TCR_Public/090419.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, April 19, 2009, Vol. 13, No. 107

                            Headlines


ABACUS 2006-9: S&P Downgrades Ratings on All Classes to 'D'
ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-1 Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-1 Notes
ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes
AMAC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes

ATHOS FUNDING: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-1 and A-2 Notes
AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-3 Certs.
AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-4 Notes to 'B3'

AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-2 Notes to 'B3'
AUCTION RATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
AUCTION RATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-2 Notes to 'B3'
AVALON RE: Fitch Changes Rating Actions on Two Classes of Notes
BALLANTYNE RE: S&P Assigns 'CC' Rating on Class A-1 Notes

BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-PWR8 Certificates
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 82 Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
BERNOULLI HIGH: Fitch Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Revenue Bonds

BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Junks Rating on 2001A Bonds from 'B1'
CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Assigns 'BB' to 2009-I Notes Class D
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class D to 'BB+'
CABELA'S CREDIT: S&P Assigns Ratings on $500 Mil. 200-I Notes
CAPITALSOURCE 2006-2: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E to 'B'

CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Three Classes
CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Notes
CAPITALSOURCE REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2006-A Notes
CAPMARK VII: Moody's Junks Ratings on 8 Classes of Notes
CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on 4 Classes of 2005-1 Notes

CHAMPLAIN CLO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'B-'
CHARITABLE LEADERSHIP: Moody's Retains 'B3' Rating on 2002A Bonds
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Ratings on Two Classes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2004-C2 Notes

CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 54 Tranches
CITY OF HOUSTON: Fitch Affirms 2001 Airport Revenue Bonds at 'B-'
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Sewer Debt
CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 34 Notes Class II-B
CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 35 Notes Class II-B

CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 36 Notes Class II-B
COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-1 Notes
COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
CORPORATE BACKED: S&P Downgrades Rating on $25 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'Ba1'

CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $27.5MM Notes to 'Ba1'
CORPORATE BACKED: S&P Corrects Rating on $73.991 Mil. Certs.
CORTS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on $219 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
CORTS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $300 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 49 Tranches

CRAFT 2007-1: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
CRAFT CLO: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Rating on 2004-2 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-CND1 Notes
DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Cuts Ratings on $30 Mil. Notes to 'CC'
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-CF1 Certificates

DRYDEN VI-LEVERAGED: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various 2004 Notes
EATON VANCE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Medium Term Notes
FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FF12 Tranches+
FLATIRON RE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on $256 Mil. Facility
FMC REAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three 2005-1 Notes

GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-2 Certificates
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2005-C4 Classes
GEM LIGOS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GFCM LLC: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three 2003-1 Certificates
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 1999-C2 Notes

GOLDEN CROSSING: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on Bank Facilities
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2004-1 Tranches
GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 2004-14 Tranches
GSR MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 44 Classes of Notes
GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2005-2 Notes

GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 2006-4 Notes
HELIOS FINANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Four 2007-S1 Notes
HIGHLAND PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
IBIS RE: S&P Rates Class A and B Series 2009-1 Notes at Low-B
INDYMAC ARM:: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 85 Tranches from 10 RMBS

INMAN SQUARE: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
ISTAR FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'BB' Senior Rating on Negative Watch
JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns 'B' to Six 2009-R4 Certs.
JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Retains Negative Watch on Warrants' Ratings
JG WENTWORTH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Notes from Two Deals

JP MORGAN: Fitch Junks Ratings on Five 2004-CIBC9 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 Classes of 2008-C2 Notes
LANDMARK II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LANDMARK II: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 12 2005-MF1 Notes

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms 'B/MR1+' Rating on Liquidity Fund
LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Classes of Notes
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'
MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2006-5 Notes to 'D'
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Puts Ratings on 1999-C1 Certs. on Neg. Watch

MEZZ CAP: S&P Puts Ratings on 28 Classes on Negative Watch
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: DBRS Junks Series 2006-1 Notes Classes N and P
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2006-1 Certs. to Low-B
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class H Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Puts Ratings on 2007-XLF Notes on Neg. Watch

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two 1998-CF1 Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Corrects Rating on Two Classes of 2006-8 Notes
MWAM CBO: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 39 Tranches

NOMURA CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-2 Notes
OWS CLO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
PASS-THROUGH AUCTION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Notes to 'B3'
POOLED COLLEGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2007 Bonds to 'Ba1'
PPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on $40 Mil. Certs. To 'D'

PREFERRED PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Cuts Rating on $50 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
PREMIUM LOAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
PRINCE GEORGE'S: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on 1997 Revenue Bonds
PRO RATA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes

PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-NRF1 Notes
PUBLIC STEERS: S&P Cuts Rating on 1998 F-Z4 Certs. To 'D'
RACERS SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2001-12-E Notes to 'B2'
RAIT PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes
REPACS TRUST: Moody's Junks Rating on $5 Mil. Debt Units

REPACS TRUST: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
REPACS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
RESERVE MANAGEMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three Funds
RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Junks Rating on Class 2-A-5 Tranche
RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Junks Ratings on 2007-2-E Certs.

RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2004-13-E Notes To B2
RESTRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Rating on 2006-18-C Certs. to 'D'
RFC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of 2007-1 Notes
RFSC SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-RM2 Tranches
SAGUARO ISSUER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Units

SANTA ROSA BAY: Fitch Junks Rating on 1996 Revenue Bonds
SATURNS TRUST: Hertz Rating Cut Cues S&P's Junk Rating on Units
SATURNS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $75 Mil. Units to 'D'
SATURNS TRUST: S&P Corrects Rating on $78 Mil. 2002-11 Certs.
SOLAR TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-CC1 Certs.

SPRINGHILL/COURTLAND: S&P Cuts Rating on 1999A Bonds to "B-"
STARS & STRIPES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
STRAITS GLOBAL: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 185 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches

STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $25 Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'Ba1'
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Junks Ratings on 2003-15 Debentures
STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B6 to 'B' from 'D'
STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Junks Rating on $56,009,124 Notes

STRUCTURED INVESTMENT: Moody's Junks Rating on Series 77 Notes
STRUCTURED INVESTMENTS: Moody's Cuts $10BB Series 80 Notes to Ba3
STRUCTURED INVESTMENTS: Moody's Cuts $10BB Series 81 Notes to Ba2
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 185 Tranches
TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches

TRUST PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Notes
TRUST PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Notes
U-HAUL S FLEET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Cargo Van Notes
U-HAUL S FLEET: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2007-1 Box Truck Notes
USP SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'

VERMONT HOUSING: S&P Puts Underlying Rating on Negative Watch
WACHOVIA PREFERRED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
WELLS FARGO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Classes from 23 RMBS
WICHITA BRENTWOOD: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on 1995 Bonds
WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2005-1 Notes

* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 62 Tranches by 13 Trust CDOs
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 142 Tranches from 17 Alt-A RMBS
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Housing Loans-Backed Tranches
* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 76 Net Interest Margin Securities
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 37 Classes from 14 Scratch-And-Dent RMBS

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 53 Classes from Three RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 68 Classes from Six RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 95 Classes from 66 NIM RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 110 Tranches from 11 Trust CDO Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 120 Classes from Nine Alt-A and RMBS

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 147 Classes from 14 RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 244 Classes from 19 RMBS Transactions



                            *********

ABACUS 2006-9: S&P Downgrades Ratings on All Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on all
classes issued by ABACUS 2006-9 Ltd. to 'D'.
  
The lowered ratings follow a number of recent write-downs of
underlying reference entities, which have caused the class A-2, B,
and C notes to incur complete principal losses and the class A-1
notes to incur a partial principal loss.

                         Ratings Lowered

                        ABACUS 2006-9 Ltd.
     
                                 Rating
                                 ------
                       Class    To    From
                       -----    --    ----
                       A-1      D     CCC-
                       A-2      D     CC
                       B        D     CC
                       C        D     CC


ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2004-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two and affirms two classes of notes
issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2004-1.  These rating actions
are effective immediately:

  -- $88,879,693 class A notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Stable Outlook;

  -- $33,750,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AA'; Stable Outlook;

  -- $73,750,000 class C notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A';
     Negative Outlook;

  -- $50,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'B' from 'BBB';
     Negative Outlook.

The affirmations reflect the increased credit enhancement
available to the class A and B notes.  The rise in credit
enhancement is due to the deleveraging of the class A notes
through asset amortization and the application of excess spread
via the additional principal amount.  Upon the occurrence of a
defaulted asset, the APA feature directs part or all of the excess
interest otherwise available to the subordinate notes to pay down
the senior-most notes in an amount equal to the aggregate balance
of defaulted assets in the portfolio.  The class A notes have
received approximately $213.6 million, or over 70% of their
original notional amount, since the closing date.

The downgrades of the class C and D notes are the result of
negative credit migration, reduced recovery rate expectations for
second lien, junior secured and subordinate debt, and increased
obligor concentration risk.  Credit deterioration in the portfolio
is particularly evidenced by the recent increase in defaulted
obligors, which were reported at 5.7% of the initial collateral
balance as of the latest trustee report dated Jan. 25, 2009.
Additionally, obligors considered 'CCC+' or below represented
about 9.4% of the performing portfolio, which contributed to an
increase in the Fitch Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) to
30.3 ('B/B-') from 24.5 ('B+/B') at the last review. The current
WARF breaches the established test level of 22.8 ('B+').

In the criteria report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'
released April 30, 2008, Fitch updated its recovery rate
assumptions for second lien loans, junior secured debt, and
subordinate debt to reflect lower recovery rate prospects for
these junior debt levels.  The updated recovery rate assumptions
impacted the analysis of ACAS BLT 2004-1 since junior and
subordinate debt represent over 90% of the total portfolio.

Finally, asset amortization has resulted in a more concentrated
portfolio.  The six largest performing obligors each comprise
about 5.6% of the performing portfolio.  All of these elements
have increased the risk profile of the class C and D notes.

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recoveries, and recovery timing.  The class C and D
notes are the most vulnerable to elevated defaults and actual
recoveries that fall below historical levels, hence the Negative
Rating Outlook on these notes.

ACAS BLT 2004-1 is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
Dec. 2, 2004 and is managed by American Capital Strategies, Ltd.  
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2007.  ACAS
BLT 2004-1 is secured by a portfolio composed of middle-market
loans, 90.2% of which are either junior secured or subordinate,
and 9.8% of which are senior secured.

The rating of the class A notes addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings of the
class B and C notes address the likelihood that investors will
receive ultimate and compensating interest payments, as per the
governing documents, as well as the stated balance of principal by
the legal final maturity date.  The rating of the class D notes
addresses the likelihood that investors will receive their stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria, 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs', released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.


ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two and affirms four classes of notes
issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2005-1.  These rating actions
are effective immediately:

  -- $412,798,581 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Stable
     Outlook;

  -- $139,792,451 class A-2A notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Stable
     Outlook;

  -- $50,000,000 class A-2B notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Stable      
     Outlook;

  -- $50,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AA'; Stable Outlook;

  -- $145,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A';
     Negative Outlook;

  -- $90,000,000 class D notes downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB';
     Negative Outlook.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit enhancement
available to the class A and B notes in the forms of subordination
and the application of excess spread via the additional principal
amount.  Upon the occurrence of a defaulted asset, the APA feature
directs part or all of the excess interest otherwise available to
the subordinate notes to pay down the senior-most notes in an
amount equal to the aggregate balance of defaulted assets in the
portfolio.  This transaction generates significant excess spread
due to a combination of high-interest-yielding assets and
relatively low-cost liabilities, including 17% of the initial
capital structure that does not accrue periodic interest payments.

The downgrades of the class C and D notes are the result of
negative credit migration and reduced recovery rate expectations
for second lien, junior secured, and subordinate debt.  Credit
deterioration in the portfolio is particularly evidenced by the
recent increase in defaulted obligors, which were reported at 3.2%
of the initial collateral balance as of the latest trustee report
dated Jan. 25, 2009.  Additionally, obligors considered 'CCC+' or
below represented about 9.5% of the performing portfolio, which
contributed to an increase in the Fitch Weighted Average Rating
Factor to 31.5 ('B/B-') from 24.7 ('B+/B') at the last review.  
The current WARF breaches the established test level of 30
('B/B-').

In the criteria report 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'
released April 30, 2008, Fitch updated its recovery rate
assumptions for second lien loans, junior secured debt, and
subordinate debt to reflect lower recovery rate prospects for
these junior debt levels.  The updated recovery rate assumptions
impacted the analysis of ACAS BLT 2005-1 since junior and
subordinate debt represent approximately 73.8% of the total
portfolio.  All of these elements have increased the risk profile
of the class C and D notes.

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recoveries, and recovery timing.  The class C and D
notes are the most vulnerable to elevated defaults and actual
recoveries that fall below historical levels, hence the Negative
Rating Outlook on these notes.

ACAS BLT 2005-1 is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
Oct. 4, 2005 and is managed by American Capital Strategies, Ltd.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2009.  ACAS
BLT 2005-1 is secured by a portfolio composed of middle-market
loans, 73.8% of which are either junior secured or subordinate,
and 26.2% of which are senior secured.

The ratings of the classes A-1, A-2A, and A-2B notes address the
likelihood that investors will receive full and timely payments of
interest, as per the governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.  The
ratings of the classes B and C notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive ultimate and compensating interest
payments, as per the governing documents, as well as the stated
balance of principal by the legal final maturity date.  The rating
of the class D notes addresses the likelihood that investors will
receive their stated balance of principal by the legal final
maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.


ACAS BUSINESS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two and affirms two classes of notes
issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2006-1.  These rating actions
are effective immediately:

  -- $276,000,000 class A notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Stable Outlook;

  -- $37,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'AA'; Negative Outlook;

  -- $72,500,000 class C notes downgraded to 'BB+' from 'A';
     Negative Outlook;

  -- $35,500,000 class D notes downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB';
     Negative Outlook.

The affirmations reflect the sufficient credit enhancement
available to the class A and B notes in the form of subordination
and the application of excess spread via the additional principal
amount.  Upon the occurrence of a defaulted asset, the APA feature
directs part or all of the excess interest otherwise available to
the subordinate notes to pay down the senior-most notes in an
amount equal to the aggregate balance of defaulted assets in the
portfolio.

The downgrades of the class C and D notes are the result of
negative credit migration and reduced recovery rate expectations
for second lien, junior secured, and subordinate debt.
Additionally, the portfolio of 43 total obligors may present some
obligor concentration risk to the transaction.

Credit deterioration in the portfolio is particularly evidenced by
the recent increase in defaulted obligors, which were reported at
3% of the initial collateral balance as of the latest trustee
report dated Feb. 26, 2009.  Additionally, obligors considered
'CCC+' or below represented about 10.8% of the performing
portfolio, which contributed to an increase in the Fitch Weighted
Average Rating Factor to 33.6 ('B/B-') from 26.2 ('B+/B') at the
last review.  The current WARF breaches the established test level
of 30 ('B/B-').

In the criteria report "Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs"
released April 30, 2008, Fitch updated its recovery rate
assumptions for second lien loans, junior secured debt, and
subordinate debt to reflect lower recovery rate prospects for
these junior debt levels.  The updated recovery rate assumptions
affected the analysis of ACAS BLT 2006-1, since junior and
subordinate debt represent over 84% of the total portfolio.  All
of these elements, in addition to the obligor risk in the
portfolio, have increased the risk profile of the class C and D
notes.

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recoveries, and recovery timing.  The class B, C and D
notes are all vulnerable to elevated defaults and actual
recoveries that fall below historical levels, hence the Negative
Rating Outlook on these notes.

ACAS BLT 2006-1 is a collateralized debt obligation that closed on
July 28, 2006 and is managed by American Capital Strategies, Ltd.  
The transaction's reinvestment period ends in August 2009.  ACAS
BLT 2006-1 is secured by a portfolio composed of middle-market
loans, 84% of which are either junior secured or subordinate, and
16% of which are senior secured.

The rating of the class A notes addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings of the
classes B, C, and D notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive ultimate and compensating interest payments, as per
the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria "Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs", released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.


AMAC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
of Notes issued by AMAC CDO Funding I.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, $242,936,549, Floating Rate Notes Due 2050,
     downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $50,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2050,
     downgraded to A3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $20,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2050,
     downgraded to Baa3 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $15,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2050, downgraded to Ba3 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-1, $12,113,392, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest
     Notes Due 2050, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D-2, $5,109,488, Fixed Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2050, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $6,060,826, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2050, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $12,349,677, Fixed Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2050, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded all Classes due to deteriorating pool
performance and revised modeling parameters.  Moody's ratings are
based on the current credit quality of the collateral and may not
reflect potential migration as per the legal documentation.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated October 6, 2006.


ATHOS FUNDING: S&P Junks Ratings on Class A-1 and A-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, and funding notes issued by Athos Funding Ltd., a
cash flow high-grade structured finance collateralized debt
obligation transaction.  The rating on the funding notes remains
on CreditWatch with negative implications.
     
The rating actions follow receipt of the notice dated April 2,
2009, from the trustee that the holder of 100% of the funding
notes, as requisite noteholder, has directed the trustee to
proceed with the liquidation of the collateral backing the rated
notes.
     
The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion that substantial losses
to the noteholders are likely based on the current market value of
the collateral and S&P's view that market prices may not recover
during the liquidation period.     

Earlier S&P had received a notice of an event of default dated
Dec. 22, 2008, followed by a notice of acceleration dated Jan. 13,
2009, for the transaction.  The deal experienced the EOD due to
the failure of an overcollateralization-based EOD trigger
specified in section 5.1 (d) of the transaction's indenture.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                        Athos Funding Ltd.
       
                                   Rating
                                   ------
       Class               To                From
       -----               --                ----
       Funding notes       CCC-/Watch Neg    BB+/Watch Neg
       A-1                 CC                BB+/Watch Neg
       A-2                 CC                B/Watch Neg

                     Other Outstanding Rating
  
                        Athos Funding Ltd.

                       Class         Rating
                       -----         ------
                       B             CC


AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $70,000,000
Class A Certificates and $35,000,000 Class B Certificates issued
by Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-12.

The rating actions are:

Auction Pass-Through Trust 2006-12

* $70,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously on
  1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

* $35,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously on
  1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating action is a result
of the change of the rating of BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION Ser. D
which was downgraded to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on
March 25, 2009.


AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $120,000,000
Class A Certificates and $30,000,000 Class B Certificates issued
by Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-3.

The rating actions are:

Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-3

* $120,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
  on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

* $30,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously on
  1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating action is a result
of the change of the rating of Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc.'s Floating
Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 5 which was downgraded
to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25, 2009.


AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $112,000,000
Class A Certificates and $28,000,000 Class B Certificates issued
by Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-5.

The rating actions are:

Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-5

  -- $112,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

  -- $28,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Bank of America Floating
Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series E which was downgraded
to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25, 2009.


AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-4 Notes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $120,000,000
Class A Certificates and $30,000,000 Class B Certificates issued
by Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-4.

The rating actions are:

Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-4

  -- $120,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

  -- $30,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s
Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 5 which was
downgraded to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25,
2009.


AUCTION PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-2 Notes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $120,000,000
Class A Certificates and $30,000,000 Class B Certificates issued
by Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-2.

The rating actions are:

Auction Pass-Through Trust 2007-2

  -- $120,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

  -- $30,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s
Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 5 which was
downgraded to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25,
2009.


AUCTION RATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $60,000,000
Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates and $15,000,000 Class B
Leveraged Trust Certificates issued by Auction Rate Securities
Trust 2007-1.

Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-1

  -- $60,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

  -- $15,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s
Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 5 which was
downgraded to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25,
2009.


AUCTION RATE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-2 Notes to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $40,000,000
Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates and $10,000,000 Class B
Leveraged Trust Certificates issued by Auction Rate Securities
Trust 2007-2.

The rating actions are:

Auction Rate Securities Trust 2007-2

  -- $40,000,000 Class A Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

  -- $10,000,000 Class B Certificates Downgraded to B3; previously
     on 1/30/2009 Downgraded to Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Bank of America Floating
Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series E which was downgraded
to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25, 2009.


AVALON RE: Fitch Changes Rating Actions on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various rating actions on these classes of
Avalon Re Ltd.:

Class B

  -- Revised to 'CCC/RR1' from 'CCC/DR3'.

Class C

  -- Revised to 'C/RR3' from 'C/DR3'.

Avalon Re provided coverage to Oil Casualty Insurance, Ltd., a
Bermuda-based insurer, on a three-year (July 1, 2005 through May
31, 2008) excess of loss reinsurance contract that attached when
losses exceeded $300 million. The most recent loss report
indicates that losses up to $47 million could potentially be ceded
to Avalon Re. This amount represents approximately one third of
the class C outstanding principal balance. Fitch does not
currently anticipate further losses to the class C notes, or
losses to the class B notes, though that is possible.  The class A
notes were paid in full on June 6, 2008.

Fitch continues to monitor OCIL's insurance losses. If the class C
notes are exhausted by subsequent loss development, holders of the
class B notes will then suffer a loss.

Fitch's analysis incorporated anticipated losses given OCIL's and
Fitch's recovery expectations. The resulting anticipated losses
were then applied to the transaction structure, enabling Fitch to
assess the impact of the losses on the securities.

Avalon Re is a Cayman Islands-domiciled insurance company formed
solely to issue the variable-rate notes, enter into a reinsurance
contract with OCIL, and to conduct activities related to the
notes' issuance.  The variable-rate notes are insurance-linked
collateralized securities that will suffer a loss of principal if
OCIL's aggregate insured losses exceed a specified threshold that
varies by note class.


BALLANTYNE RE: S&P Assigns 'CC' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'CC'
rating to Ballantyne Re plc's Class A-1 notes and its 'C' rating
to the company's Class B notes.
     
S&P had revised these ratings to 'D' on Jan. 5, 2009.  "We are
assigning new ratings to the notes because the company will pay
the Class A-1 noteholders delinquent interest, including
additional interest on the previously unpaid interest," explained
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Gary Martucci.  "In addition,
Ballantyne Re made all scheduled payments previously paid by the
financial guarantors on each other series of notes."
     
On Feb. 9, 2009, (with an effective date of Dec. 31, 2008),
Security Life of Denver Insurance Co. recaptured an additional
11.4% of the ceded business from Ballantyne, bringing the total
amount recaptured to 62.9%.  This decreases the amount of XXX
(excess) reserves Ballantyne is required to hold and lowered the
minimum balance requirement in the surplus account.  (The minimum
balance requirement is what triggered the nonpayment back in
January.)     

Although S&P expects that Ballantyne should be able to make
scheduled payments for a quarter or two, a decline in the market
value of the assets or unfavorable insurance experience (such as
higher-than-expected mortality resulting in greater benefit
payments from Ballantyne) could result in another nonpayment.  On
the business that Security Life of Denver has not recaptured, the
XXX reserve requirement will continue to increase, putting
additional strain on Ballantyne's ability to make scheduled
interest payments over time.     

Although Ballantyne can defer interest on the Class B notes, it
has not made each scheduled interest payment since from September
2008.  A 'C' rating indicates that the notes are highly vulnerable
to nonpayment and may be assigned to subordinated debt, the cash
payments of which have been suspended in accordance with the
instrument's terms.


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-PWR8 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks or
Recovery Ratings to these classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-PWR8:

  -- $19.9 million class F to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.4 million class G to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;  
  -- $17.7 million class H to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;  
  -- $8.8 million class J to 'B+' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.4 million class K to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.6 million class L to 'B-' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.6 million class M to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.2 million class N to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B';
  -- $4.4 million class P to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these
classes:

  -- $30.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $63 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $128 million class A-AB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $1.02 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $50 million class A-4FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $150 million class A-J at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $37.5 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.7 million class C at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26.5 million class D at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.7 million class E at 'A-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $17.7 million class Q.

The downgrades reflect a decline in Fitch-expected credit
enhancement to classes F through P due to projected losses on the
specially serviced loans (1.5%) as well as the downgrade and
removal of the shadow rating corresponding to one loan (0.8%).  In
addition, the downgrades reflect an increased concentration of
Fitch Loans of Concern (8.6%). The Rating Outlooks indicate the
likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one
to two years.

There are currently three loans in special servicing (1.5%).  The
largest specially serviced loan (0.9%) transferred Feb. 11, 2009
and is secured by a 145,803 square foot retail property located in
West Chester, OH.  The most recent reported occupancy was 76% as
of Dec. 31, 2007, compared to 93% at issuance.  The servicer-
reported debt service coverage ratio was 0.59 times (x) for year-
end 2007.

The two other specially serviced loans (0.6%) transferred Nov. 12,
2008 due to a technical default, when the tenant-in-common sponsor
and master lessee of each respective loan, DBSI, filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection.  The master leases for both loans were
rejected, and the respective tenant-in-common borrowers have
engaged new property management.  Through third-quarter 2008, the
larger of the two DBSI loans had a servicer-reported DSCR of
2.04x, while the smaller had coverage of 1.99x.  The special
servicer is currently negotiating forbearance agreements for both
loans.

Including the three specially serviced loans (1.5%), 22 loans
(8.6%) have been designated Fitch Loans of Concern.  This
represents an increase relative to the last Fitch rating action,
at which time there were no Fitch LOCs.

Fitch reviewed the transaction's nine shadow rated loans and their
underlying collateral: One MetroTech Center (10.4%), Lock Up
Storage Centers Portfolio (3.2%), Canyon Park Place (0.8%), The
Landings at Cypress Meadows (0.8%), JL Holdings Portfolio (0.8%),
Glendale Plaza (0.7%), Woodhaven Terrace Apartments (0.6%), The
Legends at Champions Gate (0.6%), and Plaza at Riverlakes (0.6%).

The shadow rating of one loan, The Landings at Cypress Meadows
(0.8%), was downgraded and withdrawn based on a decline in
performance.  The property is a 472-unit multifamily property
located in Tampa, FL.  As of year-end 2008, occupancy was 79%,
compared to 92% at issuance.  Through third-quarter 2008, the
Fitch stressed DSCR was 1.06x, compared to 1.32x at issuance.  
According to the Watch List, the property currently suffers from
deferred maintenance.

The remaining shadow rated loans (17.7%) were affirmed and
maintain their respective investment-grade shadow ratings, based
on stable performance since issuance.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the transaction has paid
down 4.2% to $1.69 billion, from $1.77 billion at issuance. Seven
loans (7.3%) have defeased since issuance.  There is limited near-
term refinance risk, with no loans maturing in 2009.  In 2010,
three loans (0.9%) mature; and an additional two loans (1.2%) are
anticipated to repay.  For the five loans expected to repay in
2010 (2.2%), the weighted average servicer-reported DSCR is 2.08x,
and the weighted average coupon is 5.176%.  No loans from the 2010
maturity concentration are Fitch LOCs; and one (0.6%) maintains an
investment-grade shadow rating.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 82 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 82
tranches from 9 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Bear Stearns ARM
Trust.  The collateral backing these transactions consists
primarily of first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-2-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-2-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-2-A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-2-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. I-2-A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. I-2-X-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008

     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-2-X-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. II-1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Baa2

  -- Cl. III-1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. III-2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 12/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 12/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/3/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/3/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/3/2004 Assigned
     Baa1

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. I-X-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-X-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-X-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-X-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to B1

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/1/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/13/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 7/13/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/16/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/1/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to B2

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8

  -- Cl. I-1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-1-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. I-2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-4-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 11/21/2008
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 18 tranches from 3 Bear
Stearns ARM Trust deals issued in 2006 and 2007.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable rate, Jumbo mortgage loans.  The actions
are triggered by the quickly deteriorating performance -- marked
by rising delinquencies and loss severities, along with concerns
about the continuing drop in housing prices nationwide and the
rising unemployment levels.  The actions reflect Moody's updated
expected losses on the jumbo sector announced in a press release
on March 19th, 2009, and are part of Moody's on-going review
process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on current ratings, level
of credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-
level loss expectations relative to current level of credit
enhancement.  Moody's took into account credit enhancement
provided by seniority, cross-collateralization, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.  
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/19/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2007-4

  -- Cl. I-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-1X-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2A-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-2X-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 3/19/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BERNOULLI HIGH: Fitch Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms $88.7 million and downgrades $1.3 billion
from six classes of Bernoulli High Grade CDO I, Ltd./Inc.:

  -- $856,376,278 class A-1A notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B';

  -- $352,384,154 class A-1B notes downgraded to 'B' from 'A';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $86,536,865 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';

  -- $57,691,244 class B notes affirmed at 'CC';

  -- $15,301,665 class C notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $15,678,003 class D notes affirmed at 'C'.

The class A-1A and A-1B notes are also removed from Rating Watch
Negative.

In addition, the class A-1B notes were assigned a Negative Outlook
due to the concentration of residential mortgage-backed security
assets as well as indirect exposure to RMBS through other
structured finance collateralized debt obligations in the
portfolio, which are expected to continue to face negative rating
migration until the housing market stabilizes.

The rating actions are due to Fitch's recently adjusted default
and recovery rate assumptions for analyzing SF CDOs, in addition
to negative credit migration in the underlying portfolio.  Since
the last rating action in May 2008, 80.9% of the portfolio has
been downgraded.  Assets rated below investment grade comprise
72.4% of the portfolio, of which 59.6% of the portfolio is
considered 'CCC+' or below.

Bernoulli is a hybrid transaction in which 24% of the portfolio
consists of credit default swaps referencing other CDOs.  With
respect to the synthetic portion of the portfolio; reference
obligation credit events consist of failure to pay principal,
write downs, or the reference obligation is downgraded to 'CC' or
lower.  As a result of credit events declared by the class A-1B
swap counterparty, Merrill Lynch International Bank, Ltd (MLI),
the class A-1B notes were first drawn upon in the amount of $13
million on the Jan. 5, 2009 payment date and currently have a
funded and unfunded portion.  The funded portion of the A-1B notes
currently amounts to $6.9 million, after it paid down $6.1 million
since January 2009.  The unfunded portion is currently $345.5
million, but it has not paid down since class A-1B was first drawn
upon. T he unfunded portion is paid after the funded portion of
the A-1B notes and then after the class A-1A notes are paid in
full.  Fitch expects the class A-1B funded amount to be drawn upon
again in the future as more credit events in the portfolio will
likely be declared as all but four of the reference obligations
could be declared credit events due to their low ratings.

Par coverage to all of the notes has continued to erode due to
defaulted and distressed assets, specifically RMBS.  According to
the March 2009 trustee report, the class A/B and C/D over
collateralization tests are failing, as well as the Sequential Pay
Test.  The class A/B OC test level has dropped to 39.7% versus a
trigger of 101.7%, the class C/D OC test level has dropped to
38.8% compared to the 100.4% trigger, and the Sequential Pay Test
ratio is 44.3% versus the 105.4% trigger.  As a result, the
transaction pays the notes sequentially until all of the coverage
tests are cured before switching back to pro rata payments.  Fitch
does not expect the coverage tests to cure in the future and thus
the transaction will continue to pay sequentially with principal
payments being made first to the class A-1B funded amount, then
class A-1A, then the class A-1B unfunded amount.  There are no
Events of Default triggered by coverage test failures.

Furthermore, the continued credit deterioration of the portfolio
decreases the likelihood of full principal payments to the class
A-1A notes.  The class A-1A notes are currently receiving full
interest payments, all from principal proceeds, but no principal
as all principal payments are going toward the class A-1B funded
portion.  Class A-1A can receive future principal proceeds after
the class A-1B funded amount is paid down, but the chances of
class A-1A receiving full principal payments decreases as class A-
1B continues to be drawn upon, thus increasing the class A-1B
funded balance.

The class A-2 and B notes are currently receiving full interest
payments, all of which are from principal proceeds. Only future
interest payments are expected, not principal.  The class C and D
notes have and will continue to pay in kind, whereby the principal
balances of the notes are written up by the amount of interest
owed due to the coverage test failures.  Fitch does not expect any
future interest or principal payments to the class C and D notes.

Bernoulli is a static hybrid cash and synthetic CDO which closed
in March 2006 and is monitored by Babcock & Brown Securities Pty,
Ltd.  Bernoulli is composed of 35.4% subprime RMBS primarily from
the 2005 vintage, 33.1% SF CDOs mostly from the 2004 and 2005
vintages, 27.2% Alternative-A RMBS from the 2005 and 2006
vintages, and 4.3% prime RMBS primarily from the 2005 vintage.

The rating actions resolve the 'Under Analysis' status issued on
Oct. 14, 2008, following Fitch's announcement of its proposed
criteria revision for analyzing structured finance CDOs.  The
revised criteria report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured
Finance CDOs' was published in its final form on Dec. 16, 2008
along with an updated version of the Fitch Portfolio Credit Model
that includes additional functionality for analyzing SF CDOs.  As
part of this review, Fitch makes standard adjustments for any
names on Rating Watch Negative or with a Negative Outlook,
downgrading such ratings for default analysis purposes by three
and one notches, respectively.

Fitch will continue to monitor and review this transaction for
future rating adjustments.


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Revenue Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 rating on Bexar
County Housing Finance Corporation Multifamily Revenue Refunding
Bonds (American Opportunity for Housing - Cinnamon Creek
Apartments) 2002 A and downgraded the rating on 2002 B to B1 from
Ba3.  The rating affirmation is based upon the financial cushion
debt service coverage provides for 2002 A.  The rating downgrade
for 2002B reflects a very thin coverage for 2002B.  The outlook
remains negative due to recent occupancy declines at the project
and market research which projects occupancy weak occupancy and
rent growth project's submarket.

The 278 unit garden style complex was built in 1974 and is
composed of 58, one and two-story buildings located approximately
twelve miles northwest of downtown San Antonio.  The property is
located near major employer such as South Texas Medical Center,
University of Texas at San Antonio and USAA World Headquarters.

                       Recent Developments

Occupancy at the project in 2008 was weak at 90.6% (monthly
average), which is below the 92.8% average in the Northwest San
Antonio submarket as reported by Torto Wheaton Research.  TWR
forecasts submarket occupancy will remain at or near 92.8% in 2009
and that rents will decline by an average of 0.5%.

Debt service coverage ratios for 2007 were very weak at 0.86x for
2002A and 0.77x for 2002B.  However, the shortfall was offset by
an advance of $319,317 from the American Agape Foundation, an
affiliate of the owner, American Opportunity for Housing.  Debt
service coverage ratios calculated from audited 2008 statements
improved to 1.16x for 2002A and 1.04 for 2002B.  The affirmation
of the Ba2 rating on the 2002A bonds reflects the minimal
financial cushion provided by the 1.16x debt service coverage.  
The B1 rating on the 2002B bonds reflects and extremely thin
cushion.

The last rating action was on January 29, 2008 when Series 2002A
was downgraded to Ba2 and 2002B was downgraded to Ba3.  The
principal methodology used in rating the bonds was "Affordable
Housing Methodology ", which can be found at www.moodys.com in the
Credit Policy & Methodologies directory, in the Ratings
Methodologies subdirectory.  Other methodologies and factors that
may have been considered in the rating process can also be found
in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.

                             Outlook

The outlook on the bonds remains negative.  This reflects
project's minimal financial cushion and Torto Wheaton market
research that indicates weak growth in the submarket.


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Junks Rating on 2001A Bonds from 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded, from B1 to Caa1, the
rating on the Bexar County Housing Finance Corporation (The Waters
at Northern Hills) Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Series 2001A
and has also downgraded the B3 on Series 2001C to Ca.  The rating
downgrade is based upon debt service reserve taps on tranches,
poor operating performance and a $1.2 million tax settlement with
Bexar County.  The outlook remains negative.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.

                   Recent Developments/Results:

On February 1, 2009, the $7,057.19 was drawn from the Series A
debt service reserve fund and $4,720.8 was drawn from the Series C
debt service reserve fund in order to make a scheduled interest
payment.  The project's poor performance is evidenced by audited
2007 financial statements which produce debt service coverage
ratios below 1.0x for both Series A and C and audited 2008
financial statments which produce debt service coverage ratios of
1.0x for Series A and 0.99x for Series C.  Occupancy is weak with
an average monthly rate of 87% in 2008 and 88% in February, 2009.

On December 8, 2008, the project owner signed an agreement for an
installment plan to repay $1,200,953 of back property taxes.  The
agreement required a down payment of $145,000 and a monthly
payment of $13,500 beginning on February 15, 2009.  The payments
are scheduled until February 15, 2010.  The agreement states that
the taxpayer must renew the agreement prior to February 15, 2010
and that any amounts outstanding are due in full if the property
is sold or conveyed.  The Caa1 rating on Series A reflects Moody's
expectation that debt service reserves will continue to be eroded
and ultimately depleted.  The Ca rating on Series C reflects not
only the likelihood of debt service reserve depletion but also the
poor prospects for recovery.

The last rating action was on April 3, 2008 when B1 and B3 ratings
were affirmed.

                             Outlook

The outlook for the bonds is negative due to the expectation that
debt service reserves will be ultimately be depleted.


CABELA'S CREDIT: DBRS Assigns 'BB' to 2009-I Notes Class D
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Bond Rating Service assigned ratings to these classes
issued by Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2009-I:

   -- $425 million Series 2009-I Notes, Class A rated AAA
   -- $40 million Series 2009-I Notes, Class B rated A (high)
   -- $21.25 million Series 2009-I Notes, Class C rated BBB
   -- $13.75 million Series 2009-I Notes, Class D rated BB

This transaction represents the first series issuance from
Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust in 2009 (the Trust).

The ratings reflect the ability of the transaction structure to
withstand significant stresses relative to base case losses, yield
stresses and payment rate stresses as appropriate for the rating
category.


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class D to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust, series 2009-I:

  -- $425,000,000 one-month LIBOR + 2.00% class A asset-backed
     notes 'AAA';

  -- $40,000,000 fixed 8.00% class B asset-backed notes 'A+';

  -- $21,250,000 fixed 10.00% class C asset-backed notes 'BBB+';

  -- $13,750,000 fixed 16.00% class D asset-backed notes 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable for all classes.


CABELA'S CREDIT: S&P Assigns Ratings on $500 Mil. 200-I Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2009-I's
$500 million asset-backed notes series 2009-I.
     
The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 13,
2009.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.
     
The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:
     
  -- The credit support for each class of notes that is sufficient
     to withstand the simultaneous stresses S&P applies to its
     4.0%-6.0% base case net loss rate assumption, 26.0%-30.0% \
     base case payment rate assumption, and 14.0%-16.0% base case
     yield assumption; the purchase rate assumptions ranging from
     0% to 3.0% depending on the rating scenario; the 2.0%
     servicing fee; the stressed excess spread; and the stressed
     note interest rate at each rating category;
     
  -- The credit risk associated with the collateral loan pool's
     quality, based on S&P's economic forecast, the trust
     portfolio performance, the pool statistics, and vintage data;
     
  -- World's Foremost Bank's servicing experience and S&P's
     opinion of the quality and consistency of its account
     origination, underwriting, account management, collections,
     and general operational practices;
     
  -- The timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
     principal by March 16, 2015, the stated maturity date, based
     on stressed cash flow modeling scenarios using assumptions
     commensurate with the respective rating categories; and
     
  -- The series 2009-I notes' underlying transaction mechanics and
     legal structure.
   
                   Preliminary Ratings Assigned

       Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2009-I
   
        Class            Rating             Amount (mil. $)
        -----            ------             ---------------
        A                AAA                         425.00
        B                A                            40.00
        C                BBB                          21.25
        D                BB                           13.75


CAPITALSOURCE 2006-2: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes and downgraded two classes
of notes issued by CapitalSource 2006-2.  Additionally, Fitch has
assigned Rating Outlooks to each tranche.  These rating actions
are effective immediately:

  -- $268,482,370 class A-PT affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $476,721,510 class A-1A affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $147,500,000 class A-1B affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $71,250,000 class B affirmed at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $175,500,000 class C affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $101,250,000 class D downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $56,250,000 class E downgraded to 'B' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative.

The affirmations are the result of the credit support still
available to the class A-PT, A-1A and A-1B notes (collectively
'the class A notes') and the class B and C notes through excess
spread and subordination.  These notes have maintained stable
levels of credit enhancement since inception despite credit
deterioration in the portfolio.  While cumulative charge-offs
amount to approximately $58.8 million, or 3.9% of the closing
portfolio, the class A, B and C notes have maintained credit
enhancement levels in line with their current ratings through
paydowns using primarily excess spread.  Since closing, class A-PT
has received $31.5 million (10.5% of the initial notional amount)
and class A-1A has received $73.3 million (13.3% of the initial
notional amount).

The downgrades are the result of credit deterioration in the
portfolio.  Actual defaults and increased default expectations
associated with lower-rated assets in the collateral pool have
increased the risk profile of the class D and E notes resulting in
the downgrades announced.

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recovery levels, and recovery timing.  The class C, D
and E notes are the most vulnerable to realized recoveries that
fall below historical levels.  Therefore, Fitch assigns a Negative
Outlook to the class C, D and E notes.

CapitalSource 2006-2 is a middle-market cash flow collateralized
loan obligation that closed in September 2006 and is managed by
CapitalSource Finance LLC (the manager).  The transaction has a
three-year revolving period, which was suspended due to charge-
offs in the collateral pool.  The portfolio is comprised of 92%
senior secured loans, 1% senior unsecured loans and 7% junior
secured loans or subordinate debt.  Approximately 20% of the
portfolio is comprised of asset-based loans, which offer added
recovery potential.  The three largest Fitch industry categories
represented in the CapitalSource portfolio are banking & finance
(18.9%), computers & electronic (18.6%) and healthcare (15.4%).

The ratings of the class A notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings of the
class B, C, D and E notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive ultimate and compensating interest payments, as per
the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms two and downgrades three classes of notes
issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust 2006-1 and assigns
Rating Outlooks.  The rating actions are effective immediately:

  -- $100,063,671 class A notes affirmed at 'AAA', Stable Outlook;

  -- $12,636,894 class B notes affirmed at 'AA', Stable Outlook;

  -- $31,592,004 class C notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A',
     Negative Outlook;

  -- $24,371,449 class D notes downgraded to 'B' from 'BBB',
     Negative Outlook;

  -- $14,442,033 class E notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BB'.

The affirmations reflect the increased credit enhancement
available to the class A and B notes.  The rise in credit
enhancement reflects the deleveraging of the transaction through
asset amortization and the application of excess spread via the
principal distributable shortfall feature.  Upon the occurrence of
a defaulted asset, the PDS directs part or all of the excess
interest proceeds otherwise available to the subordinate notes to
pay down the notes pro-rata or sequentially in an amount equal to
the aggregate balance of defaulted assets in the portfolio.  The
class A notes have received approximately $467.1 million (82.4% of
their original amount), and the class B notes have received $14.7
million (53.8% of their original amount) since close.

The downgrades are the result of higher default expectations
related to an increase in lower-rated assets, as well as
concentration risks associated with a small portfolio.  Obligors
considered 'CCC+' or below account for approximately half of the
collateral, which significantly increases Fitch's default
assumptions for the portfolio.  That said, over 63% of the
performing collateral is comprised of asset-based loans, which
offer added recovery potential in the event of a default.

With 33 obligors remaining, the portfolio has become increasingly
concentrated by obligor and industry.  The two largest loans each
account for 15% of the performing collateral.  A default in either
of these loans would greatly impair the credit support of the
subordinate notes of the capital structure.  According to the
trustee report dated March 20, 2009, the top three industries in
the portfolio comprised 68.5% of the performing collateral: 31.8%
in the security/alarm industry, 21.0% in the finance industry, and
15.7% in business products and services.  All of these elements
have increased the risk profile of the class C, D, and E notes.

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recoveries and recovery timing.  Based on Fitch's
analysis, the class C and D notes appear to be the most vulnerable
to realized recoveries that fall below historical levels.  
Therefore, Fitch assigns a Negative Rating Outlook to the class C
and D notes.

CapitalSource 2006-1 is a cash flow middle-market collateralized
loan obligation that closed on April 11, 2006 and is monitored by
CapitalSource LLC.  CapitalSource 2006-1 is secured by a portfolio
of senior secured loans, 63.3% of which are asset-based loans and
36.7% of which are originated on a cash-flow basis.  

The rating of the class A notes addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
well as the stated balance of principal by the legal final
maturity date.  The ratings of the class B, C, D, and E notes
address the likelihood that investors will receive ultimate and
compensating interest payments, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.

Fitch introduced Rating Outlooks for U.S. structured finance in
September 2008 to provide investors with forward-looking analysis
for a structured finance tranche's credit performance.  Fitch's
Rating Outlook indicates the likely direction of any rating change
over a one- to two-year period and may be Positive, Negative,
Stable or, occasionally, Evolving.


CAPITALSOURCE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to five
classes of notes issued by CapitalSource Commercial Loan Trust
2007-1:

  -- $312,349,676 class A downgraded to 'AA' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $11,530,614 class B downgraded to 'A' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $48,428,579 class C downgraded to 'BB' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $27,673,474 class D downgraded to 'B-' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $19,602,044 class E downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BB+'.

The downgrades are the result of credit deterioration in the
portfolio, the increased default expectations due to rise in
lower-rated assets, and concentration risks associated with a
smaller portfolio.  Cumulative charge-offs amount to approximately
$53.6 million, or 6.7% of the closing portfolio.  Obligors
considered 'CCC+' or below account for approximately 22.5% of the
portfolio, which increases Fitch's future default expectations for
the portfolio.  With 46 obligors remaining, the portfolio has
become increasingly concentrated with obligors and industries.  
The five largest loans account for approximately 25% of the
performing collateral.  A default in any of these loans would
greatly impair the credit support of the subordinate notes of the
capital structure.  That said, the transaction has switched to
paying the notes sequentially, using excess spreads to pay down
the most senior notes in addition to principal received from
portfolio amorization.  Since closing, class A has received $273.7
million (46.7% of the initial notional amount).

Future performance of the transaction is dependent upon additional
defaults, recovery levels, and recovery timing.  The class C and D
notes are the most vulnerable to realized recoveries that fall
below historical levels.  Therefore, Fitch assigns a Rating
Outlook Negative to the class C and D notes.  Fitch does not
assign Rating Outlooks to structure finance bonds rated 'CCC' and
below.

CapitalSource is a static middle-market cash flow collateralized
loan obligation that closed in April 2007 and is managed by
CapitalSource Finance LLC (the manager).  The portfolio is
comprised of 77.9% senior secured loans, 5.5% senior unsecured
loans, 6.6% junior secured loans and 10% subordinate debt.
Approximately 16% of the portfolio is comprised of asset-based
loans, which offer added recovery potential.  The three largest
Fitch industry categories represented in the CapitalSource
portfolio are computers & electronic (23%), broadcasting & media
(11.6%), and healthcare (10.9%).

The rating of the class A notes addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest, as
per the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.  The ratings of the
class B, C, D and E notes address the likelihood that investors
will receive ultimate and compensating interest payments, as per
the governing documents, as well as the stated balance of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

Fitch reviewed this transaction in accordance with its updated
criteria 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs' released on
April 30, 2008.  At that time, Fitch noted it would be reviewing
its ratings accordingly to establish consistency for existing and
new transactions.  As part of this review, Fitch makes standard
adjustments for any names on Rating Watch Negative or with a
Negative Outlook, reducing such ratings for default analysis
purposes by two notches and one notch, respectively.


CAPITALSOURCE REAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2006-A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 12 classes of
Notes issued by CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A.  The
rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1A, $69,841,832, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1R, $200,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2A, $495,264,937, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2B, $125,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to A3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $82,875,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Baa3 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $62,400,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Ba2 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $30,225,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to B1 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $30,225,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to B2 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $26,650,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to B3 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $33,150,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Caa1 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $31,200,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $48,320,223, Floating Rate Notes Due 2037,
     downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded all Classes due to deteriorating pool
performance and revised modeling parameters.  Moody's ratings are
based on the current credit quality of the collateral and may not
reflect potential migration as per the legal documentation.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates. In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools. For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated November 29, 2006.


CAPMARK VII: Moody's Junks Ratings on 8 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of one class and
downgraded the ratings of ten classes of Notes issued by Capmark
VII - CRE Ltd.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, $532,823,352, Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2036,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $170,000,000, Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2036,     
     downgraded to Baa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $80,000,000, Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2036,
     downgraded to B2 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $30,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa2 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $7,500,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa3 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $7,500,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa3 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $32,538,055, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $12,516,512, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $10,015,084, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $21,836,771, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, $46,896,981, Floating Rate Deferrable Term Notes Due
     2036, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and K due
to revised modeling parameters.  Moody's ratings are based on the
current credit quality of the collateral and may not reflect
potential migration as per the legal documentation.

The pool contains a 100% concentration in whole loans.  
Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believes
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default (PD)
for non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For
CRE CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability
of default (PD) for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral. The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates. I n addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale report dated August 10, 2006.


CARBON CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Ratings on 4 Classes of 2005-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of three classes
and downgraded the ratings of seven classes of Notes issued by
Carbon Capital II Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.  The rating actions
are:

  - Class A, $73,963,229, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, confirmed     
    at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
    Possible Downgrade

  - Class B, $54,800,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, confirmed
    at Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
    Possible Downgrade

  - Class C, $29,346,381, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, confirmed
    at A1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
    Possible Downgrade

  - Class D, $10,159,552, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded
    to Baa2 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class E, $10,164,649, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded
    to Ba1 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class F, $13,968,896, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded
    to Ba3 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class G, $22,040,497, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded
    to Caa1 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class H, $20,908,839, Floating Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded
    to Caa2 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class I, $31,527,879, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded to
    Caa3 from Ba1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
    Possible Downgrade

  - Class J, $17,224,988, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2038, downgraded to
    Caa3 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
    Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes D, E, F, G, H, I and J due to
deteriorating pool performance and revised modeling parameters.  
Moody's ratings are based on the current credit quality of the
collateral and may not reflect potential migration as per the
legal documentation.

The pool contains a 5.9% concentration in CMBS collateral of which
100% was issued in 2007.  The remaining collateral includes Whole
Loans, Mezzanine Loans and B-Notes.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated May 27, 2008.


CHAMPLAIN CLO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class C-1 and C-2 notes issued by Champlain CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction backed by corporate
loans and managed by Invesco Senior Secured Management Inc., to
'B-' from 'BBB'.  S&P removed the lowered ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The transaction was originated in May
2004.
     
The lowered ratings reflect an increase in defaults and
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying collateral
in the portfolio since the transaction was issued in 2004.  As of
April 5, 2009, Standard & Poor's collateralized debt obligation
assets database indicated that 7.35% ($32.13 million) of the
assets in the underlying portfolio had ratings in the 'CCC' range,
compared with 1.51% ($5.5 million) as of Sept. 5, 2004.  In
addition, over the same time period, the amount of defaulted
assets increased to 6.57% ($26.2 million) from 0.60% ($2.2
million).  The transaction has a structure that adds credit
enhancement via a swap that provides coverage of principal losses,
as well as credit enhancement through overcollateralization.  The
increase in defaults has affected both of these features thereby
reducing the level of credit enhancement available to support the
rated notes.


                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                        Champlain CLO Ltd.

                Rating
                ------
    Class  To             From            Current bal. (mil. $)
    -----  --             ----            ---------------------
    C-1    B-             BBB/Watch Neg                  24.400
    C-2    B-             BBB/Watch Neg                  10.000

                        Ratings Affirmed

                        Champlain CLO Ltd.

          Class        Rating    Current balance (mil. $)
          -----        ------    ------------------------
          A-1          AAA                        295.000
          A-2          AAA                         30.000
          B            A+                          10.700

Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:              Champlain CLO Ltd.
Co-issuer:           Champlain CLO LLC
Collateral manager:  Invesco Senior Secured Management Inc.
Underwriter:         Wachovia Securities Inc.
Indenture trustee:   JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A


CHARITABLE LEADERSHIP: Moody's Retains 'B3' Rating on 2002A Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's is maintaining the B3 rating of the debt of the Charitable
Leadership Foundation (NY) on watchlist for possible downgrade.
The Series 2002A bonds (Center for Medical Science Project) were
issued through the Albany (NY) Industrial Development Agency.  The
rating remains on watchlist for possible downgrade pending Moody's
review of the audited financial statements of Charitable
Leadership Foundation and Center for Medical Science, Inc.  Both
organizations have 12/31/08 fiscal year ends, and Moody's expect
the audits to be available in coming weeks.

The Series 2002A bonds are expected to be repaid from lease
payments made by various tenants leasing space in the bond-
financed biomedical research facility located in the University
Heights district of Albany.  Approximately 55% of the space is
leased by divisions of New York State government, including the
Wadsworth Center, a large NY State department of health
laboratory.  The leases with the State are 10-year leases
(expected to expire in 2013) and are subject to annual
appropriation by the State.

Approximately 45% of the research space is leased by Ordway
Research Institute, a not-for-profit research organization created
by Wadsworth Laboratory of the New York State Department of
Health, Albany Medical Center and Charitable Leadership
Foundation.  ORI has continued to receive significant financial
support from CLF for its operations since its inception
(approximately $8 million of CLF funding in FY 2008).  However,
CLF management reports that it has not provided funding to ORI in
recent months and that ORI is moving toward financial self-
sufficiency.

CMS's management reports that incoming lease payments are expected
to adequately cover the next debt service payment on the Series
2002A bonds (scheduled for July 1, 2009) and that there is no
expectation of tapping the debt service reserve fund near term.  
If lease payments do not adequately cover debt service
requirements, Charitable Leadership Foundation ultimately provides
a guaranty of debt service payments.  The rating remains on
watchlist reflecting Moody's concerns about the precipitous
decline in CLF's levels of cash and publicly traded marketable
securities and the resulting deterioration in the strength of the
Foundation's guaranty agreement.  As of 3/16/2009, CLF reported
$401,800 of cash and marketable securities.

LEGAL SECURITY: Payments under the Installment Sale Agreement are
a general obligation of CMS and the Foundation; debt service
reserve fund; mortgage lien on the leasehold interest in facility
and a security interest in the equipment; pledge and assignment to
the Trustee all right, title, and interest to all Leases.  
Although the expectation is that lease payments from building
tenants will adequately cover debt service, the Foundation also
entered into a Guaranty Agreement with the Trustee.  Under this
agreement, which is unconditional and remains in effect for the
life of the bonds, the Foundation guarantees debt service on the
bonds.

Debt-Related Rate Derivatives: None

                             Outlook

The rating remains on watchlist for further downgrade and Moody's
expect to conclude Moody's review in a 90 day period.  Moody's
will continue to focus on CLF's levels of liquid assets (including
cash and publicly traded securities), the adequacy of lease
payments to cover debt service, the financial health and
independence of Ordway Research Institute, as well as the
Foundation's ability to receive payments on loans receivable and
generate income from private investments near term.

                  What could change the rating-UP

Significant growth of the Foundation's liquid reserves through the
sale of private investments and collection of loans payable
coupled with evidence that Ordway and other tenants can fully
support lease and debt service payments on an ongoing basis
without support from CLF.

                 What could change the rating-DOWN

Failure to successfully liquidate private investments in order to
support ongoing grants and expenses; lease payments inadequately
covering debt service

Key Indicators For Charitable Leadership Foundation:

* Total cash, cash equivalents, and publicly traded equity
  securities as of 3/16/09 (unaudited): $401,800

* Total cash, cash equivalents, and publicly traded equity
  securities as of 12/31/07 (audited): $15.4 million

* Total Net Assets as of 12/31/07: $43.9 million, including $18.6
  million of loans receivable, $2.2 million of notes receivable,
  and * $7.6 million of non-publicly traded investments

* Total debt: $53.3 million as of 12/31/07

Rated Debt:

* Series 2002A Civic Facility Revenue Bonds: B3 on watchlist for
  possible downgrade

The rating on the Series 2002A bonds was assigned by evaluating
factors believed to be relevant to the credit profile of
Charitable Leadership Foundation such as 1) the business risk and
competitive position of the issuer versus others within its
industry or sector, ii) the capital structure and financial risk
of the issuer, iii) the projected performance of the issuer over
the near to intermediate term, iv) the issuer's history of
achieving consistent operating performance and meeting budget or
financial plan goals, v) the nature of the dedicated revenue
stream pledged to the bonds, vi) the debt service coverage
provided by such revenue stream, vii) the legal structure that
documents the revenue stream and the source of payment, and vii)
the issuer's management and governance structure related to
payment.

The last rating action was on December 15, 2008 when Charitable
Leadership Foundation's rating was downgraded to B3 from Ba2 and
placed on watchlist for possible downgrade.


CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Ratings on Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
downgrade these notes issued by Chatham Light CLO, Limited:

  -- Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2017, A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on December
     28, 2008 Downgraded to A2;

  -- Class B Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes Due
     2017, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 28, 2008 Downgraded to Baa2;

  -- Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes
     Due 2017, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 28, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- Class C-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes
     Due 2017, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 28, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect the expected
potential impact of applying certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and
the calculation of the Diversity Score.  In its February 4, 2009
announcement, "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs,"
Moody's stated that it had increased its default probability
assumptions for corporate credits in the collateral pools of CLOs
by a factor of 30% across all rating categories.  In addition,
Moody's stated that assets with negative outlooks or that are on
review for possible downgrade would be treated as if they had
already been downgraded by one or two notches, respectively.  At
the same time, Moody's changed its calculation of the primary
measure of industry and issuer diversification in CLOs (the
Diversity Score) to increase the estimate of correlation in most
pools of corporate credits.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 19
tranches from 2 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by CHL.  The
collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of first-
lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have determined, Moody's assesses available
credit enhancement from subordination, overcollateralization,
excess spread and any external support (mortgage insurance, pool
policy, etc.).  The available enhancement is weighed against
projected future losses to ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-29

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/7/2005
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 1/7/2005
     Assigned Baa2

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB5

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 8-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 8-X, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/3/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 6/19/2008
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/19/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/19/2008
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 6/19/2008
     Downgraded to Ca


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 15 2004-C2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 15 classes and
downgraded three classes of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust
2004-C2,  Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-C2.  

The downgrades are due to increased expected losses for the pool
resulting from higher leverage and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans and concerns about near term refinancing
risk of a portion of the pool.  Four loans, representing 6% of the
pool, mature within the next 12 months.  The action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 5% to
$977.7 million from $1.03 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 105 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 4% of the pool, with the top 10 loans representing
27% of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 17% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Eighteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a $57,000
realized loss.  There are two loans, representing less than 1% of
the pool, currently in special servicing.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate loss of $4 million for the specially serviced loans.
Moody's was provided with partial and full-year 2008 operating
results for 90% of the pool.  Moody's weighted loan to value ratio
is 100% compared to 95% at Moody's prior review in March 2007.  In
addition to an overall decline in credit quality, the pool has
experienced increased LTV dispersion since last review.
Approximately 50% of the pool has an LTV greater than 100%
compared to 33% at last review and 18% of the pool has an LTV
greater than 120% compared to 5% at last review.

The top three non-defeased loans represent 12% of the outstanding
pool balance.  The largest loan is the River Plaza Shopping Center
Loan ($41.5 million - 4.2%), which is secured by a 104,000 square
foot anchored community retail center located in the Bronx, New
York.  The property was 100% occupied as of February 2009 compared
to 95% at last review.  The center is adjacent to Target and is
anchored by Marshall's.  Moody's LTV is 104% compared to 106% at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Nordahl Marketplace Loan ($39.2
million - 4.0%), which is secured by the borrower's interest in a
313,000 square foot retail center located in San Marcos,
California.  The property is shadow anchored by Costco and major
tenants include Wal-Mart and Kohl's.  The center was 99% occupied
as of December 2008, the same as at last review.  Moody's LTV is
96%, the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the California Office Portfolio
($33.0 million -- 3.4%), which is secured by three suburban office
properties located in Orange County, California.  The portfolio
contains 256,000 square feet in eight buildings.  The portfolio
has experienced considerable lease rollover since securitization.
Occupancy was 77% as January 2009 compared to 94% at last review.
Moody's value reflects a stressed cash flow due to Moody's
concerns about upcoming lease expirations.  Moody's LTV is 104%
compared to 100% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $108,195,229, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class A-3, $65,639,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class A-4, $32,298,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class A-5, $440,496,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class A-1A, $125,048,795, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class A-J, $45,084,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class XC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class XP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 3/8/2007

  -- Class B, $34,779,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously affirmed at
     Aa2 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class C, $10,304,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously affirmed at
     Aa3 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class D, $18,034,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class E, $12,881,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class F, $12,881,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class G, $10,305,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed
     at Baa2 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class H, $14,169,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed
     at Baa3 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class J, $6,441,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1; previously
     affirmed at Ba1 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class K, $6,441,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 3/8/2007

  -- Class L, $5,152,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 3/8/2007


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 54 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 54
tranches from 4 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust.  The collateral backing these transactions
consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A
residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Tr Series 2004-NCM1

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIIA-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIIA-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     B2

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Tr Series 2004-NCM2

  -- Cl. IA-CB1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-CB-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-CB-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-CB-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIIA-CB-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIIA-CB-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IVA-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IVA-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. XS-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     B2

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2003-UP2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 8/13/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 8/13/2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on 8/13/2003 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 8/13/2003 Assigned
     B2

Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. III-A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/20/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/20/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-PO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/20/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-XS, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 6/20/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-B1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 6/20/2005
     Assigned Aa2



CITY OF HOUSTON: Fitch Affirms 2001 Airport Revenue Bonds at 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the 'B-' rating to the city of Houston,
Texas's $323 million airport system special facilities revenue
bonds (Continental Airlines Inc. Terminal E Project) series 2001.  
The Rating Outlook on the special facilities bonds is Stable.  The
series 2001 bonds are fixed-rate revenue bonds with a final
maturity in 2029.

The rating reflects the underlying financial strength of
Continental Airlines, Inc. who currently has an Issuer Default
Rating of 'B-'.  The Continental Terminal E Project bonds financed
the construction and development of Terminal E at George Bush
Intercontinental Airport, which Continental uses as an
international connection hub and Latin American gateway.  Special
facilities rent paid by Continental secures the Continental
Terminal E Project bonds and bondholders have no access to
liquidity or structural enhancements to avoid default if
Continental fails to provide timely debt service payments.  
Terminal E opened in January 2005.

Intercontinental serves as the primary commercial airport for the
metropolitan area and Houston-based Continental operates its
largest hub at the airport, accounting for 87% of enplaned
passengers in fiscal 2008.  Terminal E is a 600,000 square-foot
facility with 23 gates that can handle both domestic and
international passenger traffic.  The terminal is an essential
facility for Continental's growing international operations as
Intercontinental's international traffic exceeded 4 million
enplanements in 2008, rising by 23% since 2004.  Even with
deepening traffic declines and service cutbacks across the
aviation industry, international traffic at Intercontinental grew
by 3.1% over the course of calendar year 2008 while overall
enplanements at this airport fell by 3% over the same period the
prior year.

The IDR for Continental reflects the airline's high lease-adjusted
leverage, weak and volatile cash flow, as well as the airline
industry's ongoing vulnerability to air travel demand and fuel
price shocks.  The Stable Outlook captures the fact that the
dramatic pull-back in jet fuel prices since mid-summer of 2008 has
put Continental in a position to deliver somewhat better free cash
flow generation in 2009 even in a stressed demand environment.
Factoring in significant pressure on passenger unit revenue
comparisons through all of 2009, Continental is still in a
position to maintain liquidity at or above current levels while
meeting significant fixed financing obligations.  Unrestricted
cash balances, while pressured as a result of weak operating cash
flow in 2008, remain adequate in light of the high degree of
revenue uncertainty that Continental and its principal airline
competitors face as they operate in a period of extreme
macroeconomic stress and credit market tightness.

Continental's cash obligations for 2009 are significant but
manageable in comparison to March 31 unrestricted liquidity of
$2.65 billion.  Scheduled debt maturities for the remainder of
2009 total $442 million, and Continental now expects to make cash
pension contributions of approximately $75 million over the rest
of 2009.  Given the maturity and pension funding profile for 2009,
the need for incremental access to debt capital markets (beyond
committed aircraft financing) appears limited.  However, looking
ahead to 2010 and 2011, heavy scheduled debt maturities will
likely force Continental to access the credit markets if
unrestricted cash balances are to be maintained above critical
levels (in the $1.5 billion to $2 billion range).  Scheduled debt
maturities for 2010 total $770 million, and $1.1 billion in debt
comes due in 2011.  An easing of credit market tightness over the
next few quarters therefore seems necessary if Continental is to
avoid the need to push aircraft capital commitments out further
beyond 2009.


CITY OF NEW ORLEANS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Sewer Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 rating and changed
the outlook to stable from positive on the City of New Orleans'
Sewerage and Water Board's water system affecting $40 million in
outstanding revenue debt.  Debt is secured by net revenues of the
water system.  The rating was lowered to Ba2 in November of 2005
following Hurricane Katrina. The confirmation of the Ba2 rating
reflects debt service coverage that has been met solely by State
aid as the net revenues of the system have been insufficient.  The
change in the outlook to stable from positive reflects Moody's
belief that additional time is needed for the system's financial
operations to become structurally balanced.  The rating and
outlook take into consideration measures being taken by the Board
to increase revenues and contain expenditures.  The rating also
continues to incorporate the debt management by the Board of
Liquidation which maintains reserves equal to annual debt service
on behalf of the Board.

        Long Term Debt Issued Through Board Of Liquidation

All long term debt issued by the S&W Board has been issued through
the Board of Liquidation.  Moody's believes the Board of
Liquidation provides additional bondholder protection given its
authority to raise rates and its autonomy as an independent Board.
The S&W Board is mandated by statute to increase rates necessary
to produce 1.30 times debt service coverage from net revenues.  
Should the S&W Board not implement such rates, the Board of
Liquidation has the authority to compel it to do so.  The S&W
Board makes monthly transfers to the Board of Liquidation, in the
amount of 1/12th of the annual debt service requirement, in order
to fund the debt service account.

The Board of Liquidation, on behalf of the sewerage and water
board, maintains reserves able to meet an annual debt service
requirement.  Moody's notes that the reserves have not been
utilized, even after the storm, as State assistance was available
to meet debt service needs.

             Expenditures Continue To Exceed Revenues

Although revenues of the system appear to be recovering,
expenditures are exceeding thereby resulting in insufficient net
revenues to meet debt service.  After the devastation from
Hurricane Katrina, management adopted a very conservative budget
for fiscal 2006 assuming only 30% of prior year revenues would be
collected.  However, actual results were better than anticipated
and the $33.8 million in water service charges exceeded the budget
by 99%.  Currently, revenues are equal to 70% of pre-storm levels
but expenditures are 116% of pre-storm levels.  Part of the
increase in expenditures is the result of the system's booking of
post-employment benefits of approximately $6 million.

The customer count seems to stabilizing which should help with
forecasting for future operations.  Before the hurricane, sewer
system customers totaled 140,502; however, the customer count has
since fluctuated decreasing by 23% to a low of 108,697 in 2005 and
increasing 14% to 124,027 in 2006.  Officials report that the
increase in 2006 was the result of several homeowners having two
connections with one for the primary residence and the second for
a temporary trailer.  Customers decreased 8% in 2007 as trailers
hookups were disconnected when homes became livable again.  For
2008, the customer count of 114,513 was a 1% increase over 2007.  
Projections are that customer growth will increase approximately
1% annually for the next five years according to a study that was
conducted by Black and Veatch in November of 2007.

              Substantial Federal And State Funding

The Board has received significant funding from State and Federal
sources in fiscal years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.  FEMA is
reimbursing the Board for infrastructure improvements that are
necessary as a result of storm damage.  To-date, the Board has
received approximately $184 million in reimbursements.  The Board
also received $61.9 million from the Federal Community Disaster
Loan program and this entire amount has been drawn down since
April of 2007.  Moody's is waiting to see the results of proposed
legislation which would allow the government to forgive this loan.  
Although the Board is prepared to repay the CDL loan, forgiveness
of the loan would afford them some financial flexibility in the
future. The State provided $73 million in Gulf Opportunity (GO)
Zone funding to support debt service requirements for the water
and sewer systems.  The State has also established a $100 million
revolving fund for the Board to use to get capital projects
started; the Board has to spend money before filing for
reimbursement by FEMA.

Debt Service Not Covered Despite Significant Water Rate Increases

Net revenues of the water system have not provided debt service
coverage demonstrating insufficient revenues.  Coverage from net
revenues was negative 3.38 times in 2005, negative 1.48 times in
2006 and negative 4.88 times in 2007.  These coverage levels
reflect total debt service due despite the fact that CDL funding
was used to help make debt service payments during those years;
therefore, including the CDL funding annual debt service was
covered.  The annual debt service payment approximates $3.8
million annually.

                Management Tightening Expenditures;
                Challenges Remain For The Long-Term

Management at the utility is has demonstrated some prudent fiscal
practices.  For example, interim financial statements and a three-
month proforma are prepared and presented to the Board on a
monthly basis.  Officials are currently tightening expenditures
with hiring freezes, eliminating discretionary spending, revising
the take home vehicle policy and reducing overtime.  Moody's
believes management will continue to strive to achieve balanced
operations between revenues and expenditures in the water system
and this is reflected in the rating and stable outlook.  Future
rating reviews will incorporate year end financial results which
could place either positive or negative pressure on the rating.

                           Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's belief that rate increases and
expenditure cuts could allow the water system to become balanced
in the medium term.

The last rating action on the City of New Orleans Water System was
on December 28, 2007 when the Ba2 rating was affirmed and the
outlook changed to positive from negative.


CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 34 Notes Class II-B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Bond Rating Service assigned ratings to the Class I Swaps
and Class II Notes issued by Claris IV Limited - Series 34:

  -- $144 million Class I-A Swap, Series 34 at AA (low)
  -- $9 million Class I-B Swap, Series 34 at A (low)
  -- $17 million Class I-C Swap, Series 34 at BBB
  -- $7 million Class II-A Notes, Series 34 at BBB (low)
  -- $23 million Class II-B Notes, Series 34 at BB (low)

The obligations are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities.  The ratings of the
Class I-A Swaps, Class I-B Swaps and Class I-C Swaps only address
the probability of these classes breaching their respective
attachment points as defined in transaction documents at or prior
to their maturity dates.  The ratings of the Class II-A Notes and
Class II-B Notes address the timely payments of interest and
ultimate payments of principal at their maturity dates.

The ratings reflect:

  (1) The integrity of the transaction structure.

  (2) DBRS's assessment of portfolio quality.

  (3) Adequate credit enhancement of the notes and swaps to
      withstand projected collateral loss rates under various cash
      flow stress scenarios.


CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 35 Notes Class II-B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned ratings to the Class I Swaps and Class II Notes
issued by Claris IV Limited - Series 35:

  -- $72.5 million Class I-A Swap, Series 35 at AA (low)
  -- $8.5 million Class I-B Swap, Series 35 at A (low)
  -- $15 million Class I-C Swap, Series 35 at BBB
  -- $8 million Class II-A Notes, Series 35 at BBB (low)
  -- $31 million Class II-B Notes, Series 35 at BB (low)

The obligations are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities.  The ratings of the
Class I-A Swaps, Class I-B Swaps and Class I-C Swaps only address
the probability of these classes breaching their respective
attachment points as defined in transaction documents at or prior
to their maturity dates.  The ratings of the Class II-A Notes and
Class II-B Notes address the timely payments of interest and
ultimate payments of principal at their maturity dates.

The ratings reflect:

   (1) The integrity of the transaction structure.

   (2) DBRS's assessment of portfolio quality.

   (3) Adequate credit enhancement of the notes and swaps to
       withstand projected collateral loss rates under various
       cash flow stress scenarios.


CLARIS IV: DBRS Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 36 Notes Class II-B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Bond Rating Service assigned ratings to the Class I Swaps
and Class II Notes issued by Claris IV Limited - Series 36:

  -- $215 million Class I-A Swap, Series 36 at AA (low)
  -- $22.5 million Class I-B Swap, Series 36 at A (low)
  -- $37.5 million Class I-C Swap, Series 36 at BBB
  -- $15 million Class II-A Notes, Series 36 at BBB (low)
  -- $40 million Class II-B Notes, Series 36 at BB (low)

The obligations are collateralized primarily by a portfolio of
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities.  The ratings of the
Class I-A Swaps, Class I-B Swaps and Class I-C Swaps only address
the probability of these classes breaching their respective
attachment points as defined in transaction documents at or prior
to their maturity dates.  The ratings of the Class II-A Notes and
Class II-B Notes address the timely payments of interest and
ultimate payments of principal at their maturity dates.

The ratings reflect:

(1) The integrity of the transaction structure.

(2) DBRS's assessment of portfolio quality.

(3) Adequate credit enhancement of the notes and swaps to
    withstand projected collateral loss rates under various cash
    flow stress scenarios.


COAST INVESTMENT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded ratings of five classes of
notes issued by Coast Investment Grade 2002-1, Limited, and left
on review for possible further downgrade the rating of two of
these classes.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- $246,900,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to A3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Caa1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to Ba3 and
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $26,600,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $3,400,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due
     2017, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- $6,800,000 Class D Fixed Rate Senior Secured Notes, Due 2017,
     Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Downgraded to Caa3
     and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio, as well as the occurrence on
April 1, 2009, as reported by the Trustee, of an event of default
described in Section 5.1(d) of the Indenture dated May 2, 2002.

Recent ratings downgrades on the underlying portfolio caused
ratings-based haircuts to affect the calculation of
overcollateralization.  Thus, the Class A Overcollateralization
Ratio failed to meet the required level, as required in Section
5.1(d) of the Indenture.

As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain holders of Notes
may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take particular actions
with respect to the Collateral and the Notes.

Because of this uncertainty, the ratings assigned to the Class A
Notes and Class B Notes remain on review for possible further
action.

Coast Investment Grade 2002-2, Limited is a collateralized debt
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of collateralized debt
obligations.

The rating downgrades taken reflect the increased expected loss
associated with each tranche.  Losses are attributed to diminished
credit quality on the underlying portfolio.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different, however, depending on
the timing and outcome of a liquidation.  In addition, Moody's
explained that the rating actions listed reflect certain updates
and projections and recent rating actions on underlying assets
that consist primarily of CLOs.

Moody's announced revisions and updates to certain key
assumptions, including Default Probability and Diversity Score,
that it uses to rate and monitor collateralized loan obligations
in a Press Release published on February 4, 2009.  According to
the press release, Moody's expects that the revised assumptions
will have a significant impact on mezzanine and junior CLO
tranches, resulting in a downgrade of their ratings by three to
six notches on average.  On March 4, 2009, Moody's placed all but
the senior-most CLO tranches on review for downgrade.

In addition, Moody's explained that the rating actions taken
incorporate the application of revised and updated key modeling
parameter assumptions that Moody's uses to rate and monitor
ratings of SF CDOs.  The revisions affect the three key parameters
in Moody's model for rating SF CDOs: asset correlation, default
probability and recovery rate.  Moody's announced the changes to
these assumptions in a press release published on December 11,
2008.


COMM 2004-LNB3: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed 12 classes of COMM 2004-LNB3, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from higher leverage and
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  
The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 10, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 11%
to $1.19 billion from $1.33 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 92 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top 10 non-defeased
loans representing 52% of the pool.  The pool includes four loans,
representing 27% of the pool, with investment grade underlying
ratings.  Fourteen loans, representing 22% of the current
outstanding pool balance, have defeased and are collateralized by
U.S. Government securities.

Fifteen loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a
$12.7 million loss.  There is currently one loan, representing
less than 1% of the pool, in special servicing.  Moody's is
estimating a $2.5 million loss from this loan.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and 2008 operating
results for 95% and 55% of the conduit pool, respectively.  
Moody's loan to value ratio for the conduit component is 98%
compared to 94% at Moody's prior full review in October 2008.   
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Garden State
Plaza Loan ($130.0 million -- 10.9%), which represents a 25% pari-
passu interest in a first mortgage loan, that is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 2.0 million square foot super-regional
mall located in Paramus, New Jersey.  The mall is anchored by
Macy's, Nordstrom, J.C. Penney, Neiman Marcus and Lord & Taylor.
The in-line space was 96% leased as of July 2008.  In 2007, a
149,000 square foot expansion was completed consisting of a 99,000
square foot cinema complex and 35,000 square feet of new in-line
mall shop space.  The loan is interest only for its entire 10-year
term.  The loan sponsors are Westfield America Inc. and affiliates
of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd.  Moody's current underlying
rating is A1, the same as at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the 731 Lexington
Avenue Loan ($113.4 million -- 9.5%), which represents a 40% pari-
passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
694,000 square foot office condominium which is part of a 1.4
million square foot complex located in midtown Manhattan.  The
condominium is 100% leased to Bloomberg, LP through March 2028.  
The loan sponsor is Vornado Realty Trust.  Moody's current
underlying rating is A3, the same as at last review.

The third loan with an underlying rating is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($59.7 million -- 5.0%), which represents an 18% pari-
passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 2.0 million square foot regional mall
located in McLean, Virginia.  The mall is anchored by
Bloomingdales, Macy's, Nordstrom and Lord & Taylor. Performance
has been stable.  Moody's current underlying rating is Aaa, the
same as at last review.

The fourth loan with an underlying rating is the AFR Portfolio
Loan ($13.1 million -- 1.1%), which represents a 6% pari-passu
interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 125
office, operation centers and retail bank branches located in 17
states.  At securitization, the loan was secured by 152 properties
totaling 7.7 million square feet, however eight properties have
been released from the pool and 19 properties defeased.  Due to
property releases, defeasance, and loan amortization, the loan
amount has decreased by approximately 34% since securitization.  
The loan sponsors are American Financial Realty Trust and First
States Group LP. Moody's current underlying rating is A1, the same
as at last review.

At securitization, the DDR Portfolio Loan ($75.0 million -- 6.3%)
had an investment grade underlying rating.  The loan represents a
43% pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan that is secured
by a portfolio of 19 retail properties totaling 2.7 million square
feet located in New York, Pennsylvania, Arizona, North Carolina
and Tennessee.  Since securitization, two properties have been
released.  Moody's value reflects a stressed cash flow because of
Moody's concerns about retail tenant bankruptcies and the weak
retail environment. In addition, Moody's is concerned about the
borrower's ability to pay off the loan at maturity in June 2008.  
This loan no longer has an investment grade underlying rating.  
Moody's LTV is 77% compared to 72% at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 11.4% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the Centreville Square Loan
($58.6 million -- 4.9%), which is secured by a 312,000 square foot
grocery store anchored retail center located in Centreville,
Virginia.  The center was 89% occupied as of December 2008
compared to 95% at last review.  The increase in vacancy is due to
Legacy Furniture vacating prior to its lease expiration. Moody's
LTV is 91% compared to 90% at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 3 Beaver Valley Loan ($39.9
million -- 3.3%), which is secured by a 263,000 square foot office
building located in suburban Wilmington, Delaware.  The property
is 100% occupied by American International Insurance Company
(senior unsecured rating of parent company, American International
Group, A3 -- negative outlook) through January 2015.  The lease
expiration is coterminous with the loan maturity and therefore the
property will be exposed to significant rollover risk at loan
maturity.  Moody's LTV is 93% compared to 90% at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Stonegate Oklahoma Loan
($37.3 million -- 3.1%), which is secured by two suburban office
buildings located in Birmingham, Alabama and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.  The two buildings total 476,000 square feet and are
100% occupied.  The building in Birmingham (184,410 square feet)
is 100% occupied by Vulcan Materials Company (senior unsecured
rating Baa2 -- negative outlook).  Vulcan was downgraded from A3
to Baa2 on November 13, 2008.  Although the property performance
has been stable since last review, Moody's value reflects a
decline in tenant credit quality.  Moody's LTV is 96% compared to
92% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $75,473,114, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class A-3, $104,606,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class A-4, $114,956,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class A-5, $502,796,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class A-1A, $203,527,085, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 10/29/2008

  -- Class B, $40,063,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class C, $16,692,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously upgraded to
     Aa2 from Aa3 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class D, $28,378,000, affirmed at A2; previously affirmed at
     A2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class E, $25,039,000, affirmed at A3; previously affirmed at
     A3 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class F, $15,023,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously affirmed
     at Baa1 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class G, $13,354,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously affirmed
     at Baa2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class H, $11,685,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3; previously
     affirmed at Baa3 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class J, $11,685,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1; previously
     affirmed at Ba1 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class K, $6,677,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class L, $3,339,000, downgraded to B3 from B1; previously
     downgraded to B1 from Ba3 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class M, $5,008,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
     downgraded to B2 from B1 on 10/29/2008

  -- Class N, $5,007,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1; previously
     downgraded to Caa1 from B2 on 10/29/08

  -- Class O, $5,008,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa2; previously
     downgraded to Caa2 from B3 on 10/29/08


CORPORATE BACKED: S&P Downgrades Rating on $25 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Corporate
Backed Trust Certificates Ford Motor Co. Note-Backed Series 2003-6
Trust's $25 million class A-1 certificates to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.45% global landmark securities due
July 16, 2031, to 'D' from 'C'.      

The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on Ford
Motor Co.'s global landmark securities.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $55,000,000
7.00% Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates and $55,000,000
Notional Amount 0.625% I/O Certificates issued by Corporate Backed
Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney Debenture-Backed Series
2007-1 Trust.

The rating actions are:

Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney
Debenture-Backed Series 2007-1 Trust

  -- $55,000,000 7.00% Corporate Backed Callable Trust
     Certificates Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/12/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

  -- $55,000,000 Notional Amount 0.625% I/O Certificates
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/12/2009 Baa3 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Securities.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of J.C. Penney Corporation,
Inc. 7.625% Debentures due March 1, 2097, which were downgraded to
Ba1 from Baa3 on watch for downgrade on April 1, 2009.


CORPORATE BACKED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $27.5MM Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $27,500,000
7.00% Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates and $27,500,000
Notional Amount 0.625% I/O Certificates issued by Corporate Backed
Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney Debenture-Backed Series
2006-1 Trust.

The rating actions are:

Corporate Backed Callable Trust Certificates J.C. Penney
Debenture-Backed Series 2006-1 Trust

  -- $27,500,000 7.00% Corporate Backed Callable Trust
     Certificates Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/12/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

  -- $27,500,000 Notional Amount 0.625% I/O Certificates
     Downgraded to Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/12/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security. The rating actions are a result
of the change of the rating of J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc.
7.625% Debentures due March 1, 2097, which was downgraded to Ba1
from Baa3 on watch for downgrade on April 1, 2009.


CORPORATE BACKED: S&P Corrects Rating on $73.991 Mil. Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on the
Corporate Backed Trust Certificates American General Institutional
Capital A Series 2002-17's $73.991 million class A-1 and A-2
certificates by affirming the 'B' rating on both classes and
removing them from CreditWatch with negative implications, where
they were placed on Sept. 22, 2008.
     
The ratings on the CBTC certificates are dependent on the rating
on American General Institutional's $500 million 7.57% capital
securities series A ('B').
     
The rating actions follow the March 2, 2009, affirmation of the
rating on American General Institutional's $500 million 7.57%
capital securities series A, and its removal from CreditWatch
negative.   


CORTS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on $219 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on CorTS
Trust II For Ford Notes' $219 million series 2003-3 trust
certificates to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.45% global landmark securities due
July 16, 2031, to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating on the trust certificates is dependent on the rating on
Ford Motor Co.'s global landmark securities.


CORTS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $300 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on CorTS
Trust For Ford Debentures' $300 million certificates to 'D' from
'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.4% debentures due Nov. 1, 2046, to
'D' from 'C'.      

The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on Ford
Motor Co.'s debentures.


COUNTRYWIDE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 49 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 49
tranches from 6 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Countrywide.  
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination, over
collateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Alternative Loan Trust 2002-12

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/6/2006 Upgraded
     to A2

Alternative Loan Trust 2003-J11

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-X, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/26/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-2CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa
     
  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/25/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 3/31/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-5CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/14/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/14/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/14/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/14/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-6CB

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/1/2007
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/1/2007 Downgraded
     to B3


CRAFT 2007-1: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed under review for possible
downgrade these notes issued by CRAFT 2007-1, Ltd.:

  -- $20,000,000 Class D Deferrable Credit Linked Notes due 2017,
     Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously
     on February 12, 2007 Assigned Baa2;

  -- $16,000,000 Class E Deferrable Credit Linked Notes due 2017,
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
     February 12, 2007 Assigned Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect the expected
potential impact of applying certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and
the calculation of the Diversity Score.  In its February 4, 2009
announcement, "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs,"
Moody's stated that it had increased its default probability
assumptions for corporate credits in the collateral pools of CLOs
by a factor of 30% across all rating categories.  In addition,
Moody's stated that assets with negative outlooks or that are on
review for possible downgrade would be treated as if they had
already been downgraded by one or two notches, respectively.  At
the same time, Moody's changed its calculation of the primary
measure of industry and issuer diversification in CLOs (the
Diversity Score) to increase the estimate of correlation in most
pools of corporate credits.


CRAFT CLO: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Rating on 2004-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed under review for possible
downgrade these notes issued by CRAFT CLO 2004-2, Ltd.:

  -- Class C, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on July 22, 2004 Assigned Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect the expected
potential impact of applying certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and
the calculation of the Diversity Score.  In its February 4, 2009
announcement, Moody's stated that it had increased its default
probability assumptions for corporate credits in the collateral
pools of CLOs by a factor of 30% across all rating categories.  In
addition, Moody's stated that assets with negative outlooks or
that are on review for possible downgrade would be treated as if
they had already been downgraded by one or two notches,
respectively.  At the same time, Moody's changed its calculation
of the primary measure of industry and issuer diversification in
CLOs (the Diversity Score) to increase the estimate of correlation
in most pools of corporate credits.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-CND1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded eight pooled classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CND1.  The downgrades are
due to interest shortfalls in the amount of $362,827 reflected in
the March 16, 2009 remittance statement and the expected
accumulation of additional interest shortfalls.  The interest
shortfalls, which affect all eight outstanding classes, are due to
the special servicer's termination of advancing for interest and
property protection on the Hotel 71 Loan.  The Hotel 71 Loan (45%
of the pool balance) became REO in July 2008 and recent attempts
by the special servicer to sell the property have been
unsuccessful.

Moody's rating action is:

  - Class A-2, $77,488,045, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously
    downgraded to A1 from Aaa on 3/11/2009

  - Class A-X-1, Notional, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously
    downgraded to A1 from Aaa on 3/11/2009

  - Class AX-3, Notional, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously
    downgraded to A1 from Aaa on 3/11/2009

  - Class A-Y, Notional, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously
    downgraded to A1 from Aaa on 3/11/2009

  - Class B, $16,000,000, downgraded to C from Baa1; previously
    downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3 on 3/11/2009

  - Class C, $15,000,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
    downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on 3/11/2009

  - Class D, $22,000,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
    downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1 on 3/11/2009

  - Class E, $4,825,229, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
    downgraded to Ca from Ba2 on 3/11/2009


DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Cuts Ratings on $30 Mil. Notes to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed one class
of notes issued by Diversified Asset Securitization Holdings III,
L.P/Corp.:

  -- $65,206,387 class A-1L notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'AA',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $21,229,987 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'AA',
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $30,000,000 class A-3L notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC'
     DR3;

  -- $25,177,210 class B-1L notes affirmed at 'C'.

Additionally, Fitch has removed classes A-1L and A-2 from Rating
Watch Negative, and has removed the Distressed Recovery ratings
from classes A-3L and B-1L.

The class A-1L and class A-2 notes were assigned Negative Outlooks
due to the high concentration of residential mortgage-backed
securities in the portfolio that are expected to continue to face
negative pressure until the housing market stabilizes.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or below.

These rating actions are a result of negative credit migration in
the underlying portfolio and incorporate Fitch's recently adjusted
default and recovery rate assumptions for analyzing structured
finance collateralized debt obligations.

The credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated since the
last review in August 2007.  The Fitch weighted average rating
factor has decreased to the 'B/B-' category from the 'BBB+/BBB'
category at last review.  Approximately 43.3% of the portfolio is
rated below investment grade and 36.9% of the portfolio is rated
'CCC' and lower.

The class A-1L and A-2 notes pay pro-rata except for principal
distributions during normal amortization.  All principal proceeds
along with remaining interest proceeds after the class A-3L
interest is paid are being used to pay down the class A-1L and
class A-2 notes due to the failure of the class A
overcollateralization test with a ratio of 88.8%, falling short of
its covenant of 105.0%.  The class A-1L and A-2 notes have paid
off 69.7% since closing and 32.6% since the last review.  The
class A-3 notes are downgraded to 'CC' as they continue to receive
interest payments but any principal repayment is not anticipated.  
The class B-1L notes are downgraded to 'C' as they are deferring
interest and Fitch does not expect future interest or principal
payments to be made to the notes.

DASH III is a CDO that closed June 28, 2001.  The portfolio was
originally selected by Asset Allocation & Management, LLC and
management changed in October 2002 to TCW Asset Management Co. The
reinvestment period ended in June 2005 and TCW continues to
monitor the portfolio.  The portfolio is primarily comprised of
commercial mortgage-backed securities (29.5%), subprime RMBS
(21.4%), commercial asset backed securities (19.1%), prime RMBS
(14.1%), manufactured housing RMBS (13.2%), and real-estate
investment trusts (2.7%).

The rating actions resolve the 'Under Analysis' status issued on
Oct. 14, 2008, following Fitch's announcement of its proposed
criteria revision for analyzing structured finance CDOs.  The
revised criteria report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured
Finance CDOs' was published in its final form on Dec. 16, 2008
along with an updated version of the Fitch Portfolio Credit Model
that includes additional functionality for analyzing SF CDOs.  As
part of this review, Fitch makes standard adjustments for any
names on Rating Watch Negative or with a Negative Outlook,
downgrading such ratings for default analysis purposes by three
and one notches, respectively.


  -- $26.7 million class C 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class D 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $20.7 million class E 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $7.4 million class F 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch also affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $216.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class IO at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $23.7 million class G at 'CC/RR3;
  -- $20.7 million class H at 'C/RR6'.

The long-term rating of the $2.4 million class J has been lowered
to 'D/RR6' due to already incurred realized losses.  Class K has
been reduced to zero due to realized losses, and class A-1 has
paid in full.  The Distressed Recovery Rating on the classes of
notes has been revised to RR to reflect Fitch's updated Rating
Definitions Criteria released March 3, 2009.

The Rating Watch Negative placements are due to future anticipated
interest shortfalls on classes B through F.  The master servicer
has declared previous advances on a specially serviced loan non-
recoverable.  It is anticipated that these advances will be
recouped from the trust in June 2009 and will impact classes B
through F.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any rating changes over the next one to two years.

The advances deemed non-recoverable were due to a specially
serviced loan (1.7%) where the asset was disposed after the loan
became real estate-owned.  There has been ongoing litigation
between the trust and the former borrower due to the borrower's
bankruptcy filing and a dispute regarding the asset's sale
proceeds.  A favorable settlement to the trust has been reached;
however, the timing and the amount of proceeds that will be
applied to the trust are unknown at this time.  The master
servicer is electing to recoup the advances before the majority of
loans in the trust mature in 2009.

Currently, there are two other assets (8.3%) in special servicing.  
The largest asset is an office building (4.2%) in Dallas, TX, that
lost its sole tenant.  As of January 2009, the building was 11%
occupied. The debt service payments are currently being made by
reserves.

The next largest specially serviced asset has been real-estate
owned since 2005 and is listed for sale.  he property is an office
building (4.1%) in Irving, TX, that is currently 60% occupied.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the transaction balance
has been reduced by 39.2% to $360.0 million from $592.5 million at
issuance.  In total, 23 loans (31%) have defeased, including three
(11.6%) of the top 10 loans in the pool.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-CF1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Rating Outlooks to DLJ
Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2000-CF1:

  -- $8.9 million class B-7 to 'B-' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class B-8 to 'CCC/RR3' from 'B-'.

Fitch also affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks:

  -- $509.1 million class A-1B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class S at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $44.3 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $37.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.3 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $31 million class B-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.1 million class B-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $31 million class B-3 at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class B-4 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.2 million class B-5 at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.6 million class B-6 at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

Class A-1A has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $4.7 million
class C certificates.  Class D has been reduced to zero due to
realized losses.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's loss expectations on four
of the six loans (3.1%) transferred to special servicing since the
prior review. Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any
rating changes over the next one to two years.  As of the March
2009 distribution date, the pool's aggregate certificate balance
has decreased 19% to $717.6 million from $886.2 million at
issuance.  Forty-seven loans (54.8%) have defeased.

There are currently 17 Fitch Loans of Concern (9%), including the
six loans in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan (1.1%) is a hotel property in Clinton, NJ.  The loan is 60
days delinquent.  The servicer-reported debt service coverage
ratio and occupancy as of September 2008 were -0.30 times (x) and
48%, respectively.  The borrower has indicated that they do not
have sufficient income to operate the property.

The second largest specially loan (0.6%) is a multifamily property
in Colorado Springs, CO.  The loan, which is current, was
transferred to the special servicer in February 2009 for imminent
default.  The special servicer has reported that cash flow and
occupancy have decreased.  The fourth largest specially serviced
loan (0.3%) has the same sponsor and was transferred in February
2009 as well.

Of the non-defeased loans, approximately 36% have a maturity or
anticipated repayment dates in the next 12 months.  The weighted
average debt service coverage ratio and interest rate for these
loans were 1.2x and 8.5%, respectively.


DRYDEN VI-LEVERAGED: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Various 2004 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
downgrade these notes issued by Dryden VI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004
Inc.:

  -- A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2016, A2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on December 17,
     2008 Downgraded to A2;

  -- B-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes Due      
     2016, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- B-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes Due 2016,
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously
     on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes Due
     2016, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate Notes Due 2016,
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
     December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- Q-1 Securities Due 2016, Baa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on December 17, 2008
     Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- Q-2 Securities Due 2016, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on December 17, 2008 Downgraded to Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions reflect the expected
potential impact of applying certain revised assumptions with
respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and
the calculation of the Diversity Score.  In its February 4, 2009
announcement, "Moody's updates key assumptions for rating CLOs,"
Moody's stated that it had increased its default probability
assumptions for corporate credits in the collateral pools of CLOs
by a factor of 30% across all rating categories.  In addition,
Moody's stated that assets with negative outlooks or that are on
review for possible downgrade would be treated as if they had
already been downgraded by one or two notches, respectively.  At
the same time, Moody's changed its calculation of the primary
measure of industry and issuer diversification in CLOs (the
Diversity Score) to increase the estimate of correlation in most
pools of corporate credits.


EATON VANCE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Medium Term Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these negative rating actions
on the medium term notes issued by Eaton Vance Variable Leverage
Fund Ltd.:

Medium-Term Notes Program (US$ 26,012,801 currently outstanding)

  -- Current Long-Term Rating: Ca
  -- Prior Long-Term Rating: Caa3, on review for downgrade
  -- Prior Rating Date: October 17, 2008

EVVLF is a structured investment vehicle that invested primarily
in the leveraged bank loan market where the obligors are typically
corporations with non-investment grade ratings.  EVVLF is managed
by Eaton Vance Management. EVVLF has been in Enforcement since
October 14, 2008, at which time it had $456 million in outstanding
MTNs. EVVLF has been liquidating its portfolio and using the
proceeds to pay its outstanding debt, of which approximately $430
million has been paid down.  EVVLF expects to make a final
distribution within a week in the approximate amount of $16
million, but this is less than the $26 million owed and will
result in a nearly 40% loss to the remaining MTNs.  Moody's
further explained that the Ca rating is consistent with this known
loss to the remaining MTNs.

The ratings of the Capital Notes (US$ 209,000,000 currently
outstanding) remain C. No recoveries are expected for the Capital
Notes.


FIRST FRANKLIN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FF12 Tranches+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and confirmed the ratings
of certain tranches from First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-
FF12.  These actions are a correction to rating actions announced
on March 19th where certain specific features of the First
Franklin 2006-FF12 were not fully accounted for.  In the previous
release the two ratings now being confirmed had been erroneously
downgraded.  The two ratings being downgraded had previously been
erroneously downgraded to different ratings.  The corrected rating
actions are:

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF12

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 erroneously
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/19/2009 erroneously
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 3/19/2009
     erroneously Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 3/19/2009 erroneously
     Downgraded to Caa3

The updated press release is:

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded 275 ratings and confirmed
45 ratings from 39 First Franklin subprime residential mortgage-
backed securities transactions.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, subprime residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are triggered by a combination of
factors that can include increased delinquencies, higher loss
severities, slower prepayments and mounting losses in the
underlying collateral.  Additionally, the continued deterioration
of the housing market has also contributed to the increased loss
expectations for subprime pools.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss projections for the subprime RMBS sector first
announced in a press release on February 29, 2009, and are part of
Moody's on-going review process.

Moody's final rating actions are based on collateral performance
and updated pool-level loss expectations relative to current
levels of tranche-specific credit enhancement.  Moody's took into
account credit enhancement provided by subordination, cross-
collateralization, excess spread, time tranching, and other
structural features.

Moody's approach to analyzing more seasoned pools (prior to the
2nd half of 2005) takes into account the annualized loss rate from
last 12 months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months,
and then translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a
deal's expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses annualized roll rates of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO, respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions to arrive at projected losses.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.
Complete rating actions are:

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF11

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF12

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF2

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF3

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M8, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M9, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF4

  -- Cl. I-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF6

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF7

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-8, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-9, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF8

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 4/21/2008 Downgraded
     to B2 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH2

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH3

  -- Cl. I-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFH4

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF10

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A6, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A7, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF11

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF12

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF13

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF14

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Confirmed at Aa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF15

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF16

  -- Cl. I-A1, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF17

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF18

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF4

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF5

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF6

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF7

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF9

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-IO, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FFH1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FF1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FF2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Ln Tr 2007-H1

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Loan Tr 2007-1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Loan Tr 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ca Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Loan Tr 2007-3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Loan Tr 2007-4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2009 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Merrill Lynch First Frank Mtge Loan Tr 2007-5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 2/26/2009 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 A3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/20/2008 Downgraded
     to B1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2009 Caa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FLATIRON RE: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on $256 Mil. Facility
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it withdrew its 'BB+' bank
loan rating on Flatiron Re Ltd.'s $256 million credit facility.

The withdrawal follows the full repayment of outstanding amounts
under this facility.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's withdrew
its 'BBB-' counterparty credit rating on Flatiron at the company's
request.


FMC REAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three 2005-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of three classes
and downgraded the ratings of six classes of Notes issued by FMC
Real Estate CDO 2005-1, LTD.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, $131,825,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $43,941,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $43,941,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045, confirmed
     at Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $49,434,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to A3 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $34,055,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $13,182,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $21,970,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $35,153,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2045, downgraded
     to B2 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $12,084,000, Fixed Rate Notes Due 2045, downgraded
     to Caa1 from B2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

Moody's confirmed Classes A-1, A-2, and B and downgraded Classes
C, D, E, F, G, and H due to deteriorating pool performance and
revised modeling parameters.  Moody's ratings are based on the
current credit quality of the collateral and may not reflect
potential migration as per the legal documentation.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first full review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated June 13, 2005.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-2 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of GE Capital Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-2 and
assigns Rating Outlooks:

  -- $7.5 million class K to 'BB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
     -$12.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms the ratings and assigns Rating
Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $11.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $519.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.1 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $45.1 million class C at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only classes X-1 and X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.5 million class D at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $10 million class E at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.8 million class F at 'AA+'. Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.3 million class G at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $21.3 million class H at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.8 million class I at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5 million class J at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the $7.5 million class M and the $5.7 million
class N. Class A-1 has been paid in full.

The downgrades are due to the expected losses from two loans (2%)
which transferred to special servicing since Fitch's last rating
action.  The loans are secured by apartment complexes in Atlanta,
GA and share a common sponsor.  The properties have experienced a
decline in performance due to the economic downturn.  The special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure.  Fitch is also concerned about
an additional loan (0.7%) in the pool with the same sponsor and
considers it possible that this additional loan will transfer to
special servicing as well.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 23.7% to $765.7 million from
$1,002.9 million at issuance.  In total, 29 loans (27%) have
defeased.  Two non-defeased loans (2.3%) mature in 2010 and the
majority of the remaining non-defeased loans (63.5%) mature in
2011.

There is one shadow rated loan in the pool which is also the
pool's largest loan (5.5%).  It is secured by Holiday Inn West
57th Street, a 596-room full service hotel located in New York,
NY.  As of year-end 2007, the most recent data available,
Occupancy, RevPAR and ADR were 89.2%, $205.99 and $183.74,
respectively.  The loan retains its investment grade shadow
rating.

Fitch has identified 11 loans (10.13%) as Fitch Loans of Concern
inclusive of the specially serviced loans.  The largest Fitch Loan
of Concern (1.9%) is secured by an apartment complex in Athens, GA
which is suffering from a decline in occupancy and increased
expenses.  The second largest Loan of Concern (1.37%) is secured
by an office property located in Santa Monica, CA which is 79.3%
occupied and has been struggling with a decline in occupancy since
2006.  The remaining Loans of Concern generally have experienced
declines in performance or have sponsorship issues.  These
concerns are reflected in the Negative Outlooks.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 13 2005-C4 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes and
downgraded 12 classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C4.  
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from higher leverage, increased dispersion and realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 11, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 3% to
$2.34 billion from $2.40 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 165 loans, ranging in size from
less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top 10 loans representing
35% of the pool.  At securitization the pool included two loans
with investment grade underlying ratings.  However, the largest
loan, the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio, is currently in
special servicing and it no longer has an underlying rating.  The
remaining loan with an underlying rating represents 0.7% of the
pool.

Fourteen loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the trust, resulting in a $3.9
million loss. Currently there are six loans, representing 6% of
the pool, in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the DDR/Macquarie Meryvyn's Portfolio Loan ($106.3 million
-- 4.6%), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $237.5
million first mortgage loan.  At securitization, the loan was
secured by 35 single tenant buildings leased to Mervyn's.  
Mervyn's filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in July 2008
and subsequently closed all its stores.  Mervyn's has rejected the
leases on all the properties in this portfolio.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2008 due to imminent
default.  The loan is current and the borrower is focused on
selling or releasing the properties prior to the loan maturity in
October 2010.  Three properties have been sold, resulting in a
$21.0 million prepayment to the floating rate component of the
pari-passu loan.  Two other sites have been re-leased and two
sales are pending.  The servicer is negotiating a loan
modification with the borrower that would include a significant
prepayment of the loan.  The loan sponsors are Diversified Realty
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa3, negative
outlook) and Macquarie DDR Trust, a publicly traded real estate
investment trust.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $30.8
million for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and partial-year 2008
operating results for 95% and 55% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the conduit
component, excluding the specially serviced loans, is 109%
compared to 104% at Moody's prior review in July 2007.  In
addition to the increase in overall LTV, the pool has experienced
increased LTV dispersion.  Based on Moody's analysis, 31% of the
pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 9% at last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Selden Plaza Shopping
Center Loan ($17.0 million -- 0.7%), which is secured by a 222,000
square foot community shopping center located in Selden (Nassau
County), New York.  The center is anchored by Waldbaums and T.J.
Maxx.  The in-line space was 94.0% occupied as of December 2008,
essentially the same as last review. Moody's current underlying
rating is Baa3, the same as at last review and securitization.

The top three conduit loans represent 12.8% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the 123 North Wacker Drive Loan ($122.0
million -- 5.2%), which is secured by a 541,000 square foot Class
A office building located in Chicago, Illinois. The property was
90.0% occupied as of December 2008 compared to 97.0% at last
review and securitization. Moody's LTV is 118% compared to 115% at
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Design Center of the
Americas Loan ($91.7 million -- 3.9%), which represents a 50.0%
pari-passu interest in a 775,000 square foot design and showroom
center located in Dania Beach (Ft. Lauderdale), Florida.  The
property was 77% leased as of February 2009, compare to 89.0% at
last review and 94% at securitization.  Moody's valuation of this
loan reflects a stressed cash flow because of concerns about
continued declines in occupancy due to the stressed economic
environment.  Moody's LTV is 109%, compared to 100% at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Fireman's Fund Loan ($85.7
million -- 3.7%), which represents a pari-passu interest in a
$180.4 million first mortgage loan secured by a 710,000 square
foot office complex located in Novato, California.  The property
is 100% leased to Fireman's Fund Insurance Company through
November 2018.  Performance has been stable and the loan has
benefited from amortization.  The loan has amortized 4% since last
review.  Moody's LTV is 101%, compared to 103% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $12,674,849, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-1A, $210,648,120, affirmed at Aaa; previously      
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-1D, $34,821,014 affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-2, $224,800,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-3A, $197,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-3B, $25,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-4, $775,100,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-SB, $140,040,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-M, $239,803,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class A-J, $152,876,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class X-W, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/23/07

  -- Class B, $23,980,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously affirmed at
     Aa1 on 7/23/07

  -- Class C, $29,975,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously affirmed at
     Aa2 on 7/23/07

  -- Class D, $23,981,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa3; previously
     affirmed at Aa3 on 7/23/07

  -- Class E, $44,963,000, downgraded to A3 from A2; previously
     affirmed at A2 on 7/23/07

  -- Class F, $26,978,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A3; previously
     affirmed at A3 on 7/23/07

  -- Class G, $32,973,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
     previously affirmed at Baa1 on 7/23/07

  -- Class H, $23,980,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2;
     previously affirmed at Baa2 on 7/23/07

  -- Class J, $26,978,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3; previously
     affirmed at Baa3 on 7/23/07

  -- Class K, $11,990,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     affirmed at Ba1 on 7/23/07

  -- Class L, $11,990,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba2; previously
     affirmed at Ba2 on 7/23/07

  -- Class M, $8,993,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     affirmed at Ba3 on 7/23/07

  -- Class N, $8,993,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     affirmed at B1 on 7/23/07

  -- Class O, $5,995,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 7/23/07

  -- Class P, $8,992,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 7/23/07


GEM LIGOS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded notes issued by GEM LIGOs
III, Limited, a managed collateralized debt obligation transaction
with a portfolio of sovereign and corporate emerging market
entities.

Moody's explained that the ratings actions announced are linked to
(i) the application of revised and updated key modeling parameter
assumptions that Moody's uses to rate and monitor ratings of CLOs
and (ii) the deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral
securing the notes.  The revisions affect key parameters in
Moody's model for rating CLOs: default probability, asset
correlation, and other credit indicators such as ratings reviews
and outlooks.  Moody's announced the changes to these assumptions
in a press release published on February 4, 2009.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology and its supplements
for corporate synthetic CDOs as described in Moody's Special
Reports and press releases:

  -- Moody's revises its methodology for Emerging Market CDOs
     (April 2007)

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations
     (December 2008)

The rating actions are:

GEM LIGOs III, Limited

Class Description: US$84,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior
Secured Term Notes Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: Aa2
  -- Prior Rating: Aaa
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned Aaa

Class Description: US$30,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior
Secured Term Notes Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: A1
  -- Prior Rating: Aa2
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned Aa2

Class Description: US$29,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior
Subordinated Secured Term Notes Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: Baa3
  -- Prior Rating: A3
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned A3

Class Description: US$24,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Subordinate
Secured Term Notes Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: Ba2
  -- Prior Rating: Baa2
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned Baa2
Class Description: US$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Junior
Subordinate Secured Term Notes Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: B1
  -- Prior Rating: Ba2
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned Ba2

Class Description: the US$2,000,000 Class Q Notes Due 2021 Notes
Due 2021

  -- Current Rating: Ba3
  -- Prior Rating: Ba2
  -- Prior Rating Date: March 23, 2006, assigned Ba2


GFCM LLC: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three 2003-1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades these classes of GFCM LLC Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, series 2003-1 and assigns
Rating Outlooks:

  -- $12.3 million class F to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $7.2 million class G to 'CC/RR3' from 'BB';
  -- $2.1 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $2.1 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these
classes:

  -- $10.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $270 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $112.7 million class A-5 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.3 million class B at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.4 million class C at 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.3 million class D at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable; and
  -- $10.3 million class E at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full.

The downgrades are due to expected losses on the one specially
serviced loan (1.8%) in the transaction.  The Negative Rating
Outlooks are the result of Fitch identified Loans of Concern
(11.5%). As of the March 2009 distribution date, the transaction
has paid down 43.7% to $463,114,097 from $822,649,204 at issuance.  
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.

The specially serviced loan is secured by a 249,600 sf industrial
property in Plano, TX.  The loan transferred due to a payment
default after a large tenant vacated their space upon lease
expiration. Occupancy has dropped to 47% from a peak of 100%.  The
servicer is currently in negotiations with the borrower on
potential workout options.

The largest Loan of Concern is secured by a 79,203 sf office
complex in Sarasota, FL.  Occupancy has steadily declined from
100% at issuance to 72% as of Feb. 6, 2009.  The borrower
continues to actively market the available space.  The servicer
reported the properties were in good condition based on a site
inspection in September 2008.

The pool is geographically diverse with the highest concentration
in North Carolina (11%).  Other concentrations include Florida
(10.5%), California (9%), Maryland (8.5%), and New York (7.9%).  
The highest property type concentration in the pool is retail
(33.3%), with other concentrations including industrial (27.9%),
office (22.4%), multifamily (15.8%) and self storage (0.8%).  
Approximately 4.8% of the pool is scheduled to mature in 2010,
3.9% in 2011, and 12.6% in 2012.  No loans mature for the
remainder of 2009.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 1999-C2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes,
upgraded three classes and downgraded one class of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C2.  The upgrades are due to overall
stable pool performance and increased credit subordination due to
amortization and payoffs.  The pool balance has decreased by 58%
since Moody's last review.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.  The action is
the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the March 15, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 74%
to $255.6 million from $974.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 44 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 62% of the pool.  The pool includes a loan with an
investment grade underlying rating, representing 9% of the pool,
and a credit tenant lease component, representing 37% of the pool.  
Sixteen loans, representing 21% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Eleven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $19.5 million realized loss.  There are four loans,
representing 13% of the pool, currently in special servicing.  The
largest specially serviced loan is Red Rose Commons ($24.9 million
-- 10%), which is secured by a 263,000 square foot power center
located in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in February 2009 due to imminent default.  The
property recently experienced a significant decline in occupancy
due to the bankruptcy of Linens'N Things and Circuit City, which
together occupied 28% of the premises.  The loan matures in May
2009.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $7.5 million for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with partial or full-year 2008 operating
results for 82% of the pool.  Moody's weighted loan to value ratio
for the conduit component, excluding non-performing assets, is 76%
compared to 80% at Moody's prior review in March 2007.

The loan with the underlying rating is the Holiday Inn Mart Plaza
Loan ($21.7 million -- 8.5%), which is secured by a 528-room full
service hotel located in downtown Chicago.  RevPAR for the twelve-
month period ending June 2008 was $116.00 compared to $107.50 at
last review.  Moody's valuation of this loan incorporates a
stressed cash flow to reflect Moody's concerns about hotel
performance in the current stressed economic environment.  The
loan matures in June 2009.  Moody's current underlying rating is
Baa1, the same at last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 8% of the
outstanding pool balance.  The largest loan is the Briarcliff
Summit Apartments Loan ($7.7 million -- 3.0%), which is secured by
a 201 unit federally subsidized apartment complex located in
Atlanta, Georgia.  The property was 96% occupied as of April 2009,
essentially the same as at last review.  Despite the property's
high occupancy, performance has been negatively impacted by
increased operating expenses.  The loan is on the servicer's watch
list due to a low debt service coverage ratio.  Moody's LTV is
143% compared to 97% at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bal Seal Engineering Loan ($6.9
million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 125,000 square foot
industrial property located in Foothill Ranch, California.  The
property is 100% occupied by Bal Seal Engineering Company through
January 2019.  Performance has been stable since securitization,
but Moody's valuation of this loan reflects market vacancy and
rental rates.  Moody's LTV is 55% compared to 49% at last review.

The third largest loan is the Anchorage Business Park Loan ($5.2
million -- 2.0%), which is secured by a 190,000 square food retail
center located in anchorage, Alaska.  The property was 97%
occupied as of September 2008, essentially the same as at last
review. Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV is 47% compared
to 48% at last review.

The CTL component includes seven loans ($91.6 million -- 35.8%)
secured by properties leased to six tenants under bondable leases.  
The largest exposures are Ingram Micro Inc. (Moody's LT Corporate
Family rating Ba1, stable outlook; 23%), CarMax (7%), and Costco
Wholesale Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating A2; stable
outlook; 4%).

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at  
     Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class B, $51,136,460, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at      
     Aaa on 3/30/2007

  -- Class C, $48,725,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class D, $14,618,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded
     Aaa from Aa3 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class E, $41,416,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa2; previously
     upgraded to Aa2 from Baa1 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class F, $12,181,000, upgraded to Aa2 from A1; previously
     upgraded to A1 from Baa2 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class G, $12,182,000, upgraded to A2 from A3; previously
     upgraded to A3 from Baa3 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class H, $46,289,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class J, $7,308,000, affirmed at B1; previously affirmed at
     B1 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class K, $19,490,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on 3/30/2007

  -- Class L, $2,230,395, affirmed at C; previously downgraded to
     C from Ca on 3/30/2007


GOLDEN CROSSING: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on Bank Facilities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed Golden Crossing Finance Inc.
underlying Ba1 rating for the backed senior secured bank
facilities under review for downgrade.

"The project is on target for substantial completion in the near
future and Moody's expects that the operating performance will be
satisfactory says Catherine Deluz, Moody's analyst for GCFI.  
However overlaying the fundamental operational strength of the
project is the project's exposure to weakening counterparties.  
The key risk at this stage is a provision in the loan agreement
for the project credit facilities whereby a financial guarantor's
event of default would trigger a GCFI's event of default.  One of
the financial guarantors is XL Capital Assurance (UK) Ltd (a.k.a
Syncora).  Syncora's insurance strength rating has been downgraded
now to Ca and while the sponsor has been working diligently on
dealing with that cross default provision, there is no final
resolution as yet, and a resolution could be a few days or weeks
away.  In the meantime the deadline for Syncora to complete its
restructuring is fast approaching, and Syncora has announced that
it would suspend the payment of claims as of April 26, 2009 under
certain circumstances.  As a result, the risk that a financial
guarantor's event of default and a cross default could be
triggered before any resolution is reached is increasing."

The last rating action was on February 19, 2009 when GCFI was
downgraded to Ba1 with a negative outlook.

Debt list:

  -- Insured Senior Secured Bank Credit Facilities:
     C$963.4 million.

Golden Crossing Finance and Golden Crossing General Partnership
are special purpose vehicles indirectly owned by Bilfinger Berger
AG (not rated).  Both GCFI and GCGP are headquartered in
Vancouver, British Columbia.  GCFI is the financial conduit
created to provide funding to GCGP for the development of the
Golden Ears Bridge project, which consists of a new six-lane
bridge across the Fraser River east of Vancouver, British
Columbia, and approximately 13 kilometres of new and existing
roads.  The project is a Public Private Partnership with the South
Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority.


GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2004-1 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 6 tranches
from Greenpoint Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1.  The collateral
backing this transaction consists primarily of first-lien, fixed-
rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Greenpoint Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. SP, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 6/17/2005 Assigned
     Ba2


GSR MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 2004-14 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14.  The collateral
backing this transaction consists primarily of first-lien,
adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1B2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. 1B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 1BX, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2B1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 2B2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. 2B3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 3A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3AX, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5AX, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa


GSR MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 44 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 44
classes from GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F and 20 classes from
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY4 Trust.  
S&P removed 49 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 16 classes from the same transactions and removed 11 of the
affirmed ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
     
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses

In its analysis, S&P incorporated the loss and delinquency trends
S&P observed for the transactions backed by prime jumbo collateral
that were issued in these vintages.  Some transactions are
experiencing foreclosures and delinquencies at rates that exceed
S&P's initial projections, and these transactions have also
started to experience losses.
     
The loss projections for the two transactions rated in 2006 and
2007 are based on a forward-looking default curve.  S&P's lifetime
projected losses for the different structures from the
transactions in this release are:

                                       
Transaction                        Original         Loss
(various structure groups)         bal. (mil. $)    projection (%)
--------------------------         -------------    --------------
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F    847.1            2.55
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F    539.2            4.56
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates 2007-HY4              377.6            5.95  
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates 2007-HY4              1,063.4          11.92
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates 2007-HY4              262.9            7.16

To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  For
mortgage pools that are continuing to experience increasing
delinquencies, S&P increased its stresses to account for potential
increases in monthly losses.  In order to maintain a rating higher
than 'B', S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a class could
absorb losses in excess of the base-case loss assumptions S&P
assumed in S&P's analysis.  For example, generally, S&P assessed
whether one class could, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
130% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions in order to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P assessed whether a different class could
withstand 155% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.  Each class that has an affirmed 'AAA' rating can,
in S&P's view, withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case
loss assumptions under S&P's analysis.
     
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses at these rating levels.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien
prime jumbo mortgage loans.
     
Standard & Poor's will continue to closely monitor the performance
of these transactions and take further ratings actions as S&P
consider appropriate.
   
                          Rating Actions

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F
                          Series 2006-1F

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1A-2       3623416J3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-3       3623416K0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-5       3623416M6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-6       3623416N4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-7       3623416P9     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-8       3623416Q7     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-9       3623416R5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-10      3623416S3     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-11      3623416T1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-13      3623416V6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-14      3623416W4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-15      3623416X2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-16      3623416Y0     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-17      3623418W2     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-2       3623417A1     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-3       3623417B9     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-4       3623417C7     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-5       3623417D5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-6       3623417E3     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-7       3623417F0     A                    A/Watch Neg
    2A-8       3623417G8     A                    A/Watch Neg
    2A-9       3623417H6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-10      3623417J2     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-11      3623417K9     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-12      3623417L7     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-14      3623417N3     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-15      3623417P8     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    2A-16      362334AN4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-17      362334AP9     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    3A-1       3623417Q6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    3A-2       3623417R4     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    7A-1       3623418J1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    7A-2       3623418K8     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-P       3623418L6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    2A-P       3623418M4     BBB-                 BBB/Watch Neg
    1A-X       3623418N2     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-1       3623417S2     A+                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4A-2       3623417T0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-1       3623417Z6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-2       3623418A0     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-8       362334AQ7     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5A-9       362334AR5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-1       3623418F9     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-2       3623418G7     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    6A-3       3623418H5     B                    AAA/Watch Neg
    1A-1       3623416H7     BBB-                 AAA
    1A-4       3623416L8     BBB-                 AAA
    1A-12      3623416U8     BBB-                 AAA
    2A-1       3623416Z7     BBB-                 BBB
    2A-13      3623417M5     BBB-                 BBB
    4A-3       3623417U7     A+                   AAA
    4A-4       3623417V5     A+                   AAA
    4A-5       3623417W3     A+                   AAA
    4A-6       3623417X1     A+                   AAA
    4A-7       3623417Y9     A+                   AAA
     
  WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2007-HY4 Trust
                         Series 2007-HY4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       933636AA0     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    1-A2       933636AB8     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    2-A1       933636AC6     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A2       933636AD4     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A3       933636AE2     B                    BBB/Watch Neg
    2-A4       933636AF9     CCC                  B/Watch Neg
    L-B-1      933636AN2     CC                   CCC
    L-B-2      933636AP7     CC                   CCC
    3-A1       933636AG7     A-                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A2       933636AH5     CCC                  BBB/Watch Neg
    3-B-1      933636AR3     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    3-B-2      933636AS1     CC                   CCC
    3-B-3      933636AT9     CC                   CCC
    4-A1       933636AJ1     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A2       933636AK8     B                    A-/Watch Neg
    5-A1       933636AL6     BBB-                 AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A2       933636AM4     B                    A-/Watch Neg
    M-B-1      933636AU6     CCC                  BB/Watch Neg
    M-B-2      933636AV4     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    M-B-3      933636AW2     CC                   CCC
     
                         Ratings Affirmed

                 GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F
                          Series 2006-1F

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 5A-3       3623418B8     AAA
                 5A-4       3623418C6     AAA
                 5A-5       3623418D4     AAA
                 5A-6       3623418E2     AAA
                 5A-7       3623418X0     AAA


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Six 2005-2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes of
Notes issued by Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2.  
The rating actions are:

  -- Class S, $5,000,000, Fixed Rate Interest-Only Notes Due 2010,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A, $163,800,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2030,
     downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $31,300,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2030,
     downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $27,300,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2030, downgraded to Ba1 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $22,543,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2030, downgraded to B1 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $10,700,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2030, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $10,000,000, Fixed Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2030, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes A, B, C, D, E and F due to
deteriorating pool performance and revised modeling parameters.

The pool contains a 19% concentration in CMBS collateral of which
100% was issued between 2006 and 2007.  The remaining collateral
includes real estate bank loans, senior debt, subordinated debt
and mezzanine debt.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default (PD) for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 11 2006-4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eleven classes
of Notes issued by Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding
2006-4, LTD.  The rating actions are:

  - Class S, $6,000,000, Fixed Rate Interest-Only Notes Due 2012,
    confirmed at Aaa from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
    Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  - Class A-1, $254,644,355, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047,
    downgraded to A2 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
    Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  - Class A-2, $34,833,426, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047,
    downgraded to Ba1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
    Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  - Class B, $42,040,342, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Ba2 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class C, $25,824,781, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa1 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class D, $13,813,255, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa2 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class E, $13,212,679, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class F, $13,212,679, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class G, $14,413,831, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class H, $10,209,797, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class J, $10,209,797, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

  - Class K, $22,821,900, Floating Rate Notes Due 2047, downgraded
    to Caa3 from B2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
    for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and K
due to deteriorating pool performance and revised modeling
parameters.

The pool contains a 18.6% concentration in CMBS collateral of
which 100.0% was issued between 2006 and 2007.  The remaining
collateral includes CRE CDO securities, ABS Securities, real
estate bank loans, senior debt, subordinated debt and mezzanine
debt.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) collateral
from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of
these transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default (PD)
for non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For
CRE CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability
of default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools. For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5. With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.


HELIOS FINANCE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Four 2007-S1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible downgrade, four credit-
linked notes issued by HELIOS Finance Limited Partnership 2007-S1
and HELIOS Finance Corporation 2007-S1 as co-issuers.  The Notes
were issued in connection with a credit default swap tied to a
reference portfolio, under which Wachovia Bank, National
Association is the protected party.  The reference portfolio
consists of loans originated and serviced by Wachovia Dealer
Services, Inc. (formerly WFS Financial Inc.).  Wachovia Dealer
Services, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wachovia Bank,
which, as of December 31, 2008, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Wells Fargo & Company.

The rating actions reflect Moody's updated higher loss
expectations relative to current levels of credit enhancement.  
Moody's outlook for the US vehicle sector is negative.  The
economy will drive loss rates, particularly unemployment.  The
downgrades primarily reflect the impact of the economic downturn,
heightened by an overweight in California for the loans in the
reference portfolio.  Moody's currently anticipates the
transaction to incur lifetime cumulative net losses between 6.00%
and 8.00%.  Moody's had originally expected cumulative net losses
to be between 3.00% and 4.50%.  During its review, Moody's will
continue to refine its assessment of the transaction relative to
the credit enhancement available.

Complete rating actions are:

Co-Issuers: HELIOS Finance Limited Partnership 2007-S1 and HELIOS
Finance Corporation 2007-S1

Credit-Linked Notes, Series 2007-S1

  -- Class B-1 Notes, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 05/16/2007 Assigned Baa3

  -- Class B-2 Notes, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 05/16/2007 Assigned Ba2

  -- Class B-3 Notes, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 05/16/2007 Assigned B1

  -- Class B-4 Notes, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 05/16/2007 Assigned B3


HIGHLAND PARK: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
of Notes issued by Highland Park CDO I Ltd.  The rating actions
are:

  -- Class A-1, $329,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2051,
     downgraded to A3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $75,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2051,
     downgraded to B1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $44,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2051,
     downgraded to Caa1 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $35,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2051, downgraded to Ca from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $33,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2051, downgraded to Ca from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $11,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2051, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $24,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2051, downgraded to Ca from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded all Classes due to deteriorating pool
performance and revised modeling parameters.

The pool contains a 27% concentration in CMBS collateral of which
approximately 86% was issued between 2006 and 2008.  The remaining
collateral includes CRE CDO debt, real estate bank loans, senior
debt, subordinated debt and mezzanine debt.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated December 19, 2006.


IBIS RE: S&P Rates Class A and B Series 2009-1 Notes at Low-B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has rated Ibis Re
Ltd.'s Series 2009-1 Class A and B notes 'BB' and 'BB-',
respectively.
     
The cedents will be certain selected operating subsidiaries of
Assurant Inc., including American Security Insurance Co. and
American Bankers Insurance Co. (A-/Negative/--), though some might
not be rated.  At least one rated entity will be responsible for
the quarterly payment due under the reinsurance contract with Ibis
Re.
     
The notes are exposed to U.S. hurricane risk.
     
On a per occurrence basis, the class A notes will cover losses to
Assurant between the initial attachment point of $725 million and
$1.24 billion, and the Class B notes will cover losses between the
initial attachment point of $445 million and $725 million.  The
risk period will begin on the day after closing and go through
April XX, 2012.
     
The trigger for estimating covered losses to Ibis Re is based on
the sum of PCS insured personal property losses per state
multiplied by the pre-determined state payout factors.  The state
PCS loss amount will reflect residential personal lines only,
while commercial lines, automobile and vehicle lines, workers'
compensation lines losses, and estimate of loss-adjustment
expenses are excluded.

                           Ratings List

                           Ibis Re Ltd.

            Series 2009-1 Class A notes            BB
            Series 2009-1 Class B notes            BB-


INDYMAC ARM:: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 85 Tranches from 10 RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 85
tranches from 10 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by IndyMac.  The
collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of first-
lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.  The
IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR12 and IndyMac INDX
Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR7 are backed by pools of negative
amortization, Alt-A mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.  Additionally, Moody's further stresses the default
rate assumptions for deals with extremely low pool factors to
account for volatility arising from the small number of loans
backing these transactions.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

Complete rating actions:

c Trust Series 2001-H1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned      
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X-1-I, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-1-II, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-1-III, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2-I, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2-II, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. X-2-III, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/1/2001
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/30/2004 Upgraded
     to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/12/2007 Downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 5/24/2005 Downgraded
     to Ca

IndyMac ARM Trust Series 2001-H2

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/21/2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 12/21/2001
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/21/2001 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 5/3/2006 Downgraded
     to Ba1

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR11

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR12

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/29/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR13

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/3/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/3/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/3/2005 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/12/2008 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/12/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/12/2008 Downgraded
     to B3

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR15

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/17/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/17/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/17/2005
     Assigned Aaa

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR6

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/21/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/21/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR7

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Aa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/16/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR9

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to B1; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. 5-M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned A3

  -- Cl. 5-M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 10/29/2004
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Cl. 5-M-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Aa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/29/2004 Assigned
     Baa3


INMAN SQUARE: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed two classes of
notes issued by Inman Square Funding I, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $13,057,668 class I notes downgraded to 'A' from 'AA',
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $7,000,000 class II-fixed notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
     'BB';

  -- $30,000,000 class II-floating notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
     'BB';

  -- $18,856,553 class III notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $3,542,117 class IV-fixed notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $13,256,609 class IV-floating notes affirmed at 'C'.

Additionally, Fitch has removed classes I and II from Rating Watch
Negative.

The class I notes were assigned a Stable Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation that the ratings will remain stable over the
next one to two years.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to
classes rated 'CCC' or below.

These rating actions are a result of the continued credit
deterioration of the portfolio since the last review in September
2008.  Approximately 88.6% of the portfolio is now rated below
investment grade with 56.8% of the portfolio rated 'CCC' and
lower.  As of the March 10, 2009 trustee report, 52.9% of the
portfolio is defaulted per the transaction documents compared to
43.5% at last review.

The Class I/II overcollateralization ratio of 85.4% is failing its
covenant of 138.9% and continues to redirect interest proceeds
that would otherwise pay interest to classes III and IV to pay
down the class I notes.  The class I notes have paid off
approximately 92.1% since closing and 25.1% since last review.  
Fitch has downgraded this class to 'A' as this is a better
reflection of the risk to these notes due to the deterioration of
the portfolio.  The class II notes are downgraded to 'CCC' as they
continue to receive interest but Fitch anticipates principal
impairment.  The class III notes are downgraded to 'C' as they are
deferring interest and Fitch does not expect any future interest
payments or principal payments.

Inman Square I is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation, which closed on Oct. 20, 2004 and the portfolio is
monitored by TCW Asset Management Company.  The transaction's
revolving period ended in October 2006.  The rating actions are
due to Fitch's recently adjusted default and recovery rate
assumptions for analyzing structured finance CDOs, in addition to
negative credit migration in the underlying portfolio.  The
portfolio is primarily composed of prime residential mortgage-
backed securities (44.1%), subprime RMBS (43.8%), SF CDOs (4.2%),
commercial and consumer ABS (4.2%), and other CDOs (3.7%).

These rating actions resolve the 'Under Analysis' status issued on
Oct. 14, 2008, following Fitch's announcement of its proposed
criteria revision for analyzing structured finance CDOs.  The
revised criteria report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured
Finance CDOs' was published in its final form on Dec. 16, 2008
along with an updated version of the Fitch Portfolio Credit Model
that includes additional functionality for analyzing SF CDOs.  As
part of this review, Fitch makes standard adjustments for any
names on Rating Watch Negative or with a Negative Outlook,
downgrading such ratings for default analysis purposes by three
and one notches, respectively.


ISTAR FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'BB' Senior Rating on Negative Watch
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its 'BB'
senior unsecured debt rating on iStar Financial Inc. on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BB' long-term counterparty credit rating and 'B-'
preferred stock rating on iStar.  The outlook remains negative.
      
"The CreditWatch placement follows management's announcement that
iStar will offer to exchange a portion of its existing senior
unsecured notes for up to $1.0 billion of new, second-lien senior
secured notes.  The amount of assets pledged as security for the
new notes will depend on participation in the exchange, but it is
likely to be significant.  S&P believes the additional claims on
iStar's assets may effectively place the firm's unsecured claims
in a subordinated position to those of senior secured creditors,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jeffrey Zaun.
     
S&P has affirmed the counterparty credit rating because S&P view
the exchange as opportunistic rather than distressed, under S&P's
criteria.  
     
Although the firm is tendering for its debt at a steep discount to
par, and in some cases extending maturities of its obligations,
iStar's liquidity position should allow it to meet its obligations
through 2010 regardless of whether the offer is successful.
     
S&P's negative outlook on iStar incorporates S&P's belief that the
amount of troubled assets could increase to $6 billion and that
recoveries on troubled assets will deteriorate considerably.  S&P
could downgrade the firm if losses are greater than S&P now expect
and begin to re-exert pressure on the firm's funding or capital
levels.  S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the firm
maintains stable capital and improves asset-quality metrics while
sustaining adequate recovery values for its troubled assets.


JEFFERIES RESECURITIZATION: DBRS Assigns 'B' to Six 2009-R4 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Bond Rating Service assigned these ratings to the
Resecuritization Trust Certificates, Series 2009-R4 issued by
Jefferies Resecuritization Trust 2009-R4:

   -- $6.1 million Class 1-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $714.0 thousand Class 1-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $535.5 thousand Class 1-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $535.5 thousand Class 1-A4 rated at B
   -- $10.3 million Class 2-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $1.2 million Class 2-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $908.4 thousand Class 2-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $908.4 thousand Class 2-A4 rated at B
   -- $6.0 million Class 3-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $985.2 thousand Class 3-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $447.8 thousand Class 3-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $447.8 thousand Class 3-A4 rated at B
   -- $5.5 million Class 4-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $1.0 million Class 4-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $500.0 thousand Class 4-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $1.3 million Class 4-A4 rated at B
   -- $7.4 million Class 5-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $1.6 million Class 5-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $545.1 thousand Class 5-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $545.1 thousand Class 5-A4 rated at B
   -- $11.6 million Class 6-A1 rated at AAA
   -- $1.9 million Class 6-A2 rated at "A"
   -- $645.2 thousand Class 6-A3 rated at BBB
   -- $1.1 million Class 6-A4 rated at B

There are a total of 33 groups in this resecuritization trust,
each consisting of one seasoned senior residential mortgage-backed
security. Within each group, the AAA ratings on the Class A1
certificates, the "A" ratings on the Class A2 certificates, the
BBB ratings on the Class A3 certificates and the B ratings on the
Class A4 certificates reflect the credit enhancement provided by
subordination. The ratings also reflect the quality of the
underlying securities.

DBRS does not rate the Class 1-A5, 2-A5, 3-A5, 4-A5, 5-A5 and 6-A5
certificates or the Group 7 through Group 33 certificates.

Interest and principal payments on the notes and certificates will
generally be made on the 26th day of each month, commencing in
April 2009. Within each group, interest payments will be
distributed on a pro rata basis to the certificates and principal
payments will be distributed on a sequential basis to the
certificates until the certificate principal balance has been
reduced to zero.

Any losses realized from the underlying securities will be
allocated reverse sequentially to the certificates within each
group until their principal balances have been reduced to zero.

The Trust is a resecuritization consisting of 33 senior
residential mortgage-backed securities represented by various real
estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs). The REMIC trusts are
backed by pools of prime and Alt-A, first lien, one- to four-
family residential mortgages.


JEFFERSON COUNTY: S&P Retains Negative Watch on Warrants' Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has maintained its CreditWatch
with negative implications on the rating on Jefferson County,
Alabama's general obligation warrants outstanding, except for the
rating on the series 2001B warrants, which was recently lowered to
'D'.  Also remaining on CreditWatch negative is the rating on
Jefferson County Public Building Authority's series 2006 lease-
revenue warrants.  Revenues available for payment of debt service
on the general obligation warrants include ad valorem, sales,
business license and occupational taxes; however, none of these
legally available revenues is specifically pledged for payment of
debt service.  Also, in the event of a bankruptcy filing by the
county, the entire balance of the 2001B warrants could become due
immediately at the request of at least 25% of holders of the
warrants, all of which are being held as bank warrants at this
time.
     
The rating on Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority's
special tax bonds series 2002-C and 2005-A special tax bonds; the
ratings on Jefferson County's limited obligation school warrants
outstanding; and the rating on Jefferson County's series 2000
limited-obligation school warrants, issued for the board of
education and secured by lease payments from the Jefferson County
Board of Education to the county also remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications.
     
"The CreditWatch reflects our opinion of the potential for county
bankruptcy," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst James Breeding.
     
Standard & Poor's continues to monitor the situation and will
adjust ratings as S&P consider appropriate.


JG WENTWORTH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Notes from Two Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the notes issued in two
J.G. Wentworth structured settlement transactions.  The
transactions involve the securitization of litigation claimants'
rights to receive future scheduled payments under settlement
agreements (structured settlements).  The majority of the assets
of the pools are non-court ordered receivables.  The securities
are supported by an insurance policy issued by MBIA Insurance
Corporation.  The rating actions are prompted by rating actions
affecting the insurer and are part of an ongoing review of ABS
transactions.

The current rating on the securities is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

As part of evaluating the current rating for the securities,
Moody's Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.  
The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the guarantee.  
The complete rating actions:

Issuer: J.G. Wentworth Receivables IV LLC, Series 1998-A

  -- Class A Notes, Upgrade to Aa2; Previously on Nov 16, 2008, A2
     Placed on Watch Direction Uncertain

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation, Insurance
     Financial Strength Rating of B3; Previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded from Baa1

Issuer: J.G. Wentworth Receivables V LLC, Series 2001-A

  -- Class A1 Notes, Upgrade to Aa3; Previously on Nov 16, 2008,
     A2 Placed on Watch Direction Uncertain

  -- Class A2 Notes, Upgrade to Aa3; Previously on Nov 16, 2008,
     A2 Placed on Watch Direction Uncertain

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation, Insurance
     Financial Strength Rating of B3; Previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded from Baa1


JP MORGAN: Fitch Junks Ratings on Five 2004-CIBC9 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks or
Recovery Ratings to these classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s commercial pass-through certificates,
series 2004-CIBC9:

  -- $20.7 million class D to 'A-' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11 million class E to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.2 million class F to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;  
  -- $9.6 million class G to 'BB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.9 million class H to 'B-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.8 million class J to 'B-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;  
  -- $4.1 million class K to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB';
  -- $5.5 million class L to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-';
  -- $5.5 million class M to 'CC/RR4' from 'B+';
  -- $2.8 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $2.8 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks to
these classes:

  -- $11.2 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $146 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $103.7 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $466.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $158 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27.5 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.8 million class C at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $13.8 million class NR.

The downgrades to classes D through P are due to projected losses
on the three specially serviced loans (5.1%).  The affirmations to
classes A-1 through C reflect sufficient Fitch-expected credit
enhancement to the senior classes.  The Rating Outlooks indicate
the likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next
one to two years.

There are three loans in special servicing (5.1%) with losses
expected.  The largest specially serviced loan (4.3%) is secured
by 433,829 square feet of owned space at a 603,207 sf retail
property located in Sacramento, CA.  The loan transferred March
11, 2008 due to imminent default.  The borrower continues to
forward excess cash flow, and the loan is paid through March 2009
except for a portion of the replacement reserves.  The largest
tenant at the property, Gottschalk's (48%), filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy protection in January 2009, and in March 2009 announced
liquidation of all remaining stores.  Another major tenant (10%)
indicated that rent payments will cease, but has been paying one
month in arrears.  The recent appraised value indicates losses.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.5%) transferred
April 3, 2006 due to monetary default.  The loan is secured by
three industrial properties located in Portage, MI which comprise
a total of 119,211 sf.  The special servicer is discussing a
potential deed-in-lieu of foreclosure with the borrower.  Fitch
expects losses on the loan.

The smallest specially serviced loan (0.3%) was transferred to the
special servicer Dec. 3, 2008 due to monetary default.  The
collateral is a 126-unit multifamily complex located in Humble,
TX.  The year-end 2007 debt service coverage ratio was reported at
1.30x, compared to a reported DSCR of 0.95x through second-quarter
2008.  The property was 80% occupied as of June 30, 2008. Losses
on the loan are possible.

In addition to the specially serviced loans, two loans (1.6%) are
currently 30 days delinquent.  Fitch expects a higher probability
of transfer to the special servicer and eventual losses on these
loans.  Including the specially serviced and the delinquent loans,
15 loans (12.7%) have been designated as Fitch Loans of Concern.

Fitch reviewed financial statements, rent rolls, and other
information corresponding to the shadow rated loans: Centro Retail
Portfolio II (13.7%) and Grace Building (11%).  Based on stable
performance since issuance, both loans maintain investment-grade
shadow ratings.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced 5.8 % to $1.04 billion, from
$1.1 billion at issuance.  Eight loans (6.2%) have defeased since
issuance.  Five loans (1.8%) mature in 2009, of which two (0.5%)
have defeased.  For the non-defeased loans maturing in 2009, the
weighted-average coupon is 4.57% and the weighted-average
servicer-reported DSCR is 1.82x.  No loans mature or are
anticipated to repay in 2010.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 Classes of 2008-C2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2008-C2 on review for possible
downgrade due to the magnitude of the recent appraisal reductions
for two loans currently in special servicing and the transfer of a
third loan to special servicing.

As of the April 13, 2009 distribution date, the cumulative
appraisal reduction for the pool is $89.9 million which represents
8% of the outstanding pool balance.  The appraisal reductions
exceed Moody's expected loss for the pool.

Moody's will review the recent appraisals for the two loans
subject to the appraisal reductions and will continue to monitor
the performance of the specially serviced loans and the progress
of the special servicer's resolution strategies.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $116,589,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously affirmed at Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class A-J, $61,209,000, on review for possible downgrade;     
     previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa on 2/6/2009

  -- Class B, $14,574,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class C, $14,574,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class D, $10,201,000, on review for possible downgrade;     
     previously downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class E, $10,202,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class F, $13,116,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class G, $11,659,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Ba3 from A3 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class H, $16,031,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to B2 from Baa1 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class J, $14,574,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to B3 from Baa2 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class K, $14,573,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class L, $8,745,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class M, $4,372,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class N, $5,829,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Ca from Ba3 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class P, $4,372,000, on review for possible downgrade;     
     previously downgraded to Ca from B1 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class Q, $2,915,000, on review for possible downgrade;     
     previously downgraded to Ca from B2 on 2/6/2009

  -- Class T, $4,372,000, on review for possible downgrade;
     previously downgraded to Ca from B3 on 2/6/2009


LANDMARK II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded and left under review for
possible downgrade these notes issued by Landmark II CDO Ltd.:

  -- $188,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2012, Downgraded to Aa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on September 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa;

  -- $12,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2012, Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on March 4, 2009 Aa2, Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade.

Additionally, Moody's downgraded these notes:

  -- $24,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2012, Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 4, 2009 B1,
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- $6,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate Notes, Due
     2012, Downgraded to C; previously on October 16, 2008
     Downgraded to Ca.

Landmark II CDO Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.  The trustee has
reported that it has received a Notice of Default dated March 27,
2009, from a party identifying itself to be the Holder of more
than twenty-five percent of the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of
the Controlling Class.  The Class A Notes are currently the
Controlling Class. Such Notice of Default states that a Default
has occurred under Section 5.1(e) of the Indenture, as a result of
the purchase by the Issuer of numerous obligations in violation of
the maturity requirements set forth in Clause (f)(3)(ii) of the
definition of "Collateral Debt Obligation" contained in the
Indenture.  The Notice of Default further states, among other
things, that such acquisition of obligations, the subsequent sale
of some of those obligations, and the continued holding of others
has had a material adverse effect on the Holder of the Notes.
Pursuant to Section 5.1(e) of the Indenture, if the breach cited
in the Notice of Default is not cured within 30 days, an Event of
Default will occur under the Indenture.

The rating actions taken reflect the risk of occurrence of an
Event of Default, the application of Moody's revised assumptions
with respect to default probability, the treatment of ratings on
"Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," the
calculation of the Diversity Score, and consideration of credit
deterioration in the underlying portfolio.  The revised
assumptions that have been applied to all corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio are described in the press release dated
February 4, 2009.  Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is
observed in, among others, a decline in the average credit rating
(as measured through the weighted average rating factor), an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and failure
of the Class C and D Overcollateralization Tests.

The rating actions also reflect increased concerns about the
uncertainties arising from the potential for acceleration of the
Notes or liquidation of the collateral should an Event of Default
occur and continue.  As provided in Article 5 of the Indenture,
during the occurrence and continuance of an Event of Default, a
majority of the Controlling Class may vote to accelerate the
payments on the Notes by declaring the principal of all the Notes
to be immediately due and payable.  In addition, the Holders of at
least 66-2/3% of the Aggregate Outstanding Amount of the
Controlling Class may direct the trustee to proceed with the sale
and liquidation of the collateral.  The severity of any potential
losses to the Notes may depend on the timing and choice of these
remedies following an Event of Default.  As a result of these
uncertainties, the Class A and B Notes were downgraded.  They
remain under review for possible further downgrade as the
possibility for an Event of Default arising from the Notice of
Default continues.  In concluding its review, Moody's expects to
analyze the likelihood of an Event of Default that results in
subsequent acceleration and liquidation.


LANDMARK II: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A, B, C, and D notes issued by Landmark II CDO Ltd., an
arbitrage high-yield collateralized loan obligation transaction
managed by Aladdin Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P
placed its ratings on the class A and B notes on CreditWatch with
negative implications.
     
The downgrades reflect a decline in par value caused by the sale
of long-dated assets (assets with maturity dates that are beyond
the stated maturity date of the transaction) that the transaction
was carrying in its portfolio.  Since the time of S&P's analysis
for the last rating action, the transaction has sold more than
$57.0 million of its long-dated securities, netting $47.9 million
in proceeds.  Based on the February 2009 report, the transaction
holds approximately $15.0 million in long-dated securities, or
12.3% of the collateral, which is more than the transaction's
covenant maximum of 2.5%.  The transaction's loss of par has
eroded the credit support available to the rated notes.  
Additionally, the loss in par from the sale of the long-dated
securities caused the transaction to fail its class C and D par
coverage tests during the March 2009 payment period, resulting in
the deferment of interest to the class D notes.
     
On March 27, 2009, a party representing 25% of the aggregate
outstanding amount of the controlling class issued a notice of
default pursuant to section 5.1(e) of the indenture.  If the long-
dated securities are not back in compliance with the deal
covenants within 30 days of the notice, the trustee could issue an
event of default notice.  If the event of default is issued, the
majority of the controlling class will have the ability to call
for a liquidation of the portfolio.
     
The CreditWatch placements of the class A and class B note ratings
will remain in effect pending the potential resolution of the
notice of default and reflect the uncertainties regarding the
outcome.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the
performance of the transaction to ensure that the ratings continue
to reflect the credit quality of the obligors within the
collateral pool and that the credit enhancement available is
sufficient to support the rated notes.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                       Landmark II CDO Ltd.
    
                  Rating                        Balance ($ mil.)
                  ------                        ----------------
    Class   To             From               Current     Previous
    -----   --             ----               -------     --------
    A       AA/Watch Neg   AAA                  67.84       130.51
    B       BBB/Watch Neg  AA                   12.00        12.00
    C       CCC            B/Watch Neg          24.00        24.32
    D       CC             CCC/Watch Neg         6.31         6.15
     
Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:            Landmark II CDO Ltd.
Co-issuer:         Landmark II CDO Inc.
Current manager:   Aladdin Capital Management LLC
Underwriter:       Mizuho International PLC
Trustee:           Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:  Arbitrage high-yield CLO


LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 12 2005-MF1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 12 classes and
affirmed one class of Lasalle Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
MF1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from increased leverage, reduced debt service
coverage, and anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.
The action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 20, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 26%
to $287.0 million from $387.3 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 279 mortgage loans with an
average loan size of $1.0 million.  The top 10 loans represent 10%
of the pool.

One hundred fifteen loans, representing 39% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly
reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the trust, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $2.4 million.  Eighteen
loans, representing 9% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Six of the loans, representing 2% of the pool, are
real estate owned and six loans, representing 4% of the pool, are
in the process of foreclosure.  Moody's is estimating an aggregate
$6.7 million loss from the specially serviced loans.

As of the March 20, 2009 distribution date, cumulative unpaid
interest totaled $563,000, resulting in interest shortfalls to
Classes H, J, K, L, M and N.  In general, interest shortfalls are
caused by trust expenses associated with specially serviced loans,
including special servicing fees, legal expenses and other
expenses associated with the resolution of a loan.  Interest
shortfalls can also result when the servicer only advances a
portion of the monthly principal and interest payment for a
specially serviced loan because of a decline in the value of the
underlying property (based on an appraisal reduction
determination), or the servicer recovers previous P&I over-
advances prior to a loan being liquidated.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and partial-year 2008
operating results for 89% and 13% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio is 109% compared to
96% at Moody's prior full review in November 2008.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A, $240,916,396, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 11/12/2008

  -- Class X, Notional, downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously
     affirmed at Aaa on 11/12/2008

  -- Class B, $7,263,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa2; previously
     affirmed at Aa2 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class C, $10,168,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2; previously
     affirmed at A2 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class D, $6,779,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; previously
     affirmed at Baa1 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class E, $2,905,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously
     affirmed at Baa2 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class F, $2,905,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class G, $4,842,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class H, $1,936,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     downgraded to B1 from Ba2 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class J, $1,937,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from B1 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class K, $968,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa1; previously
     downgraded to Caa1 from B2 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class L, $1,937,000, downgraded to Ca from Caa2; previously
     downgraded to Caa2 from B3 on 11/12/2008

  -- Class M, $969,000, affirmed at Ca; previously downgraded to
     Ca from Caa2 on 11/12/2008


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Moody's Affirms 'B/MR1+' Rating on Liquidity Fund
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the B/MR1+ fund rating of the
Lehman Brothers US Dollar Liquidity Fund.  This concludes a review
of the rating, which Moody's initiated on September 22, 2008.  
The Fund was terminated on March 30, 2009.  Shareholders of the
Fund received 98% of their redemption proceeds on the date of
termination.

Moody's will withdraw the rating as the Fund has terminated.  

The last rating action concerning this fund was taken on September
22, 2008 when Moody's downgraded the rating of the fund to B/MR1+
following its suspension of redemptions and placed the rating on
review for possible further downgrade.


LEHMAN MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 22 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 22
classes from Lehman Mortgage Trust 2005-1, a U.S. prime jumbo
residential mortgage-backed securities transaction issued in 2005.  
At the same time, S&P removed 21 of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, affirmed S&P's ratings on
10 classes, and removed seven of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
     
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of this transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
expected ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  In
order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P considered whether
a class absorbed losses in excess of the base-case assumptions S&P
made in S&P's analysis.  For example, S&P assess whether a class
can withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions in order to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
considers whether a different class can withstand approximately
154% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB'
rating.  An affirmed 'AAA' rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
class can withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions.
     
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is insufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels.

As part of its analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the
underlying mortgage collateral as well as macroeconomic
influences.  For example, S&P's view of the risk profile of the
underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's default projections,
while S&P's outlook for housing price declines and the health of
the housing market influences S&P's loss severity assumptions.
     
The collateral for this deal consists of prime jumbo fixed- and
adjustable-rate mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family
residential properties.  The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that
projected credit support for the affected classes is insufficient
to maintain the previous ratings.      

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates.  The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
     
S&P monitors this transaction to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether S&P believes
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings.  S&P will continue to monitor this
transaction and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

                      Lehman Mortgage Trust
                         Series    2005-1
    
                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    1-A1       52520MAA1     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    1-A3       52520MAC7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A1       52520MAD5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A2       52520MAE3     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A3       52520MAF0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A4       52520MAG8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    2-A5       52520MAH6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    3-A1       52520MAJ2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A1       52520MAK9     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A2       52520MAL7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A3       52520MAM5     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A4       52520MAN3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A5       52520MAP8     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A6       52520MAQ6     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A7       52520MAR4     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A8       52520MAS2     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A9       52520MAT0     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    4-A10      52520MAU7     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A1       52520MAV5     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    5-A2       52520MAW3     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    6-A1       52520MAX1     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    7-A1       52520MAY9     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    AP         52520MAZ6     BB                   AAA/Watch Neg
    B1         52520MBD4     CCC                  AA+/Watch Neg
    B2         52520MBE2     CCC                  AA/Watch Neg
    B3         52520MBF9     CC                   BB/Watch Neg
    B4         52520MBG7     CC                   B/Watch Neg
    B5         52520MBH5     CC                   B-/Watch Neg
    B6         52520MBK8     CC                   CCC
     
                         Ratings Affirmed

                      Lehman Mortgage Trust
                         Series    2005-1

                 Class      CUSIP         Rating
                 -----      -----         ------
                 1-A2       52520MAB9     AAA
                 AX         52520MBB8     AAA
                 PAX        52520MBC6     AAA


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from Magnolia Finance II PLC's series 2006-8B, 2006-8C,
2006-8DG, 2006-8DU, 2006-8E, and 2006-8F to 'D' from 'CCC-'.     

The lowered ratings follow a number of recent write-downs on the
underlying reference entities, which have caused the notes to
incur principal losses.

                  
                         Ratings Lowered
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8B
                 
                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8C

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8DG

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8DU

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8E

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                 
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-8F

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-


MAGNOLIA FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2006-5 Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from Magnolia Finance II PLC's series 2006-5CE, 2006-5CG,
2006-5CU, and 2006-5D2 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.     

The lowered ratings follow a number of recent write-downs on the
underlying reference entities, which have caused the notes to
incur principal losses.


                         Ratings Lowered
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CE

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CG

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                 
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5CU

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-
                  
                     Magnolia Finance II PLC
                         Series 2006-5D2

                                         Rating  
                                         ------          
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Puts Ratings on 1999-C1 Certs. on Neg. Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings places five classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc.'s mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1999-
C1 on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $32.6 million class B 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $26.7 million class C 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $8.9 million class D 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $20.7 million class E 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $7.4 million class F 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch also affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these classes:

  -- $216.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest only class IO at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $23.7 million class G at 'CC/RR3;
  -- $20.7 million class H at 'C/RR6'.

The long-term rating of the $2.4 million class J has been lowered
to 'D/RR6' due to already incurred realized losses.  Class K has
been reduced to zero due to realized losses, and class A-1 has
paid in full.  The Distressed Recovery Rating on the classes of
notes has been revised to RR to reflect Fitch's updated Rating
Definitions Criteria released March 3, 2009.

The Rating Watch Negative placements are due to future anticipated
interest shortfalls on classes B through F.  The master servicer
has declared previous advances on a specially serviced loan non-
recoverable.  It is anticipated that these advances will be
recouped from the trust in June 2009 and will impact classes B
through F.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any rating changes over the next one to two years.

The advances deemed non-recoverable were due to a specially
serviced loan (1.7%) where the asset was disposed after the loan
became real estate-owned.  There has been ongoing litigation
between the trust and the former borrower due to the borrower's
bankruptcy filing and a dispute regarding the asset's sale
proceeds.  A favorable settlement to the trust has been reached;
however, the timing and the amount of proceeds that will be
applied to the trust are unknown at this time.  The master
servicer is electing to recoup the advances before the majority of
loans in the trust mature in 2009.

Currently, there are two other assets (8.3%) in special servicing.  
The largest asset is an office building (4.2%) in Dallas, TX, that
lost its sole tenant.  As of January 2009, the building was 11%
occupied. The debt service payments are currently being made by
reserves.

The next largest specially serviced asset has been real-estate
owned since 2005 and is listed for sale.  he property is an office
building (4.1%) in Irving, TX, that is currently 60% occupied.

As of the March 2009 distribution date, the transaction balance
has been reduced by 39.2% to $360.0 million from $592.5 million at
issuance.  In total, 23 loans (31%) have defeased, including three
(11.6%) of the top 10 loans in the pool.


MEZZ CAP: S&P Puts Ratings on 28 Classes on Negative Watch
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 28
classes of certificates from Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust's
series 2004-C1, 2004-C2, 2005-C3, 2006-C4, and 2007-C5 on
CreditWatch with negative implications.
     
The negative CreditWatch placements reflect Standard & Poor's
preliminary analysis of the specially serviced loans and other
credit-impaired loans in the transactions.  S&P's analysis assumes
higher loss severities than are typical for commercial mortgage-
backed securities loans due to the subordinated nature of the
collateral, which consists of class B notes.  In addition, the
CreditWatch placements reflect the unfavorable performance of each
of the collateral pools, which have an average delinquency rate of
13.31%.

Our analysis also considered the reported interest shortfalls as
of the March 17, 2009, trustee remittance reports and anticipated
shortfalls for each of the respective transactions.  The
shortfalls occurred after the master servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A.
(Wachovia), declared future payment advances nonrecoverable on 67
loans of 494 loans (14%) in the five transactions.  Loan servicers
generally make nonrecoverable determinations when they assess that
future advances may not be recoverable from ongoing property cash
flows or the ultimate disposition of the specially serviced
assets.  Standard & Poor's preliminary assessment indicates that
the shortfalls are likely to recur for a prolonged period of time.
     
Standard & Poor's will resolve the CreditWatch negative placements
when S&P completes its review of the specially serviced assets and
review the credit characteristics of the remaining loans in the
pools.
    
              Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

               Rating
               ------
     Class   To               From     Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --               ----     ----------------------
     A       AAA/Watch Neg    AAA                       38.72
     B       AA+/Watch Neg    AA+                       32.68
     C       AA-/Watch Neg    AA-                       27.75
     D       BBB+/Watch Neg   BBB+                      21.71
     E       BBB/Watch Neg    BBB                       18.56
     G       BB/Watch Neg     BB                        12.66
    
                Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C2

               Rating
               ------
     Class   To               From     Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --               ----     ----------------------
     A       AAA/Watch Neg    AAA                       32.04
     B       AA/Watch Neg     AA                        27.86
     C       A/Watch Neg      A                         24.60
     D       BBB/Watch Neg    BBB                       19.51
     E       BB+/Watch Neg    BB+                       17.42

                Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C3

               Rating
               ------
     Class   To               From     Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --               ----     ----------------------
     A       AAA/Watch Neg    AAA                       33.82
     B       AA/Watch Neg     AA                        30.87
     C       A/Watch Neg      A                         27.80
     D       BBB/Watch Neg    BBB                       22.68
     E       BBB-/Watch Neg   BBB-                      19.73

                Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C4

               Rating
               ------
     Class   To               From     Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --               ----     ----------------------
     A       AAA/Watch Neg     AAA                       29.39
     B       AA/Watch Neg      AA                        26.77
     C       A/Watch Neg       A                         24.15
     D       BBB/Watch Neg     BBB                       19.95
     E       BBB-/Watch Neg    BBB-                      18.51
     F       BB/Watch Neg      BB                        15.50

                Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C5
            
               Rating
               ------
     Class   To               From     Credit enhancement (%)
     -----   --               ----     ----------------------
     A       AAA/Watch Neg     AAA                       29.53
     B       AA/Watch Neg      AA                        27.40
     C       A/Watch Neg       A                         24.52
     D       BBB/Watch Neg     BBB                       20.39
     E       BBB-/Watch Neg    BBB-                      18.51
     F       BB/Watch Neg      BB                        15.38


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: DBRS Junks Series 2006-1 Notes Classes N and P
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Bond Rating Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2006-1:

   -- Class J to BB from BB (high)
   -- Class K to BB (low) from BB
   -- Class L to B (high) from BB (low)
   -- Class M to B from B (high)
   -- Class N to CCC from B
   -- Class P to CCC from B (low)

The changes primarily reflect an increase in the number of
delinquent loans and the potential losses that may result since
DBRS's last review.  While the estimated losses are expected to be
contained to the unrated Class Q, the resulting credit enhancement
levels were not sufficient to confirm all ratings within the
transaction.  Credit enhancement was sufficient to confirm the A
Classes and Classes B through H.  All trends of the transaction
are Stable.

Since its last review, the number of delinquent loans has
increased from one 30-day delinquent loan (0.1% of the pool) to
six delinquent or specially serviced loans, totaling 1.8% of the
pool.  These six loans are collateralized by three multi-family
complexes, two office properties and one retail center and have
all reported significant declines in performance.  Of the five
loans in special servicing (1.7% of the pool), only one loan, New
City Office (0.5% of the pool), is current.  The special servicer
is currently evaluating resolution options and DBRS has estimated
potential losses for these loans, which can be found within the
performance update report.

DBRS also increased its HotList to a total of ten loans, or 5.2%
of the transaction. The two largest of these loans, Inglewood Park
and Colonial Mall Glynn Place (combined 3.1% of the transaction),
were previously HotListed and have continued to experience
occupancy-related issues; however, both loans remain current. DBRS
will continue to monitor the transaction's delinquent, specially
serviced and HotListed loans closely through its "Monthly CMBS
Surveillance Report."

The majority of the remaining loans in the transaction have
maintained stable performance since issuance, reporting a
weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (WADSCR) of 1.60
times (x) (on a whole-loan and P&I basis). There has been little
change in the pool's underlying collateral since issuance as 148
of the original 152 loans remain after four small loans (0.4% of
the pool balance at issuance) prepaid from the pool. The deal is
concentrated, with its 10 largest loans accounting for 46.2% of
the pool. It also has a high concentration in retail properties,
which represent 38.4% of the current pool balance.  The retail
concentration, however, is diversified by type, including regional
malls and anchored and unanchored shopping centers. As of April
2009, the transaction has a total balance of $2,094,775,873,
representing a cumulative collateral reduction of 2.2% since
issuance.

The transaction also benefits from having three shadow-rated
investment-grade loans (totaling 13.5% of the pool). These shadow
ratings are associated with the A-Note piece(s) of Kenwood Towne
Centre (Kenwood, 6.7% of the current pool balance), rated AAA; 60
State Street (6.2% of the current pool balance), rated AAA; and
Southern California Ground Lease Portfolio (0.6% of the pool),
rated "A".  The Kenwood loan is jointly owned by Teacher's
Retirement System of the State of Illinois and a General Growth
Properties (GGP) related special-purpose entity (SPE).  GGP has
recently filed for bankruptcy protection after having difficulties
with financing its maturing debt.  The loan's shadow rating
continues to be supported by the performance of the asset and
credit enhancement provided by the subordinate B-Note.  However,
if the loan is ultimately transferred to special servicing as a
result of the bankruptcy, the transaction will be subject to a
loss from a potential 1% special servicing fee and additional
expenses.  DBRS will continue to monitor the events following
GGP's filing.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2006-1 Certs. to Low-B
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades nine classes of ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust's 2006-1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates and revises Rating Outlooks:

  -- $24.1 million class F to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $16.1 million class G to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $26.8 million class H to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;  
  -- $5.4 million class J to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.4 million class K to 'BB-' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8 million class L to 'B+' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $2.7 million class M to 'B' from 'B+'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $8 million class N to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $5.4 million class P to 'CCC/RR1' from 'B-'.

Additionally, Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating
Outlooks:

  -- $27.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $337.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $105.1 million class A-3FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $75 million class A-3B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $121 million class A-SB at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $489.5 million class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $240 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $214.2 million class AM at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $82.1 million class AJ at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class AN-FL at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Interest-only class X at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $50.9 million class B at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $21.4 million class C at 'AA-'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $29.4 million class D at 'A'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $16.1 million class E at 'A-'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $26.8 million class Q.

The downgrades are due to the expected losses from five loans
(1.7%) which transferred to special servicing since Fitch's last
rating action.  All of the specially serviced loans are currently
delinquent and the special servicer is still in negotiations with
the borrowers.  In total, Fitch considers 19 loans (10.01%) to be
Fitch Loans of Concern, including the specially serviced loans,
due to low occupancies, low debt service coverage ratios or
sponsors with issues.  These concerns are reflected in the
Negative Outlooks.

The largest specially serviced loan (0.51%) is secured by an
office property in New City, NY.  The largest tenant recently
vacated the property and the borrower is having difficulty leasing
the vacant space.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.32%) is secured by
an unanchored retail center in Kissimmee, FL.  The property was
approximately 55% occupied as of year-end 2008 and cash flow from
the property is insufficient to cover debt service.

The third (0.3%) and fourth (0.27%) largest specially serviced
loans have common sponsorship and are secured by multi-family
properties in Barstow, CA.  The loans were transferred pending
sale of the properties and assumption of the loans which have now
fallen through.  The properties remain on the market.

The final specially serviced loan (0.27%) is secured by a multi-
family property in Stanford, FL.  The loan transferred due to
notice of imminent default by the borrower.  Fitch believes that
losses on all of the specially serviced loans are likely though
not yet imminent.

As of the March 2009 remittance report, the transaction has paid
down 2.1% to $2.1 billion from $2.14 billion at issuance.  There
are no loans maturing in 2009 and 8.4% mature in 2010.

Three loans (13.5%) are shadow rated by Fitch: Kenwood Towne
Centre (6.7%), 60 State Street (6.2%) and Southern California
Ground Leases (0.6%).  Based on their stable performance since
issuance the loans maintain their investment grade credit
assessments.

The Kenwood Towne Center loan is secured by 867,504 square feet
(sf) of in-line space within a 1.13 million sf regional mall in
Cincinnati, OH.  As of year-end 2008, in-line occupancy at the
property was 95.5% compared to 98.8% at issuance.  The loan's
sponsor is General Growth Properties and the loan matures in
December 2010.

The 60 State Street loan is secured by an 823,014 sf office
building in Boston, MA.  Major tenants include Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr and The Pioneering Group.  Occupancy as of
year-end 2008 was 96.6% compared to 98% at issuance.

The Southern California Ground Leases loan is secured by the
ground leases of four industrial properties located in Los
Angeles, Brea, and Culver City, CA.  Occupancy at the properties
as of year-end 2008 has remained stable at 100% since issuance.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class H Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------  
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks to Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2003-HQ2:

  -- $124 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $522.2 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only classes X-1 and X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $39.6 million class B at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $41.9 million class C at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class D at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class E at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;  
  -- $10.5 million class F at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.2 million class G at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $14 million class H at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate classes J, K, L, M, N, and O.

The affirmations are the result of stable pool performance since
Fitch's last rating action.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the
likely direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one
to two years.  As of the March 2009 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has decreased 13.9% to $801.8 million,
from $931.6 million at issuance.  Thirteen loans (17.8%) have
defeased since issuance.

There are currently two specially serviced loans (1.7%).  The
larger specially serviced loan (1.1%) is secured by a 142,322
square foot retail property located in Aberdeen, WA.  The loan
transferred Jan. 9, 2009 after the tenant-in-common sponsor and
master lessee, DBSI, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
The loan is 90 days delinquent.  As of third-quarter 2008, the
servicer-reported debt service coverage ratio was 1.63 times (x),
and the occupancy was 93%.

The smaller specially serviced loan (0.5%) transferred Jan. 9,
2009 and is secured by a 40,331 sf retail property located in Lake
Worth, TX.  The property was 64% occupied as of the March
remittance date, and had a servicer-reported DSCR of 0.90x through
Sept. 30, 2008, compared to 0.59x at year-end 2007.  According to
the special servicer, the property is well located but suffers
from poor visibility.

The Fitch-projected losses for both specially serviced assets are
expected to be fully absorbed by the unrated class O.  Including
the specially serviced loans (1.7%), four loans (2.9%) have been
designated Fitch Loans of Concern.

Five loans (42.1%), one of which has repaid in full, were shadow
rated investment grade at issuance.  The four remaining shadow
ratings remain investment grade.

The 1290 Avenue of the Americas loan (20%) is secured by a 43-
story class A office building totaling 2 million sf, which is
located in Midtown Manhattan.  The whole loan was divided into
four pari passu notes and a subordinate B note.  Only the $126.5
million A-4 and the $34.1 million A-5 notes are included in the
trust.  As of Sept. 30, 2008, occupancy stood at 99%, unchanged
from issuance.  The Fitch stressed DSCR through third-quarter 2008
was 1.66x, compared to 1.46x at issuance.

The Oakbrook Center loan (9.4%) is secured by the fee interest in
942,039 sf of owned retail space; 240,223 sf of office space in
three buildings; and the ground leases for a 172-room Renaissance
Hotel, and the Nordstrom, Neiman Marcus, and Bloomingdale's Home
Store anchor spaces.  The property is located in Oak Brook, IL.  
The whole loan was divided into four pari passu notes, one of
which is included in the trust.  Occupancy was 95% as of September
2008, compared to 94% at issuance.  The Fitch stressed DSCR
through third-quarter 2008 was 2.13x, compared to 1.49x at
issuance.  General Growth Properties and California Public
Employees' Retirement System are the loan sponsors.  The loan
matures Oct. 1, 2012.

The 52 Broadway loan (6.9%) is secured by a 399,935 sf single
tenant office property located in the downtown submarket of
Manhattan.  The property has been 100% occupied since issuance,
and the tenant's lease extends through 2034.  The Fitch stressed
DSCR was 1.63x through year-end 2008, compared to 1.52x at
issuance.

The TruServ Portfolio I loan (3.1%) is secured by three industrial
properties located in Springfield, OR, Fogelsville, PA, and
Kingman, AZ.  The properties are leased to TruServ on three
separate triple-net leases expiring 2022, and the portfolio has
remained 100% occupied since issuance.  Through third-quarter
2008, the Fitch stressed DSCR was 1.90x. This compares to 1.60x at
issuance.

There is limited near-term refinance risk to the transaction.  The
next scheduled maturities do not occur until 2012, when 33.8% of
the loans mature.

The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect the pool's concentration
risk, as the top 10 loans represent 70.3% of the outstanding
principal balance.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Puts Ratings on 2007-XLF Notes on Neg. Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed these classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc., series 2007-XLF on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $41.2 million class C at 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $25.2 million class D at 'AA-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $27.4 million class E at 'A+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $26.3 million class F at 'A'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $26.6 million class G at 'A-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $13.5 million class H from at 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $20.6 million class J at 'BB+'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $20.6 million class K at 'BB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $21.1 million class L at 'BB-'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $5.5 million class M-HRO at 'BBB'; Rating Watch Negative;
  -- $8.4 million class N-HRO at 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Negative.

The Rating Watch Negative is due to the transfer of two loans, HRO
Hotel Portfolio (18.7%) and Le Meridian Cancun (3.2%), to special
servicing since Fitch's last review in November 2008.  The HRO
Portfolio transferred on April 15, 2009 and Le Meridian
transferred on March 20, 2009.  The special servicers are still in
the process of determining a workout strategy for the loans.

The HRO Hotel Portfolio, the largest loan in the pool, transferred
to the special servicer due to imminent default.  The loan is
collateralized by six full-service hotels (there were seven at
issuance, one has been released) that are all undergoing
significant renovations.  The loan is currently delinquent and the
borrower has requested relief from debt service payments.  The
combination of ongoing renovations at the properties and the
economic downturn has put significant pressure on the cash flow at
the properties.

The servicer also reported a mechanics lien may be filed on one of
the properties due to unpaid bills for the renovations.  At
closing, the sponsors, Morgan Stanley Real Estate fund, California
State Teachers Retirement System and Pyramid Advisors, LLC posted
a letter of credit in the amount of $102.1 million ($43,000/key)
for the renovations.  As of April 9, 2009, the LOC had a remaining
balance of $31.5 million.  The loan exercised its first extension
option and has an extended maturity date of Oct. 9, 2009.  There
are two one-year extensions remaining.

Le Meridian transferred to the special servicer due to imminent
default.  The loan is currently delinquent.  The property, located
in Cancun, Mexico has experienced a decline in Fitch-stressed net
cash flow by approximately 60% since issuance based on servicer-
provided Feb. 28, 2009 trailing 12 month financial statements.  
The decline is due primarily to lower occupancy and average daily
rate over the past year as compared to issuance and continued
pressures on vacation destinations such as Cancun.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two 1998-CF1 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes and
upgraded three classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-CF1.  
The upgrades are due to increased subordination due to
amortization and payoffs and overall stable pool performance.  The
pool balance has decreased by 58% since last review.  The action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 16, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 89%
to $124.7 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 58 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the 10 largest loans
representing 51% of the pool.  Five loans, representing 8% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Twelve loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Forty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of approximately $76.5 million.  
Classes J, K, L, M and N have been eliminated entirely due to
losses and Class H has experienced a loss of $6.2 million.  Three
loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Two of the loans, representing 2.5% of the pool, are
secured by healthcare properties and the third is secured by a
multifamily property.  Moody's is estimating an aggregate loss of
approximately $3.9 million for the specially serviced loans.

As of the most recent distribution date, unpaid interest totaled
$5.8 million for Class H.  In general, interest shortfalls are
caused by trust expenses associated with specially serviced loans,
including special servicing fees, legal expenses and other
expenses associated with the resolution of a loan.  Interest
shortfalls can also result when the servicer only advances a
portion of the monthly principal and interest payment for a
specially serviced loan because of a decline in the value of the
underlying property (based on an appraisal reduction
determination), or the servicer recovers previous P&I over-
advances prior to a loan being liquidated.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2007 and partial or full-year
2008 operating results for 83% and 71% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's loan to value ratio is 74%, the same as in Moody's prior
full review in April 2008.

The top three non-defeased loans represent 7.9% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Bristol Market Place Loan ($9.9 million --
7.9%) which is secured by a 99,256 square foot retail center
located in Santa Ana, California.  The major tenants include Smart
& Final and a Sav-On.  The center was 92% occupied as of February
2009 compared to 98% at last review.  Moody's LTV is 71% compared
to 72% at last review.

The second largest loan is the Preston Place Apartments Loan ($9.2
million -- 7.4%) which is secured by a 239-unit multifamily
property located in Plano, Texas. Performance has been stable
since last review.  Moody's LTV is 50% compared to 51% at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Van Dorn Station Loan ($7.4 million
-- 6.0%) which is secured by a 75,000 square foot retail center
located in Alexandria, Virginia.  The center is primarily tenanted
by restaurants and service tenants.  Performance has been stable
since last review.  Moody's valuation of this loan incorporates a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about the retail
environment.  Moody's LTV is 50% compared to 49% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on April 7, 2008

  -- Class D, $45,081,272, upgraded to Aaa from Aa2; previously
     upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3 on April 7, 2008

  -- Class E, $19,378,000, upgraded to A2 from Baa2; previously
     upgraded to Baa2 from Ba2 on April 7, 2008

  -- Class F, $22,146,000, upgraded to B2 from B3; previously
     upgraded to B3 from Caa2 on April 7, 2008

  -- Class G, $33,218,000, affirmed at C; previously affirmed at C
     on April 7, 2008

  -- Class H, $4,850,335, affirmed at C; previously affirmed at C
     on April 7, 2008


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Corrects Rating on Two Classes of 2006-8 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on two
classes of Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's secured fixed-rate notes
series 2006-8 by lowering its rating on the $3 million class A-7
notes to 'CCC+' from 'B' and raising its rating on the $3 million
class A-11 notes to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The class A-7 notes remain
on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed
June 29, 2007.     

The rating actions follow the March 17, 2009, lowering of S&P's
rating on Huntsman International LLC's $175 million 7.375% senior
subordinated notes due Jan. 1, 2015 (the reference obligation of
the class A-7 notes) to 'CCC+' from 'B' and the March 18, 2009,
raising of S&P's rating on Rock-Tenn Co.'s $250 million 8.2%
senior secured notes due Aug. 15, 2011 (the reference obligation
of the class A-11 notes) to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The Huntsman
International notes remain on CreditWatch negative, where they
were placed Feb. 11, 2005.
     
The ratings on the class A-7 and A-11 notes are dependent on the
lowest of the rating on the related reference obligation; the
rating on Morgan Stanley ('A'), which acts as the swap payments
guarantor; or the rating on the underlying security, BA Master
Credit Card Trust II's class A floating-rate asset-backed
certificates series 2001-B due Aug. 15, 2013 ('AAA').


MWAM CBO: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades one class, affirms two classes, and
upgrades one class of notes issued by MWAM CBO 2001-1 Ltd./Inc.:

  -- $77,198,607 class A notes downgraded to 'BBB' from 'AA+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $21,875,000 class B notes upgraded to 'CCC' from 'C';

  -- $16,943,840 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $12,122,443 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch has also removed class A from Rating Watch Negative.  
Additionally, Fitch has removed the Distressed Recovery ratings
from the class B, C-1 and C-2 notes.

The class A notes were assigned a Stable Outlook reflecting
Fitch's expectation that the rating will remain stable over the
next one to two years.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to
classes rated 'CCC' or below.

The downgrade to the class A notes is the result of credit
deterioration experienced since Fitch's review in September 2007
and reflects Fitch's view on the credit risk of the rated notes
following the release of its new rating criteria for structured
finance collateralized debt obligations.  Fitch now considers
49.7% of the portfolio to be rated below investment grade and
28.3% to be rated 'CCC+' or lower.  Approximately 4.1% of the
portfolio is now considered defaulted per the transaction's
governing documents.

The class B notes are expected to continue receiving timely
accrued interest distributions as the class A
overcollateralization ratio is 113.3% relative to its trigger of
110% and the class A interest coverage test is passing by a large
margin.  Further, there is a cash flow swap with CDC Financial
Products, Inc. that ensures timely interest distributions to both
class A and class B.  Based on the performance expectations of the
'CCC+' or lower rated portion of the portfolio, there is potential
for principal losses to the class B notes.  The class C-1 and C-2
notes are not expected to receive any distributions going forward,
because the class B OC test is failing its covenant and unlikely
to cure.

Approximately 26.9% of the portfolio supporting MWAM 2001-1
consists of investment grade inverse floater (7.7%) and range
floater (19.2%) securities.  Due to the current interest rate
environment, the inverse floaters are paying close to their
respective interest rate caps, some of which are greater than 20%
per annum, while the range floaters are not paying any interest
because LIBOR is below their respective lower bounds.  Fitch
tested the impact of the performance of these securities on the
rated notes using various interest rate and default timing
stresses.

MWAM 2001-1 is a SF CDO that closed on Jan. 24, 2001 and is
managed by Metropolitan West Asset Management.  The portfolio is
comprised of corporate bonds (44.4%), residential mortgage-backed
securities (27.6%), commercial asset-backed securities (12.5%),
commercial mortgage-backed securities (7.1%), SF CDOs (6.2%), and
real estate investment trusts (2.2%) issued between 1997 and 2003.

These rating actions resolve the 'Under Analysis' status issued on
Oct. 14, 2008, following Fitch's announcement of its proposed
criteria revision for analyzing SF CDOs.  The revised criteria
report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs', was
published in its final form on Dec. 16, 2008 along with an updated
version of the Fitch Portfolio Credit Model that includes
additional functionality for analyzing SF CDOs.  As part of this
review, Fitch made standard adjustments for any names on Rating
Watch Negative or with a Negative Outlook, downgrading such
ratings for default analysis purposes by three and one notches,
respectively.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of fifteen
classes of Notes issued by Newcastle CDO VIII 1, Limited and
Newcastle CDO VIII 2, Limited.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class S, $33,869,009, Notional Due 2011, downgraded to A1
     from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Class I-A, $462,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to A1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class I-AR, $60,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to A1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class I-B, $38,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Baa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class II, $42,750,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Ba1 from Aa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class III, $42,750,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Ba3 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class IV, $28,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to B1 from Aa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class V, $28,500,000, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa1 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class VI, $27,312,500, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class VII, $21,375,000, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa3 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class VIII, $22,562,500, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class IX-FL, $6,000,000, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class IX-FX, $7,600,000, Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class X, $19,650,000, Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class XII, $28,500,000, Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade
     
Moody's downgraded all Classes due to deteriorating pool
performance and revised modeling parameters.  Moody's ratings are
based on the current credit quality of the collateral and may not
reflect potential migration as per the legal documentation.

The pool contains a 36.6% concentration in mezzanine loans.  The
remaining collateral includes real estate bank loans, commercial
mortgage backed securities, commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligations, asset backed securities, B-Notes, real estate
investment trust debt and rake bonds.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral. The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5. With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated November 1, 2007.


NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 39 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 39
tranches from 9 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Nomura.  The
collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of first-
lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.

Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%. The results
of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline Losses -
are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guarantyand is as described in the two previous
paragraphs.

List of actions:

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2003-A2

  -- Cl. B6, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa1

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AP1

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 3/16/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B3

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AP2

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B3

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AP3

  -- Cl. A-5A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (currently
     Ba3 )

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B2

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. V-M-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. V-M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/17/2004
     Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B1

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AR2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to B1

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AR3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Ba2

Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp ALT 2004-AR4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/16/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to A3

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/16/2008
     Downgraded to Caa1

Nomura Asset Sec Corp 1994-3

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/21/1994 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA (currently B3)

  -- Cl. IO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/21/1994 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/21/1994 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/21/1994 Assigned
     Ba2


NOMURA CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 2007-2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 14 classes of
Notes and confirmed two classes of Notes issued by Nomura CRE CDO
2007-2 Ltd.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-R, $75,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1, $471,131,250, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $60,681,250, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042;
     downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $70,537,500, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to A3 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $26,600,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $27,075,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Ba1 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $20,425,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Ba2 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $21,612,500, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Ba3 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $24,937,500, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to B1 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $20,187,500, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $25,175,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, $22,800,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L, $8,787,500, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, downgraded
     to Caa2 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class M, $5,700,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, downgraded
     to Caa2 from Ba3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class N, $8,075,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, downgraded
     to Caa3 from B1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class O, $12,825,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2042,
     downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, M,
N, and O due to revised modeling parameters.

The pool contains approximately a 9.0% concentration in CMBS and
CDO collateral and the remaining is comprised of whole loans, B-
Notes, and mezzanine debt.  Moody's ratings are based on the
current credit quality of the collateral and may not reflect
potential migration as per the legal documentation.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first full review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated March 13, 2007.


OWS CLO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, X-1, X-2, B, C, and D notes issued by OWS CLO I
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction backed by
corporate loans.  At the same time, S&P placed its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, X-1, and X-2 on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  The class B, C, and D note ratings remain on
CreditWatch negative.
     
The lowered ratings reflect, among other factors, an increase in
defaults and deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
collateral in the portfolio since S&P initially assigned the
ratings in November 2005.  Based on the Feb. 28, 2009, monthly
trustee report, 6.96% ($20.24 million) of the total securities in
the underlying collateral pool have ratings of 'CCC+' and below,
up from 2.02% ($5.95 million) as of November 2005.
     
OWS CLO I Ltd. triggered an event of default on March 20, 2009,
under section 5.01(h) of the indenture, when the class A over
collateralization ratio fell below 100%.  The class A O/C ratio
calculation includes a market value-based haircut.  Based on the
trustee report dated Feb. 28, 2009, the haircut was $48.65
million.  
     
As a result of defaults and the market value-based haircuts in the
calculation of the par coverage tests, the transaction failed its
O/C ratio tests.  Based on the trustee report dated Feb. 28, 2009,
the O/C ratio for the class A notes was 84.94%, versus the
required 108.50%.  The failure of the O/C ratio tests has
prevented the mezzanine and subordinate classes from receiving
current interest, and the diverted interest is being used to
reduce the balance of the senior notes.
     
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
transaction to determine the stability of the tranches at their
respective rating levels.

                          Rating Actions

                          OWS CLO I Ltd.

                  Rating
                  ------
Class    To                 From         Current balance (mil. $)
-----    --                 ----         ------------------------
A-1      AA+/Watch Neg      AAA                           235.500
A-2      AA-/Watch Neg      AAA                            14.500
X-1      BB+/Watch Neg      A+                              1.985
X-2      BB+/Watch Neg      A+                              7.568
B        B/Watch Neg        A-/Watch Neg                   14.000
C        CCC/Watch Neg      BBB-/Watch Neg                  8.048
D        CCC-/Watch Neg     BB/Watch Neg                    8.695


PASS-THROUGH AUCTION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Notes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of
$65,000,000 Class A Certificates and $16,250,000 Class B
Certificates issued by Pass-Through Auction Market Preferred
Securities, Series 2007-1.

The rating actions are:

Class Description: $65,000,000 Class A Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

Class Description: $16,250,000 Class B Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
ratings of the Underlying Securities.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the ratings of Floating Rate Non-
Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 2 issued by Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc. and Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series
5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. which were both downgraded
to B3 on March 25, 2009.


POOLED COLLEGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2007 Bonds to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, the
rating on The Pooled College and University Projects, Series 2007
Revenue Bonds issued by the California Educational Facilities
Authority, based on the change in the mix of credit quality of the
pool.  Moody's believes the credit fundamentals of pool
participant Keck Graduate Institute, have noticeably weakened.  
The rating outlook remains stable.  The rating action affects
$36.6 million of outstanding bonds.

Moody's rating is based on a blended assessment of California
College of the Arts (Baa3/stable), Dominican University of
California (Baa3/stable), Keck Graduate Institute (not rated) and
Woodbury University (Baa3/stable).  Moody's have considered the
relative share of each participant in the remaining bond
maturities of the pool, the participants' underlying credit
quality and the corresponding expected loss (default frequency
times loss severity) for their rating categories.  Moody's then
calculated a weighted average of the expected loss of all pool
participants, and assign an overall pool rating that corresponds
to the weighted average expected loss.

LEGAL SECURITY: The bonds are secured by several, not joint,
obligations of each borrower with respect to its own bonds.  As
several obligations, borrowing institutions have obligations to
the pool for only their own pro rata share of the total debt
service and are not responsible for the default of other
borrowers.  The debt service reserve fund is comprised of separate
portions of the debt service reserve fund covering each
participant, with no joint reserve fund.  The bonds are secured
equally and ratably by the base loan payments made by each
borrowing institution.  Additionally, each borrower will grant a
lien on certain property and have a gross revenue pledge.  There
is no credit support at the pool level, such as over-
collateralization or a shared reserve fund.

* Participant: California College of the Arts
* Percentage of Pool: 29%
* Rating: Baa3
* Outlook: Stable
* Last report date: September 2, 2008

California College of the Arts' Baa3 rating with a stable outlook
is based on its market niche as an urban art and design college
enrolling approximately 1,500 FTE in fall 2007; adequate operating
cash flow supported by ongoing growth in tuition revenue;
increased diversification in its investment portfolio and recent
fundraising success on a $25 million capital campaign.  Offsetting
these strengths is a highly competitive California student market
with dependency on student charges (83% in FY07) making the CCA
vulnerable to fluctuation in enrollment; weakened financial
performance with declining operating margins; thin expendable
resources providing a limited cushion of 0.56 times and 0.49 times
in FY07); no additional debt capacity at the current rating level
as the College is highly leveraged, with debt service still
consuming nearly 9% of operations.

* Participant: Dominican University of California
* Percentage of Pool: 29%
* Rating: Baa3
* Outlook: Stable
* Last report date: April 18, 2008

Dominican University of California's Baa3 rating with a stable
outlook is based on the solid market position as a private,
independent institution in Marin County, enrollment is expected to
remain relatively stable at 1,934 FTE in fall 2007; healthy
increases in net tuition per student; continued improvement in
operating performance with a FY2007 three-year average operating
margin of 10.5%.  Challenges offsetting the strengths are a
leveraged capital profile with decreasing expendable financial
resources now thinly cushioning outstanding debt 0.28 times;
historically limited fundraising, strong competition in California
for higher education and limited room at the current rating level
to support additional debt without growth in unrestricted
liquidity.

* Participant: Keck Graduate Institute of Applied Sciences (Keck *
  or KGI)

* Percentage of Pool: 23%

* Rating: Not Rated

Keck Graduate Institute is a small graduate school, established in
1997 as a member of the Claremont Colleges consortium.  Providing
a masters and a PhD program in biosciences, Keck enrolled a small
87 full-time equivalent in fall 2008, well below the projection of
120 FTE, while discount rates remain relatively high at 45%.
Applications continue to rise with 194 applications in fall 2008,
compared to 97 in 2004.  However, Moody's remains concerned over
medium-term enrollment given KGI's international student draw and
weakened access to international student loan programs as well as
increased competition from within California and abroad.
Matriculation rates have fallen to 45% from 61% over the past four
years.

Financial performance has improved from large double-digit
deficits to negative 6.4% in FY08, however Keck remains heavily
reliant on gifts from the W. M. Keck Foundation to support
operations.  Substantial operating imbalances in the previous
years were driven by start-up (research) expenses and substantial
discounting to recruit students.  While large start-up investments
are no longer needed, the need for student discounting is likely
to persist, as are the operating deficits.  The second round of
support from the Keck Foundation provides $20 million over a seven
year period (2004-2011), with a required match (1.5 times) from
KGI.  To date, KGI has received $15 million from the Foundation
and has raised over $26 million in matching funds.  Moody's
remains concerned that operations will begin to weaken
considerably after the last $2 million installment of the
Foundation's grant is received in 2011.  Notably, in the current
year, KGI has received $10.4 million in cash due to a land sale.  
Given the extent of the support required by operations, these
funds do not provide a long-term solution. KGI will begin paying
principal on their portion of the Series 2007 bonds in 2011.
Operating cash flow in FY08 provided an adequate 1.1 times maximum
annual debt service.

At the end of FY08, KGI's $14.7 million of expendable financial
resources provided adequate cushion of 1.7x debt and one year of
operations. Moody's note that financial resources have been
pressured since the end of the fiscal year however, given the
recent investment market volatility.  Management notes a negative
18% investment return for the first six months of the fiscal year.  
Assuming a 30% decline in financial resources to reflect
investment losses and endowment spending, expendable resources
would provide 1.2 times coverage of debt and 0.7 times coverage of
annual operations.  The $10.4 million in cash which KGI received
is maintained outside the endowment, improving Keck's liquidity to
approximately $13 million.  KGI has no plans for additional
borrowing.

* Participant: Woodbury University
* Percentage of Pool: 19%
* Rating: Baa3
* Outlook: Stable
* Last report date: June 9, 2008

Woodbury University's Baa3 rating with a stable outlook is based
on its focus on programs in architecture and business as well as
its location in Burbank, leading to continued enrollment growth
with 1,400 FTE in fall 2007, up 23% over the past five years;
solid increases in net tuition per student due primarily to
increase in tuition charges, management's priority on endowment
growth for both operations and fundraising has translated into a
nearly 70% increase in financial resources over the past three
years to a $16.8 million total base in FY2007.  Challenges
offsetting the strengths are strong competition in the region for
higher education with dependency on student charges (89% in
FY2007) stressing the importance of continued successful
recruitment and retention of students; limited room at the current
rating level to support additional debt without growth in
unrestricted liquidity; financial resources providing limited
coverage of debt and operations despite strong growth in
unrestricted resources.

                             Outlook

The rating outlook is stable based on the current blend of credit
quality of the pool with three of the four participants
maintaining a stable outlook.  Further deterioration in the credit
quality of the other participant, KGI, would not directly impact
the pool rating unless it moved more than one rating notch.

              What Could Change the Rating - Up/Down

Because Moody's ratings are based on the overall credit quality of
each pool, there are likely to be rating changes as the mix of
credit quality in the pool changes over time.  These changes are
based not only on upgrades and downgrades of the individual
participants, but also on changes over time in the participants'
relative share of the debt obligation, due to both scheduled
maturities and refundings.

The last rating action and report with respect to this series, was
published on January 23, 2007, when the rating and outlook was
affirmed.


PPLUS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Ratings on $40 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on PPLUS
Trust Series FMC-1's $40 million trust certificates to 'D' from
'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.45% global landmark securities due
July 16, 2031, to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating on the trust certificates is dependent on the rating on
Ford Motor Co.'s global landmark securities.


PREFERRED PASS-THROUGH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of
$50,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust Certificates and
$10,000,000 Class B Leveraged Trust Certificates issued by
Preferred Pass-Through Trust 2007-A.

The rating actions are:

Class Description: $50,000,000 Class A Auction Rate Trust
Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

Class Description: $10,000,000 Class B Leveraged Trust
Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Securities.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Floating Rate Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock, Series 5 issued by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
which was downgraded to B3 on March 25, 2009.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Cuts Rating on $50 Mil. Certs. To 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series FRD-1's $50 million trust certificates
to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.40% debentures due Nov. 1, 2046, to
'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on Ford
Motor Co.'s debentures.


PREMIUM LOAN: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class X, B, C, and D notes issued by Premium Loan Trust I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction originated in November
2004 and backed by corporate loans managed by Lehman Bros. Asset
Management LLC.  The ratings on the class B, C, and D notes remain
on CreditWatch with negative implications.  At the same time, S&P
placed its rating on the class X notes on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Lastly, the rating on the class A notes
remains on CreditWatch negative.     

The lowered ratings reflect an increase in defaults and
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying collateral
in the portfolio since the notes were issued.  As of Feb. 27,
2009, Standard & Poor's collateralized debt obligation asset
database indicated that 8.34% ($12.8 million) of the assets in the
transaction had ratings in the 'CCC' category, compared with 3.49%
($8.9 million) as of March 24, 2005.  In addition, the amount of
assets rated 'D' increased to 3.87% ($5.9 million) from 3.23%
($8.0 million) over the same period.  The increases in credit
deterioration and defaults have reduced the level of credit
enhancement (provided primarily by overcollateralization)
available to support the rated notes.      

In addition, due to an over collateralization ratio feature that
carries discounted assets at the lower of the market value and the
purchase price of the underlying loans, the class A over
collateralization ratio has fallen below 103%, which triggered an
event of default.  Due to the failure of the class A over
collateralization test, all waterfall payments after
administrative expenses are currently being used to pay down the
class A notes, which is causing the deferment of payments to the
subordinate notes.  The rating on the class A notes remains at its
current level due to the existence of adequate credit to support
the rating at its current level and because the class A notes
currently receive all waterfall payments after administrative
expenses.  The class A notes have paid down approximately 45.63%
of their original balance.
     
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of the
transaction to determine the stability of the tranches at their
current rating levels.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                     Premium Loan Trust I Ltd.

                             Rating
                             ------
          Class      To                  From
          -----      --                  ----
          X          BB+/Watch Neg       A+
          B          BB/Watch Neg        A/Watch Neg
          C          B-/Watch Neg        BBB-/Watch Neg
          D          CCC-/Watch Neg      B+/Watch Neg

             Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative

                     Premium Loan Trust I Ltd.

                   Class         Rating
                   -----         ------
                   A             AAA/Watch Neg


Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:             Premium Loan Trust I Ltd.
Co-issuer:          Premium Loan I Corp.
Collateral manager: Lehman Bros. Asset Management LLC
Underwriter:        Institutional Credit Partners LLC Indenture
trustee:  U.S. Bank N.A.


PRINCE GEORGE'S: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on 1997 Revenue Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating of 'CC' on $74.5 million
Prince George's County, Maryland, project and refunding revenue
bonds, series 1994, issued on behalf of Dimensions Health
Corporation and Subsidiaries.

The affirmation of 'CC' reflects the continued relative stability
of DHC's financial profile due to the ongoing financial support of
the state of Maryland (rated 'AAA' with a Stable Outlook by Fitch)
and Prince George's County (rated 'AA+' with a Stable Outlook by
Fitch) and the continuing efforts to provide long-term
stabilization of DHC's operations.  Operating performance
continues to be poor; in fiscal year ending June 2008, the system
received a 'going concern' opinion in its audited financial
statements for the fourth consecutive year citing liquidity
concerns and the system's unfunded pension liabilities.  DHC lost
$3.5 million from operations (negative 1% operating margin) in
fiscal 2008, after $17 million in governmental support, producing
an operating EBITDA margin of 2.3%. Investment earnings of $1.5
million reduced the bottom loss to $2 million (negative 0.5%
excess margin).  Coverage of maximum annual debt service dropped
to 1.6x vs 3.9x in the prior year.  According to bond documents,
DHC's rate covenant is set at 1.10 times maximum annual debt
service. Failure to meet the rate covenant for two consecutive
years is considered an event of default.  Liquidity was weak at
20.8 days of cash on hand compared to 16.9 in the prior year.  
Other liquidity ratios were also weak with a cushion ratio of 2.3x
and a cash to debt ratio of 25.5%.  For the eight month period
ending February 2009, the system earned $1.1 million in operating
income (0.4 operating margin) with an operating EBIDTA of 3.6% but
days cash on hand dropped to 11 days.  MADS coverage improved
slightly to 1.6x for the eight month period.

DHC, along with Greater Southeast, serves as one of two safety net
hospitals in Washington, D.C., providing for the essential
healthcare needs of the economically depressed, underinsured and
uninsured regional population.  Fitch believes that the
essentiality of DHC's role in serving the medical needs of the
region and the history of subsidization from the state and the
county provides some confidence that the possibility of imminent
bond default or hospital closure is unlikely.  Operating grants
from the state and county totaling almost $50 million since 2006
have supported DHC's operations, but a permanent solution is
critical for long-term stability.  To that end, both the state and
the county have agreed to continue to provide annual funding of
hospital operations of $24 million through May 2010.  The Prince
George's County Hospital Authority, created in 2007 to find a
viable partner for the system, is in discussion with several
potential candidates that may be interested in acquiring the
system.  In addition, the governor has also proposed approximately
$150 million of federal support for the system to fund capital
needs and to help facilitate either an acquisition or partner
relationship with potential buyers, however, the success of these
efforts is unknown at this point.

As of June 30, 2008 DHC's debt service reserve fund was fully
funded and all debt service payments are current.  DHC had $368
million in total revenues for the fiscal year 2008.  Fitch deems
DHC's disclosure practices as poor. DHC has not posted any recent
financial information on the NRMSIRs or its Web site, but
financial information was provided to Fitch upon request.


PRO RATA FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded these
notes issued by Pro Rata Funding Ltd.:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due
     2013, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on February 2, 2009 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class A-2 Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2013,
     Downgraded to Aa3; previously on February 2, 2009 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

Moody's also placed under review for possible downgrade these
notes:

  -- US$54,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes Due 2013, A3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on September 25, 2003 Assigned
     A3;

  -- US$13,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes Due 2013, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on September 25, 2003 Assigned Baa2;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate
     Notes Due 2013, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on September 25, 2003 Assigned Ba2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Class A-1
Notes and Class A-2 Notes are a result of the additional risk
posed to the noteholders due to the action taken by Moody's on the
senior unsecured rating of General Electric Capital Corporation,
which acts as Guarantor under the Investment Agreement in the
transaction.  On March 23, 2009, Moody's downgraded the senior
unsecured rating of GECC from Aaa to Aa2.  In its analysis,
Moody's took into account the Aa2 default risk associated with
GECC, resulting in an Aa3 rating for the Class A-1 notes and Class
A-2 notes in expected loss terms.

In addition, Moody's placed under review for possible downgrade
the Class B notes, Class C notes and Class D notes in order to
reflect the expected potential impact of applying certain revised
assumptions with respect to default probability, the treatment of
ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative
Outlook," and the calculation of the Diversity Score.  In its
February 4, 2009 announcement, "Moody's updates key assumptions
for rating CLOs," Moody's stated that it had increased its default
probability assumptions for corporate credits in the collateral
pools of CLOs and other cash-flow CDO transactions by a factor of
30% across all rating categories.  In addition, Moody's stated
that assets with negative outlooks or that are on review for
possible downgrade would be treated as if they had already been
downgraded by one or two notches, respectively.  At the same time,
Moody's changed its calculation of the primary measure of industry
and issuer diversification in CLOs (the Diversity Score) to
increase the estimate of correlation in most pools of corporate
credits.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 1999-NRF1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes,
upgraded two classes and downgraded two classes of Prudential
Securities Secured Financing Corporation, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-NRF1.  The upgrades are due
to increased subordination due to amortization and payoffs.  The
pool balance has decreased by 67% since Moody's last review.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses due to realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing, increased
dispersion and concerns about near-term refinancing risk of a
portion of the pool.  Six loans, representing 53% of the pool,
mature within the next 12 months.  The action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the March 17, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 82%
to $170.1 million from $928.9 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 36 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 36% of the pool, with the top 10 loans
representing 76% of the pool.  One loan, representing 2% of the
pool, has defeased and is collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.

Eight loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of approximately $7.6 million.  Seven
loans, representing 18% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Louisville
Marriott East ($18.7 million -- 11%), which is secured by a 254
room hotel located in suburban Louisville, Kentucky.  The hotel's
performance has been negatively impacted by new competition in the
area.  Six of the remaining specially serviced loans, representing
7.2% of the pool, were transferred to special servicing due to
maturity default.  Moody's has estimated a loss of approximately
$13.9 million for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with year-end 2007 and partial-year 2008
operating statements for 96% and 97% of the pool, respectively.  
Moody's loan to value ratio, excluding the specially serviced
loans, is 74%, compared to 76% at Moody's prior full review in
November 2007.  Although the pool's overall performance has been
stable, LTV dispersion has increased since last review.  Based on
Moody's analysis, 12% of the performing loans have an LTV in
excess of 120% compared to 4% at last review.

The top three loans represent 53% of the pool. The largest loan is
the Three Park Avenue Loan ($60.6 million -- 35.6%), which is
secured by a 657,000 square foot office building located in New
York City.  The property was 90% occupied as of December 2008
compared to 96% at last review.  The loan matures in November
2009.  Moody's LTV is 58% compared to 56% at last review.

The second largest loan is the Kansas City FBI Building East Loan
($10.8 million -- 6.4%), which is secured by an 87,000 square foot
office building located in Kansas City, Missouri.  The property is
100% leased to the FBI through June 2013.  The loan originally
maturated in September 2008 but the maturity date was extended to
September 2009.  Although the property's performance has been
stable since securitization, the FBI's rent is approximately 25%
above current market levels.  Moody's made a downward adjustment
to the property's cash flow to reflect market vacancy and rent.  
In addition, Moody's utilized a higher capitalization rate due to
Moody's concerns about refinancing risk given the relatively short
term remaining on the FBI lease.  Moody's LTV is 167% compared to
79% at last review.

The third largest loan is the Bonita Center Loan ($8.6 million --
5.1%), which is secured by a 98,000 square foot retail center
located in Chula Vista, California.  The center is anchored by
Vons and was 96% occupied as of December 2008.  Moody's valuation
of this loan incorporates a stressed cash flow due to Moody's
concerns about the weak retail environment.  Moody's LTV is 53%
compared to 51% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-EC, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 11/1/2007

  -- Class C, $15,100,443, affirmed at Aaa; previously affriemd at
     Aaa on 11/1/2007

  -- Class D, $46,447,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 11/1/2007

  -- Class E, $13,935,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa1; previously
     affirmed at Aa1 on 11/1/2007

  -- Class F, $20,903,000, upgraded to A1 from A2; previously
     upgraded to A2 from A3 on 11/1/2007

  -- Class G, $25,546,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously upgraded
     to Baa3 from Ba1 on 11/1/2007

  -- Class H, $9,291,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 11/1/2007

  -- Class J, $9,291,000, affirmed at B1; previously affirmed at
     B1 in 11/1/2007

  -- Class K, $15,794,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 11/1/2007

  -- Class L, $6,502,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     affirmed at Caa1 on 11/1/2007


PUBLIC STEERS: S&P Cuts Rating on 1998 F-Z4 Certs. To 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Public
STEERS Series 1998 F-Z4 Trust's class A and B certificates to 'D'
from 'C'.
     
The rating actions reflect the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.70% debentures due May 15, 2097, to
'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating on the certificates is dependent on the rating on Ford
Motor Co.'s debentures.


RACERS SERIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2001-12-E Notes to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its rating of RACERS Series
2001-12-E issued by RACERS Series 2001-12-E Trust.

The rating action is:

RACERS Series 2001-12-E Trust

  -- RACERS Series 2001-12-E, Downgraded to B2; Previously on
     8/8/2002 Assigned Baa3

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Deposited Asset which consists of 6,500,000 of the PAMCO
CLO Series 1997-1 Class B Second Senior Secured Notes Due 2009,
currently rated Caa2(WD).


RAIT PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two classes and
downgraded the ratings of nine classes of Notes issued by RAIT
Preferred Funding II, Ltd.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1T, $207,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1R, $200,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $100,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $71,750,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to A3 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $34,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Baa3 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $14,625,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Ba1 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $14,400,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Ba2 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $20,625,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to B1 from Baa1; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $13,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $14,800,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to B3 from Baa3; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $30,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
     downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade
     
Moody's confirmed Classes A-1T and A-1R and downgraded Classes A-
2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and J due to revised modeling parameters.  
Moody's ratings are based on the current credit quality of the
collateral and may not reflect potential migration as per the
legal documentation.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated May 18, 2007.


REPACS TRUST: Moody's Junks Rating on $5 Mil. Debt Units
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of notes issued
by REPACS Trust Series Bayshore II, a synthetic collateralized
debt obligation transaction.  REPACs Trust Series Bayshore II
synthetically references a portfolio of structured finance
entities and six bespoke synthetic collateralised debt obligation
tranches each referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result
primarily of the downgrade of the insurance financial strength
rating of MBIA Insurance Corporation, which acts as Guarantor
under the Investment Agreement in the transaction.  On February
18, 2009, the insurance financial strength rating of MBIA
Insurance Corporation was downgraded to B3.

The rating action also accounts for the application of revised and
updated key modeling parameter assumptions that Moody's uses to
rate and monitor ratings of synthetic CDOs as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's reference
portfolio, including the occurrence of four credit events.  The
revisions affect key parameters in Moody's model for rating
synthetic CDOs: default probability, asset correlation, recovery
rate of structured finance obligations, and other credit
indicators such as ratings reviews and outlooks on corporate
entities.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology for corporate
synthetic CDOs and structured finance CDOs as described in Moody's
Special Reports:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (March 2009)

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (March 2009)

The rating action is:

Class Description: US$5,000,000 Debt Units, due December 2009

  -- Current Rating: Caa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: December 22, 2008
  -- Prior Rating: Baa2, on watch for downgrade


REPACS TRUST: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of notes issued
by REPACs Trust Series Bayshore I, a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction.  REPACs Trust Series Bayshore I
synthetically references a portfolio of structured finance
entities and six bespoke synthetic collateralised debt obligation
tranches each referencing a portfolio of corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the downgrade of the insurance financial strength rating of MBIA
Insurance Corporation, which acts as Guarantor under the
Investment Agreement in the transaction.  On February 18, 2009,
the insurance financial strength rating of MBIA Insurance
Corporation was downgraded to B3.  The rating action is also
resulting from the application of revised and updated key modeling
parameter assumptions that Moody's uses to rate and monitor
ratings of synthetic CDOs as well as the deterioration in the
credit quality of the transaction's reference portfolio, including
the occurrence of four credit events.  The revisions affect key
parameters in Moody's model for rating synthetic CDOs: default
probability, asset correlation, recovery rate of structured
finance obligations, and other credit indicators such as ratings
reviews and outlooks on corporate entities.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology for corporate
synthetic CDOs and structured finance CDOs as described in Moody's
Special Reports:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (March 2009)

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (March 2009)

The rating actions are:

Class Description: Class A Debt Unit

  -- Current Rating: Ca
  -- Prior Rating Date: December 22, 2008
  -- Prior Rating: Baa3, on review for possible downgrade

Class Description: Class B Debt Unit

  -- Current Rating: Ca
  -- Prior Rating Date: December 22, 2008
  -- Prior Rating: Baa3, on review for possible downgrade


REPACS TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of notes issued
by REPACs Trust Series: Warwick, a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction.  REPACs Trust Series: Warwick
synthetically references a portfolio of structured finance
entities and eight bespoke synthetic CDO tranches each referencing
a portfolio of corporate entities.

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result
primarily of the downgrade of the insurance financial strength
rating of MBIA Insurance Corporation, which acts as Guarantor
under the Investment Agreement in the transaction.  On February
18, 2009, the insurance financial strength rating of MBIA
Insurance Corporation was downgraded to B3.

The rating action also accounts for the application of revised and
updated key modeling parameter assumptions that Moody's uses to
rate and monitor ratings of synthetic CDOs as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction's reference
portfolio including the occurrence of nine credit events.  The
revisions affect key parameters in Moody's model for rating
synthetic CDOs: default probability, asset correlation, recovery
rate of structured finance obligations, and other credit
indicators such as ratings reviews and outlooks on corporate
entities.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this
transaction using primarily the methodology for corporate
synthetic CDOs and structured finance CDOs as described in Moody's
Special Reports:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
     Obligations (March 2009)

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (March 2009)

The rating actions are:

Class Description: US$50,000,000 Class A Debt Units, due May 2012

  -- Current Rating: Ca
  -- Prior Rating Date: December 17, 2008
  -- Prior Rating: Baa3, on watch for downgrade

Class Description: US$1,020,500 Class B Debt Units, due May 2012

  -- Current Rating: Ca
  -- Prior Rating Date: December 17, 2008
  -- Prior Rating: Ba1, on watch for downgrade


RESERVE MANAGEMENT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Three Funds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the fund ratings of three
Reserve Management Company Inc. money market funds.  This
concludes a review of these ratings, which Moody's initiated on
September 23, 2008.

The ratings of these funds have been confirmed:

  -- Reserve Treasury & Repo Fund: prior Rating- B, on review for
     further downgrade

  -- Reserve US$ International Treasury & Repo Fund: prior Rating-
     B/MR1+, on review for further downgrade

  -- Reserve US$ International Treasury Fund Ltd.: prior Rating-
     B/MR1+, on review for further downgrade

Moody's will withdraw the ratings as the funds have been
liquidated.  The funds liquidated at a net asset value of $1.00
per share.

The last rating action concerning these four funds was taken on
September 23, 2008, when Moody's downgraded the Reserve Treasury &
Repo Fund to a B rating, Reserve US$ International Treasury & Repo
Fund and Reserve US$ International Treasury Fund Ltd. to B/MR1+
following their suspension of redemptions, and placed them on
review for possible further downgrade.  The ratings of the other
Reserve funds that were downgraded on September 23rd remain on
review.


RESIDENTIAL ASSET: Moody's Junks Rating on Class 2-A-5 Tranche
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Class 2-A-5 tranche from
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A14CB.

Rating action is:

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A14CB

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/14/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1

The collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A mortgage loans.  The action is
triggered by rapidly increasing delinquencies, higher severities,
slower prepayments and mounting losses in the underlying
collateral.  Additionally, the continued deterioration of the
housing market has also contributed to the increased loss
expectations for Alt-A pools.  The action reflects Moody's updated
expected losses on the Alt-A sector announced in a press release
on January 22, 2009, and is part of Moody's on-going review
process.

Moody's final rating action is based on current ratings, level of
credit enhancement, collateral performance and updated pool-level
loss expectations relative to current level of credit enhancement.  
Moody's took into account credit enhancement provided by
seniority, cross-collateralization, excess spread, time tranching,
and other structural features within the senior note waterfalls.  
General loss estimation methodology is outlined.

Loss estimates are subject to variability and are sensitive to
assumptions used; as a result, realized losses could ultimately
turn out higher or lower than Moody's current expectations.  
Moody's will continue to evaluate performance data as it becomes
available and will assess the pattern of potential future defaults
and adjust loss expectations accordingly as necessary.

The rating on the note was assigned by evaluating factors
determined to be applicable to the credit profile, such as i) the
nature, sufficiency, and quality of historical performance
information regarding the asset class as well as for the
transaction sponsor, ii) an analysis of the collateral, iii) an
analysis of the policies, procedures and alignment of interests of
the key parties to the transaction, most notably the originator
and the servicer, iv) an analysis of the transaction's allocation
of collateral cashflow and capital structure, v) an analysis of
the transaction's governance and legal structure, and (vi) a
comparison of these attributes against those of other similar
transactions.


RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Junks Ratings on 2007-2-E Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded and left on review for
possible further downgrade its rating of Restructured Asset
Certificates with Enhanced Returns, Series 2007-2-E Certificates
issued by Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns,
Series 2007-2-E Trust.

The rating action is:

Class Description: Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced
Returns, Series 2007-2-E Certificates

  -- Current Rating: Caa2 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating: Baa3
  -- Prior Rating Date: 02/27/07

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Underlying Securities.  The rating action is a result of
the change of the ratings of the Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes
due 2036, issued by Mid Ocean 2000 and Class A-1 6.5563% Notes due
2036, issued by Mid Ocean 2001.  The Class A-1L Floating Rate
Notes due 2036, issued by Mid Ocean 2000 and the Class A-1 6.5563%
Notes due 2036, issued by Mid Ocean 2001 are currently rated Caa2
on review for possible downgrade.


RESTRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2004-13-E Notes To B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its rating of RACERs, Series
2004-13-E Deferrable Certificates issued by Restructured Asset
Certificates with Enhanced Returns, Series 2004-13-E.

The rating action is:

Restructured Asset Certificates with Enhanced Returns, Series
2004-13-E

  -- Deferrable Certificates,Downgraded to B2; Previously on 29
     JUL 2008 Aa2 Placed under Review for Downgrade.

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Underlying Assets which include (i) $50MM SFA CABS II CDO
Ltd., Class B Notes that are currently rated Ca by Moody's and
(ii) a credit default swap that references corporate obligors as
the reference portfolio.  SFA CABS II CDO Ltd., is a Structured
Finance CDO.  The Class B Notes were downgraded to Ca from Ba2 on
6/20/2008.  Prior to that, on 3/20/2006 Class B notes were
downgraded to Ba2 from Aa3 on watch for possible downgrade.


RESTRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Rating on 2006-18-C Certs. to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on
Restructured Asset Certificates w/ Enhanced Returns Series 2006-
18-C (ABX_A_06_1_i)'s $75 million credit-linked certificates by
lowering the rating to 'D' from 'CCC'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 3, 2009, lowering of S&P's
rating on Restructured Asset Certificates With Enhanced Returns
Series 2006-15-A Trust's $500 million certificates to 'D' from
'CCC' due to a payment default on the December 2008 payment due
date.
     
The rating action did not occur contemporaneously with the payment
default on RACERS Series 2006-15-A Trust's $500 million
certificates due to a delay in S&P's analytical process.
     
The ratings on the series 2006-18-C certificates are dependent on
the lower of the rating on (i) the certificates issued by RACERS
Series 2006-15-A Trust ('D') and (ii) the $30.559 million class M-
5 certificates Series 2005-HE7 due Nov. 25, 2035, issued by ACE
Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust ('CC').


RFC CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Classes of 2007-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two classes and
downgraded the ratings of 12 classes of Notes issued by RFC CDO
2007-1, Ltd.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, $450,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1R, $50,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     confirmed at Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2, $125,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Baa2 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2R, $2,200,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to Baa2 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $86,500,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2052,
     downgraded to B1 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $48,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa1 from A1; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $19,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $15,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa2 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $22,500,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa1; previously on      
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $15,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa2; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $24,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, $17,000,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, $15,500,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2; previously on      
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class L, $9,500,000, Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Notes
     Due 2052, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's downgraded Classes A-2, A-2R, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K
and L due to deteriorating pool performance and revised modeling
parameters.  Moody's ratings are based on the current credit
quality of the collateral and may not reflect potential migration
as per the legal documentation.

The pool contains a 20.3% concentration in commercial mortgage
backed securities collateral of which approximately 74% was issued
between 2006 and 2007.  The remaining includes commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligations, whole loan debt, B-note
debt, and mezzanine debt.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5%
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral. The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first full review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale Report dated February 23, 2007.


RFSC SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2001-RM2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 2 tranches
from RFSC Series 2001-RM2 Trust.  The collateral backing this
transaction consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Issuer: RFSC Series 2001-RM2 Trust

  -- Cl. M-I-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/31/2002
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. M-I-3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 10/8/2008
     Downgraded to Ba1


SAGUARO ISSUER: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Units
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of
US$20,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series F,
US$20,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series G,
US$14,550,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series H,
US$20,800,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series I,
US$11,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series K,
US$34,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series L
and $25,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal Units, Series M
issued by Saguaro Issuer Trust.

The rating actions are:

Class Description: US$20,000,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series F

  -- Current Rating: A3
  -- Prior Rating: A1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 02/19/09

Class Description: US$20,000,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series G

  -- Current Rating: A3
  -- Prior Rating: A1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 02/19/09

Class Description: US$14,550,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series H

  -- Current Rating: Aa3
  -- Prior Rating: Aa2
  -- Prior Rating Date: 12/23/08

Class Description: US$20,800,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series I

  -- Current Rating: Aa3
  -- Prior Rating: Aa2
  -- Prior Rating Date: 12/23/08

Class Description: US$11,000,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series K

  -- Current Rating: Baa3 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating: A1 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

Class Description: US$34,000,000 aggregate face amount of
Principal Units, Series L

  -- Current Rating: Baa3 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating: A1 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

Class Description: $25,000,000 aggregate face amount of Principal
Units, Series M

  -- Current Rating: Ba1 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating: A2 on review for possible downgrade
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the underlying Principal Certificates.

The Series F Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series F issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $20,000,000 face amount of Primary
Capital Undated Floating Rate Notes of Lloyd Bank PLC.  The U.S.
$20,000,000 face amount of Primary Capital Undated Floating Rate
Notes of Lloyd Bank PLC were downgrade to A3 on 04/03/2009.

The Series G Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series G issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $20,000,000 face amount of Undated
Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series 2 of Lloyds Bank PLC.  The
U.S. $20,000,000 face amount of Undated Capital Floating Rate
Notes, Series 2 of Lloyds Bank PLC were downgraded to A3 on
04/03/2009.

The Series H Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series H issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $14,550,000 face amount of Undated
Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes of Midland Bank plc.  The U.S.
$14,550,000 face amount of Undated Floating Rate Primary Capital
Notes of Midland Bank plc were downgraded to Aa3 on 03/09/2009.

The Series I Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series I issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $20,800,000 face amount of Undated
Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes of Midland Bank plc.  The U.S.
$20,800,000 face amount of Undated Floating Rate Primary Capital
Notes of Midland Bank plc were downgraded to Aa3 on 03/09/2009.

The Series K Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series K issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $11,000,000 face amount of Undated
Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series A of National
Westminster Bank PLC.  The U.S. $11,000,000 face amount of Undated
Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series A of National
Westminster Bank PLC were downgraded to Baa3 and left on review
for possible further downgrade on 04/03/2009.

The Series L Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series L issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $34,000,000 face amount of Undated
Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series A of National
Westminster Bank PLC.  The U.S. $34,000,000 face amount of Undated
Primary Capital Floating Rate Notes, Series A of National
Westminster Bank PLC were downgraded to Baa3 and left on review
for possible further downgrade on 04/03/2009.

The Series M Principal Units are related to the Principal
Certificates, Series M issued by IIG Funding Trust, which are, in
turn, related to the U.S. $25,000,000 face amount of Undated
Floating Rate Primary Capital Notes of Royal Bank of Scotland
Group plc.  The U.S. $25,000,000 face amount of Undated Floating
Rate Primary Capital Notes of Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
were downgraded to Ba1 and left on review for possible further
downgrade on 04/03/2009.


SANTA ROSA BAY: Fitch Junks Rating on 1996 Revenue Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades its underlying rating on approximately
$114 million in outstanding Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority (the
authority), Florida, revenue bonds, series 1996 to 'CCC' from
'BB-'.  The Rating Outlook is Negative.  A 'CCC' category rating
means that default is a real possibility and capacity for meeting
financial commitments is solely reliant upon sustained, favorable
business or economic conditions.  The authority's revenue
generating asset is the Garcon Point Bridge, which traverses the
Pensacola Bay from Garcon Point on the mainland to the Gulf Breeze
Peninsula to the south.  The toll facility extends from US 98 in
the south to I-10 in the north, covering approximately 12 miles.

The 'CCC' rating reflects the increasingly poor traffic and
revenue performance and weak financial profile of the Garcon Point
Bridge; repeated draws on debt service reserves by the authority
in order to meet obligations; lack of clear management guidance to
deal with declining traffic and escalating debt service; existence
of free competing facilities; and reliance on Florida Dept. of
Transportation for operating support.

The Negative Outlook reflects the expectation that near- to
medium-term debt obligations will fully exhaust the debt service
reserve in the next two to three years; and continued negative
pressure on traffic and revenues due to the overall economic
downturn that could accelerate reserve depletion. It is also
uncertain that higher toll increases would be revenue positive, as
Fitch views the current toll levels as at or close to the
facility's revenue maximization point.

Year-over-year traffic declines since July 2007 resulted in the
authority being placed on Rating Watch Negative in February 2008.  
Since this time, traffic has continued to decline (down 13.3%
year-over-year for fiscal 2008, down 9.9% for the first half of
2009), and management has not provided the necessary changes to
enhance revenue or explore refinancing options.  Overall traffic
has been considerably lower than the original plan of finance,
with the authority's initial 1996 forecast projecting 3.2 million
transactions in fiscal 2008 versus actual performance of 1.4
million, approximately 45% of originally forecasted levels.  
Following some improvement in 2004-2006, traffic stagnated in 2007
with 0.3% growth, and declined 13.3% in 2008.  This reversal
largely reflects declines in the Florida economy and housing
market, rising fuel prices, the July 2007 toll increase, and the
reopening of the toll-free I-10 Bridge.  Fitch expects further
traffic and revenue erosion in 2009 and 2010.  Three $0.25 toll
increases, planned for 2011, 2014, and 2017, partially mitigate
revenue shortfalls, but are insufficient to meet debt service
requirements in the near to medium term. Furthermore, with the
existence of two free alternative routes (Pensacola Bay Bridge/US
98 to West, and State Route 87 to the East, which is currently
being expanded from two lanes to four), ratemaking ability is
increasingly limited.

Fiscal 2006 and 2007 are the only years since 2001 that the
authority did not use its debt service reserve fund to pay current
debt service.  In those years, operating revenues in conjunction
with investment earnings provided approximately 1.00 times (x)
coverage of debt service.  Approximately $4.1 million was drawn
down between fiscal 2002-2008, reducing the reserve fund to $5
million as of fiscal 2008.  Under Fitch's base and stress
scenarios which reflect the planned 2011, 2014, and 2017 toll
increases, the debt service reserve will be fully drawn by the end
of fiscal 2011.  Fitch's analysis suggests that barring annual
traffic growth of 6% or greater over the next 20 years, the bonds
will default.

Under a lease purchase agreement with the authority, FDOT pays
operating and maintenance (O&M) expenses for the bridge and remits
all tolls collected to the authority as lease payments.  The term
of the lease runs through the life of the bonds and terminates in
2028, at which point FDOT will own the bridge.  Though the current
agreement states that FDOT is to be reimbursed annually from toll
revenues for payment of O&M, these reimbursements are deeply
subordinated to debt service and roll over to These year should
sufficient revenues be unavailable.  FDOT has paid O&M expenses
since the project's inception and is expected to do so for the
foreseeable future.  The authority's total liability to FDOT to
date includes O&M advances of $12.8 million accrued as long-term
debt and $7.9 million from non-interest-bearing Toll Facility
Revolving Trust Fund loans made to the authority to cover initial
bridge design costs.


SATURNS TRUST: Hertz Rating Cut Cues S&P's Junk Rating on Units
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on SATURNS
Trust No. 2003-8's $25 million class A and B units to 'CCC+' from
'B+' and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on March 13, 2009.  
     
The rating actions reflect the March 31, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Hertz Corp.'s 7.625% debentures due June 1, 2012, to
'CCC+' from 'B+' and its removal from CreditWatch with negative
implications.
     
The ratings on the units are dependent on the ratings on the Hertz
Corp. debentures.


SATURNS TRUST: S&P Downgrades Rating on $75 Mil. Units to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on SATURNS
Trust No. 2003-5's $75 million callable units to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating action reflects the April 6, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Ford Motor Co.'s 7.45% global landmark securities due
July 16, 2031, to 'D' from 'C'.
     
The rating on the callable units is dependent on the rating on
Ford Motor Co.'s global landmark securities.


SATURNS TRUST: S&P Corrects Rating on $78 Mil. 2002-11 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on
SATURNS Trust No. 2002-11's $78 million class A and B units, by
affirming the 'B' ratings on both classes and removing them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
Sept. 22, 2008.
     
The ratings on the SATURNS units are dependent on the rating on
American General Institutional Capital's $500 million 7.57%
capital securities series A ('B').
     
The rating actions follow the March 2, 2009, affirmation of the
rating on American General Institutional Capital's $500 million
7.57% capital securities series A and its removal from CreditWatch
negative.


SOLAR TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2003-CC1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of two classes
and affirmed 12 classes of Solar Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-CC1.  The downgrades are due to
higher expected losses resulting from increased leverage.  The
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the March 12, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 30%
to $326.4 million from $468.2 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 59 loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top 10 loans representing
48% of the pool.  Five loans, representing 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  
Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

There have been no realized losses since securitization and there
are currently no delinquent or specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2007 and partial year 2008
operating statements for 94% and 24% of the pool, respectively.  
Moody's loan to value ratio is 78% compared to 74% at Moody's
prior review in July 2006.  In addition to an overall decline in
credit quality, the pool has experienced increased LTV dispersion
since last review.  Based on Moody's analysis, 11% of the pool has
an LTV in excess of 100% compared to 3% at last review and 6% of
the pool has an LTV in excess of 120% compared to 0% at last
review.

The three largest loans represent 19% of the pool.  The largest
loan is the Kirkland Centre Loan ($22.8 million -- 7.0%), which is
secured by a 225,000 square foot retail center located in suburban
Montreal.  The property was 92% occupied as of February 2009
compared to 100% at last review.  Anchor tenants include Winners
and Business Depot, both of which are on long-term leases.  The
loan is full recourse to the borrower and the loan sponsor is
RioCan Real Investment Trust, Canada's largest real estate
investment trust.  Moody's stressed the property's cash flow to
reflect Moody's concerns about the weak retail environment.
Moody's LTV is 67% compared to 63% at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Eglinton Square Loan ($22.6 million
-- 6.9%), which is secured by a 275,000 square foot retail center
located in the Greater Toronto area.  The property was 91%
occupied as of August 2008 compared to 94.0% at last review.
Moody's LTV is 80%, essentially the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Matheson Boulevard Loan
($16.5 million -- 5.0%), which is secured by a 187,000 square foot
Class A suburban office building located in Mississauga, Ontario.  
The property has been 100% occupied since securitization, however,
a lease for 20% of the premises expires at year end 2009.  Moody's
LTV is 84% compared to 83% at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $49,245,987, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed  
     at Aaa on 7/27/2006

  -- Class A-2, $208,100,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed
     at Aaa on 7/27/2006

  -- Class IO-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/27/2006

  -- Class IO-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously affirmed at
     Aaa on 7/27/2006

  -- Class B, $9,400,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class C, $14,040,000, affirmed at Aa1; previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa3 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class D-1, $7,610,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     toBaa1 from Baa2 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class D-2, $7,610,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     to Baa1 from Baa2 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class E, $4,681,705, affirmed at Baa3; previously affirmed at
     Baa3 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class F, $2,340,852, affirmed at Ba1; previously affirmed at
     Ba1 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class G, $4,681,705, affirmed at Ba2; previously affirmed at
     Ba2 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class H, $2,340,852, affirmed at Ba3; previously affirmed at
     Ba3 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class J, $7,022,557, downgraded to B3 from B2; previously
     affirmed at B2 on 7/27/2006

  -- Class K, $2,340,852, downgraded to Caa1 from B3; previously
     affirmed at B3 on 7/27/2006


SPRINGHILL/COURTLAND: S&P Cuts Rating on 1999A Bonds to "B-"
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Springhill/Courtland Heights Public Facility Corp., Texas' senior-
lien multifamily housing revenue bonds (Springhill I and II,
Courtland Heights Project) series 1999A to 'B-' from 'B'.  The
outlook is negative.
     
"The downgrade reflects the continued deterioration in the
financial performance of the property with a decline in debt
service coverage to 0.19x in the 2008 fiscal year, rising
expenses, and declining rental revenues," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Raymond Kim.     

The rating reflects the decline in debt service coverage to 0.19x
maximum annual debt servicein the 2008 fiscal year, the fourth
consecutive decline in DSC; sharp increase in expenses coupled
with declining rental revenues; very high loan-to-value ratio; and
declining occupancy levels at the property.


STARS & STRIPES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Classes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of $36,400,000
Structured Auction Rate Securities Stock Custodial Receipts,
Merrill Series 2 and $19,600,000 Structured Residual Interest
Preferred Enhanced Securities Stock Custodial Receipts, Merrill
Series 2 issued by STARS & STRIPES Custodial Receipts.

The rating actions are:

STARS & STRIPES Custodial Receipts (Merrill Series 2)

  -- $36,400,000 Structured Auction Rate Securities Stock
     Custodial Receipts, Merrill Series 2 Downgraded to B3;
     previously on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

  -- $19,600,000 Structured Residual Interest Preferred Enhanced
     Securities Stock Custodial Receipts, Merrill Series 2
     Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/30/2009 Confirmed Baa1.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s
Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series 2 which was
downgraded to B3 from Baa1 on watch for downgrade on March 25,
2009.


STRAITS GLOBAL: Fitch Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed two classes of
notes issued by Straits Global ABS CDO I, Ltd.:

  -- $72,471,758 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'BB' from 'A';
  -- $72,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'BB';
  -- $41,000,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $7,000,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $11,005,865 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $3,238,360 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch also assigns a Negative Rating Outlook to the class A-1
notes.  The class A-2 notes are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.

Fitch has taken these rating actions primarily due to negative
credit migration in the portfolio.  The rating actions also
incorporate Fitch's recently adjusted default and recovery rate
assumptions for analyzing structured finance collateralized debt
obligations.  The Negative Outlook on the class A-1 notes is due
to the high concentration of residential mortgage-backed
securities in the portfolio that are expected to continue to face
negative pressure until the housing market stabilizes.

Since the last review in August 2008, the portfolio experienced
further negative credit migration.  Approximately 50% of the
portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of 4.9 notches.
Assets rated below investment grade comprise 73.4% of the current
portfolio, as compared to 43% during the time of the last review,
of which assets rated 'CCC+' and below comprise 41.5% of the
current portfolio, up from 24.4% during the last review.

Straits CDO I declared an event of default on May 7, 2008
following a drop of the class A/B over collateralization ratio to
below 100%.  As of the latest Trustee report dated March 10, 2009,
the class A/B OC ratio is 78.7%, versus its trigger of 103.7%.  On
Jan. 27, 2009, the majority of the class A-1 noteholders elected
to accelerate the transaction.  Commencing on the February 2009
distribution date, all collected interest proceeds will be used to
pay transaction related fees and expenses, including management
fees, to satisfy hedge counterparty payments, if any due for the
period, and to pay current interest due on the class A-1 notes.   
The remaining interest proceeds, if any, will be transferred to
the Principal Collections Account and used to amortize the class
A-1 notes until their principal is paid in full.

On the last payment date, $8 million, or approximately 10%, of the
outstanding principal of class A-1 notes was paid down bringing
its balance to $72.5 million, or 32.2% of the current capital
structure.  Approximately $1 million of this amortization was from
interest proceeds that were diverted as a result of the
acceleration of maturity.  To date, 70.8% of the original
principal balance of the class A-1 notes has been amortized.

As a result of the acceleration, the class A-2 notes will not
receive any interest until class A-1 is paid in full.  On the
February 2009 distribution date, the interest due the class A-2
notes in the amount of $552,825 was deferred.  Given the
composition and performance of the portfolio, Fitch expects the
class A-2 notes to receive most, if not all, of its deferred
interest in the future.  It is possible that class A-2 will also
receive some potential principal repayment once the class A-1
notes and deferred interest is paid in full.  The amount of
principal received will largely depend on the future performance
of the portfolio, including recovery values on defaulted assets
and amount of interest proceeds used for the amortization of the
class A-1 notes.

Similarly, interest due on the class B-1 and B-2 notes began
deferring on the last payment date and will continue to do so
until the principal of the class A-1, and then class A-2 notes, is
paid in full.  Fitch does not expect class B-1 or B-2 to receive
any of its deferred interest or any future principal payments.

The class C-1 and C-2 notes interest payments have been paid-in-
kind since May 2008, whereby the principal balance of the notes
has been written up by the amount of interest owed.  Fitch expects
the class C notes to receive no further interest or principal
distribution in the future.

Straits CDO I is a cash flow CDO that closed on Oct. 28, 2004 and
is managed by Declaration Management & Research LLC.  Presently
50.2% of the portfolio is comprised of U.S. subprime RMBS, 15.7%
consists of Alt-A RMBS, and 2.9% of prime RMBS.  The remaining
31.2% of the portfolio consists of 5.2% commercial mortgage-backed
securities, 3.3% of various consumer and commercial asset-backed
securities, 9.3% of commercial real estate CDOs, and 13.4%
corporate CDOs.

These rating actions resolve the 'Under Analysis' status issued on
Oct. 14, 2008 following Fitch's announcement of its proposed
criteria revision for analyzing SF CDOs.  The revised criteria
report, 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' was
published in its final form on Dec. 16, 2008 along with an updated
version of the Fitch Portfolio Credit Model that includes
additional functionality for analyzing SF CDOs.  As part of this
review, Fitch makes standard adjustments for any names on Rating
Watch Negative or with a Negative Outlook, downgrading such
ratings for default analysis purposes by three and one notches,
respectively.


STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 185 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 185
tranches from 17 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Structured
Adjustable Mortgage Loan Trust.  Additionally, 2 senior tranches
were confirmed at Aaa.The collateral backing these transactions
consists primarily of first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A
residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been assigned to each collateral group,
Moody's assesses available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/10/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/14/2007
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/2007 Downgraded
     to Ca

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to A1

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa1

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Tr 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Tr 2004-9XS

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-X, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. BX, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-16

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AIO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-17

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A1X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A2X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-18

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MX, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B6X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa

     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-20

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B7X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B8X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 92 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 92
tranches from 16 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Structured
Asset Securities Corp Trust.  The collateral backing these
transactions consists primarily of first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A
residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been assigned to each collateral group,
Moody's assesses available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is equal to the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e.,
absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described in the two previous
paragraphs.

List of actions:

Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-12XS Tr

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to A2; previously on 4/9/2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 1/25/2008 Downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/25/2008 Downgraded
     to Caa3

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2002-23XS

  -- Cl. A7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 11/5/2002 Assigned A2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2003-18XS

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A7, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 1/25/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 6/16/2003 Assigned
     A2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2003-25XS

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 8/25/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 8/19/2008
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C; previously on 8/19/2008 Downgraded
     to Ba1

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2003-28XS

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/11/2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/31/2007 Downgraded
     to Ba2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2003-36XS

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 11/14/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 11/14/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/14/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B2; previously on 11/14/2003 Assigned
     A2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2003-3XS

  -- Cl. A8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/18/2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/18/2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/18/2003 Assigned A2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-11XS

  -- Cl. 1-A4A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/15/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A4B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/15/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A5A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A5B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 6/15/2004
     Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-M2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 6/15/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 6/15/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-16XS

  -- Cl. A3A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. A4A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned


     A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/3/2004 Assigned
     Baa3

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-17XS

  -- Cl. A3A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (currently
     Baa1 on review for possible downgrade)

  -- Cl. A3B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (currently
     Baa1 on review for possible downgrade)

  -- Cl. A4B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 2/25/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-19XS

  -- Cl. A3A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3C, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A6A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A6B, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A6C, Downgraded to A1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/29/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-21XS

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 11/17/2008
     Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (currently
     Baa1 on review for possible downgrade)

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/14/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-23XS

  -- Cl. 1-A3A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3C, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3D, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AIO, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-4XS

  -- Cl. 1-M2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 2/18/2004
     Assigned A3

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-6XS

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A5B, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (currently
     Baa1 on review for possible downgrade)

  -- Cl. A6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 3/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 3/26/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 8/19/2008 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 8/19/2008
     Downgraded to Ba2

Structured Asset Securities Corp Tr 2004-9XS

  -- Cl. 1-A4A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/10/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A4B, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/10/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A4C, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/10/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A4D, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/10/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (currently
     B3)

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-M2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 5/10/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 5/10/2004 Assigned
     Baa2


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on $25 Mil. Notes to 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of US$25,000,000
of 6.25% Class A Callable Units and US 525,000,000 Notional Amount
of Interest-Only 0.598% Class B Callable Units issued by
Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings The May Department Stores
Company Debenture Backed Series 2003-7.

The rating actions are:

Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings The May Department Stores
Company Debenture Backed Series 2003-7

  -- US$25,000,000 of 6.25% Class A Callable Units Downgraded to
     Ba2; previously on 2/10/2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade.

  -- US$25,000,000 Notional Amount of Interest-Only 0.598% Class      
     B Callable Units Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 2/10/2009
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of 6.90% debentures due January
15, 2032, issued by May Department Stores Company which was
downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 on watch for downgrade on April 1,
2009.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Notes to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings of US$54,500,000
of 7.625% Callable Units and $3,690,000 Initial Notional
Amortizing Balance of Interest-Only Class B Callable Units issued
by Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings Series 2007-1.

The rating actions are:

Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings Series 2007-1

  -- US$54,500,000 of 7.625% Callable Units Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 2/10/2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade.

  -- $3,690,000 Initial Notional Amortizing Balance of Interest-
     Only Class B Callable Units Downgraded to Ba1; previously on
     2/10/2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security. The rating actions are a result
of the change of the rating of J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc.
7.625% Debentures due March 1, 2097, which were downgraded to Ba1
from Baa3 on watch for downgrade on April 1, 2009.

Moody's initially analyzed and continues to monitor this tra


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Junks Ratings on 2003-15 Debentures
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings The Hertz Corp. Debenture
Backed Series 2003-15's $25 million class A and B units to 'CCC+'
from 'B+' and removed them from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with negative implications on March 13, 2009.  
     
The rating actions reflect the March 31, 2009, lowering of the
rating on Hertz Corp.'s 7.625% debentures due June 1, 2012, to
'CCC+' from 'B+' and its removal from CreditWatch with negative
implications.
     
The ratings on the units are dependent on the ratings on the Hertz
Corp. debentures.


STRUCTURED ASSET: S&P Corrects Rating on Class B6 to 'B' from 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
B6 from Structured Asset Securities Corp. Trust 2005-6, raising it
to 'B' from 'D' and placing it on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
     
On Feb. 2, 2009, S&P incorrectly lowered the rating to 'D' based
on the trustee's December 2008 remittance report, which indicated
that this class had experienced a payment default.  However, the
class did not incur a loss, and therefore S&P is restoring the
prior 'B' rating on the class.
     
On Feb. 2, S&P also placed its ratings on 47 other classes from
this transaction on CreditWatch with negative implications.  
Notwithstanding the correction, the ratings on these classes and
on class B6 will remain on CreditWatch while S&P conduct a review
of the entire transaction.

                         Rating Corrected

          Structured Asset Securities Corp. Trust 2005-6

                                        Rating
                                        ------
   Class      CUSIP       Current       2/02/09     Pre-2/02/09
   -----      -----       -------       -------     -----------
   B6         86359DBD8   B/Watch Neg   D           B


STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Junks Rating on $56,009,124 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch
Negative the notes issued by Structured Enhanced Return Vehicle
Trust, series 2001-6.  This rating action is effective
immediately:

  -- $56,009,124 notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BBB+'.

The rating action reflects the credit deterioration in the
portfolio since deal inception and also the application of
methodology outlined under Fitch's updated Market Value Structures
criteria, published April 18, 2008.

The notes have benefited from an asset put agreement between the
note investor and the swap counterparty.  The put agreement has
the economic effect of increasing the amount of market value
declines the transaction can withstand before a termination event
occurs.  Because of the put agreement, the distance-to-trigger is
at approximately 13% according to Fitch's most recent calculation,
and would support a 'B' rating on a market value basis.  However,
the credit deterioration in the portfolio has led to a reduction
in par coverage of the notes, which now supports a 'CCC' rating
based on Fitch's analysis.  As such, the notes are rated to the
lower of the ratings indicated by the two risk exposures of the
transaction.

SERVES 2001-6 is a synthetic total rate of return collateralized
loan obligation with a market value termination trigger.  The
transaction closed on Dec. 18, 2001 and is managed by PPM America,
Inc.

The rating on the notes addresses the timely payment of interest
and ultimate payment of principal by the stated maturity date of
Nov. 15, 2013.


STRUCTURED INVESTMENT: Moody's Junks Rating on Series 77 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its rating of SIC Series 77
Notes issued by Structured Investment Corporation Series 77 Notes.

The rating action is:

Structured Investment Corporation Series 77 Notes

  -- SIC Series 77 Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 and Placed Under
     Review for Downgrade; Previously on 2/23/2004 Assigned Aaa.

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Deposited Assets which consist of Class A-1 notes of
Millstone Funding, Ltd./Millstone Funding Corp rated Caa2 along
with Preferred Shares that are currently receiving no cash
payments.  Millstone Funding, Ltd./Millstone Funding Corp is a
Structured Finance CDO.  Class A-1 was downgraded to Caa2 on
12/22/2008 and remains under review for possible downgrade.  It
was previously downgraded to Baa2 on 4/22/2008 and placed under
review for possible downgrade.


STRUCTURED INVESTMENTS: Moody's Cuts $10BB Series 80 Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its rating of Structured
Investments Corporation US$10,000,000,000 Secured Euro Medium Term
Note Programme Series 80 issued by Structured Investments
Corporation Series 80.

The rating action is:

Class Description: Structured Investments Corporation
US$10,000,000,000 Secured Euro Medium Term Note Programme Series
80

  -- Current Rating: Ba3
  -- Prior Rating: Ba2
  -- Prior Rating Date: 05/28/04

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Term Assets.



STRUCTURED INVESTMENTS: Moody's Cuts $10BB Series 81 Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its rating of Structured
Investments Corporation US$10,000,000,000 Secured Euro Medium Term
Note Programme Series 81 issued by Structured Investments
Corporation Series 81.

The rating action is:

Class Description: Structured Investments Corporation
US$10,000,000,000 Secured Euro Medium Term Note Programme Series
81

  -- Current Rating: Ba2
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 07/30/04

The transaction is a repackaged security whose rating is based
primarily upon the transaction's structure and the credit quality
of the Term Assets.  The Term Assets for this transaction are
Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes due 2016
issued by Dryden VI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004 and Preferred Shares,
Par Value U.S. $0.01 per share issued by Dryden VI-Leveraged Loan
CDO 2004.  The Class C-1 Notes have been downgraded to Ba2.


STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 185 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 185
tranches from 17 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Structured
Adjustable Mortgage Loan Trust.  Additionally, 2 senior tranches
were confirmed at Aaa.The collateral backing these transactions
consists primarily of first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A
residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been assigned to each collateral group,
Moody's assesses available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.


List of actions:

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-11

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/10/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 12/14/2007
     Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Cl. B4, Downgraded to C; previously on 12/14/2007 Downgraded
     to Ca

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-13

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to A1

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B3; previously on 12/14/2007 Upgraded
     to Baa1

Structured Adj Rate Mtge Loan Trust 2004-14

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-X, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-X, Downgraded to B2; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Tr 2004-1

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Tr 2004-9XS

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-10

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-12

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-AX, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 8-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 9-A, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1-X, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3-X, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A2; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. BX, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 11/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-16

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AIO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 12/30/2004
     Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 12/30/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-17

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A1X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A2X, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-18

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-PAX, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. MX, Downgraded to B3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B6X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-20

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B1X, Downgraded to B1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2X, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B3X, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B5X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/17/2008 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B7, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B7X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B8, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B8X, Downgraded to C; previously on 9/17/2008 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-4

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 4/26/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-PAX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-AX, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 5/21/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-6

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A5, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 9/17/2008 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Structured Adj. Rate Mtge. Loan Trust 2004-7

  -- Cl. A1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/10/2004 Assigned
     Aaa


TERWIN MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 8 tranches
from Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT.  The collateral backing
this transaction consists primarily of first-lien, fixed and
adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

List of actions:

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 8/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-PA-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 8/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-P-X, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 8/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-M-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 2/26/2006
     Downgraded A3

  -- Cl. 1-M-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2006
     Downgraded Ba3

  -- Cl. 1-M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/26/2006
     Downgraded Caa1

  -- Cl. 2-B-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 8/30/2004
     Assigned A3


TRUST PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 14 combination note securities whose
underlying components are significantly linked to bank and
insurance Trust Preferred CDO tranches.  The ratings of the
combination notes' underlying components were updated on March 27,
2009.  The rating actions are the result of an analysis primarily
based on the weighted average rating of the component ratings.

ALESCO Preferred Funding V, Corp.

  -- US$5,000,000 Series I Combination Notes Due 2034, Downgraded   
     to B3; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$4,150,000 Series II Combination Notes Due 2034, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Baa1

  -- US$4,000,000 Series III Combination Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Aa3

ALESCO Preferred Funding VI, Inc.

  -- Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     12/27/2004 Assigned Baa3

Alesco Preferred Funding VII, Inc.

  -- US$6,000,000 Series I Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 4/28/2005 Assigned Baa3

  -- US$5,000,000 Series II Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 4/28/2005 Assigned Baa3

MMCapS Funding XVIII, Ltd.

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 12/21/2006 Assigned Baa1

TPREF Funding II, Ltd.

  -- Combination Notes (Salomon), Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on 10/31/2002 Assigned A3

  -- Combination Notes (Bear), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/31/2002 Assigned A3

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd.

  -- Combo Note, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

TRAPEZA EDGE CDO, INC.

  -- Class 1 Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 8/31/2005 Assigned Baa1

Tropic CDO V Ltd.

  -- Class C-1 Combination Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     8/31/2006 Assigned Ba3

U.S. CAPITAL FUNDING IV

  -- COMBINATION TRUST U.S. $4,000,000 Series A Combination
     Certificates, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/28/2005
     Assigned Baa1

USCFIII 2.5% Combination Security Trust - Ser

  -- Series A Trust Units, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     11/30/2004 Assigned Baa2


TRUST PREFERRED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 14 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 14 combination note securities whose
underlying components are significantly linked to bank and
insurance Trust Preferred CDO tranches.  The ratings of the
combination notes' underlying components were updated on March 27,
2009.  The rating actions are the result of an analysis primarily
based on the weighted average rating of the component ratings.

ALESCO Preferred Funding V, Corp.

  -- US$5,000,000 Series I Combination Notes Due 2034, Downgraded   
     to B3; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- US$4,150,000 Series II Combination Notes Due 2034, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Baa1

  -- US$4,000,000 Series III Combination Notes Due 2034,
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/29/2004 Assigned Aa3

ALESCO Preferred Funding VI, Inc.

  -- Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     12/27/2004 Assigned Baa3

Alesco Preferred Funding VII, Inc.

  -- US$6,000,000 Series I Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 4/28/2005 Assigned Baa3

  -- US$5,000,000 Series II Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded
     to Ca; previously on 4/28/2005 Assigned Baa3

MMCapS Funding XVIII, Ltd.

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2039, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 12/21/2006 Assigned Baa1

TPREF Funding II, Ltd.

  -- Combination Notes (Salomon), Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on 10/31/2002 Assigned A3

  -- Combination Notes (Bear), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
     10/31/2002 Assigned A3

Trapeza CDO X, Ltd.

  -- Combo Note, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     Downgraded to Baa3

TRAPEZA EDGE CDO, INC.

  -- Class 1 Combination Notes Due 2035, Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on 8/31/2005 Assigned Baa1

Tropic CDO V Ltd.

  -- Class C-1 Combination Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     8/31/2006 Assigned Ba3

U.S. CAPITAL FUNDING IV

  -- COMBINATION TRUST U.S. $4,000,000 Series A Combination
     Certificates, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 12/28/2005
     Assigned Baa1

USCFIII 2.5% Combination Security Trust - Ser

  -- Series A Trust Units, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on
     11/30/2004 Assigned Baa2


U-HAUL S FLEET: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2007-1 Cargo Van Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the Series
2007-1 Cargo Van/ Pick-up Truck Asset Backed Notes issued by
U-Haul S Fleet and certain co-issuers.  The sponsor of the
transaction is U-Haul International.  The securities are supported
by an insurance policy issued by Ambac Assurance Corp.  The rating
action is prompted by rating actions affecting the insurer and is
part of an ongoing review of ABS transactions.

The current rating on the securities is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

As part of evaluating the current rating for the securities,
Moody's Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.  
The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the guarantee.  

The methodology applied in assigning the underlying rating of each
security is summarized.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: U-Haul S Fleet, LLC

  -- Series 2007-1 Cargo Van/Pick-up Truck Asset Backed Notes,
     downgraded to Baa3 under review for possible downgrade,
     previously on June 19, 2008, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corp., Insurance
     Financial Strength Rating of Ba3, previously on March 3,
     2009, Baa1 placed on review for possible downgrade

                      Principal Methodology

Important factors in Moody's credit assessment include:
liquidation/residual values of a revolving pool of new and to-be-
acquired vehicles cargo vans and pick-up trucks (pick-ups) owned
by the co-issuers; the cash flows anticipated to be generated by
these vehicles; reserve account funded to cover 6 months of
interest; overcollateralization in the form of a variable advance
rate against the capitalized cost (purchase price) of each
vehicle; the size and competitive position of the U-Haul system of
do-it-yourself moving and storage rental locations; and expertise
of UHI as Fleet Manager in managing the vehicles.

The vehicle collateral generates revenues and incurs expenses,
resulting in a net cash flow available to service debt. Revenues
and expenses, hence net cash flow, are subject to fluctuation
based on actual rental activity, expense levels, etc.  As such a
key indicator of performance is the debt service coverage ratio
for the transaction.  However the vehicle pool is revolving and
vehicles must be liquidated or refinanced out of the transaction
at or prior to reaching 15 months of age.  Therefore while in this
transaction the primary drivers of monthly available funds are
revenues and expenses, the potential liquidation value of the
collateral is a primary driver for return of principal in
distressed scenarios.  Two monte carlo simulation models are used
as the primary quantitative techniques to assess the credit.  In
the first model, gross revenue generated monthly by each type of
vehicle collateral is modeled through the simulation of
utilization and rental rates.  Other simulated variables include
ancillary revenue, operating expenses and disposition values.  
Each of these variables is simulated via a distribution derived
partly from historical operational performance data and partly
through qualitative judgment.  In addition, Moody's assesses the
probability of U-Haul default and the magnitude of potential
losses, if a default and ensuing liquidation were to occur. Due to
the strength of the System, a U-Haul default is modeled
probabilistically as either a Chapter 11 reorganization or a
Chapter 7 liquidation; in a Chapter 11 default U-Haul could either
reject or accept its role as Fleet Manager.  Occurrence of a
Chapter 7 default or Chapter 11 rejection causes a liquidation of
the collateral.  Additionally, because of the revolving nature of
the transaction and potential reliance on liquidation at maturity,
a second model based on Moody's rental car securitization model
focusing primarily on the default likelihood of the Fleet manager
and the potential liquidation value of the collateral excluding
the revenue-generating capacity of the vehicles, is also utilized.


U-HAUL S FLEET: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2007-1 Box Truck Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the Series
2007-1 Box Truck Asset Backed Notes issued by U-Haul S Fleet and
certain co-issuers.  The sponsor of the transaction is U-Haul
International.  The securities are supported by an insurance
policy issued by Ambac Assurance Corp.  The rating action is
prompted by rating actions affecting the insurer and is part of an
ongoing review of ABS transactions.

The current rating on the securities is consistent with Moody's
practice of rating insured securities at the higher of (1) the
guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and (2) the
underlying rating, based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

As part of evaluating the current rating for the securities,
Moody's Investors Service also reviewed the underlying rating.  
The underlying rating reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the guarantee.  

The methodology applied in assigning the underlying rating of each
security is summarized.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: U-Haul S Fleet, LLC

  -- Series 2007-1 Box Truck Asset Backed Notes, downgraded to
     Baa3 under review for possible downgrade, previously on June
     19, 2008, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corp., Insurance
     Financial Strength Rating of Ba3, previously on March 3,
     2009, Baa1 placed on review for possible downgrade

                      Principal Methodology

Important factors in Moody's credit assessment include: the cash
flows anticipated to be generated by a static pool of box trucks
owned by the co-issuers in service in the U Haul

System and managed by UHI; liquidation values of the box truck
collateral; reserve account funded to cover 9 months of interest;
overcollateralization in the form of an advance rate against the
assumed asset value of each box truck; the size and competitive
position of the U-Haul system of do-it-yourself moving and storage
rental locations; and the expertise of UHI as Fleet Manager in
managing the box trucks.

The box truck collateral generates revenues and incurs expenses,
resulting in a net cash flow available to service debt.  Revenues
and expenses, hence net cash flow, is subject to fluctuation based
on actual rental activity, expense levels, etc.  As such the key
indicator of performance is the debt service coverage ratio for
the transaction.  Monte carlo simulation of cash flows is the
primary quantitative technique used to assess the credit.  Gross
revenue generated monthly by each type of box truck collateral
(TM, DC and EL) is modeled through the simulation of box truck
utilization and rental rates.  Other simulated variables include
ancillary revenue, operating expenses (insurance, maintenance,
taxes and licensing) and box truck disposition values.  Each
variable is simulated via a distribution derived partly from
historical operational performance data and partly through
qualitative judgement.  In addition, Moody's assesses the
probability of a U-Haul default and the magnitude of potential
losses, if a default and ensuing liquidation were to occur.  Due
to the strength of the System, a U-Haul default was modeled
probabilistically as either a Chapter 11 reorganization or a
Chapter 7 liquidation; in a Chapter 11 default U-Haul can either
reject or accept its role as Fleet Manager.  Occurrence of a
Chapter 7 default or Chapter 11 rejection causes a liquidation of
the collateral.


USP SPC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes issued by USP SPC, acting for the account of Jackson 2006-
II, Jackson 2006-III, Jackson 2006-IV, and Jackson 2006-V to 'D'
from 'CCC-'.
    
The lowered ratings follow a number of write-downs of underlying
reference entities, which have caused the classes of notes from
these synthetic collateralized debt obligation transactions to
incur full principal losses.

                         Ratings Lowered

                             USP SPC
                         Jackson 2006-II

                                         Rating
                                         ------
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-

                             USP SPC
                        Jackson 2006-III

                                         Rating
                                         ------
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-

                             USP SPC
                         Jackson 2006-IV

                                         Rating
                                         ------
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-

                             USP SPC
                         Jackson 2006-V

                                         Rating
                                         ------
                 Class                  To   From
                 -----                  --   ----
                 Notes                  D    CCC-


VERMONT HOUSING: S&P Puts Underlying Rating on Negative Watch
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BBB+' underlying
rating on Vermont Housing Finance Agency's single-family housing
bonds on CreditWatch with negative implications.  This action
reflects Standard & Poor's March 13, 2009, downgrade of the
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. to BB/Watch Neg from A-/Watch
Neg.      

Based on S&P's assessment, the portfolio's concentration in MGIC
insured loans has had a deleterious effect on the indenture's
assumed losses under Standard & Poor's stress scenario assumptions
at the 'BBB+' level.
     
As of Dec. 31, 2008, the indenture's mortgage assets were 100%
whole loans.  The overall whole loan portfolio has approximately
4,830 mortgages containing uninsured mortgages (40.39%), Rural
Development Loans (11.18%), and a small amount of FHA loans
(0.08%).  Approximately 48.34% of all the mortgage loans within
the portfolio are enhanced by private mortgage insurance primarily
with these two providers: 86.85% of privately insured loans are
insured with MGIC (BB/Watch Neg) and 12.59% of privately insured
loans are insured with PMI Mortgage Insurance (A-/Watch Neg).
     
Standard & Poor's typically assesses the sufficiency of loss
coverage to provide credit and liquidity protection under its
scenario assumptions.  In assessing total loss coverage that would
be required under this scenario, Standard & Poor's looks for
coverage of credit losses and liquidity shortfalls associated with
defaulted loans as well as the amount of foreclosure loss that
mortgage insurers within a single-family loan portfolio will
likely absorb.  When evaluating private mortgage insurers for loss
coverage, Standard & Poor's compares the financial strength
ratings of the insurers to the current or prospective rating on
the bonds.  If insurers' FSR ratings are at least as high as the
rating for the bonds, S&P assumes that the insurers will pay on
all of their respective claims.  Standard & Poor's reduces the
credit for private insurance coverage from 100% if the provider is
rated lower than the bonds.  Should a rating fall below investment
grade, Standard & Poor's assumes there will be no payment from
that insurance provider in case of a mortgagor default.  


WACHOVIA PREFERRED: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two Notes to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of
$124,000,000 Class A Class A Money Market Preferred Trust
Certificates and $31,000,000 Class B Leveraged Preferred Trust
Certificates issued by Wachovia Preferred Pass-Through Trust
2006-B.

The rating actions are:

Class Description: $124,000,000 Class A Class A Money Market
Preferred Trust Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

Class Description: $31,000,000 Class B Leveraged Preferred Trust
Certificates

  -- Current Rating: B3
  -- Prior Rating: Baa1
  -- Prior Rating Date: 01/30/09

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings change with the
rating of the Underlying Security.  The rating actions are a
result of the change of the rating of Floating Rate Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock, Series E issued by Bank of America Corporation,
which was downgraded to B3 on March 25, 2009.


WELLS FARGO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Classes from 23 RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 51
classes from 23 Wells Fargo residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions issued in 2003 and 2004.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 526 classes from these transactions and 29
additional transactions issued between 2002 and 2004.
     
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.  To review these
transactions, S&P applied its methodology, which is discussed in
"Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Issued Before 2005,"
published March 12, 2009.  In S&P's analysis, S&P incorporated the
loss and delinquency trends observed for the transactions backed
by prime jumbo collateral that were issued in these vintages. Some
transactions are experiencing foreclosures and delinquencies at
rates that exceed S&P's initial projections, and these
transactions have also started to experience losses.
     
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration.  For
mortgage pools that are continuing to experience increasing
delinquencies, S&P increased its stresses to account for potential
increases in monthly losses.  In order to maintain a rating higher
than 'B', S&P assessed whether, in S&P's view, a class could
absorb losses in excess of the base-case assumptions S&P assumed
in its analysis.  For example, generally, S&P assessed whether one
class could, in S&P's view, withstand approximately 130% of S&P's
base-case loss assumption in order to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P assessed whether a different class could withstand 155%
of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.  
Each class that has an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view,
withstand approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
under S&P's analysis.
     
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
     
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions . The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate, first-lien,
prime jumbo mortgage loans.
     
Standard & Poor's will continue to closely monitor the performance
of these transactions and take further ratings actions as S&P deem
appropriate.

                          Rating Actions

        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-17 Trust
                       Series      2003-17
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        94981CAB5     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-3 Trust
                        Series      2004-3
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----

        B-5        949809AH0     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-5 Trust
                        Series      2004-5
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        94975DAL9     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-A Trust
                        Series      2004-A
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-4        94980FAF0     B                    BB
        B-5        94980FAG8     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-C Trust
                        Series      2004-C
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        94980AAB0     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-CC Trust
                        Series      2004-CC
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        94981MAD9     BBB-                 A
        B-3        94981MAE7     B                    BBB
        B-4        94981MAF4     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94981MAG2     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-E Trust
                        Series      2004-E
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        94981DAQ0     BBB                  A
        B-3        94981DAR8     B                    BBB
        B-4        94981DAS6     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94981DAT4     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-EE Trust
                        Series      2004-EE
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-4        949779AQ5     B                    BB
        B-5        949779AR3     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-F Trust
                        Series      2004-F
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        949770AS0     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-H Trust
                        Series      2004-H
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        94979TAH9     BB                   BBB
        B-4        94979TAJ5     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94979TAK2     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-K Trust
                        Series      2004-K
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-4        94981VAS6     B                    BB
        B-5        94981VAT4     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-L Trust
                        Series      2004-L
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        94980PAM3     BBB-                 A
        B-3        94980PAN1     B                    BBB
        B-4        94980PAP6     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94980PAQ4     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-M Trust
                        Series      2004-M
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----

        B-4        94979UAP8     B+                   BB
        B-5        94979UAQ6     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust
                        Series      2004-N
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-4        94979LAQ6     B                    BB
        B-5        94979LAR4     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-O Trust
                        Series      2004-O
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        949758AB2     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-P Trust
                        Series      2004-P
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        94980MAG3     B                    BBB
        B-4        94980NAA4     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94980NAB2     CC                   B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Q Trust
                        Series      2004-Q
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        94978LAK0     BB                   BBB
        B-4        94978LAL8     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94978LAM6     CC                   B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust
                        Series      2004-R
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        94981GAL4     B+                   BBB
        B-4        94981GAA8     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94981GAB6     CC                   B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust
                        Series      2004-S
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        94981WAJ4     BBB                  A
        B-3        94981WAK1     B                    BBB
        B-4        94981WAM7     CCC                  BB
        B-5        94981WAN5     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust
                        Series      2004-V
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        949810AJ4     BB                   BBB
        B-4        949810AK1     CCC                  BB
        B-5        949810AL9     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust
                        Series      2004-X
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        94981TAP7     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust
                        Series      2004-Y
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-5        94982AAQ5     CCC                  B
         
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust
                        Series      2004-Z
                                         Rating
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        94980RAH0     BBB-                 A
        B-3        94980RAJ6     B                    BBB
         
                         Ratings Affirmed

              Bank of America Mortgage 2002-5 Trust
                        Series      2002-5
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-6        06050HHW1     AAA
                  A-WIO      06050HHZ4     AAA
                  A-PO       06050HJA7     AAA
                   
                   RFMSI Series 2002-S11 Trust
                       Series      2002-S11
                
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        76111JVT8     AAA
                  A-P        76111JVU5     AAA
                  A-V        76111JVV3     AAA
                  M-1        76111JVX9     AAA
                  M-2        76111JVY7     AAA
                  M-3        76111JVZ4     AAA
                   
             Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation
                        Series      2003-N

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94980XAA2     AAA
                  I-A-2      94980XAB0     AAA
                  I-A-3      94980XAC8     AAA
                  I-A-4      94980XAD6     AAA
                  I-A-5      94980XAE4     AAA
                  I-A-6      94980XAF1     AAA
                  II-A-1     94980XAJ3     AAA
                  II-A-2     94980XAK0     AAA
                  II-A-3     94980XAL8     AAA
                  II-A-4     94980XAM6     AAA
                  III-A-1    94980XAN4     AAA
                  III-A-2    94980XAP9     AAA
                  III-A-3    94980XAQ7     AAA
                  III-A-4    94980XAR5     AAA
                  B-1        94980XAS3     AA
                  B-2        94980XAT1     A
                  B-3        94980XAU8     BBB
                  B-4        94980XAV6     BB
                  B-5        94980XAW4     B
                   
             Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation
                       Series      2003-18
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949775AA8     AAA
                  A-2        949775AB6     AAA
                  A-3        949775AC4     AAA
                  A-4        949775AK6     AAA
                  A-5        949775AD2     AAA
                  A-PO       949775AE0     AAA
                  B-1        949775AG5     AA
                  B-2        949775AH3     A
                  B-3        949775AJ9     BBB
                  B-4        9497759A9     BB
                  B-5        9497759B8     B
                   
      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-20 Trust
                       Series      2002-20

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-4        94979MAD3     AAA
                  A-5        94979MAE1     AAA
                  A-PO       94979MAF8     AAA
                  B-1        94979MAH4     AAA
                  B-2        94979MAJ0     AAA
                  B-3        94979MAK7     AA+
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-22 Trust
                       Series      2002-22
               
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-12     94979NAM1     AAA
                  II-A-4     94979NAV1     AAA
                  II-A-10    94979NBB4     AAA
                  II-A-PO    94979NBC2     AAA
                  I-A-WIO    94979NBK4     AAA
                  II-A-WIO   94979NBL2     AAA
                  B-1        94979NBG3     AAA
                  B-2        94979NBH1     AAA
                  B-3        94979NBJ7     AAA
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-11 Trust
                       Series      2003-11
                 
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949761AA8     AAA
                  I-A-2      949761AB6     AAA
                  I-A-3      949761AC4     AAA
                  I-A-4      949761AD2     AAA
                  I-A-5      949761AE0     AAA
                  I-A-6      949761AF7     AAA
                  I-A-8      949761AH3     AAA
                  I-A-9      949761AJ9     AAA
                  I-A-10     949761AK6     AAA
                  I-A-11     949761AL4     AAA
                  I-A-12     949761AM2     AAA
                  I-A-13     949761AN0     AAA
                  I-A-PO     949761AP5     AAA
                  II-A-1     949761AS9     AAA
                  II-A-PO    949761AT7     AAA
                  B-1        949761AU4     AA
                  B-2        949761AV2     A
                  B-3        949761AW0     BBB
                  B-4        949761AX8     BB
                  B-5        949761AY6     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-12 Trust
                       Series      2003-12
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979FAA4     AAA
                  A-2        94979FAB2     AAA
                  A-3        94979FAC0     AAA
                  A-PO       94979FAF3     AAA
                  B-1        94979FAH9     AA
                  B-2        94979FAJ5     A
                  B-3        94979FAK2     BBB
                  B-4        94979FAL0     BB
                  B-5        94979FAM8     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-13 Trust
                       Series      2003-13
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949767AA5     AAA
                  A-2        949767AB3     AAA
                  A-3        949767AC1     AAA
                  A-4        949767AD9     AAA
                  A-5        949767AE7     AAA
                  A-6        949767AF4     AAA
                  A-7        949767AG2     AAA
                  A-PO       949767AH0     AAA
                  B-1        949767AK3     AA
                  B-2        949767AL1     A
                  B-3        949767AM9     BBB
                  B-4        949767AN7     BB
                  B-5        949767AP2     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-14 Trust
                       Series      2003-14

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94981AAA1     AAA
                  I-A-2      94981AAB9     AAA
                  I-A-3      94981AAC7     AAA
                  I-A-4      94981AAD5     AAA
                  II-A-1     94981AAF0     AAA
                  II-A-2     94981AAG8     AAA
                  A-PO       94981AAH6     AAA
                  B-1        94981AAJ2     AA
                  B-2        94981AAK9     A
                  B-3        94981AAL7     BBB
                  B-4        94981AAM5     BB
                  B-5        94981AAN3     B
                   
      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-15 Trust
                       Series      2003-15
               
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94980WAA4     AAA
                  I-A-2      94980WAB2     AAA
                  I-A-3      94980WAC0     AAA
                  II-A-1     94980WAE6     AAA
                  A-PO       94980WAF3     AAA
                  B-1        94980WAG1     AA
                  B-2        94980WAH9     A
                  B-3        94980WAJ5     BBB
                  B-4        94980WAK2     BB
                  B-5        94980WAL0     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-16 Trust
                       Series      2003-16

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94980YAA0     AAA
                  II-A-1     94980YAE2     AAA
                  II-A-2     94980YAF9     AAA
                  II-A-3     94980YAG7     AAA
                  II-A-4     94980YAH5     AAA
                  II-A-IO    94980YAJ1     AAA
                  III-A-1    94980YAL6     AAA
                  III-A-2    94980YAM4     AAA
                  A-PO       94980YAB8     AAA
                  B-1        94980YAP7     AA
                  B-2        94980YAQ5     A
                  B-3        94980YAR3     BBB
                  B-4        94980YAS1     BB
                  B-5        94980YAT9     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-17 Trust
                       Series      2003-17
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94981CAD1     AAA
                  I-A-2      94981CAE9     AAA
                  I-A-3      94981CAF6     AAA
                  I-A-4      94981CAG4     AAA
                  I-A-5      94981CAH2     AAA
                  I-A-6      94981CAJ8     AAA
                  I-A-7      94981CAK5     AAA
                  I-A-8      94981CAL3     AAA
                  I-A-9      94981CAM1     AAA
                  I-A-10     94981CAN9     AAA
                  I-A-11     94981CAP4     AAA
                  I-A-12     94981CAQ2     AAA
                  I-A-13     94981CAR0     AAA
                  I-A-14     94981CAS8     AAA
                  I-A-IO     94981CAT6     AAA
                  II-A-1     94981CAV1     AAA
                  II-A-2     94981CAW9     AAA
                  II-A-3     94981CAX7     AAA
                  II-A-4     94981CAY5     AAA
                  II-A-5     94981CAZ2     AAA
                  II-A-6     94981CBA6     AAA
                  II-A-7     94981CBB4     AAA
                  II-A-8     94981CBC2     AAA
                  II-A-9     94981CBD0     AAA
                  II-A-10    94981CBE8     AAA
                  II-A-11    94981CBF5     AAA
                  A-PO       94981CBG3     AAA
                  B-1        94981CBH1     AA
                  B-2        94981CBJ7     A
                  B-3        94981CBK4     BBB
                  B-4        94981CAA7     BB
                   
      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-6 Trust
                       Series      2003-6

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949780AA8     AAA
                  I-A-PO     949780AB6     AAA
                  II-A-1     949780AE0     AAA
                  II-A-2     949780AF7     AAA
                  II-A-3     949780AG5     AAA
                  II-A-PO    949780AH3     AAA
                  B-1        949780AJ9     AA+
                  B-2        949780AK6     A+
                  B-3        949780AL4     BBB+
                  B-4        949780AM2     BB+
                  B-5        949780AN0     B
                  
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-8 Trust
                        Series      2003-8

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979RAA8     AAA
                  A-2        94979RAB6     AAA
                  A-4        94979RAD2     AAA
                  A-5        94979RAE0     AAA
                  A-6        94979RAF7     AAA
                  A-7        94979RAG5     AAA
                  A-9        94979RAJ9     AAA
                  A-PO       94979RAK6     AAA
                  B-1        94979RAN0     AA
                  B-2        94979RAP5     A
                  B-3        94979RAQ3     BBB
                  B-4        94979RAR1     BB
                  B-5        94979RAS9     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-A Trust
                        Series      2003-A
            
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-5        94980BAE2     AAA
                  A-6        94980BAF9     AAA
                  A-7        94980BAG7     AAA
                  B-1        94980BAK8     AAA
                  B-2        94980BAL6     AA+
                  B-3        94980BAM4     A+
                  B-4        94980BAN2     BBB+
                  B-5        94980BAP7     BB-
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-C Trust
                       Series      2003-C

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-4        94980EAD8     AAA
                  A-5        94980EAE6     AAA
                  A-6        94980EAF3     AAA
                  A-7        94980EAG1     AAA
                  A-8        94980EAH9     AAA
                  A-9        94980EAJ5     AAA
                  B-1        94980EAM8     AAA
                  B-2        94980EAN6     AA
                  B-3        94980EAP1     A+
                  B-4        94980EAQ9     BBB
                  B-5        94980EAR7     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-D Trust
                       Series      2003-D

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949911AA9     AAA
                  B-1        949911AC5     AAA
                  B-2        949911AD3     AA
                  B-3        949911AE1     A
                  B-4        949911AF8     BBB-
                  B-5        949911AG6     B+
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-F Trust
                        Series      2003-F

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979QAA0     AAA
                  B-1        94979QAC6     AA+
                  B-2        94979QAD4     A
                  B-3        94979QAE2     BBB+
                  B-4        94979QAF9     BB
                  B-5        94979QAG7     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-G Trust
                        Series      2003-G

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979WAA7     AAA
                  A-IO       94979WAB5     AAA
                  B-1        94979WAE9     AA
                  B-2        94979WAF6     A
                  B-3        94979WAG4     BBB
                  B-4        94979WAH2     BB
                  B-5        94979WAJ8     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-H Trust
                        Series      2003-H

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979XAA5     AAA
                  B-1        94979XAC1     AA
                  B-2        94979XAD9     A
                  B-3        94979XAE7     BBB
                  B-4        94979XAF4     BB
                  B-5        94979XAG2     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust
                        Series      2003-J

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-2      949808AB5     AAA
                  I-A-3      949808AC3     AAA
                  I-A-4      949808AD1     AAA
                  I-A-5      949808AE9     AAA
                  I-A-7      949808AG4     AAA
                  I-A-8      949808AH2     AAA
                  I-A-9      949808AJ8     AAA
                  I-A-10     949808AK5     AAA
                  I-A-11     949808AL3     AAA
                  I-A-12     949808AM1     AAA
                  II-A-1     949808AP4     AAA
                  II-A-2     949808AQ2     AAA
                  II-A-3     949808AR0     AAA
                  II-A-4     949808AS8     AAA
                  II-A-5     949808AT6     AAA
                  II-A-6     949808AU3     AAA
                  II-A-7     949808AV1     AAA
                  III-A-1    949808AW9     AAA
                  III-A-2    949808AX7     AAA
                  III-A-3    949808AY5     AAA
                  IV-A-1     949808AZ2     AAA
                  IV-A-2     949808BA6     AAA
                  IV-A-3     949808BB4     AAA
                  V-A-1      949808BC2     AAA
                  B-1        949808BD0     AA
                  B-2        949808BE8     A
                  B-3        949808BF5     BBB
                  B-4        949808BG3     BB
                  B-5        949808BH1     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-K Trust
                        Series      2003-K
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949768AA3     AAA
                  I-A-2      949768AB1     AAA
                  I-A-3      949768AC9     AAA
                  I-A-4      949768AD7     AAA
                  I-A-5      949768AE5     AAA
                  II-A-2     949768AH8     AAA
                  II-A-3     949768AJ4     AAA
                  II-A-4     949768AK1     AAA
                  II-A-5     949768AL9     AAA
                  II-A-6     949768AM7     AAA
                  II-A-7     949768AN5     AAA
                  III-A-1    949768AP0     AAA
                  III-A-2    949768AQ8     AAA
                  III-A-3    949768AR6     AAA
                  III-A-4    949768AS4     AAA
                  IV-A-1     949768AT2     AAA
                  B-1        949768AU9     AA
                  B-2        949768AV7     A
                  B-3        949768AW5     BBB
                  B-4        949913AA5     BB
                  B-5        949913AB3     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-L Trust
                        Series      2003-L

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949769AA1     AAA
                  I-A-2      949769AB9     AAA
                  I-A-3      949769AC7     AAA
                  I-A-4      949769AD5     AAA
                  I-A-5      949769AE3     AAA
                  II-A-1     949769AH6     AAA
                  B-1        949769AJ2     AA
                  B-2        949769AK9     A
                  B-3        949769AL7     BBB
                  B-4        949769AM5     BB
                  B-5        949769AN3     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-M Trust
                        Series      2003-M

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94980DAA6     AAA
                  A-2        94980DAB4     AAA
                  A-3        94980DAC2     AAA
                  B-1        94980DAE8     AA
                  B-2        94980DAF5     A
                  B-3        94980DAG3     BBB
                  B-4        94980DAH1     BB
                  B-5        94980DAJ7     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-O Trust
                        Series      2003-O

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94979YAD7     AAA
                  I-A-2      94979YAE5     AAA
                  I-A-3      94979YAF2     AAA
                  I-A-4      94979YAG0     AAA
                  I-A-5      94979YAH8     AAA
                  I-A-6      94979YAJ4     AAA
                  I-A-7      94979YAK1     AAA
                  I-A-9      94979YAM7     AAA
                  I-A-10     94979YAN5     AAA
                  I-A-11     94979YAP0     AAA
                  II-A-1     94979YAT2     AAA
                  II-A-2     94979YAU9     AAA
                  II-A-3     94979YAV7     AAA
                  III-A-2    94979YAX3     AAA
                  III-A-3    94979YAY1     AAA
                  IV-A-1     94979YAZ8     AAA
                  IV-A-2     94979YBA2     AAA
                  V-A-1      94979YBB0     AAA
                  B-1        94979YBC8     AA
                  B-2        94979YBD6     A
                  B-3        94979YBE4     BBB
                  B-4        94979YAA3     BB
                  B-5        94979YAB1     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust
                        Series      2004-2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949800AA4     AAA
                  A-PO       949800AB2     AAA
                  B-1        949800AD8     AA
                  B-2        949800AE6     A
                  B-3        949800AF3     BBB
                  B-4        949800AG1     BB
                  B-5        949800AH9     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-3 Trust
                        Series      2004-3

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949809AA5     AAA
                  A-PO       949809AB3     AAA
                  B-1        949809AD9     AA
                  B-2        949809AE7     A
                  B-3        949809AF4     BBB
                  B-4        949809AG2     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-5 Trust
                        Series      2004-5
                
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94975DAA3     AAA
                  I-A-PO     94975DAB1     AAA
                  II-A-1     94975DAC9     AAA
                  II-A-PO    94975DAF2     AAA
                  B-1        94975DAG0     AA
                  B-2        94975DAH8     A
                  B-3        94975DAJ4     BBB
                  B-4        94975DAK1     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-A Trust
                        Series      2004-A
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94980FAA1     AAA
                  B-1        94980FAC7     AA
                  B-2        94980FAD5     A
                  B-3        94980FAE3     BBB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-B Trust
                        Series      2004-B
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94981KAA9     AAA
                  B-1        94981KAC5     AA
                  B-2        94981KAD3     A
                  B-3        94981KAE1     BBB
                  B-4        94981KAF8     BB
                  B-5        94981KAG6     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-C Trust
                        Series      2004-C

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94980AAD6     AAA
                  B-1        94980AAF1     AA
                  B-3        94980AAH7     BBB
                  B-4        94980AAA2     BB
                  B-2        94980AAG9     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-CC Trust
                  Series      2004-CC
                
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94981MAA5     AAA
                  B-1        94981MAC1     AA
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-D Trust
                        Series      2004-D

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949805AA3     AAA
                  A-2        949805AB1     AAA
                  A-IO       949805AC9     AAA
                  B-1        949805AF2     AA
                  B-2        949805AG0     A
                  B-3        949805AH8     BBB
                  B-4        949805AJ4     BB
                  B-5        949805AK1     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-E Trust
                        Series      2004-E
                 
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94981DAA5     AAA
                  A-2        94981DAB3     AAA
                  A-3        94981DAC1     AAA
                  A-5        94981DAE7     AAA
                  A-6        94981DAF4     AAA
                  A-7        94981DAG2     AAA
                  A-8        94981DAH0     AAA
                  A-9        94981DAJ6     AAA
                  A-10       94981DAK3     AAA
                  A-11       94981DAL1     AAA
                  B-1        94981DAP2     AA
                   
      Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-EE Trust
                       Series      2004-EE

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949779AA0     AAA
                  II-A-1     949779AB8     AAA
                  II-A-2     949779AG7     AAA
                  II-A-3     949779AH5     AAA
                  II-A-R     949779AJ1     AAA
                  III-A-1    949779AC6     AAA
                  III-A-2    949779AL6     AAA
                  III-A-3    949779AM4     AAA
                  B-1        949779AD4     AA
                  B-2        949779AE2     A
                  B-3        949779AF9     BBB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-F Trust
                        Series      2004-F
                
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949770AA9     AAA
                  A-2        949770AB7     AAA
                  A-3        949770AC5     AAA
                  A-4        949770AD3     AAA
                  A-5        949770AE1     AAA
                  A-6        949770AF8     AAA
                  A-7        949770AG6     AAA
                  A-8        949770AH4     AAA
                  A-9        949770AJ0     AAA
                  A-10       949770AK7     AAA
                  A-11       949770AL5     AAA
                  B-1        949770AN1     AA
                  B-2        949770AP6     A
                  B-3        949770AQ4     BBB
                  B-4        949770AR2     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-G Trust
                        Series      2004-G

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94978JAA7     AAA
                  A-2        94978JAB5     AAA
                  A-3        94978JAC3     AAA
                  A-4        94978JAD1     AAA
                  B-1        94978JAF6     AA
                  B-2        94978JAG4     A
                  B-3        94978JAH2     BBB
                  B-4        94978JAJ8     BB
                  B-5        94978JAK5     B
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-H Trust
                        Series      2004-H

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979TAA4     AAA
                  A-2        94979TAB2     AAA
                  B-1        94979TAF3     AA
                  B-2        94979TAG1     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-K Trust
                       Series      2004-K

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94981VAA5     AAA
                  I-A-2      94981VAB3     AAA
                  I-A-3      94981VAC1     AAA
                  II-A-1     94981VAF4     AAA
                  II-A-2     94981VAG2     AAA
                  II-A-3     94981VAH0     AAA
                  II-A-4     94981VAJ6     AAA
                  II-A-5     94981VAK3     AAA
                  II-A-6     94981VAL1     AAA
                  II-A-7     94981VAM9     AAA
                  II-A-8     94981VAN7     AAA
                  II-A-9     94981VAV9     AAA
                  II-A-10    94981VAW7     AAA
                  II-A-11    94981VAX5     AAA
                  II-A-12    94981VAY3     AAA
                  B-1        94981VAP2     AA
                  B-2        94981VAQ0     A
                  B-3        94981VAR8     BBB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-L Trust
                        Series      2004-L

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-3        94980PAC5     AAA
                  A-4        94980PAD3     AAA
                  A-5        94980PAE1     AAA
                  A-6        94980PAF8     AAA
                  A-7        94980PAG6     AAA
                  A-8        94980PAH4     AAA
                  A-9        94980PAJ0     AAA
                  B-1        94980PAL5     AA
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-M Trust
                        Series      2004-M

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94979UAA1     AAA
                  A-4        94979UAD5     AAA
                  A-5        94979UAE3     AAA
                  A-6        94979UAF0     AAA
                  A-7        94979UAG8     AAA
                  A-8        94979UAH6     AAA
                  B-1        94979UAL7     AA
                  B-2        94979UAM5     A
                  B-3        94979UAN3     BBB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust
                        Series      2004-N

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-4        94979LAD5     AAA
                  A-5        94979LAE3     AAA
                  A-6        94979LAF0     AAA
                  A-7        94979LAG8     AAA
                  A-8        94979LAH6     AAA
                  A-9        94979LAJ2     AAA
                  B-1        94979LAM5     AA
                  B-2        94979LAN3     A
                  B-3        94979LAP8     BBB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-O Trust
                        Series      2004-O

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        949758AD8     AAA
                  B-1        949758AF3     AA
                  B-2        949758AG1     A
                  B-3        949758AH9     BBB
                  B-4        949758AA4     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-P Trust
                        Series      2004-P

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94980MAA6     AAA
                  II-A-1     94980MAB4     AAA
                  B-1        94980MAE8     AA
                  B-2        94980MAF5     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Q Trust
                        Series      2004-Q

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94978LAA2     AAA
                  I-A-2      94978LAB0     AAA
                  I-A-3      94978LAC8     AAA
                  II-A-1     94978LAF1     AAA
                  II-A-2     94978LAG9     AAA
                  B-1        94978LAH7     AA
                  B-2        94978LAJ3     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-R Trust
                        Series      2004-R

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94981GAD2     AAA
                  I-A-2      94981GAE0     AAA
                  II-A-1     94981GAF7     AAA
                  B-1        94981GAJ9     AA
                  B-2        94981GAK6     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust
                        Series      2004-S

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-1        94981WAA3     AAA
                  A-4        94981WAD7     AAA
                  A-5        94981WAE5     AAA
                  A-6        94981WAF2     AAA
                  A-7        94981WAL9     AAA
                  B-1        94981WAH8     AA
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-V Trust
                        Series      2004-V

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      949810AA3     AAA
                  I-A-2      949810AB1     AAA
                  I-A-3      949810AC9     AAA
                  II-A-1     949810AF2     AAA
                  B-1        949810AG0     AA
                  B-2        949810AH8     A
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-X Trust
                        Series      2004-X

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94981TAA0     AAA
                  I-A-2      94981TAB8     AAA
                  I-A-3      94981TAC6     AAA
                  I-A-4      94981TAD4     AAA
                  I-A-5      94981TAE2     AAA
                  II-A-1     94981TAH5     AAA
                  II-A-2     94981TAJ1     AAA
                  B-1        94981TAK8     AA
                  B-2        94981TAL6     A
                  B-3        94981TAM4     BBB
                  B-4        94981TAN2     BB
                   
       Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust
                       Series      2004-Y

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94982AAA0     AAA
                  I-A-2      94982AAB8     AAA
                  I-A-3      94982AAC6     AAA
                  II-A-1     94982AAD4     AAA
                  III-A-1    94982AAH5     AAA
                  III-A-2    94982AAJ1     AAA
                  III-A-3    94982AAK8     AAA
                  III-A-4    94982AAE2     AAA
                  III-A-5    94982AAF9     AAA
                  B-1        94982AAL6     AA
                  B-2        94982AAM4     A
                  B-3        94982AAN2     BBB
                  B-4        94982AAP7     BB
                   
        Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust
                        Series      2004-Z
                  
                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-A-1      94980RAA5     AAA
                  I-A-2      94980RAB3     AAA
                  II-A-1     94980RAC1     AAA
                  II-A-2     94980RAD9     AAA
                  II-A-IO    94980RAE7     AAA
                  B-1        94980RAG2     AA


WICHITA BRENTWOOD: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on 1995 Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its rating outlook on
Wichita (Brentwood Manor Project), Kansas's multifamily housing
revenue bonds series IX-A 1995 and IX-B 1995 to negative
from stable.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'B'
rating on project's series IX-A 1995 bonds, and its 'B-' rating on
the project's series IX-B 1995 bonds.
     
"The outlook revision reflects the property's reliance on advances
from an affiliate, Christian Relief Services Charities Residential
Inc., which is not obligated to pay debt service," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Mikiyon Alexander.
     
The ratings reflect project's reliance on advances from Christian
Relief Services Charities Residential Inc. and low demand in the
project's market, as demonstrated by occupancy rates below 90%.


WRIGHTWOOD CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2005-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
of Notes issued by Wrightwood Capital Real Estate CDO 2005-1, Ltd.  
The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, $376,775,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-R*, up to $100,000,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2040,
     downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, $48,750,000, Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, downg
     raded to Ba1 from Aa2; previously on 3/12/2009 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, $13,975,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest
     Notes Due 2040, downgraded to B1 from A1; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, $9,750,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest Notes
     Due 2040, downgraded to B2 from A3; previously on 3/12/2009
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, $21,125,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest
     Notes Due 2040, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa1; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, $14,625,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest
     Notes Due 2040, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, $8,125,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest Notes
     Due 2040, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, $6,500,000, Floating Rate Capitalized Interest Notes
     Due 2040, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3; previously on
     3/12/2009 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

* Outstanding Class A-R balance is $68,500,000 as of March 31,
  2009

Moody's downgraded all Classes solely due to revised modeling
parameters.  Moody's ratings are based on the current credit
quality of the collateral and may not reflect potential migration
as per the legal documentation.

The pool contains a 100% concentration in whole loans.

Moody's expects the aggregate default rate on CMBS loans (1.59% as
of March 2009) to revert to its long-term historical average of
1.5% to 2.0% in 2009, and most likely to surpass this level as the
market begins to form a bottom in 2010 and 2011.  Commercial
property values, which have declined about 21% from the peak
reached in October 2007, are expected to decline an additional 5
to 15% over the next 18 to 24 months.

Moody's has revised three key parameters in Moody's model for
rating and monitoring commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations - asset correlation, default probability, and recovery
rate.  These revisions are generally consistent with recent
revisions to the key parameter assumptions for rating and
monitoring other collateralized debt obligation transactions
backed by structured finance securities.

Moody's has updated its asset correlation assumption for the
commercial real estate sector to be consistent with one of Moody's
CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5 (released on February 3, 2009),
which incorporates these new parameters.  However, for CRE CDOs
with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is reducing the maximum over
concentration stress applied to correlation factors by half due to
the diversity of tenants, property types, and geographic locations
inherent in the collateral pools.  Previously, the average asset
correlations used for CMBS within CRE CDO deals ranged between 15%
and 35%, depending on vintage and issuer diversity.  In light of
the systemic seizure of the credit markets, as well as higher
intra industry and inter industry asset correlations, the updated
correlation parameters for CRE CDOs will imply an average range of
asset correlations of between 30% and 60% for the underlying
collateral.

Moody's has previously stated that CRE CDO deals with collateral
concentrations in CMBS certificates will likely be among the first
transactions to be affected by credit issues that arise, and that
the additional leverage inherent in these deals creates the
potential for greater ratings transitions compared to that of a
first order transaction (i.e., those containing non-CUSIP assets).  
For CRE CDOs with CUSIP collateral, the additional default
probability stress sometimes applied to resecuritization
collateral will not be applied to Moody's review of conduit and
fusion commercial mortgage backed securities collateral from the
2006 to 2008 vintages due to a recent ratings sweep of these
transactions.  Based on Moody's current expectations for
commercial real estate performance, Moody's have migrated the
ratings for recent vintage CMBS to levels that Moody's believe
will remain relatively stable for the next 12 to 24 months.  As
such, Moody's has eliminated the vintage stress factor and default
probability resecuritization stress from its analysis of deals
with recent vintage CMBS collateral.

For deals with pre-2006 CMBS collateral, Moody's is adopting the
default probability resecuritization stress assumptions contained
within CDOROM v2.5 to capture the leveraging effect and potential
ratings volatility of the underlying collateral.  For CMBS, this
factor is equivalent to two times the probability of default for
non-Aaa and six times the PD for Aaa-rated collateral.  For CRE
CDOs, this factor is equivalent to four times the probability of
default for non-Aaa and twelve times the PD for Aaa-rated
collateral.  The lower stress for CMBS is due to the historical
stable performance of this asset class.

For CRE CDOs with non-CUSIP collateral, Moody's is eliminating the
additional default probability stress in CDOROM v2.5 that is
applied to corporate debt as Moody's anticipate that the
underlying non-CMBS collateral will experience lower default rates
and higher recovery rates.  In addition, Moody's is reducing the
maximum over concentration stress applied to correlation factors
by half due to the diversity of tenants, property types, and
geographic locations inherent in the collateral pools.  For those
deals that are significantly less diversified, Moody's will add
back over concentration stress as warranted.

In Moody's analysis of synthetic CRE CDOs, it historically
employed a fixed recovery rate by the asset's original rating and
tranche size.  Moody's current analysis uses a simulation based
mean recovery rate based on the asset's current rating and tranche
size.  This is consistent with the assumptions underlying CDOROM
v2.5.  With this more robust approach, Moody's expects to capture
in Moody's ratings more of the tail risk associated with
variability of recovery rates.

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  This is Moody's first review since
securitization.  Moody's review at securitization is summarized in
a Pre-Sale report dated October 3, 2005.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 62 Tranches by 13 Trust CDOs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded 62 tranches across 13 Trust Preferred CDOs.  
The downgrades are prompted by the exposure of these TRUP CDOs to
trust preferred or subordinated debt issued by real estate
investment trusts, real estate operating companies, homebuilders,
commercial mortgage backed securities, and real estate related
loans.

In April 2008, Moody's downgraded most REIT TRUP CDO tranches due
to the increasing likelihood of defaults and low expected
recoveries for mortgage REITs and homebuilders.  Due to the
continued credit crisis and weak economic conditions, defaults and
interest payment deferrals for all collateral types backing REIT
CDOs are expected to be worse than previously anticipated.  
Moody's believes the weak economic environment will continue
throughout this year resulting in more defaults and low recoveries
in this area.

The rating actions are the result of using a combination of these
analysis: (1) Cash-flow modeling analysis (2) Coverage analysis
(3) Event of default analysis (4) Break-even analysis.

                     Cash Flow Modeling Analysis

Moody's looked at two scenarios from its cash flow model using the
correlated binomial distribution.  The major inputs into the cash
flow model are the default probability, correlations, and recovery
rates.

In the first scenario, Moody's assumed any security currently
defaulted, deferring payment, or with a rating of less than Caa2
to be defaulted with a zero recovery.  In the second scenario,
Moody's assumed any security currently defaulted, deferring
payment, with a rating of less than Caa1, or a market
capitalization less than $50 million to be defaulted with a zero
recovery.  These assumed defaults were removed from the total
collateral par amount used to run the cash flow models.

Moody's public ratings of the underlying securities were used as
the basis for determining which securities in each scenario would
be assumed to be defaulted as well as for calculating the default
probability of the performing collateral.  The default probability
of the performing collateral was calculated by taking its weighted
average rating factor and extrapolating the corresponding default
probability from Moody's idealized default probability table based
on the weighted average life of the collateral portfolio.  The
ratings used for the analysis were also adjusted one notch
downward for a negative outlook and two notches downward for
review for possible downgrade.  For unrated REIT securities,
Moody's assumed these names had an implied rating of B3 which is
at the lowest range of the financial measures used to asses these
credits.  The financial measures are further described in Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. REIT CDOs, April 4, 2006.  Moody's
previously assumed many of these unrated names had implied ratings
of B1 or B2.

Moody's calculated a correlation using MOODY'S CDOROMv2.5(TM)
which splits REITs into eight classifications.  Moody's further
stressed the correlations because each of these CDOs is completely
backed by real estate related securities, which have proven to be
more highly interdependent during this cycle.

Moody's assumed a 10% recovery rate for all collateral types in
REIT TRUP CDOs.  Most of this collateral is either subordinated
debt or trust preferred securities.

Among the various model parameters, the assumed defaulted par had
the greatest impact on ratings.  Other than the assumptions noted,
the cash flow model also used the approach outlined in the
Methodology Paper.

                        Coverage Analysis

For each rated tranche, Moody's calculated coverage ratios using
the par amounts from the two cash flow modeling scenarios.  The
coverage ratio was calculated as the performing collateral par
over the par amounts of the tranche being evaluated and all
tranches senior and pari passu to such tranche.  The performing
collateral excluded all assumed defaults as well as the default
probability adjusted par.  The default probability adjusted par
was calculated by multiplying the pool default probability by the
performing collateral.  To achieve an investment grade rating on a
super senior tranche, the coverage ratio using the assumed
defaults from the second scenario was expected to be above 100%.

                    Event of Default analysis

To date, there are no Moody's rated REIT TRUP CDOs that have
declared an Event of Default.  The most likely reason for a REIT
TRUP CDO to trigger an EOD is non-payment of interest on a non-
deferrable tranche or a senior coverage test generally falling
below 100% caused by a sufficient number of defaults or deferral
of interest on the underlying securities.  In the event of an EOD,
most REIT TRUP CDOs allow the controlling class, generally the
super senior tranche, the right to accelerate cash flows or
liquidate the collateral portfolio.  For these rating actions,
Moody's assumed liquidation would not result if EOD occurs because
much of the underlying collateral does not have an active market
making it difficult to sell the portfolio.  Instead, if EOD
occurs, Moody's assumed the controlling class would rather elect
to accelerate cash flows from the underlying performing
securities.

There are uncertainties with EOD and although no tranches remain
on review for possible downgrade, further downgrades may be
warranted if an EOD is triggered within any REIT TRUP CDO.

                       Break-even analysis

Moody's also looked at scenarios to see how many underlying
securities would have to default before a loss is realized on a
tranche.  This analysis was mainly used as a supplement to the
other methods in determining the sufficiency of the current
subordination at each assigned rating.

In order to promote market transparency, Moody's encourages the
underwriters and collateral managers for all TRUP CDOs to publish
the list of collateral securities in each of their respective
CDOs.

Attentus CDO I, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,903
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $128,704,886
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,704
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 172,654,886

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa1

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to A2

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Class C-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to B3

Attentus CDO II, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,661
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $152,252,500
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,264
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $196,702,500

  -- US$235,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on 4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa1

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa3

  -- US$55,000,000 Class A-3A Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on 4/24/2008 downgraded to A1

  -- US$5,000,000 Class A-3B Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on 4/24/2008 downgraded to A1

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to C; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Ba3

  -- US$32,000,000 Class C Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2041, Downgraded to C; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Caa3

Attentus CDO III, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,909
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 97,355,538
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,483
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 174,055,538

  -- US$150,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on 1/26/2007 assigned Aaa

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to B2; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa1

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-2 Third Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to Caa2; previously
     on 4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa3

  -- US$34,000,000 Class B Fourth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Baa1

  -- US$16,000,000 Class C-1 Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to C; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Ba1

  -- US$15,000,000 Class C-2 Fifth Priority Deferrable Secured
     Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to C;
     previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded to Ba1
Kodiak CDO I, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 3,226
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $124,031,250
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,681
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $292,781,250

  -- US$338,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ba3; previously
     on 4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa1

  -- US$103,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa3

  -- US$83,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Aa3

  -- US$30,000,000 Class C Fourth Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     4/24/2008 downgraded to Ba1

Kodiak CDO II, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 3,148
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $35,250,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,948
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $219,250,000

  -- US$338,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2042, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 6/29/2007 assigned
     Aaa

  -- US$53,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2042, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 6/29/2007
     assigned Aaa

  -- US$80,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2042, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 6/29/2007
     assigned Aaa

  -- US$81,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2042, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/29/2007 assigned
     Aa1

  -- US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed/Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2042, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 6/29/2007
     assigned Aa1

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING II, LTD.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,679
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $380,625,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,496
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 488,057,000

  -- Class A-1a, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to A3, on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A-1b, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to A3, on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A-1c, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to A3, on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to Ba3, under review for possible downgrade

Taberna Preferred Funding III, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,130
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $189,530,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,245
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $286,955,000

  -- Class A-1a, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa2

  -- Class A-1b, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa2

  -- Class A-1c, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa2

  -- Class A-2a, Downgraded to B3; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to A2

  -- Class B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba1

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING IV, LTD.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,134
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $145,625,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 1,940
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $262,559,000

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa1

  -- Class B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba1

TABERNA PREFERRED FUNDING V, LTD.

* First Scenario WARF: 3,088
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $207,031,250
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,726
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $345,240,250

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due August
     2036, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded to
     Aa1

  -- US$250,000,000 Class A-1LAD Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes
     Due August 2036, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa1

  -- US$60,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due August
     2036, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- US$90,000,000 Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     August 2036, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba2

Taberna Preferred Funding VI, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,779
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $166,875,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,415
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 267,500,000

  -- Class A-1A, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa1

  -- Class A-1B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa1

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Aa3

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to Baa3

  -- Class C, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to B1

Taberna Preferred Funding VII, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 2,971
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $134,218,750
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,653
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 234,218,750

  -- US$350,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037, Downgraded to B2; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2LA Floating Rate Notes Due February
     2037, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on 4/24/2008 downgraded
     to A2

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-2LB Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     February 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 4/24/2008
     downgraded to Ba2

Taberna Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 3,098
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 25,000,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 2,920
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 107,538,447

  -- US$160,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on 7/2/2008 Aaa, under review for possible
     downgrade

  -- US$215,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ba1; previously
     on 7/2/2008 Aaa, under review for possible downgrade

  -- US$120,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ba3; previously
     on 7/2/2008 Aaa, under review for possible downgrade

  -- US$75,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     7/2/2008 Aa2, under review for possible downgrade

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Fourth Priority Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     7/2/2008 A2, under review for possible downgrade

Taberna Preferred Funding IX, Ltd.

* First Scenario WARF: 3,161
* First Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $ 50,000,000
* Second Scenario WARF: 3,067
* Second Scenario Assumed Defaulted Amount: $130,625,000

  -- US$275,000,000 Class A-1LA Floating Rate Notes Due May 2038,
     Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 6/29/2007 assigned Aaa

  -- US$100,000,000 Class A 1LAD Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes
     Due May 2038, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 6/29/2007
     assigned Aaa

  -- US$116,000,000 Class A 1LB Floating Rate Notes Due May 2038,
     Downgraded to B1; previously on 6/29/2007 assigned Aaa

  -- US$25,000,000 Class A-2LA Floating Rate Notes Due May 2038,
     Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/29/2007 assigned Aa2

  -- US$53,000,000 Class A-2LB Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     May 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/2/2008 Aa3, under
     review for possible downgrade

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-3LA Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     May 2038, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/2/2008 A2, under
     review for possible downgrade


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 142 Tranches from 17 Alt-A RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 142
tranches from 17 Alt-A RMBS transactions issued by Countrywide.  
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.

These actions are a result of updated loss expectations on the
underlying collateral relative to available credit enhancement.  
Moody's methodology for rating securities for more seasoned Alt-A
pools, takes into account the annualized loss rate from last 12
months and the projected loss rate over next 12 months, and then
translates these measures into lifetime losses based on a deal's
expected remaining life.  Recent Losses are calculated by
assessing cumulative losses incurred over the past 12-months as a
percentage of the average pool factor in the last year.  For
Pipeline Losses, Moody's uses an annualized roll rate of 15%, 30%,
65% and 90% for loans that are delinquent 60-days, 90+ days, are
in foreclosure, and REO respectively.  Moody's then applies deal-
specific severity assumptions ranging from 40% to 55%.  The
results of these two calculations - Recent Losses and Pipeline
Losses - are weighted to arrive at the lifetime cumulative loss
projection.

Once expected losses have been determined, Moody's assesses
available credit enhancement from subordination,
overcollateralization, excess spread and any external support
(mortgage insurance, pool policy, etc.).  The available
enhancement is weighed against projected future losses to
ultimately arrive at an updated rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-10CB

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned     
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C; previously on 7/14/2004 Assigned B2

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-12CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 7/15/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-13CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A2; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 6/23/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-15

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 8/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-16CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Aa1; previously on 7/30/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 7/30/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-17CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 9/20/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Baa2

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-18CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 8/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 8/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 8/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-22CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A1; previously on 9/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-24CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/12/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A3; previously on 10/12/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-25CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A3; previously on 12/20/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-27CB

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-28CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned

     Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/7/2005 Assigned Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-30CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to A2; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A3; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to B1; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     A3

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on 1/5/2005 Assigned Ba3

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-32CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-33

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aa1

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 12/14/2004
     Assigned Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-36CB

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 1/27/2005 Assigned
     Aaa

Alternative Loan Trust 2004-8CB

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to A3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3; previously on 6/17/2004 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on 10/1/2007 Downgraded
     to Baa3


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Housing Loans-Backed Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions with respect to
the ratings of certain tranches of transactions collateralized by
manufactured housing loans.  These actions result in changes to
ratings announced on January 16, 2009, which the rating agency
determined had employed unduly conservative assumptions regarding
loss multiples and severity of loss upon default and did not give
full credit for scheduled principal payments.  In taking these
rating actions, Moody's applied an expanded ratings multiple table
to provide loss multiples for transactions with higher loss
levels, added credit for scheduled principal payments, and updated
its loss severity assumption to 85%, which compares to actual
recent severity experience of about 75%.  This resulted in
adjusted ratings on 19 tranches of 9 transactions.

Moody's Investors Service also reviewed underlying ratings of
insured certificates where applicable.  The underlying rating
reflects the intrinsic credit quality of the certificate in the
absence of the guarantee.  The adjusted ratings are consistent
with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at the higher
of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating and the
underlying rating based on Moody's modified approach to rating
structured finance securities wrapped by financial guarantors.

The adjusted rating actions are:

Issuer: CountryPlace Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from Aa3 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Aa3 on 4/10/2009; previously on 3/3/2009 Baa1
     Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Company (Baa1;
     previously on 3/3/2009 Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade)

Cl. A-3

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from Aa3 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     Confirmed at Baa1 on 4/10/2009; previously on 3/3/2009 Baa1
     Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Company (Baa1;     
     previously on 3/3/2009 Placed on Review for Possible      
     Downgrade)

Issuer: GreenPoint Credit Manufactured Housing Contract Trust
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-2

Cl. I A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from Aa3 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;     
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 3/3/2009 Baa1
     Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Company (Baa1;
     previously on 3/3/2009 Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade)

Cl. II A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from Aa3 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 3/3/2009 Baa1
     Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Company (Baa1;
     previously on 3/3/2009 Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade)

Issuer:GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1998-1

Cl. II A

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Baa3 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-2

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Ba3 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: Greenpoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-4

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to B1 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 1999-6

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Baa2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to B1 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2000-2

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to B2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2000-7

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A2 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Ba1 on 4/10/2009; previously on 2/18/2009
     Downgraded to B2 from Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3;
     previously on 2/18/2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-B

Cl. A-1

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-2

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-3

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-4

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-5

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-6

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. A-7

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to Baa1 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 11/17/2008
     Downgraded to A1 from Aa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Company (Baa1;
     previously on 3/3/2009 Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade)

Cl. A-IOC

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from A1 to B2 on 1/16/2009;
     changed to A2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to A1 from Aaa

Cl. M-1

  -- Current Rating: Downgraded from Baa3 to Ca on 1/16/2009;
     changed to Caa2 on 4/10/2009; previously on 09/28/2004
     Downgraded to Baa3 from Aa2


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 76 Net Interest Margin Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 76 net
interest margin securities backed by residential mortgage-backed
securitizations on review for possible downgrade.  These NIM
transactions rely on residual cash flows and prepayment penalties
generated by the underlying mortgage-backed securitizations.  
These cash flows are sensitive to a number of factors:

i) Prepayment speeds on the collateral backing the RMBS

ii) Magnitude and timing of losses incurred on the collateral
backing the underlying RMBS

iii) Impact of trigger breaches (which in turn affects step-down
and release of cash to residual bondholders) and

iv) Volume and magnitude of interest rate modifications (which
affects excess spread).

These securities have been placed on review based on the poor
performance on the underlying transactions that has negatively
impacted residual payments to the NIM holders.

Moody's analysis of NIM transactions with respect to this review
primarily focuses on each transaction's recent average monthly
principal paydown rate.  As delinquency and losses have
accumulated in the transactions underlying the NIM, residual cash
flows have severely declined and, in most cases, disappeared.  As
a result, the large majority of these transactions have not
received principal payments in recent months and many have accrued
unpaid interest.  Projected future loss levels on the large
majority of underlying transactions are now higher than previously
estimated.  These elevated loss levels further reduce the
likelihood that the net interest margin securities will ultimately
be paid in full.

During the review period, Moody's will analyze the likelihood of
NIM repayment by reviewing potential sources of cash in relation
to outstanding liabilities.  The potential sources of cash to the
NIM include i) excess spread net of projected future losses, ii)
excess overcollateralization in the event of a step-down and iii)
collections of prepayment penalties.  To the extent the NIM has
accrued unpaid interest obligations that must be paid prior to
retiring the outstanding principal, such amounts will also be
taken into account when evaluating the expected severity of loss
to the NIM bondholders.  It is expected that nearly all of the
bonds placed under review would be downgraded to B1 or below.  
Additionally, to the extent that subordinate bonds of the
underlying transactions have incurred principal impairments or
have been downgraded to Ca or C, it is expected that the
associated NIM security would be similarly downgraded to Ca or C.  
Final rating actions resolving these reviews are expected in the
next 3 to 4 weeks.

Asset Backed Funding Corporation NIM Trust 2001-AQ1 Notes

  -- Cl. A, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. NIM Trust 2004-10

  -- Notes, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/16/2005 Assigned B2

BSSP NIM Trust 2004-QA1

  -- Notes, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. NIM Trust 2007-N1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

BSSP NIM Trust 2007-N2 Notes, Series 2007-N2-VIII

  -- Cl. VIII-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

BSSP NIM Trust 2007-N2 Notes, Series 2007-N2-X

  -- Cl. X-A-2, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

BSSP NIM Trust 2007-N3 Notes, Series 2007-N3-IV

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

BSSP NIM Trust 2007-N3 Notes, Series 2007-N3-V

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. NIM Trust 2007-N7 Notes,
Series 2007-N7-II

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 10/18/2007 Assigned Ba2

Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. NIM Trust 2007-N7-IV

  -- Cl. IV-A-3, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 9/20/2007 Assigned Ba2

FFML Net Interest Margin Trust 2003-FFB

  -- Cl. A Notes, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/20/2007 Downgraded to B3

GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-NIM6

  -- Notes, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to B1

GSMSC Net Interest Margin Securities, Series 2007-NIM1

  -- Cl. N2, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/9/2007 Assigned Baa3

  -- Cl. N3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/9/2007 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. N4, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/9/2007 Assigned B3

Lehman XS NIM 1 Company 2005-7N

  -- Cl. A-2, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/1/2006 Assigned Baa3

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2007-GPM1-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 3/26/2007 Assigned Baa3

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 3/26/2007 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 3/26/2007 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Nim 1 Company 2007-GPM2

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 5/29/2007 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 5/29/2007 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. A, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to B2

  -- Cl. B, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2005-10

  -- Cl. A, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 2/10/2006 Assigned A3

  -- Cl. B, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to B3

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. A, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Cl. B, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Lehman XS NIM Company 2005-5N

  -- Cl. B, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 12/16/2005 Assigned Baa3

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2005-6

  -- Cl. A, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2005-8

  -- Cl. B, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa3

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-3

  -- Cl. A, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- Cl. B, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-7

  -- Cl. A, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Cl. B, Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Ca

Lehman XS NIM Company 2006-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 5/24/2006 Assigned A3

Lehman XS NIM Company 2006-AR4

  -- Cl. A-4, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 7/1/2008 Downgraded to Caa2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GP1

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 6/29/2006 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 6/29/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS NIM Company 2006-GP2

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 8/2/2006 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 8/2/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GP3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 8/2/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS NIM Company 2006-GP4

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 8/22/2006 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 8/22/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GPM4

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 9/26/2006 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 9/26/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GPM5

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 10/27/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GPM6

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 12/1/2006 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GPM7

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 1/8/2007 Assigned Ba3

  -- Cl. A-4, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 1/8/2007 Assigned B2

Lehman XS Net Interest Margin Notes Series 2006-GPM8

  -- Cl. A-3, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 1/25/2007 Assigned Ba3