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T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
Sunday, July 12, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 191
Headlines
1888 FUND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2000-1 Note
AFC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
AVIATION CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Notes to 'D'
BABSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-I Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 98 Tranches
BLEECKER STRUCTURED: Fitch Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Securities
CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 13 Classes of Securities
CAVALRY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
CHL MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-5 Certs. From 'B-'
COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 Classes of Certs.
COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 Classes of Certs.
COUNTRYWIDE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Securities
CS 2006-TFL2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Classes
CSFB MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 93 Tranches
DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Five Tranches
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 40 RMBS Tranches
EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GALLATIN FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 to 'Ba1'
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2004-C3 Certs. to 'D'
GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 31 Tranches
GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 17 2004-GG1 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-GG3 Certs.
GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Certificates
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Seven Tranches
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 280 Tranches
GULF STREAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
HOME RE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five 2006-1 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2004-C3 Certificates
JPMORGAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-CH1 Notes
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-HE1 Tranches
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-CIBC12 Certs.
KATONAH VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2005-C1 Certs.
LEHMAN XS: S&P Corrects Ratings on Two 2007-10H Certificates
LOWER BUCKS: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating on $27 Mil. 1992 Bonds
MARATHON STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MARKET SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 87 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-AFC1 Notes
METROPOLITAN ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Securities
MEZZ CAP: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-C4 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2003-IQ4 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-RM1 Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
NINE GRADE: Moody's Assigns 'C' Rating on $25 Million Notes
NEW SOUTH: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Note
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Corrects Ratings on Press Release
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 130 Securities
RALI SERIES: Moody's Junks Ratings on 2006-Q09 Trust From 'Aa3'
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-RS1 Notes
RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
SALT CREEK: Fitch Puts Ratings on Five Notes on Negative Watch
SARM 2008-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
SMART HOME: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 37 Tranches by Four Deals
SPGS SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1 Notes to 'D'
STRATS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $34 Mil. Certs. to 'B'
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-AR7 Notes
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Issuer Default Rating
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 32 Tranches
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five 2005-AR4 Tranches
WEST COAST: Moody's Has Not Withdrawn Ratings on Various Classes
WHITEHORSE II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 104 Tranches From 21 RMBS Deals
* Moody's Takes ABCP Rating Actions Ending July 6, 2009
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 18 Classes From 11 Prime Jumbo RMBSS
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 63 Classes From 15 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 86 Classes From 10 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 612 Classes From 44 Prime Jumbo RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Classes of Notes From Cash Flow
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 65 Classes From Six Prime Jumbo RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 120 Classes From 13 Alt-A RMBS Deals
*********
1888 FUND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by 1888 Fund, Ltd.:
-- US$290,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2015, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on December 20, 2002
Assigned Aaa;
-- US$75,000,000 Class A-2 Delayed Funding Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Aa1; previously
on December 20, 2002 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$47,000,000 Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2015,
Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the rating of these notes:
-- US$10,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2015, Confirmed at A1; previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 3301 versus a test level of 2400 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 4, 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $19.6 million, accounting for
roughly 5.5% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 17% of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
1888 Fund, Ltd., issued on December 20, 2002, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
ABFS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2000-1 Note
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of a note
issued by ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1. The security is
supported by an insurance policy issued by Ambac Assurance
Corporation.
The current ratings on the security are consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.
As part of evaluating the current rating for the security, Moody's
Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating of the
security. The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit
quality of the security in the absence of the guarantee.
The underlying rating on the security is based on the methodology
applied to all transactions with small pool factors. Moody's
defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of these two
criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less than
$1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool
has fewer than 50 loans remaining
Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The fewer
the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the minimum
default since each loan represents a higher percentage of the
pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
Complete rating action:
Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1 (Loans Remaining: Pool 2 -
- 10)
-- Cl. A-2, Current Balance: $1,194,097, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on 11/17/2008 Downgraded to Baa1
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on
7/1/2008 Published at Baa1
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Downgraded
to Ba3, Outlook Developing on 4/13/2009)
AFC MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
classes of notes from two transactions issued by AFC Mortgage
Loan. The securities are supported by insurance policies issued
by Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.
The current ratings on the securities are consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.
As part of evaluating the current ratings for the securities,
Moody's Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.
The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
security in the absence of the guarantee.
The underlying rating on the security is based on the methodology
applied to all transactions with small pool factors. Moody's
defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of these two
criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less than
$1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool
has fewer than 50 loans remaining
Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
Complete rating action:
Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1997-3
(Loans Remaining: 40)
-- Cl. 2A, Current Balance: $2,256,553, Downgraded to Ba1;
previously on 6/16/2008 Upgraded to Baa2
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
6/16/2008 Published at Baa2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 1999-4 (Loans
Remaining: 37)
-- Cl. 3A, Current Balance: $633,237 Downgraded to B3;
previously on 6/16/2008 Upgraded to A1
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3; previously on
6/16/2008 Published at A1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
AVIATION CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
subordinate classes of notes issued by Aviation Capital Group
Trust to 'D'.
The downgrades reflect a shortfall of the minimum principal
payment to the class A notes. According to the servicing report,
the minimum principal payment amount increased as a result of
aircraft sales. Consequently, the resulting deficit to class A
has caused all principal and interest to be locked out to
subordinate tranches, which caused interest shortfalls to the
class B-1, C-1, and D-1 notes.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the other outstanding
notes issued by Aviation Capital Group Trust, and S&P will
consider taking additional rating actions if performance
deteriorates further.
Ratings Lowered
Aviation Capital Group Trust
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B-1 D CCC+/Negative
C-1 D CCC/Negative
D-1 D CCC-/Negative
BABSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-I Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Babson CLO Ltd. 2006-I:
-- US$30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes, Due 2018, Downgraded to
Aa2; previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$150,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Delayed Draw Notes, Due
2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned
Aaa;
-- US$40,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes, Due 2018, Downgraded to
Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$51,700,000 Class B Senior Notes, Due 2018, Downgraded to
A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$14,000,000 Class Z Combination Notes, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on March 4, 2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:
-- US$27,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Due 2018,
Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17, 2009 Ba1 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$23,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes, Due 2018,
Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17, 2009 B1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,100,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes, Due 2018,
Confirmed at Caa3; previously on March 17, 2009 Caa3 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of
Mezzanine Overcollateralization Test and Junior
Overcollateralization Test. The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and it is currently at
3100 versus a test level of 2918 as of the last trustee report,
dated May 11, 2009. Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $35 million, accounting for roughly 6% of
the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 14% of the underlying portfolio. Additionally,
interest payments on the Class E Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Mezzanine
Overcollateralization Tests. Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in a small number of obligors
and industries. This includes a significant concentration in debt
obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.
Moody's also announced that it has upgraded the rating of this
note:
-- US$10,000,000 Class P Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Aa1;
previously on June 13, 2006 Assigned Aa3.
Moody's notes that its rating on the Class P Notes is solely with
respect to the ultimate payment of the $10,000,000 Stated
Principal Amount of the Class P Notes. Repayment on these
"principal protected notes" is supported by U.S $10,000,000 in
initial aggregate principal amount of a 10 Year US$ Zero Coupon
Note issued under a EURo Medium Term Note Programme of the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, due May 31, 2016, which is
currently rated Aa1.
Babson CLO 2006-I, issued in May 25, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 98 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 98
tranches from 18 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Banc of America.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans. These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively. Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
Moody's defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of
these two criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less
than $1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% and (2) the
pool has fewer than 50 loans remaining
Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals:
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
then subject to a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
List of actions:
Banc of America Funding 2003-2 Trust
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A3
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/17/2006
Upgraded to Ba1
Banc of America Funding 2004-D Trust
-- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/1/2005 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/1/2005 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/1/2005 Assigned
B2
Banc of America Mortgage 2003-B Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/31/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/31/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/31/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/31/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/1/2004
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/31/2003
Assigned Aaa
Banc of America Mortgage 2003-I Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/25/2003
Assigned Aa3
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/25/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/25/2003
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/25/2003
Assigned Ba3
Banc of America Mortgage 2003-J Trust
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A3
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Baa3
Banc of America Mortgage 2003-K Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A3
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to B1
Banc of America Mortgage 2003-L Trust
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/12/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/12/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/12/2004
Assigned Ba3
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-2 Trust
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. 3-B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. 3-B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. 3-B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. 3-B-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned B2
-- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-E Trust
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Baa2
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-F Trust
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/3/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/3/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/3/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/3/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
A3
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/3/2004
Assigned Baa2
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-G Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned B2
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-H Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-I Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/22/2005
Assigned Aaa
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-J Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-K Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/23/2004
Assigned Aa1
Banc of America Mortgage 2004-L Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
Bank of America Mortgage 2002-E Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Aa1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Ba1
Bank of America Mortgage 2002-G Trust
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-A-PT, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/25/2003
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. 1-B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Aa1
-- Cl. 1-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. 1-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/25/2003
Upgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. 1-B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned B2
BLEECKER STRUCTURED: Fitch Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of notes issued by
Bleecker Structured Asset Funding, Ltd.:
-- $6,211,877 class A-1 notes to 'CCC' from 'B-/DR2';
-- $43,483,141 class A-2 notes to 'CCC' from 'B-/DR2'.
These rating actions are a result of the continued credit
deterioration of the portfolio with 42.7% of the portfolio
downgraded a weighted average of 4.7 notches since the last rating
action. This negative credit migration has left 60.6% of the
portfolio now rated below investment grade, of which 39.1% is
rated 'CCC' or lower. Additionally, 43.8%, or $25.7 million, of
the current portfolio is now considered defaulted per the
transaction's governing documents, as detailed on the May 2009
trustee report.
The par amounts of some of the downgraded assets within the
portfolio have been haircut for purposes of calculating the
overcollateralization ratios causing each of the OC ratios to
further decline below their respective covenants. The class A OC
ratio has dropped to 63.1% versus a trigger of 106.5% and the
class B and class C OC ratios have decreased to 34.9% and 25.3%
respectively, as compared to their respective test limits of
110.5% and 102%.
The failure of the class A OC test, which began in March 2005, has
cut off all interest payments to the classes B, C, and D notes,
and instead applied available remaining interest and principal
proceeds towards the reduction of the class A-1 and A-2 notes
principal, pro-rata. Although, to date approximately 86.2% of the
original balance of the class A-1 and A-2 notes has paid down, the
credit enhancement available to both classes of notes has eroded.
Fitch expects both classes of notes to continue to receive their
timely interest payments for the foreseeable future. However, the
class A-1 and the class A-2 notes will likely experience some
impairment of principal over the remaining life of the transaction
given the continued deterioration and performance expectation of
the portfolio.
Bleecker is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation, which
closed on March 28, 2000 and is managed by Clinton Group, Inc.
The transaction declared an event of default on Aug. 31, 2003 due
to a failure to maintain the aggregate principal balance of all
portfolio securities to be at least equal to the aggregate
outstanding balance of all rated notes. Bleecker has a current
portfolio comprised of 58.4% commercial and consumer asset-backed
securities, 18.2% residential mortgage-backed securities, 17% of
commercial mortgage-backed securities, and 6.4% of one credit
tenant lease.
Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.
C-BASS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 40
securities and upgraded the ratings of 4 securities from 12
transactions issued by C-BASS Trust. These actions are part of an
ongoing review of subprime RMBS transactions.
The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections. The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months. Additionally, most
affected transactions have, at some point, passed performance
triggers and released portions of credit enhancement.
Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year. For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively. Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case ranging from 70% to
80%. The results of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and
Pipeline Losses -- are weighted to arrive at the lifetime
cumulative loss projection.
The upgrades of the ratings of 4 securities are based upon non-
declining credit support due to cumulative losses exceeding their
triggers, requiring all future payments to be paid to the most
senior outstanding bond.
The complete rating actions:
C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-CB3
-- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 9/27/2001 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2001 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/13/2006
Downgraded to B1
C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2001-CB4
-- Cl. IM-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/4/2002
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. IM-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/4/2002
Assigned A2
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-CB1
-- Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 3/23/2009 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A2; previously on 3/23/2009 Upgraded
to Baa1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Caa2
C-BASS 2002-CB5 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/19/2002
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/19/2002
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/5/2006
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/14/2006
Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/14/2006
Downgraded to B3
C-BASS 2002-CB6 Trust
-- Cl. M-2F, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/24/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/24/2003
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/12/2007
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/12/2007
Downgraded to Caa2
C-BASS 2003-CB2 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to A3
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 6/25/2003
Assigned Baa3
C-BASS 2003-CB3 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to A1
C-BASS 2003-CB4 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/29/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/29/2003
Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/29/2003
Assigned Baa2
C-BASS Series 2003-CB5, C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/1/2006
Upgraded to A3
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB1
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to A1
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB2
-- M-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/9/2007 Upgraded to
Aa2
-- M-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/9/2007 Upgraded to
A1
-- B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/9/2007 Upgraded
to A2
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-CB4
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/9/2007
Upgraded to A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Baa3
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Ba1
CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 13 Classes of Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on 13 classes of
Class C and D subordinate asset-backed securities issued out of
the Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust. These securities are
backed by a $47.5 billion revolving pool of consumer and small
business bank credit card receivables originated by Capital One
Bank (USA), N.A. These rating actions conclude the review
initiated on April 20, 2009.
Rationale
These rating actions are primarily driven by an increase in the
Trust charge-off rate and decrease in the principal payment rate
over the past year. Moody's expect these key metrics will remain
weak as the consumer macroeconomic environment undergoes further
deterioration.
In May, the three-month average gross charge-off rate for the
Trust averaged 10.1% in 2009, compared to 7.6% for the same period
in 2008. Despite some modest improvement in charge-offs in April
and May and some seasonal improvements in delinquency trends,
Moody's expect the Trust charge-off rate will resume its upward
trajectory as the year progresses, possibly rising to as high as
12.5% by the second quarter of 2010 in Moody's base case.
The Trust principal payment rate has fallen to 15.4% on a three-
month average basis in May, compared to 17.7% over the same period
last year. This decline is consistent with industry-wide
principal payment rates that have fallen steadily since peaking in
2006, reflecting consumers' strained financial resources.
The principal payment rate is a measure of cardholders'
willingness and ability to repay their credit card balances. It
is also a measure of the speed by which securitized investors will
be repaid if an amortization event is triggered. Therefore, a
pronounced and sustained drop in this rate may have negative
consequences for securitized noteholders.
The Class C and Class D subordinate notes may benefit from a
spread account that can provide additional credit protection.
However, the benefit afforded by this structural feature can be
ephemeral since improvement in excess spread -- even if temporary
-- would allow for the release of any accumulated amounts. For
this reason, Moody's ascribe a low value to this form of credit
protection.
In April 2009, Moody's revised its expectations for key
performance metrics of the Trust. The current expected range of
performance for the gross charge-off rate is 9.5%-12.5%, for the
principal payment rate is 13%-16%, and for the yield is 20%-23%.
The Class C(2004-4) Notes with a scheduled maturity of August 2009
are not included in the downgrade, and are confirmed at Baa2.
The complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Capital One Multi-asset Execution Trust
Ratings Confirmed
-- $150,000,000 Class C(2004-4) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, confirmed at Baa2, previously on April 20, 2009
Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Downgraded
-- $250,000,000 Class C(2003-3) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $250,000,000 Class C(2003-4) Fixed Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $100,000,000 Class C(2004-2) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $367,500,000 Class C(2004-3) Fixed Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $175,000,000 Class C(2005-1) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $175,000,000 Class C(2006-1) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $100,000,000 Class C(2006-2) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $125,000,000 Class C(2006-3) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $300,000,000 Class C(2007-1) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $250,000,000 Class C(2007-2) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $125,000,000 Class C(2007-3) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
-- $350,000,000 Class C(2007-4) Floating Rate Asset-backed
Notes, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2, previously on
April 20, 2009 Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade
Approximately $335,000,000 Class D(2002-1) Asset Backed Notes,
downgraded to B1 from Ba2, previously on April 20, 2009 Placed on
Review for Possible Downgrade
Capital One Financial Corporation (Baa1, negative outlook)
headquartered in McLean, Virginia, is a bank holding company and
the fifth largest U.S. bank credit card issuer. Capital One
reported over $210 billion in managed assets (including
securitized receivables) at December 31, 2008. Capital One Bank
(USA), N.A., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital One.
CAVALRY CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Cavalry CLO I, Ltd.:
-- US$10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009
Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$8,000,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2022, Downgraded
to Aa3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$4,000,000 Type II Composite Notes due 2022, Downgraded
to Baa2; previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:
-- US$10,250,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes dues 2022, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed
Rate Notes dues 2022, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes dues 2022, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes dues 2022, Confirmed at B3; previously on March 17,
2009 Downgraded to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and is
currently 2772 as of the last trustee report, dated June 3, 2009.
Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about $31
million, accounting for roughly 7.9% of the collateral balance,
and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 7.5% the
underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Cavalry CLO I, Ltd., issued in March 29, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 classes
of notes from three transactions issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-
Through Trust.
The ratings are based on the methodology applied to all
transactions with small pool factors. Moody's defines low pool
factor deals as those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the
outstanding collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the
pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50
loans remaining
Moody's uses this methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool - greater the number of loans
remaining, the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
Complete rating action follows:
Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2001-HYB1 (Loans
Remaining: 9)
-- Cl. B-2, Current Balance $156,552, Downgraded to A1;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-3, Current Balance $42,673, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. B-4, Current Balance $42,673, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to Ba1
Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-30 (Loans Remaining:
32)
-- Cl. M, Current Balance $721,169, Downgraded to A2; previously
on 9/1/2004 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Current Balance $384,623, Downgraded to Ba2;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Current Balance $264,428, Downgraded to B2;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. B-3, Current Balance $96,155, Downgraded to Caa1;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Current Balance $72,117, Downgraded to Caa3;
previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded to Ba1
Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-11 (Loans Remaining:
Group 5 & 6 - 26)
-- Cl. 5-A-1, Current Balance $6,305,369, Downgraded to B3;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. 5-A-2, Current Balance $700,619, Downgraded to Caa1;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. 5-X, IO Class, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/20/2009
Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. 6-A-1, Current Balance $31,263,209, Downgraded to A3;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. 6-A-2, Current Balance $20,843,040, Downgraded to Caa1;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. 6-X, Current Balance $215,588, Downgraded to Caa2;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. III-M-1, Current Balance $6,430,289, Downgraded to Ca;
previously on 2/20/2009 Downgraded to Caa1
CHL MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Rating on Class A-5 Certs. From 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on the
class A-5 certificate issued by CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2005-24 by raising it to 'BBB' from 'B-'.
On June 16, 2009, as a result of an administrative error, S&P
lowered its rating on this class to 'B' and removed it from
CreditWatch negative as part of a larger review of U.S. prime
jumbo and Alternative-A residential mortgage-backed securities.
S&P then lowered the rating to 'B-' on June 22, 2009, as part of
another prime jumbo review.
The class A-5 certificate is insured by MBIA Insurance Corp.
(MBIA; BBB/Negative/--). According to S&P's criteria, the rating
on an insured class is the higher of S&P's rating on the bond
insurer or S&P's underlying rating on the class, which is based on
S&P's analysis of the class' inherent credit support. S&P has
therefore corrected S&P's rating on class A-5 to 'BBB' to reflect
the current rating on the insurer.
Rating Corrected
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-24
$1,042 million mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-24
Rating
------
Class CUSIP Current June 22 June 16 Pre-June 16
----- ----- ------- ------- ------- -----------
A-5 126694JV1 BBB B- B AAA/Watch Neg
COMM 2003-LNB1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes and
downgraded four classes of COMM 2003-LNB1, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates. The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from increased credit
quality dispersion and realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans. The action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the June 10, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 15%
to $720.2 million from $846.0 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 82 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 49% of the pool. The pool includes four loans,
representing 27% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings. Ten loans, representing 14% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Nineteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $1.0 million realized loss. There are currently four
loans, representing 2% of the pool, in special servicing. Moody's
estimates a $3.6 million loss (31% loss severity) from one of the
specially serviced loans.
Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 84% of the pool. Moody's weighted average loan to
value ratio for the conduit component, excluding the specially
serviced loan with an anticipated loss, is 92%, the same as at
Moody's prior review. Although the overall LTV has been
relatively stable, LTV dispersion has increased since last review.
Based on Moody's analysis, 22% of the pool has an LTV in excess of
100% compared to 15% at last review. Approximately 7% of the pool
has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 4% at last review.
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit
component is 1.1X, the same as at last review. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 25 compared to 36 at last
review.
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the 75 Rockefeller
Plaza Loan ($65.0 million -- 9.0%), which is secured by a 578,2000
square foot office building that is part of the Rockefeller Center
complex in New York City. The property is 100% leased to Time
Warner Companies Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2;
stable outlook) under a 21-year triple net lease that is
coterminous with the loan maturity (August 2014). The loan is
interest only for its entire term. Moody's current underlying
rating is A3, the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR
is 0.97X compared to 1.28X at last review.
The second loan with an underlying rating is the Westfield
Shoppingtown Portfolio Loan ($54.6 million -- 7.6%), which
represents a 34% pari passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by the borrower's interest in two regional malls
located in California. The loan sponsor is Westfield America,
Inc., a publicly traded REIT. Both centers reflect a middle to
upper-middle market price orientation. Westfield Shoppingtown
Galleria at Roseville Mall is a 1.0 million square foot center
anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, J.C. Penney and Sears. The in-line
space was 97% occupied as of December 2008. Westfield
Shoppingtown Main Place Mall is a 1.1 million square foot center
that is anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom and J.C. Penney. The in-
line space was 92% occupied as of December 2008. Moody's current
underlying rating is Aa2, the same as at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is 1.96X compared to 1.73X at last review
The third loan with an underlying rating is the Chandler Fashion
Center Loan ($48.6 million -- 6.8%), which represents a 49% pari
passu interest in a first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million square foot super-
regional mall located approximately 18 miles southeast of downtown
Phoenix in Chandler, Arizona. The center includes an open-air
village component and reflects a middle to upper-middle market
price orientation. The center is anchored by Dillard's, Macy's,
Nordstrom and Sears. The center was 99% occupied as of March 2009
compared to 96% at last review. The loan sponsor is the Macerich
Company, a publicly traded REIT. Moody's current underlying
rating is Aa1, the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR
is 2.42X compared to 1.98X at last review.
The fourth loan with an underlying rating is the 1669 Collins
Avenue Loan ($24.6 million -- 3.4%), which is secured by the
leased fee interest in the land under the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in
South Beach, Florida. Moody's current underlying rating is Aa1,
the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.9X
compared to 0.8X at last review.
The three largest conduit loans represent 14.3% of the outstanding
pool balance. The largest conduit loan is the Gateway Center BJ's
Loan ($41.4 million - 5.7%), which is secured by a 152,500 square
foot portion of a 640,000 square community center located in
Brooklyn, New York. The collateral is 100% leased to BJ's
Wholesale Club (85% GLA; lease expiration 2027) and several
restaurant tenants. The property is shadow anchored by Home
Depot, Target, Bed Bath & Beyond and Marshall's. Moody's LTV is
84% compared to 90% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.19X compared to 1.02X at last review.
The second largest conduit loan is the Palladium at Birmingham
Loan ($35.7 million -- 5.0%), which is secured by two retail
properties located in Birmingham, Michigan. The properties total
150,000 square feet. Palladium Retail is a 124,500 square foot
entertainment/retail center. Willits Retail consists of three
ground-floor condominium units that total 25,400 square feet. The
properties were 83% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 100%
at last review. Performance has declined since last review due to
decreased occupancy. Moody's LTV is 121% compared to 95% at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.85X compared to 1.03X at last
review.
The third largest conduit loan is the Redland Center Loan
($25.6 million -- 3.6%), which is secured by a 134,000 square foot
office condominium located in Rockville, Maryland. The property
is 100% leased to the General Services Administration (Department
of Health and Human Services) through March 2013. Moody's LTV is
98% compared to 95% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
0.97X compared to 1.0X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $68,812,166, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 2/2/2007
-- Class A-1A, $151,484,453, affirmed at Aaa; previously
affirmed at Aaa on 2/2/2007
-- Class A-2, $347,583,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 2/2/2007
-- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 2/2/2007
-- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 2/2/2007
-- Class B, $28,553,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
Aaa from Aa2 on 2/2/2007
-- Class C, $12,691,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
Aaa from Aa3 on 2/2/2007
-- Class D, $19,036,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously upgraded to
Aa3 from A2 on 2/2/2007
-- Class E, $10,575,000, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
A1 from A3 on 2/2/2007
-- Class F, $10,576,000, affirmed at A3; previously upgraded to
A3 from Baa1 on 2/2/2007
-- Class G, $8,460,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded to
Baa1 from Baa2 on 2/2/2007
-- Class H, $12,691,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
at Baa3 on 2/2/2007
-- Class J, $16,921,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
Ba1 on 2/2/2007
-- Class K, $4,230,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
Ba2 on 2/2/2007
-- Class L, $5,287,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba3; previously
affirmed at Ba3 on 2/2/2007
-- Class M, $4,231,000, downgraded to B2 from B1; previously
affirmed at B1 on 2/2/2007
-- Class N, $4,230,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
affirmed at B2 on 2/2/2007
-- Class O, $3,172,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
affirmed at B3 on 2/2/2007
COMM 2005-LP5: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 Classes of Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes and
downgraded eight classes of COMM 2005-LP5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-LP5. The downgrades are
due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from
increased credit quality dispersion, anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans and the near term refinance risk
associated with five-year loans approaching maturity. Four loans,
representing 16% of the pool, mature within the next 12 months and
do not pass Moody's refinance test based on a 9.25% stressed
interest rate. The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the June 10, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 6% to
$1.59 billion from $1.70 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 140 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 33% of the pool. The pool includes one loan,
representing 1% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating. Due to declines in performance, two other loans which had
investment grade underlying ratings at securitization are now
being analyzed as part of the conduit pool. Six loans,
representing 26% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.
Twenty-three loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$1.5 million realized loss. There are currently five loans,
representing 8% of the pool, in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Lakeside Mall Loan, representing
5.4% of the pool, which is secured by a regional mall owned by an
affiliate of General Growth Properties. This loan was transferred
to special servicing after GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16,
2009. The second largest specially serviced loan is the Las
Ventanas Apartments Loan, which represents 1.5% of the pool. This
loan is secured by a 378-unit multifamily property located in
Houston, Texas. The loan is current and is expected to be
transferred back to the master servicer. Moody's does not expect
losses from either of these loans but estimates an aggregate
$6.8 million loss (58% loss severity on average) from the three
remaining specially serviced loans.
Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 86% of the pool. Moody's weighted average loan to
value ratio for the conduit component, excluding the specially
serviced loans with estimated losses, is 98%, essentially the same
as at Moody's prior review in June 2007. Although the overall LTV
has been stable, the pool has experienced increased credit
dispersion since last review. Based on Moody's analysis, 23% of
the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 6% at last
review. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.11X
compared to 1.08X at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 32 compared to 38 at last
review.
The loan with the investment grade underlying rating is the
Chatham Ridge Shopping Center Loan ($15.0 million -- 0.9%), which
is secured by a 176,000 square foot retail center located in
Chicago, Illinois. The economic and physical occupancy of the
center was 100% and 63%, respectively as of December 2008. The
decline in physical occupancy is due to Cub Foods, the anchor
retail tenant, vacating prior to its July 2019 lease expiration.
However, the borrower is negotiating a 20-year lease with a
replacement tenant which will increase the center's occupancy to
100%. Moody's current underlying rating is A3, the same as at
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.62X, compared to 1.53X at
last review.
The two loans which formerly had underlying ratings are Lakeside
Mall and Woodfield Commons. The Lakeside Mall Loan ($89.8 million
-- 5.4%), represents a 50% pari passu interest in a $179.7 million
loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a
1.5 million square foot regional mall located in Sterling Heights,
Michigan. The property is owned by an affiliate of GGP and was
transferred to special servicing in May 2009 because it was
included in GGP's bankruptcy filing. The property is anchored by
Macy's, J.C. Penney, Sears and Lord & Taylor. The in-line stores
were 81% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 92% at
securitization. The property's performance has declined since
last review due to the occupancy decline. Moody's analysis of
this loan incorporates a stressed cash flow due to Moody's
concerns about its declining performance trend, the weak retail
environment and the potential impact of GGP's bankruptcy on
property performance. Based on Moody's current value, Moody's do
not currently anticipate a loss on this loan. Moody's LTV is 90%
compared to 73% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.08X
compared to 1.22X at last review.
The Woodfield Commons Loan ($17.5 million -- 1.0%) is secured by a
207,000 square foot retail center located in Schaumburg, Illinois.
The property was 71% occupied as of April 2009 compared to 98% at
last review. Part of the occupancy decline is due to the 2008
departure of Steve & Barry, which previously occupied 12% of the
GLA. The largest tenants are Toys R'Us, Recreational Equipment
and Harlem Furniture. Moody's LTV is 85% compared to 71% at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.17X compared to 1.37X at last
review.
The three largest conduit loans represent 14.9% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the 63 Madison Avenue Loan ($105.0 million
-- 6.4%), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$165.0 million loan. The loan is secured by a 798,000 square foot
office building located in New York City. The property is 100.0%
occupied by two tenants, the same as at last review. The two
tenants are NY Life Insurance & Annuity Corporation (Moody's
insurance financial strength rating Aaa, negative outlook; 50% of
NRA; lease expiration December 2010) and Ziff-Davis Inc. (50% of
NRA; lease expiration June 2019). NY Life has been a tenant in
the property since it was built in 1963 to serve as part of its
Manhattan headquarters. Despite the stable occupancy, performance
has declined due to increased operating expenses. Moody's
analysis assumes that NY Life will renew its lease at the end of
its current term. The loan matures in January 2010. Moody's LTV
is 124% compared to 118% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
0.79X compared to 0.82X at last review.
The second largest conduit loan is the Bank of America Tower at
Las Olas City Centre Loan ($90.0 million -- 5.4%), which is
secured by a 409,000 square foot Class A office building located
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property was 97% occupied as of
year-end 2008 compared to 92% at last review. The largest tenant
is Bank of America, N.A (Moody's senior unsecured rating Aa3,
rating under review outlook), which occupies 20% of NRA through
November 2012. Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV is 100%,
essentially the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.0X, essentially the same as at last review.
The third largest conduit loan is the Continental Park Plaza Loan
($54.8 million -- 3.3%), which is secured by a 477,000 square foot
Class A office building located in El Segundo (Los Angeles
County), California. The property was 92% occupied as of February
2009 compared to 80% at last review. The largest tenant is
Connexus Corp., which occupies 14% of the NRA through June 2012.
Performance has improved due to increased occupancy. Moody's LTV
is 80%, compared to 85% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
1.31X compared to 1.18X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1A, $223,982,723, affirmed at Aaa; previously
affirmed at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class A-2, $566,399,600, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class A-3, $71,321,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class A-4, $305,071,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class A-J, $117,014,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class A-SB, $86,687,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 6/22/2007
-- Class B, $46,806,000 affirmed at Aa2; previously affirmed at
Aa2 on 6/22/2007
-- Class C, $14,892,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously affirmed at
Aa3 on 6/22/2007
-- Class D, $27,658,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
A2 on 6/22/2007
-- Class E, $21,275,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
A3 on 6/22/2007
-- Class F, $23,403,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
previously affirmed at Baa1 on 6/22/2007
-- Class G, $14,893,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2;
previously affirmed at Baa2 on 6/22/2007
-- Class H, $17,020,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously
affirmed at Baa3 on 6/22/2007
-- Class J, $12,765,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba1; previously
affirmed at Ba1 on 6/22/2007
-- Class K, $6,383,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously
affirmed at Ba2 on 6/22/2007
-- Class L, $4,255,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; previously
affirmed at Ba3 on 6/22/2007
-- Class M, $4,255,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
affirmed at B1 on 6/22/2007
-- Class O, $4,255,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
affirmed at B3 on 6/22/2007
-- Class GMB-1, $27,500,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
upgraded to Aaa from Baa1 on 9/13/2007
-- Class GMB-2, $28,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
upgraded to Aaa from Baa2 on 9/13/2007
-- Class GMB-3, $16,200,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
upgraded to Aaa from Baa3 on 9/13/2007
-- Class GMB-4, $14,300,000, affirmed at Aaa ; previously
upgraded to Aaa from Baa3 on 9/13/2007
COUNTRYWIDE ALTERNATIVE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3
securities from 3 transactions issued by Countrywide Alternative
Loan Trust. The rating actions are the result of recent
deterioration relative to expected performance. The collateral
backing the transactions consist primarily of first-lien,
adjustable Alt-A mortgage loans. The downgrades relate to
cashflowing senior bonds whose support has deteriorated in recent
months, as principal payments have slowed relative to erosion of
credit support provided by subordinate bonds.
The rating actions are:
Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC11
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/29/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC3
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/29/2009
Downgraded to A1
Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC4
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 1/29/2009
Downgraded to Ba1
The downgraded bonds are at higher risk of losses in the event
that they are not paid off before supporting subordinate bonds are
completely written down. In the event that subordinate bonds are
written down entirely, these deals have structural features that
redirect principal payments to be paid pro rata to all senior
bonds, and/or direct losses to be allocated pro rata to each of
the outstanding senior bonds.
In its analysis of these bonds, Moody's has considered the current
available level of credit enhancement and updated its base
cashflow assumptions for the transactions, in order to account for
CDR, CPR and severity trends.
CS 2006-TFL2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades these classes of CS 2006-TFL2, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:
-- $536 million class A-2 to 'AA+' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $41 million class B to 'AA' from 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41 million class C to 'A+' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33 million class D to 'A' from 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25 million class E to 'A-' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19 million class F to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19 million class G to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19 million class H to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20 million class J to 'BB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $22 million class K to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $16.3 million class L to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $61.6 million class KER-A to 'A-' from 'AA-'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $43.8 million class KER-B to 'BBB+' from 'A'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $38.4 million class KER-C to 'BBB-' from 'A-'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $47.3 million class KER-D to 'BB+' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $47.7 million class KER-E to 'BB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $63.5 million class KER-F to 'B' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $11 million class BEV-A to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $4.2 million class QUN-A to 'B' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $3.9 million class QUN-B to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $5.7 million class QUN-C to 'B' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $3.7 million class QUN-D to 'B' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $7 million class ARG-A to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $5.5 million class ARG-B to 'B' from 'BB-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $4 million class NHK-A to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable.
In addition, Fitch downgrades and removes from Rating Watch
Negative these classes:
-- $12.4 million class MW-A to 'B' from 'AA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $7.5 million class MW-B to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative.
In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:
-- $263.9 billion class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class A-X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only A-X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class A-X-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.
Furthermore, Fitch affirms these classes, which are non-pooled
components of the trust assets, and revises the Outlooks as
indicated:
-- $375.7 million class SV-A1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $126 million class SV-A2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only SV-AX at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61 million class SV-B at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31 million class SV-C at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31 million class SV-D at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30 million class SV-E at 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31 million class SV-F at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30 million class SV-G at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54 million class SV-H at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;
-- $34 million class SV-J at 'BBB'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;
-- $39 million class SV-K at 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.
Classes SHD-A, SHD-B, SHD-C, SHD-D, and SHD-E paid in full on
June 26, 2009.
The downgrades reflect the lowering of the shadow ratings of six
loans (78.6%) in the pooled component of the trust to below
investment grade. These loans are the Kerzner International
Portfolio (48.8%), Beverly Hilton (11.8%), Argent Hotel (6.3%),
Metropolitan Warner Center (4.6%), NH Krystal Hotel Portfolio
(3.8%), and One Queensridge Place (3.3%). Performance of these
loans has declined due to the economic downturn and is not
expected to stabilize as anticipated at issuance.
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of rating changes
over the next one to two years. Negative Outlooks reflect loans
that are behind on their stabilization plans or where economic
pressures, which have hit hotels and condo developments
particularly hard, may make the execution of the original business
plans less feasible.
Classes MW-A and MW-B, which are rake classes associated with
Metropolitan Warner Center (4.6%), have been downgraded due
declining performance. The Metropolitan Warner Center loan is
collateralized by 677 units within the condominium property
located in Woodland Hills, California. The subject was formerly
an apartment complex that was converted into condominiums. Debt
is paid down as unit sales are executed. The pace of unit sales
has fallen significantly behind initial expectations. The loan,
originally scheduled to mature on
July 9, 2009, was recently modified by the special servicer and
extended for three years. The new maturity is July 9, 2012.
The Kerzner Portfolio consists of a diverse portfolio of real
estate, including resort casinos, golf courses, timeshares, vacant
waterfront land and ongoing construction projects. The portfolio
is sponsored by Istithmar PJSC, Whitehall Funds, Kerzner Family,
Colony Capital, Baron Funds and The Related Companies. Occupancy,
ADR and RevPAR as of Dec. 31, 2008, is 70%, $341, and $239,
respectively, compared to the issuer's initial projections of the
respective 81%, $323, and $262 at origination. The portfolio
continues to stabilize as construction projects are completed at
the Atlantis property, including the Phase III expansion which
added a 600-room all-suite hotel tower, a 495-unit condominium
hotel, approximately 40-acres of new water attractions, and the
Dolphin Experience. While cash flow has improved from year-end
2007 to YE2008, Fitch does not expect that performance
expectations from origination will be achieved as the economy and
travel industry continue to face significant challenges.
The downgrades of the shadow ratings of the Beverly Hilton (7.4%),
The Argent Hotel (3.9%), and NH Krystal Portfolio (2.4%) are due
to a decline in revenues driven by falling RevPAR which is in some
cases combined with higher expenses.
As of the June 2009 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
principal balance has decreased 33% to $2.28 billion from $3.4
billion at issuance. Four loans, The Plaza Residential and Retail
(23.8% of the initial pool balance), The Sheffield (9.7%), JP
Morgan International Tower III (1.5%), and The Plaza Condo-Hotel
and Hotel (1.1%) have paid in full.
The largest loan in the transaction, The Sava Healthcare Portfolio
(35.9%), consists of two partially cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted loans: the Sava Portfolio, consisting of 169 properties
and the Fundamental Portfolio, consisting of 28 properties.
Occupancy as of March 2009 is 80.1%, compared with 86.1% at
issuance. Cash flow has improved since issuance; however, Fitch
considers health care properties to have high volatility due to
the direct relationship between revenue and the policies
surrounding Medicare and Medicaid. Any revision to the current
federal and state policies on health care reimbursement may have a
significant impact on property performance. The portfolio is
sponsored by Rubin Schron, an experienced health care property
operator. All of the Fitch rated classes related to the Sava
Healthcare Portfolio are non-pooled components of the related
trust.
Approximately 52.7% of loans remaining in the pool have maturities
in 2009. Of the maturing loans, all have at least one one-year
extension remaining.
CSFB MORTGAGE-BACKED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40 classes
of notes from 10 transactions issued by CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates.
The ratings are based on the methodology applied to all
transactions with small pool factors. Moody's defines low pool
factor deals as those that meet one of these two criteria: (1) the
outstanding collateral balance is less than $1 million, and the
pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool has fewer than 50
loans remaining. Moody's uses these methodology to estimate
losses on low pool factor deals.
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
Complete rating action follows:
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR13
(Loans Remaining: 24)
-- Cl. V-B, Current Balance $1,900,324, Downgraded to Caa1;
previously on 5/24/2002 Assigned Baa2
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR21
(Loans Remaining: Group 1, 2, & 3 -- 16, Group 4 - 37)
-- Cl. I-A-1, Current Balance $1,476,789, Downgraded to Aa2;
previously on 7/31/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-X, IO Class, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/31/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. IV-B, Current Balance $1,877,560, Downgraded to Ca;
previously on 7/31/2002 Assigned Baa2
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR28
(Loans Remaining: Group 1 & 2 -- 23, Group 3 - 5)
-- Cl. I-A-1, Current Balance $758,926, Downgraded to Aa2;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-2, Current Balance $701,056, Downgraded to Aa2;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Current Balance $2,228,027, Downgraded to A2;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-2, Current Balance $370,706, Downgraded to A2;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-3, Current Balance $919,034, Downgraded to A2;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-4, Current Balance $24,121, Downgraded to A3;
previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-M-2, Current Balance $1,365,777, Downgraded to B1;
previously on 5/5/2006 Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. C-B-1, Current Balance $695,440, Downgraded to Ba2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. C-B-2, Current Balance $231,756, Downgraded to B2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. C-B-3, Current Balance $324,493, Downgraded to Caa2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to A3
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR33
(Loans Remaining: Group 1, 2, 3 & 4 - 48)
-- Cl. I-A-1, Current Balance $1,863,779, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Current Balance $1,048,967, Downgraded to A3;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-A-1, Current Balance $651,816, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-A-2, Current Balance $1,890,268, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-A-3, Current Balance $1,960,755, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-A-4, Current Balance $1,955,449, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. IV-A-1, Current Balance $4,487,915, Downgraded to Baa1;
previously on 1/24/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. C-B-1, Current Balance $905,431, Downgraded to Ba2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. C-B-2, Current Balance $374,873, Downgraded to B2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. C-B-3, Current Balance $250,333, Downgraded to Caa2;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to A2
-- Cl. C-B-4, Current Balance $133,005, Downgraded to Ca;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. C-B-5, Current Balance $50,103, Downgraded to C;
previously on 5/9/2005 Upgraded to B1
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR12
(Loans Remaining: Group 4 - 31)
-- Cl. IV-M-2, Current Balance $2,147,851, Downgraded to Caa3;
previously on 11/13/2007 Downgraded to Ba3
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR15
(Loans Remaining: Group 4 - 39)
-- Cl. IV-M-2, Current Balance $4,155,244, Downgraded to Baa3;
previously on 6/30/2003 Assigned A2
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR22
(Loans Remaining: Group 4 - 31)
-- Cl. IV-M-3, Current Balance $1,539,926, Downgraded to Ba1;
previously on 12/29/2003 Assigned A3
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR24
(Loans Remaining: Group 6 - 30)
-- Cl. VI-M-3, Current Balance $1,864,447, Downgraded to B1;
previously on 11/25/2003 Assigned A3
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR9
(Loans Remaining: Group 1 & 2 -- 31, Group 3 - 39)
-- Cl. I-A-1, Current Balance $18,434, Downgraded to Aa3;
previously on 4/28/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-2, Current Balance $98,973, Downgraded to Aa3;
previously on 4/28/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-3, Current Balance $2,647, Downgraded to Aa3;
previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Current Balance $872,454, Downgraded to Aa3;
previously on 4/28/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-2, Current Balance $6,940,215, Downgraded to Aa3;
previously on 4/28/2003 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-M-2, Current Balance $4,442,252, Downgraded to Caa2;
previously on 4/28/2003 Assigned A2
-- Cl. C-B-1, Current Balance $822,543, Downgraded to Baa1;
previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. C-B-2, Current Balance $349,983, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. C-B-3, Current Balance $262,510, Downgraded to Caa1;
previously on 9/27/2006 Upgraded to A3
CSFB Trust 2002-NP14 (Loans Remaining: 41)
-- Cl. M-2, Current Balance $1,830,742, Downgraded to Ca;
previously on 9/30/2005 Downgraded to Caa1
CSFB MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 93 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 93 tranches and confirmed
2 tranches from 3 Jumbo and Alt-A CSFB transactions.
The collateral backing transactions CSFB 2005-1 group II, CSFB
2005-4 groups I III, and CSFB 2005-5 groups I II VI VII, consists
primarily of first-lien, fixed-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans, and
collateral backing transactions CSFB 2005-4 group II and CSFB
2005-5 groups III IV V, consists of primarily first-lien, fixed-
rate, Alt-A mortgage loans. The actions are triggered by the
quickly deteriorating performance, marked by rising delinquencies
and loss severities, along with concerns about the continuing drop
in housing prices nationwide and rising unemployment levels. The
rating actions listed below on the securities backed by Jumbo
collateral reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo
sector announced in a press release on March 19th, 2009. The
rating actions listed below on the securities backed by Alt-A
collateral reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the Alt-A
sector announced in a press release on January 22, 2009. The
actions are a part of Moody's on-going review process of these
sectors.
Moody's final rating actions are based on the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and on the current ratings Moody's took into account
credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-collateralization,
time tranching and other structural features within the priorities
of payments.
Moody's applied a similar approach for deals backed by Alt-A
collateral from the 2005 vintage with updated key parameters, such
as severity and the rate of delinquency build up, which would be
generally lower relative to the 2006 and 2007 vintages. These
updates capture the specific characteristics of loans from the
2005 vintage that were originated in an environment of relatively
tighter underwriting standards and also benefited from some
initial home price appreciation.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, actual realized losses could
ultimately turn out higher or lower than Moody's current
expectations. Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data
as it becomes available and will assess the pattern of potential
future defaults and adjust loss expectations accordingly as
necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2005-1
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2005-4
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-7, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-8, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-10, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-11, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-12, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-13, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-14, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-15, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-16, Downgraded to A2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-17, Downgraded to A3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-18, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-19, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 4/9/2009
Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-20, Downgraded to A3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-21, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-22, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-23, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-24, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 4/9/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-25, Downgraded to A3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-X, Downgraded to A2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/9/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/9/2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs 2005-5
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-8, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-10, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-13, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-14, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-15, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-16, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. III-A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. VI-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. VI-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. VI-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. VI-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. VII-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 4/9/2009 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/9/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 4/9/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/9/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. C-X, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/19/2009
Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/9/2009 Ba3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/9/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. D-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:
i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information available for the asset class as
well as for the transaction sponsor,
ii) collateral analysis,
iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
interests of the key parties to the transaction, most
notably the originator and the servicer,
iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
cashflow and capital structure,
v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
structure, and
vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Five Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the ratings of 5 tranches
from 2 Deutsche Bank Alt-A transactions. Previously, certain loss
and principal allocation features of the transactions were not
accurately accounted for. Ratings have been adjusted to reflect
that, for both transactions, losses will not be allocated to
certain senior certificates, and distribution of principal to
those tranches will remain sequential after the depletion of the
subordinated certificates.
The corrective rating actions for the securities are:
Deutsche Alt-A Secs Mtge Loan Tr 2007-BAR1
-- Cl. A-1, Corrected to Aaa; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
to Aa3
-- Cl. A-2, Corrected to Aa1; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
to Caa2
-- Cl. A-4, Corrected to Ca; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
to Caa2
Deutsche Alt-A Secs Mtge Loan Tr 2007-RAMP1
-- Cl. A-2, Corrected to Ba2; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
to Caa2
-- Cl. A-3, Corrected to Ca; previously on 2/2/2009 Downgraded
to Caa3
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans. The
actions are triggered by rapidly increasing delinquencies, higher
severities, slower prepayments and mounting losses in the
underlying collateral. Additionally, the continued deterioration
of the housing market has also contributed to the increased loss
expectations for Alt-A pools. The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated expected losses on the Alt-A sector announced in a
press release on January 22, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-
going review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.
The ratings on the notes were assigned by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the notes,
such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information regarding the asset class as well as for
the transaction sponsor, ii) an analysis of the collateral, iii)
an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of interests
of the key parties to the transaction, most notably the originator
and the servicer, iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation
of collateral cashflow and capital structure, v) an analysis of
the transaction's governance and legal structure, and (vi) a
comparison of these attributes against those of other similar
transactions.
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 40 RMBS Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of 40 RMBS tranches issued by Deutsche Mortgage
Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-PR1 and 12
tranches issued by Prime Mortgage Trust 2006-DR1 due to continued
deterioration in recent performance of these deals.
The deals are backed by fixed-rate residential mortgage loans
originated in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's economy has been in
recession for the past three years and the unemployment rate in
the region has increased to 15.0%. Moody's economy.com forecasts
the unemployment rate in Puerto Rico to continue to rise and reach
19.1% by 1st quarter of 2010. Due to the deteriorating economic
environment, delinquencies on the underlying pools have nearly
doubled over the past year. For loans underlying 2006-PR1,
delinquencies greater than 60 days (as a percentage of original
balance) have risen to 5.40% from 2.75% over the prior 12 months
as of June 2009. For loans underlying 2006-DR1 delinquencies
greater than 60 days (as a percentage of original balance) have
risen to 6.60% from 3.45% a year ago as of June 2009.
Historically, a large percentage of delinquent borrowers in Puerto
Rico were able to cure out of the delinquencies. However, the
prolonged recession has increased the risk of default. Moody's
also expects delinquencies (and future defaults) to continue to
rise as the unemployment rate in Puerto Rico increases through
2010.
In addition to the increased frequency of defaults, Moody's
actions are also based on concerns relating to expectations of
severity of loss given default. Historically, Puerto Rico has
enjoyed modest house price appreciation -- however, slowdown in
the mainland US and the severity of the recession in Puerto Rico,
has started to adversely impact house prices on the island, as a
result loss severities on the deals are expected to rise. Also,
the average foreclosure timeline in Puerto Rico is 24 months which
can further exacerbate severities through increased foreclosure
costs.
The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections.
Updated loss estimates for the transactions were arrived at using
a two-stage process. First, serious delinquencies were projected
until mid-2010 (the expected trough in the Puerto Rico economy)
using historical performance to date. The projected delinquencies
were then converted to projected losses using lifetime roll rates
(probabilities of transition to default) of 50%, 75%, 90% and 100%
for loans that were 60 day delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent,
in foreclosure and properties held-for-sale respectively. The
loss upon default (loss severity) was assumed to be 30%. The
second step was to determine defaults and losses for the remaining
life of the deal following the projection period. To calculate
future defaults, Moody's applied a burnout factor to the default
rate calculated over the projected period (until mid-2010). The
burnout accounts for the likely improvement in performance
subsequent to 2010 as the economy recovers. Future losses were
obtained by applying severity assumptions to future defaults.
Three bonds issued by the Deutsche 2006-PR1 deal are insured by
Financial Security Assurance Inc. (Aa3 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade on 5/20/2009). The current ratings on these
insured securities are consistent with Moody's practice of rating
insured securities at the higher of (1) the guarantor's insurance
financial strength rating and (2) the underlying rating, based on
Moody's modified approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors.
Complete rating actions are:
Deutsche Mtge Secs Inc Mtge Loan Tr. 2006-PR1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-F, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-S, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-PO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A-F-1, Downgraded to Aa3 and remains on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously
on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc.
(Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade on
5/20/2009)
-- Cl. 3-A-F-2, Downgraded to Aa3 and remains on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously
on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc.
(Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade on
5/20/2009)
-- Cl. 3-A-I, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A-S, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-PO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A-F-1, Downgraded to Aa3 and remains on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously
on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc.
(Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade on
5/20/2009)
-- Cl. 4-A-F-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A-I-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A-I-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A-S-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A-S-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-PO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-F-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-F-2, Downgraded to Aa3 and remains on Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Current Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba1; previously
on 5/21/2009 Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Security Assurance Inc.
(Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade on
5/20/2009)
-- Cl. 5-A-F-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-F-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-I-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-I-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-I-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-I-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-S-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-S-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-S-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A-S-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009
Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-PO, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-1A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-1B, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/21/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. CW-A1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
PRIME Mortgage Trust 2006-DR1
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 5/21/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 5/21/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/21/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EAGLE CREEK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Eagle Creek CLO Ltd.:
-- US$45,900,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$11,800,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March
17, 2009, Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:
-- US$23,200,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2018, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
17, 2009, Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,700,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 17,
2009, Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade;
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class D Overcollateralization Test. The weighted average rating
factor has increased over the last year. Based on the latest
trustee report, dated May 19, 2009, defaulted securities total
about $10.7 million, accounting for roughly 3.7% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
10.4% of the underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.
Eagle Creek CLO Ltd., issued in February 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
EASTLAND CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Eastland CLO, Ltd.:
-- US$100,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Baa3; Previously on
March 13, 2007 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$825,600,000 Class A-2a Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; Previously on
March 13, 2007 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$206,000,000 Class A-2b Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Ba1; Previously on
March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$78,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Ba3; Previously on
March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$81,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to Ca;
Previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$68,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to C;
Previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to B2 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$48,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
-- Interest Extendable Notes Due 2022, Downgraded to C;
Previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization tests. The
weighted average rating factor has steadily increased over the
last year and is currently 3220 versus a test level of 2785 as of
the last trustee report, dated May 31, 2009. Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $125 million, accounting
for roughly 8.35% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower by Moody's or CCC+ or lower by S&P makes up
approximately 18% of the underlying portfolio. Additionally,
interest payments on the Class B, C and D Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class A, Class B,
and Class C overcollateralization tests. Moody's also observes
that the transaction is exposed to a significant concentration of
mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in the underlying portfolio.
The majority of these CLO tranches are currently assigned low
speculative-grade ratings and carry depressed market valuations
that may herald poor recovery prospects in the event of default.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Eastland CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
GALLATIN FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-2 to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Gallatin Funding I Ltd.:
-- US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2014,
Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4, 2009 A1 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. The weighted
average rating factor has increased over the last year and it is
currently 2586 versus a test level of 2306 as of the last trustee
report, dated June 2, 2009. Based on the same report, defaulted
securities total about $32.5 million, accounting for roughly 10%
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 17.9% of the underlying portfolio. Moody's views
the build-up of funds in the Excess Spread Collateral Account as
well as continued delevering of the Class A-1 Notes since the last
rating action as a positive trend for the most senior notes in the
transaction. On the other hand, Class A-2 Notes were negatively
impacted by the loss of par in the deal due to defaults.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Gallatin Funding I Ltd., issued in June of 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2004-C3 Certs. to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
the class J, K, L, and M commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s
series 2004-C3. The ratings were on CreditWatch with negative
implications before the downgrades, where they were placed on
April 7, 2009.
The downgrades reflect recurring interest shortfalls that are
likely to continue due to nonrecoverable determinations made on
two of the five assets with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC. As of the June 10, 2009, remittance report, this
amount totaled $96,423.
Details concerning the two assets with the special servicer that
are causing the shortfalls are:
The Rolling Hills Apartments asset has a total exposure of
$17.5 million and became real estate owned in January 2007.
Located in Nashville, Tennessee, the asset is a 276-unit
multifamily property built in 1969 and renovated in 2000-2004.
The Berkeley Ridge Apartments asset has a total exposure of
$12.3 million and became REO in January 2007. Also located in
Nashville, Tennessee, the asset is a 244-unit multifamily property
built in 1973 and renovated in 2004.
In addition to the two assets above, these three assets are with
the special servicer:
The Lafayette Plaza loan has a total exposure of $3.8 million and
was transferred to the special servicer in January 2009 due to an
imminent default. The loan is 90-plus-days delinquent and is
secured by a 32,112-sq.-ft. retail property in Wappinger Falls,
New York. The property was built in 1970 and renovated in 1990.
As of Dec. 31, 2008, the reported debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 0.87 and occupancy was 46.7%. The special servicer is
following a dual track of workout and foreclosure. Standard &
Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.
The International Tower loan has a total exposure of
$34.4 million and was transferred to the special servicer in April
2009 due to a covenant default. The loan is 30-plus-days
delinquent and is secured by a 302,992-sq.-ft. office building
built in Chicago in 1969 and renovated in 1999. As of Dec. 31,
2008, the reported DSCR was 0.86 and occupancy was 74.3%. A major
tenant at the property vacated its space when its lease expired in
May 2007, triggering a rollover reserve escrow payment of $92,000
per month. The triggered payment was not implemented until
February 2009, at which time the borrower was notified of its
cumulative obligation of $1.7 million, which reflects monthly
payments from July 2007.
On Feb. 6, 2009, the borrower provided a hardship letter stating
that it would be unable to meet the additional increase in the
rollover reserve, and, as of May 2009, it would no longer be able
to support monthly reserve payments. The borrower will be
submitting a proposal for a loan modification. At this time,
Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the resolution of
this asset.
The Rivergate Apartments loan has a total exposure of
$6.5 million and was transferred to the special servicer in June
2009 due to an imminent default. A 120-unit multifamily property
in East Windsor, Conn., secures this loan. The property was built
in 1972 and renovated in 1999. As of
March 31, 2009, the reported DSCR was 0.46 and occupancy was
90.9%. CWCapital is still assessing the situation, and, at this
time, Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the
resolution of this asset.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C3
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
J D B-/Watch Neg 2.04
K D CCC+/Watch Neg 1.50
L D CCC/Watch Neg 1.09
M D CCC-/Watch Neg 0.68
GMACM MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 31 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 31
tranches from five RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust in 2003 and 2004.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans. These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively. Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
List of actions:
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR1
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/1/2003
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/1/2003
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/1/2003
Assigned B2
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-AR2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 12/24/2003
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/24/2003
Assigned B2
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2
-- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5-A-II, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/27/2004
Assigned Ba2
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J6
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aaa
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-J2
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/24/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/24/2004 Assigned
Aaa
GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Grayson CLO, Ltd.:
-- US$1,015,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to A2; previously on
November 30, 2006 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$111,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Baa2; previously
on March 4, 2009 Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade;
-- US$68,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured
Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
on March 4, 2009, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade;
-- US$72,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured
Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded
to B1; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$75,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured
Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded
to Ca; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B2 and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$31,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured
Deferrable Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Downgraded
to C; previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$90,000,000 aggregate face amount of Grayson Combination
Trust 2006 Pass Through Certificates due 2021, Downgraded
to B2; previously on March 4, 2009 Baa2 Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's has also applied resecuritization stress factors to
default probability assumptions for structured finance asset
collateral as described in the press release titled "Moody's
updates its key assumptions for rating structured finance CDOs,"
published on December 11, 2008.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Overcollateralization Tests. The weighted average rating factor
has steadily increased over the last year and is currently 3053
versus a test level of 2780 as of the last trustee report, dated
May 31, 2009. Based on the same report, defaulted securities
total about $130 million, accounting for roughly 9% of the
collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up
approximately 15% of the underlying portfolio. Additionally,
interest payments on the Class B, C and D Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class A, B, C and
D Overcollateralization Tests.
Moody's also observes that the transaction is exposed to a
significant concentration of mezzanine and junior CLO tranches in
the underlying portfolio. The majority of these CLO tranches are
currently assigned low speculative-grade ratings and carry
depressed market valuations that may herald poor recovery
prospects in the event of default.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Grayson CLO, Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 17 2004-GG1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 classes and
upgraded three classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
GG1. The upgrades are due to defeasance and increased
subordination resulting from paydowns and principal amortization.
The pool has paid down 11% since Moody's last full review in March
2007. The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the June 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 16%
to $2.2 billion from $2.6 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 117 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 32% of the pool. The pool includes five loans,
representing 16% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings. Thirty loans, representing 34% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
Eighteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There are currently three loans, representing 7% of the pool, in
special servicing. Two of the specially serviced loans,
representing 7% of the pool, are secured by regional malls owned
by affiliates of General Growth Properties, Inc. These loans were
transferred to special servicing after GGP's bankruptcy filing on
April 16, 2009. Moody's does not expect a loss on these two
loans, but estimates a $1.9 million loss (31% loss severity) from
the third specially serviced loan.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for 100% and 63%, respectively, of the pool. Moody's
weighted average loan to value ratio for the conduit component,
excluding the specially serviced loan with an estimated loss, is
95% compared to 90% at Moody's prior full review. Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio for the conduit pool is
1.14X, the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 35 compared to 34 at last
review.
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the 111 Eighth
Avenue Loan ($143.3 million -- 6.5%), which represents a 33.2%
interest in a $431.2 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 2.9 million square foot office and telecom building
located in the Chelsea area of New York City. The property was
99% occupied as of January 2009, essentially the same as at last
review. Major tenants include Google (8% NRA; lease expiration
February 2021), Sprint (9% NRA; lease expiration December 2014)
and CCH Legal Information (6% NRA; lease expirations in July 2015
and February 2019). Performance has improved since securitization
due to increased rental revenues and amortization. The property
is also encumbered by a B Note, a portion of which is the
collateral for the non-pooled and non-Moody's rated Classes OEA-B1
and OEA-B2. The loan sponsors are Jamestown and the New York
Common Retirement Fund. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.49X compared
to 1.39X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating is
Baa1 compared to Baa2 at last review.
The second loan with an underlying rating is the Southland Mall
Loan ($81.0 million -- 3.7%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.3 million square foot regional mall located in
Hayward, California. The loan, which matured in February 2009,
was transferred to special servicing in March 2009 due to a
maturity default and is included in GGP's bankruptcy filing.
Based on Moody's value of the property, Moody's do not currently
anticipate a loss on this loan. Anchors include Macy's, J.C.
Penney and Kohl's. As of December 2008 the in-line space was 90%
occupied, compared to 96% at securitization. Steve & Barry's was
still listed on the rent roll, even though it had vacated in 2008.
Excluding the Steve & Barry's space and space leased on a month-
to-month basis to temporary tenants, in-line occupancy falls to
71%. The loan was originally structured with a 30-year
amortization schedule and has amortized by approximately 5% since
last review. Moody's analysis of this loan incorporates a
stressed cash flow to reflect Moody's concerns about the current
weak retail environment and the potential impact of GGP's
bankruptcy on property performance. Moody's analysis also
reflects the elimination of certain tranching benefits associated
with the nature of the collateral and the sponsorship and
management of the mall. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.44X compared
to 1.46X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating is
Baa2 compared to A3 at last review.
The third loan with an underlying rating is the Deerbrook Mall
Loan ($73.3 million -- 3.3%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.2 million square foot regional mall located in the
suburban Houston suburb of Humble, Texas. The loan, which matured
in March 2009, was transferred to special servicing in March due
to maturity default and is included in GGP's bankruptcy filing.
Based on Moody's value of the property, Moody's do not currently
anticipate a loss on this loan. Anchors include Dillard's,
Macy's, Sears and J.C. Penney, none of which are part of the
collateral. As of January 2009 the in-line space was 93%
occupied, compared to 96% at last review. Excluding space leased
on a month-to-month basis to temporary tenants, inline occupancy
falls to 87%. The loan was originally structured with a 25-year
amortization schedule and has amortized by approximately 7% since
last review. Moody's analysis of this loan incorporates a
stressed cash flow to reflect Moody's concerns about the current
weak retail environment and the potential impact of GGP's
bankruptcy on property performance. Moody's analysis also
reflects the elimination of certain tranching benefits associated
with the nature of the collateral and the sponsorship and
management of the mall. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.66X compared
to 1.51X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating is
Baa1, the same as at last review.
The fourth loan with an underlying rating is the Water Tower Place
Loan ($53.6 million -- 2.2%), which represents a 30% interest in a
$170.8 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by an
eight-story mixed use property located on North Michigan Avenue in
downtown Chicago, Illinois. The loan sponsor is GGP. The
property is not part of GGP's bankruptcy filing; however, the loan
is on the master servicer's watchlist due to GGP's sponsorship.
The property totals 822,000 square feet which includes 728,000
square feet of retail space and 94,000 square feet of office
space. The retail space is anchored by Macy's, which leases 35%
of the NRA through January 2016. As of September 2008, the in-
line space was 84% occupied compared to 95% at last review. The
loan was originally structured with a 30-year amortization
schedule and has amortized by approximately 4% since last review.
Moody's analysis of this loan incorporates a stressed cash flow to
reflect Moody's concerns about the current weak retail environment
and the potential impact of GGP's bankruptcy on property
performance. Moody's analysis also reflects the elimination of
certain tranching benefits associated with the nature of the
collateral and the sponsorship and management of the mall.
Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.38X, the same as at last review.
Moody's current underlying rating is A2, the same as at last
review.
The fifth loan with an underlying rating is the 222 East 41st
Street Loan ($10.0 -- 0.5%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a leased fee land parcel in the Grand Central
submarket in New York City. The land is improved with a 371,000
square foot office building constructed in 1999 and leased to the
Jones Day Law firm. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.20X compared to
1.18X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating is Aa2,
the same as at last review.
The three largest non-defeased conduit loans comprise 10.5% of the
pool. The largest loan is the Aegon Center Loan ($108.4 million -
- 4.9%), which is secured by a 634,000 square foot Class A office
building located in downtown Louisville, Kentucky. The property
was 94% leased as of January 2009 compared to 96% at last review.
Major tenants include Aegon N.V. (Moody's senior unsecured rating
A3 -- negative outlook; 41% of NRA; lease expiration December
2012), Frost Brown Todd (18% of NRA; lease expiration April 2015)
and Stites and Harbison (13% of NRA; lease expiration May 2014).
The loan was structured with an initial 60-month interest only
period. Moody's LTV is 99% compared to 96% at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.03X compared to 1.02X at last review.
The second largest loan is the 180 North LaSalle Loan
($61.8 million -- 2.8%), which is secured by a 766,000 square foot
office building located in the East Loop submarket of Chicago,
Illinois. The property was 86% leased as of February 2009
compared to 80% at last review. Major tenants include Accenture
(22% of NRA; lease expiration July 2015), Performics (8% of NRA;
lease expiration April 2015), and Schwartz, Cooper, Greenberger &
Kraus (7% of NRA; lease expiration August 2014). Performance has
been stable. Moody's LTV is 92% compared to 93% at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.08X compared to 1.07X at last review.
The third largest loan is the New Roc City Loan ($61.2 million --
2.8%), which is secured by a 446,000 square foot lifestyle retail
center in New Rochelle, New York. The property was 91% occupied
as of June 2008 compared to 98% at last review. Performance has
declined with the fall in overall occupancy. Moody's LTV is 88%
compared to 82% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.20X
compared to 1.28X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-3, $42,173,329, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class A-4, $296,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class A-5, $381,830,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class A-6, $100,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class A-7, $1,005,555,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
affirmed at Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa ; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class XP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 3/1/2007
-- Class B, $61,802,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
Aaa from Aa2 on 3/1/2007
-- Class C, $26,021,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa1; previously
upgraded to Aa1 from Aa2 on 12/20/2007
-- Class D, $52,043,000, upgraded to Aa3 from A1; previously
upgraded to A1 from A2 on 3/1/2007
-- Class E, $32,527,000, upgraded to A2 from A3; previously
affirmed at A3 on 3/1/2007
-- Class F, $32,527,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
at Baa1 on 3/1/2007
-- Class G, $26,022,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed
at Baa2 on 3/1/2007
-- Class H, $39,032,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
at Baa3 on 3/1/2007
-- Class J, $6,505,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
Ba1 on 3/1/2007
-- Class K, $13,011,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
Ba2 on 3/1/2007
-- Class L, $13,011,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
Ba3 on 3/1/2007
-- Class M, $9,758,000, affirmed at B1; previously affirmed at
B1 on 3/1/2007
-- Class N, $9,758,000, affirmed at B2; previously affirmed at
B2 on 3/1/2007
-- Class O, $6,506,000, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
B3 on 3/1/2007
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 2005-GG3 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-GG3 on review for possible downgrade due
to concerns that expected losses for the pool have increased as a
result of anticipated losses from loans in special servicing and
increased credit quality dispersion for the remainder of the pool.
Since Moody's prior review in May 2007, nine loans, representing
15% of the pool, have transferred to special servicing. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the June 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$3.40 billion from $3.59 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 135 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 49% of the pool. The pool includes four loans with
underlying ratings, representing 19% of the pool. Eleven loans,
representing 4% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
by U.S. Government securities.
Twenty-nine loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Nine loans, representing 15% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The top two loans in special servicing, representing
11% of the pool, are secured by malls owned by affiliates of
General Growth Properties, Inc. These loans were transferred to
special servicing due to GGP's bankruptcy filing on April 16,
2009. The third largest loan in special servicing, and the
primary loan of concern, is the Place Properties Portfolio Loan
($98.7 million -- 2.9%). The loan is secured by nine student
housing properties located in various southern states. The loan
was transferred to special servicing on May 21, 2009 due to
imminent default. The loan is interest-only for the full term and
matures in December 2009.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-J, $228,986,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 5/2/2007
-- Class B, $112,247,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 5/2/2007
-- Class C, $40,410,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 5/2/2007
-- Class D, $58,368,000, currently rated A2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 5/2/2007
-- Class E, $35,920,000, currently rated A3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 5/2/2007
-- Class F, $44,899,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 5/2/2007
-- Class G, $35,919,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 5/2/2007
-- Class H, $40,409,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 5/2/2007
-- Class J, $8,980,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 5/2/2007
-- Class K, $13,470,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 5/2/2007
-- Class L, $17,960,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 5/2/2007
-- Class M, $13,469,000, currently rated B1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 5/2/2007
-- Class N, $8,980,000, currently rated B2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 5/2/2007
-- Class O, $13,470,000, currently rated B3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 5/2/2007
GSC PARTNERS: Moody's Keeps Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by GSC Partners CDO Fund VI,
Limited:
-- US$28,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes due
2017, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on 3/4/2009 Aa1 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- US$37,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on 3/23/2009 Downgraded
to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$4,300,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
2017, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/23/2009 Downgraded
to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$8,700,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/23/2009 Downgraded
to B3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$21,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the ratings for the notes have been
confirmed after allowing for Moody's revised assumptions with
respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the
application of certain stresses with respect to the default
probabilities associated with certain Moody's credit estimates,
and the calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised
assumptions that have been applied to all corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio are described in the press release dated
February 4, 2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for
rating CLOs." Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that
recoveries for second lien loans will be below their historical
averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Moody's notes that a material proportion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through Moody's credit estimates. Moody's analysis reflects the
application of certain stresses with respect to the default
probabilities associated with such credit estimates that have not
been recently updated.
The transaction has experienced an increase in the collateral par
of the portfolio since the inception of the deal. In addition,
the Minimum Weighted Average Spread Test and Minimum Weight
Average Coupon Test are currently 3.63% and 10.93%, respectively,
well above the required test levels of 3.05% and 7.75%. The
weighted average rating factor is currently at 3251 versus a test
level of 3025 as of the last trustee report, dated May 26, 2009.
GSC Partners CDO Fund VI, Limited, issued On October 20, 2005, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two 1999-C1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes,
upgraded one class and downgraded one class of GS Mortgage
Securities Corporation II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C1. The upgrade is due to increased
credit support resulting from significant paydowns and principal
amortization. The pool has paid down by 83% since Moody's last
full review in October 2007. The downgrade is due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing. The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.
As of the June 18, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 90%
to $85.9 million from $890.6 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 45 loans ranging in size from
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top 10 non-defeased loans
representing 48% of the pool. Two loans, representing 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.
Thirteen loans, representing 15% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Thirty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate $18.5 million realized loss. There are eleven
loans, representing 41% of the pool, currently in special
servicing. All of the specially serviced loans have passed their
respective maturity dates. The largest specially serviced loan is
the Howard Johnson Riverwalk Plaza Hotel Loan ($6.2 million --
7.3%), which is secured by a 132-key limited service hotel located
in San Antonio, Texas. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2008 due to a maturity default. Moody's
estimates an aggregate loss on eleven specially serviced loans
totaling $11.6 million (33% loss severity on average).
Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for 99% and 64%, respectively, of the pool, excluding
defeased loans. Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio,
excluding the specially serviced loans with estimated losses, is
73% compared to 76% at Moody's last review. Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio is 1.9X compared to 1.5X at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 24
compared to 91 at last review.
The top three performing loans represent 14.8% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Old Times Union Building Loan ($6.5 million --
7.6%), which is secured by an 110,443 square foot office complex
located in Albany, New York. The properties were built in 1920
and 1930 and renovated in 1986. The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because the single tenant, NYS Office Real
Property, has been leasing the property on a month-to-month basis
since its lease expired in October 2008. The loan matures in June
2010. Although property performance has been stable since
securitization, Moody's valuation reflects Moody's concerns about
the 100% month-to-month tenancy, the age of the property and the
weak Albany office market. Based on market data compiled by CB
Richard Ellis, the downtown Albany office vacancy rate was
approximately 13% as of fourth quarter 2008 compared to 5% for the
same period in 2007. Moody's LTV is 118% compared to 74% at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.23X compared to 1.53X at last
review.
The second largest loan is the Foxwood Crossing Apartments Loan
($3.8 million -- 4.4%), which is secured by a 72-unit multifamily
property located in Greenfield, Wisconsin. Performance has been
stable since last review. Moody's LTV is 90% compared to 99% at
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.14X compared to 1.04X at
last review.
The third largest loan is the Food-4-Less Center Loan
($2.4 million -- 2.8%), which is secured by a 49,725 square foot
grocery store located in San Luis Obispo, California. The
property is leased to Food-4-Less through December 2017, ten
months prior to the loan maturity in October 2018. Moody's
concern about this single tenant building is mitigated by the
significant amortization during the loan term. Based on the 240-
month amortization schedule, the loan will be less than $6 per
square foot when the tenant's lease expires. Moody's LTV is 56%
compared to 60% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.74X
compared to 1.63X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 10/24/2007
-- Class F, $39,861,284, upgraded to Aa2 from A2; previously
upgraded to A2 from Baa1 on 9/25/2008
-- Class G, $28,944,000, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
B3 on 10/24/2007
-- Class H, $6,679,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
affirmed at Caa1 on 10/24/2007
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Seven Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 67
tranches from 7 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by GSR.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans. These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
List of actions:
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/17/2006
Upgraded to Aaa
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-11
-- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1AX, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2AX1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2AX2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-12
-- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A6, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A1
-- Cl. 1B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. 1B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. 1B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/30/2004
Assigned B2
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-15F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 7A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 7A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5
-- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/14/2004
Assigned Aaa
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9
-- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 1AX, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 5A8, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 6A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. 7A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 280 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 280 tranches and
confirmed 25 tranches from 11 Jumbo transactions issued by GSR.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans. The
actions are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance --
marked by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with
concerns about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide
and the rising unemployment levels. The actions listed below
reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector
announced in a press release on March 19th, 2009, and are part of
Moody's on-going review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3F
-- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-6, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-7, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-9, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-10, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-11, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-13, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-14, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-15, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-16, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-17, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-10, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-11, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-12, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-13, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-11, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-12, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-13, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-14, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-15, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-16, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-17, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-18, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-19, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 7A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 7A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-7, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-8, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-9, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-10, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3
-- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 7A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2B3, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-6, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-7, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-8, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-9, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-11, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-13, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Confirmed at B2; previously on 3/19/2009 B2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-10, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-11, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-12, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-13, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-14, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-1, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-12, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-13, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-14, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-15, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-16, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-17, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-18, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-19, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-20, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-21, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 7A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 9A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-11, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-12, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-13, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-14, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-15, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-16, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-9, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-10, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/19/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3F
-- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-4, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1A-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-9, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2A-10, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-7, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3A-8, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4A-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:
i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information available for the asset class as
well as for the transaction sponsor,
ii) collateral analysis,
iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
interests of the key parties to the transaction, most
notably the originator and the servicer,
iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
cashflow and capital structure,
v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
structure, and
vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
GULF STREAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various 2007-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1,
Ltd.:
-- US$76,500,000 Class A-1-B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
Downgraded to A3; previously on March 31, 2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$17,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 31, 2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$33,750,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
2021, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 31, 2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$31,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes due
2021, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 31, 2009 Caa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, and an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and it is currently at 2948 versus a test level of 2770 as of the
last trustee report, dated May 15, 2009. Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $28.6 million, accounting
for roughly 6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated
Caa1 or lower make up approximately 16% of the underlying
portfolio. Moody's also assessed the collateral pool's elevated
concentration risk in a small number of obligors and industries.
This includes a significant concentration in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.
Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.
Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued on May 24, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.:
-- US$300,000,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Aa1;
previously on May 9, 2006 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$33,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Baa2;
previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$14,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to
Ba2; previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded to Ba1 and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$11,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B2;
previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded to B1 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$3,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B2;
previously on March 17, 2009, Downgraded to B1 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$17,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deforrable
Floating Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
March 17, 2009, Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Class D Principal Coverage Test and the Class E Principal Coverage
Test. The weighted average rating factor has increased over the
last year. Based on the last trustee report, dated June 2, 2009,
defaulted securities total about 37.2 million, accounting for
roughly 9.6% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 7.2% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class D-1 Notes, Class D-2
Notes and Class E Notes are presently being deferred as a result
of the failure of the Class C Principal Coverage Test as of the
last payment date.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO II, Ltd.:
-- US$255,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Notes Due December
2016, Downgraded to A2; previously on December 1, 2004
Assigned Aaa;
-- US$8,000,000 Class A-2A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes
Due December 2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade;
-- US$7,000,000 Class A-2B Fixed Rate Senior Secured Note Due
December 2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 4,
2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$2,500,000 Class B-1A Floating Rate Deferrable
Amortizing Senior Secured Notes Due December 2016,
Downgraded to B1; previously on March 18, 2009, Downgraded
to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$7,500,000 Class B-1B Fixed Rate Deferrable Amortizing
Senior Secured Notes Due December 2016, Downgraded to B1;
previously on March 18, 2009, Downgraded to Baa3 and
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$11,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Notes
Due December 2016, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on
March 18, 2009, Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$11,000,000 Class C Secured Notes Due December 2016,
Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009, Downgraded
to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,000,000 Class D Subordinated Secured Notes Due
December 2016, Downgraded to C; previously on March 18,
2009, Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$16,000,000 Combination Securities Due December 2016,
Downgraded to C; previously on December 1, 2004 Assigned
Ba2.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Overcollateralization Tests for Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes and
Class D Notes. The weighted average rating factor has steadily
increased over the last year and it is currently at 2255 versus a
test level of 2100 as of the last trustee report, dated June 5,
2009. Based on the same report, defaulted securities total about
38.8 million, accounting for roughly 12.3% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
6% of the underlying portfolio. Additionally, interest payments
on the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are presently being
deferred as a result of the failure of the Overcollateralization
Tests for Class B-2 Notes and Class C Notes.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Hewett's Island CLO II, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
HOME RE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Five 2006-1 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the ratings of five tranches issued by the Home Re 2006-
1 Limited transaction.
The Home Re 2006-1 transaction includes synthetic securitizations
of mortgage insurance risk associated with a reference portfolio
of approximately $583 million of subprime and Alt-A mortgage
loans. The mortgage insurance is provided by Mortgage Guaranty
Insurance Corporation. Noteholders are exposed to the risk of
future claims under the mortgage insurance policies. The
riskiness of the notes is a function of the credit performance of
the underlying reference portfolio of mortgage loans and the
amount of risk assumed. Credit enhancement for the notes is
provided primarily through subordination.
The actions are triggered by higher than anticipated delinquency
levels and severity of loss as well as well as slower than
anticipated voluntary prepayments for the reference portfolio,
resulting in higher updated loss expectation for the underlying
collateral and lower coverage for the rated debt given available
credit enhancement.
The ratings on the securities are monitored by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the
securities, such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
historical performance information regarding the asset class ii)
an analysis of the underlying collateral, iii) an analysis of the
transaction's allocation of cash flow and capital structure, and
(iv) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
General loss estimation methodology for the reference portfolios
is outlined below.
For recent vintages (2005 and later), Moody's calculates estimated
losses for residential mortgage pools in a two-step process.
First, serious delinquencies are projected through late 2009,
primarily based upon recent performance. These projected
delinquencies are converted into projected losses using lifetime
roll rates (the probability of transition to default) averaging
85% for 60-day delinquencies, 90% for delinquencies greater than
90 days, 100% for loans in foreclosure and REO, and deal specific
severity assumptions.
The second step is to determine losses beyond 2009. Depending on
a deal's performance, as well as collateral credit
characteristics, such as loan type, or loan-to-value ratios and
geographic concentrations of remaining current loans, Moody's
assumes varying degrees of slowing in the loss rate (which is
measured by loss-to-liquidation) for the remaining life of the
deal. Typical degrees of slowing in loss rate after late 2009
range from 15% to 25%.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and, as a result,
realized losses could ultimately turn out higher or lower than
Moody's current expectations. Moody's will continue to evaluate
performance data as it becomes available and will assess the
pattern of potential future defaults and adjust loss expectations
accordingly if necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
Home Re 2006-1 Limited
-- Cl. M-2, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/21/2006 Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-3, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/21/2006 Assigned Baa3
-- Cl. B-1, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/21/2006 Assigned Ba1
-- Cl. B-2, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/21/2006 Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. B-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/21/2006 Assigned Ba3
JP MORGAN: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2004-C3 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., series 2004-C3, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:
-- $15.2 million class F to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $18.9 million class G to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $15.2 million class H to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $20.9 million class J to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $7.6 million class K to 'B' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
-- $5.7 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.
In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings (RRs)
to these classes:
-- $9.5 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-';
-- $3.8 million class N to 'CC/RR1' from 'B+';
-- $5.7 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'B';
-- $5.7 million class Q to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.
Fitch affirms these classes:
-- $3.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $156.7 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $154.7 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $235.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $166.1 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $421.4 million class A-5 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87.2 million class A-J at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.6 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- $13.3 million class C at 'AA-'; Outlook Negative;
-- $13.3 million class D at 'A+'; Outlook Negative;
-- $15.2 million class E at 'A'; Outlook Negative.
Fitch does not rate the $21.7 million class NR.
The downgrades are the result of additional specially serviced
loans and increased Fitch loss expectations since Fitch's last
rating action. Fitch assumed losses for all of the specially
serviced loans which resulted in significantly lower credit
enhancement. As loans have recently transferred to special
servicing, Fitch's loss estimates may be adjusted as additional
information on the resolution of the loans becomes available.
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes
over the next one to two years. The Negative Rating Outlooks
reflect the high percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern and the
potential for increased loss estimates. As of the June 2009
distribution date, the pool has paid down 5% to
$1.44 billion from $1.51 billion at issuance. Ten loans (13.6%)
have defeased including the largest loan in the deal (6.9%).
Seven non-defeased loans (4.4%) are scheduled to mature within the
next two years.
Fitch has identified 32 Loans of Concern (27.4%), including seven
specially serviced loans (7.1%). The largest specially serviced
loan (4.1%) is secured by a portfolio of eight industrial/flex
properties located in the greater Boston metropolitan statistical
area. The loan recently transferred to special servicing due to
imminent default resulting from several factors which include an
outstanding lawsuit from the leasing broker, issues with the
majority owner's liquidity to keep the loan current, and upcoming
loan maturity in January 2010 and ability to refinance. The loan
is current.
The second largest specially serviced loan (1.5%) is secured by a
multifamily property located in San Antonio, Texas and is
currently 90 days delinquent. The loan has been in special
servicing since December 2007 when the borrower MBS Co. filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. A plan of reorganization was filed which
contemplates the sale of the property subject to an assumption of
the loan. The property is under contract for sale, subject to
court approval. The loan will be assumed and modified.
The third largest specially serviced loan (0.5%) is secured by a
67,141 square feet retail property, consisting of three tenants,
located in Wichita Falls, Texas and renovated in 2003. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in April 2009 due to the
bankruptcy filing of the largest tenant, Linens N Things. At
origination the spaces were leased to Linens N Things, Ross, and
Shoe Carnival. After Linens N Things vacated, vacancy fell to
55.5%. The borrower requested a loan modification. The borrower
has a draft lease out to TJ Maxx for the former Linens N Things
space. The loan is current.
JPMORGAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2007-CH1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following actions on these classes of
JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1 Group 1:
-- Class AF-1A affirmed at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class AF-1B affirmed at 'A/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class AF-2 affirmed at 'B/LS3'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class AF-3 affirmed at 'CCC/RR2';
-- Class AF-4 upgraded to 'CCC/RR3' from 'CC/RR3';
-- Class AF-5 upgraded to 'CCC/RR3' from 'CC/RR3';
-- Class AF-6 upgraded to 'CCC/RR2' from 'CC/RR2';
-- Class MF-1 affirmed at 'CC/RR5';
-- Class MF-2 affirmed at 'C/RR5';
-- Class MF-3 affirmed at 'C/RR5';
-- Class MF-4 affirmed at 'C/RR5';
-- Class MF-5 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
-- Class MF-6 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
-- Class MF-7 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
-- Class MF-8 affirmed at 'C/RR6';
-- Class MF-9 affirmed at 'C/RR6'.
The AF-4, AF-5 and AF-6 classes were downgraded to 'CC' on June
12, 2009. Fitch used loss coverage ratios to guide the long-term
ratings. A bond's loss-coverage ratio is determined by dividing
the amount of projected collateral loss that would result in a
bond default by the expected base-case collateral loss amount. A
loss-coverage ratio between .75 and .99 generally results in a
'CCC' long-term rating while a ratio between .50 and .74 generally
results in a 'CC' long-term rating.
For JPM 2007-CH1 Group1, Fitch projects a collateral loss on the
remaining pool balance of 32%. As determined by cashflow
analysis, the AF-4 to AF-6 classes all have loss coverage ratios
between .50 and .74 and were previously assigned 'CC' ratings.
However, while all three classes are expected to eventually
default, the immanency of default is more consistent with that
seen by 'CCC' rated classes than by 'CC' rated classes. All three
classes are projected to default in approximately four years,
which is consistent with the average time to default for 'CCC'
rated Subprime senior classes. The average time to default for
'CC' rated Subprime senior classes is approximately 18 months.
Additionally, the relationship of the three bonds' credit
enhancement to severely delinquent loans is higher than any other
currently rated 'CC' Subprime class and more similar to a typical
'CCC' rated class. As a result of these additional
considerations, the bonds were upgraded to 'CCC'.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-HE1 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 14
tranches issued by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-
HE1.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, subprime residential
mortgage loans. The actions are triggered by a combination of
factors that can include increased delinquencies, higher loss
severities, slower prepayments and mounting losses in the
underlying collateral. Additionally, the continued deterioration
of the housing market has also contributed to the increased loss
expectations for subprime pools. The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated loss projections for the subprime RMBS sector
first announced in a press release on February 29, 2009, and are
part of Moody's on-going review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on collateral performance
and updated pool-level loss expectations relative to current
levels of tranche-specific credit enhancement. Moody's took into
account credit enhancement provided by subordination, cross-
collateralization, excess spread, time tranching, and other
structural features.
Complete rating actions are:
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-HE1
-- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AV-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AV-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 B1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AV-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 B2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AV-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 B3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. MF-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. MF-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. MF-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. MF-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-CIBC12 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC12 on review for possible downgrade
due to concerns that expected losses for the pool have increased
as a result of anticipated losses from loans in special servicing
and expected increased leverage and credit quality dispersion for
the remainder of the pool. Since Moody's prior review in July
2007, ten loans, representing 5% of the pool, have transferred to
special servicing. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the June 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$2.1 billion from $2.2 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 191 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 4.7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 26% of the pool.
Twenty-nine loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watch-list. The watch-list includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watch-list to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Based on Moody's preliminary analysis, the overall pool has
experienced increased credit quality dispersion. Approximately
52% and 16% of the pool have LTVs in excess of 100% and 120%,
respectively, compared to 43% and 0.5% at last review. Ten loans,
representing 5% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Five of the specially serviced loans (2% of the pool) are 60-90+
days delinquent; three loans (1%) are in foreclosure and two loans
(1%) are real estate owned.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-J, $162,527,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aaa on 7/6/2007
-- Class B, $43,341,000, currently rated Aa2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa2 on 7/6/2007
-- Class C, $18,962,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Aa3 on 7/6/2007
-- Class D, $32,505,000, currently rated A2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A2 on 7/6/2007
-- Class E, $27,088,000, currently rated A3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at A3 on 7/6/2007
-- Class F, $24,380,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa1 on 7/6/2007
-- Class G, $24,379,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa2 on 7/6/2007
-- Class H, $29,797,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Baa3 on 7/6/2007
-- Class J, $8,126,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba1 on 7/6/2007
-- Class K, $8,126,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba2 on 7/6/2007
-- Class L, $8,127,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at Ba3 on 7/6/2007
-- Class M, $5,417,000, currently rated B1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B1 on 7/6/2007
-- Class N, $8,127,000, currently rated B2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B2 on 7/6/2007
-- Class P, $5,417,000, currently rated B3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously affirmed at B3 on 7/6/2007
KATONAH VII: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Katonah VII CLO Ltd.:
-- US$100,000,000 Class A-1 Delayed Drawdown Floating Rate Notes
due 2017, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 18, 2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$167,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
Downgraded to A2; previously on March 18, 2009 Aaa Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$15,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 18, 2009 Aa2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$25,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 18, 2009 Ba2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$20,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2017, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18, 2009 Caa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Par Value
Ratios. The weighted average rating factor has steadily increased
over the last year and is currently 2809 versus a test level of
2625 as of the last trustee report, dated June 19, 2009. Based on
the same report, defaulted securities total about $46 million,
accounting for roughly 13% of the collateral balance, and
securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 9% of the
underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Katonah VII CLO Ltd., issued in November 15, 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2005-C1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes and
downgraded four classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-
C1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C1.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from increased credit quality dispersion, anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans and the refinance risk
associated with five-year loans approaching maturity. Five loans,
representing 5% of the pool, mature within the next 12 months and
do not pass Moody's refinance test based on a 9.25% stressed
interest rate. The action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the June 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 3% to
$1.47 billion from $1.52 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 89 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 56% of the pool. The pool includes four loans with
investment grade underlying ratings, representing 23% of the pool.
Due to a decline in performance, the Macquarie DDR Portfolio Loan
($85 million -- 6%), which had an investment grade underlying
rating at securitization, is now analyzed as part of the conduit
pool. Fourteen loans, representing 6% of the pool, have defeased
and are now secured with U.S. Government securities.
Ten loans, representing 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
There have been no losses since securitization. Currently there
are three loans, representing less than 1% of the pool, in special
servicing. Moody's is estimating an aggregate loss of
approximately $5 million from these loans.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for approximately 99% and 80% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's loan to value ratio for the conduit component is 96%
compared to 94% at Moody's last review in April 2007. Although
the overall LTV has been relatively stable, the pool has
experienced increased credit dispersion since last review. Based
on Moody's analysis, 13% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120%
compared to 4% at last review. Moody's stressed Debt Service
Coverage Ratio is 1.05X compared to 1.01X at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 19 compared to 20 at last
review.
The largest loan with an investment grade underlying rating is the
11 West 42nd Street Office Loan ($158 million -- 11%), which is
secured by a 877,000 square foot office building located in the
Grand Central office submarket of New York City. Moody's current
underlying rating is Baa3, the same as at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is 1.40X compared with 1.25X at last review.
The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Mall del
Norte Loan ($113 million -- 8%), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.2 million square foot regional mall
located in Laredo, Texas. Moody's current underlying rating is
Baa3, the same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.37X
compared with 1.20X at last review.
The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the IBM
Gaithersburg Loan ($46 million -- 3%), which is secured by a
393,000 square foot office building located in Gaithersburg,
Maryland. The building is 100% leased to IBM through March 2016.
Property performance has remained stable. Moody's current
underlying rating is A1, the same as at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is 1.48X, compared with 1.45X at last review.
The fourth largest loan with an underlying rating is the United
States District Courthouse Loan ($17 million -- 1%), which is
secured by a 47,000 square foot office building located in El
Centro, California, approximately 10 miles north of the Mexican
border. The loan fully amortizes over its 15-year term and has
amortized by approximately 13% since last review. The property is
100% leased to the U.S. Magistrate Courthouse through September
2019. Moody's current underlying rating is Aaa, the same as at
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.45X, compared with 0.96X
at last review.
The loan which formerly had an underlying rating is Macquarie DDR
Portfolio Loan ($85 million -- 6%), which is secured by four
retail properties totaling 800,000 square feet. The centers are
located in South Texas (2), South Carolina and Colorado.
Occupancy has dropped to 84% as of March 2009 from 96% at
securitization. Moody's analysis incorporates a stressed cash
flow due to Moody's concerns about the portfolio's declining
performance trend and the weak retail environment. Moody's LTV is
99% compared to 72% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
0.94X compared to 1.30X at last review.
The top three conduit exposures represent 22% of the outstanding
pool balance. The largest conduit exposure is the 2100 Kalakaua
Avenue Loan ($130 million -- 9%), which is secured by a 97,000
square foot high-end fashion retail center located in Honolulu,
Hawaii. The property was 85% occupied as of March 2009, the same
as at last review. Moody's LTV is 84% compared to 85% at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.03X, the same as at last
review.
The second largest conduit exposure consists of the Wilshire Rodeo
Plaza Loans ($113 million -- 8%), which are secured by two mixed
use properties totaling 265,000 square feet located in Beverly
Hills, California. The properties were 97% leased as of March
2009 compared to 100% at last review. Moody's LTV is 111%
compared to 100% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.87X
compared to 0.95X at last review.
The third largest conduit exposure is the U-Store-it Loan
($84 million -- 6%) which is secured by 21 self storage facilities
located in 10 states. Performance has improved due to increased
rental revenues. The loan matures in May 2010. Moody's LTV is 81%
compared to 91% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.27X
compared to 1.00X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $ 8,291,367, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-1A, $180,427,533, affirmed at Aaa; previously
affirmed at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-2, $232,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-3, $162,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-4, $531,842,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-J, $102,769,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class A-AB, $54,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class X-CL, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class X-CP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 4/18/07.
-- Class B, $13,351,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously affirmed at
Aa1 on 4/18/07.
-- Class C, $26,704,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously affirmed at
Aa2 on 4/18/07.
-- Class D, $19,073,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously affirmed at
Aa3 on 4/18/07.
-- Class E, $24,796,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
A2 on 4/18/07.
-- Class F, $15,259,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
A3 on 4/18/07.
-- Class G, $17,167,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
at Baa1 on 4/18/07.
-- Class H, $17,166,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed
at Baa2 on 4/18/07.
-- Class J, $22,889,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3; previously
affirmed at Baa3 on 4/18/07.
-- Class K, $5,717,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1; previously
affirmed at Ba1 on 4/18/07.
-- Class L, $7,623,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2; previously
affirmed at Ba2 on 4/18/07.
-- Class M, $3,811,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba3; previously
affirmed at Ba3 on 4/18/07.
LEHMAN XS: S&P Corrects Ratings on Two 2007-10H Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
class 1-A4-1 and 1-A4-2 certificates issued by Lehman XS Trust
2007-10H.
On July 2, 2007, as a result of an administrative error, S&P
incorrectly listed class 1-A4-1, which is insured by Ambac
Assurance Corp. (BBB/Watch Neg/--), as not having bond insurance
from Ambac in S&P's systems. At the same time, S&P incorrectly
listed class 1-A4-2, which is not insured by Ambac, as having
Ambac bond insurance.
As a result, on June 25, 2009, S&P incorrectly lowered the rating
on class 1-A4-1 to 'CCC' and affirmed the rating on class 1-A4-2
at 'A'.
According to S&P's criteria, the rating on an insured class is the
higher of S&P's rating on the bond insurer or its underlying
rating on the class, which is based on S&P's analysis of the
class' inherent credit support. Standard & Poor's downgraded
Ambac to BBB/Watch Neg/-- from A/Negative/-- on June 24, 2009.
S&P therefore have corrected S&P's rating on class 1-A4-1 to
'BBB/Watch Neg' to reflect the current rating on the insurer.
Concurrently, S&P corrected its rating on class 1-A4-2 to 'CC' to
reflect the fact that it is not insured.
Ratings Corrected
Lehman XS Trust 2007-10H
Series 2007-10H
Rating
------
Class CUSIP Current June 25 Pre-June 25
----- ----- ------- ------- -----------
1-A4-1 525237BH5 BBB/Watch Neg CCC AAA
1-A4-2 525237BJ1 CC A A
LOWER BUCKS: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Rating on $27 Mil. 1992 Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B3 rating for Lower Bucks
Hospital on Watchlist for possible downgrade. The Watchlist
applies to $27 million of Series 1992 Bonds issued by Langhorne
Manor Higher Education and Health Authority, PA. The Watchlist
follows receipt of unaudited ten-month financial statements ending
April 30, 2009, and the continued decline in financial
performance. Moody's expects to complete its review in the next
90 days.
The last rating action on Lower Bucks Hospital was on March 26,
2009, when Moody's affirmed the B3 rating and negative outlook.
MARATHON STRUCTURED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1 Draw, A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes issued by Marathon
Structured Finance CDO I Ltd., a hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transaction collateralized by mainly corporate CDOs.
The ratings on the class A-1 Draw, A-1, A-2, B, and C notes remain
on CreditWatch with negative implications.
On July 7, 2009, Standard & Poor's received notice from the
trustee stating that the majority of the controlling noteholders
has directed the trustee to proceed with the liquidation of the
collateral backing the rated notes. Previously S&P had received a
notice of event of default dated June 16, 2009, which was followed
by a notice of acceleration dated June 30, 2009, for the
transaction. The deal experienced the EOD because it failed an
overcollateralization-based EOD trigger specified in section 5.01
(i) of the transaction's indenture.
The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion that substantial losses
to the noteholders are likely based on the current market value of
the collateral and S&P's view that market prices may not recover
during the liquidation period.
Rating Actions
Marathon Structured Finance CDO I Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 Draw BB/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
A-1 BB/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 B/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
B CCC/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
C CCC-/Watch Neg BBB+/Watch Neg
D CC BB-/Watch Neg
Other Ratings Reviewed
Marathon Structured Finance CDO I Ltd
Class Rating
----- ------
E CC
MARKET SQUARE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Market Square CLO Ltd.:
-- US$232,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2017, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on May 31, 2005 Assigned
Aaa;
-- US$8,250,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2017, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on March 18,
2009 Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings of these notes:
-- US$27,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March
18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$8,250,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009
Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
high-yield corporate bonds and second lien loans will be below
their historical averages, consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the Class B
Overcollateralization Test, the Class C Overcollateralization
Test, and the Class D Overcollateralization Test. The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and is currently 2667 versus a test level of 2500 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 10, 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $24 million, accounting for
roughly 8.3% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 14% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class D Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Class C
Overcollateralization Test. Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in debt obligations of
companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and insurance
industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly correlated in
the current market environment.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Market Square CLO Ltd., issued in May 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 87 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 87
tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Merrill Lynch.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default,. The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
Complete rating actions are:
Merrill Lynch Bank USA Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 2001-A
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/30/2001 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/30/2001 Assigned
Ba2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-C
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Ba3
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-G
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Baa1
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Ba2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-H
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 1/23/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Ba3
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-1
-- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Aa1
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-A
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa1
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Ba1
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/18/2004 Assigned
B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-C
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Ba3
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-E
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Baa1
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Baa3
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/30/2004 Assigned
B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-F
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Aa1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to A1
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to A3
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Ba1
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-G
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/13/2005 Assigned
B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2004-HB1
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI Series 2004-A2
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/1/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/1/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/1/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-A
-- Cl. 1A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-1A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. X-2A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. X-2A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/17/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. X-B, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa1
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A1
-- Cl. B-3A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to A2
-- Cl. B-3B, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa3
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/17/2003 Assigned
B2
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-A6
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Aa3
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Baa1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to Baa3
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/17/2007 Upgraded
to B1
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2002-AFC1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
securities and upgraded the ratings of two securities from Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 2002-AFC1. These actions
are part of an ongoing review of subprime RMBS transactions.
The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections. The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months. Additionally, the
affected transactions has, at some point, passed performance
triggers and released portions of credit enhancement.
Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year. For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively. Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case 80%. The results of
these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are
weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.
Moody's has upgraded two bonds as a result of the deal permanently
failing its cumulative loss performance trigger, causing all
principal collections to be distributed sequentially. These
sequential payments to the upgraded bonds will enable the tranches
to maintain strong credit profiles.
The complete rating actions follow:
Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. Series 2002-AFC1
-- Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 2/21/2002 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. MF-2, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/21/2002 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. BV-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 4/30/2009
Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Cl. BF-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 4/30/2009 Baa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
METROPOLITAN ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
securities and upgraded the ratings of eight securities from six
transactions issued by Metropolitan. These actions are part of an
ongoing review of subprime RMBS transactions.
The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections. The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months. Additionally, most
affected transactions have, at some point, passed performance
triggers and released portions of credit enhancement.
Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year. For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively. Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case 75%. The results of
these two calculations -- Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are
weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.
Moody's has upgraded eight bonds as a result of each deal
permanently failing its cumulative loss performance trigger,
causing all principal collections to be distributed sequentially.
These sequential payments to the upgraded bonds will enable the
tranches to maintain strong credit profiles.
The complete rating actions:
Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II Series, 1998-A
-- B-1, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/28/1998 Assigned
Baa2
Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1998-B
-- M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 11/24/1998 Assigned A2
Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1999-A
-- M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 3/18/1999 Assigned A2
-- B-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/1/2003
Downgraded to B3
Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1999-B
-- M-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 10/1/2003 Upgraded to
Aa2
-- B-1, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/20/1999 Assigned
Baa2
-- B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 11/30/2005
Downgraded to B2
Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II, Series 1999-C
-- Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 10/1/2003 Upgraded
to Baa3
-- Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/1/2003 Upgraded
to Ba3
Issuer: Metropolitan Mortgage Funding, Inc., Series 2000-B
-- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 10/1/2003
Downgraded to A1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/1/2003
Downgraded to Caa2
MEZZ CAP: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various 2006-C4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and removes from Rating Watch Negative
seven classes of Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-C4:
-- $59.8 million class A to 'B' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
-- $2.2 million class B to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $2.2 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';
-- $3.6 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';
-- $1.2 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';
-- $2.6 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';
-- $6.9 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3'.
In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:
-- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0.8 million class H at 'C/RR6'.
Fitch does not rate the class J certificates.
The downgrades are the result of significant deterioration in loan
performance across the pool. Subsequent to the last full
transaction review, 15 loans (10.1%) were transferred to the
special servicer, while an additional 12 loans which have not yet
transferred (5.8%) to special servicing are delinquent. Fitch
Loans of Concern now total 44.6% of the pool, compared to 23.8% at
the previous full transaction review. As of the June remittance
date, all Fitch-rated classes incurred current period interest
shortfalls.
A summary of late paying loans, as of the June remittance date,
is:
-- 90 Days +: 22 loans totaling $14.4 million (17.0%);
-- 60-89 Days: one loan totaling $0.3 million (0.3%);
-- 30-59 Days: five loans totaling $2.4 million (2.9%);
-- Late < 30 Days (Beyond Grace Period): seven loans totaling
$3.1 million (3.7%).
Each mortgage loan within the transaction consists of two notes:
the A note, or senior component, which is not included in the
trust's mortgage assets, and the B note. The B notes in the pool
consist of subordinate interests in the first mortgage loans. All
loans are secured by traditional commercial real estate property
types and are subject to standard intercreditor agreements that
limit the rights and remedies of the B note holder in the event of
default and upon refinancing. Due to their subordinate positions,
B notes which default and incur a loss are typically 100% non-
recoverable. Servicer advancing generally ceases once a loan
becomes 30 days past due.
In total, 23 loans (18.0%) are currently in special servicing; and
four additional trust loans which have not yet transferred (1.5%)
have a related A note which is specially serviced in its
respective trust. The largest specially serviced loan is the
largest in the pool: the Lightstone Portfolio (4.7%), which is
expected to be non-recoverable.
Fitch reviewed updated rent rolls, operating statements, and
reports (obtained from both the B note and the related A note
servicers) for 99.2% of the loans in the pool. Following the
review, Fitch has designated 69 loans (44.6%), including the 23
specially serviced loans (18.0%), as Fitch Loans of Concern.
Fitch Loans of Concern are considered to have a higher than
average probability of default, and typically include loans with a
debt service coverage ratio below 1.0 times (x), a Fitch loan-to-
value ratio of greater than 100%, a significant decline in
reported occupancy, or no history of reported financials. Of the
10 largest loans in the pool (34.0%), three (10.7%) are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern.
As of the June 2009 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 4.7% to $84.8 million, from
$88.9 million at issuance. To date, no loans have defeased. The
transaction's upcoming maturity risk includes one loan (3.9%)
maturing in 2010, 0% in 2010 and six loans (1.1%) maturing in
2011; of these, four (0.4%) are Fitch Loans of Concern. Across
the pool, the weighted average coupon is 11.91%, and the weighted
average DSCR for the loans with servicer-reported 2008 cash flows
was 1.25x on the whole loan (combined A and B note) amount. The
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any changes to the
ratings over the next one to two years.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2003-IQ4 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes,
upgraded two classes and downgraded three classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-IQ4. The upgrades of two non-pooled classes are due
to the improved performance of the Mall at Millenia Loan. The
downgrades of three pooled classes are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from increased credit quality
dispersion and realized and anticipated losses from loans in
special servicing. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the June 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 21%
to $572.0 million from $727.8 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top 10 non-
defeased loans representing 50% of the pool. The pool includes
three loans with underlying ratings, representing 28% of the pool.
Seven loans, representing 11% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.
Ten loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a
realized loss of $1.9 million. The Executive Tower Loan
($3.1 million -- 0.5%) is currently in special servicing. The
loan is secured by a 50,000 square foot office building located in
Omaha, Nebraska. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2008 after the master tenant, DBSI Inc., filed for
bankruptcy. The property was 62% occupied as of January 2009.
The loan is currently 90+ days delinquent and matures in December
2012. Moody's is estimating a loss of $1.1 million (34% severity)
for this loan.
Moody's was provided with full year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for 97% and 82% of the pool, respectively, excluding
defeased loans. Moody's loan to value ratio for the conduit
component is 79% compared to 78% at Moody's last review. Although
the overall LTV has been stable, the pool has experienced
increased credit dispersion since last review. Based on Moody's
analysis, 8% of the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to
3% at last review. Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
for the conduit component is 1.51X compared to 1.48X at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans and loans with
underlying ratings, has a Herf of 25 compared to 29 at last
review.
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Mall at Millenia
Loan ($69.0 million -- 12.1%), which represents a participation
interest in the senior component of a $192.1 million mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by the borrower's interest in a
1.1 million square foot luxury mall located in Orlando, Florida.
The mall is anchored by Bloomingdale's, Macy's and Neiman Marcus.
The in-line space was 99% occupied as of December 2008, the same
as at last review. Comparable store sales were $789 per square
foot for the trailing-twelve month period ending March 2009.
Property performance has improved since last review due to
increased revenues and stable expenses. However, Moody's analysis
reflects the elimination of certain tranching benefits associated
with the nature of the collateral and the sponsorship of the mall.
The property is also encumbered by a $15.0 million non-pooled
junior loan that serves as the security for non-pooled Classes MM-
A and MM-B. Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR
for the senior loan are Baa1 and 1.50X, respectively, compared to
Baa1 and 1.40X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating
and stressed DSCR for the junior loan are Baa3 and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to Ba1 and 1.30X at last review.
The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Federal
Center Loan ($66.4 million -- 11.6%), which represents a
participation interest in a $132.8 million mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by two adjacent Class B office buildings located
in Washington D.C. The buildings total 722,000 square feet and
were 99% leased as of December 2009, essentially the same as at
last review. The General Services Agency is the largest tenant,
occupying approximately 87% of the space under two leases expiring
in August 2009 (38% NRA) and January 2013 (49% NRA). The GSA has
leased space at the property since 1981 and has previously renewed
leases on a long-term basis in 1991, 1992 and 2001. Moody's
analysis assumes that the GSA will renew the lease that is
expiring in 2009. Moody's current underlying rating is Baa3, the
same as at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.37X compared
to 1.35X at last review.
The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the Oakbrook
Center Loan ($22.2 million -- 3.9%), which represents a
participation interest in a $213.8 million mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by a mixed-use property located west of Chicago in
Oak Brook, Illinois that consists of an open-air regional mall,
three office buildings and a ground lease to a hotel and a
theater. The center totals approximately 2.4 million square feet,
of which 1.6 million square feet serves as collateral for the
loan. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Lord & Taylor, Neiman
Marcus, Nordstrom and Sears. In-line and office space occupancy
as of March 2009 was 94% and 75%, respectively, compared to 98%
and 75% at last review. Performance has improved since last
review due to higher rental revenues. Moody's current underlying
rating is Aa2 compared to A1 at last review. Moody's stressed
DSCR is 1.84X compared to 1.61X at last review.
The top three conduit loans represent 15.2% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Katy Mills Loan ($53.8 million --
9.4%), which represents a participation interest in a
$144.6 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1.2 million square foot outlet mall
located near Houston in Katy, Texas. The mall is anchored by Bass
Pro Shops, Burlington Coat Factory, Marshall's, and AMC Theaters.
The property was 90% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 95%
at last review. Moody's LTV is 92% compared to 93% at last
review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.09X compared to 1.08X at last
review.
The second largest conduit loan is the Encino Place Loan
($17.8 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by an 84,000 square foot
mixed-use retail and office property located in Encino,
California. The property was 89% leased as of May 2009 compared
to 94% at last review. Property performance has been negatively
impacted by decreased revenues and increased expenses. Moody's
LTV is 137%, compared to 107% at last review. Moody's stressed
DSCR is 0.75X compared to 0.96X at last review.
The third largest conduit loan is the Laurels Apartments Loan
($15.2 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 254-unit
multifamily property located in Gainesville, Florida. The
property was 82% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 98% at
last review. Property performance has been negatively impacted by
decreased revenues and increased expenses. Moody's LTV is 88%,
compared to 80% at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.08X
compared to 1.19X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $24,949,997, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 11/13/2007
-- Class A-2, $449,730,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
at Aaa on 11/13/2007
-- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 11/13/2007
-- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 11/13/2007
-- Class B, $18,194,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 11/13/2007
-- Class C, $23,652,000, affirmed at A1; previously upgraded to
A1 from A2 on 11/13/2007
-- Class D, $4,549,000, affirmed at A2; previously upgraded at
A2 from A3 on 11/13/2007
-- Class E, $7,278,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed at
Baa1 on 11/13/2007
-- Class F, $7,277,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed at
Baa2 on 11/13/2007
-- Class G, $8,188,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed at
Baa3 on 11/13/2007
-- Class H, $8,187,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
Ba1 on 11/13/2007
-- Class J, $3,639,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
Ba2 on 11/13/2007
-- Class K, $1,819,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
Ba3 on 11/13/2007
-- Class L, $5,459,000, downgraded to B3 from B1; previously
affirmed at B1 on 11/13/2007
-- Class M, $1,819,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
affirmed at B2 on 11/13/2007
-- Class N, $1,819,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
affirmed at B3 on 11/13/2007
-- Class MM-A, $10,000,000, upgraded to Baa2 from Baa3;
previously upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1 on 11/13/2007
-- Class MM-B, $5,000,000, upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1; previously
upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2 on 11/13/2007
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-RM1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class,
upgraded two classes and downgraded one class of Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-RM1. The upgrades are due to increased
credit support due to principal amortization and payoffs. The
pool has paid down by 85% since Moody's last full review in
September 2007. The downgrade is due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from increased leverage and anticipated
losses from loans in special servicing. The action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.
As of the June 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 92%
to $71.9 million from $859.4 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 63% of the pool. Two loans, representing 6% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
Twelve loans, representing 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
realized loss of approximately $10 million. Three loans,
representing 12% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Willow Tree Loan
($5.1 million -- 7.1%), which is secured by a 67,800 square foot
vacant office building located in Leonia, New Jersey. The loan
matured in November 2008. Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of
approximately $3 million (35% loss severity on average) for the
specially serviced loans.
Moody's was provided with year-end 2008 operating results for 90%
of the pool. Moody's loan to value ratio, excluding defeased
loans, is 77% compared to 69% at Moody's last review. Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.62X compared to 1.73X at
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf
score is 40. The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 18
compared to 60 at last review.
The top three conduit loans represent 26% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Sybase Building Loan ($8.5 million -- 12%),
which is secured by a 96,000 square foot office building located
in Boulder, Colorado. The property is 100% occupied by Sybase
Corporation, the same as last review. Moody's LTV is 66%,
compared to 71%, at last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.75X
compared to 1.53X at last review.
The second largest loan is the Green Ridge Heights Apartments Loan
($5.8 million -- 8%), which is secured by a 309-unit apartment
complex located in Cleveland, Ohio. The property was 97% occupied
as of December 2008, essentially the same as last review.
Performance has improved due to increased rental revenues.
Moody's LTV is 86%, compared to 95% at last review. Moody's
stressed DSCR is 1.19X compared to 1.03X at last review.
The third largest loan is the Comfort Suites Loan ($4.3 million --
6%), which is secured by a 120-key limited service hotel located
in Lexington, North Carolina. The property has been on the
servicer's watchlist since 2003 due to poor performance and low
DSCR. Moody's LTV is 178%, compared to 136% at last review.
Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.73X compared to 0.92X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class X, notational, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
Aaa on 9/26/2007
-- Class H, $22,243,781, upgraded to Aaa from Aa2; previously
upgraded to Aa2 from A2 on 9/25/2008
-- Class L, $6,445,000, upgraded to Ba2 from B2; previously
affirmed at B2 on 9/26/2007
-- Class M, $8,594,000, affirmed at B3; previously affirmed at
B3 on 9/26/2007
-- Class N, $8,593,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2; previously
affirmed at Caa2 on 9/26/2007
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Morgan Stanley Investment
Management Croton, Ltd.:
-- $175,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Term Notes Due 2018,
Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 31, 2006,
Assigned Aaa;
-- $50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2018,
Downgraded to Aa1; previously on January 31, 2006,
Assigned Aaa;
-- $4,000,000 Class B Senior Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018,
Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- $14,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Downgraded to A3; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- $14,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 18,
2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- $4,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 18,
2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:
-- $16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018, Confirmed at Baa3; previously on March 18,
2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of the
Mezzanine Overcollateralization Test. The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and it is
currently at 2704 versus a test level of 2595 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 5, 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $10.76 million, accounting for
roughly 3.7% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 13.4% of the underlying portfolio.
Additionally, interest payments on the Class E Notes are presently
being deferred as a result of the failure of the Mezzanine
Overcollateralization Test. Moody's also assessed the collateral
pool's elevated concentration risk in a small number of obligors
and industries. This includes a significant concentration in debt
obligations of companies in the banking, finance, real estate, and
insurance industries, which Moody's views to be more strongly
correlated in the current market environment.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Morgan Stanley Investment Management Croton, Ltd., issued in
December 2005, is a collateralized loan obligation, backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB-' rating on
Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-8 $3.5 million class A-15
secured fixed-rate notes on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The rating on the class A-15 notes is dependent on the lowest of
(i) the rating on the reference obligation, Navistar International
Corp. ('BB-/Watch Neg'); (ii) the rating on Morgan Stanley
(A/Negative/A-1), which acts as the swap payments guarantor; and
(iii) the rating on the underlying security, BA Master Credit Card
Trust II's series 2001-B class A certificates due Aug. 15, 2013
('AAA').
The rating action reflects the July 2, 2009, placement of S&P's
rating on the reference obligation, Navistar International Corp.,
on CreditWatch with negative implications.
NAVIGATOR CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Navigator CDO 2006, Ltd.:
-- US$40,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured
Revolving Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously
on September 7, 2006 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$265,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Term
Notes Due 2020, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on
September 7, 2006 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$10,000,000 Class 1 Combination Notes Due 2020,
Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 4, 2009 A3 Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade.
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:
-- US$26,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
Term Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$7,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Secured Deferrable Term
Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 17,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$15,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
Term Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at B1; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B1 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Secured Deferrable
Term Notes Due 2020, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on
March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured by the weighted
average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of
defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of securities
from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class B
Principal Coverage Test, Class C Principal Coverage Test, and
Class D Principal Coverage Test. The weighted average rating
factor has increased over the last year and it is currently 2890
versus a test level of 2889 as of the last trustee report, dated
June 8, 2009. Based on the same report, defaulted securities total
about $29 million, accounting for roughly 7.5% of the collateral
balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately
13.1% of the underlying portfolio. Additionally, interest
payments on the Class C and D Notes are presently being deferred
as a result of the failure of the Class B Principal Coverage Test
and Class C Principal Coverage Test.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1.5
notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between 12-15
months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that
were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as CEs
do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for
CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Navigator CDO 2006, Ltd., issued in September of 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
NINE GRADE: Moody's Assigns 'C' Rating on $25 Million Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned this
rating to Notes issued by Nine Grade Funding III, Ltd.:
-- C to the U.S. $25,000,000 Class A Deferrable Variable Rate
Notes due December 2050.
Nine Grade Funding III Ltd. has issued rated liabilities totaling
$25 million. This transaction is a pass-through structure backed
by one underlying Moody's Eligible Portfolio Collateral consisting
of a CDO security.
The Moody's rating of the Notes addresses the ultimate cash
receipt of all required interest and principal payments, as
provided by the Notes' governing documents, and are based on the
expected loss posed to Noteholders, relative to the promise of
receiving the present value of such payments.
The rating reflects the risks due to the diminishment of cash flow
from the underlying portfolio consisting of CDO Securities due to
defaults, the transaction's legal structure and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.
NEW SOUTH: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001-1 Note
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of a note
issued by New South Home Equity Trust 2001-1. The security is
supported by an insurance policy issued by Ambac Assurance
Corporation.
The current rating on the security is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.
As part of evaluating the current rating for the security, Moody's
Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating. The
underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
security in the absence of the guarantee.
The underlying rating on the security is based on the methodology
applied to all transactions with small pool factors. Moody's
defines low pool factor deals as those that meet one of these two
criteria: (1) the outstanding collateral balance is less than
$1 million, and the pool factor is less than 5% or (2) the pool
has fewer than 50 loans remaining.
Moody's uses these methodology to estimate losses on low pool
factor deals.
First, gross defaults are determined by applying assumed lifetime
roll-rates (probabilities of transition to default) to the
transactions' current delinquency buckets and a pipeline
multiplier. The pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible
defaults that might arise from borrowers that are current. The
pipeline multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of
loans remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans
remaining the higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are
subject to a floor -- a minimum default. The minimum default also
differs based on the number loans remaining in the pool. The
fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool the higher the
minimum default since each loan represents a higher percentage of
the pool.
The final default number is then multiplied by expected loss
severity to arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss
severity also differs by transaction and is higher for more recent
vintages.
Complete rating action:
Issuer: New South Home Equity Trust 2001-1 (Loans Remaining: 39)
-- Cl. A-2, Current Balance: $987,086, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on 11/17/2008 Upgraded to Aa1
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Ba3,
previously on 4/13/2009 Downgraded to Ba3)
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Corrects Ratings on Press Release
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings revised a release on Newcastle CDO VI, Limited,
issued earlier, clarifying that the 'F2' short-term rating for
class I-MM was also placed on Rating Watch Negative.
Fitch Ratings downgraded five classes and placed on Rating Watch
Negative two classes issued by Newcastle CDO as a result of credit
deterioration of the recent vintage residential mortgage-backed
securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral
within the portfolio.
Fitch places these classes on Rating Watch Negative:
-- $315,692,316 class I-MM notes 'BBB/F2';
-- $59,000,000 class I-B notes 'BB'.
Fitch downgrades these classes:
-- $33,021,499 class II notes to 'CCC' from 'B+'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $15,061,946 class III-FL notes to 'CC' from 'B';
-- $5,095,206 class III-FX notes to 'CC' from 'B';
-- $9,668,567 class IV-FL notes to 'C' from 'B-';
-- $2,452,827 class IV-FX notes to 'C' from 'B-'
Additionally, classes III and IV have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.
Fitch expects to resolve the Negative Watch status over the next
few months.
Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2009, 9.3% of the
portfolio has been downgraded and an additional 11.9% has been
placed on Rating Watch Negative. Based on Fitch derived ratings,
60.5% of the portfolio is rated below investment grade; including
9.9% rated 'CCC' or lower. As a basis for comparison, at issuance
26.6% of the portfolio was rated below investment grade with the
lowest rating at 'B'. Additionally, as of the June 2009 trustee
report, 6.9%, or $33.9 million, of the current portfolio is now
considered defaulted per the transaction's governing documents.
The collateral deterioration within the portfolio has caused each
of the overcollateralization ratios to decline further and breach
its respective covenant. The failure of the class I OC test has
caused all interest proceeds otherwise available to pay interest
to classes II through IV, to be used to redeem the class I-MM
notes. As of the June 2009 trustee report, the class I OC test is
114.4%, compared to its covenant of 118%. Similarly, the class
II, III, and IV OC tests are failing their respective triggers.
To date, approximately 2.3% of the original balance of the class
I-MM notes has been redeemed.
For underlying bonds not rated by Fitch, Fitch's CDO rating
methodology stipulates an input of the lower of the ratings
assigned by either Moody's or S&P. Fitch does not rate 41.2% of
the bonds in this transaction.
Newcastle VI is a managed CDO, which closed April 19, 2005.
Currently, the portfolio is composed of 51.4% commercial mortgage-
backed securities from the 2003 through 2007 vintages, 16.5%
residential mortgage backed securities from the 2004 through 2007
vintages, 14.9% real estate investment trust debt, 13.9%
commercial real estate loans, and 3.4% corporate loans.
The rating of the class I-MM and I-B (collectively class I) notes
addresses the likelihood that investors will receive timely
payments of interest, as per the governing documents, as well as
the aggregate outstanding amount of principal by the stated
maturity date. The ratings of the class II, III, IV notes address
the likelihood that investors will receive ultimate interest
payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the aggregate
outstanding amount of principal by the stated maturity date.
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and placed on Rating
Watch Negative two classes issued by Newcastle CDO VI, Limited as
a result of credit deterioration of the recent vintage residential
mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed
securities collateral within the portfolio.
Fitch places these classes on Rating Watch Negative:
-- $315,692,316 class I-MM notes 'BBB';
-- $59,000,000 class I-B notes 'BB'.
Fitch downgrades these classes:
-- $33,021,499 class II notes to 'CCC' from 'B+'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $15,061,946 class III-FL notes to 'CC' from 'B';
-- $5,095,206 class III-FX notes to 'CC' from 'B';
-- $9,668,567 class IV-FL notes to 'C' from 'B-';
-- $2,452,827 class IV-FX notes to 'C' from 'B-'
Additionally, classes III and IV have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.
Fitch expects to resolve the Negative Watch status over the next
few months.
Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2009, 9.3% of the
portfolio has been downgraded and an additional 11.9% has been
placed on Rating Watch Negative. Based on Fitch derived ratings,
60.5% of the portfolio is rated below investment grade; including
9.9% rated 'CCC' or lower. As a basis for comparison, at issuance
26.6% of the portfolio was rated below investment grade with the
lowest rating at 'B'. Additionally, as of the June 2009 trustee
report, 6.9%, or $33.9 million, of the current portfolio is now
considered defaulted per the transaction's governing documents.
The collateral deterioration within the portfolio has caused each
of the overcollateralization ratios to decline further and breach
its respective covenant. The failure of the class I OC test has
caused all interest proceeds otherwise available to pay interest
to classes II through IV, to be used to redeem the class I-MM
notes. As of the June 2009 trustee report, the class I OC test is
114.4%, compared to its covenant of 118%. Similarly, the class
II, III, and IV OC tests are failing their respective triggers.
To date, approximately 2.3% of the original balance of the class
I-MM notes has been redeemed.
For underlying bonds not rated by Fitch, Fitch's CDO rating
methodology stipulates an input of the lower of the ratings
assigned by either Moody's or S&P. Fitch does not rate 41.2% of
the bonds in this transaction.
Newcastle VI is a managed CDO, which closed April 19, 2005.
Currently, the portfolio is composed of 51.4% commercial mortgage-
backed securities from the 2003 through 2007 vintages, 16.5%
residential mortgage backed securities from the 2004 through 2007
vintages, 14.9% real estate investment trust debt, 13.9%
commercial real estate loans, and 3.4% corporate loans.
The rating of the class I-MM and I-B (collectively class I) notes
addresses the likelihood that investors will receive timely
payments of interest, as per the governing documents, as well as
the aggregate outstanding amount of principal by the stated
maturity date. The ratings of the class II, III, IV notes address
the likelihood that investors will receive ultimate interest
payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the aggregate
outstanding amount of principal by the stated maturity date.
NEWCASTLE CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and placed on Rating
Watch Negative two classes issued by Newcastle CDO VII, Corp., as
a result of credit deterioration of the recent vintage residential
mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed
securities collateral within the portfolio.
Fitch places these classes on Rating Watch Negative:
-- $328,653,818 class I-A notes 'BBB+' and placed on Rating
Watch Negative;
-- $21,800,000 class I-B notes 'BBB' and placed on Rating
Watch Negative;
-- $53,000,000 class II notes 'BB+' and remains on Rating
Watch Negative;
Fitch downgrades these classes:
-- $26,233,966 class III notes downgrade to 'C' from 'BB-';
-- $20,431,516 class IV-FL notes downgrade to 'C' from 'B';
-- $6,292,995 class IV-FX notes downgrade to 'C' from 'B';
-- $16,808,363 class V notes downgrade to 'C' from 'CCC
Additionally, classes III and IV have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative.
Fitch expects to resolve the Negative Watch status over the next
few months.
The ratings of the class I-A, I-B, and II notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive full and timely payments of
interest, as per the governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date. The
ratings of the class III, IV-FL, IV-FX and V notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive ultimate and compensating
interest payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the
stated balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.
Since Fitch's last rating action in May 2009, 12.3% of the
portfolio has been downgraded and an additional 11.7% has been
placed on Rating Watch Negative. Based on Fitch derived ratings,
64.9% of the portfolio is rated below investment grade; including
13.0% rated 'CCC' or lower. As a basis for comparison, at
issuance 37.6% of the portfolio was rated below investment grade
with the lowest rating at 'B'. Additionally, as of the June 2009
trustee report, 8.2%, or $42.4 million, of the current portfolio
is now considered defaulted per the transaction's governing
documents.
The collateral deterioration within the portfolio has caused each
of the overcollateralization ratios to decline further and breach
its respective covenant. The Senior Par Value test has been
failing since December 2008. As of the June 2009 trustee report,
the Senior Par Value ratio is 104.7%, compared to its covenant of
120.8%. Similarly, the class III and IV Par Value ratios have
dropped to 98.3% and 92.6% compared to their respective triggers
of 115.2% and 110.9%.
The failure of the Senior Par Value test has caused all interest
proceeds otherwise available to pay interest to the class III
through V notes, to be used to redeem the class I-A notes. To
date, approximately 2.2% of the original balance of the class I-A
notes has been redeemed.
For underlying bonds not rated by Fitch, Fitch's CDO rating
methodology stipulates an input of the lower of the ratings
assigned by either Moody's or S&P. Fitch does not rate 52.8% of
the bonds in this transaction.
Newcastle VII is a managed CDO that closed on Dec. 20, 2005.
Currently, the portfolio is composed of 65.0% CMBS from the 2004
through 2007 vintages, 19.6% RMBS from the 2004 through 2007
vintages, and 15.4% real estate investment trust debt.
PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades these five classes of notes issued by
Pacific Bay CDO, Ltd., and assigns Loss Severity ratings as
indicated:
-- $99,915,007 class A-1 notes to 'AA' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Stable; assigned 'LS3';
-- $64,000,000 class A-2 notes to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook
Stable; assigned 'LS3';
-- $36,000,000 class B notes to 'CCC' from 'B';
-- $6,716,571 class C notes to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $17,000,000 preference shares to 'C' from 'CC'.
The class A-1 and A-2 notes were assigned a Stable Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable
over the next one to two years. Fitch does not assign Rating
Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or below.
These rating actions are the result of credit deterioration
experienced since Fitch's rating action in May 2008, and reflect
Fitch's view on the credit risk of the rated notes following the
release of its new rating criteria for structured finance
collateralized debt obligations. Approximately 46.3% of the
portfolio has experienced a downgrade since the last rating
action, and Fitch now considers 41% of the portfolio to be rated
below investment grade, of which 26.3% of the portfolio is
considered rated 'CCC' or lower. As of the May 31, 2009, trustee
report, approximately 23.6% of the portfolio is now considered
defaulted per the transaction's governing documents.
Pacific Bay declared an Event of Default on Dec. 22, 2008, due to
the class A/B Overcollateralization ratio declining below 100%. As
a remedy to the EOD, the required majority of the controlling
class, the class A-1 notes, voted to accelerate the transaction on
May 1, 2009. On the May 5, 2009 distribution date, all interest
and principal proceeds went to redeem class A-1 principal after
paying fees, the interest rate swap payment, class A-1 accrued
interest and the one-time termination payment to the class A-2
basis swap counterparty. On future payment dates, all interest
otherwise payable to the class A-2 notes and the class B notes
along with all principal proceeds will be used to pay principal to
the class A-1 notes until the class is paid in full.
The class A-2 and B notes are rated to the receipt of timely
interest and ultimate principal repayment. Fitch expects that the
class A-2 defaulted interest and class B defaulted interest can be
repaid once class A-1 and A-2 are paid in full, respectively.
Based on the current performance expectations for the remaining
portfolio, the class A-2 notes are expected to begin receiving
interest distributions, including defaulted interest, and full
principal repayment after the class A-1 notes have been paid in
full. The class B notes are expected to begin receiving interest
distributions and partial principal repayment after the class A-2
notes have been paid in full.
The class C notes and preference shares are not expected to
receive any payments going forward due the performance
expectations of the underlying portfolio and their subordinated
position in the capital structure.
Pacific Bay is a SF CDO that closed on Nov. 4, 2003, and is
managed by Pacific Investment Management Company LLC. The
portfolio is comprised primarily of residential mortgage-backed
securities (73.2%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (9.3%),
asset-backed securities (8.9%) and corporate bonds (8.5%).
Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.
PACIFIC COAST: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of notes issued by Pacific
Coast CDO, Ltd.:
-- $112,448,452 class A notes to 'CCC' from 'A';
-- $96,000,000 class B notes to 'CC' from 'CCC/DR4'.
These rating actions are the result of credit deterioration
experienced since Fitch's last rating action, and reflect Fitch's
view on the credit risk of the rated notes following the release
of its new rating criteria for structured finance collateralized
debt obligations. Fitch now considers 70.9% of the portfolio to
be rated below investment grade, of which 55.4% of the portfolio
is considered rated 'CCC+' or lower. As of the May 31, 2009
trustee report, approximately 19.9% of the portfolio is now
considered defaulted per the transaction's governing documents and
2.8% has experienced write-downs.
Pacific Coast declared an Event of Default as of Oct. 25, 2004 due
to the class A/B Overcollateralization ratio declining below 100%.
As a remedy to the EOD, a majority of the controlling class, the
class A notes, may vote to accelerate the transaction, but has not
done so to date. On the April 27, 2009 distribution date,
interest collections were insufficient to cover the entire
interest rate swap payment and a portion of this payment was made
using principal proceeds. Approximately $1 million, or 50% of the
principal collection account was used for the interest rate swap,
class A and class B interest distributions.
The interest rate swap will expire in October 2010, at which point
interest proceeds will likely be sufficient to cover interest
distributions to the class A and B notes, with excess spread
remaining to redeem class A principal. However, the benefit from
excess spread after October 2010 is unlikely to outweigh the
amount of credit enhancement erosion up to that point. Based on
performance expectations for the portion of the portfolio rated
'CCC+' or lower and the amount of principal proceeds used to pay
interest distributions, the class A notes may experience a
principal shortfall.
The class B notes are expected to continue receiving interest
distributions through principal proceeds, unless the controlling
class votes to accelerate the maturity of the transaction. They
are not expected to receive any principal repayment in the future.
Pacific Coast is a SF CDO that closed on Sept. 25, 2001, and is
managed by Pacific Investment Management Company LLC. The
portfolio is comprised of residential mortgage-backed securities
(42.4%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (19.5%), asset-
backed securities (19.5%), SF CDOs (8.7%), corporate CDOs (6.7%)
and corporate bonds (3.2%).
Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.
RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 130 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 130
securities from 25 transactions issued by Residential Asset
Securities Corporation. These actions are part of an ongoing
review of subprime RMBS transactions.
The rating actions are the result of an analysis of credit
enhancement relative to updated collateral loss projections. The
revised loss projections generally result from deterioration in
collateral performance in recent months. Additionally, most
affected transactions have, at some point, passed performance
triggers and released portions of credit enhancement. In
addition, in certain RASC deals, the over-collateralization
accounts and excess spread are cross-collateralized between the
different pools within a transaction. Therefore, for these deals,
losses incurred on a deteriorating pool could erode the over-
collateralization accounts for both pools. As a result, the
better performing pool's loss may be allocated to subordinate
bonds instead of being absorbed by that pool's outstanding over-
collateralization amount. This feature can adversely affect the
creditworthiness of certain bonds backed by better performing
collateral relative to a non-related collateral group from the
same transaction.
Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from last
12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and
then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year. For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively. Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions, in this case ranging from 55% to
80%. The results of these two calculations -- Recent Losses and
Pipeline Losses -- are weighted to arrive at the lifetime
cumulative loss projection.
The complete rating actions:
RASC Series 1999-RS1
-- A-I-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/17/2008
Published at Aa2
-- A-II, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/17/2008
Published at Aaa
RASC Series 2001-KS2 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/29/2001
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 6/29/2001
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/28/2005
Downgraded to A2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/7/2006
Downgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/17/2007
Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/29/2001
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/29/2006
Downgraded to A1
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/7/2006
Downgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/29/2001
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2001-KS3 Trust
-- A-I-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 10/23/2001
Assigned Aaa
-- A-I-6, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/23/2001 Assigned
Aaa
-- A-II, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/23/2001 Assigned
Aaa
-- M-I-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/28/2005
Downgraded to A2
-- M-I-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/7/2006 Downgraded
to Ba2
-- M-I-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/7/2006 Downgraded
to Caa1
-- M-II-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/23/2001
Assigned Aa2
-- M-II-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/23/2001
Assigned A2
-- M-II-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/23/2001 Assigned
Baa2
RASC Series 2002-KS1 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. A-IIA, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. A-IIB, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
RASC Series 2002-KS2 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/29/2002
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/25/2006
Downgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/25/2006
Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/25/2006
Downgraded to Caa3
RASC Series 2003-KS11 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/20/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/20/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/20/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/20/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/20/2004
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS2 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 4/24/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/24/2003
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS4 Trust
-- Cl. A-II-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. A-II-B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. A-III, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/17/2008
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/31/2003
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/31/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 7/31/2003
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS5 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-II-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-II-B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS6 Trust
-- Cl. A-I, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/29/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/29/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 1/3/2008
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/3/2008
Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/3/2008
Downgraded to B2
RASC Series 2003-KS7 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/26/2003
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/26/2003
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/26/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/26/2003
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS8 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2003
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/21/2003
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/21/2003
Assigned Baa2
RASC Series 2003-KS9 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-II-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-II-B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
RASC Series 2004-KS1 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba3
RASC Series 2004-KS10 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/19/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/19/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. B, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to B3
RASC Series 2004-KS11 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to A2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Caa2
RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/17/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to B3
RASC Series 2004-KS2 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba1
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 4/15/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba3
RASC Series 2004-KS3 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/28/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba2
RASC Series 2004-KS4 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. A-II-A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Cl. A-II-B3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 4/13/2009
Downgraded to Ba2
RASC Series 2004-KS5 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 8/16/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba2
RASC Series 2004-KS6 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/30/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/16/2007
Downgraded to Ba2
RASC Series 2004-KS7 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/8/2008
Downgraded to Ba3
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B1; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at Ba3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/8/2008
Downgraded to B1
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B3; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at B1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/19/2008
Downgraded to B2
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B3; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at B2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/8/2008
Downgraded to B1
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B3; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at B1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-II-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/19/2008
Downgraded to B2
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at B2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-II-B3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/19/2008
Downgraded to B3
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at B3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
RASC Series 2004-KS8 Trust
-- Cl. M-II-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to B2
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 3/23/2009
Downgraded to Ca
RASC Series 2004-KS9 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 8/8/2008
Published at Baa2
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B2; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at Baa2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/8/2008
Published at Baa2
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B3; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at Baa2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/8/2008
Published at Baa2
-- Current Underlying: Downgraded to B3; previously on
8/8/2008 Published at Baa2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured Rating Withdrawn on 3/25/2009)
RALI SERIES: Moody's Junks Ratings on 2006-Q09 Trust From 'Aa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 1 tranche from the RALI
Series 2006-QO9 Trust.
Complete rating action is:
Issuer: RALI Series 2006-QO9 Trust
-- Cl. AXP, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa3
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, negative amortization, Alt-A mortgage
loans. The action is triggered by rapidly increasing
delinquencies, higher severities, slower prepayments and mounting
losses in the underlying collateral. Additionally, the continued
deterioration of the housing market has also contributed to the
increased loss expectations for Option ARM pools. The actions
listed below reflect Moody's updated expected losses on the Option
ARM sector announced in a press release on February 5, 2009, and
are part of Moody's on-going review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread,
time tranching, and other structural features within the senior
note waterfalls.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.
The ratings on the notes were assigned by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the notes,
such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information regarding the asset class as well as for
the transaction sponsor, ii) an analysis of the collateral, iii)
an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of interests
of the key parties to the transaction, most notably the originator
and the servicer, iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation
of collateral cashflow and capital structure, v) an analysis of
the transaction's governance and legal structure, and (vi) a
comparison of these attributes against those of other similar
transactions.
RAMP SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-RS1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
securities issued by RAMP Series 2002-RS1 Trust. These actions
are part of an ongoing review of seasoned subprime RMBS
transactions.
Moody's approach to analyzing seasoned subprime pools (i.e. prior
to 2H 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate on the
pools over the last 12 months and the projected loss rate over
next 12 months, and then translates these measures into lifetime
losses based on a deal's expected remaining life. Recent Losses
are calculated by assessing cumulative losses incurred over the
past 12-months as a percentage of the average pool factor in the
last year. For Pipeline Losses, Moody's applies annualized roll
rates (probabilities of transition to default) of 15%, 30%, 65%
and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are in
foreclosure, and REO respectively. Moody's then applies deal-
specific loss severity assumptions, in this case 75% to calculate
the pipeline loss. The results of these two calculations --
Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -- are weighted and then
multiplied by the deal's expected remaining life to arrive at the
lifetime cumulative loss projection.
One of the pools in the transaction is backed by less than 50
loans. Losses on this pool were derived using Moody's approach to
low pool factor deals.
For low pool factor deals, Moody's first estimates gross defaults
by applying assumed lifetime roll-rates to the transactions'
current delinquency buckets and a pipeline multiplier. The
pipeline multiplier accounts for further possible defaults that
might arise from borrowers that are current. The pipeline
multiplier differs for each deal based on the number of loans
remaining in the pool -- greater the number of loans remaining the
higher the multiplier. The estimated defaults are then subject to
a minimum default. The minimum default also differs based on the
number loans remaining in the pool. The fewer the number of loans
remaining in the pool the higher the minimum default since each
loan represents a higher percentage of the pool. The final
default number is then multiplied by expected loss severity to
arrive at Moody's expected loss estimate. Loss severity also
differs by transaction and is higher for more recent vintages.
The credit support available from the over-collateralization
account and excess spread in this deal is cross-collateralized
between the two pools within the transaction. Therefore, losses
incurred on a weaker pool could erode the overall over-
collateralization available to the pools. As a result, the better
performing pool can be adversely affected. This will impact the
creditworthiness of certain bonds backed by better performing
collateral relative to a non-related collateral group from the
same transaction.
The class A-1-5 is supported by an insurance policy issued by
Ambac Assurance Corporation. The current rating on the insured
security is consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured
securities at the higher of (1) the guarantor's insurance
financial strength rating and (2) the underlying rating, based on
Moody's modified approach to rating structured finance securities
wrapped by financial guarantors.
As part of evaluating the current rating for the security, Moody's
Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating. The
underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
security in the absence of the guarantee.
Complete action is:
Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS1 Trust
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/17/2008
Upgraded to Aa1
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Ba3,
previously on 4/13/2009 Downgraded to Ba3)
-- Cl. M-I-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 5/30/2006
Downgraded to A3
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/19/2007
Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. M-II-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 1/18/2007
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Cl. M-II-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/5/2006
Downgraded to Caa1
RFMSI SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 9 tranches
from 3 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans, issued by
RFMSI.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans. These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively. Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: RFMSI Series 2004-S7 Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-P, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-V, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004
Assigned Aaa
Issuer: RFMSI Series 2004-S9 Trust
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-P, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-V, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/1/2005
Assigned Aaa
Issuer: RFSC Series 2002-RM1 Trust
-- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/27/2005
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. B-I-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 7/17/2006
Upgraded to Ba1
ROSEDALE CLO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Rosedale CLO II Ltd.:
-- US$218,000,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Term Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on
May 1, 2007 Assigned Aaa;
-- US$26,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on
March 4, 2009 Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$15,000,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Ba3;
previously on March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$13,400,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Downgraded to C; previously on
March 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook,"and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Moody's analysis also reflects the expectation that recoveries for
second lien loans will be below their historical averages,
consistent with Moody's research. Moody's has also applied
resecuritization stress factors to default probability assumptions
for structured finance asset collateral as described in the press
release titled "Moody's updates its key assumptions for rating
structured finance CDOs," published on December 11, 2008.
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below, and failure of Class
C, D, and E Principal Coverage Tests. The weighted average rating
factor has steadily increased over the last year and it is
currently at 2605 versus a test level of 2704 as of the last
trustee report, dated June 5, 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted securities total about $ 8.2 million, accounting for
roughly 2.8% of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1
or lower make up approximately 9.8% of the underlying portfolio.
Due to the impact of all aforementioned stresses, key model inputs
used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers.
Rosedale CLO II, issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
SALT CREEK: Fitch Puts Ratings on Five Notes on Negative Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed five classes of notes issued by Salt
Creek High Yield CSO 2005-1 Ltd. on Rating Watch Negative:
-- US$34,000,000 class A-1$L notes 'AAA';
-- EUR5,000,000 class A-1EL notes 'AAA';
-- US$20,000,000 class A-2$L notes 'AA+';
-- EUR20,000,000 class A-2EF notes 'AA+';
-- US$30,000,000 class A-4$L notes 'AA-'.
These seven classes issued by Salt Creek remain on Watch Negative:
-- US$1,000,000 class A-6$L notes 'A';
-- EUR3,000,000 class A-6EL-1 notes 'A';
-- US$15,000,000 class A-7$L notes 'A-'
-- US$5,000,000 class B-2$L notes 'BBB';
-- US$3,000,000 class B-3$L notes 'BBB-';
-- US$500,000 class B-5$L notes 'BB-';
-- US$2,000,000 class B-6$L notes 'B+'.
The Negative Watch status reflects Fitch's view that the credit
risk of the notes is worsening given the deterioration in the
reference portfolio. Since the previous rating action in February
2009, the notes have suffered approximately 5% loss in credit
enhancement due to trading losses and exposure to several credit
events. In addition, 48.1% of the reference portfolio has
experienced negative credit migration since February 2009,
including 4.8% with ratings downgraded to 'D'. Currently, 36.5%
of the portfolio has a Negative Outlook, with an additional 4.2%
on Watch Negative. Assets with a Fitch derived rating in the
'CCC' bucket or below comprise 29.5% of the portfolio.
Salt Creek is a synthetic collateralized debt obligation that
matures in March 2010 and is managed by TCW Asset Management Co.
Salt Creek provides investors leveraged access to the credit risk
of a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing primarily non-
investment-grade corporate obligations. Salt Creek gains access
to the credit risk of the portfolio via a credit default swap
between Salt Creek and J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., as swap
counterparty.
This transaction was reviewed in accordance with Fitch's current
criteria for corporate CDOs. Fitch's revised criteria report for
rating corporate CDOs was released on April 30, 2008.
SARM 2008-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 5 tranches and confirmed
1 tranche from SARM 2008-1.
The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans. The actions
are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance -- marked
by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with concerns
about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide and the
rising unemployment levels. The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector announced in a
press release on March 19, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-going
review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2008-1
-- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A1X, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A21, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A22, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:
i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information available for the asset class as
well as for the transaction sponsor,
ii) collateral analysis,
iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
interests of the key parties to the transaction, most
notably the originator and the servicer,
iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
cashflow and capital structure,
v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
structure, and
vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
SMART HOME: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 37 Tranches by Four Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review the ratings of
thirty seven tranches issued in four transactions from the Smart
Home Reinsurance shelf.
The four Smart Home Reinsurance transactions include synthetic
securitizations of mortgage insurance risk associated with a
reference portfolio of approximately $4.89 billion of subprime and
Alt-A mortgage loans. The mortgage insurance is provided by
Radian Guaranty Inc. Noteholders are exposed to the risk of
future claims under the mortgage insurance policies. The
riskiness of the notes is a function of the credit performance of
the underlying reference portfolio of mortgage loans and the
amount of risk assumed. Credit enhancement for the notes is
provided primarily through subordination.
The actions are triggered by higher than anticipated delinquency
levels and severity of loss as well as well as slower than
anticipated voluntary prepayments for the reference portfolios,
resulting in higher updated loss expectation for the underlying
collateral and lower coverage for the rated debt given available
credit enhancement.
The ratings on the securities are monitored by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile of the
securities, such as i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of
historical performance information regarding the asset class ii)
an analysis of the underlying collateral, iii) an analysis of the
transaction's allocation of cash flow and capital structure, and
(iv) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
For recent vintages, Moody's calculates estimated losses for
residential mortgage pools in a two-step process. First, serious
delinquencies are projected through late 2009, primarily based
upon recent performance. These projected delinquencies are
converted into projected losses using lifetime roll rates (the
probability of transition to default) averaging 85% for 60-day
delinquencies, 90% for delinquencies greater than 90 days, 100%
for loans in foreclosure and REO, and deal specific severity
assumptions.
The second step is to determine losses beyond 2009. Depending on a
deal's performance, as well as collateral credit characteristics,
such as loan type, or loan-to-value ratios and geographic
concentrations of remaining current loans, Moody's assumes varying
degrees of slowing in the loss rate (which is measured by loss-to-
liquidation) for the remaining life of the deal. Typical degrees
of slowing in loss rate after late 2009 range from 15 to 25%.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and, as a result,
realized losses could ultimately turn out higher or lower than
Moody's current expectations. Moody's will continue to evaluate
performance data as it becomes available and will assess the
pattern of potential future defaults and adjust loss expectations
accordingly if necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
Smart Home Reinsurance 2004-1 Limited
-- Cl. M-1, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Aa2
Smart Home Reinsurance 2005-1 Limited
-- Cl. M-1, Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. M-2, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-3, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Aa3
-- Cl. M-4, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-5, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-6, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-7, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned A3
-- Cl. M-8, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. M-9, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-10, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/15/2005 Assigned Baa3
Smart Home Reinsurance 2005-2 Limited
-- Cl. M-2, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-3, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Aa3
-- Cl. M-3A, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned Aa3
-- Cl. M-4, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-4A, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-5, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-5A, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-6, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned A3
-- Cl. M-6A, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned A3
-- Cl. M-7, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. M-7A, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. M-8, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-8A, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. M-9, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Baa3
-- Cl. M-9A, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned Baa3
-- Cl. B-1, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 12/23/2005 Assigned Ba1
-- Cl. B-1A, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 3/14/2006 Assigned Ba1
Smart Home Reinsurance 2006-1 Limited
-- Cl. M-2, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. M-3, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Aa3
-- Cl. M-4, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned A1
-- Cl. M-5, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned A2
-- Cl. M-6, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned A3
-- Cl. M-7, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. M-8, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Baa1
-- Cl. M-9, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Baa3
-- Cl. B-1, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on 6/12/2006 Assigned Ba1
SPGS SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1 Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on SPGS
SPC's Baldwin Series 2006-VII's class A-1 notes to 'D' from
'CCC-'.
The downgrade follows a number of recent write-downs of underlying
reference entities, which have caused the notes to incur a
complete principal loss.
Rating Lowered
SPGS SPC
Series Baldwin 2006-VII
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 D CCC-
STRATS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $34 Mil. Certs. to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on STRATS
Trust For Ambac Financial Group Inc. Securities Series 2007-1's
$34 million callable class A certificates to 'B' from 'BB+'. At
the same time, S&P placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The rating on the class A certificates is dependent solely upon
the rating on the underlying security, Ambac Financial Group's
$400 million variable-rate directly issued capital securities due
Feb. 7, 2087 ('B/Watch Neg').
The rating action follows the June 24, 2009, lowering of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'B' from 'BB+' and the
placement of the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2004-AR7 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-
AR7, a U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction. Furthermore, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
remaining four classes from this transaction as well as 49 classes
from 12 additional deals.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
expected ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In
order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P considered whether
a class absorbed losses in excess of the base-case assumptions S&P
made in S&P's analysis. For example, S&P assesses whether a class
can withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
considers whether a different class can withstand approximately
154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB'
rating. An affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
class can withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is insufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels.
As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral as well as macroeconomic
influences. For example, S&P's view of the risk profile of the
underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default projections,
while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and the health of
the housing market influences S&P's loss severity assumptions.
The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates. The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
The collateral for these deals consists of prime jumbo adjustable-
rate mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family residential
properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.
Rating Actions
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR7
Series 2004-AR7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 86359LFV6 BB A+
B-3 86359LFW4 CCC BBB
B-4 86359LFX2 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2004-AR8
Series 2004-AR8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 86359LGE3 AAA
A-2A 86359LGF0 AAA
A-2B 86359LGG8 AAA
X-1 86359LGH6 AAA
X-2 86359LGJ2 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2003-AR4
Series 2003-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86359LAA7 AAA
A-2 86359LAB5 AAA
X 86359LAC3 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR1
Series 2004-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 86359LAP4 AAA
I-A-2 86359LAQ2 AAA
I-A-3 86359LAR0 AAA
II-A-1 86359LAS8 AAA
X 86359LAT6 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR2
Series 2004-AR2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A 86359LBL2 AAA
II-A 86359LBM0 AAA
III-A 86359LBN8 AAA
X 86359LBP3 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR3
Series 2004-AR3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 86359LBX6 AAA
I-A-2 86359LBY4 AAA
I-A-3 86359LBZ1 AAA
II-A-1 86359LCA5 AAA
X 86359LCB3 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR4
Series 2004-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 86359LDH9 AAA
II-A-1 86359LDJ5 AAA
III-A-1 86359LDW6 AAA
X 86359LDK2 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR6
Series 2004-AR6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 86359LEV7 AAA
A-1B 86359LFJ3 AAA
A-2 86359LEW5 AAA
A-3 86359LFK0 AAA
X 86359LEX3 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR7
Series 2004-AR7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 86359LFN4 AAA
A-1B 86359LFP9 AAA
X 86359LFQ7 AAA
B-1 86359LFU8 AA+
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR2
Series 2002-AR2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86358HNH8 AAA
X 86358HNJ4 AAA
A-2 86358HNK1 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR3
Series 2002-AR3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86358HNX3 AAA
X 86358HNY1 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1
Series 2003-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86358HRV3 AAA
A-2 86358HRW1 AAA
A-3 86358HRX9 AAA
A-3M 86358HRY7 AAA
A-4 86358HRZ4 AAA
A-5 86358HSA8 AAA
X-1 86358HSB6 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR2
Series 2003-AR2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86358HTY5 AAA
A-2 86358HTZ2 AAA
X 86358HUA5 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR3
Series 2003-AR3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 86358HUT4 AAA
A-2 86358HUU1 AAA
X 86358HUV9 AAA
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Fitch Withdraws 'D' Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the Issuer Default Rating and
outstanding debt ratings on Thornburg Mortgage, Inc.:
-- IDR 'D';
-- Senior notes 'C/RR6';
-- Senior subordinated secured notes 'C/RR6';
-- Subordinated notes 'C/RR6';
-- Preferred stock 'C/RR6'.
Ratings may be withdrawn after 30 days have elapsed after a
default. Fitch downgraded Thornburg's IDR to 'D' on May 4, 2009,
after the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
THORNBURG MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 32 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 32
tranches from six RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust in 2002, 2003, and
2004.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage loans.
These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss expectations on
the underlying collateral relative to available credit
enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale respectively.
Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity) assumptions
ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are projected to
default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions mentioned above
can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's specific
characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life by
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
List of actions:
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-3
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Aa1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
to A2
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/18/2003 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/27/2005 Upgraded
to Ba1
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/18/2003 Assigned
B2
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-3
-- Cl. B3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded to
A2
-- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded
to Baa2
-- Cl. B5, Downgraded to B2; previously on 7/17/2006 Upgraded to
Ba2
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-2
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/27/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/27/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/27/2004 Assigned
Aaa
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-3
-- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/11/2004 Assigned
B2
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-4
-- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/10/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-AX, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/10/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/10/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. III-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/10/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. IV-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/10/2005 Assigned
B2
WAMU MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five 2005-AR4 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 5 tranches from WAMU
2005-AR4.
The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Jumbo mortgage loans. The actions
are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance -- marked
by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with concerns
about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide and the
rising unemployment levels. The actions listed below reflect
Moody's updated expected losses on the jumbo sector announced in a
press release on March 19, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-going
review process.
Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement. Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.
Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR4
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
The ratings on the notes were assigned after evaluating factors
determined applicable to the credit profile of the notes, such as:
i) the nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical
performance information available for the asset class as
well as for the transaction sponsor,
ii) collateral analysis,
iii) an analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of
interests of the key parties to the transaction, most
notably the originator and the servicer,
iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation of collateral
cashflow and capital structure,
v) an analysis of the transaction's governance and legal
structure, and
vi) a comparison of these attributes against those of other
similar transactions.
WEST COAST: Moody's Has Not Withdrawn Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has not withdrawn,
reduced or taken any other adverse action with respect to its
current ratings on these notes issued by West Coast Funding I,
Ltd., as the "Issuer" as a result of the entry into and execution
of a novation agreement among Issuer, AIG Financial Products Corp.
as "Transferor" and Barclays Bank PLC as "Transferee" on July 8,
2009, as the "Novation Transaction", evidencing Transferor's wish
to transfer by novation its rights and responsibilities under five
cash flow swap transactions to Transferee:
-- US$1,187,950,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
Currently Rated Ca; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to Ca
-- US$1,187,950,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
Currently Rated Ca; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to Ca
-- US$100,000 Class A-1v Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Currently
Rated Ca; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to Ca
-- US$81,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
Currently Rated C; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to C
-- US$81,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2041,
Currently Rated C; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to C
-- US$54,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Currently
Rated C; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to C
-- US$60,750,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2041, Currently Rated C; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to
C
-- US$33,750,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2041, Currently Rated C; previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to
C
-- US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2041, Currently Rated C;
previously on 4/24/09 Downgraded to C
Moody's analysis relied on review of the related swap and novation
documentation as well as an examination of the cash flows in the
transaction.
Many CDO documents (to which Moody's is never a party) specify
that, in order to amend the documents, the issuer must obtain an
opinion from the rating agencies that the proposed amendment would
not in and of itself result in the related ratings being
downgraded or withdrawn at the time of the amendment. This type
of provision is typically referred to in the CDO indenture as a
"rating agency confirmation" or "RAC". Moody's is never obligated
to provide a RAC, and the decision whether or not to issue a RAC
lies entirely within Moody's sole discretion.
Before providing a RAC for an amendment, the proposal will be
reviewed by a Moody's credit committee which will consider, among
other things, the performance of the specific CDO and collateral
manager and the specifics of the proposed amendment and the
particular structure of the CDO. A RAC is purely an opinion, as
of the point in time at which the RAC is provided, that the
proposed amendment in isolation does not introduce sufficient
additional credit risk so as to negatively impact the related
ratings. In other words, it does not consider the impact of other
factors on the ratings, such as collateral deterioration. Also,
the RAC does not address any other, non-credit related impact that
the amendment might have. Moody's further emphasizes that a RAC
is not a substitute for noteholder consent or for independent
analyses by noteholders of the impact on them of any proposed
amendment.
WHITEHORSE II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Whitehorse II, Ltd.:
-- US$232,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due June
2017, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on April 28, 2005
Assigned Aaa;
-- US$25,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due June
2017, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
In addition, Moody's has confirmed the ratings on these notes:
-- US$15,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due June
2017, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on March 18, 2009 Ba1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$12,750,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due June
2017, Confirmed at B1; previously on March 18, 2009 B1
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The
actions also reflect Moody's revised assumptions with respect to
default probability, the treatment of ratings on "Review for
Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the application
of certain stresses with respect to the default probabilities
associated with certain Moody's credit estimates, and the
calculation of the Diversity Score. The revised assumptions that
have been applied to all corporate credits in the underlying
portfolio are described in the press release dated February 4,
2009, titled "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs."
Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through a
decline in the average credit rating (as measured through the
weighted average rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount
of defaulted securities, an increase in the proportion of
securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. The weighted
average rating factor has steadily increased over the last year
and it is currently at 2681 versus a test level of 2650 as of the
last trustee report, dated June 4, 2009. Based on the same
report, defaulted securities total about $12.8 million, accounting
for roughly 4% of defaults based on total portfolio pre-defaults
of the collateral balance, and securities rated Caa1 or lower make
up approximately 9% of Caa-rated securities reported by trustee of
the underlying portfolio.
Moody's also notes that a material proportion of the collateral
pool includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's Credit Estimates. Moody's analysis
reflects the application of certain stresses with respect to the
default probabilities associated with CEs. These additional
stresses reflect the rapid pace of recent changes in credit market
conditions and the default rate expectations in the current
economic cycle that are higher than the historical averages.
Specifically, the default probability stresses include (1) a 1 and
a half notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs updated between
12-15 months ago; and (2) assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs
that were not updated within the last 15 months. Additionally, as
CEs do not carry credit indicators such as ratings reviews and
outlooks, a stress of a half notch-equivalent assumed downgrade
for CEs is also applied to CEs provided between 6-12 months ago.
Due to the impact of all the aforementioned stresses, key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from trustee's reported numbers.
Whitehorse II, Ltd., issued in April 21, 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 104 Tranches From 21 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 104
tranches from 21 RMBS transactions, backed by prime Jumbo loans,
issued by Wells Fargo in 2004.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, jumbo residential mortgage
loans. These actions are a result of Moody's updated loss
expectations on the underlying collateral relative to available
credit enhancement.
Moody's methodology for rating securities backed by pools of jumbo
mortgages originated prior to 2005 takes into account the
annualized loss rate from the last 12 months and the projected
loss rate over the next 12 months, and then translates these
measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's expected remaining
life.
Recent Losses are calculated by assessing cumulative losses
incurred over the past 12-months as a percentage of the average
pool factor for the previous year. Pipeline Losses are calculated
by using annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%, 65% and 90% for loans
that are 60-89 days delinquent, 90 or more days delinquent, in
foreclosure, and properties that are held for sale (REO)
respectively. Moody's then applies loss upon default (severity)
assumptions ranging from 25% to 35% on the loans that are
projected to default. The roll-rates and severity assumptions
mentioned above can vary from deal-to-deal, depending on a deal's
specific characteristics.
Weights are then applied to Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses.
The weights applied depend on the year of loan and RMBS
origination -- deals from earlier vintages typically experience
higher Recent Losses and, as a result, have higher weights on
Recent Losses. The weighted loss is then translated to a lifetime
projected loss depending on the deal's expected remaining life,
which is estimated based the deal's pool factor and prepayment
speeds.
Moody's final rating actions are based on i) the level of credit
enhancement available relative to the updated pool-level loss
expectations and ii) current ratings. In addition, Moody's takes
into account credit enhancement provided by seniority, cross-
collateralization, time tranching, and other structural features
within the priority of payments.
For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described in the two previous paragraphs.
List of actions:
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-4 Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-A Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/16/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/16/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/16/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-AA Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-BB Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Baa2
-- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Ba2
-- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned B2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-C Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 4/26/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/26/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 4/26/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-CC Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-DD Trust
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/15/2005
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-E Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/1/2004
Assigned Aaa
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-H Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 6/7/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/7/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 6/7/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-I Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to Aa2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 7/17/2007
Upgraded to A2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-J Trust
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 8/3/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-M Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/27/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/27/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 8/27/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/26/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/26/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/26/2004
Assigned Aaa
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-P Trust
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-U Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-W Trust
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aa1
-- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Aaa
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/20/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 11/29/2004
Assigned Baa2
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-A-IO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Aa2
-- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned A2
-- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/27/2005
Assigned Baa1
* Moody's Takes ABCP Rating Actions Ending July 6, 2009
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service rated these ABCP program Prime-1 during
the period June 30, 2009, through July 6, 2009:
Moody's Assigns Prime-1 Rating To Arabella Finance
Limited/Arabella Finance Llc, Successor Abcp Programme
To Arabella Funding Limited
In London, Moody's has assigned a definitive Prime-1 rating to the
asset-backed commercial paper issued by Arabella Finance Limited
as issuer and Arabella Finance LLC as co-issuer. Arabella Finance
is a newly established, partially supported, multiseller ABCP
programme sponsored by Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG (rated
A1/Prime-1/C-). Arabella Finance has been established as a
successor to Arabella Funding Ltd., a partially supported,
multiseller ABCP programme established in 2001 by HVB.
All Assets funded through Arabella Funding will be transferred to
Arabella Finance within a few days and afterwards, all ABCP issued
by Arabella Funding will be repaid in full at maturity. Upon
request from HVB, Moody's plans to withdraw the Prime-1 rating
assigned to Arabella Funding after all outstanding ABCP issued by
the program is repaid. Arabella Funding will not issue any
further ABCP after the rating withdrawal date.
Arabella Finance is authorized to issue up to EUR 10 billion of
ABCP in both the US and the Euro ABCP markets. Arabella Finance
will use the proceeds from the sales of its ABCP to advance funds
under commissioning agreements to asset purchasing companies,
which will use the proceeds to purchase assets, including trade
and term receivables (but not asset backed securities). Arabella
Finance is structured as a prior review programme.
The Prime-1 rating assigned to the ABCP issued by Arabella Finance
is based on, among other factors, these: (i) Moody's review of all
asset pools prior to inclusion in the programme's portfolio; (ii)
liquidity support provided by Prime-1-rated banks; (iii) program-
level credit enhancement in the form of a standby letter of credit
provided by HVB, London Branch; (iv) hedging agreements provided
by Prime-1-rated financial institutions used to mitigate interest
rate and currency risk; (v) the experience and capability of HVB
as program administrator; and (vi) structural protections to
ensure the bankruptcy-remoteness of Arabella Finance Limited and
Arabella Finance LLC.
The ratings of these abcp programs were affirmed at Prime-1 during
the period June 30, 2009, through July 6, 2009:
Abel Funding/Tasman Funding Restructures Program
Abel Funding Pty Limited (Abel Funding)/Tasman Funding, Inc.
(Tasman Funding) has restructured its program due to the
integration of conduit operations by Royal Bank of Scotland plc
from ABN Amro N.V. The amendments to the program include (i) the
inclusion of a new special purpose vehicle, Entourage Funding,
acting as an asset holding company for the Abel/Tasman program,
(ii) increase in program-level credit enhancement to 8% from 5%,
(iii) the creation of a loan agreement between Abel Funding and
Tasman Funding, which replaces the US$ funding agreements, and
(iv) enhancement in the security structure.
Abel Funding/Tasman Funding program is a partially supported,
multiseller asset-backed commercial paper conduit, now sponsored
by the Royal Bank of Scotland plc (rated Aa3/Prime-1/C-). Abel
Funding issues ABCP in the Australian and European markets, while
Tasman Funding issues ABCP in the US market.
The Prime-1 ratings assigned to the ABCP issued by Abel
Funding/Tasman Funding are based on, among other factors, these:
(i) analysis of the excepted loss on the underlying assets
financed by the program and the sufficiency of asset-level credit
enhancement; (ii) program-level credit enhancement sized at 8% of
the aggregate investments; (iii) asset-level liquidity facilities
provided by Prime-1 rated RBS; (iv) the experience of RBS
(Australia) Pty Limited as the program administrator; and (v)
structural protections to ensure the bankruptcy-remoteness of
Entourage Funding, Abel Funding, and Tasman Funding.
Calyon's Atlantic Adds $130 Million Trade Receivable Facility
Atlantic Asset Securitization LLC, a partially supported,
multiseller conduit sponsored by Calyon (Aa3/Prime-1/D), has added
a $130 million trade receivable facility to its portfolio. The
receivables are originated by a non investment-grade-rated
producer and distributor of beverages. This transaction is
supported by a liquidity facility that funds for the face amount
of ABCP as long as Atlantic is not bankrupt.
With this transaction, Atlantic has $11.45 billion in purchase
commitments and $1.0 billion in program-level credit enhancement.
The rating of these uscp program was affirmed at prime-1 during
the period June 30, 2009, through July 6, 2009:
Louis Dreyfus Corp. Extends Existing USCP Program
Louis Dreyfus Corporation has extended and amended its existing US
commercial paper program supported by two irrevocable letters of
credit issued by Calyon, New York Branch (rated Aa3/Prime-1/D).
Calyon's irrevocable, direct-pay letters of credit provide full
support for the payment of commercial paper notes upon maturity.
One letter of credit supports a 364-day facility, while the second
letter supports a 2-year facility. The expiration dates for both
letters of credit were extended to May 2010.
Along with the facility extension, Louis Dreyfus reduced the
combined authorized issuance amount of the program to $358 million
from $451 million. Up to $182.3 million of CP may be issued under
the 364-day facility and up to $175.7 million of CP may be issued
under the 2-year facility. Moody's rating on the CP notes is
based primarily on Calyon's Prime-1 rating.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (Aa1/Prime-1/B), acting
as depositary, will draw on the letter of credit to pay maturing
commercial paper notes.
Louis Dreyfus Corporation is a privately held company based in
Wilton, Connecticut that directly and through subsidiaries is
engaged in trading and merchandising and in some cases, processing
of grains and oilseeds, cotton, coffee, sugar, citrus products,
freight, and biofuels. The company is a wholly-owned indirect
subsidiary of Louis Dreyfus Commodities B.V., a Dutch company and
itself a majority-owned subsidiary of Louis Dreyfus S.A.S., and
one of the worldwide group of BV subsidiaries that conducts the
Louis Dreyfus Group's global agricultural activities.
Louis Dreyfus Corporation has another letter of credit-backed USCP
program supported by an irrevocable, direct-pay letter of credit
issued by Barclays Bank PLC, New York Branch. The program issues
two series of notes, Series A and Series B, and has an authorized
issuance of $430 million. The Series A notes can be issued up to
an amount of $204 million and the Series B notes can be issued up
to an amount of $226 million.
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 18 Classes From 11 Prime Jumbo RMBSS
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 18
classes from 11 U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 2002-2003. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 111 classes from these transactions and
from six additional transactions.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
expected ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In
order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P considered whether
a class absorbed losses in excess of the base-case assumptions S&P
made in S&P's analysis. For example, S&P assess whether a class
can withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
considers whether a different class can withstand approximately
154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB'
rating. An affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects S&P's opinion that a
class can withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is insufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels.
As part of S&P's analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of
the underlying mortgage collateral as well as macroeconomic
influences. For example, S&P's view of the risk profile of the
underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default projections,
while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and the health of
the housing market influences S&P's loss severity assumptions.
The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates. The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
The collateral for these deals consists of prime jumbo fixed- and
adjustable-rate mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family
residential properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether S&P believes
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.
Rating Actions
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR12 Trust
Series 2002-AR12
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 939336CT8 BB AA+
B-3 939336CU5 CCC AA-
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR15 Trust
Series 2002-AR15
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 929227WN2 BBB AA+
B-3 929227WP7 CCC A
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR16 Trust
Series 2002-AR16
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-3 929227WT9 BB A
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR19 Trust
Series 2002-AR19
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 929227ZY5 BB AA
B-3 929227ZZ2 CCC A-
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR6 Trust
Series 2002-AR6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-3 929227QE9 B BBB
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR9 Trust
Series 2002-AR9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-B-3 9393357S8 B BBB
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR10 Trust
Series 2003-AR10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-4 92922FEG9 B BB
B-5 92922FEH7 CCC B
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR11 Trust
Series 2003-AR11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-5 92922FJP4 CCC B
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR3 Trust
Series 2003-AR3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-3 929227H25 BBB A-
B-4 929227K88 B BBB
B-5 929227K96 CCC B+
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR4 Trust
Series 2003-AR4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-4 929227M86 B BB+
B-5 929227M94 CCC B
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR6 Trust
Series 2003-AR6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-5 9292274N3 B BB-
Ratings Affirmed
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR12 Trust
Series 2002-AR12
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 939336CR2 AAA
B-1 939336CS0 AAA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR15 Trust
Series 2002-AR15
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-5 939336DN0 AAA
B-1 929227WM4 AAA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR16 Trust
Series 2002-AR16
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 929227WQ5 AAA
X 929227YA8 AAA
B-1 929227WR3 AAA
B-2 929227WS1 AA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR18 Trust
Series 2002-AR18
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 929227ZC3 AAA
B-1 929227ZE9 AAA
B-2 929227ZF6 AA-
B-3 929227ZG4 A-
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR19 Trust
Series 2002-AR19
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-6 929227ZS8 AAA
A-7 929227ZT6 AAA
A-8 929227ZU3 AAA
B-1 929227ZX7 AAA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR6 Trust
Series 2002-AR6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 929227QB5 AAA
B-1 929227QC3 AA+
B-2 929227QD1 AA-
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR9 Trust
Series 2002-AR9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A 9393357P4 AAA
I-B-1 9393357Q2 AA+
I-B-2 9393357R0 A+
II-A 9393357T6 AAA
II-B-1 9393357U3 AAA
II-B-2 9393357V1 AA
II-B-3 9393357W9 A
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-S8 Trust
Series 2002-S8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-5 929227B54 AAA
I-A-6 929227B62 AAA
I-A-7 929227E51 AAA
II-A-2 929227B88 AAA
II-A-7 929227C53 AAA
I-P 929227C61 AAA
II-P 929227C79 AAA
I-B-1 929227C87 AAA
I-B-2 929227C95 AA+
I-B-3 929227D29 A
II-B-1 929227D37 AAA
II-B-2 929227D45 AA+
II-B-3 929227D52 A+
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR10 Trust
Series 2003-AR10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-6 92922FEA2 AAA
A-7 92922FEB0 AAA
B-1 92922FEC8 AA
B-2 92922FED6 A
B-3 92922FEE4 BBB
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR11 Trust
Series 2003-AR11
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-6 92922FJF6 AAA
B-1 92922FJJ8 AA
B-2 92922FJK5 A
B-3 92922FJL3 BBB
B-4 92922FJN9 BB
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR3 Trust
Series 2003-AR3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-5 929227G67 AAA
B-1 929227G83 AAA
B-2 929227G91 AA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR4 Trust
Series 2003-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-6 929227L87 AAA
A-7 929227L95 AAA
B-1 929227M45 AA+
B-2 929227M52 A+
B-3 929227M60 BBB+
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR5 Trust
Series 2003-AR5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A6 929227R57 AAA
A7 929227R65 AAA
X1 929227R81 AAA
X2 929227R99 AAA
B1 929227S23 AA+
B2 929227S31 A+
B3 929227S49 BBB+
B4 929227S56 BB+
B5 929227S64 B+
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2003-AR6 Trust
Series 2003-AR6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 9292274D5 AAA
A-2 9292274E3 AAA
B-1 9292274H6 AA+
B-2 9292274J2 AA-
B-3 9292274K9 A-
B-4 9292274M5 BBB
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-S7 Trust
Series 2002-S7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-4 929227YE0 AAA
II-A-1 929227YF7 AAA
III-A-1 929227YG5 AAA
IV-A-4 929227YL4 AAA
II-P 929227YT7 AAA
IV-P 929227YU4 AAA
Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-MS11
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 939336ME0 AAA
II-A-11 939336NV1 AAA
II-A-12 939336NW9 AAA
III-A-1 939336ML4 AAA
III-A-2 939336MM2 AAA
I-X 939336MP5 AAA
II-X 939336MQ3 AAA
III-X 939336MR1 AAA
I-P 939336MT7 AAA
II-P 939336MU4 AAA
III-P 939336MV2 AAA
C-B-1 939336MX8 AAA
C-B-2 939336MY6 AA+
C-B-3 939336MZ3 AA
Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-MS8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 939336HY2 AAA
II-A-1 939336HZ9 AAA
II-A-2 939336JA2 AAA
II-A-3 939336JB0 AAA
II-A-4 939336JC8 AAA
II-A-5 939336JD6 AAA
II-A-7 939336JF1 AAA
II-A-8 939336JG9 AAA
II-A-9 939336JH7 AAA
III-A-1 939336JJ3 AAA
IV-A-4 939336JN4 AAA
IV-A-5 939336JP9 AAA
C-X-1 939336JR5 AAA
C-X-2 939336JS3 AAA
C-P-1 939336JT1 AAA
IV-P 939336JU8 AAA
C-B-1 939336JV6 AAA
C-B-2 939336JW4 AA+
C-B-3 939336JX2 AA
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 63 Classes From 15 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 63
classes from 15 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions issued from 2003 to 2007 and removed 46 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P
categorizes these transactions as "scratch and dent" RMBS due to
the nature of the underlying collateral. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 18 classes from 11 of these transactions
and from two additional transactions, and removed 10 of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.
Scratch-and-dent transactions generally fall into one of four
categories depending on the characteristics of the underlying loan
collateral: reperforming loans, outside-the-guidelines loans,
document-deficient loans, and nonperforming liquidating trusts.
The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's projected
losses, which S&P bases on factors including the dollar amount of
losses S&P has observed within the transactions over the prior 12
months; the current delinquency pipeline, which factors in S&P's
roll-rate assumptions; and the default curves S&P uses when
reviewing subprime transactions. Classes lowered to 'D' have
experienced principal write-downs.
S&P considers RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust, which contains seasoned
loans, "document deficient". S&P considers Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities Trust 2003-1, which also contains seasoned
loans, "outside the guidelines".
Generally, for "reperforming" transactions, S&P used the
historical dollar losses of the pool to calculate a monthly
default rate, which S&P then applied to the pool under different
constant prepayment rate assumptions.
In each scenario, S&P compared its loss projections with the
amount of subordination and applicable excess interest available
for each class to assess the amount of credit support S&P
considered sufficient based on its future loss projections.
Generally, S&P's baseline loss projections represent its 'B' case
rating scenario, and S&P adjusts the projection according to
credit enhancement multiples that are specific to each rating
category. Typically, if the ratio of credit enhancement to
remaining losses for a class is commensurate with the level
associated with the current rating on the class, S&P will affirm
the rating. The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that the amount
of credit enhancement available for the classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, while affirmations
reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit enhancement is
sufficient to support the ratings at their current levels.
Subordination of more-junior classes within each applicable
structure, overcollateralization, and excess interest provide
credit support for these transactions. The collateral backing the
affected trusts consists predominantly of first-lien, fixed- or
adjustable-rate, reperforming, subprime, or Alt-A residential
mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated performance
information to assess whether, in S&P's view, the applicable
credit enhancement is sufficient to support the current ratings.
S&P will continue to monitor these transactions and take
additional rating actions as S&P think appropriate.
Rating Actions
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-SD3
Series 2006-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 00443CAA6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 00443CAB4 B AA/Watch Neg
M-2 00443CAC2 CC A/Watch Neg
M-3 00443CAD0 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-1
Series 2003-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 07384YHC3 CCC BBB
GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1A 362725AA1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-1B 362725AB9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 362725AC7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 362725AD5 BBB AA+/Watch Neg
M-2 362725AE3 CCC AA-/Watch Neg
B-1 362725AF0 CC A-/Watch Neg
B-2 362725AG8 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-03
Series 2005-03
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 576436CM9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 576436CN7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 576436CP2 B AA/Watch Neg
M-2 576436CQ0 CCC A/Watch Neg
M-3 576436CR8 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
M-4 576436CS6 CC BBB/Watch Neg
Quest Trust 2006-X2
Series 2006-X2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 74836YAA8 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 74836YAB6 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 74836YAC4 CCC AA+/Watch Neg
M-2 74836YAD2 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-3 74836YAE0 CC AA-/Watch Neg
M-4 74836YAF7 CC A+/Watch Neg
M-5 74836YAG5 CC A/Watch Neg
M-6 74836YAH3 CC A-/Watch Neg
M-7 74836YAJ9 D BBB+/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust
Series 2005-RP3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 76112BP79 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 76112BP87 A AA/Watch Neg
M-2 76112BP95 CCC A/Watch Neg
M-3 76112BQ29 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
M-4 76112BQ37 CC BBB/Watch Neg
M-5 76112BQ45 CC BBB-/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2005-SP2 Trust
Series 2005-SP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-2 76112BE30 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-I-3 76112BE48 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-I-1 76112BE55 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-I-2 76112BE63 B A/Watch Neg
M-I-3 76112BE71 CCC BBB+/Watch Neg
M-I-4 76112BE89 CC BBB/Watch Neg
M-I-5 76112BE97 CC BBB-/Watch Neg
A-II 76112BF54 AA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-IO-A 76112BG20 AA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-IO-B 76112BG38 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
M-II-1 76112BF62 CCC AA/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust
Series 2005-SP3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 76112BS50 BBB AA
M-2 76112BS68 CCC A
M-3 76112BS76 CCC BBB+
M-4 76112BS84 CC BBB
RAAC Series 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 76112B2V1 BB AA+
M-2 76112B2W9 CCC A+
M-3 76112B2X7 CC A-
M-4 76112B2Y5 CC BBB
RAAC series 2006-RP2 Trust
Series 2006-RP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 74919MAA4 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 74919MAB2 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-2 74919MAC0 D A/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2006-RP3 Trust
Series 2006-RP3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 74919RAA3 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 74919RAE5 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-2 74919RAF2 CC A/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2006-RP4 Trust
Series 2006-RP4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 74919TAA9 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 74919TAB7 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-2 74919TAC5 CC A/Watch Neg
M-3 74919TAD3 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2007-RP1 Trust
Series 2007-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 74977YAA7 B AAA
M-1 74977YAB5 CCC AA
M-2 74977YAC3 CC A
M-3 74977YAD1 CC BBB+
M-4 74977YAE9 CC BBB
RAAC Series 2007-RP2 Trust
Series 2007-RP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 74919WAA2 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 74919WAB0 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-2 74919WAC8 CC A/Watch Neg
RAAC Series 2007-RP4 Trust
Series 2007-RP4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 74919LAD0 B AAA
M-1 74919LAE8 CCC AA
M-2 74919LAF5 CC A
Ratings Affirmed
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-1
Series 2003-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07384YGX8 AAA
A-2 07384YGY6 AAA
M-1 07384YHA7 AA
M-2 07384YHB5 A
RAAC Series 2005-SP3 Trust
Series 2005-SP3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 76112BS35 AAA
A-3 76112BS43 AAA
RAAC Series 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 76112B2U3 AAA
A-3 76112B3R9 AAA
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 86 Classes From 10 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 86
classes from 10 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo, Alternative-A, subprime
and scratch-and-dent mortgage loan collateral issued in 2005,
2006, and 2007. S&P removed 40 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 11 classes from four of the same transactions and
removed one of the affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's assessment of current losses as well as
projected losses based on S&P's methodology and assumptions. The
lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels. Although
cumulative losses were generally low in comparison to S&P's
projected lifetime losses for the transactions reviewed, S&P is
projecting an increase in losses due to increases in delinquencies
and the current negative condition of the housing market. The
affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the classes is sufficient to cover
losses associated with the existing rating levels
To maintain an 'AAA' rating for classes in Alt-A and subprime
transactions, S&P considers whether a bond is able to withstand
approximately 150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to
individual caps and qualitative factors assumed on specific
transactions. For a class for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating,
S&P consider whether a bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case
loss assumptions. Other rating categories are dispersed,
approximately equally, between these two loss assumptions. For
example, to maintain a 'BB' rating on one class, S&P may consider
whether the class is able to withstand approximately 110% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions, while, in connection with a different
class, S&P may consider whether it is able to withstand
approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.
To maintain a rating higher than 'B' for prime jumbo transactions,
S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a class could absorb losses
in excess of the base-case loss assumptions S&P assumed in its
analysis. For example, S&P assessed whether one class could, in
S&P's view, withstand approximately 130% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P assessed
whether a different class could withstand 155% of S&P's base-case
loss assumption to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class that has
an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under S&P's
analysis.
Scratch-and-dent transactions generally fall into one of four
categories depending on the characteristics of the underlying loan
collateral: reperforming, outside-the-guidelines, document-
deficient, and nonperforming liquidating trusts.
Generally, for reperforming transactions, S&P utilized the
observed historic dollar loss experience of the pool to calculate
a monthly default rate, which S&P then applied to the pool under
different constant prepayment rate assumptions.
In each scenario, S&P compared its loss projections with the
amount of subordination and applicable excess interest on a class-
by-class basis to assess the amount of credit support S&P
considered sufficient based on S&P's future loss projections.
Generally, S&P's baseline loss projections represent S&P's 'B'
case rating scenario, and S&P adjusts the projection based on
credit enhancement multiples that are specific to each rating
category. Typically, if the rating is commensurate with the ratio
derived from credit enhancement-to-remaining losses, S&P will
affirm the rating. The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the amount of credit enhancement available for the downgraded
classes is not sufficient to cover losses at the previous rating
levels, while affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement is sufficient to support the ratings at their
current levels.
The subordination of more-junior classes within each applicable
structure, as well as excess interest for some structures,
provides credit support for the affected transactions. In
addition, some of the reviewed transactions may be collateralized
by loans that are generally insured by third parties that cover a
certain amount, up to a maximum, based on the insurer's
regulations. The collateral backing these transactions originally
consisted predominantly of fixed- or adjustable-rate, Alt-A, prime
jumbo, subprime, or reperforming residential mortgage loans
secured by one- to four-family properties. In addition, some of
the loans may be insured by the FHA or U.S. VA.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated performance
information to assess whether, in S&P's view, the applicable
credit enhancement is sufficient to support the current ratings.
S&P will continue to monitor these transactions and take
additional rating actions as S&P think appropriate.
Rating Actions
ABFC 2007-WMC1 Trust
Series 2007-WMC1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1B 04545EAP8 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-2A 04545EAB9 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-2B 04545EAC7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 04545EAD5 CC AA+/Watch Neg
M-2 04545EAE3 CC AA/Watch Neg
M-3 04545EAF0 CC AA-/Watch Neg
M-4 04545EAG8 CC A+/Watch Neg
M-5 04545EAH6 CC A/Watch Neg
M-6 04545EAJ2 CC A-/Watch Neg
M-7 04545EAK9 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
M-8 04545EAL7 CC BBB/Watch Neg
M-9 04545EAM5 CC BBB-/Watch Neg
B-1 04545EAN3 CC BB+/Watch Neg
A-1A 04545EAA1 B AAA/Watch Neg
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
Series 2005-4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 004375EL1 BB BBB
M-4 004375EN7 CCC B-
M-6 004375EQ0 CC CCC
Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OA2
Series 2007-OA2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 02149LAA9 CCC AA
1-A-2 02149LAB7 CC BB
1-A-3 02149LAC5 CC B
2-A-1 02149LAE1 A AAA
2-A-2 02149LAF8 CCC B+
2-A-3 02149LAG6 CC B
1-X 02149LAD3 CCC AA
2-X 02149LAH4 A AAA
M-1 02149LAK7 CC CCC
M-2 02149LAL5 CC CCC
BankUnited Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
Rating
Class CUSIP To From
I-A-2 06652DAB5 BBB+ AAA
I-A-3 06652DAP4 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 06652DAD1 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-FRE2
Series 2006-FRE2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 14454AAB5 BBB AAA
A-3 14454AAC3 BBB AAA
A-4 14454AAD1 BBB AAA
A-5 14454AAE9 BBB AAA
M-1 14454AAF6 B BBB+
M-2 14454AAG4 CCC BB
M-3 14454AAH2 CCC B
M-5 14454AAK5 CC CCC
M-6 14454AAL3 CC CCC
M-7 14454AAM1 CC CCC
GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 362707AA9 B AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 362707AB7 CCC A+/Watch Neg
M-2 362707AC5 CC BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 362707AD3 CC BB-/Watch Neg
B-2 362707AE1 CC B+/Watch Neg
B-3 362707AF8 CC B/Watch Neg
HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-I1
Series 2005-I1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 40430HCV8 CCC BB
II-A-3 40430HCM8 CCC BBB
II-A-4 40430HCN6 CCC BB
M-1 40430HCP1 CC B-
M-2 40430HCQ9 CC CCC
M-3 40430HCR7 CC CCC
M-5 40430HCT3 D CC
HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-NC1
Series 2007-NC1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 40430TAA0 B AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 40430TAB8 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-3 40430TAC6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
A-4 40430TAD4 CCC BB-/Watch Neg
M-1 40430TAE2 CC B/Watch Neg
M-2 40430TAF9 CC CCC
M-3 40430TAG7 CC CCC
M-4 40430TAH5 CC CCC
M-5 40430TAJ1 CC CCC
M-6 40430TAK8 CC CCC
M-7 40430TAL6 CC CCC
M-8 40430TAM4 CC CCC
IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE4
Series 2005-HE4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-3 45071KCM4 B AAA
M-1 45071KCN2 CCC AA+
M-2 45071KCP7 CC BB
M-3 45071KCQ5 CC B
M-4 45071KCR3 CC CCC
M-5 45071KCS1 CC CCC
M-6 45071KCT9 CC CCC
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2005-AR18 Trust
Series 2005-AR18
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 92922F8K7 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 92922F8L5 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3A 92922F8M3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3B 92922F8N1 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A4 92922F8P6 B AAA/Watch Neg
2-A1 92922F8Q4 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
2-A2 92922F8R2 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 92922F8S0 B AAA/Watch Neg
3-A1 92922F8T8 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
3-A2 92922F8U5 B AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 92922F8V3 CC AA/Watch Neg
B-2 92922F8W1 CC A/Watch Neg
B-3 92922F8X9 CC BBB/Watch Neg
B-4 92925CAG7 CC BB/Watch Neg
B-5 92925CAH5 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4
Series 2005-4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 004375EE7 AAA
A-2C 004375EH0 AAA
A-2D 004375EJ6 AAA
M-1 004375EK3 AA+
M-3 004375EM9 B
M-5 004375EP2 CCC
BankUnited Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 06652DAA7 AAA
I-X 06652DAC3 AAA
Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2006-FRE2
Series 2006-FRE2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 14454AAA7 AAA
M-4 14454AAJ8 CCC
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 612 Classes From 44 Prime Jumbo RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 612
classes from 44 U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued from 2005 to 2007 and removed 368
of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 430 classes from 36 of
these transactions, as well as four additional transactions, and
removed 142 of the ratings from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the projected credit
support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P review the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration, and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assess whether the class can withstand the base-case loss
assumptions S&P use in its analysis. To maintain an 'AAA' rating,
S&P assess whether the class can withstand approximately 235% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors applied to specific transactions. To maintain
rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P
assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding the base-
case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating category,
up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, S&P would assess
whether one class could withstand approximately 130% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 155% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BBB' rating.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien,
prime jumbo mortgage loans.
Rating Actions
Banc of America Funding 2005-6 Trust
Series 2005-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 05946XL92 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 05946XM26 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-3 05946XM34 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-4 05946XM42 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-5 05946XM59 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-6 05946XM67 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-7 05946XM75 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-8 05946XM83 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-9 05946XM91 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-10 05946XN25 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 05946XN41 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-2-A 05946XN58 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 05946XN66 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 05946XN74 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 05946XN82 BBB+ AAA
2-A-6 05946XN90 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-7 05946XP23 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-8 05946XP31 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-9 05946XP49 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-10 05946XP56 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-11 05946XP64 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-12 05946XP72 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-13 05946XP80 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
30-PO 05946XQ22 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
Banc of America Funding 2005-8 Trust
Series 2005-8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 05946XX57 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 05946XX65 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 05946XX81 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 05946XX99 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 05946XY23 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 05946XY31 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 05946XY49 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-6 05946XY56 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-7 05946XY64 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-8 05946XY72 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-9 05946XY80 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-1 05946XY98 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 05946XZ22 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-3 05946XZ30 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-4 05946XZ48 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-5 05946XZ55 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-1 05946XZ63 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-2 05946XZ71 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-3 05946XZ89 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-4 05946XZ97 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-5 05946X2A0 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-6 05946X2B8 A AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-7 05946X2C6 AA- AAA
4-A-9 05946X2E2 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-10 05946X2F9 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-11 05946X2G7 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-12 05946X2H5 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-13 05946X2J1 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-14 05946X2K8 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-15 05946X2L6 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-16 05946X2M4 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-17 05946X2N2 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-18 05946X2P7 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-19 05946X2Q5 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-20 05946X2R3 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-21 05946X2S1 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-22 05946X2T9 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-23 05946X2U6 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-24 05946X2V4 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-25 05946X2W2 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-26 05946X2X0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-27 05946X2Y8 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-28 05946X2Z5 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-29 05946X3A9 A- AAA/Watch Neg
30-PO 05946X3C5 BB AAA/Watch Neg
Banc of America Funding 2006-B Trust
Series 2006-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 058928AA0 CCC B
4-A-1 058928AH5 CCC B
6-A-1 058928AL6 CCC B
Banc of America Funding 2006-F Trust
Series 2006-F
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 05950HAA9 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 05950HAB7 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2-A-1 05950HAD3 BB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 05950HAE1 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3-A-1 05950HAF8 BB AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 05950HAG6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-4 05950HAL5 D CC
Banc of America Mortgage 2005-H Trust
Series 2005-H
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 05949CFT8 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 05949CFU5 B AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 05949CFW1 A AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 05949CFX9 B AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 05949CFY7 A AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 05949CFZ4 A AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 05949CGA8 A AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-1 05949CGB6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 05949CGC4 A AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-1 05949CGD2 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-2 05949CGE0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-3 05949CGF7 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
B-5 05949CGL4 CC B/Watch Neg
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-6
Series 2005-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I A-1 07387ADG7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 07387ADH5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
III A-1 07387ADJ1 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A-1 07387ADK8 B- AAA/Watch Neg
V-A-1 07387ADM4 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 07387ADR3 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B-2 07387ADS1 CC A/Watch Neg
B-3 07387ADT9 CC BB+/Watch Neg
ChaseFlex Trust Series 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 16165TAX1 BB+ A/Watch Neg
1-A2 16165TAY9 BB+ A/Watch Neg
2-A1 16165TAZ6 BB+ A/Watch Neg
2-A2 16165TBA0 BB+ A/Watch Neg
3-A1 16165TBB8 BB+ A/Watch Neg
3-A2 16165TBC6 BB+ A/Watch Neg
3-A3 16165TBD4 BB+ A
3-A4 16165TBE2 BB+ A/Watch Neg
4-A1 16165TBF9 BB+ A/Watch Neg
4-A2 16165TBG7 BB+ A/Watch Neg
4-A3 16165TBH5 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A1 16165TBJ1 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A3 16165TBL6 A A/Watch Neg
5-A4 16165TBM4 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A5 16165TBN2 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A6 16165TBP7 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A7 16165TBQ5 BB+ A/Watch Neg
5-A8 16165TBR3 BB+ A
A-X 16165TBS1 BB+ A
A-P 16165TBT9 BB+ A/Watch Neg
M 16165TBV4 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-1 16165TBW2 CCC B/Watch Neg
B-2 16165TBX0 CC CCC
B-3 16165TBY8 CC CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-18
Series 2006-18
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 12543WAA6 B- AAA/Watch Neg
1-X 12543WAB4 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 12543WAC2 AA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 12543WAD0 AA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 12543WAE8 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 12543WAF5 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 12543WAG3 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-6 12543WAH1 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-7 12543WAJ7 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2-X 12543WAL2 AA AAA/Watch Neg
PO 12543WAM0 B- AAA/Watch Neg
CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-HYB2
Series 2006-HYB2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 126694C63 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1-A-2 126694C71 CCC B/Watch Neg
1-A-IO 126694C89 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2-A-1A 126694C97 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2-A-1B 126694D21 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2-A-2 126694D39 CCC B/Watch Neg
2-A-IO 126694D47 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3-A-1 126694D54 BB BBB/Watch Neg
3-A-2 126694D62 CCC B/Watch Neg
4-A-1 126694D70 B+ BBB/Watch Neg
4-A-2 126694D88 CCC B/Watch Neg
M 126694E20 CC CCC
B-1 126694E38 CC CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-HYB3
Series 2005-HYB3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 12669GA50 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1A 12669GA76 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2A 12669GE49 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3A 12669GE56 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4A 12669GE64 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3B 12669GE98 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4B 12669GF22 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5B 12669GF30 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-6B 12669GF48 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-IO 12669GA84 BBB AAA
3-A-1 12669GA92 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 12669GF55 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-IO 12669GF63 BBB- AAA
M 12669GB26 B- AA/Watch Neg
B-1 12669GB34 CCC A/Watch Neg
B-2 12669GB42 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-3 12669GB59 D B/Watch Neg
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-J3
Series 2005-J3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-6 12669G4P3 BBB+ AA
2-A-6 12669G4X6 BBB+ AA
X 12669G4Z1 BBB+ AA
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB3
Series 2006-HYB3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1A 1266943U0 CCC B
1-A-1B 1266943V8 CCC B
1-A-IO 1266943X4 CCC B
2-A-1A 1266943Y2 CCC B
2-A-B-2 1266944A3 CCC B
2-A-B-3 1266944B1 CCC B
2-A-IO 1266944D7 CCC BB
3-A-1B 1266944F2 CCC B
3-A-IO 1266944H8 CCC B
4-A-1A 1266944J4 CCC B
4-A-1C 1266944L9 CCC B
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-17
Series 2007-17
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 12544KAA1 CCC BB
1-A-2 12544KAB9 B BBB-
1-A-3 12544KAC7 CCC BB
1-A-4 12544KAD5 CCC B
1-A-5 12544KAY9 CCC BB
1-A-6 12544KAZ6 CCC BB
1-X 12544KAE3 B BB
1-PO 12544KBA0 CCC B
2-A-1 12544KAF0 CCC BB
2-A-2 12544KAG8 CCC B
2-A-3 12544KBB8 CCC BB
2-A-4 12544KBC6 CCC BB
2-A-5 12544KBD4 CCC BB
2-X 12544KAH6 CCC BB
2-PO 12544KBE2 CCC B
3-A-1 12544KAJ2 CCC BB
3-A-2 12544KAK9 CCC B
3-X 12544KAL7 CCC BB
4-A-2 12544KAN3 CCC B
4-PO 12544KAQ6 CCC B
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-9
Series 2007-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 12544XAA3 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 12544XAB1 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-3 12544XAM7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-4 12544XAN5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-5 12544XAP0 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-6 12544XAQ8 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-7 12544XAR6 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-8 12544XAS4 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-9 12544XAT2 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-10 12544XAU9 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-11 12544XAV7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-12 12544XAW5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-13 12544XAX3 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-14 12544XAY1 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-15 12544XBA2 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
X 12544XAE5 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
PO 12544XAD7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A1 17307G2Z0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A2 17307G3A4 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-X 17307G3B2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-M 17307G3J5 CC AA+/Watch Neg
I-B1 17307G3L0 CC AA/Watch Neg
I-B2 17307G3M8 CC BBB/Watch Neg
I-B3 17307G3N6 CC B/Watch Neg
I-B4 17307G3P1 CC CCC
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2005-5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 225458TF5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 225458TG3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-2 225458TH1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-3 225458TJ7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-4 225458TK4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-5 225458TL2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-6 225458TM0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-7 225458TN8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-8 225458TP3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-9 225458TQ1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-10 225458TR9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-11 225458TS7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-13 225458TU2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-14 225458TV0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-15 225458TW8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-16 225458UM8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
VI-A-1 225458UH9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
VI-A-2 225458UJ5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
VI-A-3 225458UK2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
VI-A-4 225458UL0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
VII-A-1 225458UN6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-1 225458TX6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-2 225458TY4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-4 225458UA4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-7 225458UD8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A-1 225458UE6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
V-A-1 225458UG1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
C-P 225458US5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
D-P 225458UT3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
C-B-1 225458UU0 AA AA/Watch Neg
C-B-2 225458UV8 BBB- A/Watch Neg
C-B-3 225458UW6 B- BBB-/Watch Neg
C-B-4 225458VH8 CCC BB/Watch Neg
C-B-5 225458VJ4 CC B/Watch Neg
D-B-1 225458UX4 AA- AA-/Watch Neg
D-B-2 225458UY2 BBB+ A-/Watch Neg
D-B-3 225458UZ9 B BBB-/Watch Neg
D-B-4 225458VE5 CCC BB/Watch Neg
D-B-5 225458VF2 CC B/Watch Neg
III-A-5 225458UB2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
II-A-1 32051GY25 BB A
II-A-2 32051GY33 B- B
III-A-1 32051GY58 BBB+ A
III-A-2 32051GY66 B- B
IV-A-2 32051GY82 B- B
First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-6
Series 2005-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 32051GWQ4 AA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-2 32051GWR2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-3 32051GWS0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-5 32051GWU5 AA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-PO 32051GWV3 AA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 32051GWX9 AA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-PO 32051GWY7 AA AAA/Watch Neg
First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-8
Series 2005-8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 32051GN35 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-2 32051GN43 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-3 32051GN50 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-4 32051GN68 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-5 32051GN76 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-6 32051GN84 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-7 32051GN92 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-8 32051GP25 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-9 32051GP33 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-10 32051GP41 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-11 32051GP58 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-PO 32051GP66 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 32051GP82 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-PO 32051GP90 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-AR4
Series 2006-AR4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-2 32053AAB2 CCC BBB
I-A-IO 32053AAD8 CCC BBB
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 36185MDN9 BB- A
1-A-2 36185MDP4 B- B
2-A-1 36185MDQ2 BBB+ A
2-A-2 36185MDR0 B- B
3-A-2 36185MDT6 B- B
M-2 36185MDV1 CC CCC
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR-7
Series 2005-AR7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1 362341WX3 B- AAA/Watch Neg
1A2 362341WY1 B- AAA/Watch Neg
2A1 362341WZ8 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2A2 362341XA2 B- AAA/Watch Neg
3A1 362341XB0 B- AAA/Watch Neg
4A1 362341XC8 B- AAA/Watch Neg
4A2 362341XD6 B- AAA/Watch Neg
5A1 362341XE4 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
5A2 362341XF1 B- AAA/Watch Neg
1B1 362341XH7 CCC AA/Watch Neg
2B1 362341XL8 BBB- AA
1B2 362341XJ3 CC A/Watch Neg
2B2 362341XM6 B- A
1B3 362341XK0 CC BBB/Watch Neg
2B3 362341XN4 CCC BBB
1B4 362341XS3 CC BB/Watch Neg
2B4 362341XV6 CC BB
2B5 362341XW4 CC B
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3F
Series 2006-3F
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A-1 362334JG0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1A-2 362334JH8 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1A-3 362334JJ4 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1A-4 362334JK1 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1A-5 362334JL9 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
1A-6 362334JM7 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
1A-7 362334JN5 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-1 362334JP0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-2 362334GM0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-3 362334JR6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-4 362334JS4 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-5 362334JT2 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-6 362334JU9 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A-7 362334JV7 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
2A-8 362334JW5 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-1 362334HG2 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-2 362334JY1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
3A-3 362334JZ8 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
3A-4 362334KA1 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-5 362334KB9 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-6 362334KC7 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
3A-7 362334KD5 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-8 362334KE3 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-9 362334KF0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-10 362334KG8 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-11 362334KH6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-12 362334KJ2 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-14 362334KL7 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-15 362334KM5 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-16 362334KN3 A AAA/Watch Neg
3A-17 362334KP8 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
3A-18 362334KQ6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
4A-1 362334HH0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
5A-1 362334HJ6 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
5A-2 362334KT0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
A-P 362334KU7 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
A-X 362334KV5 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR1
Series 2007-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1 362290AA6 CCC A/Watch Neg
1A2 362290AB4 CCC B/Watch Neg
2A1 362290AC2 CCC A/Watch Neg
2A2 362290AD0 CCC B/Watch Neg
3A1 362290AH1 CCC A/Watch Neg
3A2 362290AJ7 CCC B/Watch Neg
4A1 362290AK4 BB+ A/Watch Neg
4A2 362290AL2 CCC B/Watch Neg
5A1 362290AM0 A A/Watch Neg
5A2 362290AN8 CCC B/Watch Neg
6A1 362290AP3 A A/Watch Neg
6A2 362290AQ1 CCC B/Watch Neg
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A 41161PJ38 CCC B
2-A1A 41161PK44 BB BBB
2-A2B 41161PK51 CCC B
3-A1B 41161PK77 CCC B
4-A 41161PK85 CCC B
B-2 41161PJ61 CC CCC
B-4 41161PJ87 D CC
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5
Series 2005-A5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 466247SD6 AA AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 466247SE4 AA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 466247SF1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 466247SG9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 466247SH7 AA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-1 466247SJ3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 466247SK0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-3 466247SL8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-4 466247SM6 AA AAA/Watch Neg
5-A-1 466247SP9 AA AAA/Watch Neg
T-A-1 466247SQ7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-B-1 466247SS3 B+ AA/Watch Neg
T-B-1 466247SV6 AA AA/Watch Neg
I-B-2 466247ST1 CCC A/Watch Neg
T-B-2 466247SW4 A A/Watch Neg
I-B-3 466247SU8 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
T-B-3 466247SX2 BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
I-B-4 466247SY0 CC BB/Watch Neg
T-B-4 466247TB9 CCC BB/Watch Neg
I-B-5 466247SZ7 CC B/Watch Neg
T-B-5 466247TC7 CCC B/Watch Neg
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2006-A1
Series 2006-A1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 466247E33 B AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 466247E41 B AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-3 466247E58 B- A/Watch Neg
2-A-1 466247E66 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 466247E74 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 466247E82 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 466247E90 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 466247F24 B- A/Watch Neg
3-A-1 466247F40 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 466247F57 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-3 466247F65 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-4 466247F73 B- A/Watch Neg
3-A-X 466247F81 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 466247F99 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 466247G23 CC B/Watch Neg
B-3 466247G31 CC CCC
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-S3
Series 2007-S3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 46631NAA7 CCC BB
1-A-11 46631NAL3 CCC BB
1-A-12 46631NAM1 CCC BB
1-A-13 46631NAN9 CCC BB
1-A-14 46631NAP4 CCC BB
1-A-15 46631NAQ2 CCC BB
1-A-16 46631NAR0 CCC BB
1-A-17 46631NAS8 CCC BB
1-A-20 46631NAV1 CCC BB
1-A-21 46631NAW9 CCC BB
1-A-22 46631NAX7 CCC BB
1-A-23 46631NAY5 CCC BB
1-A-24 46631NAZ2 CCC BB
1-A-25 46631NBA6 CCC BB
1-A-26 46631NBB4 CCC BB
1-A-27 46631NBC2 CCC BB
1-A-28 46631NBD0 CCC BB
1-A-29 46631NBE8 CCC BB
1-A-30 46631NBF5 CCC BB
1-A-31 46631NBG3 CCC BB
1-A-32 46631NBH1 CCC BB
1-A-33 46631NBJ7 CCC BB
1-A-34 46631NBK4 CCC BB
1-A-35 46631NBL2 CCC BB
1-A-36 46631NBM0 CCC BB
1-A-37 46631NBN8 CCC BB
1-A-38 46631NBP3 CCC BB
1-A-39 46631NBQ1 CCC BB
1-A-42 46631NBT5 CCC BB
1-A-43 46631NBU2 CCC BB
1-A-44 46631NBV0 CCC BB
1-A-45 46631NBW8 CCC BB
1-A-46 46631NBX6 CCC BB
1-A-47 46631NBY4 CCC BB
1-A-48 46631NBZ1 CCC BB
1-A-50 46631NCB3 CCC BBB
1-A-54 46631NCF4 CCC BBB
1-A-55 46631NCG2 CCC BBB
1-A-56 46631NCH0 CCC BBB
1-A-57 46631NCJ6 CCC BBB
1-A-58 46631NCK3 CCC BBB
1-A-60 46631NCM9 CCC BB
1-A-61 46631NCN7 CCC BB
1-A-64 46631NCR8 CCC BB
1-A-67 46631NCU1 CCC BB
1-A-68 46631NCV9 CCC BB
1-A-69 46631NCW7 CCC BB
1-A-70 46631NCX5 CCC BB
1-A-71 46631NCY3 CCC BB
1-A-72 46631NCZ0 CCC BB
1-A-73 46631NDA4 CCC BB
1-A-74 46631NDB2 CCC BB
1-A-75 46631NDC0 CCC BB
1-A-76 46631NDD8 CCC BBB
1-A-77 46631NDE6 CCC BBB
1-A-78 46631NDF3 CCC BBB
1-A-79 46631NDG1 CCC BBB
1-A-80 46631NDH9 CCC BBB
1-A-81 46631NDJ5 CCC BB
1-A-82 46631NDK2 CCC BB
1-A-83 46631NDL0 CCC BB
1-A-84 46631NDM8 CCC BB
1-A-85 46631NDN6 CCC BB
1-A-86 46631NDP1 CCC BB
1-A-87 46631NDQ9 CCC BB
1-A-89 46631NDS5 CCC BB
1-A-90 46631NDT3 CCC BB
1-A-96 46631NDZ9 CCC BB
1-A-97 46631NEA3 CCC BB
1-A-99 46631NEC9 CCC BB
A-100 46631NED7 CCC BB
A-X 46631NFC8 CCC B
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-2
Series MLCC2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A 59020UZZ1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A 59020UA21 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A 59020UA39 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 59020UA47 A+ AA/Watch Neg
M-2 59020UA54 BB- A/Watch Neg
M-3 59020UA62 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 59020UA70 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 59020UA88 CCC B/Watch Neg
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 590219AD3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A 590219AE1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A 590219AF8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A 590219AG6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 590219AJ0 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-2 590219AK7 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 590219AL5 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
1-A-58 46631NCK3 CCC BBB
1-A-60 46631NCM9 CCC BB
1-A-61 46631NCN7 CCC BB
1-A-64 46631NCR8 CCC BB
1-A-67 46631NCU1 CCC BB
1-A-68 46631NCV9 CCC BB
1-A-69 46631NCW7 CCC BB
1-A-70 46631NCX5 CCC BB
1-A-71 46631NCY3 CCC BB
1-A-72 46631NCZ0 CCC BB
1-A-73 46631NDA4 CCC BB
1-A-74 46631NDB2 CCC BB
1-A-75 46631NDC0 CCC BB
1-A-76 46631NDD8 CCC BBB
1-A-77 46631NDE6 CCC BBB
1-A-78 46631NDF3 CCC BBB
1-A-79 46631NDG1 CCC BBB
1-A-80 46631NDH9 CCC BBB
1-A-81 46631NDJ5 CCC BB
1-A-82 46631NDK2 CCC BB
1-A-83 46631NDL0 CCC BB
1-A-84 46631NDM8 CCC BB
1-A-85 46631NDN6 CCC BB
1-A-86 46631NDP1 CCC BB
1-A-87 46631NDQ9 CCC BB
1-A-89 46631NDS5 CCC BB
1-A-90 46631NDT3 CCC BB
1-A-96 46631NDZ9 CCC BB
1-A-97 46631NEA3 CCC BB
1-A-99 46631NEC9 CCC BB
A-100 46631NED7 CCC BB
A-X 46631NFC8 CCC B
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-2
Series MLCC2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A 59020UZZ1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A 59020UA21 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A 59020UA39 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 59020UA47 A+ AA/Watch Neg
M-2 59020UA54 BB- A/Watch Neg
M-3 59020UA62 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 59020UA70 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 59020UA88 CCC B/Watch Neg
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 590219AD3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A 590219AE1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A 590219AF8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A 590219AG6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 590219AJ0 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-2 590219AK7 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 590219AL5 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
1-A-58 46631NCK3 CCC BBB
1-A-60 46631NCM9 CCC BB
1-A-61 46631NCN7 CCC BB
1-A-64 46631NCR8 CCC BB
1-A-67 46631NCU1 CCC BB
1-A-68 46631NCV9 CCC BB
1-A-69 46631NCW7 CCC BB
1-A-70 46631NCX5 CCC BB
1-A-71 46631NCY3 CCC BB
1-A-72 46631NCZ0 CCC BB
1-A-73 46631NDA4 CCC BB
1-A-74 46631NDB2 CCC BB
1-A-75 46631NDC0 CCC BB
1-A-76 46631NDD8 CCC BBB
1-A-77 46631NDE6 CCC BBB
1-A-78 46631NDF3 CCC BBB
1-A-79 46631NDG1 CCC BBB
1-A-80 46631NDH9 CCC BBB
1-A-81 46631NDJ5 CCC BB
1-A-82 46631NDK2 CCC BB
1-A-83 46631NDL0 CCC BB
1-A-84 46631NDM8 CCC BB
1-A-85 46631NDN6 CCC BB
1-A-86 46631NDP1 CCC BB
1-A-87 46631NDQ9 CCC BB
1-A-89 46631NDS5 CCC BB
1-A-90 46631NDT3 CCC BB
1-A-96 46631NDZ9 CCC BB
1-A-97 46631NEA3 CCC BB
1-A-99 46631NEC9 CCC BB
A-100 46631NED7 CCC BB
A-X 46631NFC8 CCC B
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-2
Series MLCC2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A 59020UZZ1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2-A 59020UA21 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A 59020UA39 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 59020UA47 A+ AA/Watch Neg
M-2 59020UA54 BB- A/Watch Neg
M-3 59020UA62 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 59020UA70 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 59020UA88 CCC B/Watch Neg
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 590219AD3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A 590219AE1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A 590219AF8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A 590219AG6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 590219AJ0 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-2 590219AK7 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 590219AL5 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-II-8 76112BSV3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-9 76112BSW1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-10 76112BSX9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-11 76112BSY7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-12 76112BSZ4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-13 76112BTA8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-PO 76112BTB6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-1 76112BQL7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-2 76112BQM5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-3 76112BQN3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-6 76112BQR4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-7 76112BQS2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-9 76112BQU7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-10 76112BQV5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-PO 76112BQX1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-1 76112BQY9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-2 76112BQZ6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-PO 76112BRB8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 76112BRC6 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-2 76112BRD4 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 76112BRE2 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 76112BRX0 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 76112BRY8 CC B/Watch Neg
RFMSI Series 2007-S6 Trust
Series 2007-S6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 762009AA6 CCC B
I-A-2 762009AB4 CCC B
I-A-3 762009AC2 CCC B
I-A-4 762009AD0 B- AA
I-A-5 762009AE8 CCC B
I-A-6 762009AF5 B+ AAA
I-A-8 762009AH1 CCC B
I-A-9 762009AJ7 CCC B
I-A-10 762009AK4 CCC B
I-A-11 762009AL2 CCC B
I-A-12 762009AM0 CCC B
I-A-13 762009AN8 B+ AA
I-A-14 762009AP3 CCC B
I-A-15 762009AQ1 CCC B
I-A-16 762009AR9 B- B
I-A-17 762009AS7 B+ AAA
I-A-18 762009AT5 CCC B
I-A-19 762009AU2 CCC B
I-A-20 762009AV0 CCC B
I-A-P 762009AX6 CCC B
I-A-V 762009AW8 B+ AAA
II-A-P 762009BQ0 CCC B
II-A-V 762009BP2 BB- AAA
II-A-1 762009AY4 CCC B
II-A-2 762009AZ1 CCC B
II-A-3 762009BA5 CCC B
II-A-4 762009BB3 CCC AA
II-A-5 762009BC1 BB- AAA
II-A-6 762009BD9 CCC B
A-II-8 76112BSV3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-9 76112BSW1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-10 76112BSX9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-11 76112BSY7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-12 76112BSZ4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-13 76112BTA8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-II-PO 76112BTB6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-1 76112BQL7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-2 76112BQM5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-3 76112BQN3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-6 76112BQR4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-7 76112BQS2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-9 76112BQU7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-10 76112BQV5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-III-PO 76112BQX1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-1 76112BQY9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-2 76112BQZ6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IV-PO 76112BRB8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 76112BRC6 AA AA/Watch Neg
M-2 76112BRD4 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 76112BRE2 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
B-1 76112BRX0 CCC BB/Watch Neg
B-2 76112BRY8 CC B/Watch Neg
RFMSI Series 2007-S6 Trust
Series 2007-S6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 762009AA6 CCC B
I-A-2 762009AB4 CCC B
I-A-3 762009AC2 CCC B
I-A-4 762009AD0 B- AA
I-A-5 762009AE8 CCC B
I-A-6 762009AF5 B+ AAA
I-A-8 762009AH1 CCC B
I-A-9 762009AJ7 CCC B
I-A-10 762009AK4 CCC B
I-A-11 762009AL2 CCC B
I-A-12 762009AM0 CCC B
I-A-13 762009AN8 B+ AA
I-A-14 762009AP3 CCC B
I-A-15 762009AQ1 CCC B
I-A-16 762009AR9 B- B
I-A-17 762009AS7 B+ AAA
I-A-18 762009AT5 CCC B
I-A-19 762009AU2 CCC B
I-A-20 762009AV0 CCC B
I-A-P 762009AX6 CCC B
I-A-V 762009AW8 B+ AAA
II-A-P 762009BQ0 CCC B
II-A-V 762009BP2 BB- AAA
II-A-1 762009AY4 CCC B
II-A-2 762009AZ1 CCC B
II-A-3 762009BA5 CCC B
II-A-4 762009BB3 CCC AA
II-A-5 762009BC1 BB- AAA
II-A-6 762009BD9 CCC B
II-A-7 762009BE7 BB- AA
II-A-8 762009BF4 CCC B
II-A-9 762009BG2 CCC B
II-A-10 762009BH0 BB- AA
II-A-11 762009BJ6 CCC B
II-A-12 762009BK3 CCC B
II-A-13 762009BL1 CCC B
II-A-14 762009BM9 CCC B
II-A-15 762009BN7 CCC B
Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-17
Series 2005-17
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 86359DSB4 A- AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 86359DSC2 A- AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3 86359DSD0 A- AAA/Watch Neg
1-A4 86359DSE8 A- AAA/Watch Neg
1-A5 86359DSF5 A- AAA/Watch Neg
1-A6 86359DSG3 A- AAA/Watch Neg
2-A1 86359DSH1 A- AAA/Watch Neg
3-A1 86359DSJ7 A- AAA/Watch Neg
4-A1 86359DSK4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A2 86359DSL2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A3 86359DSM0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A4 86359DSN8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A5 86359DSP3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A6 86359DSQ1 A- AAA/Watch Neg
5-A1 86359DSR9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
5-A2 86359DSS7 A- AAA/Watch Neg
AP 86359DST5 A- AAA/Watch Neg
B1 86359DSW8 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B2 86359DSX6 CCC A/Watch Neg
B3 86359DSY4 CC BBB/Watch Neg
B4 86359DTA5 D B/Watch Neg
Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-6
Series 2005-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B1 863576CV4 B- BBB
B2 863576CW2 CCC B
B5 86359DBC0 CC CCC
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 88522WAA1 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-2A 88522WAB9 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-2B 88522WAC7 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-3A 88522WAD5 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-3B 88522WAE3 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
A-X 88522WAF0 AA AA/Watch Neg
B-1 88522WAG8 B- AA/Watch Neg
B-2 88522WAH6 CCC A/Watch Neg
B-3 88522WAJ2 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B-4 88522WAK9 CCC B/Watch Neg
B-5 88522WAL7 CC CCC
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-5
Series 2007-5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A-1 88522TAA8 B- A
2A-1 88522TAB6 CCC B
3A-1 88522TAC4 BB A
3A-2 88522TAD2 AA- AAA
1A-2 88522TAF7 CCC B
3A-3 88522TAG5 CCC B
3A-4 88522TAH3 CCC B
1-AX 88522TAK6 B- A
2AX 88522TAL4 CCC B
3-AX1 88522TAM2 BB A
3-AX2 88522TAN0 AA- AAA
B-2 88522TAR1 CC CCC
B-3 88522TAS9 CC CCC
Wachovia Mortgage Loan Trust LLC Series 2005-B Trust
Series 2005-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 92977YBN0 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A-2 92977YBS9 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-1 92977YBP5 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-2 92977YBU4 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-3 92977YBV2 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-4 92977YBW0 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A-5 92977YBX8 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-1 92977YBQ3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A-2 92977YBY6 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-1 92977YBR1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4-A-2 92977YBZ3 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 92977YCA7 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B-2 92977YCB5 CCC A/Watch Neg
B-3 92977YCC3 CC BB/Watch Neg
B-4 92977YCD1 CC B/Watch Neg
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2005-AR16 Trust
Series 2005-AR16
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 92922F6W3 BB- AAA
1-A2 92922F6X1 BB- AAA
1-A3 92922F6Y9 BB- AAA
1-A4A 92922F6Z6 A- AAA
1-A4B 92922F7A0 BB- AAA
1-A5 92922F7B8 CCC BBB
2-A1 92922F7C6 B- AAA
2-A2 92922F7D4 B- AAA
2-A3 92922F7E2 B- AAA
2-A4 92922F7F9 CCC BBB
B-5 92922F7M4 D CC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-1 Trust
Series 2005-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 94982EAA2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 94982EAD6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-1 94982EAE4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-PO 94982EAG9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 94982EAH7 AA AA/Watch Neg
B-2 94982EAJ3 A A/Watch Neg
B-3 94982EAK0 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
B-4 94982EAL8 BB BB/Watch Neg
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-14 Trust
Series 2005-14
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 949832AA7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-2 949832AB5 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-3 949832AC3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-5 949832AE9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-6 949832AF6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-7 949832AG4 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-8 949832AH2 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-9 949832AJ8 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-10 949832AK5 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-11 949832AL3 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-PO 949832AM1 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 949832AP4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-2 949832AQ2 AA- AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-PO 949832AS8 AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR11 Trust
Series 2005-AR11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 94982RAA3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 94982RAC9 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-B-1 94982RAD7 AA AA/Watch Neg
II-B-1 94982RAG0 B AA/Watch Neg
I-B-2 94982RAE5 A A/Watch Neg
II-B-2 94982RAH8 CCC A/Watch Neg
I-B-3 94982RAF2 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
II-B-3 94982RAJ4 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
I-B-4 94982RAK1 BB BB/Watch Neg
II-B-4 94982RAN5 CC BB/Watch Neg
I-B-5 94982RAL9 B B/Watch Neg
II-B-5 94982RAP0 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
Banc of America Funding 2005-5 Trust
Series 2005-5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 05946XD34 AAA
1-A-2 05946XD42 BBB
1-A-3 05946XD59 BBB
1-A-4 05946XD67 BBB
1-A-5 05946XD75 BBB
1-A-6 05946XD83 BBB
1-A-7 05946XD91 BBB
1-A-8 05946XE25 BBB
1-A-9 05946XE33 BBB
1-A-10 05946XE41 BBB
1-A-11 05946XE58 BBB
2-A-1 05946XE74 AAA
2-A-2 05946XE82 BBB
3-A-1 05946XE90 BBB
3-A-2 05946XF24 BBB
3-A-3 05946XF32 BBB
3-A-4 05946XF40 BBB
3-A-5 05946XF57 BBB
3-A-6 05946XF65 BBB
3-A-7 05946XF73 BBB
3-A-8 05946XF81 BBB
30-IO 05946XF99 AAA
30-PO 05946XG23 BBB
B-1 05946XG31 CCC
Banc of America Funding 2005-6 Trust
Series 2005-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
30-IO 05946XP98 AAA
Banc of America Funding 2005-8 Trust
Series 2005-8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
30-IO 05946X3B7 AAA
Banc of America Funding 2006-B Trust
Series 2006-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-2 058928AB8 CCC
2-A-1 058928AD4 B
2-A-2 058928AE2 CCC
3-A-1 058928AF9 B
3-A-2 058928AG7 CCC
4-A-2 058928AJ1 CCC
5-A-1 058928AK8 CCC
6-A-2 058928AM4 CCC
7-A-1 058928AN2 BB
7-A-2 058928AP7 CCC
Banc of America Funding Trust 2006-6
Series 2006-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 05950RAA7 B
1-A-2 05950RAB5 B
1-A-3 05950RAC3 B
1-A-4 05950RAD1 B
1-A-5 05950RAE9 B
1-A-6 05950RAF6 B
1-A-7 05950RAG4 B
1-A-8 05950RAH2 B
1-A-9 05950RAJ8 B
1-A-10 05950RAK5 AAA
1-A-11 05950RAL3 AAA
1-A-12 05950RAM1 BB
1-A-13 05950RAN9 B
1-A-14 05950RAP4 B
1-A-15 05950RAQ2 B
1-A-16 05950RAR0 B
1-A-17 05950RAS8 BB
1-A-18 05950RAT6 BB
1-A-19 05950RAU3 B
1-A-20 05950RAV1 B
1-A-21 05950RAW9 B
1-A-22 05950RAX7 BB
1-A-23 05950RAY5 B
1-A-24 05950RAZ2 B
2-A-1 05950RBB4 B
2-A-2 05950RBC2 B
2-A-3 05950RBD0 B
2-A-4 05950RBE8 B
3-A-1 05950RBF5 B
3-A-2 05950RBG3 B
3-A-3 05950RBH1 B
3-A-4 05950RBJ7 AAA
3O-IO 05950RBK4 AAA
3O-PO 05950RBL2 B
M 05950RBM0 CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2007-5
Series 2007-5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12544VAA7 BB
A-2 12544VAB5 CCC
A-3 12544VAC3 CCC
A-4 12544VAD1 CCC
A-5 12544VAE9 CCC
A-6 12544VAF6 CCC
A-7 12544VAG4 CCC
A-8 12544VAH2 CCC
A-9 12544VAJ8 CCC
A-10 12544VAK5 CCC
A-11 12544VAL3 CCC
A-12 12544VAM1 CCC
A-13 12544VAN9 CCC
A-14 12544VAP4 CCC
A-15 12544VAQ2 CCC
A-16 12544VAR0 CCC
A-17 12544VAS8 CCC
A-18 12544VAT6 CCC
A-19 12544VAU3 CCC
A-20 12544VAV1 CCC
A-21 12544VAW9 CCC
A-22 12544VAX7 CCC
A-45 12544VBW8 CCC
A-46 12544VBX6 CCC
A-47 12544VBY4 CCC
A-48 12544VBZ1 CCC
A-49 12544VCL1 CCC
A-50 12544VCM9 CCC
X 12544VCA5 BB
PO 12544VCB3 CCC
M-A 12544VCD9 CCC
A-23 12544VAY5 CCC
A-24 12544VAZ2 CCC
A-25 12544VBA6 CCC
A-26 12544VBB4 CCC
A-27 12544VBC2 CCC
A-28 12544VBD0 CCC
A-29 12544VBE8 CCC
A-30 12544VBF5 CCC
A-31 12544VBG3 CCC
A-32 12544VBH1 CCC
A-33 12544VBJ7 CCC
A-34 12544VBK4 CCC
A-35 12544VBL2 CCC
A-36 12544VBM0 CCC
A-37 12544VBN8 CCC
A-38 12544VBP3 CCC
A-39 12544VBQ1 CCC
A-40 12544VBR9 CCC
A-41 12544VBS7 CCC
A-42 12544VBT5 CCC
A-43 12544VBU2 CCC
A-44 12544VBV0 CCC
A-51 12544VCN7 CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-J3
Series 2005-J3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 12669G4J7 BBB
1-A-2 12669G4K4 BBB
1-A-3 12669G4L2 BBB
1-A-4 12669G4M0 BBB
1-A-5 12669G4N8 BBB
1-A-7 12669G4Q1 BBB
2-A-1 12669G4S7 BBB
2-A-2 12669G4T5 BBB
2-A-3 12669G4U2 BBB
2-A-4 12669G4V0 BBB
2-A-5 12669G4W8 BBB
2-A-7 12669G4Y4 BBB
PO 12669G5A5 BBB
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB3
Series 2006-HYB3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-2 1266943W6 CCC
2-A-B-1 1266943Z9 BB
2-A-2 1266944C9 CCC
3-A-1A 1266944E5 CCC
3-A-2 1266944G0 CCC
4-A-1B 1266944K1 B
4-A-2 1266944M7 CCC
4-A-IO 1266944N5 B
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-17
Series 2007-17
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
4-A-1 12544KAM5 BB
4-X 12544KAP8 BB
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-5
Series 2005-5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II-A-12 225458TT5 AAA
III-A-3 225458TZ1 AAA
III-A-6 225458UC0 AAA
IV-A-2 225458UF3 AAA
PP 225458VD7 AAA
C-X 225458UQ9 AAA
D-X 225458UR7 AAA
II-X 225458UP1 AAA
First Horizon Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 32051GX83 A
I-A-2 32051GX91 B
IV-A-1 32051GY74 A
First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-6
Series 2005-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-4 32051GWT8 AAA
First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-AR4
Series 2006-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 32053AAA4 CCC
I-A-3 32053AAC0 CCC
II-A-1 32053AAE6 BBB
II-A-2 32053AAF3 CCC
II-A-IO 32053AAG1 BBB
III-A-1 32053AAH9 CCC
GMACM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
3-A-1 36185MDS8 A
M-1 36185MDU3 CCC
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR-7
Series 2005-AR7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
6A1 362341XG9 AAA
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
3-A1A 41161PK69 BBB
X 41161PJ46 BBB
B-1 41161PJ53 CCC
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5
Series 2005-A5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
4-A-1 466247SN4 AAA
JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2007-S3
Series 2007-S3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-2 46631NAB5 CCC
1-A-3 46631NAC3 CCC
1-A-4 46631NAD1 CCC
1-A-5 46631NAE9 CCC
1-A-6 46631NAF6 CCC
1-A-7 46631NAG4 CCC
1-A-8 46631NAH2 CCC
1-A-9 46631NAJ8 CCC
1-A-10 46631NAK5 CCC
1-A-18 46631NAT6 CCC
1-A-19 46631NAU3 CCC
1-A-40 46631NBR9 CCC
1-A-41 46631NBS7 CCC
1-A-49 46631NCA5 CCC
1-A-51 46631NCC1 CCC
1-A-52 46631NCD9 CCC
1-A-53 46631NCE7 CCC
1-A-59 46631NCL1 CCC
1-A-62 46631NCP2 CCC
1-A-63 46631NCQ0 CCC
1-A-65 46631NCS6 CCC
1-A-66 46631NCT4 CCC
1-A-88 46631NDR7 CCC
1-A-91 46631NDU0 CCC
1-A-92 46631NDV8 CCC
1-A-93 46631NDW6 CCC
1-A-94 46631NDX4 CCC
1-A-95 46631NDY2 CCC
1-A-98 46631NEB1 CCC
A-101 46631NEE5 CCC
A-102 46631NEF2 CCC
A-103 46631NEG0 CCC
A-104 46631NEH8 CCC
A-105 46631NEJ4 CCC
A-106 46631NEK1 CCC
A-107 46631NEL9 CCC
A-108 46631NEM7 CCC
A-109 46631NEN5 CCC
A-110 46631NEP0 CCC
A-111 46631NEQ8 CCC
A-112 46631NER6 CCC
A-113 46631NES4 CCC
A-114 46631NET2 CCC
2-A-1 46631NEX3 CCC
2-A-2 46631NEY1 CCC
2-A-3 46631NEZ8 CCC
2-A-4 46631NFA2 CCC
A-P 46631NFB0 CCC
P 46631NFL8 AAA
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-2
Series MLCC2005-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
X 59020UB20 AAA
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2007-3
Series 2007-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 59022XAA5 AAA
I-A-2 59022XAB3 AAA
II-A-1 59022XAC1 AAA
II-A-2 59022XAD9 AAA
III-A-1 59022XAE7 AAA
III-A-2 59022XAF4 AAA
M-1 59022XAH0 AA
M-2 59022XAJ6 A
M-3 59022XAK3 BBB
B-2 59022XAP2 CCC
Prime Mortgage Trust 2007-3
Series 2007-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II-B-3 74162WAM0 CCC
RAAC Series 2005-SP1 Trust
Series 2005-SP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-I-IO 76112BSL5 AAA
A-III-4 76112BQP8 AAA
A-III-8 76112BQT0 AAA
A-III-IO 76112BQW3 AAA
A-IV-IO 76112BRA0 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-17
Series 2005-17
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AX 86359DSU2 AAA
PAX 86359DSV0 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2005-6
Series 2005-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A1 863576BB9 AAA
1-A2 863576BC7 AAA
1-A3 863576BD5 AAA
1-A4 863576BE3 AAA
2-A1 863576BF0 AAA
2-A2 863576BG8 AAA
2-A3 863576BH6 AAA
2-A4 863576BJ2 AAA
2-A5 863576BK9 AAA
2-A6 863576BL7 AAA
2-A7 863576BM5 AAA
2-A8 863576BN3 AAA
2-A9 863576BP8 AAA
2-A10 863576BQ6 AAA
2-A12 863576BS2 AAA
2-A13 863576BT0 AAA
2-A14 863576BU7 AAA
2-A15 863576BV5 AAA
2-A16 863576BW3 AAA
2-A17 863576BX1 AAA
2-A18 863576BY9 AAA
2-A19 863576BZ6 AAA
2-A20 863576CA0 AAA
2-A21 863576CB8 AAA
3-A1 863576CC6 AAA
3-A2 863576CD4 AAA
4-A1 863576CE2 AAA
5A-1 863576CF9 AAA
5A-2 863576CG7 AAA
5A-3 863576CH5 AAA
5A-4 863576CJ1 AAA
5A-6 863576CL6 AAA
5A-7 863576CM4 AAA
5A-8 863576CN2 AAA
5A-9 863576CP7 AAA
5A-10 863576CQ5 AAA
5A-11 863576CR3 AAA
AP 863576CS1 AAA
AX 863576CT9 AAA
PAX 863576CU6 AAA
B3 863576CX0 CCC
B4 863576CY8 CCC
Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-5
Series 2007-5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 88522TAQ3 CCC
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2005-AR16 Trust
Series 2005-AR16
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 92922F7G7 CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-1 Trust
Series 2005-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-WIO 94982EAF1 AAA
B-5 94982EAM6 CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-14 Trust
Series 2005-14
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-4 949832AD1 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Classes of Notes From Cash Flow
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 27
classes of notes from one cash flow and three hybrid
collateralized debt obligation transactions following the
liquidation of the collateral in their portfolios. S&P then
withdrew its ratings on these tranches.
The affected tranches have a combined issuance amount of
$2.74 billion. S&P lowered its ratings on the cash flow CDO
transaction to 'D' because the proceeds from the liquidation have
not been sufficient to make par payments to the rated notes. S&P
lowered its ratings on the hybrid CDO transactions to 'D' because
the transactions did not have proceeds to pay back par payments to
the noteholders after making the termination payments on the
credit default swap contracts.
The three hybrid CDOs are backed predominantly by mezzanine
residential mortgage-backed securities and distressed asset-backed
securities, and the cash flow CDO is backed predominantly by high-
grade RMBS securities. The deals triggered events of default,
after which the controlling noteholders voted to accelerate the
maturity of the notes and liquidate the collateral assets.
The current rating actions follow notice from the trustees that
the liquidation of the portfolio assets is complete and that the
available proceeds have been distributed to the noteholders.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Deal Name Class To Interim From
--------- ----- -- ------- ----
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. SupSrSwap NR D B-/Watch Neg
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. II NR D CC
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. III NR D CC
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. IV NR D CC
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. V NR D CC
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. VI NR D CC
Alpha Mezz CDO 2007-1 Ltd. VII NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. Super Sr NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. II Fd Sr NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. III Fd Sr NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. IV Fd Sr NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. V Fd Mezz NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. VI Fd Mezz NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. VII FdMezz NR D CC
Arca Fdg 2006-I Ltd. VIII FdMez NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. A-1 NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. A-2 NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. B NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. C NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. D NR D CC
Halcyon Sec. Pdts Inv ABS
CDO I Ltd. E NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding I
Ltd. A1 S NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding
I Ltd. A1 J NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding
I Ltd. A2 NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding
I Ltd. A3 NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding
I Ltd. B NR D CC
Ischus High Grade Funding I
Ltd. C NR D CC
NR - Not rated.
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 65 Classes From Six Prime Jumbo RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 65
classes from six U.S. prime jumbo and subprime residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions issued from 2005 to 2007.
S&P removed 38 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications. Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on
13 classes from five of the transactions and removed all of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses based on the dollar
amounts of loans currently in the transactions' delinquency,
foreclosure, and real estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's
projection of future defaults. S&P also incorporated cumulative
losses to date in S&P's analysis when assessing rating outcomes.
For information on how S&P derive its loss assumptions, S&P's use
of loss curve forecasting methodology, and how S&P incorporate
each transaction's current delinquency (including 60- and 90-day
delinquencies), default, and loss trends into S&P's analysis.
As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral as well as macroeconomic
influences. For example, S&P's assessment of the risk profile of
the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default
projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and
the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss severity
assumptions. Furthermore, for each deal, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations based on upward trends in delinquencies.
To maintain an 'AAA' rating, S&P considers whether a class in a
subprime transaction is able to withstand approximately 150% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions. For a class
for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P consider whether a bond
is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumption. Other
rating categories are dispersed, approximately equally, between
these two loss assumptions. For example, to maintain a 'BB'
rating on one class, S&P may consider whether the class is able to
withstand approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions,
while, in connection with a different class, S&P may consider
whether it is able to withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.
For prime jumbo transactions, a class may have to withstand
approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions in order to
maintain a 'BB' rating, while a different class may have to
withstand approximately 154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BBB' rating. An affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects
S&P's opinion that the class can withstand approximately 235% of
S&P's base-case loss assumptions.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given out current
projected losses.
The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates. The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of either subprime, first-lien, fixed-rate,
adjustable-rate, or negative-amortization residential mortgage
loans or prime jumbo fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loans
secured by one- to four-family properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.
Rating Actions
Banc of America Funding 2007-C Trust
Series 2007-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 059522AT9 CCC BBB+
1-A-2 059522AU6 BB AAA
1-A-3 059522AV4 BB AAA
1-A-4 059522AW2 BB AAA
1-A-5 059522AX0 CCC BBB+
2-A-1 059522AY8 BB AAA
2-A-2 059522AZ5 CCC BBB+
3-A-1 059522BA9 BB AAA
3-A-2 059522BB7 CCC BBB+
4-A-1 059522BC5 A AAA
4-A-2 059522BD3 A AAA
4-A-3 059522BE1 A AAA
4-A-4 059522BF8 CCC BBB+
X-B-1 059522BN1 CC CCC
5-A-1 059522BG6 CC B
5-A-2 059522BH4 B BBB
5-A-3 059522BJ0 CC B
GSAMP Trust 2006-NC1
Series 2006-NC1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 362334EB6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-3 362334EC4 AA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 362334ED2 BBB AA+/Watch Neg
M-2 362334EE0 B AA+/Watch Neg
M-3 362334EF7 CCC AA/Watch Neg
M-4 362334EG5 CCC AA/Watch Neg
M-5 362334EH3 CC A/Watch Neg
M-6 362334EJ9 CC BB/Watch Neg
B-1 362334EK6 CC B/Watch Neg
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR6
Series 2005-AR6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1 362341RT8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
1A2 362341RU5 AA AAA/Watch Neg
1A4 362341RW1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2A1 362341RX9 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
2A2 362341RY7 AA AAA/Watch Neg
3A1 362341RZ4 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3A2 362341SA8 AA AAA/Watch Neg
4A1 362341SB6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
4A2 362341SC4 AA AAA/Watch Neg
4A3 362341SD2 AA AAA/Watch Neg
4A4 362341SE0 AA AAA/Watch Neg
4A5 362341SF7 AA AAA/Watch Neg
B1 362341SG5 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B2 362341SH3 CC A/Watch Neg
B4 362341RQ4 CC BB/Watch Neg
B3 362341SJ9 CC BBB/Watch Neg
Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 61751QAA3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 61751QAB1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-3 61751QAC9 CCC A/Watch Neg
A-4 61751QAD7 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-1 61751QAE5 CCC B/Watch Neg
M-2 61751QAF2 CC CCC
M-3 61751QAG0 CC CCC
M-4 61751QAH8 CC CCC
M-5 61751QAJ4 CC CCC
M-6 61751QAK1 CC CCC
B-1 61751QAL9 CC CCC
RASC Series 2006-KS1 Trust
Series 2006-KS1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-3 76113AAE1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-4 76113AAF8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 76113AAG6 AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
M-2 76113AAH4 A A/Watch Neg
M-3 76113AAJ0 BB BBB/Watch Neg
M-4 76113AAK7 B BB/Watch Neg
M-5 76113AAL5 CCC B/Watch Neg
M-6 76113AAM3 CC CCC
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-15
Series 2005-15
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 863579UL0 A AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 863579UM8 B AAA/Watch Neg
1-AX 863579UN6 A AAA
1-PAX 863579UP1 A AAA
2-A1 863579UQ9 A AAA/Watch Neg
2-A2 863579UR7 B AAA/Watch Neg
3-A1 863579US5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A2 863579UT3 B AAA/Watch Neg
4-A1 863579UU0 BB AAA/Watch Neg
4-A2 863579UV8 B AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 863579UW6 CCC AA+/Watch Neg
B-2 863579UX4 CC AA/Watch Neg
B-3 863579UY2 CC A/Watch Neg
B-4 863579UZ9 CC BB+/Watch Neg
B-5 863579VA3 CC BB/Watch Neg
B-6 863579VB1 CC B/Watch Neg
B-7 863579VC9 CC CCC
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 120 Classes From 13 Alt-A RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 120
classes from 13 U.S. Alternative-A residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007. S&P
removed 88 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications. Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven
classes from four of these transactions and removed two of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch negative).
The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate the transactions' current and S&P's projected losses
based on the dollar amounts of loans currently in the
transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real estate owned
pipelines, as well as S&P's projection of future defaults. S&P
also incorporated cumulative losses to date in S&P's analysis when
assessing rating outcomes.
S&P derived its loss assumptions using S&P's criteria found in the
"Related Research" section. As part of S&P's analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral as well as macroeconomic influences. For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while S&P's outlook for housing price
declines and the health of the housing market influence S&P's loss
severity assumptions. Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss
expectations for each deal based on upward trends in
delinquencies.
To maintain a 'AAA' rating, S&P considers whether a class in an
Alt-A transaction is able to withstand approximately 150% of S&P's
base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors assumed on specific transactions. For a class
for which we've affirmed a 'B' rating, S&P considers whether a
bond is able to withstand S&P's base-case loss assumptions. Other
rating categories are dispersed, approximately equally, between
these two loss assumptions. For example, to maintain a 'BB'
rating on one class, S&P may consider whether the class is able to
withstand approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions,
while, in connection with a different class, S&P may consider
whether it is able to withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses. The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that
there is sufficient credit enhancement to support the ratings at
their current levels. Certain senior classes also benefit from
senior-support classes that would provide support to a certain
extent before any applicable losses could affect the super-senior
certificates. The subordination of classes within each structure
provides credit support for the affected transactions.
The collateral backing these deals originally consisted
predominantly of Alt-A, first-lien, fixed-rate, adjustable-rate,
or negative-amortization residential mortgage loans secured by
one- to four-family properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.
Rating Actions
American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-1A-1 02660CAA8 CCC AAA
I-1A-2 02660CAB6 CC A/Watch Neg
I-1A-3 02660CAC4 CC BB/Watch Neg
I-2A-1 02660CAD2 CC A/Watch Neg
I-2A-2 02660CAE0 CC BB/Watch Neg
I-3A-1 02660CAF7 CC A/Watch Neg
I-3A-2 02660CAG5 CC BB/Watch Neg
I-M-1 02660CAJ9 CC CCC
I-M-3 02660CAR1 D CC
Banc of America Funding 2006-8T2 Trust
Series 2006-8T2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 05951UAB7 B BBB/Watch Neg
A-2 05951UAC5 B BBB/Watch Neg
A-3 05951UAD3 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-4 05951UAE1 CCC BB/Watch Neg
A-5 05951UAF8 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-6 05951UAW1 CCC BB/Watch Neg
A-7 05951UAG6 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-8 05951UAH4 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-9 05951UAJ0 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-10 05951UAK7 CCC B+/Watch Neg
A-11 05951UAL5 CCC B/Watch Neg
M-1 05951UAM3 CC CCC
M-2 05951UAN1 CC CCC
M-3 05951UAP6 CC CCC
M-4 05951UAQ4 CC CCC
Banc of America Funding 2007-C Trust
Series 2007-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
6-A-1 059522AA0 BB AAA/Watch Neg
6-A-2 059522AB8 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
7-A-1 059522AC6 BB AAA/Watch Neg
7-A-2 059522AD4 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
7-A-3 059522AE2 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
7-A-4 059522AF9 BB AAA/Watch Neg
7-A-5 059522AG7 BB AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 059522AH5 CC BBB-/Watch Neg
M-2 059522AJ1 CC BB/Watch Neg
M-3 059522AK8 CC BB/Watch Neg
M-4 059522AL6 CC B/Watch Neg
M-5 059522AM4 CC B/Watch Neg
M-6 059522AN2 CC CCC
GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-11
Series 2006-11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1 362367AA2 CCC BB/Watch Neg
2A1 362367AB0 B AAA/Watch Neg
2A2 362367AC8 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
2A3-A 362367AD6 B AAA/Watch Neg
2A3-B 362367AE4 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-1 362367AF1 CC B/Watch Neg
M-2 362367AG9 CC CCC
M-3 362367AH7 CC CCC
M-4 362367AJ3 CC CCC
GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-3
Series 2006-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 362334BQ6 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 362334BR4 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
A-3 362334BS2 B AAA/Watch Neg
A-4 362334BT0 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-1 362334BU7 CC B/Watch Neg
M-2 362334BV5 CC B-/Watch Neg
M-3 362334BW3 CC CCC
GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-9
Series 2006-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 362382AD5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 362382AE3 CCC A/Watch Neg
A-3 362382AF0 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
A-4-A 362382AG8 B AAA/Watch Neg
A-4-B 362382AH6 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-1 362382AJ2 CC B/Watch Neg
M-2 362382AK9 CC CCC
M-3 362382AL7 CC CCC
Harbor View Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11
Series 2006-11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1A 41162GAA0 B AAA/Watch Neg
A-1B 41162GAB8 CCC B/Watch Neg
B-1 41162GAC6 CC CCC
B-2 41162GAD4 CC CCC
B-3 41162GAE2 CC CCC
B-4 41162GAF9 CC CCC
IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR4
Series 2006-AR4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A1-B 45661EAW4 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A1-C 45661EAX2 CC B/Watch Neg
A2-A 45661EAY0 CC B/Watch Neg
M-1 45661EAZ7 CC CCC
M-2 45661EBA1 CC CCC
M-3 45661EBB9 CC CCC
M-4 45661EBC7 D CCC
Lehman XS Trust
Series 2005-5N
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A2 86359DUM7 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3 86359DUN5 B AAA/Watch Neg
2-A1 86359DUP0 BB AAA/Watch Neg
2-A2 86359DUQ8 B AAA/Watch Neg
3-A2 86359DUT2 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
3-A3B 86359DUY1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
3-A3C 86359DUZ8 B AAA/Watch Neg
M1 86359DUV7 CCC AA+/Watch Neg
M2 86359DUW5 CC AA/Watch Neg
M3 86359DUX3 CC BB/Watch Neg
Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-14N
Series 2006-14N
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1B 52522CAB9 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 52522CAC7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3 52522CAD5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
2-A 52522CAE3 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
M1-I 52522CAK9 CC AA/Watch Neg
M2-I 52522CAL7 CC BBB/Watch Neg
M3-I 52522CAM5 CC BB/Watch Neg
M4-I 52522CAN3 CC B/Watch Neg
M5-I 52522CAP8 CC CCC
M6-I 52522CAQ6 CC CCC
3-A2 52522CAG8 B AAA/Watch Neg
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-13ARX
Series 2006-13ARX
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 61750PAA6 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
A-2 61750PAB4 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-3 61750PAC2 CCC B/Watch Neg
A-4 61750PAD0 CC CCC
RALI Series 2006-QA11 Trust
Series 2006-QA11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 74922XAA5 CCC B/Watch Neg
RALI Series 2006-QS 18 Trust
Series 2006-QS18
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 74922RAA8 CCC B+/Watch Neg
I-A-2 74922RAB6 CCC B+
I-A-3 74922RAC4 CCC B+/Watch Neg
I-A-4 74922RAD2 CCC B+/Watch Neg
I-A-5 74922RAE0 CC B/Watch Neg
I-A-6 74922RAF7 CC B/Watch Neg
I-A-7 74922RAG5 CC B
II-A-1 74922RAH3 CCC B+/Watch Neg
II-A-2 74922RAJ9 CCC B+
II-A-3 74922RAK6 CC B/Watch Neg
II-A-4 74922RAL4 CC B/Watch Neg
II-A-5 74922RAM2 CC B/Watch Neg
II-A-6 74922RAN0 CC B
I-A-P 74922RAS9 CC B/Watch Neg
I-A-V 74922RAT7 CCC B+
II-A-P 74922RAU4 CC B/Watch Neg
II-A-V 74922RAV2 CCC B+
III-A-1 74922RAP5 A AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-2 74922RAQ3 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-3 74922RAR1 B AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-P 74922RAW0 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
III-A-V 74922RAX8 A AAA
Ratings Affirmed
IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR4
Series 2006-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1-A 45661EAV6 AAA
Lehman XS Trust
Series 2005-5N
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A1 86359DUL9 AAA
3-A1A 86359DUR6 AAA
3-A1B 86359DUS4 AAA
Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-14N
Series 2006-14N
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A1A 52522CAA1 AAA
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
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related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/
On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts. The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.
Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.
The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.
For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911. For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA. Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez, Philline
Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug,
and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2009. All rights reserved. ISSN: 1520-9474.
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