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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, October 10, 2025, Vol. 26, No. 203

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Bessent's Rescue Pledge Put to Test by Traders


B A H A M A S

BAHAMAS: To Strengthen Disaster-Risk Management with IDB Support


B R A Z I L

PARANA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

PHOENIX AVIATION: Fitch Affirms 'B' LongTerm IDR


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

[] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Alburquerque Criticizes Senate Tip Law


P A N A M A

GLOBAL BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable


P E R U

INRETAIL SHOPPING: Moody's Rates Up to $450MM Unsec. Notes 'Ba1'
INRETAIL SHOPPING: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB+'


P U E R T O   R I C O

AMBASSADOR VETERANS: Seeks to Extend Exclusivity to Feb. 8, 2026
CONCORDE METRO: Seeks Continued Cash Collateral Access
CONCORDE METRO: To Sell Puerto Rico Property to MDD Child for $120K


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

HERITAGE PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR & Alters Outlook to Neg.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Scrapped Revenue Earners
TRINIDAD GENERATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR & Alters Outlook to Neg

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Bessent's Rescue Pledge Put to Test by Traders
---------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Flatley & Nicolle Yapur at Bloomberg News report that US
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's record as a powerful pacifier of
unruly markets is now being put to the test in Argentina, where
investors are questioning the value of his pledge of support for
President Javier Milei.

Barely a week after Argentine assets surged on a vow from Bessent
to provide "all options for stabilisation," traders drove the
Argentine peso down over six percent against the dollar – forcing
Milei's government to intervene and stem the plunge, only for it to
fall again and prompt further dollar sales by officials, according
to Bloomberg News.  The capacity of Buenos Aires to keep up such
efforts on its own is limited by its lean foreign exchange
reserves, putting a spotlight on what Washington is prepared to do,
Bloomberg News says.

"There's a sentiment things can't hold at this pace," said Hans
Humes, the chairman of Greylock Capital Management, who has more
than three decades of experience with emerging markets. "The
selling is led by locals, and dealers and investors here aren't
going to stand in the way," New York-based Humes said, Bloomberg
News says.

Bessent reiterated that the US Treasury is "fully prepared to do
what is necessary" with regard to Argentina.  He also said in the
post on X that he spoke with Economy Minister Luis Caputo, who he
said will be travelling to Washington in coming days to
"meaningfully advance" discussions on "options for delivering
financial support,"  Bloomberg News relays.

Bessent expects Milei's "party will do well" in Argentina's October
26 midterm elections and hailed the libertarian's economic policies
as a "beacon" in Latin America as many other countries governed by
leftist leaders face presidential elections in the next year or so,
Bloomberg News discloses.

"We're giving them a swap line, we're not putting money into
Argentina," Bessent said in an interview with CNBC. "America First
doesn't mean America alone."

Argentine bonds maturing in 2035 jumped to session highs after
Bessent's X post, but reversed gains shortly after amid an absence
of further detail, extending losses for a fourth straight day,
Bloomberg News relays.  The peso retreated further in trading, and
is now down around seven percent for the week so far, Bloomberg
News discloses.

The crisis of confidence stems from a poor showing of Milei's party
in a key local election last month, and the US pledge was aimed at
shoring up the Argentine ally of President Donald Trump before a
bigger midterm election in late October, Bloomberg News relays.
Investors are anticipating some major shift in foreign-exchange
policy after those ballots, but the question now is whether the
current framework can make it that far, Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News discloses that Milei himself said in a recent
interview with local media that the US show of support is
geopolitical. But what's compounding the challenge for Bessent is
that Washington is hardly united behind the effort.

Soybeans are a key reason why. US soy farmers have been locked out
of their biggest export market – China – thanks to trade
tensions, and their Argentine competitors have been stepping into
the breach, Bloomberg News relays.  That's left some lawmakers
uneasy about aid for Buenos Aires.

Senator Chuck Grassley, a senior Republican from Iowa, questioned
why the US would "help bail out Argentina while they take American
soybean producers' biggest market???" in a post on X, Bloomberg
News notes.  Senator John Hoeven, a North Dakota Republican, said
that help for Argentina is part of a "bigger relationship" the
administration is working on with Argentina, and pointed to
promises of help for US farmers from Trump, which the president
reiterated in a Truth Social post later in the day, Bloomberg News
discloses.

Bessent himself was captured in a photograph looking at what
appeared to be a text from Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins
expressing concern about the support for Argentina, CNN reported,
citing an Associated Press image, Bloomberg News notes.

The modern history of financial rescues shows that, sometimes, the
announcement effect alone can be enough to stabilise a turbulent
market, Bloomberg News says.  Then-Treasury secretary Henry Paulson
famously explained in July 2008 during the financial crisis, "If
you have got a bazooka, and people know you've got it, you may not
have to take it out," he added.

Bloomberg News discloses that was indeed the case with one US
Federal Reserve program during the spring 2020 Covid crisis.  A
primary corporate-bond support programme with a half-trillion
dollar limit was never used, as confidence in US credit markets
rapidly recovered, Bloomberg News relays.

But things aren't heading that way with Argentina – where three
different governments since 2018 have amassed US$55 billion in debt
over multiple bailouts from the International Monetary Fund that
failed to stabilise the economy, Bloomberg News notes.

An open question is how much it will take to stabilise the
situation, and whether the elements Bessent outlined – in a
social media post – will prove sufficient.  The Treasury didn't
respond to a request for comment.

"We need greater clarity on the US support package, particularly
regarding its terms, conditionality and duration," said Pedro
Quintanilla-Dieck, a senior emerging-market strategist at UBS.
"Further details on these aspects could unlock tactical upside for
Argentina's bonds from current depressed levels,"  Bloomberg News
relays.

Foreign-exchange swaps – one of the tools Bessent has referenced
– proved an effective solution during times of crisis in 2008 and
2020 when there was sudden demand for dollar liquidity, Bloomberg
News discloses.  But those were initiated by the Federal Reserve
– which has effectively unlimited capacity – rather than the
Treasury, which faces constraints, Bloomberg News notes.  The Fed
has offered no public indication it's part of the broader effort to
aid Argentina, Bloomberg News says.

There's always the potential for something unexpected. Bessent has
deep knowledge of the foreign exchange market from his decades-long
career as a hedge fund manager, and a wide network of contacts in
the financial industry, Bloomberg News relays.  Back in the Asian
financial crisis, then-Treasury secretary Robert Rubin – a former
co-head of Goldman Sachs – helped secure commitments from global
banks to roll over South Korean short-term credit, helping avert a
bigger collapse, Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News notes that earlier, Bessent emerged as a key voice
of assurance for Wall Street amid alarm over Trump's plans for the
most aggressive tariff hikes since before World War II.  In a
late-July interview, he argued that "I think I could have made the
markets go up on Liberation Day," referring to the April 2
unveiling of the steep levies.

Time will tell if Bessent's skills will be enough to help Argentina
stabilise, Bloomberg News adds.

                       About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota) -- with an approved immediate
disbursement of an equivalent of US$9.65 billion.  Argentina's
IMF-supported program sought to improve public finances and start
to reduce persistent high inflation through a multi-pronged
strategy.

On April 11, 2025, the IMF further approved a 48-month Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Argentina totaling US$20
billion (or 479 percent of quota), with an immediate disbursement
of US$12 billion, and a first review planned for June
2025 with an associated disbursement of about US$2 billion.  The
program is expected to help catalyze additional official
multilateral and bilateral support, and a timely re-access to
international capital markets.

Fitch Ratings, on May 12, 2025, upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency and Local-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  The upgrade reflects the launch of a new IMF
program, among other things.  S&P Global Ratings, in February 2025
lowered its local currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to
'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and its national scale rating to 'SD' from
'raB+'.  Moody's Ratings, in January 2025, raised Argentina's local
currency ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling
to Caa1 from Caa3.  DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC in
November 2024.




=============
B A H A M A S
=============

BAHAMAS: To Strengthen Disaster-Risk Management with IDB Support
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has approved a US$160
million loan to support The Bahamas in enhancing its disaster-risk
management.

The operation, which has been approved by the IDB's Board of
Executive Directors, is the second loan in a series of two. The
first, approved in 2023, focused on establishing the legal
structure for disaster-risk management. It led to the passage of
the Disaster Risk Management Act.

This second loan will allow The Bahamas to design and adopt the
core policy instruments created by that law, such as national
standards for humanitarian assistance, a comprehensive financial
strategy for disaster management, and reference parameters for
disaster management. The operation will also enable the Bahamian
authorities to better identify and reduce risks and improve
disaster preparedness and recovery planning.

Under the program, the authorities plan to create an information
system based on past disasters and projected scenarios to improve
risk informed decision making and preparedness. Additionally, the
program will train public officials in risk assessment to ensure
that disaster resilience is progressively integrated into new
public infrastructure.

The Bahamas is among the countries in the region most exposed to
natural disasters. In the last 25 years, it has experienced 15
major events, mostly hurricanes.

The program will benefit the approximately 390,000 residents across
all the islands of The Bahamas, which are exposed to the effects of
tropical storms and hurricanes.

The IDB loan has a 20-year repayment term, a 5.5-year grace period,
and an interest rate based on the secured overnight financing rate
(SOFR).




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

PARANA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the State of Parana, Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable. Additionally, Fitch has affirmed
Parana's Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B' and
National Long- and Short-Term Ratings at 'AAA(bra)' and 'F1+(bra)',
respectively. The Rating Outlook for the National Ratings is
Stable. Parana's Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) is assessed at
'bbb'.

Parana's IDRs are capped by Brazil's 'BB'/Stable sovereign IDR. Per
Fitch's criteria, Brazilian Local and Regional Governments (LRGs)
do not qualify for a rating that is higher than the sovereign's due
to the regulatory framework. The federal government has strong
influence over local governments, such as by setting new spending
responsibilities, interfering with subnational tax policy, and
requesting pre-clearance to enter foreign credit operations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Standalone Credit Profile

Parana's SCP of 'bbb' results from the combination of a 'Weaker'
risk profile and 'aaa' debt sustainability assessment. The SCP
factors in the state´s comparison with national and international
peers.

Risk Profile: 'Weaker'

The 'Weaker' assessment reflects Fitch's view that there is a high
risk that the issuer's ability to cover debt service with the
operating balance will weaken unexpectedly over the scenario
horizon (2025 to 2029) due to lower revenue, higher expenditure, or
an unexpected rise in liabilities or debt-service requirements.

Revenue Robustness: 'Midrange'

Fitch evaluates this factor as 'Midrange' due to the state's fiscal
autonomy and low dependence on federal transfers.

The Brazilian tax collection framework transfers a large share of
responsibility in tax collection to states and municipalities.
Constitutional transfers exist to compensate poorer entities. Fitch
considers a high dependence on transfers a weak feature for
Brazilian LRGs. The primary metric for revenue robustness is the
transfers ratio (transfers to operating revenue). Fitch classifies
LRGs reporting a ratio above or equal to 40% as 'Weaker', while
others with a ratio below 40% are 'Midrange'.

Parana reports substantial fiscal autonomy, which drives this
'Midrange' factor. Transfers represented 24.9% of operating revenue
for the average of the 2020-2024 period. Historically, revenue
growth performed above GDP growth. For 2020-2024, CAGR was 5.2% in
real terms for operating revenue, compared to an average annual GDP
growth of 2.2%.

Revenue Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Fitch evaluates this factor as 'Weaker' due to Brazilian states'
reliance on a small number of taxpayers and the history of federal
intervention in state tax policy.

In 2024, the State of Parana raised the ICMS basic tariff to 19.5%
from 19%, while the tariff over electricity was raised to 19% from
18%. These measures were implemented to recover some of the tax
losses incurred after the National Congress movement in June 2022,
which limited the ICMS tariff on fuels and electricity.

Despite the state's efforts, revenue adjustability is very limited
for Brazilian states and municipalities. Overall, the affordability
of additional taxation is low because tax tariffs are near the
constitutional national ceiling. A small number of taxpayers
contribute a large share of tax collection, with the 10 largest
representing approximately 30.6% of ICMS tax collection in Parana.
The history of federal intervention creates additional challenges
for revenue adjustability due to tax policy uncertainty.

Expenditure Sustainability: 'Midrange'

Fitch evaluates this factor as 'Midrange' due to robust operating
margins in the last years.

Responsibilities for states are moderately countercyclical because
they handle healthcare, education and law enforcement. Expenditure
grows with revenues due to earmarked revenue. States and
municipalities must allocate a share of revenues to health and
education, causing procyclical behavior in good times; high revenue
growth leads to increased spending. However, the significant weight
of personal expenditure and salary rigidity means downturns do not
see similar drops in expenditure despite lower revenue.

Parana reports moderate control over expenditure growth, with sound
margins. Operating margins averaged 16.7% in the 2020-2024 period.
The state is current on its payroll bill and has no significant
delays for the payment of suppliers. Operating expenditure CAGR was
5.2% in real terms between 2020-2024, aligned with the state's
operating revenue performance with a CAGR of 5.2% in the same
period.

Expenditure Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Fitch evaluates this factor as 'Weaker' due to budget rigidity and
the limited ability to lower expenditures.

Brazilian local governments' rigid cost structure leads to a
'Weaker' assessment. The Brazilian constitution limits the ability
to reduce expenditures, especially for the payroll and pensions.
Consequently, when revenue drops unexpectedly, operating
expenditure do not automatically decrease.

In 2024, personal expenditures for the State of Parana accounted
for 65.5% of total spending. Salary rigidity and limited control
over human resources or pensions limits the flexibility of this
category for adjustments. Other operating expenditures made up
34.8% of total spending in 2024 and have some flexibility, but
constitutional mandates on health and education still limit
adjustments. Capex represented 6.3% of total expenditures in 2024
and averaged 7.4% between 2020 and 2024. Historically, Brazilian
LRGs have often cut investments during challenging economic
periods.

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: 'Weaker'

Fitch assess this factor as 'Weaker' due to the underdeveloped
credit market and the presence of off-balance sheet risks related
to pensions and judicial liabilities.

Access to new loans is restricted as Brazilian LRGs are not allowed
to access the market through bond issuances. Lenders consist mainly
of public commercial and development banks and multilateral
organizations. Often, loans are guaranteed by the federal
government, especially for foreign currency loans. Therefore, the
federal government has strict control over new lending to LRGs.

Brazil has a moderate national framework for debt and liquidity
management, with prudential borrowing limits and loan type
restrictions. Under the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) of 2000,
LRGs must comply with indebtedness limits. States' consolidated net
debt cannot exceed 2x (200%) of net current revenue. Parana
reported a negative debt ratio of 5.07% as of December 2024.
According to Resolution 43 of 2001 of the Federal Senate,
guarantees are limited to 22% of net current revenue. In 2024,
Parana's guarantees to government-related entities amounted to
1.67% of net current revenues.

As of December 2024, external debt totaled BRL4.6 billion, making
up 21% of direct debt. External debt is owed to multilateral
organizations and comes with a federal government guarantee. Debt
owed directly to the federal government accounted for 56.7% of
direct debt in December 2024. Intergovernmental debt offers more
favorable terms, such as debt service relief during economic
distress, as seen in 2020 and early 2021.

Moderate off-balance sheet risk exists due to the pension system.
This system burdens most Brazilian LRGs, especially states, which
are responsible for education and public security. Pension payments
form a significant share of operating expenditure. Another major
contingent liability involves judicial claims, known as
"precatorios." The National Congress mandates that subnational
governments must fully pay for these liabilities until 2029.

The Pension Reform of 2019 strengthened the medium- and long-term
sustainability of Parana's pension system. The financial fund
expenditure (BRL 9 billion in 2025), which originates from a
pay-as-you-go system, should increase over the next five years,
stabilize at BRL 10.4 billion in 2030, and enter a descending
trend, reaching BRL 5.6 billion in 2050 and extinguishing by 2070.
The capitalization pension fund will gradually replace the
financial fund. Currently, it holds assets under management in the
amount of BRL 12.5 billion and pays benefits of BRL 3.3 billion
annually. Overall, the pension burden should increase to BRL 14.3
billion by 2030, and gradually decrease to BRL 11.5 billion in 2050
and BRL 5.7 billion by 2070

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: 'Midrange'

Fitch evaluates this factor as 'Midrange' due to adequate cash in
the last three-years.

A framework exists for the federal government to provide emergency
liquidity support by extending the maturity date for the state's
federal debt. Fitch assesses the entity's available liquidity,
excluding sovereign support, to determine whether the liabilities
and liquidity flexibility assessment is 'Weaker' or 'Midrange'.

Fitch's liquidity rate for Brazilian LRGs is defined as the ratio
of short-term financial obligations to net cash, as established by
the previous version of the CAPAG system by the Brazilian National
Treasury. The CAPAG, or Capacidade de Pagamento, assesses which
entities qualify for federal government guarantees.

Fitch has set a threshold of 100% for the average of the last three
years (2022-2024) and for the last year-end results available
(December 2024), which would result in a 'Midrange' assessment for
this factor. Parana reported a three-year average liquidity ratio
of 7.2%. As of December 2024, the metric reached 6.9%, supporting
the 'Midrange' assessment.

Financial Profile: 'aaa category'

Parana's Financial Profile is assessed at 'aaa'. Fitch's rating
case forward-looking scenario indicates that the payback ratio (net
adjusted debt to operating balance), the primary metric of the debt
sustainability assessment, will average 1.6x for 2027 to 2029,
which is aligned with a 'aaa' assessment. The actual debt service
coverage ratio (ADSCR), the secondary metric, is projected at an
average of 2.3x for 2027-2029, aligned with a 'aa' assessment. The
fiscal debt burden is projected at 12.8% for the same period.

The financial profile is further strengthened by Parana´s
significant cash position, which generates sizable returns. In
fact, interest revenue averaged 3.7x interest payments during
2022-2024, reflecting a sizable cash position and high interest
rates in Brazil.

Other Rating Factors

The ratings of the State of Parana are capped by the sovereign.

Short-Term Ratings

Parana´s short-term IDRs are positioned at 'B' and its national
short-term rating is positioned at 'F1+(bra)'.

National Ratings

Parana´s long-term national scale rating is positioned at
'AAA(bra)', at the top of the correspondence table. The Outlook is
Stable.

Peer Analysis

Parana's SCP of 'bbb' results from the combination of a 'Weaker'
risk profile and 'aaa' debt sustainability assessment. The SCP
factors in the state´s comparison with national and international
peers. Parana's IDRs of 'BB'/Outlook Stable are not affected by
asymmetric risks or extraordinary support but are capped by the
sovereign rating.

Parana SCP compares well with the Turkish metropolitan
municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara, which also display a
'Weaker' risk profile and 'aaa' financial profile. Ankara and
Parana share similar coverage and leverage metrics, while
Istanbul´s coverage metric is somewhat weaker. In Latin America,
Parana´s closest peers are Estado de Mexico and the Metropolitan
Municipality of Lima, which display a 'Low Midrange' risk profile
and 'aa' financial profile. The peer comparison informs the SCP
derivation and Parana´s IDRs are limited by the Brazilian
sovereign.

Issuer Profile

Fitch classifies the State of Parana as a Type B LRG. Type B LRGs
are required to cover debt service from cash flow. The state is an
important exporter of soy, poultry and coffee and has a solid
industrial sector with car plants, pulp and paper, and shale oil,
among others.

Key Assumptions

Risk Profile: 'Weaker'

Revenue Robustness: 'Midrange'

Revenue Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Expenditure Sustainability: 'Midrange'

Expenditure Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: 'Weaker'

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: 'Midrange'

Financial Profile: 'aaa'

Asymmetric Risk: 'N/A'

Support (Budget Loans): 'N/A'

Support (Ad Hoc): 'N/A'

Rating Cap (LT IDR): 'BB'

Rating Cap (LT LC IDR) 'BB'

Rating Floor: 'N/A'

Quantitative assumptions - Issuer Specific

Fitch's rating case is a "through-the-cycle" scenario, which
incorporates a combination of revenue, cost and financial risk
stresses. It is based on 2020-2024 figures and 2025-2029 projected
ratios. The key assumptions for the scenario include.

Quantitative Assumptions - Issuer Specific

Yoy 5.1% increase in operating revenue on average in 2025-2029,
which results of a combination of growth assumptions for taxes
(linked to inflation plus spread), transfers (linked to nominal
GDP), and other operating revenue (linked to inflation). The rating
case includes a 100 bps annual negative shock to taxes and
transfers.

Yoy 4.7% increase in tax revenue on average in 2025-2029, which
reflects projections for inflation, economic activity growth and
the expected lower IPVA tariff starting in 2026.

Yoy 5.9% increase in operating expenditure on average in 2025-2029,
as Fitch expects opex to grow above inflation.

Net capital balance of - BRL7,126million on average in 2025-2029;
capex is projected to sustain historical values in real terms and
to absorb excess cash generation through the projection horizon.

Long-term debt considers new loan disbursements as projected by the
government minus amortization of non-intergovernmental debt.

Cost of debt: 6.1% on average in 2025-2029, which reflects
government projections for debt service payments. For the rating
case, Fitch applies a 50 bps shock to apparent cost of debt.

Quantitative assumptions - Sovereign Related

Figures as per Fitch's sovereign actual for 2024 and forecast for
2025-2029, respectively. No weights and changes since the last
review are included as none of these assumptions was material to
the rating action.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- A negative action on Brazil's IDR would lead to a negative action
on Parana's rating, as its rating is currently capped by the
sovereign;

- Parana's IDRs would be downgraded if its payback ratio is
projected to rise above 5x and its actual debt service coverage
ratio is projected to fall below 2x.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- A positive action on Brazil's IDR would lead to a positive action
on Parana's rating, as its rating is currently capped by the
sovereign.

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings

The ratings of the State of Parana are capped by the Brazilian
sovereign.

   Entity/Debt             Rating              Prior
   -----------             ------              -----
Parana, State of   LT IDR    BB     Affirmed   BB
                   ST IDR    B      Affirmed   B
                   LC LT IDR BB     Affirmed   BB
                   LC ST IDR B      Affirmed   B
                   Natl LT AAA(bra) Affirmed   AAA(bra)
                   Natl ST F1+(bra) Affirmed   F1+(bra)




===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

PHOENIX AVIATION: Fitch Affirms 'B' LongTerm IDR
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected long-term debt rating of
'BB-(EXP)' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR2' to the proposed $592
million senior secured Term Loan B (TLB) co-issued by PAC Aviation
III Designated Activity Company (PACDIII) and PAC DAC LLC (PACD),
collectively the co-issuers and ultimately wholly owned by Phoenix
Aviation Capital, LLC (PAC).  Fitch has also affirmed the Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) for Phoenix Aviation Capital Limited at
'B/Stable' and the senior unsecured notes at 'B'/'RR4'. The fixed
rate of interest and final maturity date will be determined at the
time of issuance. Proceeds from the co-issued TLB will be used to
refinance existing secured borrowings under Phoenix's warehouse
facility and the acquisition of aircraft.

Previous rating action commentaries incorrectly identified the
ultimate parent for the Long-Term IDR as Phoenix Aviation Capital
Limited. The name has now been updated to Phoenix Aviation Capital,
LLC on Fitch's website. Phoenix Aviation Capital, LLC's Long-Term
IDR is 'B' with a Stable Outlook.

Key Rating Drivers

Term Loan Anchored to PAC's IDR: The expected rating for the
co-issued TLB is anchored to PAC's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'B'. This reflects Fitch's view that Phoenix represents
the consolidated credit strength of the broader Phoenix aviation
franchise, including its 100% ownership of PAC III and PAC DAC. The
TLB benefits from a full recourse guarantee from PAC, which allows
Fitch to evaluate the debt based on Phoenix's overall credit
profile rather than the immediate borrower's standalone
creditworthiness.

Higher Ranking in Capital Structure: The expected rating for the
proposed TLB is two notches higher than PAC's Long-Term IDR and
existing senior unsecured notes. This reflects the higher ranking
of the TLB in the capital structure and Fitch's expectations for
strong recovery prospects in a stress scenario, the solid security
package backing the instrument mainly comprising highly liquid Tier
1 aircraft, as defined by Fitch, and sufficient availability of
unencumbered assets.

Incremental Increase in Leverage: The transaction will lead to an
incremental increase in leverage, as proceeds from the issuance
will be used for general corporate purposes, including the
repayment of outstanding borrowings under the firm's existing
warehouse facility and to fund the acquisition of aircraft in
2H25.

Phoenix's gross debt-to-tangible equity, which treats its preferred
shares as 100% equity, was2.7x at June 30, 2025. Pro forma for the
expected TLB issuance, Fitch anticipates leverage to increase
toabout3.2x. This is broadly in line with the firm's business plan
and Fitch's expectations and is commensurate with the assigned
rating in the context of Phoenix's business model and fleet
portfolio mix. Future deleveraging could come from the selective
sale of noncore assets, as well as the company's outstandingUSD325
million equity commitment that is available. The company targets
leverage on a net debt-to-equity basis of around 3.0x over the long
term.

Decrease in Unsecured Debt Mix; Sound Liquidity Coverage: Unsecured
debt accounted for 41% of total debt as of June 30, 2025. Following
this TLB issuance, the unsecured debt will decrease to around 34%
of total debt but remains comfortably above Fitch's sensitivity for
unsecured debt of 20%. In addition, Fitch projects liquidity
coverage will remain sufficient to meet upcoming liquidity needs,
including order book funding requirements.

Full-Service Lessor of New Technology Aircraft: The ratings reflect
PAC's nominal, but growing, franchise as a global, full-service
lessor of new tech narrowbody aircraft, appropriate current and
target leverage, lack of meaningful near-term debt maturities and
sound profitability metrics.

Rating Constraints: Rating constraints include execution risk
associated with the company's ambitious growth targets and short
operating track record as a standalone lessor; reliance on
wholesale secured funding; a smaller and significantly concentrated
portfolio by customer and geography; and funding and placement
risks with the firm's sizeable orderbook. There are potential
governance weaknesses and conflicts of interest associated with
Phoenix's externally managed business model, limited number of
board members, and ownership by fixed life funds.

Sector Constraints: Rating constraints applicable to the aircraft
leasing industry more broadly include the monoline nature of the
business, vulnerability to exogenous shocks, sensitivity to higher
oil prices, inflation and unemployment, which negatively impact
travel demand, potential exposure to residual value risks, reliance
on wholesale funding sources, and meaningful competition. These
constraints are further influenced by Fitch's expectation for a
less favorable operating environment, including a moderation in
travel demand due to dampening global economic growth.

For more information on the key rating drivers and sensitivities
underpinning PAC's ratings, see "Fitch Rates Phoenix Aviation
Capital, LLC 'B'; Outlook Stable" dated June 24, 2025 and
available.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Weakening of the company's projected long-term cash flow
generation, net spreads sustained below 1%, liquidity coverage
dropping below 1.0x, and/or a sustained increase in gross leverage
meaningfully above 3.0x.

- Macroeconomic and/or geopolitical headwinds that lead to lease
restructurings rejections, lessee defaults, and increase losses, or
a material deterioration in fleet quality, particularly concerning
the proportion of tier 1 aircraft, average fleet age, and average
lease terms, could also negatively impact ratings.

- PAC's ownership by private funds could lead to negative rating
actions if it results in elevated capital extractions or if a
forced sale of the company at fund maturity undermines its
financial profile, franchise, or long-term strategic direction.

- Shortcomings in corporate governance or conflicts of interest
that weaken PAC's franchise position, limiting its ability to
pursue new business opportunities.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Strong execution of its planned growth targets and long-term
strategic financial objectives, including maintaining leverage
within the targeted range.

- The ratings could also benefit from increased scale, greater
lessee diversification with single airline exposure approaching 10%
of NBV, enhanced geographic diversification of the fleet,
maintenance of low impairment ratios, and demonstrated track record
of funding and placement of orderbook deliveries.

- An upgrade could also be contingent upon sustained net spreads
above 2%, while maintaining liquidity coverage above 1.2x and an
unsecured funding mix of 20% on a sustained basis.

DEBT AND OTHER INSTRUMENT RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The expected senior secured debt rating is two-notches above PAC's
Long-Term IDR and reflects the aircraft collateral backing the
obligations, which suggests strong recovery prospects.

The senior unsecured debt rating is equalized with Phoenix's
Long-Term IDR and reflects expectations for average recovery
prospects in a stress scenario, given the availability of
unencumbered assets.

DEBT AND OTHER INSTRUMENT RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

The senior secured debt rating is primarily sensitive to changes in
Phoenix's Long-Term IDR and secondarily to the relative recovery
prospects of the instruments.

The senior unsecured debt rating is primarily sensitive to changes
in Phoenix's Long-Term IDR and the relative recovery prospects of
the instruments. A decline in unencumbered asset coverage, combined
with a material increase in secured debt, relative to Phoenix's
business plan, could result in the notching of the unsecured debt
down from the Long-Term IDR.

ADJUSTMENTS

The Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) has been assigned in line with
the implied SCP.

The Asset Quality score has been assigned below the implied score
due to the following adjustment reason(s): Concentrations; asset
performance (negative), Risk profile and business model(negative).

The Earnings & Profitability score has been assigned below the
implied score due to the following adjustment reason(s): Historical
and future metrics (negative).

The Capitalization & Leverage score has been assigned below the
implied score due to the following adjustment reason(s): Risk
profile and business model (negative), Historical and future
metrics (negative).

ESG Considerations

PAC has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Management Strategy due
to execution risk associated with the operational implementation of
the company's outlined business plan, which has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

PAC has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Governance Structure due
to potential governance and conflicts of interest risks associated
with PAC's limited number of independent board members and
ownership by a fixed-life fund structure and external management.
Shortcomings in corporate governance or conflicts of interest could
weaken PAC's franchise position and limit its ability to pursue new
business opportunities. This has a negative impact on the credit
profile and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other
factors.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt               Rating              Recovery   Prior
   -----------               ------              --------   -----
Phoenix Aviation
Capital Limited        LT IDR B    Affirmed                 B

   senior unsecured    LT     B    Affirmed          RR4    B

PAC DAC LLC

   senior secured      LT BB-(EXP) Expected Rating   RR2

Phoenix Aviation
Capital LLC            LT IDR B    New Rating

PAC Aviation III
Designated Activity
Company

   senior secured      LT BB-(EXP) Expected Rating   RR2




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

[] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Alburquerque Criticizes Senate Tip Law
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that former Vice President Rafael
Alburquerque criticized a recent Senate amendment to the Labor
Code, warning it will hurt both consumers and delivery workers. The
law mandates a 10% tip on food deliveries, which Alburquerque said
will increase costs for customers ordering pizza, hamburgers, and
other meals, according to Dominican Today.

Alburquerque noted that tips are currently voluntary and based on
service satisfaction, the report notes.  The new law, however,
forces customers to pay the 10% tip, allowing food delivery
companies to reduce workers' wages under the pretext that they
receive tips, the report relays.  He added that this could also
reduce workers' benefits, as tips are excluded from severance
calculations, the report discloses.

The former Labor Minister also warned of potential disputes with
digital delivery platforms, which typically do not include tips in
transactions, the report says.  He condemned the Senate's move as
prioritizing business owners over workers, concluding, "That's
called the Senate serving capital," he added.

                 About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic was raised
to 'BB' in December 2022 with stable outlook.  Moody's credit
rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 in August 2023
with the outlook changed to positive.  Fitch, in December 2023,
affirmed the Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the outlook to positive.




===========
P A N A M A
===========

GLOBAL BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Global Bank Corporation's (GBC)
Long-Term (LT) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'. Fitch has also
affirmed the bank's Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb', Short-Term (ST)
IDR at 'B' and the Government Support Rating (GSR) of 'No Support'
(ns).

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the bank's Long- and Short-Term
National Ratings at 'AA(pan)' and 'F1+(pan)', respectively. The
Rating Outlook for the LT IDR and LT National Rating are Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed GBC's international debt rating at 'BB',
and LT senior unsecured debt rating and ST senior unsecured debt
rating at 'AA(pan)' and 'F1+(pan)', respectively.

Key Rating Drivers

Ratings Driven by Viability Rating: GBC's IDRs and National Ratings
are driven by its 'bb' Viability Rating (VR) which is above the
implied level of 'bb-'. GBC's VR is influenced by Fitch's
assessment of the Panamanian OE, currently at 'bb+' with a stable
trend. GBC's VR is highly influenced by the bank's consistent
business profile.

Operating Environment with Moderate Influence: Panama's sovereign
rating (BB+/Stable) and broader operating environment moderately
influence GBC's VR, with the sovereign rating continuing to cap the
Operating Environment (OE) despite fundamentals that point to a
'bbb' category.

While GDP growth has slowed and interest rates remain high, system
credit growth, asset quality, and profitability are outperforming
Fitch's expectations. Fitch projects GDP per capita and Operational
Risk Index (ORI) to remain stable and continue to preserve
operating conditions for banks.

Solid Business Profile: GBC is assessed at 'bb', above its implied
'b' level. The bank's sustained market position compensates for its
lower total operating income compared with local peers. Its
four-year average total operating income (TOI; FY22-FY25) was
USD229 million. As the third-largest bank in Panama by local loans
(8.8% market share) and by internal deposits (7.8%) as of June
2025, GBC benefits from a well-established franchise. It also holds
leading positions in key lending segments, including agriculture,
commercial, and residential mortgages.

Stable Asset Quality: At FYE25, GBC's asset quality was stable,
with Stage 3 loans at 3.9% of gross loans (2022-2025 average: 4.1%)
and loans 90+ days past due at 2.8%. Reserve coverage of 89% for
Stage 3 and 123% for 90+ days past due is assessed as adequate
considering the additional buffer provided by
overcollateralization. Fitch expects asset quality to stay broadly
in line with FYE25, with Stage 3 loans around 3.0%-3.3% and NPLs
around 2.8%-3.0%. A modest improvement is possible, supported by a
targeted charge-off strategy this fiscal year to realign the
portfolio with the bank's risk appetite.

Profitability Remains Under Pressure: GBC's FY25 performance was
relatively stable, constrained by net interest margin (NIM)
compression and operational efficiency that is still improving. As
of June 2025, its core metric—operating profit to risk-weighted
assets (RWAs)—remained below 1% (0.9%; 2022-2025 average: 0.8%).

Fitch expects profitability to hold steady through the next fiscal
year end with a core metric still below 1%, as the bank plans
higher provisions as part of its portfolio clean-up strategy via
charge offs. However, Fitch anticipates improvement over the
ratings horizon, supported by potential NIM tailwinds from a
declining interest-rate environment in a highly competitive market,
more controlled funding costs, and efficiency gains from increased
digitalization.

Improved Capitalization: Fitch believes the bank's capital features
provide additional loss-absorption capacity. The CET1 ratio
(CET1/RWAs) rose to 11.3% as of June 2025 (June 2024: 9%). Fitch
also considers the countercyclical buffer (dynamic reserve) and the
perpetual AT1 bond (a convertible instrument with a 6.5% Tier 1
trigger) as loss-absorbing, which lifts the capitalization measure
to the regulatory CAR of 15.9%. Fitch expects the core capital
metric to remain broadly in line with the level reported at FYE25.

Diversified Funding; Stable Deposit Base: Historically, GBC has
maintained broad access to non-deposit funding alongside a
relatively steady deposit base. However, a key element of its
profitability strategy is to meaningfully reduce reliance on these
alternative funding sources and place greater emphasis on deposits.
The core loans-to-deposits ratio improved to 108% at FYE25—viewed
by Fitch as adequate—down from an average of 119% over
FYE22-FYE25, partly reflecting slower loan growth relative to
deposit growth. The top 20 depositors represented a considerable
share of total deposits, consistent with Fitch's view that this
concentration is appropriate and aligned with the company's
business model.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- A sustained decline in the core profitability ratio (operating
profit to RWA) consistently below 0.5%, together with a material
deterioration in the bank's asset quality that reduces the
CET1-to-RWA ratio (including the countercyclical buffer) to less
than 10% could lead to downgrades of the bank's IDRs, VR and
National Rating;

- A downward revision of Fitch's assessment of the OE that
undermines GBC's credit profile could lead to a downgrade of the
bank's IDR and VR.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- GBC's IDRs, VR and national ratings could be upgraded if
profitability remains consistently above 1.5%, which would allow
the CET1-to=RWA ratio to stay above 15% on a sustained basis,
(including the countercyclical buffer) while asset quality is
maintained;

- GBC's IDR and VR could be upgraded by an upward revision of
Fitch's assessment of the OE.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

Debt: The rating of the senior unsecured global debt is at the same
level as GBC's 'BB' LT IDR, as the likelihood of default of the
notes is the same as that of the bank.

The National LT and ST senior unsecured debt ratings are equal to
GBC's 'AA(pan)' National LT and 'F1+(pan)' National ST ratings,
respectively, because the likelihood of default on this debt is the
same as for the bank.

GSR: The GSR of 'ns' indicates that external support, while
possible, cannot be relied on, given Fitch's view that Panama has
limited capacity to support the banking system and domestic
systemically important banks, primarily due to the sector's large
size and the absence of a lender of last resort.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- The bank's long-term senior unsecured debt rating, national
long-term senior unsecured debt rating and national short-term
senior unsecured debt rating would mirror any downgrade of GBC's
Long-Term IDR, national long-term rating and national short-term
rating, respectively.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- The bank's LT senior unsecured debt rating and National LT senior
unsecured debt rating would mirror any potential upgrade on GBC's
LT IDR and National LT rating, respectively. The bank's National ST
senior unsecured debt rating is at the highest level of the
national rating scale and therefore has no upside potential.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- There is no downside potential for GSR because this is the lowest
level on the respective scale.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- As Panama is a dollarized country with no lender of last resort,
an upgrade in GSR is unlikely.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The bank's 'bb' VR has been assigned above the 'bb-' implied VR due
to the following adjustment reason: Business Profile (Positive).

The 'bb+' Operating Environment Score has been assigned below the
'bbb' implied score due to the following adjustment reason:
Sovereign Rating (Negative).

The 'bb' Business Profile Score has been assigned above the 'b'
category implied score due to the following adjustment reason:
Market Position (Positive).

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                    Rating            Prior
   -----------                    ------            -----
Global Bank
Corporation       LT IDR             BB Affirmed    BB
                  ST IDR             B  Affirmed    B
                  Natl LT       AA(pan) Affirmed    AA(pan)
                  Natl ST      F1+(pan) Affirmed    F1+(pan)
                  Viability          bb Affirmed    bb
                  Government Support ns Affirmed    ns

   senior
   unsecured      LT                 BB Affirmed    BB

   senior
   unsecured      Natl LT       AA(pan) Affirmed    AA(pan)

   senior
   unsecured      Natl ST      F1+(pan) Affirmed    F1+(pan)




=======
P E R U
=======

INRETAIL SHOPPING: Moody's Rates Up to $450MM Unsec. Notes 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings assigned a Ba1 rating to InRetail Shopping Malls
(IRSM) proposed new senior unsecured notes up to $450 million. The
proposed notes will rank pari passu with IRSM's other senior
unsecured foreign currency debt instrument. The company's existing
ratings remain unchanged. The outlook is stable.

Total net proceeds from the proposed issuance will be used for the
repayment of IRSM's 2028 $350 million senior unsecured notes.

The rating of the proposed notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by us to date and assumes that these
agreements are legally valid, binding, and enforceable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

IRSM Ba1 rating reflects its continued track record of strong
operating and financial performance, with metrics commensurate with
a Ba1 rating. IRSM's Moody's-adjusted total debt to gross assets
improved to 32.9% at the end of June 2025 from 33.9% at year-end
2024, while net debt to EBITDA ratios will remain within 2.5x and
3.6x range in the next 12 to 18 months. The strong operating
performance and strengthened credit metrics reflect sustained
improvements at InRetail Shopping Malls.

InRetail Shopping Malls' operating performance is expected to
remain strong through 2025 and 2026. Moody's-adjusted net debt to
EBITDA and EBITDA to interest ratios reached 3.6x and 3.0x,
respectively, in the twelve months ended in June 2025. Even under a
weaker consumption environment and increased debt, the net debt to
EBITDA ratio is expected to remain close to 3.0x through 2026,
along with an EBITDA to interest expense coverage ratio above 3.0x,
supported by good financial management, an adequate maturity
profile, and strong liquidity.

IRSM's Ba1 rating also reflect its position as the largest Peruvian
mall company, with a total of 22 good-quality properties accounting
for a gross leasable area (GLA) of 860,000 square meters (sqm),
strategically located in and around the country's 12 largest
cities, with a concentration in the capital city of Lima.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the company's
credit metrics and liquidity will remain strong over the next 12-18
months and that the company will maintain its good liquidity and
liability management.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

InRetail Shopping Malls' ratings could be upgraded if the company
maintains its positive free cash flow generation over time along
with a good liquidity profile, diversified sources of capital, and
no significant amount of pledged assets. Quantitatively, an upgrade
would require, on a sustained basis, a Moody's-adjusted total debt
to gross assets lower than 30%, an EBITDA to interest expense ratio
above 3.5x, and an increase in gross assets to at least $2
billion.

On the other hand, InRetail Shopping Malls' ratings could be
downgraded if the company faces significant operating or liquidity
challenges, significantly increases the amount of pledged assets,
or if its credit metrics deteriorate on a sustained basis. This
could include Moody's-adjusted total debt to gross assets above
35%, an EBITDA to interest coverage ratio below 2.5x, and secured
debt to gross assets above 20%.

InRetail Shopping Malls is a Peruvian real estate trust dedicated
to the management, leasing, and development of shopping malls under
the "Real Plaza" (RP) banner. The firm is a privately held
subsidiary of InRetail Real Estate Corp., the real estate division
of InRetail Perú Corp., which holds 100% of IRSM and is one of the
leading and largest multiformat retailers in the Andean region.
Ultimately, the corporate structure is part of the holding company
Intercorp Peru Ltd., a large Latin American business conglomerate.
As of June 30, 2025, IRSM had ownership interests in a portfolio of
22 shopping malls with a total of approximately 860 thousand square
meters (sqm) of gross leasable area (GLA).

The principal methodology used in this rating was REITs and Other
Commercial Real Estate Firms published in May 2025.


INRETAIL SHOPPING: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB+' issue-level rating to
InRetail Shopping Malls' (ISM; BB+/Stable/--) proposed senior
unsecured notes of up to $450 million. S&P expects the company to
implement an effective hedging strategy for the full principal
amount, as it did in the past. The notes will have a fixed-rate
coupon and a maturity between seven and 10 years.

The company intends to use the net proceeds to repay its
outstanding $350 million 5.75% notes due April 2028. After repaying
the notes, ISM will use any remaining net proceeds for general
corporate purposes, which may include capital expenditure.

S&P said, "Considering the proposed transaction, we assume that
ISM's credit metrics will remain in line with its existing
financial risk profile, including S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt
to EBITDA and debt to capital near 3.8x and 35%, respectively, by
the end of 2026. For more information about our base case please
see Tear Sheet: InRetail Shopping Malls, published on July 15,
2025. We expect the refinancing will extend the company's average
debt maturity profile above 6.0 years from about 3.2 years as of
June 30, 2025.

"The rating on the proposed notes is at the same level as our
issuer credit rating on ISM, reflecting our view that there is no
significant subordination risk present in its capital structure.
This is because we expect the vast majority of the debt to remain
at ISM's level and on an unsecured basis. We expect the company's
debt priority ratio to remain below 15%, well below our 50%
threshold according to our criteria.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that ISM will maintain solid
credit metrics in the next 12 months. We forecast revenue to
recover growing above 10% and EBITDA over net rental income of
82%-83% in 2026, while we expect ISM to sustain its prudent
financial policy."




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

AMBASSADOR VETERANS: Seeks to Extend Exclusivity to Feb. 8, 2026
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Veterans Services of Puerto Rico LLC asked the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to extend its
exclusivity periods to file a plan of reorganization and obtain
acceptance thereof to February 8, 2026 and March 9, 2026,
respectively.

The Debtor explains that applying First Circuit factors to the
present case clearly demonstrates cause for the requested
extension.

The first factor, case complexity, is readily satisfied given that
this case involves the operation of a specialized veteran care
facility under government contract. Prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy, the Parties were engaged in prosecuting two complaints
against each other; instead of continuing the costly protracted
litigation, the Parties will continue to discuss settlement
negotiations with the Government of Puerto Rico, the Department of
Justice and the coordination of multiple governmental stakeholders
while ensuring uninterrupted care for vulnerable veteran
residents.

The second factor, likelihood of consensual plan, is even more
compelling considering recent developments. Following the September
22, 2025, meeting with the Government of Puerto Rico and the OPV in
the Department of Justice's offices, the parties established a work
plan designed to provide consensual treatment that could result in
a consensual plan for the benefit of the veterans and all creditors
of this case.

The third factor, ensuring the debtor is not holding creditors
hostage, is also satisfied, as evidenced by the Debtor's consistent
good faith efforts throughout this proceeding. It must be borne in
mind that this case has just celebrated its third month in
bankruptcy and Debtor has been diligent. Rather than seeking delay
tactics, the Debtor has demonstrated measurable progress through
full compliance with these Court Orders, US Trustee requirements,
successful resolution of utility service issues with LUMA Energy
(the biggest creditor) and maintaining all disclosure
requirements.

The Debtor asserts that the requested extension will not prejudice
creditors but will instead enhance value preservation by allowing
completion of the negotiations initiated with the Government of
Puerto Rico and the OPV; which will derive quantifiable benefits to
the estate and its creditors.

Ambassador Veterans Services of Puerto Rico LLC is represented by:

     Javier Villarino, Esq.
     Villarino & Associates LLC
     P.O. Box 9022515
     San Juan, PR 00902
     Tel: (787) 565-9894
     Email: jvillarino@vilarinolaw.com

      About Ambassador Veterans Services
           of Puerto Rico LLC

Ambassador Veterans Services of Puerto Rico LLC operates a nursing
and intermediate care facility for veterans in Juana Diaz, Puerto
Rico. The Company provides residential healthcare services to
eligible veterans at its location in Barrio Amuelas.

Ambassador Veterans Services of Puerto Rico LLC sought relief under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
25-02690) on June 13, 2025. In its petition, the Debtor reports
total assets of $2,567,403 and total liabilities of $4,068,135.

The Debtors are represented by Javier Vilarino, Esq. at Vilarino
and Associates LLC.


CONCORDE METRO: Seeks Continued Cash Collateral Access
------------------------------------------------------
Concorde Metro Seguros LLC and Banco Popular de Puerto Rico advise
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico that they
have reached an agreement regarding the Debtor's use of cash
collateral and now desire to memorialize the terms of this
agreement into an agreed order.

The Debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 24. BPPR
subsequently filed a secured claim for approximately $1.96 million,
based on a credit facility secured by various loan documents
including a mortgage and assignment of leases and rents. BPPR holds
a first-priority, perfected security interest over the Debtor's
leases and associated rental income, which constitutes the cash
collateral in question.

On April 14, the parties initially filed a stipulation allowing the
debtor interim use of this cash collateral to cover essential
operational expenses per a court-approved budget, with the initial
period ending June 23. The stipulation was later extended by court
order through August 31. In this joint motion, the parties seek to
further extend the stipulation through October 15, under the same
terms and conditions as previously agreed. This extension is
intended to allow the debtor to continue operating while
negotiations for a longer-term arrangement or reorganization plan
proceed.

A copy of the motion is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=O7Q03j
from PacerMonitor.com.

                  About Concorde Metro Seguros

Concorde Metro Seguros LLC is a single-asset real estate debtor, as
defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(51B). The Company's primary
business involves managing the Metro Medical Center in Bayamon,
Puerto Rico, which serves as its principal asset.

Concorde Metro Seguros LLC sought relief under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 25-01269) on March 24,
2025. In its petition, the Debtor reports estimated assets and
liabilities between $1 million and $10 million each.

The Debtor is represented by Javier Vilarino, Esq. at Vilarino and
Associates LLC.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, as lender, is represented by:

   Luis C. Marini-Biaggi, Esq.
   Ignacio J. Labarca-Morales, Esq.
   Getzemarie Lugo-Rodríguez, Esq.
   MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ, LLC
   250 Ponce de León Ave, Suite 900
   San Juan, P.R. 00918
   Tel: (787) 705-2171
   lmarini@mpmlawpr.com
   ilabarca@mpmlawpr.com
   glugo@mpmlawpr.com


CONCORDE METRO: To Sell Puerto Rico Property to MDD Child for $120K
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Concorde Metro Seguros LLC seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to sell Property, free and
clear of liens, claims, interests, and encumbrances.

The Debtor retains Christiansen Commercial as the exclusive sales
agent and broker of the Property.

The Debtor seeks to sell certain real property as part of its
reorganization efforts under the Bankruptcy Code, specifically that
certain commercial property described as follows:

"Propiedad Horizontal: Apartamento: A-102. CONDOMINIO METRO MEDICAL
CENTER de Bayamón Sur. Cabida: 184.36 Metros Cuadrados. Local para
oficina situado en la primera planta del Edificio "A" del
Condominio Metro Medical Center, ubicado en la calle Marginal, "PR"
guión dos (PR-2), Barrio Pájaros, Urbanización Hermanas Dávila,
Bayamón, Puerto Rico, con un área superficial de mil novecientos
ochenta y tres punto cuarenta y siete (1,983.47) pies cuadrados,
equivalentes a ciento ochenta y cuatro punto treinta y seis
(184.36) metros cuadrados, y que colinda: por el Norte, en setenta
y nueve pies (79') una pulgada (1"), con pasillo comunal; por el
Sur, en setenta y nueve pies (79') una pulgada (1") con elementos
exteriores; por el Este, en veinticinco pies (25') dos pulgadas
(2") y siete octavos (7/8) de otra, con elementos comunes del
edificio; y por el Oeste, en veinticinco pies (25') dos pulgadas
(2") y siete octavos (7/8) de otra, con elementos exteriores del
edificio. Las entradas a este local son por su lado Norte. A esta
unidad le corresponde la siguiente participación en los elementos
comunes generales del condominio, 1.22% (Property").

The Property was registered in favor of Concorde Metro Seguros,
LLC, which acquired it by Purchase and Sale by Deed Number 63
executed in San Juan on December 31, 2015, before Notary Public
Ricardo O. Melendez Sauri.

The Property is subject to liens and encumbrances, including a
Mortgage in favor of Banco Popular de Puerto Rico.

The Debtor received a private offer from MDD Child Neurology LLC, a
Puerto Rico limited liability company, with a purchase price of
$120,000.

The Debtor will coordinate with the Buyer for the closing of said
transaction and with BPPR for the partial release of Suite A-102
from the existing lien. The net proceeds from the sale, unless
otherwise agreed in writing between the Debtor and BPPR, shall be
paid to BPPR and applied toward reduction of the mortgage debt
secured by the Property.

The Payment Terms are cash at closing on or before December 19,
2025.

The deposit is $6,000.00 earnest money and the Property will be
conveyed by special warranty deed, free and clear of all liens,
claims and encumbrances.

The Debtor has obtained recent comparable sales data from
Christiansen Commercial, the Court-approved broker, for office
condominium units within the Metro Medical Center complex to
establish the fair market value of the Property. The comparable
sales data shows that the Purchase Price of $120,000 ($61 per
square foot) represents fair market value.

The Debtor shall bear the cost of the internal revenue stamps
required for the execution of the original deed. Buyer shall pay
the costs of rights, fees, and stamps on certified copies of the
deed for registration in the Property Registry of Puerto Rico, as
well as the statutorily applicable notarial tariff, and shall
select the notary. Each party shall bear its own legal fees and
expenses in connection with this transaction.

There are real estate property taxes owed to the Centro de
Recaudación de Ingresos Municipales for the Property in the
amount
of $1,448.89 as of October 1, 2025.

The Buyer has the right, upon written notice to Seller at any time
prior to Closing, to assign this Agreement or to designate as
purchaser any affiliate or newly formed entity under Buyer's
control. Any such assignee or designee shall assume all obligations
of Buyer under the Agreement.

                  About Concorde Metro Seguros

Concorde Metro Seguros LLC is a single-asset real estate debtor, as
defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(51B). The Company's primary
business involves managing the Metro Medical Center in Bayamon,
Puerto Rico, which serves as its principal asset.

Concorde Metro Seguros LLC sought relief under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 25-01269) on March 24,
2025. In its petition, the Debtor reports estimated assets and
liabilities between $1 million and $10 million each.

The Debtor is represented by Javier Vilarino, Esq. at Vilarino and
Associates LLC.




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T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
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HERITAGE PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR & Alters Outlook to Neg.
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S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Heritage Petroleum Co.
Ltd. to negative. S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issuer credit and
issue-lever ratings on Heritage and its debt, respectively, while
its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains unchanged at 'b-'.

The negative outlook on Heritage reflects that on Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T).

On Sept. 25, 2025, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago (T&T) to negative and affirmed its 'BBB-/A-3' ratings. The
negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade absent
meaningful and timely steps to strengthen the sustainability of
public finances, ensure balanced economic growth, and maintain the
country's strong external profile.

The sovereign rating supports our ratings on Heritage Petroleum Co.
Ltd., because of its relevance and very important role for T&T's
economy as the country's main oil and gas producer. Our ratings on
Heritage correlate with those on T&T, given the company's very
strong linkage with the government through the government's full
ownership of Heritage's parent company Trinidad Petroleum Holdings
Ltd. (TPHL; not rated).

T&T's fiscal and external buffers have eroded gradually, reflecting
limited effectiveness of long-standing efforts to boost GDP growth
and strengthen fiscal management. The country's fiscal and external
buffers have been gradually weakening over time and its long-term
economic growth has been low. Despite many efforts, there has been
only limited progress by previous administrations in diversifying
the economy, leaving it vulnerable to volatile energy prices. If
the government fails to take timely corrective steps to strengthen
the sustainability of public finances, ensure long-term balanced
economic growth, and maintain the country's strong external
profile, this could add pressure to the ratings on T&T. Failure to
address a prolonged weakening of public finances and diminution of
foreign exchange reserves could reflect institutional shortcomings
that limit the government's capacity to build buffers that enhance
the country's ability to respond to negative shocks.

S&P said, "We maintain our view of Heritage as a core entity to the
group's strategy. We still believe that TPHL is an integral hub of
the country's energy complex. Heritage remains the leading oil
producer company while Paria (another TPHL subsidiary, not rated)
remains the sole supplier of refined oil products in T&T.
Therefore, TPHL's importance to the country's economy remains
strong. We continue to view Heritage as a core subsidiary of TPHL,
because it continues to carry out the group's strategic objectives
and due to the importance of Heritage's cash flow to TPHL's
consolidated figures. Heritage holds the group's oil exploration
and production segment, representing about 90% of TPHL's
consolidated EBITDA. Given the importance of TPHL's operations to
T&T's economy, we believe that the group will maintain a very high
likelihood of extraordinary support from the government. We
maintain our view of TPHL's strong link to Trinidad and Tobago
(BBB-/Negative/A-3), which supports the 'BB' issuer credit rating
on Heritage.

"We still expect Heritage's credit profile to remain commensurate
with its SACP of 'b-'. Complex macroeconomic and geopolitical
issues have hampered oil and gas prices so far in 2025, with Brent
crude oil reference prices of around US$60/barrels of oil
equivalent (boe). Nevertheless, we expect the company could
somewhat offset these lower prices through broadly stable
production of around 44,000 boe for the next 12-18 months. We
expect international reference oil prices to recover next year.
Coupled with the company implementing operational efficiencies, we
therefore believe Heritage should remain on track to reach an
EBITDA generation of around Trinidad and Tobago dollar (TT$) 2.5
billion-TT$3.0 billion while its debt to EBITDA remains around
2.0x, commensurate with the SACP.

"We still see Heritage as a core subsidiary of TPHL because it
continues to carry out the group's strategic objectives and
contributes significantly to TPHL's consolidated figures. As we
maintain our view of TPHL's strong link to T&T, our negative
outlook on Heritage mirrors that on the sovereign.

"Despite the negative outlook, we expect Heritage's credit metrics
will remain commensurate with its current SACP of 'b-', reflecting
EBITDA margins of about 30% and debt to EBITDA of 2.0x-3.0x for the
next 12-18 months. We maintain our view that Heritage's role as a
core group entity won't change in the next 12 months.

"We could downgrade Heritage in the next 6-24 months if we were to
take the same action on T&T. This is because we see Heritage as a
core subsidiary of TPHL, which we think has a very strong link to
T&T." S&P could also downgrade the company if:

-- Heritage's group credit profile weakens due to
weaker-than-expected credit metrics, or unexpected significant debt
or weaker liquidity at the group level; or

-- Heritage doesn't benefit from rising oil prices or delays
investments for production growth, raising debt to EBITDA above
3.0x on a consistent basis.

S&P said, "We could revise the outlook on Heritage to stable or
raise the ratings in the next 24 months if we were to do the same
on T&T.

"On the other hand, although unlikely, we could upgrade Heritage in
the next 12-18 months if it deleverages faster than we expect,
reducing debt to EBITDA below 2.0x consistently while benefiting
from higher production and rising prices. Moreover, we could take a
positive rating action if the company is consistent with financial
reporting and refinances debt before it matures. In addition, fully
repaying the outstanding debt of Petrotrin (T&T's former
state-owned oil company) could strengthen TPHL's financial risk
profile."


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Scrapped Revenue Earners
-------------------------------------------
Ria Taitt at Trinidad and Tobago Express reports that the Trinidad
and Tobago Government's decision to increase the deficit to $9
billion, to scrap the property tax and the Trinidad and Tobago
Revenue Authority that would have led rating agency S&P amending
Trinidad and Tobago's credit rating from stable to negative.

This is the view of former finance minister Colm Imbert.

Speaking at a news conference at the Opposition Leader's office in
Port of Spain, Imbert said: "The (S&P) Outlook has changed to
negative for two reasons. In the mid-year review, the new
Government decided to increase the budgeted expenditure for fiscal
2025 by $3.143 billion, thereby increasing the deficit to over $9
billion . . . You have to borrow for the deficit, according to
Trinidad and Tobago Express.

"So automatically, Standard and Poor's would have read the
minister's speech, they would look at the mid-year review. And
these numbers would be presented to them when they came . . . So
they would see that the new Government decided to spend $3 billion
more in fiscal 2025 without any additional revenue, which is why
the deficit would have gone to $9 billion, the report notes.  And
obviously they would not have been very happy about that, the
report relays.  They would have taken a dim view that the new
Government is increasing expenditure without increasing revenue,
the report discloses.  So that's the first reason why the outlook
would go from stable to negative, the report notes.

"The second reason is that we had worked on several new revenue
generating instruments. One would be the Trinidad and Tobago
Revenue Authority . . . and the estimates of the amount of
additional revenue that could be earned through the TTRA varied
from $3 billion to $5 billion to as much as $10 billion," the
report relays.

He said the second revenue-generating measure that was scrapped was
property tax, the report says.

"And then, of course, you had the unfortunate developments with the
Dragon deal just before the election, where the United States
decided they would not continue the licensing arrangement for the
Dragon gas project. So they would have looked at that in totality,"
he added.

Imbert said he was happy S&P had maintained T&T's investment grade
rating at BBB-.

He noted a credit rating of BBB-, which is the lowest level of the
investment grade, (after that, to get into the speculative grade)
would have been based on information presented to Standard & Poor's
during their visit on July 23, just two months, three weeks after
the general election, the report notes.

"And from my own personal experience, the information presented to
Standard and Poor's would have been up-to-date to April, possibly.
So the information given to Standard and Poor's would have been
based on what the previous government had done.  And therefore, I'm
quite happy that the investment grade rating was maintained because
that would have been based on fiscal out turn, revenue, expenditure
and other things that would have been done prior to the general
election," Imbert said, the report discloses.

The report relays that Imbert was asked about the fact that no
budget date had been announced as yet. He said he suspected the
date was October 6.

"You need about 20 days to complete the exercise if you do it in
the usual way.  If you do it in a normal way, where you start at 10
in the morning, you vote at 8 o'clock in the night, you don't have
sittings on Saturdays and Sundays. You need about 20 days," he
said. He recalled, however, in 2010, then-PM Kamla Persad-Bissessar
saying "it is 3 in the morning, why are we still debating," the
report notes.

"And she told me that she had to go to a Heads of Government
conference in Jamaica. So they ran it (Parliament) right through 24
hours. A normal government would have indicated by now that the
budget would be within the next couple of days," he said.

He said there has to be the presentation of the budget, then three
clear days for the Opposition Leader to prepare her reply, then
four to five days of debate, five days of Standing Finance
Committee, and then the debate begins in the Senate, the report
discloses.

"And then the budget division of the Ministry of Finance has
prepared the documents to go to the President for the President to
assent to the Appropriation bill . . . So they need about two days
for that—two, three days," the report relays.

He said the Government cannot spend any money beyond October 31.

"According to the law . . . they're allowed to spend 10% of what
was spent in the previous year during the month of October. From
the time first of November reaches, if the budget is not assented
to by the President, then the Government can't spend any money,"
Imbert said, the report notes.

Imbert took issue with statements made by Planning Minister Kennedy
Swaratsingh, the report relays.  He said Swaratsingh's statements
made in the Senate with respect to the collection and distribution
of property tax suggested local government corporations had
received certain amounts of property tax, the report discloses.  
He said when PNM corporations came out and said they received no
property tax money, Swaratsingh said he never said that, the report
says.

Imbert said he had since listened to Parlview channel and
Swaratsingh did say the money paid and distributed across the
corporations was 'XYZ'. . .  Anybody who understands English
language could understand that to mean that the corporations
received," Imbert said, the report relays.

Imbert said the property tax was initially set up for the money to
go into the Consolidated Fund because the corporations were not in
a position to collect the tax, the report notes.

"So categorically, no corporation ever received any property tax,"
he added.


TRINIDAD GENERATION: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR & Alters Outlook to Neg
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S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Trinidad Generation
Unlimited (TGU) to negative from stable. S&P also affirmed its
'BB+' issuer credit and issue-level ratings on TGU, while its
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains unchanged at 'bb-'.

The negative outlook on TGU reflects that on Trinidad Generation
Unlimited (TGU).

On Sept. 25, 2025, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on its
long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago (T&T) to negative and affirmed its 'BBB-/A-3' ratings. The
negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade, absent
meaningful and timely steps to strengthen the sustainability of
T&T's public finances, ensure balanced economic growth, and
maintain the country's strong external profile.

S&P said, "Our ratings on Trinidad Generation Unlimited (TGU)
mirror those on the sovereign, based on its relevance and very
important role for T&T's economy, given its importance as a
critical electricity generator and provider for the country.
Government-owned TGU is the most efficient power plant, measured by
its heat rate, in T&T. Our ratings on TGU move in tandem with those
on T&T, given its very strong linkage with the government, given
that the latter fully owns TGU."

T&T's fiscal and external buffers have eroded gradually, reflecting
limited effectiveness of long-standing efforts to boost GDP growth
and strengthen fiscal management.

The country's fiscal and external buffers have been gradually
weakening over time and its long-term economic growth has been low.
Despite many efforts, there has been only limited progress by
previous administrations in diversifying the economy, leaving it
vulnerable to volatile energy prices. If the government fails to
take timely corrective steps to strengthen the sustainability of
public finances, ensure long-term balanced economic growth, and
maintain the country's strong external profile could add pressure
to T&T's credit quality. Failure to address a prolonged weakening
of public finances and diminution of foreign exchange reserves
could reflect institutional shortcomings that limit the
government's capacity to build buffers that enhance the country's
ability to respond to negative shocks.

S&P said, "Our ratings on TGU move in tandem with those on the
sovereign, and our outlook on the company mirrors that on T&T. We
think the company will continue playing a key role in T&T's
economy, given that we view TGU as a critical electricity asset for
T&T, which enhances the company's creditworthiness. TGU accounts
for 34% of Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission's (T&TEC; not
rated) total contracted capacity and meets over 55% of the
country's electricity demand. This, combined with the government's
100% guarantee of TGU's revenue through a power purchase agreement
(PPA), its full ownership of the company, and a change-of-control
provision that would trigger a debt payment acceleration, leads us
to think that a very high likelihood that the government would
provide extraordinary financial support to TGU under stressed
conditions remains in place.

"We still expect TGU's credit profile to remain in line with its
SACP of 'bb-'. The company recently alleviated liquidity pressures
and concerns over its debt structure by refinancing a sizable
maturity of its senior notes of $450 million through a new senior
unsecured notes issuance of $525 million due 2033, comfortably
extending its debt maturity profile. This, together with our
expectation that the company will maintain broadly healthy credit
metrics (net debt to EBITDA below 5.0x, funds from operations (FFO)
to debt of around 10%, and FFO interest coverage of around 2.0x)
results in a 'bb-' SACP.

"The negative outlook on TGU mirrors that on T&T
(BBB-/Negative/A-3). We maintain our view that the very high
likelihood of extraordinary support from the government will remain
in place in the next 6-24 months. Despite the negative outlook, we
expect that TGU's credit metrics will remain in line with its SACP
of 'bb-'.

"We could downgrade TGU in the next 6-24 months if we were to take
the same action on T&T or if we perceive a lower likelihood of
extraordinary support from the government, which could occur if
other market participants are able to replace TGU's electricity
output. We could also downgrade TGU if its credit profile
deteriorates through tighter leverage metrics or interest coverage.
This could be reflected in FFO to debt below 9% or FFO cash
interest coverage below 1.75x. Additionally, if unforeseen events
weaken the company's liquidity position, TGU's credit quality could
erode.

"We could revise our outlook on TGU to stable or raise the ratings
in the next 24 months if we were to take the same action on the
sovereign. We could also upgrade the company if it maintains net
debt to EBITDA consistently below 4.5x and FFO to debt consistently
above 13%, while the company also maintains cushioned liquidity."



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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