TCR_Public/090719.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 19, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 198

                            Headlines



ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
AIMCO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-A Notes
AIMCO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-A Notes
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
AMMC CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

ARCHIMEDES FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
ARCHSTONE SYNTHETIC: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Classes
ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
AVENUE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
BABSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-III Notes

BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-1 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2007-SV1 Tranches
BELHURST CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
BELLA VISTA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-1 Tranches

BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series IV Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
BOREALIS NO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
CAPITAL AUTO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
CD 2007-CD5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of Securities

CENT CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
CHASE CREDIT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 205 Tranches
CHRYSLER CA: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Rating on Class A Notes
CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on One Tranche

CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
CIT GROUP: Fitch Says Rating Cut Has Minimal Effect on CDOs
CIT GROUP: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine Transactions
COLISEUM SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on FACTS 2007-1 Notes to 'D'
CREDIT LINKED: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on 2005-1 Notes

CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes of Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-C3 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 2007-C3 Securities
CWMBS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches
DAVENPORT CDO: S&P Corrects Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Action on Notes
DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Rating Action on Six Classes of Notes
DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Floating Rate Notes
DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Notes
DIAMOND LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

DISCOVER CARD: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 14 Classes of ABS
DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
DLJ 1997-A: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A Notes From 'Aaa'
DRYDEN VII-LEVERAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
DT AUTO: Moody's Confirms Rating on Class A-3 Tranche

FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Series of Notes
GALAXY X: Moody's Confirms Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GMACM HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
GOLDEN KNIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-GG10 Certs.

GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-GG10 Securities
GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Classes of Notes
GULF STREAM-COMPASS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Notes

HALCYON LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
IRIDAL PUBLIC: S&P Raises Rating on Series 4 Notes From 'BB'
IRWIN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-2 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-CIBC12 Certs.

JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-CIBC9 Securities
KATONAH V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2004-C2 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2000-C4 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on Seven 2004-C7 Securities

LCM II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
LCM III: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
MAGNETITE V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-XLF Certs. to 'D'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2008-TOP29 Securities

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 2007-IQ16 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Raises Rating on $3 Mil. A-13 Notes to 'B'
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-IQ9 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on 2007-13 Notes
MORTGAGE GUARANTY: Fitch Downgrades Insurer Strength Rating

MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
MT WILSON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
OCEANVIEW A1B: Fitch Junks Ratings on $25 Mil. A1B Receipts
PROVIDENT FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches

SACO I: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Two 2005-GP1 Tranches
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2000-C3 Certs.
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
SECURITY NATIONAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-A Notes
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Moody's Junks Corporate Family Rating

SLATE CDO: Fitch Junks Ratings on Eight Classes of 2007-1 Notes
STARTS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Series 2007-20
TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2005-4 Notes
UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class L Certs. to 'D'
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 24 2007-C32 Certs.

WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Cuts Ratings on Various 2005-C20 Certs. to 'D'
WASI FINANCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 Certs. From Three Resecuritizations
* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 15 Certs. by Five Resecuritizations
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 56 Tranches From 41 SF CDOs
* Moody's Modifies Rating Methodology on Structured Finance
* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 85 Classes From Five CMBS

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches From Nine CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 77 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions



                            *********

ACAS BUSINESS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1:

  -- US$435,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2005-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on October 21,
     2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes,
     Series 2005-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on March
     4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$145,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-1, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
     23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor) and other performance metrics of the
underlying portfolio relative to the transaction's covenants.  The
weighted average rating factor has steadily increased over the
last year and is currently 3821 versus a test level of 3450 as of
the last trustee report, dated April 27, 2009.  Moody's also noted
that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-fixed,
receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the hedge
counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in the
deal.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1, issued in October 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
U.S. dollar-denominated middle-market loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AIMCO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AIMCO CLO, Series 2006-A:

  -- US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     Aa1; previously on July 13, 2006 assigned Aaa;

  -- US$21,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$19,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's has also upgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2020,
     Upgraded to Baa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class D
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2619
versus a test level of 2550 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 3, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $16.4 million, accounting for roughly 4.1% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 9.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class B Notes is the
result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis including an in-
depth assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating
model along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative
factors.  By way of comparison, rating actions taken by Moody's in
its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely based on a
parameter-based approach.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

AIMCO CLO, Series 2006-A, issued in July 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AIMCO CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2005-A Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AIMCO CLO, Series 2005-A:

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on September 8, 2005 assigned Aaa;

  -- US$229,000,000Class A-1B Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on September 8, 2005 assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$17,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$6,250,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class C and D
Overcollateralization Tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2756
versus a test level of 2420 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $14 million, accounting for roughly 4.4% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 12.9% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

AIMCO CLO Series 2005-A, issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches from 2 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by American Home.
Additionally, 5 senior tranches were confirmed at Aaa.  The
collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses -- are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

American Home Mortgage Investment Tr 2004-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-6, Downgraded to A3; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

American Home Mortgage Investment Tr 2004-3

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. VI-A5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/26/2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 5/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MH-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/26/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


AMMC CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by AMMC CLO V, Limited:

  -- US$ 40,000,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 28,750,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on December 20, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa.;

  -- US$ 9,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 18, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 19,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2017, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:

  -- US$ 19,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
     2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Bal and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
3042 versus a test level of 2500 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $12 million, accounting for roughly 4% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

AMMC CLO V, Limited, issued in December 20, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ARCHIMEDES FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Archimedes Funding IV (Cayman)
Ltd.:

  -- US$46,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2013, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/4/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$8,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2013, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/28/2008 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$42,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     due 2013, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B and
Class C Overcollateralization Ratio Tests.  The weighted average
rating factor has steadily increased over the last year and is
currently 2714 versus a test level of 2500 as of the last trustee
report, dated May 12, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $20 million, accounting for roughly 11% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 9.4% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class C Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B and C
overcollateralization tests.  Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in a small number of obligors
and industries.  This includes a significant concentration in debt
obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.  Finally, Moody's
noted that the portfolio includes a number of investments in
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
These investments potentially expose the notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Archimedes Funding IV (Cayman) Ltd., issued in December 21, 2000,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ARCHSTONE SYNTHETIC: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-3, and D-2 notes issued by Archstone
Synthetic CDO II SPC, a synthetic corporate high-yield
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  S&P raised all five
ratings and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

Due to an administrative error, S&P did not take into account in
S&P's analysis certain short positions included in the underlying
reference portfolio.  This resulted in downgrades of the above-
mentioned classes on May 7, 2009.  The current ratings reflect
S&P's revised analysis, which takes into account these short
positions.

       Ratings Raised And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                  Archstone Synthetic CDO II SPC

                              Rating
                              ------
              Class       To          From
              -----       --          ----
              A-1         BBB         BB-/Watch Neg
              A-2         BBB         B+/Watch Neg
              B-1         BBB-        B/Watch Neg
              B-3         BBB-        B/Watch Neg
              D-2         B+          CCC+/Watch Neg


ARES ENHANCED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ares Enhanced Loan Investment
Strategy II, Ltd.:

  -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes
     Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 19, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 19, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:

  -- Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Fixed Rate Notes
     Due 2020 Rate Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Interest Fixed Rate Notes
     2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans and high yield corporate bonds will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class B Overcollateralization Test and the Class C
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and it is currently at
2804 versus a test level of 2710 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 15, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $24 million, accounting for roughly 6.1% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 15% of the underlying portfolio.

Ares Enhanced Loan Investment Strategy II, Ltd., issued in January
of 2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


AVENUE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Avenue CLO II, Ltd:

  -- US$320,000,000 Class A-L Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on August 11, 2005 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$35,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's also confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$22,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,250,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2017,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the weighted average rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class B-1 and Class B-2L Overcollateralization Tests.  The
weighted average rating factor has increased recently and it is
currently 2593 versus a test level of 2520 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 19, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $51.55 million, accounting for roughly
11.71% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 9.19% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Avenue CLO II, Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BABSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-III Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Babson CLO LTD. 2005-III:

  -- US$425,000,000 Class A Senior Notes due 2019, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on November 9, 2005 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class B Senior Notes due 2019, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class Q Combination Notes due 2019, Downgraded
     to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 A3 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$38,500,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2019,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2019,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$12,500,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2019,
     Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D and
Class E Overcollateralization Tests.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
3176 versus a test level of 2841 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 10, 2009. Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $25 million, accounting for roughly 4.4% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 17% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class C, D, E, and Q Notes are presently
being deferred.  Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's
elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of companies in
the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Babson CLO 2005-III, issued in November 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Ballyrock CLO II Limited:

  -- US$290,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on November 5, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class D-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Confirmed at B1; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 3337 versus a test level of 2420 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 15, 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $18 million, accounting for
roughly 4.7%of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 17.3% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Ballyrock CLO II Limited, issued in November 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BANC OF AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 15 2007-1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
revises Rating Outlooks on 15 classes of commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., series 2007-1.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 9.9% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
6.3%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 6.3% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 66.7% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Approximately 34% of the mortgages mature within the next five
years: 4.4% in 2011, 9.2% in 2012, 19.7% in 2013, and 0.6% in
2014.  All losses associated with these loans are recognized in
the rating actions.

Fitch identified 24 Loans of Concern (26.7%) within the pool, 10
of which (9.3%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, four (8%) are current.  Five of the Fitch Loans of Concern
(26.4%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans (61.8%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Five of the Loans of Concern (20.4%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 9% to 43%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Solana
(8.7%), 575 Lexington Avenue (5.2%), and 1412 Broadway (3.3%).
Solana consists of 1,793,290 square feet of office space, 43,685
sf of retail, a 38,000 sf health club, and a full-service Marriott
hotel.  The property, located in Westlake, TX, was built in 1988
and most recently renovated in 2006.  The most recent servicer
reported debt service coverage ratio is 2.01 times (x) as of June
2008.  The loan, sponsored by Maguire Partners, transferred to the
special servicer in March 2009 for imminent default after a large
tenant vacated a portion of their space.  The tenant continues to
occupy 375,000 sq with their lease expiration in 2011.
Additionally, the borrower reported the Marriott hotel within the
complex is underperforming expectations.  The special servicer is
discussing workout options with the borrower.  Limited details are
presently available on the workout and current valuation of the
asset due to the loan's recent transfer to special servicing.

The 575 Lexington Avenue loan is secured by a 637,685 sf office
property in New York, New York.  At issuance, the loan was
underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation
that below market leases expiring during the term of the loan
would be re-signed at higher rates, providing for potential upside
in future cash flows.  Based on year-end 2008 performance, the
property is behind the stabilization schedule.  The servicer
reported year-end debt service coverage ratio and occupancy was
0.69x and 90%, as compared to the issuer DSCR and occupancy of
1.14x and 94% at origination.  Based on current performance and
anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity.  At closing, the loan was structured with a $10 million
debt service reserve to cover full debt service payments for
approximately 12 months.  As of February 2009, the balance of the
debt service reserve remains unchanged.

The 1412 Broadway loan is secured by a 24-story, 397,710 sq office
property in Midtown Manhattan, New York.  Since origination, the
property has experienced an increase in both vacancy and operating
expenses.  Cash flow has declined as a result, with the servicer
reporting a year-end 2008 DSCR of 0.89x, as compared to a year-end
2007 DSCR of 0.98x.  Fitch adjusted losses upwards as a result of
occupancy declining to 77.9% (as of March 2009), compared with
89.3% at issuance.

Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative these
classes:

  -- $259.5 million class A-J to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27.5 million class B to 'BBB-' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.4 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $27.5 million class D to 'BB' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $39.3 million class E to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $39.3 million class F to 'B' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.4 million class G to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $35.4 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $39.3 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.9 million class K to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11.8 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.9 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3.9 million class N to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.9 million class O to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11.8 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $15 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $293 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $444 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $68.5 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $698.7 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $637 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class XW at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $214.5 million class A-MFX at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-MFL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $39.3 million class Q.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2007-SV1 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches issued in Bear Stearns Second Lien Trust 2007-SV1
transaction due to higher pool losses in relation to remaining
tranche-specific credit protection.  Underlying securities'
collateral consists primarily of closed-end second lien
residential mortgage loans.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include:

   i) Moody's review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
      historical loan performance information;

  ii) analysis of the collateral composition and pool credit
      performance including prepayment, loan delinquency and loss
      data;

iii) consideration of the transaction's capital structure and
      related allocations of collateral cash flows and losses; and

  iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement levels to updated
      Moody's pool loss projections based on present collateral
      credit performance.

Some of the securities are guaranteed by the respective financial
guarantors.  The underlying ratings generally reflect the
intrinsic credit quality of the securities in the absence of the
guarantee.  The current ratings on the below-noted securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating such insured securities
at the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength
rating and the underlying or intrinsic rating.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: Bear Stearns Second Lien Trust 2007-SV1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/8/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/8/2008 Published at Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on 3/9/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 10/8/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     10/8/2008 Published at Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on 3/9/2009)

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca


BELHURST CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Belhurst CLO Ltd.:

  -- $310,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 23, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-2 Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes Due
     2020, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 23, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- $45,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 23, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $15,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Downgraded
     to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- $35,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $12,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to B3; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $12,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of
overcollateralization tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2843
versus a test level of 2450 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 5, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $48.6 million, accounting for roughly 9% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 13.58% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class D and E Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C and D
overcollateralization tests.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Belhurst CLO Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BELLA VISTA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-1 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches from one RMBS transaction, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2004-1.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
This action is a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

Issuer: Bella Vista Mortgage Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-4-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/6/2004
     Assigned Baa2


BLACKROCK SENIOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series IV Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Blackrock Senior Income Series
IV:

  -- US$385,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     Aa2; previously on January 29,2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$14,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Downgraded to
     A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$3,000,000 Class Z Combination Notes, Downgraded to B1;
     previously on January 29,2007 Assigned Baa2.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
     Confirmed at B2; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2677 versus a test level of 2986 as of the last
trustee report, dated May 29, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $12 million, accounting for
roughly 2.7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.1% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Blackrock Senior Income Series IV, issued on January 26, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by BlueMountain CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$57,900,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2017, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,200,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes due
     2017, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$23,000,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$27,800,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2017, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2825 versus a test level of 2350 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 11, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $20 million, accounting for
roughly 4% of the collateral pool, and securities rated Caa1 or
lower make up approximately 11% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

BlueMountain CLO Ltd., issued in November 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


BOREALIS NO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
B US$ notes issued by Borealis No. 1 (CDO) Ltd., a synthetic
corporate investment-grade collateralized debt obligation, to 'D'
and removed it from CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
then withdrew the rating.

The downgrade and withdrawal of the rating follows a May 28, 2009,
cancellation agreement stating that the notes experienced a
principal loss and were subsequently not paid in full.

                          Rating Actions

                     Borealis No. 1 (CDO) Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
         Class         To     Interim     From
         -----         --     -------     ----
         B US$ nts     NR     D           CCC-/Watch Neg


CAPITAL AUTO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust
2007-4 transaction, and revises Outlooks:

  -- Class A-2a notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-2b notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3a notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4 notes at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes at 'BBB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;
  -- Class D notes at 'BB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable.

Current loss performance in this transaction is worse than
originally expected, and the future, projected performance has
been revised accordingly.  Fitch expects losses to continue to
exceed original expectations.  As of the June 2009 collection
period, the transaction has total delinquencies of 4.68% and net
losses of 1.94%.  Fitch has noted that delinquency and cumulative
net loss performance have continued to exhibit weaker trends in
recent months.  Performance deterioration is expected to continue,
which may negatively impact credit support for more subordinate
classes.  As a result, Classes C and D are being revised to
Outlook Negative.

Despite higher than expected CNL and delinquencies, the cash flows
available to service the outstanding debt in the transaction
currently continue to allow credit enhancement to build on a
nominal basis.  Fitch analyzed the transaction incorporating the
stress of the revised base case CNL assumptions and the timing of
the remaining losses.  Based on the analysis, Fitch concluded that
CE is currently adequate to support the existing ratings under
Fitch's revised assumptions and therefore affirms all classes of
outstanding notes.


CD 2007-CD5: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from CD 2007-CD5
Mortgage Trust and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed June 26, 2009.  In addition,
S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on eight classes from the same
transaction and removed six classes from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.15x and a loan-to-value ratio of 108%.  S&P further stressed the
loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted
average DSC of 0.92x and an LTV of 147%.  The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 73.9% and 40.6%,
respectively.  The lowered ratings on the subordinate classes also
reflect S&P's expectations for credit support erosion upon the
eventual resolution of six of the 16 specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's view, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                         Credit Concerns

Sixteen loans ($113.1 million, 5.4 %) in the pool are currently
with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  A breakdown of the
specially serviced loans by payment status is: one asset is in
foreclosure ($9.9 million total exposure); one loan is 90-plus
days delinquent ($3.7 million); two loans are 60-plus days
delinquent ($11.3 million); five loans are 30 days delinquent
($54.0 million); six loans are less than 30 days delinquent
($30.0 million); and one loan is current ($5.6 million).  One of
the loans has an appraisal reduction amount in effect in the
amount of $0.9 million.  All of the specially serviced assets have
balances that are less than 0.5% of the total pool balance except
the CGM RRI Hotel Portfolio (1.7%), which is 30 days delinquent.
A default notice was sent to the borrower, who indicated plans to
request a restructuring.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 161 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.1 billion, the same as at issuance.  There are two master
servicers for the transaction, Wachovia Bank N.A. and Capmark
Finance Inc.  Recent financial information was provided for 86% of
the pool; 90% of the servicer-provided information was full-year
2008 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.36x for the
pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.15x and 108%, respectively.  Eleven loans ($95.7 million,
4.6%) in the pool are delinquent, and nine are currently with LNR.
The transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Twenty-nine oans are on the watchlist, including three of the top
10 loans.  Twenty-eight loans ($410.5 million, 20%) have reported
DSC below 1.10x, and 19 loans ($324.6 million, 16%) have reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

                      Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$827.3 million (40%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC for the top 10 loans of 1.43x,
down from 1.45x at issuance.  Three of the top 10 loans (8%) have
reported DSCs under 1.0x.  All of the low-DSC top 10 loans are on
the master servicer's watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans were 1.30x and 101%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-CD5

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     A-M       A-        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.08
     A-MA      A-        AAA/Watch Neg                   20.08
     A-J       BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                   13.43
     A-JA      BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                   13.43
     B         BB+       AA+/Watch Neg                   12.42
     C         BB+       AA/Watch Neg                    11.42
     D         BB        AA-/Watch Neg                   10.42
     E         BB        A+/Watch Neg                     9.54
     F         BB-       A/Watch Neg                      8.66
     G         BB-       A-/Watch Neg                     7.66
     H         B+        BBB/Watch Neg                    6.53
     J         B+        BBB/Watch Neg                   5.40
     K         B         BBB-/Watch Neg                  4.39
     L         B         BB+/Watch Neg                   3.14
     M         B-        BB/Watch Neg                    2.76
     N         B-        BB-/Watch Neg                   2.51
     O         B-        B+/Watch Neg                    2.26
     P         B-        B/Watch Neg                      2.01
     Q         CCC+      B-/Watch Neg                     1.88

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-CD5

                Rating
                ------
    Class   To        From               Credit enhancement (%)
    -----   --        ----               ----------------------
    A-1     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12
    A-2     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12
    A-3     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12
    A-AB    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12
    A-4     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12
    A-1A    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       30.12

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-CD5

       Class   Rating               Credit enhancement (%)
       -----   ------               ----------------------
       XP      AAA                                   N/A
       XS      AAA                                   N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CENT CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Cent CDO 15 Ltd.:

  -- US$61,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa2; previously on August 29, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$39,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Paced
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$39,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
     Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class Q-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these
notes:

  -- US$33,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2021, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2880 versus a test level of 2666 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 4, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $43.5 million, accounting for
roughly 7.2% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 10.4% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Cent CDO 15 Ltd., issued in 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


CHASE CREDIT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class B notes to A2
from A1 and Class C notes to Ba1 from Baa1 of the Series 2003-4
issued out of the Chase Credit Card Master Trust.  These
securities are backed by $9 billion of consumer credit card
receivables originated and serviced by Chase Bank USA, NA and its
affiliates.  These rating actions conclude the review initiated on
April 20, 2009.

                            Rationale

These rating actions are primarily driven by an increase in the
Trust charge-off rate and decrease in the principal payment rate
over the past year.  Moody's expect these key metrics will remain
weak as the consumer macroeconomic environment undergoes further
deterioration.

Like other credit card issuers, collateral performance for the
Trust has deteriorated in the current economic environment.  For
example, CHAMT's charge-off rate, which in May 2009 reached 9.1%,
has risen by approximately 76% since May 2008.  Recently, the rise
in charge-offs have accelerated, increasing by more than 40% in
just the last four months.  Similarly, CHAMT's total delinquency
rate, a harbinger of near-term charge-offs, is also rising rapidly
and hit an all-time high of 5.0% in April 2009.

In addition, CHAMT's principal payment rate has fallen by
approximately two percentage points from a year ago.  The
principal payment rate is a measure of cardholders' willingness
and ability to repay their credit card balances.  It is also a
measure of the speed by which securitized investors will be repaid
if an amortization event is triggered.  Therefore, a drop in this
rate may have negative consequences for securitized noteholders.

The revised expected range of performance for Trust gross charge-
off rate is 9.5%-12.5% up from 7.5%-9.5%.  Moody's current
expected range for principal payment rate is 13.0%-16.0% and for
the yield is 12.5%-15.5%.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Chase Credit Card Master Trust:

  -- $50,750,000 Class B Notes, Series 2003-4, downgraded to A2
     from A1; previously on April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- $65,250,000 Class C Notes, Series 2003-4, downgraded to Ba1
     from Baa1; previously on April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade

Chase, based in Wilmington, Delaware, reported total assets of
$88.7 billion as of March 31, 2009. Chase's long-term bank
deposits are rated Aa1 and its Bank Financial Strength rating is
C-. The rating outlook on all ratings is negative.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 205 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 205
tranches from 29 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively.  Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.

List of actions:

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-21

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
     to Baa1

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-27

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to A1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-37

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/25/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-42

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-46

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A2; previously on 10/20/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 10/20/2003
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 10/20/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 10/20/2003
     Assigned Ba2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-48

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-49

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-56

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/8/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/8/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/8/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-58

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/13/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/13/2003
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 11/13/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/13/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/13/2003 Assigned
     B2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-60

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
     to A2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to A2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB2

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded
     to A3

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB3

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/11/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/11/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-18, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-19, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/15/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aa3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-19

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2004 Assigned
     B2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-21

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/5/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-22

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/6/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-24

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     8/26/2008 Published at Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded Ca,
     Outlook Developing on 3/9/2009)

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     8/26/2008 Published at Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded Ca,
     Outlook Developing on 3/9/2009)

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2008 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa2; previously on
     8/26/2008 Published at Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Outlook
     Negative on 6/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 1-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-IO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/16/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/16/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/6/2004 Assigned Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/3/2004 Assigned Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/7/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/7/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/7/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/7/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/7/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J5

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa


CHRYSLER CA: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Rating on Class A Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the rating of CALW2 Class
A notes issued by Chrysler CA Lease Receivables Trust II.  The
Notes are backed by certain Asset-Backed Notes that in turn are
secured by retail auto lease contracts originated and serviced by
Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for CALW2 Class A notes for
business reasons.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Chrysler CA Lease Receivable Trust II, CALW2 Class A Notes

  -- CALW2 Class A Notes, Withdrawn; previously on July 9, 2009,
     Confirmed at Ba3.


CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on One Tranche
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken a rating action on a tranche
of a Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc transaction, correcting a
rating action announced on May 8.  In the previous release the
rating was upgraded based on the erroneous assumption that the
Class B supports the Class A.  In fact, Class A is not supported
by Class B, and it has cumulative principal losses.  There is not
enough collateral in the pool to fully repay the tranche balance
and the cumulative principal loss to date.  The corrected rating
action is:

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1991-05

  -- Cl. A, Previously Upgraded to A2 from Caa1 on 5/8/2009,
     Changed to Caa1 on 7/15/2009

The rating is based on the methodology applied to all transactions
with low pool factors.  Moody's defines low pool factor deals as
those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the outstanding
collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the pool factor is
less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals:

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current.  The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining, the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.


CITICORP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 29 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 29 tranches and confirmed
1tranche from 2 deals issued by Citicorp.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans.  The actions are
triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance -- marked by
rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with concerns
about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide and the
rising unemployment levels.  The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector announced in a
press release on March 19, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-going
review process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-5

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Aa2 and remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Aa2 and remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-8, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-9, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-10, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-11, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-12, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-13, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2005-7

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-5, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-6, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA-8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:

  i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
     performance information available for the asset class as well
     as for the transaction sponsor,

ii) collateral analysis,

iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
     interests of the key parties to the transaction, most notably
     the originator and the servicer,

iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
     cashflow and capital structure,

  v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
     structure, and

vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
     similar transactions.


CIT GROUP: Fitch Says Rating Cut Has Minimal Effect on CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
A credit event by CIT Group Inc. would have a minimal impact on
investment-grade ratings of synthetic CDOs, according to Fitch
Ratings.

Despite being referenced in over half (53%) of its rated synthetic
CDOs, recently completed sensitivity analysis showed many tranches
rated 'CCC' and below are likely to default and suffer losses
while investment-grade tranches can absorb a potential loss and
maintain their current ratings.  Tranches currently rated in the
'BBB' and 'BB' rating categories face downgrade risk resulting
from diminished credit enhancement from potential CIT losses.

Fitch downgraded CIT to 'C' earlier.

Fitch assumed two recovery scenarios -- an average corporate
unsecured recovery rate of 40% indicative of the 'RR4' recovery
rating on CIT's senior secured obligations, as well as a stressed
recovery of 5% indicative of the 'RR6' recovery rating on the
subordinated instruments.

In the 40% recovery stress, 26 single tier tranches would suffer
losses.  These tranches are all currently rated 'CCC' to 'C' with
Recovery Ratings of 'RR6' signaling poor recovery (0-10%) given
default.  Assuming a much more conservative recovery rate of 5%, a
CIT Group credit event would result in the default of 35 single
tier CDO tranches, which are currently rated 'CCC' to 'C' with
Recovery Ratings of 'RR6'.

No master level CDO squared tranches would suffer losses in the
40% recovery stress; however, master level credit enhancement
levels would erode or cross subordination mechanisms would begin
to absorb losses in 45 tranches of CDO squareds.  Cross
subordination is a structural protection mechanism which evenly
spreads losses among all inner CDOs of CDO squared transactions.
This means that inner CDOs exposed to losses would share losses
with unexposed inner CDOs.  Thus inner CDO losses are not passed
through to the master CDO level until all inner CDO protection is
exhausted.  Assuming a 5% recovery, no master level CDO squared
tranches are expected to default; however, the same features
described above would become active in 52 tranches.

The current median credit enhancement level for 'B'-rated
synthetic CDO tranches is 4%.  The conservative recovery
assumption for a default of CIT Group would bring this down to
approximately 3%.  Given a median remaining risk horizon of 4.5
years, further CDO level rating migration to the 'CCC' level is
highly likely.  Migration of high investment grade tranches is
much less likely because the credit enhancement is higher and the
remaining risk horizon is shorter.  For example, the median 'AAA'
enhancement under the conservative recovery scenario would drop to
approximately 8.3% from 9.2% with a remaining life of 1.8 years.
Regarding 'BBB' tranches, some could be at risk for downgrade to
'BB' depending on the remaining portfolio composition in terms of
ratings and industry concentration as well as the remaining risk
horizon.

CIT is referenced globally in 147 Fitch rated synthetic CDOs out
of a total global universe of 277 corporate synthetic CDOs.  The
majority of the exposed transactions are European CDOs (83
European, 43 U.S., and 21 Asian CDOs).  Through these 147 exposed
transactions, Fitch rates a total of 312 tranches of notes (210
Single Tier Classes and 102 CDO Squared Classes).

Fitch will continue to carefully monitor underlying corporate
credit migration in Fitch rated CDOs.  If losses are projected to
exceed its expectations, Fitch will take rating action
accordingly.


CIT GROUP: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
downgrade nine asset-backed transactions sponsored by CIT Group
Inc., through its various subsidiaries, between 2004 and 2009.
The rationale for the actions is the heightened risk of a CIT
bankruptcy.  CIT, through its subsidiaries, acts as the seller and
servicer (in some instances also as the administrator) in the
affected deals.

On July 13, 2009, Moody's downgraded the senior unsecured rating
of CIT to B3 from Ba2.  Additionally, Moody's placed CIT's long-
term ratings on review for further possible downgrade.  The
downgrade of CIT's rating was based on Moody's growing concern
with CIT's liquidity position and prospects for survival of the
franchise.  The rating action for the asset-backed transactions is
a result of an increased level of uncertainty around the servicing
of these transactions should CIT file for bankruptcy.

During the review period, Moody's will primarily focus on
determining the likelihood and extent of a servicer disruption in
the event of CIT's bankruptcy and its likely impact on the
performance of the securitized assets and rated securities.  The
key considerations will include:

* The likelihood that the servicing platform would survive a CIT
  bankruptcy;

* Control of funds in the securitizations including the extent of
  commingling risk;

* The existence of mitigating factors such as presence of a back-
  up servicer and/or administrator, effectiveness of servicer
  termination triggers and the ability and willingness of the
  Indenture Trustee to reduce the negative impact of a potential
  servicer disruption;

* The potential dependence of CIT customers on continued financing
  from CIT and a possible increase in defaults if that financing
  were no longer available.

CIT, which commenced operations in 1908, is a bank holding company
that operates through a bank subsidiary as well as non-bank
subsidiaries.  CIT's primary business activities consist of
providing financing and leasing products and services to clients
within various industries.  The company organizes its operations
into five business segments: (1) Corporate Finance, (2) Trade
Finance, (3) Transportation Finance, (4) Vendor Finance and (5)
Consumer Finance.  The sponsors, servicers and administrators in
the structured transactions affected by this rating action are
wholly owned subsidiaries of CIT.

The rating framework employed in rating the small business
transaction is consistent with that Moody's uses within other
asset-backed sectors including the equipment sector.
Specifically, Moody's employed an actuarial approach in arriving
at the expected loss estimate for the collateral pool backing the
transaction.  An actuarial (rather than loan-by-loan) approach
involves inferring gross default and recovery rates for a given
asset pool based on the analysis of historical performance for
static pools of similar receivables.  In rating securitizations
backed by student loans originated under FFELP, Moody's assesses
both the liquidity and credit risk of the transaction.  The
drivers that affect the performance of a transaction include
defaults, servicer guarantee rejection rates, voluntary
prepayments, basis risk, borrower benefit utilization, and the
number of borrowers in non-repayment status, such as deferment and
forbearance.

The complete rating actions are:

U.S. Student Loan ABS:

Issuer: Education Funding Capital Trust - IV (2004 Indenture)

  -- Class 2004A-2, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/24/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class 2004A-3, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/24/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class 2004A-4, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/24/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class 2004A-5, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/24/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class 2004A-6, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/24/2004 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CIT Education Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Class A-1, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/16/2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/16/2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-3, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/16/2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-4, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/16/2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 6/16/2005 Assigned Aa1

Issuer: CIT Education Loan Trust 2007-1

  -- Class A, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 7/31/2007 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 7/31/2007 Assigned Aa1

Canadian Equipment Lease and Loan ABS:

Issuer: CIT Canada Equipment Receivables Trust 2008-1

  -- Class A-2, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/17/2008 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CIT Canada Equipment Receivables Trust II, Series 2009-1

  -- Class A-1, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 4/9/2009 Assigned P-1

  -- Class A-2, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 4/9/2009 Assigned Aaa

U.S. Equipment Lease and Loan ABS:

Issuer: CIT Equipment Collateral 2006-VT2

  -- Class A-4, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 12/5/2006 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 12/5/2006 Assigned Aa3

  -- Class C, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 12/5/2006 Assigned A2

  -- Class D, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 12/5/2006 Assigned Baa3

Issuer: CIT Equipment Collateral 2008-VT1

  -- Class A-2A, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/19/2008 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2B, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/19/2008 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-3, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 5/19/2008 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: CIT Equipment Collateral 2009-VT1

  -- Class A-1, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/10/2009 Assigned P-1

  -- Class A-2, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/10/2009 Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-3, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
     previously on 6/10/2009 Assigned Aaa

U.S. Small Business ABS:

Issuer: CIT SBL Company 2008-1

  -- Class A, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade, previously
     on 12/30/2008 Assigned Aaa


COLISEUM SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on FACTS 2007-1 Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded the floating-rate
notes issued by Coliseum SPC's series FACTS 2007-1 to 'D' and then
withdrew the rating.

The transaction is a credit default swap that is directly linked
to the rating on the super-senior swap of Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1
Ltd., which S&P lowered to 'D' and subsequently withdrew on
July 9, 2009.

                  Rating Lowered, Then Withdrawn

                           Coliseum SPC
       $120,000,000 floating-rate notes series FACTS 2007-1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
      Class                 To                 From
      -----                 --                 ----
      Notes                 D                  B-/Watch Neg
                            NR                 D

                        NR - Not rated.


CREDIT LINKED: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on 2005-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
notes issued by Credit Linked Notes Ltd. 2005-1.

The rating withdrawal follows S&P's receipt of the redemption
agreement dated June 25, 2009.  Standard & Poor's received
confirmation from the issuer that the notes were paid in full on
June 29, 2009.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                  Credit Linked Notes Ltd. 2005-1

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class                       To           From
     -----                       --           ----
     Notes                       NR           CCC-/Watch Neg


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 20 Classes of Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 20
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series2006-
TFL2.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on 28 other classes
from his transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its ratings on
three classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from COMM 2006-FL12.  Finally, S&P removed all 51 of its ratings
from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed on April 7, 2009.

Hotel properties secure seven loans in the series 2006-TFL2 pool
totaling $920.6 million (87% of the pool trust balance).  These
properties are located in Paradise Islands, the Bahamas (36% of
the pool trust balance), Southern California (27%), Tucson (7%),
San Francisco (7%), Mexico (5%), Upstate New York (2%),
Springfield, Illinois (1%), Oklahoma City (1%), and
Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania (1%).  S&P based its hotel analysis
on a review of the borrowers' operating statements for the three
months ended March 31, 2009, and the year ended December 31, 2008,
as well as their 2009 budgets.  The lodging collateral performance
has been significantly affected by the reduction in business and
leisure travel.  S&P's analysis factored in S&P's assumption that
average 2009 revenue per available room in the industry would
decline between 14% and 16%, as S&P noted in a recent article.

According to Smith Travel, the general U.S. hotel industry
reported RevPAR declines of 19% in the first five months of 2009
compared with 2008.

The Kerzner International loan, the largest loan secured by hotel
properties, is the largest loan in the series 2006-TFL2 pool.  The
fee interest in two full-service resort hotels totaling 3,023
rooms secures this loan.  The collateral for this loan also
includes a water park, casino, 18-hole golf course, vacant land,
the assignment of the borrower's 50% joint-venture interest in
timeshare units, and a condo and marina project, all located on
Paradise Islands.  To date, the whole-loan balance has been paid
down by $106.9 million to $2.582 billion, which is bifurcated into
a $1.373 billion senior participation interest and a
$1.209 billion subordinate junior participation interest.  The
senior participation interest is split into two pari passu notes.
The first note has a balance of $686.5 million that consists of a
$384.1 million senior pooled component (36% of the pool trust
balance) and a $302.4 million subordinate nonpooled component
raked to the 'KER' certificates.  The other pari passu note is in
the COMM 2006-FL12 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
transaction.  This includes a $527.6 million senior pooled
component and a $158.9 million subordinate nonpooled component
raked to the 'KR' certificates.  S&P is in the process of
analyzing the remaining assets in the COMM 2006-FL12 transaction.
The master servicer for this loan, Wachovia Bank N.A., reported
debt service coverage of 2.46x and 70% occupancy for the year
ended December 31, 2008.  The loan matures on September 9, 2009.
Wachovia informed us that the borrower intends to exercise one of
its two remaining 12-month extension options.

According to the June 15, 2009, trustee remittance report, pool
statistics are:

There are 11 loans in the pool, including senior participation
interests in nine floating-rate mortgage loans, one FR whole-
mortgage loan, and one FR mortgage loan that is split into pari
passu notes.  There are mortgages on nine full-service, six
limited-service, and four extended-stay hotels; one small land
parcel; one retail/media center; one communication data center;
and three condominium properties.  All of the loans are indexed to
one-month LIBOR.

Details of the specially serviced loan in the series 2006-TFL2
pool are:

The Sheffield loan has a whole-loan balance of $36.5 million that
is split into a $16.6 million senior pooled component (2% of the
pool trust balance), a $13.4 million subordinate nonpooled
component that supports the 'SHD' raked certificates, and a
$6.5 million nontrust junior participation interest.  In addition,
the borrower's equity interests in the property secure six
mezzanine loans totaling $261.8 million.  This loan is secured by
an 845-unit apartment building in Manhattan and is currently
undergoing an extensive condominium conversion renovation program.
After renovation, there will be a total of 597 condo units.  Based
on the April 2009 sales report, 248 condo units have closed, and
an additional 30 contracts have been signed.  This loan, which
matured on April 9, 2009, and has no extension options remaining,
was transferred to the special servicer on April 24, 2009.  The
transfer was the result of a termination event in the forbearance
agreement prompted by the borrower not covering construction cost
shortfalls of $52.0 million.  The master and special servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital, specified that the whole-note was
sold subsequent to the June 15, 2009, trustee remittance report
date.  It is S&P's understanding from KeyBank that the proceeds
from the note sale would pay down the pooled certificates and
retire the 'SHD' raked certificates, and this is expected to be
reflected in the trustee remittance report as early as July 2009.
Once this occurs, S&P expects to set the ratings on the 'SHD'
raked certificates to 'NR'.

Near-term maturities (within the next three months) for the loans
in the pool are:

The Beverly Hilton loan has a whole-loan balance of $264.0 million
that consists of a $155.0 million senior pooled component (15% of
the pool trust balance), an $11.0 million subordinate nonpooled
component that supports the 'BEV-A' raked certificates, and a
$98.0 million nontrust junior participation interest.  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests secure a $36.0 million
mezzanine loan.  This loan, secured by a 569-room, full-service
hotel in Beverly Hills, California, matures on Aug. 9, 2009.
KeyBank has indicated that the borrower is exercising one of its
two remaining 12-month extension options.  KeyBank reported a DSC
of 1.34x and 72% occupancy for the 12 months ended March 31, 2009.
S&P's adjusted valuation has declined 52% since issuance.

The JW Marriott Starr Pass loan has a trust balance of
$78.0 million (7%) and a whole-loan balance of $145.0 million.  In
addition, the borrower's equity interests secure a $20.0 million
mezzanine loan.  This loan, secured by a 575-room, full-service
resort hotel in Tucson, matures on August 9, 2009.  KeyBank
indicated that the borrower is exercising one of its two 12-month
extension options.  KeyBank is currently working with the borrower
to resolve issues relating to the debt service and seasonality
reserve replenishment requirements.  KeyBank reported a 1.40x DSC
and 66% occupancy for the 12 months ended March 31, 2009.  S&P's
adjusted valuation has fallen 47% since issuance.

The NH Krystal Hotels loan has a whole-loan balance of
$54.0 million that consists of a $50.0 million senior pooled
component (5% of the pool trust balance) and a $4.0 million
subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the 'NHK-A'
certificates.  This loan, secured by three full-service hotels
totaling 982 rooms in Cancun, Ixtapa, and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,
matures on August 9, 2009.  KeyBank indicated that the borrower is
exercising one of its two remaining 12-month extension options.
KeyBank reported a 2.86x DSC for the 12 months ended April 30,
2009, and 68% occupancy as of March 2009.  S&P's adjusted
valuation has declined 42% since issuance.

There are seven pooled and one nonpooled loans that have raked
certificates, four of which S&P.  Of the remaining four loans, S&P
downgraded the 'ARG' and affirmed the 'MW', 'QUN', and 'SV' raked
certificates.  Details are:

The Argent Hotel loan has a whole-loan balance of $150.0 million
that consists of a $75.5 million senior pooled component, a
$12.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that is raked to the
'ARG' certificates, and two junior nontrust participation
interests totaling $62.0 million.  In addition, the borrower's
equity interests in the property secure two mezzanine loans
totaling $62.0 million.  A 672-room, full-service hotel in San
Francisco secures this loan.  S&P's adjusted valuation has fallen
36% since issuance.  The loan matures on April 9, 2010, and has
one 12-month extension option remaining.

The Metropolitan Warner Center loan has a whole-loan balance of
$94.2 million that consists of a $45.3 million senior pooled
component, a $19.9 million subordinate nonpooled component that
supports the 'MW' raked certificate classes, and two nontrust
junior participation interests totaling $29.0 million.  This loan
is secured by 685 residential units of a 1,279-unit garden-style
condominium conversion property in Woodland Hills, California.  As
of June 2009, 219 units had been sold, and 40 additional units are
under contract.  S&P's adjusted valuation is down since issuance.
The loan was extended to a final maturity of July 9, 2012.

The One Queensridge Place loan has a whole loan balance of
$86.9 million that consists of a $28.3 million senior pooled
component, a $17.5 million subordinate nonpooled component that is
raked to the 'QUN' certificates, and a $41.1 million nontrust
junior participation interest.  This loan is secured by 219
condominium units in Las Vegas.  To date, 136 units have been
sold.  KeyBank indicated it has drawn down on an existing
$50.0 million letter of credit to pay off the trust loan balance.
It is S&P's understanding from KeyBank that the proceeds would pay
down the pooled certificates and retire the 'QUN' raked
certificates.  This is expected to be reflected in the trustee
remittance report as early as in July 2009.  Once this occurs, S&P
expects to set the ratings on the 'QUN' raked certificates to
'NR'.

The Sava/Fundamental Portfolio loan has a whole-loan balance of
852.5 million that consists of an $842.7 million nonpooled trust
balance that supports the 'SV' raked certificates and a
$9.8 million nontrust junior participation interest.  In addition,
the borrower's equity interests in the properties secure mezzanine
loans totaling $185.1 million.  This loan is secured by 194 health
care facilities totaling 23,303 beds in various locations
throughout the U.S.  S&P's adjusted valuation is comparable to
S&P's levels at issuance.  The loan matures on June 9, 2010, and
has one 12-month extension option remaining.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    B        AA        AA+/Watch Neg                      20.31
    C        A+        AA/Watch Neg                       16.42
    D        A-        AA-/Watch Neg                      13.30
    E        BBB       A+/Watch Neg                       10.93
    F        BBB-      A/Watch Neg                         9.13
    G        BB-       A-/Watch Neg                        7.33
    H        B         BBB+/Watch Neg                      5.52
    J        CCC+      BBB/Watch Neg                       3.63
    K        CCC       BB+/Watch Neg                       1.54
    L        CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    KER-A    BB+       AA-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    KER-B    BB        A/Watch Neg                          N/A
    KER-C    BB-       A-/Watch Neg                         N/A
    KER-D    B-        BBB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
    KER-E    CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    KER-F    CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    BEV-A    CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    ARG-A    CCC-      BB/Watch Neg                         N/A
    ARG-B    CCC-      BB/Watch Neg                         N/A
    NHK-A    CCC-      BB/Watch Neg                         N/A

                          COMM 2006-FL12
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    KR1      CCC+      BBB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
    KR2      CCC       BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    KR3      CCC-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TFL2

                Rating
                ------
    Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --        ----              ----------------------
    A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                      74.99
    A-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                      24.19
    A-X-1    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    A-X-2    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    A-X-3    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    MW-A     B+        B+/Watch Neg                         N/A
    MW-B     B         B/Watch Neg                          N/A
    SHD-A    A-        A-/Watch Neg                         N/A
    SHD-B    BBB+      BBB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
    SHD-C    BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    SHD-D    BB+       BB+/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SHD-E    BB-       BB-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    QUN-A    A-        A-/Watch Neg                         N/A
    QUN-B    BBB+      BBB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
    QUN-C    BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    QUN-D    BB+       BB+/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-A1    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-A2    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-B     AA+       AA+/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-C     AA        AA/Watch Neg                         N/A
    SV-D     AA-       AA-/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-E     A+        A+/Watch Neg                         N/A
    SV-F     A         A/Watch Neg                          N/A
    SV-G     A-        A-/Watch Neg                         N/A
    SV-H     BBB+      BBB+/Watch Neg                       N/A
    SV-J     BBB       BBB/Watch Neg                        N/A
    SV-K     BBB-      BBB-/Watch Neg                       N/A
    SV-AX    AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                        N/A


                       N/A - Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-C3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C3 on review for
possible downgrade due to concerns that expected losses for the
pool have increased as a result of realized and anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing and an overall decline in credit
quality for the remainder of the pool.  Since Moody's prior review
in June 2007, seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, have
transferred to special servicing.  The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 4% to
$1.57 billion from $1.64 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 198 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 35% of the pool.  The pool includes 53 loans,
representing 12% of the outstanding loan balance, secured by
residential co-ops.  Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$3.6 million loss. Seven loans, representing 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan, Southland Center Mall ($108.4 million- 7%), is secured by a
mall owned by an affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc.  The
mall is located in Taylor, Michigan, approximately 17 miles south
of Detroit.  This loan was transferred to special servicing due to
GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009.  The second largest
specially serviced loan is Longford Plaza Loan, which represents
1.1% of the pool.  The loan is secured by a 101,000 square foot
office property located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The property's
performance declined due to a decrease in occupancy.  The loan is
in foreclosure.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class F, $20,462,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class G, $16,369,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class H, $18,416,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class J, $6,138,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class K, $8,185,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class L, $6,139,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class M, $4,092,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class N, $4,092,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 6/14/2007

  -- Class O, $6,139,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 6/14/2007


CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 23 2007-C3 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 23
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Credit
Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed June 26, 2009, and July 13, 2009.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three classes from the same transaction
and removed one from CreditWatch negative.

The lowered ratings follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financials, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 0.97x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 121%.  S&P further stressed loan cash flows
under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
0.77x and an LTV of 165%.  The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 86.5% and 48.8%, respectively.  The
lowered ratings on the subordinate classes J-Q also reflect S&P's
expectations for credit support erosion upon the eventual
resolution of 13 of the 19 specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                          Credit Concerns

Nineteen assets ($262.2 million, 9.8%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  The payment status of the
loans is: two are real estate owned ($37.4 million total
exposure); one is in foreclosure ($23.1 million); five are 90-plus
days delinquent ($65.8 million); two are 60-plus days delinquent
($10.2 million); four are 30 days delinquent ($21.4 million);
three are less than 30 days delinquent ($93.7 million); and two
are current ($17.4 million).  All but three of the specially
serviced assets have balances that are less than 1.0% of the pool
balance.  Eight of the specially serviced assets have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect.  The aggregate ARA amount is
$34.6 million.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 238 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.7 billion, the same as at issuance.  KeyBank Real Estate
Capital reported financial information for 92% of the pool; 88% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.31x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 0.97x and
121%, respectively.  Sixteen loans ($162.6 million, 6.1%) in the
pool are 30 or more days delinquent, 14 of which ($151.5 million,
5.7%) are currently with LNR.  The transaction has not experienced
any principal losses to date.  Forty-five loans are on the
watchlist, including two of the top 10 loans.  Fifty-one loans
($604.3 million, 23%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, while 32
loans ($411.1 million, 15%) have reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$825.3 million (31%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.38x for the top 10 loans.
One of the top 10 loans, Koger Center Office Park Portfolio (3%),
is currently with LNR.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
loans were 1.0x and 117%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     A-2       BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-3       BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-AB      BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-4       BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-1-A1    BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-1-A2    BBB+      AAA/Watch Neg                   30.09
     A-M       BB+       AAA/Watch Neg                   20.06
     A-J       B+        AAA/Watch Neg                   12.54
     B         B+        AA+/Watch Neg                   11.91
     C         B+        AA /Watch Neg                   10.41
     D         B         AA-/Watch Neg                    9.40
     E         B         A+/Watch Neg                     8.65
     F         B         A/Watch Neg                      7.77
     G         B-        A-/Watch Neg                     6.64
     H         B-        BBB+/Watch Neg                   5.39
     J         CCC+      BBB-/Watch Neg                   4.26
     K         CCC       BB/Watch Neg                     3.13
     L         CCC-      BB-/Watch Neg                    2.76
     M         CCC-      B+/Watch Neg                     2.51
     N         CCC-      B/Watch Neg                      2.13
     O         CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                     1.88
     P         CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg                   1.63
     Q         CCC-      CCC/Watch Neg                    1.25

      Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C3

                   Rating
                   ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     S         CCC-      CCC-/Watch Neg                   1.00

                         Ratings Affirmed

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C3

             Class   Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------   ----------------------
             A-1     AAA                       30.09
             A-X     AAA                         N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


CWMBS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 27
tranches from four RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust in 2004.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to A2

CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB3

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

CWMBS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/12/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Baa2


DAVENPORT CDO: S&P Corrects Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on four
classes of notes issued by Davenport CDO I Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation backed by multiple tranches of
various CDO transactions, by lowering them to 'D' following an in-
kind distribution of the collateral to the holders of these notes
and the cancellation of the notes.  S&P subsequently withdrew its
ratings on these classes.

On June 17, 2009, the trustee notified Standard & Poor's that on
December 5, 2008, 100% of the noteholders of these classes
exchanged their notes for an in-kind distribution of the
underlying CDO collateral.  S&P lowered the ratings to 'D' based
on S&P's view that, due to the credit quality and level of
defaults in the underlying CDO portfolio, and given prevailing
market prices, these noteholders would not have received par plus
accrued interest prior to these classes' maturity dates.

The rating actions did not occur contemporaneously with the
exchange and cancellation of the notes because the trustee did not
provide notice of the exchange and cancellation until June of
2009.

                Ratings Lowered And Then Withdrawn

                                              Rating
                                              ------
      Deal Name             Class      To     Interim   From
      ---------             -----      --     -------   ----
      Davenport CDO I Ltd.  ABCP       NR/NR  D/NR/NM   CC/C
      Davenport CDO I Ltd.  SP SR A-1  NR     D         CC
      Davenport CDO I Ltd.  SP SR A-2  NR     D         CC
      Davenport CDO I Ltd.  SP SR A-3  NR     D         CC

                          NR - Not rated.


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Does Not Take Rating Action on Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by Davis Square Funding IV,
Ltd., as the "Issuer" as a result of the entry into and execution
of a novation agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp.
as "Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 14,
2009, as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under four
cash flow swap transactions to Transferee:

  -- US$387,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     Currently Rated B3; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to B3

  -- Up to US$950,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due
     2040, Currently Rated B3; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$64,875,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/4/09 Rated C

  -- US$28,125,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$19,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$2,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     Currently Rated Baa1 On Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 12/17/08 Downgraded to Baa1 On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$9,099,000 Class F Participating Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/4/09 Downgraded to C

Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.

Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment.  This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC".  Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.

Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO.  A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings.  In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration.  Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have.  Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Rating Action on Six Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by Davis Square Funding III,
Ltd., as the "Issuer" as a result of the entry into and execution
of a novation agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp.
as "Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 15,
2009, as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under two
cash flow swap transactions to Transferee:

  -- US$337,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2039,
     Currently Rated B2; previously on 2/2/09 Downgraded to B2

  -- Up to US$1,000,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due
     2039, Currently Rated B2; previously on 2/2/09 Downgraded to
     B2

  -- US$60,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2039,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 2/2/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2039, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/2/09 Rated C

  -- US$75,000,000 Class C Participating Notes Due 2039, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/2/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$9,500,000 Class D Participating Notes Due 2039, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/2/09 Downgraded to C

Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.

Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment.  This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC".  Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.

Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO.  A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings.  In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration.  Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have.  Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Floating Rate Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by Davis Square Funding VI,
Ltd. as a result of the entry into and execution of a novation
agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp. as
"Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 10,
2009, as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under 18
cash flow swap transactions to Transferee:

  -- Up to US$1,166,000,000 Class A-1LT-c Floating Rate Notes Due
     2041, Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to
     C

  -- US$274,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$300,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$85,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$105,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2041, Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to
     C

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2041, Currently Rated C; previously on 4/22/09 Downgraded to
     C

Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.

Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment.  This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC".  Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.

Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO.  A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings.  In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration.  Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have.  Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.


DAVIS SQUARE: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Notes
--------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by Davis Square Funding V,
Ltd., as a result of the entry into and execution of a novation
agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp. as
"Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 13,
2009 as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under 18
cash flow swap transactions to Transferee:

  -- Up to US$1,740,000,000 Class A-1-a Floating Rate Notes Due
     2040, Currently Rated Caa2; previously on 2/24/09 Downgraded
     to Caa2

  -- Up to US$1,740,000,000 Class A-1-b Floating Rate Notes Due
     2040, Currently Rated Caa2; previously on 2/24/09 Downgraded
     to Caa2

  -- US$18,000,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes Due 2016, Currently
     Rated Aaa; previously on 9/30/05 Rated Aaa

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     Currently Rated C; previously on 2/24/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$96,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 2/24/09 Downgraded to C

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2040, Currently Rated C; previously on 10/27/08 Downgraded to
     C

  -- US$17,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 10/27/08 Downgraded to C

  -- US$17,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Currently
     Rated C; previously on 10/27/08 Downgraded to C

Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.

Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment.  This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC".  Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.

Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO.  A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings.  In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration. Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have.  Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.


DIAMOND LAKE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Diamond Lake CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$190,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2019, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- Up to US$50,000,000 Class A-1LR Floating Rate Revolving Notes
     Due December 2019, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/28/2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2019, Downgraded to A2, previously on 3/4/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,750,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2019, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded
     to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     December 2019, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on 3/17/2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due December
     2019, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on 3/17/2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
2729 versus a test level of 2535 as of the last trustee report,
dated 6/15/2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $12 million, accounting for roughly 3.7% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 10.67% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Diamond Lake CLO, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


DISCOVER CARD: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 14 Classes of ABS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 14 classes
of asset-backed securities issued out of the Discover Card
Execution Note Trust.  These securities are backed by $38 billion
of consumer credit card receivables originated and serviced by
Discover Bank, a subsidiary of Discover Financial Services.

The rating actions concludes the review of the indicated
securities issued from the Trust initiated on June 2, 2009 when
Moody's placed these ratings under review for possible downgrade,
and follow Discover's subsequent issuance of a Class D Notes to
provide additional credit enhancement to all the outstanding
securities issued out of DCENT.

The certificates issued by Discover's other credit card trust,
Discover Card Master Trust, which were also placed under review on
June 2, 2009, remain under review.  On June 17, 2009, Discover
announced in an 8-K filing its intention to add subordination to
these securities by no later than July 24, 2009, at which time
Moody's will conclude its review of the related certificates.

                            Rationale

In order to address the deterioration in some of the Trust's key
performance metrics, on July 2, 2009, Discover issued a
subordinated Class D certificate, adding 6.5% in credit
enhancement for the benefit of all classes of currently
outstanding DCENT securities.  The Class A, B and C notes now have
a total of 19.0%, 13.5% and 6.5% of subordination (expressed as a
percentage of the aggregate invested amount) up from 12.5% and
7.0% and 0.0%, respectively.

In September, Discover is expected to issue an additional sub-
series of certificates, Series 2009-SD.  This series, issued out
of the Discover Card Master Trust, will make its principal
collections available to all other outstanding securities in both
Trusts.  This reallocation of principal will ultimately boost
excess spread, similar to other issuers' use of the discount
option.  Through this mechanism, Moody's estimate that the
potential lift to excess spread is 4%.  Furthermore, the issuance
of the subordinated Series 2009-SD, sized at 2% of the aggregate
invested amount of both DCENT and DCMT, will provide additional,
albeit temporary, credit enhancement to all outstanding
securities.  Series 2009-SD is expected to mature in December
2011.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Discover Card Execution Note Trust, DiscoverSeries:

  -- $1,000,000,000 Class A (2007-1), Fixed Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $1,250,000,000 Class A (2007-2), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $900,000,000 Class A (2008-1), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $1,000,000,000 Class A (2008-2), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $850,000,000 Class A (2008-3), Fixed Rate Asset-backed Notes,
     Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for possible
     downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $750,000,000 Class A (2008-4), Fixed Rate Asset-backed Notes,
     Confirmed at Aaa; previously placed under review for possible
     downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class B (2007-1), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at A2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $115,000,000 Class B (2007-2), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at A2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $85,000,000 Class B (2008-1), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at A2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $60,000,000 Class B (2008-3), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at A2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class C (2007-1), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $200,000,000 Class C (2007-2), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $300,000,000 Class C (2008-1), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

  -- $105,000,000 Class C (2008-3), Floating Rate Asset-backed
     Notes, Confirmed at Baa2; previously placed under review for
     possible downgrade on June 2, 2009

                     Collateral Performance

The consumer-led economic downturn has adversely affected
Discover's Trust collateral performance, albeit to a lesser extent
than many others in the industry.  This distinction in performance
is attributable to the Trust's well-seasoned portfolio comprised
of mostly-prime credit card receivables.  In addition, the Trust
has lower-than-average exposure to California and Florida, where
consumers have been particularly hard hit by home price
depreciation in the current economic downturn.

Moody's performance expectation for the Trust's gross charge-off
rate is 9%-11%, principal payment rate is 14.5%-17.5% and yield is
18%-21%.

These performance expectations indicate Moody's forward-looking
view of the likely range of performance over the medium term.
From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these
expectations.  Performance that falls outside a given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than anticipated when the related securities were rated.
Even so, a deviation from the expected range will not necessarily
result in a rating action nor does performance within expectations
preclude such actions.  The decision to take (or not take) a
rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range of factors
including, but not exclusively, the performance metrics.

                   ABS Linkage To Discover Bank

On June 1, Moody's downgraded Discover's deposit rating to Baa3
from Baa2, reflecting Moody's view that the likelihood of a
partial or full shutdown of purchases on the Discover Card network
is incrementally higher than that viewed previously (though still
quite low).  Moody's ratings on the asset-backed securities issued
out of the Trust are closely related to the rating of Discover in
several respects.

The Discover Card network, which allows merchants to accept
Discover Card transactions, is a proprietary system.  Therefore,
its viability is inextricably linked to the credit strength of
Discover.

Secondly, investors in securities issued out of the Trusts benefit
from a unique structural feature -- the fixed finance charge
allocation.  The efficacy of the fixed finance charge allocation
feature is primarily dependent upon the viability of the
underlying card program.  In a scenario in which credit lines are
shut down and cardholders can no longer make purchases on the
Discover Card, the fixed finance charge allocation would provide,
little, if any, incremental benefit.

Discover Financial Services, a newly formed bank holding company,
is a leading credit card issuer and electronic payment services
company.  The company reported total managed receivables of
$50.9 billion as of 5/31/09.

On June 1, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior
unsecured ratings of Discover Financial Services to Ba1 from Baa3
and its principal operating subsidiary Discover Bank, to Baa3 from
Baa2.  The rating outlook for both institutions remains negative.
The Bank Financial Strength Ratings of Discover Bank was lowered
to D+ from C- and the Prime-2 short-term rating for Discover Bank
was reduced to Prime-3.  Discover Bank is the originator and
servicer of the DiscoverSeries Trust.


DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded and
left on review for possible further downgrade the ratings of three
classes of notes issued by Diversified Global Securities Limited
II.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$163,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes, Due
     December 17, 2017, Downgraded to A2 and remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 2/24/2009 Aaa and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B Fixed Rate Senior Subordinate Notes,
     Due December 17, 2017, Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on 2/24/2009
     Downgraded to Aa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Subordinate Notes, Due
     December 17, 2017, Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on 2/24/2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Diversified Global Securities Limited II is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.  CLOs consist approximately 87% of the portfolio, of
which majority are from 2002 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor,
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below.  More than 52% of its assets have been downgraded since
Moody's last review of the transaction in February 2009.  The
trustee reported the WARF of the portfolio is 3560 as of June 10,
2009.  The Trustee currently reports defaulted assets in the
amount of 2.7 million.  Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 19% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO and CBO tranches in the underlying
portfolio.  Since the last review of this transaction in February
2009, Moody's has completed the first stage of its two-stage
review of U.S. and EMEA CLOs.  Some of the underlying securities
in the portfolio experienced more severe rating action than was
anticipated at the time of last review.  Moody's is currently in
Stage II of its CLO review and performing comprehensive analysis
by modeling each CLO individually.  Additional rating actions will
be taken as necessary for all rated liabilities.  As a result, the
ratings assigned to Class A, B and C remain on watch for possible
downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


DLJ 1997-A: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A Notes From 'Aaa'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded notes issued by DLJ 1997-A RMBS
resecuritization transaction due to realized cumulative losses on
the notes.

The notes (original balance of $52 million) have incurred
$1.004 million in losses due to losses on the underlying bonds in
the transaction.  The underlying bonds that have taken losses
primarily include subordinate bonds from RSMC Series 1991-3 and
RSMC Series 1991-8.  Current outstanding balance of the notes is
$139,380.32

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1997-A

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/3/1997 Assigned
     Aaa


DRYDEN VII-LEVERAGED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by DRYDEN VII-LEVERAGED LOAN CDO
2004:

  -- Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Aa2; previously
     on July 30, 2004 Assigned Aaa;

  -- Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Aa3;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to A3; previously
     on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- Class A-3F Fixed Rate Notes, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
     March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class B-1L
Principal Coverage Test.

The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased over the
last year and is currently 2680 versus a test level of 2250 as of
the last trustee report, dated June 5, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $32.36 million,
accounting for roughly 8% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 11% of the
underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments on the
Class B2L Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the
failure of the Class B-1L Principal Coverage Test.  Moody's also
assessed the collateral pool's elevated concentration risk in a
small number of obligors and industries.  This includes a
significant concentration in debt obligations of companies in the
banking, finance, real estate, and insurance industries, which
Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in the current market
environment.  Finally, Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a
number of investments in securities that mature after the maturity
date of the notes.  These investments potentially expose the notes
to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the
notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

DRYDEN VII-LEVERAGED LOAN CDO 2004, issued in July 22, 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


DT AUTO: Moody's Confirms Rating on Class A-3 Tranche
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed the Baa3 rating on the Class A-3 tranche
issued from DT Auto Owner Trust 2007-A subprime auto loan
transaction serviced by DT Credit Corporation.  The decision was
prompted by Moody's updated cumulative lifetime losses of
approximately 35% for the transaction which are slightly lower
than the range of 36% to 40% that was previously expected when the
notes were placed on review.  During the past few months,
performance has shown signs of stabilization, suggesting a
slightly lower loss expectation.

Moody's cumulative lifetime loss expectation for the transaction
at closing was between 25% and 27%.  While updated expected losses
of 35% are higher than at closing, credit enhancement also
increased due to the build up of the reserve account, which is
currently at its floor level.  The rating action concludes the
evaluation of the securities that were previously placed on review
for possible downgrade on April 1, 2009.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
notes in the absence of the transaction's guarantee from Syncora
Guarantee Inc., formerly XL Capital Assurance Inc.  The current
ratings on the below notes are consistent with Moody's practice of
rating insured securities at the higher of the guarantor's
insurance financial strength rating and any underlying rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: DT Auto Owner Trust 2007-A

  -- Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 35% (as a
     percentage of the original loan pool balance)

  -- Class Description: Class A-3

  -- Current Rating: Confirmed at Baa3; previously on April 1,
     2009 Baa3 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc., formerly XL
     Capital Assurance Inc. (Ca; previously on March 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca from Caa1)

  -- Underlying rating: Confirmed at Baa3; previously on April 1,
     2009 Baa3 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade


FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Series of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded First National Master Note Trust
series 2008-2 and 2008-3 class B notes to 'A-' from 'A', and class
D notes to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  Class C and class D notes will
continue to be placed on Rating Watch Negative.  Subsequent to the
above actions, the ratings for series 2008-2 and 2008-3 are:

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-2 class B
     Notes: 'A-'; Rating Outlook Stable;

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-2 class C
     Notes: 'BBB', Rating Watch Negative;

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-2 class D
     Notes: 'BB', Rating Watch Negative;

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-3 class B
     Notes: 'A-'; Rating Outlook Stable;

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-3 class C
     Notes: 'BBB', Rating Watch Negative;

  -- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-3 class D
     Notes: 'BB', Rating Watch Negative;

The rating actions are a result of deteriorating trust performance
relative to available credit enhancement for each class.  There
has been a significant increase in delinquencies and charge-offs
in the trusts, along with slowing monthly payment rates during the
first half 2009.  In particular, the four most recent servicing
reports show a rapid increase in charge-offs.  On a gross basis,
charge-offs have risen from 6.34% at the beginning of the year to
9.43% for the most recent reporting period.  The percentage of
accounts that are 60 or more days delinquent has also risen during
this period indicating that an elevated level of chargeoffs will
persist over the near term.

MPR, a measure of how quickly consumers are paying off their debt,
was at 12.86% in May collection month compared to 14.87% for the
same period a year ago.  Given that payment rates are generally
inversely correlated to delinquency rates, a rise in delinquencies
could further slow the payment rate in the trusts.

Excess spread, a measure of a trust's ability to generate
profitability, has experienced significant downward pressure in
2009.  The series that Fitch rated, 2008-2 and 2008-3, experienced
a decline of approximately 370 basis points (bps) and 400 bps in
excess spread during the last two collection months, due primarily
to higher charge-offs and lower yield.  As a result, one month
excess spread levels range from 139 bps to 243 bps.  The three
month average excess spread levels range from 319 bps to 403 bps.
The spread account has an upfront deposit of 50 bps and does not
trap excess spread until the three month average falls below 400
bps.  The recent volatility in excess spread is not consistent
with the original assumption and Fitch is concerned that the class
C and D notes may not derive as much enhancement as originally
anticipated from the excess spread account.

Fitch's analysis included a comparison of observed performance
trends over the past few months to Fitch's base case expectations
for each outstanding rating category.  As part of its on-going
surveillance efforts, Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of these trusts.


GALAXY X: Moody's Confirms Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Galaxy X CLO Ltd.:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
     Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:

  -- US$22,225,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 20,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$12,775,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 20, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and it is currently at 3025 versus a test level of 2998 as of the
last trustee report, dated May 14, 2009.  Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $13.6 million, accounting
for roughly 3.7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 16.6% of the underlying
portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Galaxy X CLO, Ltd., issued on February 26, 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GMACM HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 20 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 20
tranches issued in four GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust transactions
due to higher pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-
specific credit protection.  Underlying securities' collateral
consists primarily of closed-end second lien residential mortgage
loans.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

Some of the securities are guaranteed by the respective financial
guarantors identified.  The underlying ratings generally reflect
the intrinsic credit quality of the securities in the absence of
the guarantee.  The current ratings on the below-noted securities
are consistent with Moody's practice of rating such insured
securities at the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial
strength rating and the underlying or intrinsic rating.  Please
see the press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's
modifies approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped
by financial guarantors".

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to B2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Outlook
     Negative on 6/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Outlook
     Negative on 6/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded
     to Ba2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Outlook
     Negative on 6/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3, Outlook
     Negative on 6/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     10/29/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/29/2008 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/29/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca


GOLDEN KNIGHT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Golden Knight II CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$292,500,000 Class A First Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes due 2019, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 27,
     2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$40,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Floating Rate
     Notes due 2019, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 4,
     2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,250,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Subordinate
     Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Downgraded
     to Ba3; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinate Deferrable
     Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Junior Subordinate
     Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Downgraded
     to C; previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class D and
Class E Overcollateralization Tests.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
2891 versus a test level of 2581 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 4, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $16.2 million, accounting for roughly 4.2%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 7.6% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally,
interest payments on the Class E Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class D
Overcollateralization Test.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Golden Knight II CLO Ltd., issued in 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


GS MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 16 2007-GG10 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative, and
revises Rating Outlooks on 16 classes of commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates from GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II,
series 2007-GG10.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at
the end of this press release.

The downgrades are the result of loss expectations and reflect
Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real estate market
value and cash flow declines.  Fitch foresees potential losses
could reach as high as 13.1% for this transaction, should market
conditions not recover.  The rating actions are based on losses of
8.3%, including 100% of the term losses and 25% of the losses
anticipated to occur at maturity; the 8.3% recognizes all of the
losses anticipated in the next five years.  Given the uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic conditions, commercial real estate
fundamentals, interest rates, liquidity and property performance,
Fitch's actions do not account for the full magnitude of possible
maturity losses.  The bonds with Negative Outlooks indicate
classes that may be downgraded in the future should full potential
losses be realized.

Fitch analyzed the transaction and calculated expected losses by
assuming cash flows on each of the properties decline 15% from
year-end (YE) 2007 and property values decline 35% from issuance.
These loss estimates were reviewed in more detail for 61.8% of the
pool and, in certain cases, revised based on additional
information and/or property characteristics.

Fitch identified 34 Loans of Concern (37%) within the pool, 14 of
which (7.4%) are specially serviced.  Of the specially serviced
loans, five (3.5%) are current.  One of the specially serviced
loans (2.1%) is within the transaction's top 15 loans (50.8%) by
unpaid principal balance.

Seven of the Loans of Concern (18.6%) within the top 15 loans are
expected to default during the term, with loss severities ranging
from 3% to 26%.  The largest contributors to loss are: Two
California Plaza (6.2%), 119 West 40th Street (2.1%), and
Lynnewood Gardens (1.7%).

The Two California Plaza loan is secured by a 1,329,810 square
foot (sf) office property located in downtown Los Angeles, CA.
Maguire Properties is the loan sponsor.  At issuance, the loan was
underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the expectation
that below market leases expiring during the term of the loan
would be re-signed at higher rates, providing for potential upside
in future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008 performance, the property
is behind the stabilization schedule.  The servicer reported YE
2008 debt service coverage ratio and occupancy were 0.92 times (x)
and 94.0% respectively.  Based on current performance and
anticipated declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's
maturity in 2017.  At closing, the loan was structured with a
$3 million debt service reserve which has been completely
depleted.

The 119 West 40th Street loan is secured by a 22-story, 333,901 sf
office building located in Midtown Manhattan, New York.  At
issuance, the loan was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow
based on the expectation that below market leases expiring during
the term of the loan would be re-signed at higher rates, providing
for potential upside in future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008
performance, the property is behind the stabilization schedule.
The servicer reported YE 2008 DSCR and occupancy were 0.43x and
92.0% respectively.

119 West 40th Street transferred to the special servicer in June
2009 for imminent default after the debt service reserves posted
at issuance were depleted and the property had failed to achieve
positive cash flow.  Additionally, cost overruns associated with
building renovations have resulted in uncompleted construction at
the property, including the main lobby.  The special servicer is
discussing workout options with the borrower.  Limited details are
presently available on the workout and current valuation of the
asset due to the loan's recent transfer to special servicing.

The Lynnewood Gardens loan is secured by a 1,789 unit apartment
complex located in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania.  At issuance, the
loan was underwritten to a stabilized cash flow based on the
expectation that a major renovation at the property would provide
for upside in future cash flows.  Based on YE 2008 performance,
the property is behind the stabilization schedule . The servicer
reported YE 2008 debt DSCR and occupancy were 0.63x and 87.0%
respectively.  Based on current performance and anticipated
declines, losses are expected prior to the loan's maturity in
2017.  At closing, the loan was structured with a $785,000 debt
service reserve which has a current balance of $789,000.

The pool is concentrated in terms of property type and geography,
with office properties representing 65% of pool, and loans secured
by properties in California representing 29% of the pool.  Only
one loan (0.12%) matures prior to 2017 at which point 85.6% of the
pool matures.

Rating actions are:

  -- $519.9 million class A-J to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $75.6 million class B to 'BB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $94.5 million class C to 'BB' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $56.7 million class D to 'B' from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $56.7 million class E to 'B' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $75.6 million class F to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $75.6 million class G to 'B-' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $104.0 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $94.5 million class J to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $75.6 million class K to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $37.8 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB'. Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.9 million class M to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $28.4 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B+';

  -- $18.9 million class O to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $18.9 million class P to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $18.9 million class Q to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $72.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $725.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $246.6 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $72.0 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3,661.0 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $514.0 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $756.3 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable

Fitch does not rate the $141.8 million class S.


GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 19 2007-GG10 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 19
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2007-GG10 and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where they were placed June 26, 2009, and
July 13, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five
classes from the same transaction and removed three of them from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 0.83x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 161%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.66x and an LTV of 222%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under S&P's 'AAA' scenario were 93.3% and 56.1%,
respectively.  The lowered ratings on the subordinate classes also
reflect S&P's expectation for credit support erosion upon the
eventual resolution of six of the 11 specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                          Credit Concerns

Eleven assets ($337.1 million, 4.5%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment
status of the loans are: one is real estate owned ($55.4 million
total exposure); one is in foreclosure ($46.1 million); four are
90-plus days delinquent ($65.6 million); one is 60-plus days
delinquent ($32.5 million); two are 30 days delinquent
($97.2 million); and two are current ($53.1 million).  All of the
specially serviced assets have balances that are less than 1.0% of
the pool balance.  Three of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect.  The aggregate ARA amount
is $30.6 million.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 202 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$7.6 billion, the same as at issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A., the
master servicer, reported financial information for 99% of the
pool; 94% of the information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.14x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 0.83x and
161%, respectively.  Ten loans ($327.0 million, 4.3%) in the pool
are delinquent and are currently with CWCapital.  The transaction
has not experienced any principal losses to date.  Fifty-two loans
are on the watchlist, including six of the top 10 loans.
Forty-seven loans ($3.3 billion, 44%) have reported DSC below
1.10x, and 32 ($2.1 billion, 28%) have reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

                      Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$3.1 billion (42%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.15x for the top 10 loans.
Five of the top 10 loans (21%) have reported DSCs equal to or
under 1.0x. All of the low-DSC top 10 loans are on the servicer's
watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were
0.76x and 146%, respectively.  S&P reviewed property inspections
provided by the master servicer for five of the assets underlying
the top 10 exposures in the transaction.  One property was
characterized as "excellent," while the remaining properties were
characterized as "good."

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG10

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To        From          Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----          ----------------------
     A-2       BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                  30.02
     A-3       BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                  30.02
     A-AB      BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                  30.02
     A-4       BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                  30.02
     A-1-A     BBB-      AAA/Watch Neg                  30.02
     A-M       BB        AAA/Watch Neg                  20.01
     A-J       B+        AAA/Watch Neg                  13.13
     B         B+        AA+/Watch Neg                  12.13
     C         B+        AA /Watch Neg                  10.88
     D         B         AA-/Watch Neg                  10.13
     E         B         A+/Watch Neg                    9.38
     F         B         A/Watch Neg                     8.38
     G         B         A-/Watch Neg                    7.38
     H         B-        BBB/Watch Neg                   6.00
     J         B-        BBB-/Watch Neg                  4.75
     K         B-        BB/Watch Neg                    3.75
     L         B-        BB-/Watch Neg                   3.25
     M         B-        B+/Watch Neg                    3.00
     N         B-        B/Watch Neg                     2.63

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG10

                Rating
                ------
     Class   To       From              Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --       ----              ----------------------
     O       B-       B-/Watch Neg                   2.38
     P       CCC+     CCC+/Watch Neg                 2.13
     Q       CCC      CCC/Watch Neg                  1.88

                         Rating Affirmed

              GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-GG10

             Class   Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----   ------   ----------------------
             A-1     AAA                       30.02
             X       AAA                         N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


GSAMP TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
tranches issued in two GSAMP Trust transactions due to higher
expected losses relative to tranche-specific credit protection.
Underlying securities' collateral consists primarily of closed-end
second lien residential mortgage loans.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next year
and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under a
schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba3

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to B2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to B2

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-S6

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/8/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18 classes
of notes from two transactions issued by GSR Mortgage Loan Trust
due to higher expected pool losses in relation to remaining
tranche-specific credit protection.

The collateral backing GSR 2005-AR2 groups 1 through 4 consists
primarily of first-lien, adjustable-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans.
The actions are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance
-- marked by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with
concerns about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide
and the rising unemployment levels.  The actions listed below
reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector
announced in a press release on March 19, 2009, and are part of
Moody's on-going review process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

The 2002-3F and the Group 5 of the 2005-AR2 transaction are backed
by less than 50 loans.  The ratings are based on the methodology
applied to all transactions with small pool factors.  Moody's
defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of these two
criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less than
$1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool
has fewer than 50 loans remaining

Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.

First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier.  The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current.  The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier.  The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default.  The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool.  The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.

The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate.  Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.

Complete rating action:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3F (Loans Remaining: 13)

  -- Cl. IB-1, Current Balance: $246,519, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on 9/25/2003 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. IB-2, Current Balance: $144,015, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 9/25/2003 Upgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. IB-3, Current Balance: $103,466, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 9/25/2003 Upgraded to A2

  -- Cl. IB-4, Current Balance: $41,578, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on 9/25/2003 Upgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. IB-5, Current Balance: $42,288, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 9/25/2003 Upgraded to Ba2

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR2 (Loans Remaining: Group 5
-- 43)

  -- Cl. 1A1, Current Balance: $14,166,043, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A2, Current Balance: $27,687,584, Downgraded to Baa3;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A3, Current Balance: $1,319,229, Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A1, Current Balance: $113,512,511, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3A1, Current Balance: $28,087,708, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4A1, Current Balance: $85,201,734, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B1, Current Balance: $10,418,611, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B2, Current Balance: $7,293,419, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 3/19/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B3, Current Balance: $4,518,267, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5A1, Current Balance: $16,538,381, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B1, Current Balance: $752,963, Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B2, Current Balance: $579,250, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 3/19/2009 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B3, Current Balance: $289,937, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


GULF STREAM-COMPASS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007,
Ltd.:

  -- US$45,000,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on August 23, 2007 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$13,125,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2019, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2019, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,625,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due
     2019, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on March 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook,", and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class E
Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and is currently
2641 versus a test level of 2719 as of the last trustee report,
dated June 15, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $18 million, accounting for roughly 6.1% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 14.7% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2007, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Halcyon Structured Asset
Management CLO I Ltd.:

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on May 11, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$291,400,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
     Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on May 11, 2006
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$27,600,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2018, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:

  -- US$31,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes, Due 2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 17,
     2009, Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$29,900,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
     Dee 2018, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 17, 2009,
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class C Overcollateralization Ratio Test and the Class D
Overcollateralization Ratio Test.  The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and it is
currently at 3015 versus a test level of 2830 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 1, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about 18.5 million, accounting for
roughly 4.2% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 13% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Ratio Test.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a half notch-equivalent assumed downgrade
for CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.

The ratings on Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes reflect the
actual underlying rating of the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2
Notes.  These underlying ratings are based solely on the intrinsic
credit quality of the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes in the
absence of the financial guaranty insurance policy from CIFG
Europe, whose current insurance financial strength rating is Ba3.
The above action on the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes is a
result of, and is consistent with, Moody's modified approach to
rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors as described in the press release dated November 10,
2008, titled "Moody's modifies approach to rating structured
finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors."

Halcyon Structured Asset Management CLO I Ltd., issued in May
2006, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HALCYON LOAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Halcyon Loan Investors CLO I,
Ltd.:

  -- US$270,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020, Downgraded to Aa2;
     previously on October 25, 2006 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020, Downgraded to A3;
     previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020, Downgraded to
     Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020,
     Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March17, 2009, Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020,
     Downgraded to Caa1; previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Sixth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due November 20, 2020,
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Principal Coverage Tests for the Class B Notes, Class C Notes, and
Class D Notes.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and it is currently at 3073 versus a
test level of 2665 as of the last trustee report, dated June 10,
2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
20.8 million, accounting for roughly 5.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
16% of the underlying portfolio.  Additionally, interest payments
on the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Class B Pricipal
Coverage Test.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1
½ notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between
12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs
that were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as
CEs do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a half notch-equivalent assumed downgrade
for CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.

Halcyon Loan Investors CLO I, Ltd., issued in October 2006, is a
[collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


IRIDAL PUBLIC: S&P Raises Rating on Series 4 Notes From 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the series
4 notes issued by Iridal Public Ltd. Co., a synthetic corporate
investment-grade collateralized debt obligation transaction, to
'AAA' from 'BB'.

The raised rating reflects the termination of the credit default
swap between the issuer and Royal Bank of Canada, London branch.
Due to the termination of the credit default swap, the issuer
faces no remaining exposure to the reference portfolio of
investment-grade corporate debt.  Therefore, the rating on the
series 4 notes is consistent with the credit quality of the
underlying asset, the EUR85 million floating-rate credit-linked
secured notes due 2013 issued by Hypothekenbank in Essen AG.


IRWIN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued in Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2 transaction
due to higher pool losses in relation to remaining tranche-
specific credit protection.  Underlying securities' collateral
consists primarily of closed-end second lien residential mortgage
loans and second lien home equity lines of credit.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

The securities are guaranteed by the respective financial
guarantors.  The underlying ratings generally reflect the
intrinsic credit quality of the securities in the absence of the
guarantee.  The current ratings on the below-noted securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating such insured securities
at the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength
rating and the underlying or intrinsic rating.  Please see the
press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's modifies
approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped by
financial guarantors".

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next year
and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under a
schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/31/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/31/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 76 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 76
tranches from 4 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans.  These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65%, and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A5

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     B2

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/15/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/15/2005 Assigned B2

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S1

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-P, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Ba2

  -- Cl. C-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     B2

J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-S2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. 1-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. 1-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     B2

  -- Cl. 2-B-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. 2-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     B2

  -- Cl. 3-B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. 3-B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. 3-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 3-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. 3-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     B2

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/28/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/28/2005 Assigned
     Aaa


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Nine 2005-CIBC12 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of nine classes and
downgraded 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC12.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from increased leverage, increased credit quality
dispersion and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.
On July 9, 2009, Moody's placed the ratings of 14 on review for
possible downgrade.  The action concludes that review. The action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions.

As of the July 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$2.1 billion from $2.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 191 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 26% of the pool.  The pool includes one loan,
representing 6% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  The Loews Universal Hotel Portfolio ($100 million -- 5%)
previously had an investment grade underlying rating but is now
analyzed as part of the conduit pool because of a decline in
performance.  Four loans, representing 3% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-one loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch-list.  The master servicer's watch-list includes
loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established
as part of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's on-going monitoring
of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watch-list to assess which
loans have material issues that could impact performance.  Not all
loans on the watch-list are delinquent or have significant issues.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool with a loss of
approximately $962,600.  Currently ten loans, representing 5% of
the pool, are in special servicing.  Five of the specially
serviced loans (2% of the pool) are 60-90+ days delinquent; three
loans (1%) are in foreclosure and two loans (1%) are real estate
owned.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $31.3 million in loss from
these specially serviced loans (56% loss severity on average).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 85%
of the pool, excluding defeased loans.  Moody's weighted average
loan to value ratio for the conduit component is 105% compared to
97% at last review.  In addition to the overall increase in LTV,
the pool has experienced increased credit quality dispersion.
Based on Moody's analysis, approximately 53% of the pool has a LTV
in excess of 100% compared to 43% at last review.  Approximately
17% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 0.5% at
last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 0.97X compared to
0.99X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 65 compared to 73 at last
review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the 4250 North Fairfax Drive
Loan ($45.0 million -- 2.1%), which is secured by a 304,500 square
foot office building located in Arlington, Virginia.  The loan is
interest only for its entire term.  The property 97% occupied as
of December 2008 compared to 100% at last review.  The largest
tenant, Qwest Communications, occupies 53% of the net rentable
area through June 2014.  Performance has been impacted by
increased operating expenses.  Moody's current underlying rating
is Baa1 compared to A3 at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.57X compared to 1.61X at last review.

The Loews Universal Hotel Portfolio Loan ($100.0 million -- 4.7%)
originally had an underlying rating but is now analyzed as part of
the conduit pool because of a decline in performance.  The loan is
a pari passu interest in a $450.0 million first mortgage loan
secured by three full service hotel properties.  The three hotels
are all located in Orlando, Florida and total 2,400 guest rooms.
The portfolio's net operating income has declined 18% since
securitization.  According to Smith Travel, the Orlando hotel
market year-to-date performance through March 2009 declined 24%
from the same period in 2008.  Moody's anticipates that the
portfolio's performance will continue to weaken in 2009 due to
continued declines in tourist and business travel.  Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and 0.62X, respectively,
compared to 67% and 1.69X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 9.1% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 40 Rector Street Loan ($80.0 million -
- 3.8%), which is secured by an 440,130 square foot office
building located in New York City's Battery Park sub-market.  The
loan is interest only for its entire term and matures on June 1,
2010.  The property was 98% occupied as of February 2009, the same
as last review.  The property has significant rollover risk with
92% of the leases expiring within the next twelve months.  The
largest tenant is the City of New York, which occupies 49% of the
NRA through July 2010.  Moody's analysis of this loan reflects the
property's significant rollover risk and costs to re-tenant the
property.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 150% and 0.65X,
respectively, compared to 113% and 0.83X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Promenade at Westlake Loan
($70.0 million -- 3.3%), which is secured by a 201,570 square foot
retail center located in Thousand Oaks, California.  The loan is
interest only for the first five years, converting to a 360-month
schedule thereafter.  The property is currently 100% occupied, the
same as at last review.  Performance has improved due to increased
rental revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
0.91X, respectively, compared to 105% and 0.85X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the LXP-ISS Loan ($46.6 million
-- 2.1%), which is secured by three office buildings containing a
total of 289,000 square feet in Atlanta, Georgia.  The buildings
are 100% leased to Internet Security System through May 2013.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, the
same as at last review.

Moody's rating actions is:

  -- Class A-2, $140,096,114,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-3A1, $163,601,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-3A2, $122,934,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-3B, $200,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-4, $649,324,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-SB, $137,352,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-M, $216,704,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/6/2007

  -- Class A-J, $162,527,000, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa;
     previously Aaa, placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/9/2009

  -- Class B, $43,341,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2; previously
     Aa2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class C, $18,962,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa3; previously
     Aa3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class D, $32,505,000, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously
     A2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class E, $27,088,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously
     A3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class F, $24,380,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1;
     previously Baa1, placed on review for possible downgrade on
     7/9/2009

  -- Class G, $24,379,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously
     Baa2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class H, $29,797,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously
     Baa3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class J, $8,126,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class K, $8,126,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously
     Ba2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class L, $8,127,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
     Ba3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class M, $5,417,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
     B1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class N, $8,127,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B2; previously
     B2, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009

  -- Class P, $5,417,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     B3, placed on review for possible downgrade on 7/9/2009


JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2004-CIBC9 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-CIBC9 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where
they were placed June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on seven classes from the same transaction and removed six
from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
S&P's recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria,
which was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of all
the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage
(DSC) of 1.79x and a loan-to-value ratio of 83%.  S&P further
stressed loan cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.52x and an LTV of 106%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 30.2% and
32.2%, respectively.  The lowered ratings on the subordinate
classes also reflect anticipated credit support erosion upon the
eventual resolution of three of the four specially serviced
assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                          Credit Concerns

Four assets ($57.4 million, 5.6%) in the pool are currently with
the special servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc.  Three loans are
90-plus days delinquent ($14.5 million total exposure), and one is
60 days delinquent ($45.4 million).  All of the specially serviced
assets have balances that are less than 1.0% of the total pool
balance except the Country Club Plaza loan (4.33%), which is
the fourth-largest loan in the pool.  Two of the specially
serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in effect.  The
aggregate ARA amount is $2.4 million.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 95 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.0
billion, down from 98 loans totaling $1.1 billion at issuance.
Seven loans totaling $61.8 million (6.0%) have been defeased since
issuance.  Excluding the defeased loans, Capmark Finance Inc.
reported financial information for 95% of the pool; 61% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.87x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.79x and
83%, respectively.  Six loans ($79.0 million, 7.7%) in the pool
are delinquent, and four are currently with Centerline.  The
transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Twenty-three loans are on the watchlist ($273.4 million, 26.7%),
11 loans ($73.8 million, 7.2%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, and
five loans ($29.7 million, 2.9%) have reported DSC of less than
1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$497.6 million (49%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.17x for the top 10 loans,
up from 1.92x at issuance.  Three of the top 10 loans (18%) have
reported DSCs above 2.0x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top
10 loans were 2.09x and 91%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC9

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To        From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----           ----------------------
     B         A         AA/Watch Neg               12.22
     C         A-        AA-/Watch Neg              10.88
     D         BBB       A/Watch Neg                 8.86
     E         BB+       A-/Watch Neg                7.79
     F         BB-       BBB+/Watch Neg              6.31
     G         B         BBB-/Watch Neg              5.37
     H         CCC+      BB/Watch Neg                3.63
     J         CCC+      B+/Watch Neg                3.36
     K         CCC       B/Watch Neg                 2.95
     L         CCC-      B-/Watch Neg                2.42
     M         CCC-      CCC+/Watch Neg              1.88
     N         CCC-      CCC/Watch Neg               1.61

       Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

         JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC9

                Rating
                ------
     Class    To        From          Credit enhancement (%)
     -----    --        ----          ----------------------
     A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg              14.91
     A-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg              14.91
     A-3      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg              14.91
     A-4      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg              14.91
     A-1A     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg              14.91
     P        CCC-      CCC-/Watch Neg              1.34

                         Rating Affirmed

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-CIBC9

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             X        AAA                         N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


KATONAH V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Katonah V, Ltd.:

  -- US$184,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on May 21, 2003 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 4, 2009, Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$14,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015,
     Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded
     to Ba3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded
     to Caa3; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$9,250,000 Class D Fixed Rate Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook" and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.  Due
to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test and the Class D Overcollateralization
Test.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased
over the last year and is currently 2840 versus a test level of
2480 as of the last trustee report, dated as of June 11, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
$25 million, accounting for roughly 11.6% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
12.5% of the underlying portfolio.  Moody's also noted that the
portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes.  These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Katonah V, Ltd., issued on May 21, 2003, is a collateralized loan
obligation, backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2004-C2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes and
downgraded five classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-
C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from increased leverage and anticipated losses from
loans in special servicing.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 26%
to $919.1 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 74 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 67% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 39% of the
pool, have investment grade underlying ratings.  Six loans,
representing 4% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Nineteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

There have been no losses since securitization. There are four
loans, representing 7% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Inland
Center Loan ($52.7 million -- 5.7%), which is secured by the in-
line portion of a 1.0 million square foot regional mall located in
San Bernardino, California.  The property's performance since
securitization has been negatively impacted by significant
turnover among its anchor tenants.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in February 2009 due to a maturity default.  The
borrower was granted a 24-month extension that included providing
additional collateral and payment of all servicer fees and costs.
Of the three remaining specially serviced loans, two are
performing maturity defaults while the fourth loan is 90+ days
delinquent.  Moody's is not estimating a loss for Inland Center
but estimates an aggregate $6.4 million loss for the three
remaining loans (43% loss severity on average).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for 98% and 80%, respectively, of the pool, excluding
defeased loans.  Moody's weighted average loan to value  ratio for
the conduit component, excluding the specially serviced loans, is
95% compared to 93% at Moody's last review.  Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio is 1.1X, the same as at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances, unless addressed by extra
credit enhancement.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with underlying ratings,
has a Herf of 18 compared to 23 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the GIC Office
Portfolio Loan ($149.3 million -- 16.2%), which is a pari passu
interest in a $696.5 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by 12 office properties totaling 6.4 million square feet
and located in seven states.  The highest geographic
concentrations are Chicago (39% of NRA), suburban Philadelphia
(17%), and San Francisco (12%).  As of December 2008, the
portfolio was 92% occupied, essentially the same as at last
review.  The Chicago concentration is comprised of two buildings -
- the AT&T Corporate Center (1.5 million square feet; 24%) and the
USG Building (928,000 square feet; 14%).  The performance of these
properties has declined significantly since the last review and
the lease of the portfolio's largest tenant, AT&T (10%), expired
on March 31, 2009.  According to the most recent available
information, it appears that AT&T vacated their premises.  The
portfolio's performance has declined since last review due to
decreased rental revenues and increased expenses.  The loan
sponsor is Prime Plus Investments, Inc., a private REIT wholly
owned by the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
(Realty) Pte Ltd.  The loan matures in January 2014.  Moody's
current underlying rating is Baa2, compared to A1 at the last
review of this loan.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.44X compared to
1.73X at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Somerset
Collection Loan ($125.5 million -- 13.7%), which is a 50% pari
passu interest in a $251.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan
is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.4 million square foot
regional mall located in Troy, Michigan.  The center is the
dominant mall in its trade area and is anchored by Macy's,
Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus.  As of December
2008, the property was 99% occupied, essentially the same as at
last review.  The property is also encumbered by a B-Note which is
held outside the trust.  The loan is interest only for its entire
10-year term.  Property performance has been stable, but Moody's
analysis incorporates a stressed cash flow and higher cap rate to
reflect Moody's concerns about the depressed Michigan economy and
weak national retail environment, particularly for higher end
retailers.  Moody's current underlying rating is Baa2, compared to
A1 at the last review of this loan.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.36X compared to 1.44X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the Farmers
Market Loan ($41.3 million -- 4.5%), which is secured by a 228,339
square foot mixed-use property (retail & office) built in 1940 and
renovated in 2002.  As of December 2008, the property was 98%
occupied, essentially the same as at last review.  The largest
tenants include The Ant Farm, LLC (13% NRA; lease expiration
November 2014) and The Children's Place (9% NRA; lease expiration
December 2017).  Performance has improved due to increased base
rents.  Moody's current underlying rating is A1 compared to A2 at
last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.65X compared to 1.55X at
last review.

The fourth largest loan with an underlying rating is the Ruppert
Yorkville Towers Loan ($41.3 million -- 4.5%), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a high-rise 825 unit multifamily
complex located on the Upper East Side of Manhattan.  The complex
was completed in 1975 and converted to a condominium structure in
2003.  The collateral for the loan includes 432 unsold residential
units, unsold storage units and 53,810 square feet of commercial
space.  The unsold units are either vacant, occupied by market
rate tenants or occupied by pre-conversion tenants at below market
rental rates.  The majority of tenants pay rents that are
significantly below market.  However, rents have increased since
securitization as tenants renew or as units are converted to
market rates.  Net operating income has improved by approximately
70% since securitization.  Moody's current underlying rating is
Aaa, the same as at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.47X
compared to 1.34X at last review.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 16.5% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Maritime Plaza I and II
Loan ($73.7 million -- 8.0%), which is secured by two office
buildings totaling 345,736 square feet.  Built in 2001 and
renovated in 2003, the properties are situated at the intersection
of M Street and 12th Street in Washington, DC.  As of March 2009,
the properties were 100% occupied compared to 89% at last review.
The largest tenant is Computer Sciences Corporation (Moody's
senior unsecured rating Baa1, stable outlook; 37% of NRA, leases
expire in 2013 and 2014).  Financial performance has improved
since the last review due to increased occupancy.  Moody's LTV is
85% compared to 98% at the last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.14X compared to 0.99X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 280 Metro Center Loan
($44.3 million -- 4.8%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 351,816 square foot (213,787 square feet of
collateral) anchored retail center located ten miles south of San
Francisco in Colma, California.  The property was 99% occupied as
of December 2008 compared to 100% at last review.  The property is
anchored by Marshalls, Nordstrom Rack and Bed Bath & Beyond.  Net
cash flow has increased due to increased base rent.  Moody's LTV
is 89% compared to 95% at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.10X compared to 0.97X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Torrance Town Center Loan
($33.9 million -- 3.7%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 259,476 square foot anchored retail center located
in Torrance, California.  The center is anchored by Kohl's and
Smart & Final.  Circuit City was the third anchor prior to its
liquidation in the first quarter of 2009.  The property was 100%
occupied as of January 2009.  After adjusting for the loss of
Circuit City, occupancy drops to 87%.  Moody's LTV is 88% compared
to 82% at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.14X compared to
1.16X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $51,477,792, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/13/2007

  -- Class A-3, $144,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/13/2007

  -- Class A-4, $558,483,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/13/2007

  -- Class X-CL, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/13/2007

  -- Class X-CP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/13/2007

  -- Class B, $15,433,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class C, $13,889,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa2 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class D, $12,346,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded to
     Aa2 from Aa3 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class E, $16,976,000, affirmed at A1; previously affirmed at
     A1 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class F, $13,890,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class G, $21,605,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class H, $12,347,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class J, $10,802,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed
     at Baa2 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class K, $12,347,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
     at Baa3 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class L, $4,629,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class M, $4,630,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class N, $3,087,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class P, $3,086,000, downgraded to B3 from B1; previously
     affirmed at B1 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class Q, $3,087,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 3/13/2007

  -- Class S, $3,086,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 3/13/2007


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2000-C4 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes and
downgraded two classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-
C4, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C4.
The downgrades are due to increased leverage and higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized losses from loans in
special servicing and concerns about loans approaching maturity.
Eight loans, representing 5% of the pool, mature within the next
12 months and do not pass Moody's stressed refinance test.  The
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 29%
to $713 million from $999 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 131 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top non-
defeased ten loans representing 34% of the pool.  The pool
includes two loans, representing 16% of the pool, with investment
grade underlying ratings.  Fifty-six loans, representing 37% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $16.2 million.  The
losses have eliminated Class P and have resulted in a $3.7 million
loss to Class N. Currently there are three loans, representing 2%
of the pool, in special servicing.  The loans in special servicing
include two loans that are real estate owned  and one loan is in
foreclosure.  Moody's is estimating an aggregate $11.6 million
loss (79% loss severity on average) from the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for
approximately 98% of the pool, excluding defeased loans.  Moody's
loan to value ratio for the conduit component, excluding the
specially serviced loans with estimated losses, is 85% compared to
81% at Moody's prior full review in February 2009.  Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit pool is 1.32X
compared to 1.33X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf score of 27, the same as at last
review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Westfield
Shoppingtown South Shore Loan ($78.2 million -- 11.0%), which is
secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.2 million square foot
regional mall located in Bay Shore (Long Island), New York.  The
center is anchored by Macy's, Sears and J.C. Penney.  The center
was 95% occupied as of March 2009 with a 82% occupancy rate for
the in-line space.  Although financial performance has been
stable, Moody's analysis of this loan incorporates a stressed cash
flow to reflect Moody's concerns about the weak retail environment
and a higher capitalization rate consistent with current market
conditions.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.46X compared to 1.54X at
last review.  Moody's current underlying rating is A3 compared to
A1 at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Westfield
Shoppingtown Plaza Camino Real Loan ($36.0 million -- 5.1%), which
is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.1 million square foot
regional mall located in Carlsbad, California.  The center is
anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney and Sears.  The center was 82%
occupied as of December 2008.  Performance of the property has
been stable since securitization.  Moody's analysis of this loan
incorporates a stressed cash flow to reflect Moody's concerns
about the current weak retail environment.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is 3.03X compared to 3.18X at last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating is Aaa, the same as at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans comprise 10.2% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Johnson City Mall Loan
($37.6 million -- 5.3%), which is secured by a 545,000 square foot
regional mall located in Johnson City, Tennessee.  The center was
97% occupied as of March 2009 compared to 95% at last review.  The
center is anchored by Belk, Sears and J.C. Penney.  Performance
has improved since last review, but Moody's analysis of this loan
incorporates a higher capitalization rate consistent with current
market conditions.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and
1.52X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.46X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 136 Madison Avenue Loan
($20.6 million -- 2.9%), which is secured by a 284,000 square foot
Class B office building located in midtown Manhattan.  The
property was 76% leased as of April 2009 compared to 74% at last
review.  Major tenants include Wacoal America, Inc. (23% of NRA,
lease expiration April 2019), Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.
(Moody's senior unsecured rating Ba3, positive outlook; 17% of
NRA; lease expiration March 2010) and Aristeia Capital, Inc. (7%
of NRA, lease expiration October 2015).  Performance has weakened
since securitization due to the December 2008 lease expiration of
Bestform, Inc., which occupied 18% of the premises.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.44X, respectively, compared to 58%
and 1.60X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Georgesville Square Loan
($14.8 million -- 2.1%), which is secured by a 254,000 square foot
retail center located in Columbus, Ohio.  The center was 98%
occupied as of April 2009, the same as at last review.  The center
is anchored by Lowe's and Kroger.  Performance has been stable.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.14X, respectively,
compared to 80% and 1.16X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $518,888,990, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/26/2009

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/26/2009

  -- Class B, $42,460,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/26/2009

  -- Class C, $39,963,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/26/2009

  -- Class D, $12,488,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class E, $7,493,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa2 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class F, $17,483,000, affirmed at A1; previously affirmed at
     A1 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class G, $12,489,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class H, $22,479,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class J, $12,488,000, affirmed at B2; previously downgraded
     to B2 from Ba2 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class K, $7,493,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2; previously
     downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class L, $7,493,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class M, $9,990,000, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to
     C from Caa2 on 2/26/2009

  -- Class N, $1,296,928, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to
     C from Ca on 2/26/2009


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on Seven 2004-C7 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed
June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 18
classes from the same transaction and removed 15 from CreditWatch.

The lowered ratings follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which
was the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans
in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.79x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 98%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows
under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of
1.55x and an LTV of 125%.  The implied defaults and loss severity
under the 'AAA' scenario were 39.8% and 28.4%, respectively.  The
lowered ratings on the subordinate classes also reflect S&P's
expectations for credit support erosion upon the eventual
resolution of the two specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's view, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                          Credit Concerns

Two loans ($5.3 million, 0.4%) in the pool are currently with the
special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  Both loans are
90-plus days delinquent and have balances that are less than 0.5%
of the total pool balance.  An appraisal reduction amount of
$0.8 million is in effect against one of the assets.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 87 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.3 billion, down from 90 loans totaling $1.4 billion at
issuance.  Seven loans totaling $301.2 million (23.3%) have been
defeased.  Excluding the defeased loans, Wachovia Bank N.A.
reported financial information for 99% of the pool; 90% of the
servicer-provided financial information was full-year 2008 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.75x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.79x
and 98%, respectively.  Two loans ($5.3 million, 0.4%) in the pool
are delinquent and are currently with CWCapital.  The transaction
has experienced three losses to date totaling $5.2 million.
Seventeen loans are on the watchlist ($183.1 million, 14.2%).
Eleven loans ($90.8 million, 7.0%) have reported DSC below 1.10x,
and seven loans ($55.2 million, 4.3%) have reported DSC of less
than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$633.6 million (49%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.85x for the top 10 loans.
Two of the top 10 loans (18%) have reported DSC above 2.0x, and
one loan (2%) has reported DSC below 1.0x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV for the top 10 loans were 2.0x and 111%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C7

                Rating
                ------
    Class     To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --        ----              ----------------------
    K         BB+       BBB-/Watch Neg              2.33
    L         BB        BB+/Watch Neg               2.06
    M         BB-       BB/Watch Neg                1.65
    N         B+        BB-/Watch Neg               1.38
    P         B         B+/Watch Neg                1.24
    Q         CCC+      B/Watch Neg                 0.97
    S         CCC       B-/Watch Neg                0.69

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C7

               Rating
               ------
   Class   To         From               Credit enhancement (%)
   -----   --         ----               ----------------------
   A-1     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-2     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-3     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-4     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-5     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-6     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   A-1A    AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                       11.49
   B       AA+        AA+/Watch Neg                       10.67
   C       AA         AA/Watch Neg                         9.58
   D       AA-        AA-/Watch Neg                        8.35
   E       A+         A+/Watch Neg                         7.39
   F       A          A/Watch Neg                          6.30
   G       A-         A-/Watch Neg                         5.34
   H       BBB+       BBB+/Watch Neg                       4.38
   J       BBB        BBB/Watch Neg                        3.70

                         Ratings Affirmed

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C7
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C7

         Class   Rating             Credit enhancement (%)
         -----   ------             ----------------------
         X-CL    AAA                                   N/A
         X-CP    AAA                                   N/A
         X-OL    AAA                                   N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


LCM II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by LCM II:

  -- US$10,750,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2016, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$4,800,000 Class E-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Notes due 2016, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$4,200,000 Class E-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2016, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$5,000,000 Series I Combination Securities due 2016,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on November 9, 2004 Assigned
     Ba1.

In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of this note:

  -- US$21,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2016, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

Moody's has also upgraded the rating of this note:

  -- US$13,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2016, Upgraded to at Baa2; previously on March 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2309 versus a test level of 2360 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 10, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $6 million, accounting for roughly 1.7% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 3% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class C Notes is the
result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis including an in-
depth assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating
model along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative
factors.  By way of comparison, rating actions taken by Moody's in
its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely based on a
parameter-based approach.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

LCM II, issued on November 9, 2004, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


LCM III: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by LCM III Ltd.:

  -- US$ 16,000,000 Class C Notes due 2017, Confirmed at Ba3,
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$ 11,500,000 Class D Notes due 2017, Confirmed at B3,
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

In addition, Moody's has upgraded that rating of these notes:

  -- US$ 25,000,000 Class B Notes due 2017, Upgraded to Baa2,
     previously on March 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2296 versus a test level of 2335 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 19, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $8.8 million, accounting for roughly 2.6%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 3.6% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's notes that the rating action on the Class B Notes is the
result of a comprehensive deal-level analysis including an in-
depth assessment of results from Moody's quantitative CLO rating
model along with an evaluation of deal-specific qualitative
factors.  By way of comparison, rating actions taken by Moody's in
its Stage I CLO surveillance sweep were largely based on a
parameter-based approach.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

LCM III Ltd., issued on April 21, 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MAGNETITE V: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Magnetite V CLO, Limited:

  -- US$270,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on September 30, 2003
     Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$19,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Deferrable
     Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 20,
     2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2015, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     March 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class D
Overcollateralization Test.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 2924
versus a test level of 2460 as of the last trustee report, dated
May 29, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $10 million, accounting for roughly 3% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 12% of the underlying portfolio.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Magnetite V CLO, Limited, issued in September of 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2007-XLF Certs. to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D' on
the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 2007-XLF.  The rating was
on CreditWatch with negative implications before the downgrade.

The downgrade of the class L certificates to 'D' resulted from
interest shortfalls associated with special servicing fees related
to two specially serviced loans, the HRO Hotel Portfolio and Le
Meridien Cancun, which are detailed below.  S&P expects the
shortfalls from the Le Meridien Cancun loan to recur and do not
believe they will be recovered in the near term.

The HRO Hotel Portfolio loan, the second-largest loan in the pool,
is secured by six full-service hotel properties totaling 2,152
rooms in various locations throughout the U.S.  This loan has a
whole-loan balance of $152.7 million that is split into a
$138.8 million senior pooled component and a $13.9 million junior
nonpooled component that is raked to the 'HRO' certificates (not
rated by Standard & Poor's).  In addition, the borrower's equity
interests in the properties secure three mezzanine loans totaling
$116.0 million.

The HRO loan, which is current, was transferred to the special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc., on April 14, 2009, due to
imminent default after the borrower expressed difficulty in
continuing to cover operating and debt service shortfalls.
Midland indicated that as part of an agreement to resolve the
default, the available letters of credit were drawn down to fund
various reserve accounts, and $6.0 million was also used to pay
down the principal balance of the loan, bringing the whole-loan
balance to $146.7 million.  In addition, according to Midland, the
borrower would repay any expenses and special servicing fees
associated with the loan transfer.  Midland stated that the
principal paydown and interest shortfall repayment would be
reflected in the trustee remittance report as early as July 2009.
Midland specified that before returning the loan to master
servicing, it is in the process of reviewing the draft appraisals
and plans to reallocate the loan balance among the remaining
properties accordingly.  The reported debt service coverage was
0.06x for the 12 months ended December 31, 2008, and overall
occupancy was 49% as of April 2009.  This loan matures on
October 9, 2009, and has two one-year extension options remaining.

The Le Meridien Cancun loan, the ninth-largest loan in the pool,
is secured by a 213-room, full-service hotel in Cancun, Mexico.
This loan has a whole-loan balance of $56.2 million that consists
of a $26.3 million senior pooled balance, a $14.9 million nontrust
subordinate B note, and a $15.0 million nontrust subordinate C
note.  This loan, which is currently 30-plus days delinquent, was
transferred to the special servicer on March 27, 2009, due to
imminent default.  According to Midland, the property is currently
not generating sufficient cash flow to cover debt service
payments.  The property was 55% occupied as of April 2009.
Midland has indicated to us that the borrower is highly
cooperative and is preparing to exclusively list the property for
sale.  An appraisal has been ordered.

S&P is in the process of analyzing the performance of these two
assets and the remaining assets in the pool based on financial
information S&P received from the master servicer, also Midland.
Based on S&P's review of this information, S&P could potentially
take additional rating actions.

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-XLF

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class      To                 From
           -----      --                 ----
           L          D                  BBB-/Watch Neg


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2008-TOP29 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
June 26 and April 7, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on five classes from the same transaction and removed four from
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage (DSC) of 1.34x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 95%, respectively.  S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.01x and an LTV of 136%.  The implied
defaults and loss severity under S&P's 'AAA' scenario were 66.4%
and 43.7%, respectively.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                         Credit Concerns

There are no delinquent or specially serviced loans as of the June
2009 remittance date.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 82 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.2 billion, the same as at issuance.  Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
reported financial information for 87% of the pool; 99% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.47x for the pool based on
the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.34x and
95%, respectively.  The transaction has not experienced any
principal losses to date.  Thirteen loans are on the watchlist,
including three of the top 10 loans.  Four loans ($46.7 million,
4%) have reported DSC below 1.10x, and one loan ($3.0 million,
0.2%) has reported DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$618.5 million (50%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.45x for the top 10 loans.
Three of the top 10 loans (21%) appear on the servicer's
watchlist.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were
1.38x and 93%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29
     Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2008-TOP29

                 Rating
                 ------
       Class   To       From          Credit enhancement (%)
       -----   --       ----          ----------------------
       A-4     AA       AAA/Watch Neg                  27.12
       A-4FL   AA       AAA/Watch Neg                  27.12
       A-M     A-       AAA/Watch Neg                  17.07
       A-J     BBB      AAA/Watch Neg                  11.17
       B       BBB-     AA/Watch Neg                    9.54
       C       BB+      AA-/Watch Neg                   8.66
       D       BB       A/Watch Neg                     6.90
       E       BB-      A-/Watch Neg                    5.90
       F       B+       BBB+/Watch Neg                  4.77
       G       B+       BBB/Watch Neg                   3.64
       H       B        BBB-/Watch Neg                  2.76
       J       B        BB+/Watch Neg                   2.64
       K       B        BB/Watch Neg                    2.26
       L       B        BB-/Watch Neg                   2.13
       M       B-       B+/Watch Neg                    2.01
       N       B-       B/Watch Neg                     1.63
       O       CCC+     B-/Watch Neg                    1.26

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29
     Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2008-TOP29

               Rating
               ------
     Class   To       From               Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --       ----               ----------------------
     A-1     AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                       27.12
     A-2     AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                       27.12
     A-3     AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                       27.12
     A-AB    AAA      AAA/Watch Neg                       27.12

                          Rating Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2008-TOP29
     Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2008-TOP29

              Class   Rating    Credit enhancement (%)
              -----   ------    ----------------------
              X       AAA                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 25 2007-IQ16 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 25
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed
June 26, 2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on three
classes from the same transaction and removed one from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.07x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 107%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 0.89x and an LTV of 144%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 80.2% and 40.5%,
respectively.  The lowered ratings on the subordinate classes also
reflect S&P's expectations for credit support erosion upon the
eventual resolution of six of the eight specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                         Credit Concerns

Eight assets ($149.5 million, 5.8%) in the pool are with the
special servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc.  The payment status of
the loans is: three loans are in foreclosure ($11.6 million total
exposure); one loan is 60-plus days delinquent ($5.7 million); two
are less than 30 days delinquent ($9.8 million); and two are in
their grace periods ($123.6 million).  Three of the specially
serviced assets have appraisal reduction amounts in effect.  The
aggregate ARA amount is $1.2 million.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 234 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$2.6 billion, the same as at issuance.  Capmark Finance Inc.
reported financial information for 92% of the pool; 82% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 data.  S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.40x for the pool based on
the reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.07x and
107%, respectively.  Four loans ($16.7 million, 0.7%) in the pool
are 60-plus days delinquent and are currently with Centerline.
The transaction has not experienced any principal losses to date.
Thirty-eight loans are on the watchlist, including one of the top
10 loans.  Thirty-eight loans ($282.7 million, 11%) have reported
DSC below 1.10x, and 23 loans ($118.2 million, 4.6%) have reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$952.6 million (37%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.52x for the top 10 loans.
One of the top 10 loans (5%) has a reported DSC above 2.0x.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.15x and 92%,
respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16

                 Rating
                 ------
       Class    To     From           Credit enhancement (%)
       -----    --     ----           ----------------------
       A-2      A+     AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
       A-3      A+     AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
       A-4      A+     AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
       A-1A     A+     AAA/Watch Neg              30.09
       A-M      BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg              20.06
       A-MFL    BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg              20.06
       A-MA     BBB+   AAA/Watch Neg              20.06
       A-J      BB+    AAA/Watch Neg              12.54
       A-JFL    BB+    AAA/Watch Neg              12.54
       A-JA     BB+    AAA/Watch Neg              12.54
       B        BB+    AA+/Watch Neg              11.79
       C        BB     AA/Watch Neg               10.78
       D        BB     AA-/Watch Neg              10.16
       E        BB-    A+/Watch Neg               8.65
       F        BB-    A/Watch Neg                8.15
       G        B+     A-/Watch Neg               6.77
       H        B+     BBB+/Watch Neg             5.77
       J        B      BBB/Watch Neg              4.76
       K        B      BBB-/Watch Neg             3.51
       L        B-     BB+/Watch Neg              3.13
       M        B-     BB/Watch Neg               2.76
       N        B-     BB-/Watch Neg              2.38
       O        CCC+   B+/Watch Neg               1.76
       P        CCC    B/Watch Neg                1.50
       Q        CCC-   B-/Watch Neg               1.13

       Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16

                Rating
                ------
    Class   To         From              Credit enhancement (%)
    -----   --         ----              ----------------------
    A-1     AAA        AAA/Watch Neg                      30.09

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ16
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-IQ16

         Class   Rating            Credit enhancement (%)
         -----   ------            ----------------------
         X-1     AAA                                  N/A
         X-2     AAA                                  N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Raises Rating on $3 Mil. A-13 Notes to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the
$3 million class A-13 secured fixed-rate notes from Morgan Stanley
ACES SPC's series 2006-8 to 'B' from 'B-'.  At the same time, S&P
removed the rating from CreditWatch with positive implications,
where it was placed on June 2, 2009.

The rating on the class A-13 notes is dependent on the lowest of
(i) the rating on the reference obligation, Virgin Media Finance
PLC's 8.75% bonds due April 15, 2014 ('B'); (ii) the rating on
Morgan Stanley ('A'), which acts as the swap payments guarantor;
and (iii) the rating on the underlying security, BA Master Credit
Card Trust II's class A floating-rate asset-backed certificates
series 2001-B due August 15, 2013 ('AAA').

The rating action follows the July 10, 2009, raising of S&P's
rating on the reference obligation, Virgin Media Finance PLC's
8.75% bonds, and the removal of the rating from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where it was placed on May 28, 2009.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-IQ9 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9 and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications, where they were placed on June 26,
2009.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 10 classes from
the same transaction and removed seven from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
recently released U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was
the primary driver of the rating actions.  S&P's analysis included
a review of the credit characteristics of all the loans in the
pool.  Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.34x and an 88%
loan-to value ratio.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows
S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.14x and
an LTV of 113%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the
'AAA' scenario were 59.4% and 25.7%, respectively.  The lowered
ratings on the subordinate classes also reflect S&P's expectation
for credit support erosion upon the eventual resolution of three
of the eight specially serviced assets.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that, in
S&P's opinion, provide adequate support through various stress
scenarios.

                          Credit Concerns

Eight assets ($139.4 million, 9.6%) in the pool are currently with
the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.  Five loans are
90-plus days delinquent ($23.3 million total exposure), two are 30
days delinquent ($4.4 million), and one is less than 30 days
delinquent ($114.0 million).  An appraisal reduction amount of
$1.5 million is in effect against one loan, Mariemont Promenade.
The ARA is equal to 38% of the loan's outstanding balance.  All
the specially serviced assets have balances that are less than
1.0% of the total pool balance except the Hulen Mall loan (7.74%),
which was transferred following the General Growth Properties
bankruptcy filing.  S&P believes it is possible that special
servicing fees and expenses may result from the transfer.  S&P
continue to monitor the developments relating to the GGP
bankruptcy and will take rating actions as S&P determine
necessary.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the June 2009 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 239 loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$1.5 billion, down from 241 loans totaling $1.5 billion at
issuance.  Four loans totaling $31.2 million (2.2%) have been
defeased. Excluding the defeased loans, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
reported financial information for 100% of the pool; 79% of the
financial information was full-year 2008 data. S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.69x for the pool based on the reported
figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.34x and 88%,
respectively.  Seven loans ($26.7 million, 1.8%) in the pool are
delinquent and are currently with Midland.  The transaction has
not experienced any losses to date.  Eight loans are on the
watchlist, 36 loans ($167.2 million, 11.5%) have reported DSC
below 1.10x, and 28 loans ($124.8 million, 9%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.0x.

                     Summary Of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$680.6 million (47%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.74x for the top 10 loans,
up from 1.69x at issuance.  Two of the top 10 loans (7%) have
reported DSC above 2.0x.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top
10 loans were 1.19x and 93%, respectively.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's updated
conduit/fusion criteria.  The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-IQ9

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class     To        From            Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --        ----            ----------------------
     A-J       AA-       AAA/ Watch Neg              12.10
     B         A         AA/Watch Neg                9.87
     C         A-        AA-/Watch Neg               9.08
     D         BBB+      A/Watch Neg                 7.24
     E         BBB       A-/Watch Neg                6.18
     F         BBB-      BBB+/Watch Neg              5.13
     G         BB+       BBB/Watch Neg               4.34
     H         BB-       BBB-/Watch Neg              3.16
     J         B+        BB+/Watch Neg               2.76
     K         B         BB/Watch Neg                2.24
     L         B-        BB-/Watch Neg               1.84
     M         B-        B/Watch Neg                 1.45
     N         CCC+      B-/Watch Neg                1.18
     O         CCC       CCC+/Watch Neg              0.79

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-IQ9

                Rating
                ------
   Class    To        From                Credit enhancement (%)
   -----    --        ----                ----------------------
   A-1      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-2      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-3      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-AB     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-4      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-5      AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05
   A-1A     AAA       AAA/Watch Neg                       21.05

                         Ratings Affirmed

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2005-IQ9
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-IQ9

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             X-1      AAA                        N/A
             X-2      AAA                        N/A
             X-Y      AAA                        N/A

                     N/A - Not applicable.


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on 2007-13 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-' rating on
the notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC series 2007-
13, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.

The rating withdrawal follows the redemption of the notes stated
in the transaction's July 6, 2009, unwind notice.

                         Rating Withdrawn

                  Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
                          Series 2007-13

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                      Class    To      From
                      -----    --      ----
                      I SrA    NR      CCC-

                         NR - Not rated.


MORTGAGE GUARANTY: Fitch Downgrades Insurer Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the insurer financial strength rating
of Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and
placed it and the long-term debt and senior debt ratings of MGIC
Investment Corp. on Rating Watch Negative.  Earlier, MGIC
Investment Corp. announced a restructuring of its core mortgage
insurance operations.  The plan, which has received approval from
its main regulator, the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance, allows for the downstreaming of capital from MGIC, the
company's main operating subsidiary, to an existing, wholly owned
subsidiary of MGIC, MGIC Indemnity Corp.

Initially, $500 million of capital will be downstreamed from MGIC
to MG Indemnity, with the goal of being able to continue to write
additional mortgage insurance business while placing MGIC's
existing legacy book of business into de facto runoff.  Absent any
action on the part of management, MGIC would have been expected to
breach its regulatory risk to capital trigger within several
quarters, at which point it would have likely been forced into
runoff.  The capital restructuring allows the company to continue
to operate and seek to earn a higher return on a portion of its
capital than would otherwise be the case.

Fitch notes that the rating action is driven by the proposed
removal of capital from one regulated entity for placement in a
separate regulated entity.  Notwithstanding MGIC's ownership of MG
Indemnity, there still exists some subordination of claim on
capital for payment of losses.

Fitch notes that the proposed restructuring has both negative and
positive implications with respect to MGIC's policyholders.  The
most significant negative aspect of the transaction for MGIC's
policyholders is that the downstreaming of capital from MGIC to MG
Indemnity reduces the resources that are immediately available to
pay claims at MGIC over the short term.  Moreover, while capital
is being downstreamed to a wholly-owned subsidiary of MGIC, it
will be utilized to underwrite new business and thus increase the
risk profile of this capital, through releveraging, and
subordination of MGIC policyholders to MG Indemnity policyholders
for payment of losses from these resources.

Positively, the restructuring allows the MGIC group to avoid a
risk-to-capital driven cessation of operations, and to underwrite
potentially high quality business at attractive rates.  The new
business will be housed in a legal entity that is unencumbered by
legacy portfolio issues.  Given the ownership structure within the
organization, this could ultimately benefit MGIC policyholders
over the long term as any dividends paid out of MG Indemnity would
pass to MGIC and would then be subject to MGIC's regulatory
capital restrictions.  Further, the franchise position of the
consolidated entity is strengthened by this action.

MGIC policyholders would also receive some protections from
various structural aspects of the transaction.  The restructuring
was approved after a satisfactory assessment by the WI OCI of
MGIC's claims-paying ability and is subject to approval by the
government sponsored entities, the primary beneficiaries of MGIC's
insurance.  In addition, any further capital distributions from
MGIC down to MG Indemnity will require regulatory approval.  MG
Indemnity will also be limited to an operating leverage limit of
18:1 rather than 25:1, which may provide a cushion in the event
that capital is repatriated to MGIC.  Lastly, given that the GSEs
are the primary beneficiaries of MGIC's policies and will drive
the demand for MG Indemnity's insurance, Fitch believes that the
MGIC group would have incentives to perform on MGIC's claims in
order to protect the franchise value of MG Indemnity.

Fitch will continue to monitor the impact of the proposed
restructuring from the perspective of policyholders of both MGIC
and MG Indemnity.  In the event that the GSEs approve the
transaction, it is likely that the ratings would be affirmed and
assigned a Negative Outlook.  In the event that the proposed
transaction does not take place and no other solution for
continuing operations is achieved, it is likely that MGIC's IFS
ratings would be downgraded to below investment grade, as a near-
to mid-term cessation of operations would become increasingly
likely.

Fitch has downgraded this rating and placed it on Rating Watch
Negative:

Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp.

  -- IFS to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'.

Fitch has placed these ratings on Rating Watch Negative:

MGIC Investment Corp.

  -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating 'B';
  -- $200 million 5.625% senior notes due Sept. 15, 2011 'B';
  -- $300 million 5.375% senior notes due Nov. 1, 2015 'B'.

This rating remains unaffected:

MGIC Investment Corp.

  -- $390 million 9% convertible junior subordinated debentures
     due 2063 'C'.

Fitch will comment on this rating at a later date:

MGIC Australia Pty Ltd

  -- IFS 'BBB'.


MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches from one RMBS transaction, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A5.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
This action is a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A5

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/14/2003 Assigned
     B2


MT WILSON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$227,600,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2018, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on May 31, 2006 Assigned
     Aaa;

  -- US$8,900,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes due
     2018, Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$22,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$16,900,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade;

  -- US$6,900,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     due 2018, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Overcollaterization Test with respect to the Class C, Class D and
Class E Notes.  The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and is currently 2828 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 4, 2009.  Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $22.9 million, accounting for
roughly 7.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 14.4% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class D Notes and Class E
Notes are presently being deferred as a result of the failure of
the Class C Overcollateralization Test.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Mt. Wilson CLO, Ltd., issued in May 31, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


OCEANVIEW A1B: Fitch Junks Ratings on $25 Mil. A1B Receipts
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the rating of the sole class of notes
issued by Oceanview A1B Custodial Receipts:

  -- $25,000,000 Oceanview A1B Custodial Receipts to 'CCC' from
     'BB'.

The Custodial Receipts are a resecuritization of a portion of the
class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I, Ltd. combined with
insurance provided by a guarantor.  When Oceanview CBO I closed in
June 2002, XL Capital Assurance Inc., the predecessor of Syncora
Guarantee Inc., had privately insured $25 million of the
$70 million class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I.

In September 2008, Fitch withdrew the 'CCC' Insurer Financial
Strength rating of Syncora and its subsidiaries.  Prior to
September 2008, the rating of the Custodial Receipts was primarily
based on the IFS rating of Syncora as guarantor.  Because Fitch
had withdrawn the rating of the guarantor, the rating of the
Custodial Receipts is now based on the unenhanced credit profile
of the underlying collateral, the Oceanview CBO I class A-1B
notes.  This security is currently rated 'CCC' by Fitch as of
May 22, 2009.

Furthermore, pursuant to the New York State Insurance Department's
order, Syncora suspended payments on all claims in April 2009.
The suspension will continue until the guarantor restores its
surplus to policyholders to the minimum amount required by New
York State Insurance Law.  As such, Fitch has determined that the
holders of the Custodial Receipts no longer derive any protection
from the financial guarantor until the suspension ends.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.


PROVIDENT FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from one RMBS transaction, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1.

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.

Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year.  Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default.  The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.

Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses.  The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.

Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings.  In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.

List of actions:

Issuer: Provident Funding Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Baa2


RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eight
tranches issued in three RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust
transactions due to higher pool losses in relation to remaining
tranche-specific credit protection.  Underlying securities'
collateral consists primarily of closed-end second lien
residential mortgage loans and second lien home equity lines of
credit.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include: i) Moody's
review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical loan
performance information, ii) analysis of the collateral
composition and pool credit performance including prepayment, loan
delinquency and loss data, iii) consideration of the transaction's
capital structure and related allocations of collateral cash flows
and losses, and iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement
levels to updated Moody's pool loss projections based on present
collateral credit performance.

The securities are guaranteed by the respective financial
guarantors.  The underlying ratings generally reflect the
intrinsic credit quality of the securities in the absence of the
guarantee.  The current ratings on the below-noted securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating such insured securities
at the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength
rating and the underlying or intrinsic rating.  Please see the
press release dated November 10, 2008, titled "Moody's modifies
approach to rating structured finance securities wrapped by
financial guarantors".

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next year
and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under a
schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HS2

  -- Cl. A-I-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2; previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/19/2008
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to B2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/24/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/24/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HSA1

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/24/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Series 2006-HSA2 Trust

  -- Cl. A-I-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)

  -- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/24/2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)


SACO I: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Two 2005-GP1 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on two tranches issued
in SACO I Trust 2005-GP1 transaction due to higher pool losses in
relation to remaining tranche-specific credit protection.
Underlying securities' collateral consists primarily of second
lien home equity lines of credit.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include:

  i) Moody's review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
     historical loan performance information;

ii) analysis of the collateral composition and pool credit
     performance including prepayment, loan delinquency and loss
     data;

iii) consideration of the transaction's capital structure and
     related allocations of collateral cash flows and losses; and

iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement levels to updated
     Moody's pool loss projections based on present collateral
     credit performance.

Some of the securities are guaranteed by the respective financial
guarantors.  The current ratings on these securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating such insured securities
at the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength
rating and the underlying or intrinsic rating.  The underlying
ratings generally reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the guarantee.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-GP1

  -- Cl. A-1, Currently Rated Aa2 Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
     10/30/2008 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Aa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade on 5/20/2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/30/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Eight 2000-C3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of eight classes
and downgraded five classes of Salomon Brothers Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-C3.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from specially serviced loans, increased leverage and increased
credit quality dispersion.  The action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 26%
to $673.8 million from $914.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 131 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 21% of the pool.  Thirty seven loans,
representing 47% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Thirty four loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $14.2 million.  There are
currently five loans, representing 7% of the pool, in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Jorie Plaza
Loan ($21.0 million -- 3%), which is secured by 192,000 SF office
property located in Oak Brook, Illinois.  The property was
transferred to special servicing in November 2008 and is in the
process of foreclosure.  The property is suffering from low
occupancy and diminished cash flow.  A November 2008 appraisal
valued the property at $11.3 million.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate loss of $19.5 million (47% loss severity on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 87% of the pool, excluding defeased loans.  Moody's
weighted average loan to value ratio, excluding the specially
serviced loans with estimated losses, is 87% compared to 83% at
Moody's prior full review in October 2007.  In addition to an
overall increase in LTV, the pool has experienced increased credit
quality dispersion since last review.  Based on Moody's analysis,
35% of the pool has a LTV greater than 100% compared to 22% at
last review.  Approximately 12% of the pool has an LTV in excess
of 120% compared to 6% at last review.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.36X compared to
1.38X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 43
compared to 56 at last review.

The largest performing non-defeased loan is the Westland Meadows
Loan ($20.7 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by a 774-pad
manufactured housing community located approximately 15 miles
southwest of Detroit in Westland, Michigan.  Performance has
weakened since last review due to declines in occupancy and rental
rates.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low
debt service coverage. The property was 83% occupied as of
December 2008.  Moody's LTV is 114% compared to 105% at last
review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.90X compared to 0.93X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Friedman Portfolio Loan
($16.8 million -- 2.5%), which is secured by three mixed use
(office and retail) properties located in Chicago, Illinois.  The
properties total 169,000 square feet and were 92% occupied as of
November 2008 compared to 76% at last review.  The portfolio's
performance has improved due to higher net operating income due to
increased occupancy.  Moody's LTV is 81% compared to 94% at last
review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.39X compared to 1.20X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Webster Building Loan ($14.6 million
-- 2.2%), which is secured by a 137,000 square foot office
property in Washington, DC.  The property is 100% occupied by the
D.C. Government through August 2009.  The tenant has indicated
that it will vacate the property at the expiration of its lease.
Moody's valuation of this loan is based on a "dark analysis" which
reflects releasing the property at market rents and incorporates
re-tenanting costs and downtime before the building is fully
occupied.  The loan matures in April 2010.  Moody's LTV is 121%
compared to 53% at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.94X
compared to Moody's 1.98X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $477,502,552, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 10/4/2007

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 10/4/2007

  -- Class B, $43,446,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 10/4/2007

  -- Class C, $36,586,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 10/4/2007

  -- Class D, $13,720,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously affirmed at
     Aa1 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class E, $13,720,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously affirmed at
     Aa3 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class F, $13,720,000, affirmed at A3; previously upgraded to
     A3 from Baa1 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class G, $13,720,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
     at Baa3 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class J, $6,860,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class K, $5,716,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     affirmed at B1 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class L, $10,290,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class M, $4,574,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1; previously
     affirmed at Caa1 on 10/4/2007

  -- Class N, $3,430,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa3; previously
     affirmed at Caa3 on 10/4/2007


SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
tranches from two Seawall SPC U.S. synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The two tranche ratings have a direct link to the ratings on their
respective reference obligations, which S&P lowered in conjunction
with S&P's actions affecting the related commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction, Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust Series 2007-C3, on July 14, 2009.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                           Seawall SPC
  $62,125,964 series 2008 CMBS CDO-5 class A floating-rate notes

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class                    To                  From
     -----                    --                  ----
     Notes                    B+                  AAA/Watch Neg

                           Seawall SPC
   $31,062,982 series CSMC 2007-C3 class AJ floating-rate notes

                                      Rating
                                      ------
     Class                    To                  From
     -----                    --                  ----
     Notes                    B+                  AAA/Watch Neg


SECURITY NATIONAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-A Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class B notes issued
by Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-A.  The notes are
backed by loans on a miscellaneous pool of assets.  The original
pool consisted of residential, commercial and other assets.  As of
the latest payment date, most of the residential assets have been
liquidated (or paid-off in some instances).  The current pool
consists primarily of other assets which include commercial real
estate, account receivables, inventory, agricultural land, raw
land, autos, vacant lots, agricultural products and various
others.

Moody's has assessed the credit quality of the remaining pool of
assets by estimating the percentage of the performing and non-
performing loans in the trust that will eventually default.
Moody's expects that nearly 70%-100% of the loans will default
over the remaining life of the deal.  Moody's estimates are in
line with the current macroeconomic environment and the general
expected performance trend for liquidation trusts of similar
composition.

To calculate the net loss on the loans which are expected to
default, Moody's has applied various severities based on the asset
type backing the loan.  Moody's expects severities in the range of
30%-90% across all the asset types in the pool with an average
severity of 64%.  Moody's believes that the available credit
enhancement, which includes overcollateralization and a spread
account, is not sufficient for the current rating assignment given
the revised expected loss for the trust.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-A

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously A3 assigned on
     12/21/2005


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Moody's Junks Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Sinclair Broadcast Group,
Inc.'s Corporate Family Rating to Caa2 from B3 and Probability of
Default Rating to Caa3 from Caa1.  Associated debt ratings were
lowered as detailed below and LGD assessments were updated to
reflect the current debt mix and the above average family recovery
rate as currently forecast and implied by the one notch
differential between the CFR and PDR.  The ratings were placed
under review for further possible downgrade.

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

Downgrades:

Issuer: Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa2 from B3

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- 4.875% Senior Convertible Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2
     (no change to LGD4 - 59% assessment)

Issuer: Sinclair Television Group, Inc

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to B1 from
     Ba3 (no change to LGD1 - 5% assessment)

  -- 8% Senior Subordinated Notes, Downgraded to Caa2, LGD3 - 32%
     from B3, LGD3 - 31%

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Issuer: Sinclair Television Group, Inc

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

The downgrade and review follows the company's announcement in a
July 10, 2009 Form 8-K that Cunningham Broadcasting Corporation,
one of Sinclair's local market agreement partners, may need to
amend the terms of the LMA or receive an injection of cash to fund
or extend the maturity of its outstanding term loan due on
July 31, 2009.  A cross default under Sinclair's credit facility
would be caused if Cunningham files for bankruptcy or is involved
in a similar insolvency proceeding and Cunningham is currently
operating under a waiver for a previously undisclosed technical
default related to the failure to file certain annual financial
statements with its lenders on June 5, 2009.

Moody's is concerned that Sinclair's ability to resolve the
refinancing risk associated with $438 million of notes putable in
May 2010 and January 2011 without impairing its capacity to absorb
the likely increase in cash interest costs and address its
remaining $788 million of debt that all matures by the end of
2012, could be further weakened by a cash contribution to or
change in the LMA terms with Cunningham. Sinclair disclosed in the
Form 8-K that between 28-34% of its projected 2009 broadcast cash
flow is derived from its Cunningham relationship.  In Moody's
opinion, the situation with Cunningham is creating pressure to
resolve the putable note refinancing overhang on a more
accelerated timetable and heightening the near term risk of a
restructuring through bankruptcy or a transaction such as a put
extension/discounted debt repurchase that Moody's would likely
consider a distressed exchange.

In the review, Moody's will monitor Sinclair's discussions with
the convertible note holders and Cunningham and evaluate the
effects of any transactions on the company's future cash flow and
capital structure.

The last rating action was on June 16, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded Sinclair's CFR to B3 from B1, PDR to Caa1 from B1, and
speculative grade liquidity rating to SGL-4 from SGL-3.

Sinclair, headquartered in Baltimore, Maryland, is a television
broadcaster, operating 58 television stations in 35 markets.
Sinclair generated revenue of approximately $723 million for the
trailing twelve months ended March 31, 2009.


SLATE CDO: Fitch Junks Ratings on Eight Classes of 2007-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight classes issued by Slate CDO
2007-1, Ltd., as a result of on-going negative credit migration of
the recent vintage CMBS and CRE CDO collateral within the
reference portfolio:

  -- $267,327,116 class A-1SA notes to 'CCC' from 'BB';
  -- $130,693,257 class A-1SB notes to 'CCC' from 'BB';
  -- $67,500,000 class A-1J notes to 'CC' from 'BB-';
  -- $38,200,000 class A-2 notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $27,800,000 class A-3 notes to 'C from 'CCC';
  -- $18,000,000 class B1 notes to 'C from 'CCC';
  -- $13,500,000 class B-2 notes to 'C from 'CCC';
  -- $11,200,000 class B-3 notes to 'C from 'CC'.

Classes A-1SA through A-2 have been removed from Rating Watch
Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms one class from Slate CDO 2007-1:

  -- $5,300,000 class C notes at 'C'.

Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2009, 14.3% of the
reference portfolio has been downgraded and an additional 28.3%
has been placed on Rating Watch Negative.  Based on Fitch derived
ratings, 94.5% is rated below investment grade; including 31.9%
rated 'CCC' or lower.  As a basis for comparison, at issuance 4.8%
of the reference portfolio was rated below investment grade with
the lowest rating at 'BB+'.  Additionally, as of the June 2009
trustee report, 11.5%, or $69.5 million, of the current portfolio
is now considered defaulted per the transaction's governing
documents.

The collateral deterioration within the portfolio has caused each
of the overcollateralization ratios to further decline and breach
its respective covenant.  The class A-2 OC test has been failing
since February 2009.  As of the June 2009 trustee report, the
class A-2 OC test is 75.9%, compared to its covenant of 108.2%.
Similarly, the class B-3 OC ratio has dropped to 66.6%, compared
to its trigger of 101.5%.

Slate CDO 2007-1 declared an Event of Default on April 3, 2009,
due to the Senior Adjusted Credit Ratio breaching its covenant.
As a remedy to the EOD, the required majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the transaction on July 2, 2009.  On the
July 6, 2009 distribution date, all interest and principal
proceeds went to redeem class A-1SA and A-1SB principal after
paying fees, the interest rate swap payment, class A-1SB interest
distribution amount and commitment fee to the class A-1SA.  On
future payment dates, all interest otherwise payable to the class
A-1J through C notes along with all principal proceeds will be
used to redeem the classes A-1SA and A-1SB on a pro-rata basis.
Proceeds allocated to class A-1SA will be deposited into the
collateralization account which serves as additional support for
the transaction.  The class A-1SA credit default swap notional
amount will be reduced by an equivalent amount.

Fitch expects that the classes A-1J defaulted interest can be at
least partially repaid once class A-1SA and A-1SB are paid in
full.  Classes A-2 through C are not likely to receive any
payments going forward due to the performance expectations of the
underlying portfolio.

Slate CDO 2007-1 is a hybrid collateral debt obligation that
combines the use of synthetic and cash assets, as well as unfunded
and funded liabilities.  At issuance, Slate CDO 2007-1 had a
$270 million initially unfunded super-senior liquidity facility,
and issued approximately $330 million of funded notes and funded
preference shares.  The CDO initially invested in a $600 million
portfolio of combined synthetic and cash securities.  The
portfolio consists of 55% CDS, primarily referencing CMBS and CMBS
B-Piece Resecuritizations, as well as 45% cash commercial
mortgage-backed securities, commercial real estate CDO cash
securities, and cash CMBS B-Piece Resecuritizations.  The
transaction is also supported by a collateralization account,
initially $60 million.  The collateral was selected and is
monitored by Petra Capital Management LLC.

For underlying bonds not rated by Fitch, Fitch's CDO rating
methodology stipulates an input of the lower of the ratings
assigned by either Moody's or S&P.  Fitch does not rate 52.8% of
the bonds in this transaction.

The ratings of the class A-1SA, A-1SB (together the class A-1S
notes), A-1J, and class A-2 notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
well as the stated balance of principal, by the stated maturity
date pursuant to the governing documents.  The ratings of the
class A-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, and C notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive ultimate interest payments, as well as the
stated balance of principal, by the stated maturity date in
accordance with the governing documents.


STARTS LTD: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating on Series 2007-20
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
notes issued by STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.'s series 2007-19 and 2007-20,
both synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

The rating withdrawals follow the repurchase of the notes
according to the repurchase notices dated June 25, 2009.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                       STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
                Maple Hill II managed synthetic CDO

                                         Rating
                                         ------
              Series          Class    To      From
              ------          -----    --      ----
              2007-19         A3-D3    NR      BBB-
              2007-20         B2-D2    NR      B+

                         NR - Not rated.


TRICADIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2005-4 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded ratings
of five classes of notes issued by Tricadia CDO 2005-4, Ltd., and
left on review for possible further downgrade the ratings of two
of these classes.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class A-1LA, Downgraded to Ba3 and remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to A2
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1LB, Downgraded to Caa2 and remains on Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on 3/12/2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2L, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/12/2009
     Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class A-3L, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/12/2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Class B-1L, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/12/2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Tricadia CDO 2005-4, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.  CLOs consist approximately [90]% of the portfolio,
of which majority are from 2005 vintage.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor,
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the coverage tests.  More than 80% of
its assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review of the
transaction in March 2009.  The trustee reported WARF of the
portfolio is 2865 as of March 6, 2009.  The Trustee currently
reports defaulted assets in the amount of 48.2 million.
Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 10% of the
underlying portfolio.  In addition, the Trustee reports that the
transaction is currently failing one or more coverage tests,
including the Class A Overcollateralization Ratio Test.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  Since the last review of this
transaction in March 2009, Moody's has completed the first stage
of its two-stage review of U.S. and EMEA CLOs.  Some of the
underlying securities in the portfolio experienced more severe
rating action than was anticipated at the time of last review.
Moody's is currently in Stage II of its CLO review and performing
comprehensive analysis by modeling each CLO individually.
Additional rating actions will be taken as necessary for all rated
liabilities.  As a result, the ratings assigned to Class A1-LA and
Class A1-LB remain on watch for possible downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


UBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class L Certs. to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D' from
'BBB-' on the class L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate
from UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1.  The rating was on
CreditWatch with negative implications before the downgrade.

The downgrade reflects interest shortfalls associated with special
servicing fees and other expenses related to the 30-plus-days
delinquent Atlantic Towers loan.  The shortfalls have reduced the
available distribution amount to the class L certificates, and S&P
expects the shortfalls to this class from the Atlantic Towers loan
to continue for the foreseeable future.

The Atlantic Towers loan, secured by three land parcels in
Washington, D.C., has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$21.6 million (1% of the pool trust balance).  This loan was
transferred to the special servicer, Capmark Finance Inc., on
May 1, 2009, due to a maturity default.  The sponsors had
originally intended to build multifamily towers, but have failed
to secure construction financing. Capmark is pursuing foreclosure.

There are two other loans in special servicing; details of these
loans are:

The Le Meridien San Francisco loan, secured by a 360-room hotel in
San Francisco, has a trust balance of $47.0 million (3%) and a
whole-loan balance of $99.1 million.  The loan was transferred to
Capmark on May 14, 2009, due to a maturity default.  Capmark is in
discussions with the borrower on a modification agreement.  The Le
Meridien San Francisco loan is also incurring special servicing
fees, but based on S&P's conversation with the special servicer,
S&P expects the fees to be recovered in the near term.

The Maui Prince Resort loan is secured by a 310-room hotel (with
development rights that allow for the construction of an
additional 517 hotel rooms), two 18-hole golf courses, and 1,194
acres of unimproved land in Maui, Hawaii.  The whole-loan balance
is $192.5 million and consists of a pooled trust balance of
$162.5 million (10%) and a junior $30.0 million nonpooled
component that is included in the trust.  The loan was transferred
to Capmark on June 12, 2009, due to a maturity default.
Performance at the property has been below expectations, and the
servicer reported the debt service coverage at negative 0.71x for
full-year 2008.

Capmark is in discussions with the borrower and the mezzanine
lenders.  S&P expects that special servicing fees will have a
future impact on the trust, including the nonpooled classes that
are supported by this loan.  Should this occur, S&P will review
the ratings and take actions as S&P deem necessary.

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

              UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                           Rating
                           ------
                Class    To       From
                -----    --       ----
                L        D        BBB-/Watch Neg


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 24 2007-C32 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 24 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Securities
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C32 due to overall stable
pool performance.  The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$3.81 billion from $3.82 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 143 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 46% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 2.7% of the
pool, had investment grade underlying ratings at securitization.
Due to declines in performance, these loans are now analyzed as
part of the conduit pool.

Forty loans, representing 39% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

The pool has not experienced any realized losses since
securitization.  There are currently six loans, representing 2% of
the pool, in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is Sheraton West ($29.5 million -- 0.8%), which is secured by
a 372-unit full service hotel located in Richmond, Virginia.  This
loan was transferred to special servicing in October 2008 due to
imminent default.  The second largest specially serviced loan is
Wyndham-Atlanta ($26.0 million -- 0.7%), which is secured by a
191-unit full service hotel located in Atlanta, Georgia.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in March 2009 for monetary
default and is now 90+ days delinquent.  Moody's estimates losses
on four of the six specially serviced loans totaling $35.8 million
loss (53% loss severity on average).

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 93%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
conduit component is 144% compared to 152% at Moody's last review
in February 2009.  The previous review was part of Moody's first
quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS transactions.
The previous review incorporated assumptions for capitalization
rates and stressed cash flows that were outlined in "Rating
Methodology Update: U.S. CMBS Conduit and Fusion Review Prompted
by Declining Property Values and Rising Delinquencies" dated
February 5, 2009.

Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 0.77X compared to
0.82X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool has a Herf of 31 compared to 34 at last
review.

The two loans which formerly had investment grade underlying
ratings but are now analyzed as part of the conduit pool due to
declines in performance are Port Chester Shopping Center and
Courtyard at Marriott.  The Port Chester Shopping Center Loan ($70
million -- 1.8%) is secured by an anchored retail center located
in Port Chester, New York.  Major tenants include Kohl's,
Waldbaum's and Al Freidman, which replaced Linen N'Things after it
vacated at the end of 2008.  The property was 99% occupied as of
June 2009.  Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.16X, respectively.

The Courtyard by Marriott Loan ($35.0 million -- 0.9%) is secured
by a 498-room full service hotel located in downtown Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.  The hotel's performance has declined due to a
significant increase in expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 73% and 1.62X, respectively.

The top three conduit exposures represent 24.1% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Beacon D.C. & Seattle Pool
($414 million -- 10.8%), which represents a pari passu interest in
a $2.7 billion first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 17
office properties located in Washington, Virginia and Washington,
DC.  The properties range from 103,000 to 1.1 million square feet
and total 9.8 million square feet.  The portfolio was 93% occupied
as of December 2008 compared to 97% at securitization.  The
portfolio's performance has declined due to increased operating
expenses.  The loan is interest-only throughout its entire five
year term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 174% and 0.58X,
respectively, compared to 154% and 0.63X at last review.

The second largest conduit exposure is the ING Hospitality Pool
($283.9 million -- 7.4%), which represents a pari passu interest
in a $567.7 million first mortgage.  The loan is secured by 46
hotels located in 18 different states.  The portfolio's RevPAR for
the trailing 12-month period ending December 31, 2008 was $85.42
compared to $111.74 at securitization.  The loan is interest-only
for its entire five year term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
122% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 143% and 0.88X at last
review.

The third largest conduit exposure is the DDR Southeast Pool
($221.3 million -- 5.8%), which represents a pari passu interest
in an $885 million first mortgage.  The loan is secured by 52
anchored retail properties located in ten states.  The portfolio
was 89% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 96% at
securitization.  The loan is interest only for the entire 10 year
term.  Moody's LTV is and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 116% and 0.84X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $19,691,181 affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-1A, $442,665,364, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-2, $946,379,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-3, $948,589,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-4FL, $250,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-PB, $62,827,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $382,385,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class IO, notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-J, $253,330,000, affirmed at A2; previously
     downgraded to A2 from Aaa on 2/11/09

  -- Class B, $43,019,000, affirmed at A3; previously downgraded
     to A3 from Aa1 on 2/11/09

  -- Class C, $47,798,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously downgraded
     to Baa1 from Aa2 on 2/11/09

  -- Class D, $28,679,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously downgraded
     to Baa2 from Aa3 on 2/11/09

  -- Class E, $28,679,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously downgraded
     to Baa3 from A1 on 2/11/09

  -- Class F, $38,238,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously downgraded
     to Ba1 from A2 on 2/11/09

  -- Class G, $43,018,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously downgraded
     to Ba2 from A3 on 2/11/09

  -- Class H, $47,799,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously downgraded
     to Ba3 from Baa1 on 2/11/09

  -- Class J, $52,578,000, affirmed at B1; previously downgraded
     to B1 from Baa2 on 2/11/09

  -- Class K, $33,458,000, affirmed at B3 from Baa3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on 2/11/09

  -- Class L, $19,120,000, affirmed at Caa1; previously downgraded
     to Caa1 from Ba1 on 2/11/09

  -- Class M, $9,559,000, affirmed at Caa1; previously downgraded
     to Caa1 from Ba2 on 2/11/09

  -- Class N, $14,340,000, affirmed at Caa2; previously downgraded
     to Caa2 from Ba3 on 2/11/09

  -- Class O, $9,559,000, affirmed at Caa2; previously downgraded
     to Caa2 from B1 on 2/11/09

  -- Class P, $9,560,000, affirmed at Caa3; previously downgraded
     to Caa3 from B2 on 2/11/09

  -- Class Q, $9,560,000, affirmed at Caa3; previously downgraded
     to Caa3 from B3 on 2/11/09


WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Cuts Ratings on Various 2005-C20 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
the class J, K, L, M, N, and O commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2005-C20.  The ratings were on CreditWatch with negative
implications before the downgrades, where they were placed on
April 7, 2009.

The downgrades to 'D' reflect recurring interest shortfalls
resulting from an appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction
(ASER) in effect for one asset with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  As a result, interest shortfalls
have occurred for several classes since November 2008, and S&P
expects them to recur for the foreseeable future.

Details concerning this asset with the special servicer are:

The Macon & Burlington Mall Pool loan has a total exposure of
$146.2 million and was transferred to the special servicer in
February 2008 due to an imminent default.  The loan is 90-plus-
days delinquent and is secured by two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted regional malls.

The Burlington Mall is a 419,194-sq.-ft. mall in Burlington, North
Carolina, built in 1969 and renovated in 2004.  The Macon Mall is
a 762,398-sq.-ft. mall in Macon, Gerogia, built in 1975 and
renovated in 1997.  A $113.8 million appraisal reduction amount
(ARA) is in effect on this asset.  The related ASER amount on the
June 17, 2009, remittance report was $463,168, which is an
increase from the ASER of $347,498 in the May 15, 2009, remittance
report.  The cumulative ASER reported was $2,876,307.  CWCapital
has initiated foreclosure, and a receiver is in place for both
properties.

Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the resolution
of this asset.

In addition to the asset above, these two assets are with the
special servicer.

The Azalea Hill Apartments loan has a total exposure of
$6.5 million and was transferred to the special servicer in March
2009 due to monetary default.  A 144-unit multifamily property in
Montgomery, Ala., secures this loan.  The property was built
between 1988 and 1990 and renovated during 2004 and 2005. As of
December 31, 2008, the reported debt service coverage was 0.28x,
and the occupancy was 45.8%.  The special servicer is still
evaluating its options.  Standard & Poor's expects a minimal loss
upon the resolution of this asset.

The Country Inn & Suites-Sarasota Florida loan has a total
exposure of $7.4 million and was transferred to the special
servicer in March 2009 due to its failure to pay the monthly
reserve.  A 101-room limited-service hotel constructed in 2003 in
Sarasota, Florida, secures this loan.  The borrower requested that
the loan be transferred to special servicing to modify these
reserve payments.  The borrower brought the loan current in mid-
April 2009.  S&P expects the loan to be returned to the master
servicer in July 2009.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20

               Rating
               ------
   Class     To       From              Credit enhancement (%)
   -----     --       ----              ----------------------
   J         D        CCC/Watch Neg                       3.17
   K         D        CCC-/Watch Neg                      2.75
   L         D        CCC-/Watch Neg                      2.34
   M         D        CCC-/Watch Neg                      2.07
   N         D        CCC-/Watch Neg                      1.79
   O         D        CCC-/Watch Neg                      1.52


WASI FINANCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches issued by WASI Financial Limited Partnership Credit
Linked Securities 2006-HES1 transaction due to higher pool losses
in relation to remaining tranche-specific credit protection.

This synthetic transaction provides the owner of a sizable pool of
mortgages as the "Protection Buyer" credit protection through a
credit default swap with the issuer as the "Protection Seller" of
the notes.  Through this agreement, the Protection Buyer pays a
fee in return for the transfer of a portion of the reference
portfolio credit risk.  The reference portfolio consists primarily
of closed-end second lien residential mortgage loans and second
lien home equity lines of credit.

Investors in the notes have an interest in the holdings of the
issuer, which include highly rated investment instruments, a
forward delivery agreement and fee collections on the agreement
with the Protection Buyer.  Investors are exposed to losses from
the reference portfolio but benefit only indirectly from cash
flows from these assets.  Depending on the class of notes held,
investors have credit protection from subordination.  Maturity
Date of the transaction is June 2011.

The ratings on the securities were monitored by evaluating factors
Moody's determined to be essential in the analysis of securities
backed by such loans.  The salient factors include:

  i) Moody's review of the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
     historical loan performance information;
ii) analysis of the collateral composition and pool credit
     performance including prepayment, loan delinquency and loss
     data;

iii) consideration of the transaction's capital structure and
     related allocations of collateral cash flows and losses; and

iv) a comparison of current credit enhancement levels to updated
     Moody's pool loss projections based on present collateral
     credit performance.

When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on a
collateral analysis of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and
Constant Default Rate.

CPR is based on the average of the last six months 1-month CPR.

There are two approaches for determining pool CDR.  The first
approach calculates CDR based on pool loan losses from the
previous twelve months, i.e. recent losses.  A second approach is
based on pipeline losses -- losses derived from days-aged
delinquencies and Moody's assumptions for default based on days
delinquent, in foreclosure, or liquidation, and the severity of
loss given default.  Moody's assumes 100% severity for second
liens, including both CES and HELOCs.  After the CDR is calculated
using the two methods, the effective CDR for loss projection
purposes is determined by using a weighted average of the CDRs as
determined by the recent loss and pipeline loss approaches -- with
weightings determined on a transaction by transaction basis.
Moody's assumes that the CDR will not decline for the next two
years and will decline subsequently for the life of the deal under
a schedule, typically reducing by 50% in year 3 and remaining
constant thereafter.

Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal.  The credit enhancement calculation can also include
credit for excess spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference
in the weighted average loan coupon and the all-inclusive
securities' interest and deal fees, including servicing.  Excess
spread benefit is calculated by multiplying the stressed
annualized excess spread by the weighted average life of the deal.

Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche.  Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).

Issuer: WASI Financial Limited Partnership Credit Linked
Securities 2006-HES1

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/25/2006 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/25/2006 Assigned
     Baa1

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/25/2006 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-1-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/25/2006
     Assigned Baa3

  -- Cl. B-1-B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/25/2006
     Assigned Baa3


WESTCHESTER CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Westchester CLO, Ltd.:

  -- US$570,500,000 Class A-1-A Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
     May 31, 2007 Assigned Aaa;

  -- US$142,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Extendable Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     February 25, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 and Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$80,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
     Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on February 25,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$53,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Caa1;
     previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$36,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes due 2022, Downgraded to C;
     previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$37,500,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Extendable Notes due 2022, Downgraded to C;
     previously on February 25, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.  The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score.  The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.

Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of all the
Overcollateralization tests.  The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 3275
versus a test level of 2737 as of the last trustee report, dated
May 29, 2009.  Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $86 million, accounting for roughly 13% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a number
of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates.  Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs.  These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months.  Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.

Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should an Event of Default
occur and continue.  In Moody's view, there is a potential for an
Event of Default arising from the Class A/B Overcollateralization
Ratio falling below 100%, as described in Section 5.1 (d) of the
Indenture, dated May 31, 2007.  As provided in Article 5 of the
Indenture, during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of
Default, a majority of the Controlling Class may vote to
accelerate the payments on the Notes by declaring the principal of
all the Notes to be immediately due and payable.  In addition, the
Super Majority of each Class of Notes or the Majority of the
Controlling Class (if the Class A/B Overcollateralization Ratio is
less than 90%) may direct the trustee to proceed with the sale and
liquidation of the collateral.

Westchester CLO, Ltd., issued in May 31, 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


ZAIS INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded ratings
of four classes of notes issued by Zais Investment Grade Limited V
and left on review for possible further downgrade the ratings of
two of these classes.  The notes affected by the rating action
are:

  -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Ba2 and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade; previously
     on 2/24/2009 Downgraded to A1 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa1
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
     2/24/2009 Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Ca; previously on 2/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 2/24/2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Zais Investment Grade Limited V, Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations.  CLOs consist approximately 90% of the portfolio, of
which the majority are from 2003-2006 vintages.

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio.  Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through a decline in the average
credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating factor,
an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, an
increase in the proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1
and below, and failure of the coverage tests.  More than 60% of
its assets have been downgraded since Moody's last review of the
transaction in February 2009.  The trustee reported WARF of the
portfolio is 3671 as of June 4, 2009.  The Trustee currently
reports defaulted assets in the amount of 20.16 million.
Securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 27% of the
underlying portfolio.  In addition, the Trustee reports that the
transaction is currently failing one or more coverage tests,
including the Class A Overcollateralization Test.

Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio.  Since the last review of this
transaction in February 2009, Moody's has completed the first
stage of its two-stage review of U.S. and EMEA CLOs.  Some of the
underlying securities in the portfolio experienced more severe
rating action than was anticipated at the time of last review.
Moody's is currently in Stage II of its CLO review and performing
comprehensive analysis by modeling each CLO individually.
Additional rating actions will be taken as necessary for all rated
liabilities.  As a result, the ratings assigned to Class A-1 and
Class A-2 remain on watch for possible downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 Certs. From Three Resecuritizations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 11
certificates issued in 3 resecuritized transactions.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
Moody's ratings on the underlying residential mortgage-backed
securities (underlying securities).  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

The ratings on the underlying securities are used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2005-WF1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/12/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/12/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/12/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/12/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/12/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/12/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/12/2005
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/13/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/13/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/13/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-3, Ltd.

  -- Notes, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/13/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on 15 Certs. by Five Resecuritizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on 15
certificates issued in 5 resecuritized transactions and confirmed
the ratings on 2 certificates issued in 1 resecuritized
transaction given the deterioration in performance and ratings of
the portfolio underlying these resecuritization transactions.

The certificates in the resecuritizations are backed by one or
more securities, which in turn are backed by residential mortgage
loans.  These rating actions have been triggered by changes in
Moody's ratings on the underlying residential mortgage-backed
securities (underlying securities).  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization are based on:

  (i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing the
      underlying securities portfolio and the updated ratings on
      the underlying securities portfolio

(ii) The available credit enhancement on the underlying
      securities, and

(iii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

(1) Moody's first updated its loss assumptions on the underlying
    pool of mortgage loans (backing the underlying securities) and
    then arrived at updated ratings on the underlying securities.

The ratings on the underlying securities are used to derive a
weighted average portfolio rating based on a weighted average
rating factor.  To determine the portfolio WARF, Moody's assigns
the ratings on the underlying securities a Rating Factor based on
Moody's published 10-yr idealized loss expectations.  Weights are
assigned to each Rating Factor based on the contribution (by
outstanding pledged balance) of the underlying security to the
resecuritized transaction.

(2) Second, Moody's determines the weighted average credit
    enhancement available to the portfolio security by evaluating
    the loss coverage level consistent with the ratings on the
    underlying securities and the underlying mortgage pool losses
    and weighting them based on the outstanding pledged balance of
    the underlying securities.

(3) Finally, the ratings on the bonds issued in the
    resecuritization are determined after taking into
    consideration additional structural aspects of the
    resecuritization.  For transactions where only a single
    tranche is issued, the weighted average portfolio rating (as
    determined in step 1 above) is the rating assigned to the
    tranche.  Where multiple securities are issued, the loss
    allocation and cash flow priority are taken into
    consideration.  For instance where the certificates in the
    resecuritization are tranched into a super senior tranche and
    a support tranche, the support tranche is notched down to
    reflect a higher severity of loss to that tranche.  The rating
    on the super senior tranche is determined based on the total
    credit enhancement available i.e. the credit enhancement
    assessed in step (2) and the additional enhancement from the
    support tranche.

The probability of default for the junior-most certificate in the
resecuritization is the same as the probability of default for the
lowest rated underlying certificate.  However, Moody's anticipates
a higher loss severity on the junior-most class due to its
subordinate position (both in terms of principal distribution and
loss allocation) and smaller size (when compared to underlying
certificate).  Therefore, the ratings on junior certificates in
the resecuritization are lower than the portfolio rating on the
combined underlying bonds.

Because the ratings on the certificates in the resecuritization
are linked to the ratings on the underlying certificates and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
certificates may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization.  The ratings on the
certificates in the resecuritization address the ultimate payment
of promised interest and principal and do not address any other
amounts that may be payable on the certificates.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described above.

Complete Rating Actions are:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2006-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previoulsy on 11/29/2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previoulsy on 11/29/2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previoulsy on 11/29/2006
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previoulsy on 11/29/2006
     Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 11/14/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 11/14/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSMSC Pass-Through Trust 2008-2R

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/2/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/2/2009 Downgraded
     to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/2/2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/2/2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-R4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 1/13/2009 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 1/13/2009
     Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/13/2009 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/13/2009 Assigned
     Ba2

Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-2, Ltd.

  -- Notes, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/13/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 56 Tranches From 41 SF CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of 56 tranches contained within 41 US Structured Finance
CDOs.  The tranches affected by the actions are from CDOs that
have experienced an Event of Default and in each case the Trustee
has been directed to liquidate the collateral as a post-event-of-
default remedy.  Moody's has been notified by the respective
Trustee in each of these cases that a final distribution of
liquidation proceeds has taken place (except for retention of a
small amount of residual funds in certain cases).

The rating actions taken reflect the final liquidation
distribution and changes in severity of loss associated with the
downgraded tranches.

ACA Aquarius 2006-1, Ltd.

  -- US$1,266,000,000 Class A1S Variable Funding Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2046, Downgraded to C; previously on
     6/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Armitage ABS CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$1,950,000,000 Class A-1M Floating Rate Senior Secured
     Notes Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/11/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$450,000,000 Class A-1Q Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
     Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/11/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Auriga CDO Ltd.

  -- US$975,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due January 2047, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 9/23/2008 Downgraded to Ca

CAMBER 6 plc

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Cherry Creek CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$195,000,000 Class A1S Senior Floating Rate Notes Due May
     2046, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

Costa Bella CDO Ltd.

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2046, Downgraded to C; previously on
     9/23/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- Class A-1 Swap, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/23/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Duke Funding XII, Ltd.

  -- US$1,388,000,000 Class A-S1VFA Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2046, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/23/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-S1VFB Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2046, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/23/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

Fort Denison Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$225,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 6/25/2008 Downgraded to Ca

GSC ABS Funding 2006-3g, Ltd.

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-1-a Floating Rate Notes Due June 2042,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 7/17/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- Up to US$1,085,000,000 Commercial Paper Notes/Class A-ILT
     Floating Rate Notes Due June 2042, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 7/17/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Gulf Stream-Atlantic CDO 2007-1, Ltd.

  -- US$300,000,000 CLASS A1-VF SENIOR FLOATING RATE NOTES DUE
     2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

High Grade Structured Credit CDO 2007-1

  -- Up to US$3,240,000,000 Class A-1B Notes, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 9/3/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$27,900,000 Class X Senior Secured Notes Due 2017,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 12/11/2008 Downgraded to Caa3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

Hudson High Grade Funding 2006-1, Ltd.

  -- US$1,275,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/8/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1, Ltd.

  -- US$37,000,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes Due 2012,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/8/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$1,200,000,000 Senior Swap, Downgraded to C; previously on
     8/8/2008 Downgraded to Ca

IXIS ABS CDO 3 Ltd.

  -- Class A-1LA Investor Swap, Downgraded to C; previously on
     4/24/2009 Downgraded to Ca

Jupiter High Grade CDO VII, Ltd.

  -- US$1,050,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     C; previously on 9/11/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Kleros Real Estate CDO III, Ltd.

  -- US$815,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes due 2046, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Libertas Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.

  -- US$200,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on
     8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Longridge ABS CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$160,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/23/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Mars CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$180,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2052, Downgraded to C; previously on
     5/29/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Midori CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$6,500,000 Class A-X Secured Notes Due 2047, Downgraded to
     C; previously on 11/14/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Neptune CDO IV, Ltd.

  -- Class A-1 Swap, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Class X Senior Amortizing Floating Rate Notes due April 2015,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 5/18/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Nordic Valley 2007-1 CDO, LTD.

  -- US$0 Class A-1 Senior Secured Funded Notes due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/26/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$600,000,000 Class A-1 Unfunded Notes due 2047, Downgraded
     to C; previously on 8/26/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$31,500,000 Class A-X Senior Secured Notes Due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/26/2008 Downgraded to Caa2
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

Norma CDO I Ltd.

  -- US$975,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2049, Downgraded to C; previously on
     8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Octans II CDO Ltd.

  -- US$ 945,000,000 Class A-1 Swap, Downgraded to C; previously
     on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Octonion I CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$22,250,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes Due 2014,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/26/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Pinnacle Peak CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$750,000,000 Class A1M Floating Rate Notes Due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Caa3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$265,000,000 Class A1Q Floating Rate Notes Due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Caa3
     and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

Plettenberg Bay CDO Limited

  -- US$300,000,000 Class S Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2047,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/26/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Preston CDO I, Ltd.

  -- US$5,400,000 Class X Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2013, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

Raffles Place Funding, Ltd.

  -- Funding Notes/CP Notes-1, Downgraded to C; previously on
     3/26/2009 Downgraded to Ca

Sagittarius CDO I Ltd.

  -- US$15,000,000 Class S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2012, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/11/2008 Downgraded to
     Caa3 and remains on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$630,000,000 Super Senior Swap, Downgraded to C; previously
     on 9/23/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Singa Funding, Ltd.

  -- US$600,000,000 Class A1M Floating Rate Notes Due 2046,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 9/23/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Sorin CDO V Ltd.

  -- US$402,000,000 Class A-1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2051, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Springdale CDO 2006-1 Ltd.

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due March 2051, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- US$60,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     March 2051, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/29/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

Tallships Funding, Ltd.

  -- Advance Swap, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/6/2008
     Downgraded to Ca

  -- Revolving Credit Agreement, Downgraded to C; previously on
     10/6/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Tasman CDO, Ltd.

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A1J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/26/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- US$164,000,000 Class A1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- US$58,000,000 Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2047, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/26/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

Tenorite CDO I Ltd.

  -- Up to US$550,000,000 Class A Notes, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Timberwolf I, Ltd.

  -- US$ 9,000,000 Class S-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2011,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to Ca


     Tourmaline CDO II Ltd

  -- US$700,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Variable Funding Floating
     Rate Notes, Due 2046, Downgraded to C; previously on
     11/21/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Vertical ABS CDO 2007-2, Ltd.

  -- US$22,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2014, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded to
     Ca

Vertical Virgo 2006-1, Ltd.

  -- US$1,266,000,000 Class A1S Variable Funding Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2046, Downgraded to C; previously on
     9/23/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Western Springs CDO Ltd.

  -- US$200,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008
     Downgraded to Ca


* Moody's Modifies Rating Methodology on Structured Finance
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service is modifying the rating methodology it
applies to structured finance securities insured by financial
guarantors.  Specifically, starting September 1, 2009, Moody's
will withdraw the ratings on those structured finance securities
insured by guarantors that have financial strength ratings below
Baa3 (that is non-investment grade) if either of two conditions
are met: Moody's is unable to determine an underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security or
the issuer has requested that the guaranty constitute the sole
credit consideration.

Moody's listed securities impacted by the new policy whereby their
ratings will be withdrawn on September 1, 2009, unless prior to
that date Moody's is a) provided sufficient information to
determine the underlying rating or b) informed by the issuer in
the case of GMAC Certificados Bursatiles UDIS MXMACFW 07-5U to no
longer rate the security solely based on the guaranty.

Moody's rating on a structured finance security insured by a
financial guarantor will continue to be at the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) providing that an
underlying rating can be determined the current underlying rating
on the security, regardless of whether the underlying rating is
published or not.  If the underlying rating cannot be determined
or if the issuer has requested that the guaranty constitute the
sole credit consideration, and a) providing the guarantor's
financial strength rating is Baa3 or higher, Moody's rating on a
structured finance securitiy shall continue to be equal to the
guarantors financial strength rating, otherwise, b) as detailed
above, Moody's will withdraw the rating.

At this time, Moody's is not changing the rating methodology it
applies for non-structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors.

For this security, the issuer has requested that the guaranty
constitute the sole credit consideration:

* Deal Name: GMAC Certificados Bursatiles UDIS MXMACFW 07-5U

  -- Tranche Name: MXMACFW 07-5U Certificados Bursatiles Class A
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
  -- Current Rating: B3

These securities, Moody's is unable to determine the underlying
rating, therefore the rating on the securities is equal to the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating.

* Deal Name: GESB plc

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

* Deal Name: Juneau Investments LLC MTN Programme

  -- Tranche Name: Medium Term Note Programme
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2001 Series A and B

  -- Tranche Name: Medium Term Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 48182PAB9

* Deal Name: Juneau Investments LLC 2000 B

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. 2000-B
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAA7

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2001 Series A and B

  -- Tranche Name: 2001 Ser. A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

* Deal Name: Juneau Investment LLC 2000A

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. 2001-A-1
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

* Deal Name: Juneau Investment LLC 2000A

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. 2001-A-2
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAC3

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2002 Series A

  -- Tranche Name: 2002 Series A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAD1

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investment LLC, 2002 Series B

  -- Tranche Name: 2002 Series B
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAE9

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2003 Series A

  -- Tranche Name: 2003 Ser. A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAF6

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2004 Series A

  -- Tranche Name: 2004 Ser. A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

CUSIP: 01446EAG4

* Deal Name: Aleutian Investments LLC, 2006 Series A

  -- Tranche Name: 2006 Ser. A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: Ba3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC MTN Programme

  -- Tranche Name: Class A
  -- Financial Guarantor: Capital Markets Assurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FAE0

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 1999-C

  -- Tranche Name: Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FAH3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 2000-B

  -- Tranche Name: Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC 2000-E

  -- Tranche Name: Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC

  -- Tranche Name: Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
Program

  -- Tranche Name: Global Medium-Term Note Program
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 589628DJ2

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2002-E

  -- Tranche Name: Float Rate Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FAX8

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2004-B

  -- Tranche Name: Float Rate Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FAY6

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2006-A

  -- Tranche Name: Flt Rt Notes
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FAZ3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company LLC, Series 2006-B

  -- Tranche Name: 2006-B
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LBZ8

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCH7

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LBN5

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LEK8

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LEF9

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LEQ5

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266MBB9

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCY0

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCE4

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCF1

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDF0

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCJ3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDH6

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LBM7

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCP9

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCT1

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LCS3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDG8

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDM5

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDQ6

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDU7

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LDW3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LEB8

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 55266LED4

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. MTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

* Deal Name: MBIA Global Funding, LLC - Global Medium-Term Note
  Program

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. EMTN
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FBB5

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company, LLC, Series 2007-A

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. 2007-A
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 58962FBC3

* Deal Name: Meridian Funding Company LLC, Series 2007-B

  -- Tranche Name: Ser. 2007-B
  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation
  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 051155AA7

* Deal Name: Augusta Funding Limited II

  -- Tranche Name: $150,000,000 8.40% Secured Guaranteed Bonds Due
     2030

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation

  -- Current Rating: B3

CUSIP: 268417AD4

* Deal Name: EDT Funding Ltd.

  -- Tranche Name: $142,739,000 8.0979% Secured Guaranteed Bonds
     Due April 15, 2030, Series 1995-1, Class A-4

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation

  -- Current Rating: B3


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 85 Classes From Five CMBS
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 85 classes from five commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions on review for possible
downgrade due to the significant credit uncertainty surrounding
the ultimate resolution of the Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant
Town Loan.  Recent stagnant collateral performance, weakening
multifamily market fundamentals, and the potential for an adverse
court ruling requiring a refund of past rent increases to tenants
prompted this action.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of CMBS transactions.

The PCV/ST Loan represents a $3.0 billion pari passu first
mortgage spread among five CMBS deals.  The loan is secured by two
adjacent multifamily apartment complexes totaling 11,230 units
located on the east side of Manhattan.  The borrower purchased the
property for $5.4 billion in 2006 and planned to increase the
value through a comprehensive renovation of the property and
conversion of rent regulated to market rent units.  However,
progress has been slower than expected.  As of April 2009, just
39% of the apartments were at market rate compared to a projected
56% by the appraiser at the time of securitization.  In addition,
the softening Manhattan rental market has contributed to lower
effective rents on the market rent units, with significant
concessions being offered to maintain a high occupancy rate.

In March 2009, the Appellate Division of the New York State
Supreme Court ruled that the property owner should not have been
deregulating apartments and then raising regulated rents to market
while receiving "J-51" tax abatements.  But later the property
owner was granted the right to appeal the decision to New York's
highest appeals court.  The case is tentatively scheduled to be
heard in September.  An adverse ruling could require the property
owner to refund past rent increases to tenants, as well as limit
future rent increases.

The property's operating income does not cover the mortgage
payment, with an actual first mortgage debt service coverage ratio
of 0.75X and total debt DSCR (including $1.4 billion of mezzanine
debt) of 0.51X for the full year 2008.  The property's first
quarter 2009 annualized operating income is approximately 3% lower
than that for the full year 2008 and 7% lower than the 2009
budget.

At securitization, a $400 million interest reserve and a
$190 million general reserve were established to cover interest
shortfalls.  As of June 2009, approximately $70 million of these
reserves remain, which will likely be depleted by the end of the
year. While the situation is still ongoing, Moody's expects the
loan to be transferred to special servicing at the latest when the
interest reserve runs out.

Moody's will continue to monitor the performance of the loan and
the resolution of the legal proceedings.

Moody's rating action is:

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-C30 (19% exposure)

  -- Class A-M, $540,349,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $250,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed Aaa on 2/12/2009

  -- Class A-J, $671,798,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class B, $49,397,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class C, $79,035,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class D, $69,155,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class E, $59,277,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class F, $69,155,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class G, $98,794,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class H, $79,035,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class J, $88,914,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class K, $79,035,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/12/2009

  -- Class L, $39,518,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba2 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class M, $19,759,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba3 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class N, $29,638,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B1 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class O, $19,758,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B2 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class P, $9,880,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on
     2/12/2009

  -- Class Q, $19,759,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/12/2009

Moody's prior review is summarized in a Press Release dated
February 12, 2009.

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-5 (18% exposure)

  -- Class A-M, $341,702,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class AM-FL, $100,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-J, $211,490,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class AJ-FL, $175,000,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $77,297,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $33,128,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $77,298,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $38,649,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $55,213,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $49,691,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $49,692,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $11,042,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class P, $11,043,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/6/2009

Moody's prior review is summarized in a press release dated
February 6, 2009.

COBALT CMBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-C2 (10% exposure)

  -- Class A-MFX, $221,947,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-MFL, $20,000,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-JFX, $102,630,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class A-JFL, $100,000,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $21,171,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $27,219,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $21,170,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $15,122,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $18,146,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $30,243,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $24,195,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class J, $24,194,000, currently rated B2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class K, $30,244,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/6/2009

  -- Class L, $12,097,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $3,024,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class N, $9,073,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class O, $6,049,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B2 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class P, $3,024,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on
     2/6/2009

  -- Class Q, $6,049,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/6/2009

Moody's prior review is summarized in a Press Release dated
February 6, 2009.

ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-6 (9% exposure)

  -- Class AM, $214,593,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/10/2009

  -- Class AJ, $107,403,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class AJ-FL, $75,000,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class B, $42,919,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class C, $16,094,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class D, $34,872,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class E, $18,776,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class F, $24,142,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class G, $24,142,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class H, $26,824,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/10/2009

  -- Class J, $5,365,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba2 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class K, $5,365,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class L, $5,364,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class M, $5,365,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class N, $5,365,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on
     2/10/2009

  -- Class P, $5,365,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/10/2009

Moody's prior review is summarized in a Press Release dated
February 10, 2009.

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-C31 (4% exposure)

  -- Class A-M, $584,547,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/11/2009

  -- Class A-J, $460,331,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $36,534,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $73,068,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $73,069,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $29,227,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $51,148,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $58,454,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $80,376,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $51,147,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $65,762,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3
     on 2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $29,227,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $14,614,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $21,921,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class O, $14,614,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class P, $14,613,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class Q, $14,614,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class S, $7,306,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class T, $14,614,000, currently rated Ca, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca from Caa3 on
     2/11/2009

Moody's prior review is summarized in a press release dated
February 11, 2009.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches From Nine CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 34
tranches from nine U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  The ratings on 29 of the downgraded
tranches are on CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating
a significant likelihood of further downgrades.  Additionally, S&P
placed the ratings on four of the tranches S&P reviewed on
CreditWatch negative.

The 34 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $3.5 billion. Seven of the nine transactions
are CDOs backed by corporate CDOs and CDOs of asset-backed
securities, while the remaining two transactions are CDOs backed
by mezzanine structured finance residential mortgage-backed
securities.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration of the underlying collateral, which in turn resulted
from weakening in the credit quality of the corporate and ABS
securities that these CDOs carry in their portfolios.

The CreditWatch placements predominantly affect transactions for
which a significant portion of the collateral assets currently
have ratings on CreditWatch negative or have significant exposure
to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                                               Rating
                                               ------
  Transaction                    Class     To             From
  -----------                    -----     --             ----
Coast Investment Grade 2001-1    A         A/Watch Neg    AAA
Coast Investment Grade 2001-1    B-1       BB/Watch Neg   AA-/Watch Neg
Coast Investment Grade 2001-1    B-2       BB/Watch Neg   AA-/Watch Neg
Coast Investment Grade 2001-1    C-1       CCC-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Coast Investment Grade 2001-1    C-2       CCC-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        A-1LA     CCC           BBB-/Watch Neg
Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        A-1LB     CC             B/Watch Neg
Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     A-1       B+/Watch Neg  BBB-/Watch Neg
Parkridge Lane Structured
Finance Special Opportunities
CDO I Ltd                        A-1       AA             AAA
                                 A-2       BB+/Watch Neg  BBB/Watch Neg
                                 B         B+/Watch Neg   BB/Watch Neg
                                 C         CCC+/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
Pioneer Valley Structured
Credit CDO I Ltd                 A-1A      BB/Watch Neg   A+/Watch Neg
                                 A-2       CCC+/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
                                 B         CC             CCC-/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd          A-1L      BB+/Watch Neg  AAA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd          A-2L      B+/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd          A-3L      CCC/Watch Neg  BBB+/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd          B-1L      CC             CCC/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         A-1LA     A/Watch Neg    AAA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         A-1LB     BBB+/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         A-2L      BB/Watch Neg   AA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         A-3L      B+/Watch Neg   BBB+/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         B-1L      CCC+/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         B-2L      CCC-/Watch Neg CCC+/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited IX A-1       BBB+/Watch Neg AA
Zais Investment Grade Limited IX A-2       BB-/Watch Neg  A/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited IX B         CCC+/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  A-1a      A/Watch Neg    AAA
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  A-1b      A/Watch Neg    AAA
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  A-2       BBB-/Watch Neg AA+/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  A-3       BB/Watch Neg   A+/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  A-4       B-/Watch Neg   BBB/Watch Neg
Zais Investment Grade Limited X  B         CCC/Watch Neg  B/Watch Neg

              Rating Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                                                  Rating
                                                  ------
  Transaction                      Class     To             From
  -----------                      -----     --             ----
  Parkridge Lane Structured
  Finance Special Opportunities
  CDO I Ltd                        D         CCC/Watch Neg  CCC
                                   E         CCC-/Watch Neg CCC-
  Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd          X         AAA/Watch Neg  AAA
  Zais Investment Grade Limited X  S         AAA/Watch Neg  AAA

                     Other Ratings Reviewed

      Transaction                      Class     Rating
      -----------                      -----     ------
      C-Bass CBO V Ltd                 B         AAA
      C-Bass CBO V Ltd                 C         AAA
      C-Bass CBO V Ltd                 D-1       AA
      C-Bass CBO V Ltd                 D-2       AA
      Diversified Asset Securitization
      Holdings II L.P.                 A-1       AA+
                                       A-1L      AA+
      Gresham Street CDO Funding
      2003-1 Ltd                       B         AAA
                                       C         AAA
                                       D         A-
                                       Pref Shrs BBB-
      Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        A-2L      CC
      Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        A-3L      CC
      Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        B-1L      CC
      Manasquan CDO 2005-1 Ltd.        B-2L      CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     A-2       CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     A-3       CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     B         CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     C         CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     D         CC
      Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.     E         CC
      NYLIM Stratford CDO 2001-1 Ltd.  A         AAA
      Pioneer Valley Structured Credit
      CDO I Ltd                        C         CC
                                       D         CC
                                       X         AAA
      Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd          A         BBB/Watch Neg
      Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd          B         B/Watch Neg
      Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd          C         CCC/Watch Neg
      Tricadia CDO 2006-6 Ltd.         X         AAA/Watch Neg
      Zais Investment Grade Limited IX C         CC
      Zais Investment Grade Limited IX D         CC
      Zais Investment Grade Limited IX X         AAA
      Zais Investment Grade Limited X  C         CC
      Zais Investment Grade Limited X  D         CC


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 77 Classes From Five RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 77
classes from five residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. Alternative-A and subprime mortgage
loan collateral issued in 2005 and 2007.  S&P removed 26 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades and CreditWatch resolutions incorporate S&P's
assessment of current losses as well as projected losses based on
S&P's methodology and assumptions.

The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels.  Although
cumulative losses were generally low in comparison with S&P's
projected lifetime losses for the transactions reviewed, S&P is
projecting an increase in losses due to increases in delinquencies
and the current negative condition of the housing market.

For a list of publications detailing S&P's derivation of lifetime
losses for the transactions S&P reviewed, refer to the "Related
Research" section below.

To maintain an 'AAA' rating for classes in Alt-A and subprime
transactions, S&P considers whether a bond is able to withstand
approximately 150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors assumed on specific
transactions.  For a class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating,
S&P considers whether a bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case
loss assumptions.  Other rating categories are dispersed,
approximately equally, between these two loss assumptions.  For
example, to maintain a 'BB' rating on one class, S&P would
consider whether the class is able to withstand approximately 110%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, while, in connection with a
different class, S&P would consider whether it is able to
withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating.

The subordination of more-junior classes within each applicable
structure, as well as excess interest for some structures,
provides credit support for the affected transactions.  In
addition, some of the transactions S&P reviewed may be
collateralized by loans that are generally insured by third
parties that cover a certain amount, up to a maximum, based on the
insurer's regulations.  The collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of fixed- or adjustable-rate,
Alt-A or subprime residential mortgage loans secured by one- to
four-family properties.

S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated performance
information to assess whether, in S&P's view, the applicable
credit enhancement is sufficient to support the current ratings.
S&P will continue to monitor these transactions and take
additional rating actions as S&P think appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                       ABFC 2007-NC1 Trust
                         Series 2007-NC1

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   A-1        00076BAA2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
   A-2        00076BAB0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1        00076BAE4     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2        00076BAF1     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-3        00076BAG9     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M-4        00076BAH7     CCC                  A+/Watch Neg
   M-5        00076BAJ3     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M-6        00076BAK0     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M-7        00076BAL8     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   M-8        00076BAM6     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   M-9        00076BAN4     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg

      Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2007-HE7
                          Series 2007-HE7

                                    Rating
                                    ------
   Class      CUSIP         To                   From
   -----      -----         --                   ----
   I-A-1      07387VAA7     BBB                  AAA/Watch Neg
   I-A-2      07387VAB5     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-1     07387VAC3     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   II-A-2     07387VAD1     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   III-A-1    07387VAE9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
   III-A-2    07387VAF6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
   M-1        07387VAG4     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
   M-2        07387VAH2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
   M-3        07387VAJ8     CCC                  AA-/Watch Neg
   M-4        07387VAK5     CC                   A+/Watch Neg
   M-5        07387VAL3     CC                   A/Watch Neg
   M-6        07387VAM1     CC                   A-/Watch Neg
   M-7        07387VAN9     CC                   BBB+/Watch Neg
   M-8        07387VAP4     CC                   BBB/Watch Neg
   M-9        07387VAQ2     CC                   BBB-/Watch Neg

              CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1
                           Series 2005-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A-1      12669GRM5     BB                   AAA
        1-A-2      12669GRN3     CCC                  A
        1-X        12669GRP8     BB                   AAA
        2-A-1      12669GRQ6     BB                   AAA
        2-A-2      12669GRR4     CCC                  A
        2-A-3      12669GSN2     CCC                  A
        2-X        12669GRS2     BB                   AAA
        M-X        12669GRV5     CC                   CCC
        M-1        12669GRU7     CC                   CCC
        M-2        12669GSP7     CC                   CCC
        B-3        12669GRY9     D                    CC

   WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY5 Trust
                          Series 2007-HY5

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A1       92990GAA1     CC                   B
        1-A2       92990GAB9     CC                   CCC
        1-B-1      92990GAL7     CC                   CCC
        2-A-1      92990GAC7     CC                   B
        2-A-2      92990GAD5     CC                   B
        2-A-3      92990GAE3     CC                   B
        2-A-4      92990GAF0     CC                   B
        2-A-5      92990GAG8     CC                   B
        2-AB 1     92990GAH6     CC                   CCC
        2-AB 2                   CC                   CCC
        2-AB 3                   CC                   CCC
        2-AB 4                   CC                   CCC
        2-AB 5                   CC                   CCC
        2-B-1      92990GAP8     CC                   CCC
        2-B-2      92990GAQ6     CC                   CCC
        3-A1       92990GAJ2     B                    AAA
        3-A2       92990GAK9     CC                   B
        3-B-1      92990GAS2     CC                   CCC
        3-B-2      92990GAT0     CC                   CCC
        3-B-3      92990GAU7     CC                   CCC

  WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY7 Trust
                          Series 2007-HY7

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        1-A1       93364FAA9     CC                   CCC
        1-A2       93364FAB7     CC                   CCC
        2-A1       93364FAC5     CC                   CCC
        2-A2       93364FAD3     CC                   CCC
        2-A3       93364FAE1     CC                   CCC
        2-A4       93364FAF8     CC                   CCC
        L-B-1      93364FAP6     CC                   CCC
        3-A-1      93364FAG6     CC                   B+
        3-A2       93364FAH4     CCC                  B+
        3-A3       93364FAJ0     CC                   B
        3-A4       93364FAK7     CC                   CCC
        3-B-1      93364FAS0     CC                   CCC
        3-B-2      93364FAT8     CC                   CCC
        3-B-3      93364FAU5     D                    CC
        4-A1       93364FAL5     CCC                  BBB-
        4-A2       93364FAM3     CC                   B
        4-A3       93364FAN1     CC                   B
        4-B-1      93364FAV3     CC                   CCC
        4-B-2      93364FAW1     CC                   CCC
        4-B-3      93364FAX9     CC                   CCC



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez, Philline
Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug,
and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.

                  *** End of Transmission ***