Even with the improved
new vehicle sales demonstrated by the increasing MPRs, evidence of
bloated dealer inventories remains.  Aging of vehicle inventory
over 180 days reached approximately 33% of the portfolio during
the July period, the highest levels Fitch has witnessed for this
transaction and a material increase from the first quarter 2009
averages of approximately 13%.

The MCFOT trust entered rapid amortization following the April 30,
2009 bankruptcy filing of Chrysler LLC.  The Class A notes are
receiving 100% of the principal allocations and the bonds have
paid down to approximately $345 million through the July 2009
distribution period from their original balance of $1 billion.
Losses, which trended to their highest levels following the
bankruptcy filing, averaging .38% per month for the April through
June 2009 distribution periods, still remain low on a nominal
basis and have improved through the July period.  MPRs showed
improvement during the July 2009 distribution period, increasing
to 42.6% from 26% in June benefiting materially from the impact of
trust balance declines on the MPR calculations.  Inventory aging,
similar to the General Motors case, remains a concern, with
approximately 5% of the pool being supported by vehicle inventory
that has aged beyond 360 days.

The other remaining transactions continue to revolve in accordance
with their transaction documents.

Should monthly payment rates and losses not materially deteriorate
from current levels, the SWIFT XI and MCFOT transactions should
repay full principal within the next few months.  Key potential
impacts to performance would include new developments that would
infringe on the support provided to the sector, disorderly unwinds
of dealers that have been targeted for closure or economic
conditions deteriorating further and creating additional
constraint on consumer interest in automotive purchasing.

Fitch currently rates five outstanding U.S. auto-related dealer
floorplan ABS transactions, all of which are associated with the
three U.S. domestic auto manufacturers and are detailed below.
Fitch downgraded all transactions on April 14, 2009 and placed
each of them on Rating Watch Negative following continued system-
wide deterioration in the domestic auto industry and the
heightened financial risk of each of the auto manufacturers.  Each
transaction remains on Rating Watch Negative.

These classes are fixed- and floating-rate notes issued by
Chrysler Financial LLC (MCFOT), Ford Motor Credit Company (FCFMOT)
and GMAC LLC (SWIFT and SMART) secured by loans made by each
company to franchised vehicle dealerships to support their
purchase and flooring of vehicles manufactured by the related
manufacturer:

Master Chrysler Financial Owner Trust:

  -- Series 2006-A term 'A'.

Ford Credit Floorplan Master Owner Trust A:

  -- Series 2006-4 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2006-4 class B 'BBB'.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT XI):

  -- Series 2005-A class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2005-A class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2005-A class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2005-A class D 'B''.

Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust (SWIFT 2007-AE-1):

  -- Class A notes 'AA';
  -- Class B notes 'BBB';
  -- Class C notes 'BB';
  -- Class D notes 'B''.

SWIFT Master Auto Receivables Trust:

  -- Series 2007-2 class A 'AA';
  -- Series 2007-2 class B 'BBB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class C 'BB';
  -- Series 2007-2 class D 'B'.

All transactions remain on Rating Watch Negative by Fitch.


SYMPHONY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Symphony CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Revolving Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 18, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded
     to Aa2; previously on November 18, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Place Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2752 versus a test level of 2460 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 15, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $14.5 million, accounting for
roughly 3.6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.9% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Symphony CLO I, issued in November 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


T2 INCOME: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd.:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable
     Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 23,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$9,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
     Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Subordinated Deferrable
     Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to B3; previously on March 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions on notes are the result
of a comprehensive deal-level analysis including an in-depth
assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating model
along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative factors.  By
way of comparison, rating actions previously taken by Moody's on
the notes during its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely
based on a parameter-based approach.

Moody's also notes that the rating actions taken on the notes are
a result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio as
well as Moody's revised assumptions with respect to default
probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the calculation of
the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that have been
applied to all corporate credits in the underlying portfolio are
described in the press release dated February 4, 2009, titled
"Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs." Moody's
analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for second
lien loans will be below their historical averages, consistent
with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 3691 versus a test level of 4035 as of the last trustee
report, dated July 2, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $7.9 million, accounting for roughly 2.9%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 25.1% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

T2 Income Fund CLO I Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


TABERNA PREFERRED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five rated notes from Taberna
Preferred Funding II, Ltd/Inc.

The downgrades are a result of the decrease in the transaction's
spread, coupon and ability to service its debt following
$169 million (17.7%) in distressed and other debt exchanges and
default on an additional $59.4 million (6.2%) of collateral since
January 2009.  The average spread and coupon have decreased from
2.03% and 5.39%, respectively, as of January 31, 2009, to 1.78%
and 4.72% as of the May 31, 2009 trustee report.

The rating on the class B notes reflects Fitch's view that default
appears inevitable.  Fitch would consider non-payment of accrued
interest to the class B notes as a default.

These notes are backed primarily by trust preferred securities and
subordinated debt issued by real estate investment trusts and
financial institutions specializing in mortgage lending.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

  -- $359,908,299 class A-1A to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $95,825,583 class A-1B to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $8,997,708 class A-1C to 'CCC' from 'B';
  -- $86,500,000 class A-2 to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $120,500,000 class B to 'C' from 'CC'.

The class C-1, C-2, C-3, D, E-1, E-2, and F notes are affirmed at
'C'.


TERRA CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A1 2007-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A1 notes issued by Terra CDO SPC Ltd.'s series 2007-2 segregated
portfolio, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized
debt obligation transaction, and removed it from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The transaction's credit default swap portfolio was terminated on
April 1, 2009.  Following the termination, the tranche rating
became linked to the rating on the guaranteed investment contract
provider, Ambac Assurance Corp. (CC/Developing/--), which S&P
lowered on July 28, 2009.

                          Rating Lowered

                        Terra CDO SPC Ltd.
                Series 2007-2 Segregated Portfolio

                               Rating
                               ------
           Class       To                 From
           -----       --                 ----
           A1          CC                 BBB/Watch Neg


TERRA CDO: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Three Classes of 2007-5 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
class A, B1, and B2 notes issued by Terra CDO SPC Ltd.'s series
2007-5 segregated portfolio, a synthetic corporate investment-
grade collateralized debt obligation transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the noteholders' decision to
exercise the option to put the entire principal amount of the
notes outstanding to the issuer, pursuant to section 8.07 of the
indenture and section 10.01 of the master terms.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                        Terra CDO SPC Ltd.
                Series 2007-5 segregated portfolio

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                      Class    To      From
                      -----    --      ----
                      A        NR      CCC+
                      B1       NR      CCC-
                      B2       NR      CCC-

                          NR - Not rated.


TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2004-EQR1 Cert.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of a
certificate issued by Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-EQR1 due to
higher expected pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-
specific credit protection.

The transaction is backed by less than 50 loans.  The ratings are
based on the methodology applied to all transactions with small
pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as those that
meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral
balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is less than
5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining.

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets ("delinquency pipeline")
and a pipeline multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for
further possible defaults that might arise from borrowers that are
current.  The pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on
the number of loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of
loans remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults
are subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default
also differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-EQR1 (Loans Remaining: 13)

  -- Cl. M-2, Current Balance: $1,702,602, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on 11/29/2007 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade


USAA CREDIT: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating of A3 to the Class
B notes of the privately-placed USAA Credit Card Master Owner
Trust, VFN Series 2005-A transaction.  Moody's assigned ratings of
Baa3 and Ba3 to the Class C and Class D notes issued out of the
VFN Series 2008-3 transaction in August 2008.  The notes are
backed by a pool of receivables generated by USAA-originated Visa,
MasterCard and American Express credit card accounts.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: USAA Credit Card Master Owner Trust

* Up to $185,660,920 Class B Asset Backed Notes, VFN Series 2005-
  A, rated A3

Moody's range of performance expectation for the Trust charge-off
rate is 4%-6%, for the principal payment rate is 15%-18%, and for
the yield is 10%-13%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities were rated.  Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

On December 19, 2008, Moody's published a report introducing
Volatility Scores and Parameter Sensitivities for the global
credit card ABS sector.  Moody's V Scores provide a relative
assessment of the quality of available credit information and the
potential variability around the various inputs to a rating
determination.  V Scores are intended to rank transactions by the
potential for significant rating changes owing to uncertainty
around the assumptions due to data quality, historical
performance, the level of disclosure, transaction complexity, the
modeling and the transaction governance that underlie the ratings.
V Scores apply to the entire transaction (rather than individual
tranches).

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the U.S. Credit Card ABS sector.  In
addition, the four broad components underlying the V Score have
each been assessed a Medium assumption uncertainty for the USAA
Credit Card Master Owner Trust, which are also the same
assessments for the U.S. Card ABS sector.  The sub-component
addressing disclosure of securitization collateral pool
characteristics was assessed a Medium assumption uncertainty, as
opposed to the baseline credit card ABS assessment of Low/Medium
assumption uncertainty.  Since USAA's transactions are not
publicly registered, they are not held to the higher reporting
standards pursuant to Regulation AB.

Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative, model-indicated
calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's-rated
structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters
used in the initial rating process differed.  The analysis assumes
that the deal has not aged.  It is not intended to measure how the
rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how
the initial rating of the security might differ as certain key
parameters vary.

In rating US Credit Card ABS, the payment rate, charge-off rate,
purchase rate, yield and certain other inputs are used to
calculate the median expected loss and the A3 proxy level, which
in turn are the two inputs used to determine a new lognormal loss
distribution.  Three new lognormal loss distributions were
calculated by assuming these three principal payment rate and
charge-off rate combinations: (1) 14%/6%, (2) 11%/8% and (3) 9%/9%
from the base case of 17%/5%.  The quantitative/model indicated
Parameter Sensitivities for the notes under these three additional
scenarios are: two notches (i.e. A3 to Baa2), four notches and six
notches, respectively.


VELOCITY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Velocity CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$229,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Notes Due August 22,
     2016, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on August 31, 2004
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Interest Deferrable
     Notes Due August 22, 2016, Downgraded to B2; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Interest Deferrable Notes
     Due August 22, 2016, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March
     18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,300,000 Class 1 Composite Securities Due August 22,
     2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on August 31, 2004
     Assigned A3.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Interest Deferrable
     Notes Due August 22, 2016, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class C and
D overcollateralization tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has increased over the last year and is currently 2841 as of the
last trustee report, dated June 16, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $15.7 million, accounting
for roughly 5.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 18% of the underlying
portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Velocity CLO, Ltd, issued in August 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings 14 2004-RP1 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 14 tranches from WaMu
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2004-RP1 deal due to higher
expected pool losses in relation to available credit protection.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable rate, mortgage loans guaranteed
by the FHA or the VA (typically 80% FHA and 20% VA.)  As economic
conditions have deteriorated; performance of these loans have
worsened with serious delinquencies (that is, loans more than 60
days past due, in foreclosure or held for sale) as a percentage of
current balance increasing from 33.5% 12 months ago, to 35.6% as
of May 2009 for FHA -- VA pools issued in 2006. While for FHA --
VA pools issued in 2007, serious delinquencies as a percentage of
current balance have risen from 41.0% 12 months ago, to 44.5% as
of May 2009.  Cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools, however, are
low in absolute terms due to the FHA - VA guarantee. Nevertheless,
for FHA - VA pools issued in 2006, cumulative losses have risen
from 0.31% in May 2008 to 0.45% one year later.  For FHA - VA
pools issued in 2007, cumulative losses have more than doubled
from 0.16% a year earlier to 0.34% as of May 2009.

Moody's expects loss levels on FHA -- VA pools to rise further as
the general level of remaining delinquencies remain elevated and
loss severities increase.  Due to the FHA - VA guarantee, loss
severities on these pools have been historically low at 2.0% --
4.0%.  However, with recent house price depreciation, increase in
foreclosure costs and timelines and

change in the debenture rate applied by FHA to pay interest
claims, future loss severities on these pools are expected to be
higher.  Moody's now expects loss severities on FHA loans
originated before 2004 to average 5.0% and on FHA loans originated
in 2004 and after to average 6.5% (this is due to change in
debenture rate application by FHA for loans originated after 2004
which results in a lower interest expense being paid by the FHA
and a higher severity to the trust).  Loss severities on VA loans
are expected to average 20%.  As a result, Moody's now projects
cumulative losses on FHA -- VA pools issued between 2002 and 2007
to average 1.42% as a percentage of original balance securitized
(3.00% as a percentage of current balance) versus Moody's original
expected loss estimates of 0.40% - 0.50%.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the priority of payments.

Complete rating actions are:

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-RP1

  -- Cl. I-F, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-S, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-HJ, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/15/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/15/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/15/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/15/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WAMU MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 115 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 115
tranches from 21 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by WaMu Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Trusts.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively.  Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2003-AR10 Tr

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/7/2003 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2003-AR11 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/1/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/1/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/1/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 12/1/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/1/2003 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2004-AR7 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/23/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/23/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 8/23/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 8/23/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs, 2002-AR18 Trust

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba1

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs, 2002-AR19 Trust

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba1

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs, 2003-AR1 Tr.

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs, 2003-AR5

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Ba2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR5 Tr

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR12 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to B1

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR3 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A1

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa3

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR4 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba3

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR6 Tr

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR7 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR8 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 8/28/2003 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2003-AR9 Tr

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     B2

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Ba2

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR1 Tr

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to B1

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR11 Tr

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/30/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR3 Tr

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 6/11/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 6/11/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/11/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/11/2004 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR4 Tr

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     B2

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-AR9 Tr

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

WaMu Mortgage Securities Corp. 2001-AR5 Trust

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Ba1


WASI FINANCE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-HES1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
the securities of WASI Finance Limited Partnership Credit-Linked
Notes, Series 2006-HES1 as the issuer:

  -- $4,783,621,472 class A-1-A to 'A/LS1' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable (Not Offered);

  -- $500,000 class A-1-B to 'A/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable
      (Not Offered);

  -- $227,420,000 class M-1 to 'BBB/LS4' 'AAA'; Outlook Stable
      (Not Offered);

  -- $114,198,000 class M-2 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook Stable
      (Not Offered);

  -- $56,111,000 class M-3-A to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Stable (Not Offered);

  -- $500,000 class M-3-B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook Stable
      (Not Offered);

  -- $50,754,000 class M-4 Notes to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $39,042,000 class M-5 to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $48,802,000 class M-6 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'A+';

  -- $41,306,000 class B-1-A to 'CC/RR2' from 'A';

  -- $7,496,000 class B-1-B to 'CC/RR1' from 'A';

  -- $105,413,000 class B-2 to 'C/RR2' from 'BBB-' (Not Offered);

  -- $40,994,000 class B-3 to 'C/RR2' from 'BB' (Not Offered);

  -- $14,540,000 Class B-4-A to 'C/RR5' from 'BB-' (Not Offered);

  -- $100,000 class B-4-B to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-' (Not Offered);

  -- $14,944,121 class B-5 to 'D/RR6 from 'B+' (Not Offered);

  -- $0 class B-6 to 'D/RR6' from 'B' (Not Offered);

  -- $0 class B-7 to 'D/RR6' from 'B-' (Not Offered).

The transaction is a synthetic balance sheet transaction that
references a $5.4 billion diversified portfolio of fixed and
adjustable rate, second lien home mortgage loans, all of which are
originated and serviced by Wachovia Bank, National Association.
The transaction is designed to provide credit protection for
realized losses on the reference portfolio through a credit
default swap that is documented under an International Swaps and
Derivatives Association agreement between the issuer and the swap
counterparty.  Under the terms of the CDS, the swap counterparty
will make premium payments to the issuer in exchange for
protection payments on any losses in the portfolio that exceed the
subordination of the class B-2 notes.  The notes mature on the
June 2011 distribution date.

Expected losses were determined on this transaction by assigning a
frequency of foreclosure to each delinquency bucket in the
transaction.  Since the reference pool is 100% second lien
collateral a severity assumption of 100% was utilized.

A cash flow analysis was performed to assess each bond's credit
risk.  Fitch determined the amount of pool collateral losses that
will cause the bond to experience a dollar of impairment.  This
amount is referred to as the bonds break loss.  This analysis
takes into account a bond's position in the capital structure,
payment priority, and any other structural features that provide
loss protection to the bond.

The relationship between the bonds' BL and the EL is used to
determine the bonds loss coverage ratio.  This is used to drive
the ratings on the transaction.  The ratings on the notes address
the timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal
upon maturity.

In addition to the Long-Term Rating for each bond, Fitch assigns
Recovery Ratings for bonds rated below 'B'.  The Recovery Rating
scale is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics
of an obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Ratings are
designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis while
taking into account the time value of money.

In conjunction with these rating actions, Fitch Ratings has
assigned Loss Severity ratings to eight bonds.  Introduced in
February, LS ratings are meant to complement the existing Long-
Term Credit ratings for structured finance securities.  LTC
ratings exclusively address the probability of default of a
security.  The LS ratings provide an indication of the relative
degree of risk that a security might suffer a high loss severity
in the event that the security defaults.  It will always be
necessary to consider loss severity (as indicated by the LS
rating) in conjunction with probability of default (as indicated
by the LTC rating.)  The LS rating scale consists of five rating
categories from 'LS1' to 'LS5'.  LS ratings are only assigned to
securities that have corresponding LTC ratings in rating
categories 'AAA' through 'B'.  The LS rating category to be
assigned will be determined through a calculation that measures
the size of the tranche (tranche thickness) relative to the base
expected loss determined for the asset portfolio underlying the
transaction.


* Moody's Assigns Ratings on Two Participation Interests
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to these
participation interests:

1. Ba1 to the US$127,287,454.88 Versailles Participation Interest
   2009-Z1a allocated pursuant to the Amended and Restated
   Participation Agreement dated as of June 30, 2009 between
   Versailles Assets LLC, as seller, and Bleachers Finance 1
   Limited (the "Participation Agreement")

2. Caa3 to the US$22,500,000 Versailles Participation Interest
   2009-Z1b allocated pursuant to the Participation Agreement

The Participation Agreement is creating participation interests in
the principal and interest payments received by Versailles Assets
LLC, as seller of participation interests, in Versailles's
holdings of certain Class A-1 Notes issued by Zohar CDO 2003-1
Limited, a collateralized loan obligation transaction issued in
November 2003.  Under the terms of the Participation Agreement,
Versailles will pass on to the Versailles Participation Interest
2009-Z1a as the "Senior Participation Interest" and the Versailles
Participation Interest 2009-Z1b as the "Junior Participation
Interest" the interest and principal payments it receives on the
Zohar CDO Class A-1 notes.  Bleachers Finance 1 Limited is the
purchaser under the Participation Agreement of both the Senior and
Junior Participations Interests.

The Senior Participation Interest represents initially an 84.98%
interest and the Junior Participation initially represents a
15.02% interest in the amounts received by Versailles on the Zohar
CDO A-1 Notes.  The Senior Participation will be senior to the
Junior Participation in the receipt of all scheduled interest and
principal payments.

Moody's ratings on the Senior and Junior Participation Interests
address the ultimate cash receipt of all interest and principal
payments required by the Participation Agreement and are based on
the expected loss posed to holders of the Participation Interests
relative to the promise of receiving the present value of such
payments.  The ratings take into account, among other
considerations, (a) the credit quality of the underlying Zohar CDO
Class A-1 Notes and (b) the likelihood that Versailles will pass
on all interest and principal payments received on the Zohar CDO
Class A-1 Notes subject to the participation.  No assignment of an
ownership interest or grant of a security interest in the Zohar
CDO Class A-1 Notes is being made under the Participation
Agreement in favor of either the Senior Participation or the
Junior Participation.  Any downgrade by Moody's of the ratings of
the Zohar CDO Class A-1 Notes or of Versailles may result in a
downgrade of the ratings of the Participation Interests.

Versailles is an asset-backed commercial paper conduit which has a
current Moody's rating of

P-1. Bleachers is not currently rated by Moody's.  Natixis
Financial Products Inc. provides liquidity and credit support
facilities for both Versailles and Bleachers.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certs. by Resecuritizations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on nine
certificates issued in three RMBS resecuritization transactions
from 2005 and 2008.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
performance and/or Moody's ratings on the underlying residential
mortgage-backed securities (underlying securities).  The ratings
on the certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

(i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
    underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on the
    underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
     securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

Certain resecuritizations may contain underlying securities that
were not originally rated by Moody's.  In this case, an expected
loss was derived by comparing the non-rated deal to Moody's-rated
deals with similar current collateral and performance
characteristics.  An implicit rating was then determined by
comparing current available credit enhancement for the non rated
tranche to the estimated expected loss for the deal.

The ratings on the underlying securities are then used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/8/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/8/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/8/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/8/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/8/2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust Notes, Series
2008-R2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 5/15/2008
     Assigned Aaa and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/15/2008 Assigned
     Aaa and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 6/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa1


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 47 Classes From Seven RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 47
classes from seven residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2004 and 2005.  S&P removed 45 of the lowered ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed
its ratings on 15 classes from four of these transactions and
removed 14 of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.  S&P downgraded the 1-A-1 and 1-A-2 classes from
Impac CMB Trust's series 2005-6 to 'BBB', and the ratings on these
classes remain on CreditWatch with negative implications due
to financial guarantees provided by Ambac Assurance Corp.
('BBB/Watch Neg' financial strength rating).

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using the criteria listed in the
"Related Research" section below.  As part of its analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral as well as macroeconomic influences.  For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price
declines and the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss
severity assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations for each deal based on upward trends in
delinquencies.

Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for each Alt-A
transaction rated in 2005 based on a forward-looking default
curve.

To maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P considers whether a bond is able
to withstand approximately 150% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions, subject to individual caps and qualitative factors
assumed on specific transactions.  For a class for which we've
affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P considers whether a bond is able to
withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  Other rating
categories are dispersed, approximately equally, between these two
loss assumptions.  For example, to maintain a 'BB' rating on one
class, S&P may consider whether the class is able to withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, while, in
connection with a different class, S&P may consider whether it is
able to withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.

The subordination of more junior classes within each structure
provides credit support for the affected transactions.  The
collateral backing these deals originally consisted predominantly
of Alt-A, first-lien, fixed- or adjustable-rate, or negative-
amortization residential mortgage loans secured by one- to four-
family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P think
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                   Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6
                           Series 2005-6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    1-A-1      45254NQG5     BBB/Watch Neg       AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A-2      45254NQW0     BBB/Watch Neg       AAA/Watch Neg
    1-M-1      45254NQK6     CC                  AA/Watch Neg

            IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR10
                         Series 2005-AR10

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    A-1        45660LKW8     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        45660LKX6     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        45660LKY4     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-X        45660LKZ1     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B-1        45660LLB3     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B-2        45660LLC1     CCC                 AA/Watch Neg
    B-3        45660LLD9     CCC                 AA-/Watch Neg
    B-4        45660LLE7     CC                  A/Watch Neg
    B-5        45660LLF4     CC                  BBB+/Watch Neg

    Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation Alternative Loan Trust
                          Series 2004-AR4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    I-A-1      65535VGK8     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      65535VGL6     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     65535VGM4     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     65535VGN2     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-3     65535VGP7     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-4     65535VGQ5     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-5     65535VGR3     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-6     65535VGS1     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-1    65535VGT9     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    III-A-2    65535VGU6     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        65535VGV4     AA                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        65535VGW2     CCC                 A+/Watch Neg
    M-3        65535VGX0     CC                  A-/Watch Neg

                    RALI Series 2005-QA5 Trust
                          Series 2005-QA5

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    A-1        76110H4Z9     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    A-II       76110H5A3     A+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        76110H5C9     CCC                 AA/Watch Neg

                    RALI Series 2005-QA8 Trust
                          Series 2005-QA8

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    CB-I-1     761118BP2     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    CB-I-2     761118BQ0     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    NB-I       761118BR8     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    CB-II-1    761118BS6     B-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    CB-III     761118BV9     B+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    NB-II      761118BU1     B+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    NB-III     761118BW7     B+                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        761118BY3     CC                  AA/Watch Neg
    CB-II-2    761118BT4     B-                  AAA/Watch Neg

                    RALI Series 2005-QO1 Trust
                          Series 2005-QO1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    A-1        761118EN4     AA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        761118EP9     AA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-3        761118EQ7     BBB+                AAA/Watch Neg
    A-4        761118ER5     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    X          761118ET1     AA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        761118EX2     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        761118EY0     CC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-3        761118EZ7     CC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-4        761118ES3     CC                  A+/Watch Neg
    M-5        761118EW4     CC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-6        761118FT0     CC                  A-/Watch Neg

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2005-AR3
                         Series 2005-AR3

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    I-A-1      86359LJZ3     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      86359LKA6     BB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-3      86359LKB4     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-X        86359LKC2     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     86359LKD0     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-X        86359LKE8     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    M-1        86359LKJ7     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    M-2        86359LKK4     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    M-3        86359LKL2     CC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-4        86359LKM0     CC                  AA/Watch Neg
    M-5        86359LKN8     CC                  AA-/Watch Neg
    M-6        86359LKP3     CC                  A+/Watch Neg
    B-1        86359LKQ1     CC                  A/Watch Neg

                         Rating Affirmed

                  Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-6
                          Series 2005-6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2-A-1      45254NQQ3     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 52 Tranches From 26 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 52
tranches from 26 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  At the same time, S&P removed 36 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  The
ratings on 13 of the downgraded tranches are on CreditWatch with
negative implications, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrades.  Additionally, S&P placed its ratings on two
of the other tranches S&P reviewed on CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and recent negative rating actions on U.S. subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities.  The CreditWatch
placements primarily affect transactions for which a significant
portion of the collateral assets currently have ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications or have significant
exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

In addition, Standard & Poor's reviewed the rating assigned to
Blue Heron Funding VI Ltd. and, based on the current credit
support available to the tranche, has left the rating at its
current level.

The 52 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $12.162 billion.  Eleven of the 26 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  Ten of the 26
transactions are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were
collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The other five
transactions are CDOs of CDOs that were collateralized at
origination primarily by notes from other CDOs, as well as by
tranches from RMBS and other SF transactions.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                                  Rating
                                                  ------
Transaction                          Class  To            From
-----------                          -----  --            ----
ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                  A-1S   CC            B-/Watch Neg
Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.      A-1    CC            B-/Watch Neg
Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.     A-1A   CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Charles River CDO I Ltd.             A-1A   CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Charles River CDO I Ltd.             A-1B   CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Charles River CDO I Ltd.             A-2F   CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
Charles River CDO I Ltd.             A-2V   CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
Coast Investment Grade 2000-1 Ltd.   B-1    BB+/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Coast Investment Grade 2000-1 Ltd.   B-2    BB+/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit A-1    A/Watch Neg   AAA/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit A-2    A/Watch Neg   AAA/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit B-1    BBB-/WatchNeg AA+/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit B-2    BBB-/WatchNeg AA+/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit C-1    B/Watch Neg   A-/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Connecticut Valley Structured Credit C-2    B/Watch Neg   A-/Watch Neg
   CDO II Ltd.
Diversified Global Securities Ltd.II B      AA/Watch Neg  AA
Diversified Global Securities Ltd.II C      BBB+/WatchNeg A-
Duke Funding X Ltd.                  A-1    CC            BB/Watch Neg
Duke Funding X Ltd.                  A-2    CC            B/Watch Neg
Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.           B      CCC-          BB-/Watch Neg
Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.           A-1    CC            B+/Watch Neg
Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.           A-2    CC            CCC
Highridge ABS CDO II Ltd.            A-1J   CC            CCC/Watch Neg
Highridge ABS CDO II Ltd.            A-1S   CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd. S      CCC-          BB/Watch Neg
Ischus CDO II Ltd.                   A-1A   CC            B-/Watch Neg
Ischus CDO II Ltd.                   A-1B   CC            B-/Watch Neg
Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.     A-1    CC            BB/Watch Neg
Longshore CDO Funding 2006-1 Ltd.    A-1    CC            B-/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO II Ltd.                  A-1    CC            B+/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO II Ltd.                  A-2    CC            CCC-
Montauk Point CDO Ltd.               A1     CC            BB-/Watch Neg
Montauk Point CDO Ltd.               A2     CC            B-/Watch Neg
Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.          A-1U   CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.             A-1B   CC            CCC+/WatchNeg
North Cove CDO III Ltd.              A      CC            CCC+/WatchNeg
North Cove CDO III Ltd.              B      CC            CCC/Watch Neg
North Cove CDO III Ltd.              C      CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
North Cove CDO III Ltd.              D      CC            CC/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO II Ltd.             A      CC            B-/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO II Ltd.             B      CC            CCC+/WatchNeg
Orient Point CDO II Ltd.             C      CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
Orient Point CDO Ltd.                A-1NVA CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO Ltd.                A-1NVB CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO Ltd.                A-1V   CC            BB+/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO Ltd.                A-2    CC            B-/Watch Neg
Orient Point CDO Ltd.                B      CC            CCC-/WatchNeg
Parapet 2006 Ltd.                    A      CC            B/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                A-1    BB/Watch Neg  BBB-/WatchNeg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                A-2    B-/Watch Neg  B+/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                A-3    CCC-/WatchNeg CCC/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                S      AAA/Watch Neg AAA
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd.            A-2    BB-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.       A-1    CC            B+/Watch Neg
Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.       A-2    CC            CCC-/WatchNeg

                      Other Ratings Reviewed

      Transaction                           Class     Rating
      -----------                           -----     ------
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   A-1J      CC
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   A-2F      CC
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   A-2V      CC
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   A-3       CC
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   B         CC
      ACA ABS 2005-2 Ltd.                   ComboSecs CC
      Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.       A-2       CC
      Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.       B         CC
      Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.       C         CC
      Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.       D-1       CC
      Belle Haven ABS CDO 2005-1 Ltd.       D-2       CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      A-1B      CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      B         CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      C         CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      D         CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      E         CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      F         CC
      Bernoulli High Grade CDO II Ltd.      G         CC
      Blue Heron Funding VI Ltd.            Cert      AAA
      Charles River CDO I Ltd.              B-F       CC
      Charles River CDO I Ltd.              B-V       CC
      Charles River CDO I Ltd.              C         CC
      Charles River CDO I Ltd.              Comb Sec  CC
      Coast Investment Grade 2000-1 Ltd.    A         AAA
      Diversified Global Securities Ltd.II  A         AAA
      Duke Funding X Ltd.                   A-3       CC
      Duke Funding X Ltd.                   B-1       CC
      Duke Funding X Ltd.                   B-2       CC
      Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.            C         CC
      Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.            C Loan    CC
      Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.            D-1       CC
      Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.            D-2       CC
      Dutch Hill Funding II Ltd.            D-3       CC
      Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.            B         CC
      Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.            C-1       CC
      Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.            C-2       CC
      Fort Sheridan ABS CDO Ltd.            C-3       CC
      Highridge ABS CDO II Ltd.             A-2       CC
      Highridge ABS CDO II Ltd.             A-3       CC
      Highridge ABS CDO II Ltd.             B         CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  A-1       CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  A-2       CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  B         CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  C         CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  D         CC
      Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2 Ltd.  E         CC
      Ischus CDO II Ltd.                    A-2       CC
      Ischus CDO II Ltd.                    B         CC
      Ischus CDO II Ltd.                    C         CC
      Ischus CDO II Ltd.                    D         CC
      Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.      A-2       CC
      Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.      A-3       CC
      Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.      B         CC
      Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.      C         CC
      Kleros Preferred Funding IX Ltd.      D         CC
      Longshore CDO Funding 2006-1 Ltd.     A-2       CC
      Longshore CDO Funding 2006-1 Ltd.     B         CC
      Longshore CDO Funding 2006-1 Ltd.     C         CC
      Longshore CDO Funding 2006-1 Ltd.     D         CC
      Mercury CDO II Ltd.                   B         CC
      Mercury CDO II Ltd.                   C         CC
      Mercury CDO II Ltd.                   D         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                B         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                C         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                D         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                E         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                F         CC
      Montauk Point CDO Ltd.                G         CC
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           A-1A      BBB
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           A-1B      BBB
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           A-1W      BBB
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           A-2       CC
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           B-F       CC
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           B-V       CC
      Mulberry Street CDO II Ltd.           C         CC
      Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.              A-1A      BBB
      Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.              A-2       CC
      Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.              B         CC
      Mulberry Street CDO Ltd.              C         CC
      North Cove CDO III Ltd.               E         CC
      Orient Point CDO II Ltd.              D         CC
      Orient Point CDO II Ltd.              E         CC
      Orient Point CDO Ltd.                 C         CC
      Orient Point CDO Ltd.                 D         CC
      Orient Point CDO Ltd.                 E         CC
      Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                 B         CC
      Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                 C         CC
      Sheffield CDO II Ltd.                 D         CC
      Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd.             A-1       AAA
      Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd.             B         CC
      Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd.             C-1       CC
      Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd.             C-2       CC
      Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.        A-3       CC
      Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.        B         CC
      Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.        C         CC
      Stillwater ABS CDO 2006-1 Ltd.        D         CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 62 Classes From Six Alt-A Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 62
classes from six U.S. Alternative-A and prime jumbo residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions issued in 2004 through
2007.  S&P removed 45 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on
23 classes from these six transactions and removed three of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using S&P's criteria listed in
the "Related Research" section.  As part of its analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price
declines and the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss
severity assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations for each deal based on upward trends in
delinquencies.

For Alt-A transactions, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P consider
whether a class is able to withstand approximately 150% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions.  For a class
for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P considers whether a
bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while
S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

For prime jumbo transactions, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P
consider whether a class is able to withstand approximately 235%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps
and qualitative factors applied to specific transactions.  For a
class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P consider whether
a bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 127% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while
S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses.  The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that
there is sufficient credit enhancement to support the ratings at
their current levels.  Certain senior classes also benefit from
senior-support classes that would provide support to a certain
extent before any applicable losses could affect the super-senior
certificates.  The subordination of classes within each structure
provides credit support for the affected transactions.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of Alt-A, first-lien, fixed-rate, adjustable-rate,
or negative-amortization residential mortgage loans secured by
one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2005-43
                          Series 2005-43

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                  From
        -----      -----         --                  ----
        1-A-1      12667G5S8     A-                  AAA
        4-A-1      12667G5Z2     BB-                 AAA
        5-A-1      12668AAX3     CCC                 AAA

             CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2004-22
                          Series 2004-22

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                  From
        -----      -----         --                  ----
        M          12669F7C1     A                   AA
        B-1        12669F7D9     B                   BBB
        B-2        12669F7E7     CCC                 B

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6
                           Series 2007-6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                  From
        -----      -----         --                  ----
        2-A1       17312VAS7     CC                  CCC
        2-A2       17312VAT5     CC                  CCC
        2-A3       17312VAU2     CC                  CCC
        2-A4       17312VAV0     CC                  CCC
        2-A5       17312VAW8     CC                  CCC
        2-A6       17312VAX6     CC                  CCC
        2-XS       17312VBH0     CC                  CCC
        2-PO       17312VAY4     CC                  CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR2
                          Series 2007-AR2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    1A1        3622N6AA7     CCC                 A-/Watch Neg
    1A2        3622N6AB5     CC                  B/Watch Neg
    2A1        3622N6AC3     CCC                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    2A2        3622N6AD1     CC                  B/Watch Neg
    3A1        3622N6AE9     CCC                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    3A2        3622N6AF6     CC                  B/Watch Neg
    4A1        3622N6AG4     BBB-                BBB-/Watch Neg
    4A2        3622N6AH2     CC                  B/Watch Neg
    5A1A       3622N6AJ8     B                   BBB-/Watch Neg
    5A1B       3622N6AW9     B                   BBB-/Watch Neg
    5A2        3622N6AK5     CC                  B/Watch Neg
    6A1        3622N6AL3     CCC                 BBB-/Watch Neg
    6A2        3622N6AM1     CCC                 B/Watch Neg
    B1         3622N6AN9     CC                  CCC
    B2         3622N6AP4     CC                  CCC
    B3         3622N6AQ2     CC                  CCC

    Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI Series 2005-A7
                          Series 2005-A7

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    I-A-1      59020UE35     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    I-A-2      59020UE43     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-1     59020UH32     BB                  AAA/Watch Neg
    II-A-2     59020UH40     CCC                 AAA/Watch Neg
    M-1        59020UE50     CCC                 AA/Watch Neg
    M-2        59020UE68     CC                  A/Watch Neg
    M-3        59020UE76     CC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    B-1        59020UE92     CC                  BB/Watch Neg

   Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-1
                          Series 2005-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                  From
    -----      -----         --                  ----
    1-A1       863579KY3     A                   AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A2       863579KZ0     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A        863579LA4     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A        863579LB2     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    3-AX       863579MF2     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A1       863579LC0     AA+                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A2       863579LD8     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A1       863579LE6     AAA                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A2       863579LF3     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A        863579LG1     A-                  AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         863579LH9     BB                  AA+/Watch Neg
    B1X        863579LJ5     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B2         863579LK2     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B2X        863579LL0     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B3         863579LM8     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B3X        863579LN6     CCC                 AA+/Watch Neg
    B4         863579LP1     CCC                 AA/Watch Neg
    B4X        863579LQ9     CCC                 AA/Watch Neg
    B5         863579LR7     CCC                 A+/Watch Neg
    B5X        863579LS5     CCC                 A+/Watch Neg
    B6         863579LT3     CC                  A/Watch Neg
    B7         863579LU0     CC                  A-/Watch Neg
    B7X        863579LV8     CC                  A-/Watch Neg
    B8         863579LW6     CC                  BBB+/Watch Neg
    B9         863579LY2     CC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    B10        863579LZ9     CC                  BBB-/Watch Neg
    B10X       863579LX4     CC                  BBB-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                  Alternative Loan Trust 2005-43
                          Series 2005-43

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A-2      12667G5T6     CCC
                 1-A-3      12667G5U3     CCC
                 2-A-1      12667G5V1     AAA
                 2-A-2      12667G5W9     CCC
                 3-A-1      12667G5X7     CCC
                 4-A-2      12667G6A6     CCC
                 4-A-3      12667G5Y5     CCC
                 5-A-2      12668AAY1     CCC

              CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2004-22
                          Series 2004-22

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1        12669F6X6     AAA
                 A-2        12669F6Y4     AAA
                 A-3        12669F6Z1     AAA
                 X-2        12669F7A5     AAA
                 X-3        12669F7B3     AAA

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6
                          Series 2007-6

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A1A      17312VAA6     CCC
                 1-1IO      17312VAC2     CCC
                 1-A2A      17312VAD0     CCC
                 1-A3A      17312VAE8     CCC
                 1-23IO     17312VAG3     CCC
                 1-A4A      17312VAH1     CCC
                 1-4IO      17312VAK4     CCC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 166 Classes From 10 Alt-A RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 166
classes from 10 U.S. Alternative-A and U.S. prime jumbo
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued in
2005, 2006, and 2007.  S&P removed 117 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  Additionally, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on 33 classes from five of these
transactions and removed 16 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults.  S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.

S&P derived its loss assumptions using S&P's criteria listed in
the "Related Research" section.  As part of S&P's analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences.  For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price
declines and the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss
severity assumptions.  Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations for each deal based on upward trends in
delinquencies.

For Alt-A transactions, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P consider
whether a class is able to withstand approximately 150% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions.  For a class
for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P consider whether a bond
is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while
S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

For prime jumbo transactions, to maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P
consider whether a class is able to withstand approximately 235%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps
and qualitative factors applied to specific transactions.  For a
class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P consider whether
a bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions.  To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding
the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 127% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while
S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses.  The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that
there is sufficient credit enhancement to support the ratings at
their current levels.  Certain senior classes also benefit from
senior-support classes that would provide support to a certain
extent before any applicable losses could affect the super-senior
certificates.  The subordination of classes within each structure
provides credit support for the affected transactions.

The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of Alt-A, first-lien, fixed-rate, adjustable-rate,
or negative-amortization residential mortgage loans secured by
one- to four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

       Chevy Chase Funding LLC Mortgage Backed-Certificates,
                       Series 2006-3 Trust

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        16678YAA0     CCC                  A
   A-2        16678YAB8     CCC                  A/Watch Neg
   A-NA                     CCC                  A
   IO                       CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   NIO                      CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   B-1        16678YAC6     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   B-1NA                    CC                   B/Watch Neg
   B-2        16678YAD4     CC                   CCC
   B-2NA                    CC                   CCC
   B-3        16678YAE2     CC                   CCC
   B-3NA                    CC                   CCC

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4F
                         Series 2006-4F

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1A-1       362650AA1     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-1       362650AB9     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-2       362334QD9     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-3       362650AC7     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   2A-4       362650AD5     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-5       362650AE3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-6       362650AF0     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-7       362650AG8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-8       362650AH6     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-9       362650AJ2     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   2A-10      362650AK9     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   2A-11      362650AL7     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   3A-1       362650AM5     BBB                  A-/Watch Neg
   3A-2       362650BP7     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   4A-1       362650AN3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   4A-2       362650AP8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   5A-1       362650AQ6     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   5A-2       362650AR4     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   5A-3       362650AS2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-4       362650AT0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-5       362650AU7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-6       362650AV5     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   5A-7       362650AW3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-8       362650AX1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-9       362650AY9     BB                   BB/Watch Neg
   5A-10      362650AZ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   5A-11      362650BA0     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   6A-1       362650BB8     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   6A-2       362650BQ5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   6A-3       362650BR3     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   A-P        362650BC6     B                    BB/Watch Neg
   A-X        362650BD4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   B-1        362650BF9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   B-2        362650BG7     CC                   CCC

              Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-14
                          Series 2005-14

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   2-A-1A     41161PWT6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A-1B     41161PYR8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   3-A-1A     41161PWU3     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A-1B     41161PYS6     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
   4-A-1A     41161PWV1     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-1B     41161PYT4     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
   5-A-1A     41161PWW9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   5-A-1B     41161PYU1     CCC                  BB+/Watch Neg
   B-1        41161PWZ2     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   B-2        41161PXA6     CC                   CCC
   B-3        41161PXB4     CC                   CCC

              Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-12
                          Series 2006-12

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1A-1A      41162DAA7     CC                   CCC
        2A-1A2     41162DAC3     CCC                  BBB
        2A-1A3     41162DAD1     CCC                  B
        2A-2B      41162DAG4     CCC                  B
        B-1        41162DAJ8     CC                   CCC

            Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-13
                          Series 2007-13

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   1-A-1      61756HAA8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   1-A-2      61756HAB6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   1-A-3      61756HAC4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   1-A-P      61756HAD2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   1-A-X      61756HAE0     BB                   AAA
   2-A-1      61756HAF7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   2-A-2      61756HAG5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   2-A-3      61756HAH3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   2-A-P      61756HAJ9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   3-A-1      61756HAK6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   3-A-2      61756HAL4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   4-A-1      61756HAM2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-2      61756HAN0     CC                   B
   4-A-3      61756HAP5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-4      61756HAQ3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-5      61756HAR1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-6      61756HAS9     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-7      61756HAT7     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-8      61756HAU4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   4-A-9      61756HAV2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-10     61756HAW0     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-11     61756HAX8     CCC                  B
   7-A18      61756HCL2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   7-A-X      61756HCM0     B                    AAA
   3-B-1      61756HCR9     CC                   CCC
   3-B-2      61756HCS7     CC                   CCC
   3-B-3      61756HCT5     CC                   CCC
   3-B-4      61756HCY4     CC                   CCC
   6-A-1      61756HBN9     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   6-A-2      61756HBP4     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   6-A-3      61756HBQ2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   6-A-4      61756HBR0     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   6-A-5      61756HBS8     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-1      61756HBT6     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-2      61756HBU3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   7-A-3      61756HBV1     CCC                  AA
   7-A-4      61756HBW9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A-5      61756HBX7     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-6      61756HBY5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-7      61756HBZ2     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   7-A-8      61756HCA6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A-9      61756HCB4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-10     61756HCC2     CCC                  AA
   7-A-11     61756HCD0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   7-A-12     61756HCE8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   7-A-13     61756HCF5     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-14     61756HCG3     CC                   AA
   7-A-15     61756HCH1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   7-A-16     61756HCJ7     CCC                  AA
   7-A-17     61756HCK4     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   4-A-12     61756HAY6     CCC                  B
   4-A-13     61756HAZ3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-14     61756HBA7     CCC                  B
   4-A-15     61756HBB5     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-16     61756HBC3     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-17     61756HBD1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   4-A-18     61756HBE9     CCC                  B
   4-A-19     61756HBF6     CCC                  B
   4-A-X      61756HBG4     BB                   AAA
   B-1        61756HCN8     CC                   CCC
   B-2        61756HCP3     CC                   CCC
   B-3        61756HCQ1     CC                   CCC
   B-4        61756HCV0     CC                   CCC
   5-A-1      61756HBH2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   5-A-2      61756HBJ8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
   5-A-3      61756HBK5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   5-A-4      61756HBL3     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   5-A-P      61756HBM1     CCC                  B/Watch Neg

  Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Grantor Trust 2007-AR3
                   Series 2007-AR3 CLASS I-A-4B

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A-4B     86363QAA0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

  Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Grantor Trust 2007-AR3
                   Series 2007-AR3 CLASS II-A-3B

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   II-A-3B    86363QAB8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2006-AR7
                         Series 2006-AR7

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-2A       86361HAC8     CCC                  AAA
   A-2B       86361HAD6     CCC                  AAA
   A-4        86361HAG9     CCC                  AAA
   A-5        86361HAH7     CCC                  AAA
   A-6        86361HAJ3     CCC                  AAA
   A-9        86361HAM6     B                    AAA
   A-10       86361HAN4     B                    AAA
   A-11       86361HAP9     B                    AAA
   A-12       86361HAQ7     CCC                  AAA
   A-13A      86361HAR5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
   B-1        86361HAU8     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   B-2        86361HAV6     CC                   CCC
   B-3        86361HAW4     CC                   CCC
   B-4        86361HAX2     CC                   CCC
   B-5        86361HAY0     CC                   CCC

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3
                         Series 2007-AR3

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A-1      86363NAA7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-2      86363NAB5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-3      86363NAC3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-4A     86363NAD1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-4B     86363NAR0     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-5      86363NAX7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-B-1      86363NAG4     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
   I-B-2      86363NAH2     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
   I-B-3      86363NAJ8     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg
   I-B-4      86363NAK5     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
   I-B-5      86363NAL3     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   I-B-6      86363NAM1     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   I-B-7      86363NAN9     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   I-B-8      86363NAP4     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg
   I-B-9      86363NAQ2     CC                   BB+/Watch Neg
   II-A-2     86363NAZ2     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-3A    86363NBA6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-3B    86363NBG3     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-B-1     86363NBB4     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
   II-B-2     86363NBC2     CC                   B/Watch Neg
   II-B-3     86363NBD0     CC                   CCC

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR4
                         Series 2007-AR4

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        86364MAA8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        86364MAB6     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   A-3        86364MAC4     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   A-5        86364MAE0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   A-6        86364MAF7     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   A-7        86364MAG5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   B-1        86364MAK6     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
   B-2        86364MAL4     CC                   AA+/Watch Neg
   B-3        86364MAM2     CC                   AA/Watch Neg
   B-4        86364MAN0     CC                   AA-/Watch Neg
   B-5        86364MAP5     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
   B-6        86364MAQ3     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   B-7        86364MAR1     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   B-8        86364MAS9     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   B-9        86364MAT7     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg

                        Ratings Affirmed

              Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-12
                          Series 2006-12

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 2A-1A1     41162DAB5     AAA
                 2A-1B      41162DAE9     AAA
                 2A-2A      41162DAF6     AA
                 2A-2C      41162DAH2     AAA

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2006-AR7
                         Series 2006-AR7

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-1A       86361HAA2     AAA
                 A-1B       86361HAB0     AAA
                 A-3        86361HAF1     AAA
                 A-8        86361HAL8     AAA
                 A-13B      86361HAS3     BBB
                 X          86361HAT1     AAA

     Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR3
                          Series 2007-AR3

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 I-X-1      86363NAE9     AAA
                 I-X-2      86363NAF6     AAA
                 II-A-1     86363NAY5     AAA

      Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR4
                          Series 2007-AR4

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 A-4A       86364MAD2     AAA
                 A-4B       86364MAU4     AAA
                 X-1        86364MAH3     AAA
                 X-2        86364MAJ9     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 6,198 Classes From 611 RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 6,198
classes from 611 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A mortgage loan collateral
issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  S&P removed 3,945 of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 2,125 classes from these transactions
and from 52 additional transactions and removed 221 of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.  In total, the
downgrades affected $235.21 billion of RMBS certificates.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P
used in S&P's analysis.  In order to maintain a rating higher than
'B', S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses
exceeding the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to
each rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating.  For example,
in general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.

The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover the losses associated with the current rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization and excess spread.  The underlying pool of
loans backing these transactions consists of different
combinations of fixed- and adjustable-rate, hybrid, and option
adjustable-rate mortgage Alt-A mortgage loans.



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Danilo Munnoz, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie
Varquez, Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.

                  *** End of Transmission ***