/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/250313.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Thursday, March 13, 2025, Vol. 26, No. 52
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Challenging Milei's 'Iron Triangle'
ARGENTINA: IMF Funds to Stabilize Economy Without Adding Debt
ARGENTINA: The 'Hustling Expert' Behind $250MM Crypto Scandal
B R A Z I L
ITAU UNIBANCO: Fitch Rates Medium-Term Senior Notes 'BB+'
C O L O M B I A
COLOMBIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Foreign Currency IDR, Outlook Negative
C O S T A R I C A
[] Fitch Takes Actions on 7 Banks After Revised Costa Rica Outlook
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
[] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Central Bank to Issue New RD$50 Bill
J A M A I C A
JAMAICA: GOJ's 90-Day and 182-Day Treasury Bills Oversubscribed
P U E R T O R I C O
PUERTO RICO: PREPA Bankruptcy Attention Turns to Revenue Dispute
SAPOBLA INVESTMENTS: Case Summary & Five Unsecured Creditors
- - - - -
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Challenging Milei's 'Iron Triangle'
----------------------------------------------
Agustino Fontevecchia at Buenos Aires Times reports that a chain of
recent events seem to have thrown the Javier Milei administration
off its course lately. Just when it seemed that the government was
about to consolidate its socio-political hegemony on the back of a
marked reduction in inflation, Donald Trump won the US presidency
and took possession of the White House, according to Buenos Aires
Times.
Milei was ecstatic and has since made his way several times to the
United States, where he's become a house staple, a buddy to Elon
Musk and one of the few global leaders who receives praise from the
billionaire in charge of the world's most powerful country, the
report notes.
Since then, Milei has utilised global platforms (like the World
Economic Forum at Davos) to deride "woke" culture, turned his back
on Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelenskyy (earning the approval of
Russian premier Vladimir Putin) and been engaged in a crypto "rug
pull" operation via the memecoin '$LIBRA' and a series of shady
characters that were also involved in launching US First Lady
Melania Trump's '$MELANIA' token, the report relays.
These three issues, which have further ramifications, have all been
negative for Argentina's president, Buenos Aires Times cites. And
there's also a common thread between them: Milei's decision to
blindly follow Trump, the report discloses. While the political
affinity is undeniable, despite deep ideological contradictions
between the two, there may be a palpable objective behind Milei's
extreme pragmatism: securing a deal with the International Monetary
Fund that becomes the pillar of a potent victory in this year's
midterm elections, the report says.
Milei and Economy Minister Luis 'Toto' Caputo have repeatedly
promised that the deal is close. The latest major announcement came
at his controversial address to the Legislative Assembly kicking
the congressional term, the report notes. Following the lead of
the United States, Milei attempted to make it a "State of the
Union" address, changing the time of his speech from the
traditional mid-morning to nighttime, which is prime time for
television, the report relays.
He also decided to hold the event in the middle of an "extra long"
weekend, with two bank holidays for carnival, the report notes. TV
ratings were quite poor, oscillating between 13 and 17 rating
points, compared to peaks of 50 points during last year's visit to
Congress, the report discloses.
And while he made the big announcement, it was another issue that
attracted the public attention: the public showdown between his
star political advisor, freelancer Santiago Caputo, and national
deputy Facundo Manes, the report relays. While a major part of the
opposition declined the president's invitation to participate,
including the Union Cívica Radical (UCR), Manes attended the
Assembly and spent a significant portion of time responding to
Milei's speech by yelling from his seat while exhibiting an issue
of the Constitution. This won him the ire of Caputo, who was
already under fire for some recent missteps, the report relays.
The "Kremlin Magician," as he's come to be known, later faced off
with Manes in the halls of Congress. In front of several smartphone
cameras, he gave him a couple of taps on the chest after touching
his face in a patronising, semi-threatening manner, the report
discloses. Manes later said he had been physically threatened by
"Argentina's most powerful person."
Whether Manes, who is a famous neuroscientist and author,
purposefully sought to lure Milei and Caputo into a trap, or
whether he was truly protesting the president's speech is
unimportant, the report says. It's a challenge to the president's
political centrality that drew from a message which sought to build
fortitude by announcing a deal that would help the libertarians win
the midterm elections, the report relates. And it's one more
challenge, or error, from the three vertices of the "iron triangle"
that run the show: Caputo, Presidential Chief-of-Staff Karina Milei
and the President himself, the report discloses.
Another such challenge came from Grupo Clarín, the country's
largest and most powerful media group, which pulled a rabbit out of
a hat in the form of the acquisition of the Argentine assets of
Spanish telecoms giant Telefonica, the report notes.
From its media outlets, Grupo Clarín had proven a circumstantial
ally of the Milei administration, with some of its prime-time stars
being amongst the select group that is allowed on the record access
to the President, including journalist Jonatan Viale, the report
says.
Progressively, though, it started to toughen its stance, in tandem
with the acceleration of the operation to acquire Telefonica
Argentina through Telecom, potentially generating a 70-percent
concentration in the telecommunications sector that would
undoubtedly raise objections, particularly from regulator ENACOM,
the report notes.
From one day to the next, Telecom - which is owned by Grupo Clarín
and Mexican investor David Martínez - announced the deal was
closed for US$1.245 billion, that the funds had already been
deposited and that possession would be taken the following day, the
report discloses. It caught the government off-guard, forcing
Milei to put out a press release indicating the monopolistic
tendencies in the telecommunications market would be reviewed, the
report relays.
He then took to social media and public appearances to go on the
offensive against Grupo Clarín, noting that it had always inked
shady deals with different governments at the expense of the
people, the report says. He effectively declared war on Clarin.
Interestingly, Milei seemed to be contradicting his recent economic
argument against the concept of market failure and in favour of
monopolies, the report relays. One that he continues to defend
when it comes to the $LIBRA crypto scandal, where Milei shows no
remorse for the hundreds of millions of dollars that were
siphoned-off by Hayden Davis and his associates via sniping and
insider trading that he enabled, the report notes. Market failure
only exists when it is in the government's benefit, it seems, the
report discloses. Yet, it remains unclear why Clarín and Milei
have decided to clash head on, the report relays. For the media
juggernaut, it must know something everyone else doesn't – it
seems to be betting on confrontation with the government in order
to push through a controversial merger that requires regulatory
approval, the report relays. From Milei's standpoint, he generally
takes aim at specific journalists that criticise him, but in
general avoids picking fights with media groups and their owners
(with the notable exception of Editorial Perfil), the report notes.
Now, he's locked horns with the toughest adversary in the space,
following in the footsteps of none other than former president
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, the report discloses.
Back to the IMF deal, there's talk of fresh funds and a loan worth
US$10 billion to US$20 billion, the report relays. As Carlos
Burgueno explained in Perfil, Argentina needs at least US$10
billion this year to face debt with multilateral institutions,
including the IMF, the report discloses.
Milei and Caputo have indicated that the deal would allow them to
strengthen the Central Bank's balance sheet and allow them to lift
currency controls (known locally as the "cepo"), yet that would
generate the risk of a market-imposed devaluation, the report
notes.
Indeed, the Milei administration has been forced to come out
publicly to deny that the IMF is pushing for a devaluation, given
the strength of the peso, the report says. According to Burgueno,
they are trying to convince the IMF board that Argentina is "pricey
in dollars" given excessive regulation, high taxes, and other
"monetary overhang" as opposed to an artificially overvalued peso,
the report relays.
The technical staff at the IMF has made it clear that they do not
want to finance capital flight in the form of carry trade, as
happened last time when they lent Mauricio Macri US$44.5 billion,
with Caputo and Federico Sturzenegger also in the scene, the report
notes. It was an extraordinary situation given the haste with
which a record-setting sum was approved, and there was also
something else in common then: Trump, the report discloses.
The Donald, therefore, holds the keys to Milei's future, the report
adds.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision
allowed the authorities an immediate disbursement of an equivalent
of US$9.65 billion in March 2022.
Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances
and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary
policy framework.
In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for
Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of
around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to
entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external
buffers, and underpin the recovery.
On Feb. 17, 2025, S&P Global Ratings lowered its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and
its national scale rating to 'SD' from 'raB+'. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings
on Argentina. The outlook on the long-term foreign currency rating
remains stable.
On Jan. 8, 2025, Moody's Ratings raised Argentina's local currency
ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling to Caa1
from Caa3. Moody's said the decision to raise the local and
foreign currency ceilings reflects the increased predictability and
the greater consistency in economic policy that has led to a rapid
reduction in monetary and fiscal imbalances that were stoking very
high inflation.
On Nov. 15, 2024, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'CC',
and its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.
Argentina's upgrade to 'CCC' from 'CC' reflects developments that
have improved Fitch's confidence in the authorities' ability to
make upcoming foreign-currency bond payments without seeking relief
of some sort.
DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC on November 25, 2024.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.
ARGENTINA: IMF Funds to Stabilize Economy Without Adding Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Rio Times, reports that Argentine
President Javier Milei has signaled an imminent agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), aiming to secure fresh funding
to stabilize the country's fragile economy.
Speaking during his annual address to Congress, Milei framed the
deal as essential for addressing Argentina's chronic economic
challenges, including inflation, currency restrictions, and fiscal
imbalances, according to globalinsolvency.com.
Milei's government plans to use the IMF funds, estimated at $11
billion, to replenish the Central Bank's depleted reserves and
reduce Treasury debt owed to the Central Bank, the report notes.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision
allowed the authorities an immediate disbursement of an equivalent
of US$9.65 billion in March 2022.
Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances
and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary
policy framework.
In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for
Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of
around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to
entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external
buffers, and underpin the recovery.
On Feb. 17, 2025, S&P Global Ratings lowered its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and
its national scale rating to 'SD' from 'raB+'. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings
on Argentina. The outlook on the long-term foreign currency rating
remains stable.
On Jan. 8, 2025, Moody's Ratings raised Argentina's local currency
ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling to Caa1
from Caa3. Moody's said the decision to raise the local and
foreign currency ceilings reflects the increased predictability and
the greater consistency in economic policy that has led to a rapid
reduction in monetary and fiscal imbalances that were stoking very
high inflation.
On Nov. 15, 2024, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'CC',
and its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.
Argentina's upgrade to 'CCC' from 'CC' reflects developments that
have improved Fitch's confidence in the authorities' ability to
make upcoming foreign-currency bond payments without seeking relief
of some sort.
DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC on November 25, 2024.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.
ARGENTINA: The 'Hustling Expert' Behind $250MM Crypto Scandal
-------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing the Wall Street Journal, reports that
Hayden Davis, 28 years old, became the face of the highest-profile
cryptocurrency scandal since the implosion of FTX in 2022, one that
has ensnared Argentine President Javier Milei.
He is a college dropout who hawked energy drinks as a teen and sold
Oreos to make rent, according to globalinsolvency.com. Under
"skills" on LinkedIn, he listed "hustling expert."
Propelled by self-confidence and networking savvy, Davis went from
cookie seller to erstwhile crypto king, according to interviews and
a review of more than a decade of social-media posts, podcasts and
blog posts, the report notes.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision
allowed the authorities an immediate disbursement of an equivalent
of US$9.65 billion in March 2022.
Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances
and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary
policy framework.
In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for
Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of
around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to
entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external
buffers, and underpin the recovery.
On Feb. 17, 2025, S&P Global Ratings lowered its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and
its national scale rating to 'SD' from 'raB+'. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings
on Argentina. The outlook on the long-term foreign currency rating
remains stable.
On Jan. 8, 2025, Moody's Ratings raised Argentina's local currency
ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling to Caa1
from Caa3. Moody's said the decision to raise the local and
foreign currency ceilings reflects the increased predictability and
the greater consistency in economic policy that has led to a rapid
reduction in monetary and fiscal imbalances that were stoking very
high inflation.
On Nov. 15, 2024, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'CC',
and its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.
Argentina's upgrade to 'CCC' from 'CC' reflects developments that
have improved Fitch's confidence in the authorities' ability to
make upcoming foreign-currency bond payments without seeking relief
of some sort.
DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC on November 25, 2024.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
ITAU UNIBANCO: Fitch Rates Medium-Term Senior Notes 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB+' rating to Itau Unibanco Holding
S.A.'s (IUH) senior notes. The notes will be comprised of a USD65
million green bond and a USD15 million social bond. These notes
will be distributed privately on March 7, 2025 under IUH's Global
Medium-Term Note Programme through IUH's Grand Cayman Branch, with
a maturity date of May 30, 2029.
The net proceeds from both tranches will be used to finance, and or
refinance, in whole or in part, new or existing eligible green and
social projects in accordance with the bank's Sustainable Finance
Framework issued in April 2024.
Key Rating Drivers
The notes were rated at the same level as IUH's 'BB+' Issuer
Default Rating (IDR), as these senior notes will rank equally in
the right of payment with its other present and future unsecured
and unsubordinated indebtedness.
Rating Sensitivities
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
The notes' rating could be downgraded if IUH's VR and IDR are
downgraded.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
The notes' rating could be upgraded if IUH's VR and IDR are
upgraded.
Date of Relevant Committee
16 December 2024
ESG Considerations
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating
----------- ------
Itau Unibanco
Holding S.A.
senior unsecured LT BB+ New Rating
===============
C O L O M B I A
===============
COLOMBIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Foreign Currency IDR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Colombia's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and revised its Outlook to
Negative from Stable.
Key Rating Drivers
Negative Outlook: Fitch revised the Outlook on Colombia's ratings
to Negative from Stable on the deterioration in its fiscal position
and uncertain prospects for corrective measures. The central
government fiscal balance for 2024 came in at 6.7% of GDP, sharply
underperforming Fitch's forecast of 5.6% of GDP, mainly due to
revenue shortfalls and an inability to implement offsetting
spending cuts.
As a result, general government (GG) debt to GDP jumped to an
estimated 58% from 53% in 2023. Fitch believes that fiscal risks
are tilted to the downside as the government will continue to
struggle to meet fiscal targets and debt to GDP will continue to
rise over the forecast period.
Colombia's ratings are supported by a track record of macroeconomic
and financial stability, underpinned by an independent central bank
with an inflation targeting regime and a free-floating currency.
The ratings are constrained by high fiscal deficits and uncertain
prospects for consolidation needed to stabilize debt/GDP, a high
interest burden, and high commodity dependence.
Fiscal Uncertainties to Persist: Fitch envisages difficulties for
the government to meet the revised fiscal rule target this year,
given it projects tax administration efforts to yield 1.4% of
additional revenues that Fitch expects is unlikely to be achieved.
Considering this revenue uncertainty and a worse-than-expected 2025
starting point, Fitch has upped its CG deficit forecasts for both
2025 and 2026 to 6.2% of GDP and 5.8%, respectively (from 5.1% and
4.7% previously). Fitch sees downside fiscal risks to even its
revised forecasts from continued revenue underperformance as well
as the reluctance of the Petro administration to sacrifice its
spending priorities.
Mounting spending pressures and budgetary rigidities will make
further deficit reduction difficult to achieve beyond 2026 without
implementing tax reforms. Colombia has a good track record of
implementing revenue-enhancing tax reforms amid fiscal pressures,
but Fitch does not anticipate additional tax reforms during the
rest of the Petro administration. Presidential elections are
scheduled for May 2026.
Debt Burden to Rise: Fitch projects consolidated GG debt to
continue to increase over the forecast period, reaching 62% of GDP
in 2026, up from 57.8% in 2024, and continuing to diverge from the
projected 2026 'BB' median of 55.4%. Colombia's GG interest/revenue
ratio is expected to increase to 15.7% in 2025, above the 'BB'
median of 10.1% and up from 14.9% in 2024. Fitch sees downside
risks to the debt trajectory from further fiscal slippage, growth
underperformance, or exchange-rate depreciation given that 35% of
total debt is denominated in foreign currency.
Reforms Add to Fiscal Pressures: Last year, the Congress passed a
pension reform that creates solidarity and semi-contributive
pillars, with an estimated annual fiscal cost of 0.3% of GDP. It
also redirects future pension contributions (up to 2.3x the minimum
wage) to a public pension fund from individual private accounts,
although current assets will be untouched.
Additionally, Congress passed a constitutional reform increasing CG
transfers to local and regional governments to 39.6% of current
revenues from 27.2%. A law redistributing competencies to local and
regional governments will also be put in place. The increased
transfers would be implemented gradually over a 12-year period
beginning in 2027 (or once the law is in place). In Fitch's view,
this will further increase the already significant budget
rigidities (estimated at over 80% currently) in the medium term.
Growth To Accelerate: Fitch expects economic growth to accelerate
significantly in 2025 to 2.7% from 1.7% in 2024 on the back of
resilient consumer spending and recovering investment. However,
uncertainties about trend growth persist since investment to GDP
fell significantly during the pandemic and has only recovered to
17.1% in 2024. Fitch believes the ratio will remain below historic
levels (averaging 22% of GDP from 2010 to 2020) throughout the
forecast period.
Inflation Slowly Falls: Fitch expects inflation to continue
declining and reach the upper band of the central bank's 3% (+/-
1pp) target by end-2025 from 5.2% at end-2024. Widespread
indexation and unwinding of fuel subsidies in 2023-2024 have led to
a slower disinflation process than most countries in the region.
The central bank has cut interest rates cumulatively by 375 bp
since December 2023 to 9.5% in December 2024. Year-to-date, the
central bank has been on hold. Fitch expects additional cuts
reaching a terminal rate of 6.5% by YE 2026, but there is the risk
of a more gradual pace from a slower-than-expected disinflation or
stronger than expected peso depreciation.
Narrower Current Account Deficits: The current account deficit is
expected to widen marginally in 2025 to 2.1% of GDP from 1.8% in
2024, well below its 2022 high of 6.1%. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) has proven resilient to date despite political uncertainties,
reaching an estimated USD10 billion in net terms in 2024 (3.1% of
GDP). Fitch expects similar levels of net FDI in 2025-2026 that
continue to fully cover the current account deficits.
The central bank has accumulated reserves to boost its external
liquidity position to USD61.9 billion as of end-2024, with Fitch
expecting further accumulation of nearly USD3 billion in 2025. In
April 2024, the IMF approved a new two-year flexible credit line of
USD8.1 billion for Colombia, which provides an additional buffer
that the country has utilized in the past to manage external
shocks.
ESG - Governance: Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank
Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign
Rating Model (SRM). Colombia has a medium WBGI ranking at 42.9
reflecting a track record of violence but peaceful political
transitions, a moderate level of rights for participation in the
political process, moderate institutional capacity, established
rule of law and a moderate level of corruption.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
Public Finances: A continued deterioration in Colombia's GG
debt-to-GDP ratio, for example from persistently high fiscal
deficits and/or weak growth.
Macro: Deterioration of investment and medium-term growth prospects
with adverse social ramifications, such as high unemployment and
poverty levels.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
Public Finances: Achievement of fiscal consolidation that
stabilizes the GG debt-to-GDP ratio.
Structural/Macro: Improvement in macro-policymaking that boosts
fiscal and monetary credibility and/or growth-enhancing reforms.
Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) and Qualitative Overlay (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Colombia a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB+' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR scale.
Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from
the SRM to arrive at the final Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR.
Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's qualitative overlay (QO) is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting
factors within Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable
and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.
Country Ceiling
The Country Ceiling for Colombia is 'BBB-', 1 notch above the
Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. This reflects moderate constraints
and incentives, relative to the IDR, against capital or exchange
controls being imposed that would prevent or significantly impede
the private sector from converting local currency into foreign
currency and transferring the proceeds to non-resident creditors to
service debt payments.
Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of
+1 notch (above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee did not apply a
qualitative adjustment to the model result.
ESG Considerations
Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are
therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver
with a high weight. As Colombia has a percentile rank below 50 for
the respective Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on
the credit profile.
Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a
high weight. As Colombia has a percentile rank below 50 for the
respective Governance Indicators, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.
Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' [+] for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
WBGIs is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Colombia
has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance
Indicator, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.
Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' [+] for Creditor Rights
as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating
and is a rating driver for Colombia, as for all sovereigns. As
Colombia has track record of 20+ years without a restructuring of
public debt and captured in Fitch's SRM variable, this has a
positive impact on the credit profile.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Colombia LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Country Ceiling BBB- Affirmed BBB-
senior
unsecured LT BB+ Affirmed BB+
Senior
Unsecured-Local
currency LT BB+ Affirmed BB+
===================
C O S T A R I C A
===================
[] Fitch Takes Actions on 7 Banks After Revised Costa Rica Outlook
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating action on six Costa Rican banks and
one Panamanian bank after the recent Rating Outlook revision on the
Costa Rica sovereign to Positive, from Stable. Fitch has also
revised the 'bb' outlook on Costa Rica's banking system operating
environment (OE) to positive, from stable, following the sovereign
action.
Costa Rica's robust growth and high per capita income could have a
positive effect on the OE. Fitch estimates the country's GDP per
capita at USD17,800 for 2024, and the Operational Risk Index was
59% as of January 2025. Fitch expects banks will continue to
generate consistent business volume amid the country's positive
macroeconomic dynamics.
Key Rating Drivers
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR) and Banco de Costa Rica (BCR)
Fitch has affirmed the Long- and Short-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of BNCR and BCR at
'BB' and 'B', respectively. The Outlook of the Long-Term IDRs has
been revised to Positive, from Stable, mirroring the Outlook on the
sovereign. Fitch has also affirmed the banks' Viability Ratings
(VR) and Government Support Ratings (GSR) at 'bb'.
The banks' IDRs are driven by the GSRs, which reflect Fitch's
opinion of the potential support the banks would receive, if
needed, from their sole owner, the Costa Rican state (BB/Positive).
The government propensity to support BNCR and BCR is driven, with
high influence, by the explicit guarantee stated in the National
Banking System Law (article 4) for BNCR and BCR as state-owned
banks. The law stipulates that the government is responsible for
all the banks' non-subordinated liabilities in the event of their
liquidation.
BNCR's VR reflects its sound business profile, characterized by
high total operating income and its strong market position as the
largest bank in Costa Rica by assets. Fitch also considers BNCR's
consistent financial performance. The bank's asset quality is
proactively managed, and profitability has been at moderate levels.
The bank's capital position has been stable during the last few
years and provides a cushion for unexpected credit losses.
Liquidity is supported by a wide deposit base and ample access to
alternative funding.
BCR's VR mirrors its solid market position, diversified business
model and policy role in providing financial services to productive
sectors of the country. The VR also incorporates the bank's
controlled asset quality metrics, reasonable profitability and
capitalization, considering its business model, along with a stable
funding profile, which reflects its consistent local deposit
franchise and ordinary government support.
Fitch revised BCR's business profile score to positive, from
stable, in line with the revision of the OE score, as the bank's
high market share as the third-largest bank in loans and second in
deposits, its public nature and status as a domestic systemically
important bank supports Fitch's view that the OE has a significant
influence on the bank's business operations, thus justifying an
equalized assessment.
Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A. (BICSA)
Fitch has affirmed BICSA's Long- and Short-Term IDRs at 'BB' and
'B', respectively. The Outlook for the Long-Term IDR has been
revised to Positive, from Stable, mirroring the action on its
parent companies, BCR and BNCR. In addition, Fitch has affirmed the
Shareholder Support Rating (SSR) at 'bb'. Fitch considers both BCR
and BNCR's ability and propensity to support BICSA, should the need
arise.
Fitch has also affirmed BICSA's National Long- and Short-Term
Ratings at 'AA-(pan)' and 'F1+(pan)' and has revised the Outlook on
the National Long-Term Rating to Positive, from Stable.
Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC)
Fitch has affirmed BPDC's Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency
IDRs and Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'BB' and
'B', respectively. The Rating Outlook on the Long-Term IDRs is
Stable. Fitch has also affirmed the bank's VR at 'bb' and GSR at
'bb-'.
BPDC's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic creditworthiness embodied
in its 'bb' VR, which captures the benefits from its public nature
on its consistent business profile and sound capital metrics; the
VR also consider the bank's adequate asset quality and still
challenged profitability.
Fitch revised BPDC's business profile score trend to positive, from
stable, as Fitch believes BPDC's high market share as the fourth
largest bank in loans and deposits, its public nature, and status
as a domestic systemically important bank support its view that the
OE has a significant influence on the bank's business operations,
thus justifying an equalized assessment.
On the other hand, the bank's profitability remains challenged,
which limits its VR at the current level and restricts the
potential for a Positive Outlook on the Long-Term IDRs. Despite a
slight recovery in the operating profit to risk-weighted asset
(RWA) ratio in 2024 to 0.82%, from 0.65% in 2023, Fitch lowered the
earnings and profitability score to 'bb-' and maintained the
negative trend, as the 2021-2024 average of 1.7% aligns more
closely with the newly assessed score. While Fitch projects a
gradual recovery, if the pace is slower than expected, the ratio
could fall to the 'b' category, supporting its negative trend
assessment.
Banco BAC San Jose, S.A (BAC San Jose)
Fitch has affirmed BAC San Jose' Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at
'BB+' and Local-Currency IDR at 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook for the
Long-Term IDRs remains Stable. Fitch has also affirmed BAC San
Jose's Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B', VR at
'bb' and SSR at 'bb+'.
BAC San Jose' IDRs are driven by its SSR, which reflect Fitch's
view of a high propensity and adequate ability of support from its
parent, BAC International Bank, Inc. (BIB; BB+/Stable) if needed.
The bank's relevant role for its shareholder as a key and integral
part of its diversification and business strategy in a core market,
results in BAC San Jose's Long-Term IDR being equalized with that
of its parent's. Fitch also incorporates in its support rationale
the negative reputational implications of a potential default of
BAC San Jose for the parent. The agency's support analysis
moderately weights the high level of integration between the
entities, which has translated into adopting best practices between
them, benefiting BAC San Jose's business and risk profile.
BAC San Jose's VR reflects its solid domestic franchise, supported
by a solid business model in an improving economic environment. The
bank's solid retail and corporate franchise has resulted in good
pricing power in key segments and access to a large and stable
deposit base, which has led to more revenue diversification
compared to peers.
Fitch revised BAC San Jose' risk profile score and asset quality
trends to positive, from stable, to reflect the positive trend on
asset quality metrics, which historically have compared favorably
among peers and are expected to be sustained over the medium term.
Also, Fitch expects that further improvements to the OE will
benefit asset quality and risk profile metrics, supporting its view
that the OE has a significant influence on the bank's credit
operations, asset quality metrics and risk profile.
Banco Davivienda (Costa Rica) S.A. (Davivienda CR)
Fitch has affirmed Davivienda CR's Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency IDRs and Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs
at 'BB+' and 'B', respectively. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDRs
is Stable. Fitch has also affirmed the bank's VR at 'bb-'.
Davivienda CR's SSR drives its Long-Term IDRs, based on Fitch's
assessment of the ability and propensity of its parent, Banco
Davivienda S.A. (Davivienda; BB+/Stable), to provide support, if
required. This assessment results in Davivienda CR's Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs and the Outlook being aligned to
its parent's IDRs.
Davivienda CR's VR indicates a stable and diversified business
model, balancing corporate and personal banking, and its position
as the second-largest private bank in Costa Rica. This assessment
considers the exchange rate sensitivity affecting the bank's risk
profile and its impact on profitability, which is in a recovery
phase. Asset quality remains robust, complemented by prudent
capitalization and stable funding.
Fitch revised Davivienda CR's business profile score trend to
positive, from stable, considering the potential benefits in the
bank's market position and income generation from the agreement
between Davivienda and The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) to integrate
Scotiabank's operations in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama into
Davivienda.
Cooperativa Nacional de Educadores, R.L. (Coopenae)
Fitch has affirmed Coopenae's Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency
IDR's and Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'BB-' and
'B', respectively. The Outlook for the Long-Term IDRs is Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed Coopenae's VR at 'bb-' and GSR at 'ns'.
Coopenae's IDRs are driven by its VR, which considers its
consolidated business profile, sound capitalization, as well as
good asset quality and improving profitability.
Fitch revised Coopenae's business profile 'b' score trend to
positive, from stable. The agency believes a more favorable OE will
benefit the entity's total operating income generation under a more
consolidated financial system. Coopenae's total operating income
increased by 47.3% in 2024, compared to 2023, and the average of
2021 to 2024 was USD92 million.
Government Support Ratings
BPDC
Fitch believes the bank's 'bb-' GSR, one notch below the sovereign
IDR, reflects the limited probability of support from the Costa
Rican government and its current ability to support the bank.
Despite the bank's legally protected public nature and systemic
importance, there is no explicit government guarantee that would
likely equalize the ratings with the sovereign, as is the case of
the largest state-owned bank peers.
Coopenae
Coopenae's GSR of 'ns' reflects that external support cannot be
relied upon, given that Coopenae is not a systematically important
financial institution.
Rating Sensitivities
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
BNCR and BCR
- BNCR and BCR's IDRs and GSRs will be downgraded in the event of a
downgrade in Costa Rica's sovereign rating.
- BNCR and BCR's VRs will be downgraded by a downward revision of
Fitch's assessment of the Costa Rican OE.
- BNCR's VRs would be downgraded by a downward revision of Fitch's
assessment of the Costa Rican OE. Additionally, BNCR's VR will be
downgraded by materially further loan portfolio deterioration that
affects operating profitability to levels below 1.25% and pressures
the Fitch Core Capital (FCC) to RWA ratio consistently below 10%.
- BCR's VR will be downgraded by a downward revision of Fitch's
assessment of the Costa Rican OE. Also, BCR's VR will be downgraded
due to a material deterioration in the asset quality that weakens
BCR's financial profile and Fitch's assessment of the bank's risk
profile. Specifically, if the operating profit-to-RWA declines
consistently below 1.25% and the FCC to RWA ratio declines to a
level consistently below 12%. Also, if a bill involving the sale of
the bank were approved, Fitch would review the expected effects on
the bank's IDRs, GSR and VR and would likely place them on Rating
Watch.
BICSA
- The banks' IDRs and SSR could be downgraded if its parents'
ratings are downgraded; a significant reduction in BCR and BNCR's
propensity to provide timely support to their subsidiary could also
trigger a downgrade of BICSA's ratings.
- BICSA's national scale ratings would also be downgraded in the
case of a multi-notch downgrade of BCR and BNCR's IDRS.
- BICSA's senior debt national ratings would be downgraded in case
of a downgrade of the issuer's national ratings.
BPDC
- IDRs and VR could be downgraded if sustained deterioration in
financial performance drives a material deterioration in asset
quality and a decline in the bank's operating profit to RWA metric
to a level continuously below 1.25%.
- The GSR is sensitive to a downgrade of the sovereign rating, as
well as its propensity to provide support.
BAC San Jose
- Negative changes in BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSR would result from
a negative more than one notch rating action on Costa Rica's
sovereign and Country Ceiling ratings.
- Any relevant reduction in BIB's propensity of support may trigger
a downgrade of BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSR. Additionally, a
downgrade of BIB's IDRs could lead to a similar action on BAC San
Jose's ratings.
- BAC San Jose's VR could be downgraded in the case of a material
deterioration of the bank's financial performance resulting from a
material asset-quality deterioration that significantly erodes its
profitability and drops its FCC to RWA consistently below 9%.
Davivienda CR
- Negative changes in Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR would mirror a
more than one notch negative movement in Costa Rica's sovereign
ratings and Country Ceiling.
- A downgrade in Davivienda's IDRs would trigger the same action on
Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR.
- Any perception by Fitch of the parent's significantly reduced
propensity to support the subsidiary may trigger a downgrade of the
IDRs and SSR.
Coopenae
- A downgrade in Coopenae's IDRs and VR could result from a
sustained deterioration in asset quality, coupled with a consistent
lower operational profit to RWA continuously below 0.5%.
- There is no downside potential for the GSR, because it is the
lowest level on the respective scale.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
BNCR and BCR
- BNCR and BCR's IDRs and GSRs could be upgraded in the event of an
upgrade to Costa Rica's sovereign rating.
- An upward revision of Fitch's assessment of Costa Rica's OE in
conjunction with a consistent financial performance and business
profile could lead to an upgrade of BNCR and BCR's VRs. The
sovereign rating acts as a cap to the bank's VR.
BICSA
- Fitch could upgrade BICSA's IDRs, SSR and National-Scale ratings
if its parent companies' ratings are upgraded.
- BICSA's senior debt national ratings would be upgraded in case of
an upgrade of the issuer's national ratings.
BPDC
- The bank's IDRs and VR could be upgraded if both Costa Rica's
sovereign rating and OE score positive outlook result in an upgrade
and if its operating profit to RWA's ratio improves and stabilizes
at least at 2%.
- The GSR could be upgraded if Costa Rica's sovereign rating is
upgraded.
BAC San Jose
- BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSRs could be upgraded one notch
following a similar action on BIB's IDRs.
- The VR could be upgraded if the bank consistently maintains a
very strong financial profile, while improving Fitch's OE
assessment.
Davivienda CR
- Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR could be upgraded one notch
following a similar action on Davivienda's IDRs.
Coopenae
- Coopenae's IDRs and VR could be upgraded if there is a consistent
improvement in its total operating income generation, allowing
Coopenae to sustain higher profitability, reflected in an operating
profit to RWA indicator consistently above 2.0%, along with a
controlled asset quality.
- As Coopenae is not a systematically important financial entity,
an upgrade in its GSR is unlikely.
OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS
BICSA
The Long- and Short-Term National Rating of BICSA's senior
unsecured issuances in Panama are rated 'AA-(pan)' and 'F1+(pan)',
respectively, at the same level of the issuer. The ratings reflect
the creditworthiness of BICSA's parents, BCR and BNCR, relative to
other rated issuers in Panama. Although the debt ratings do not
have an Outlook, Fitch believes that senior unsecured debt could be
upgraded if the bank's IDRs are upgraded.
OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES
This section is not applicable.
VR ADJUSTMENTS
BNCR, BCR, BPDC, BAC San Jose, Davivienda CR, Coopenae
The OE score of 'bb' has been assigned below the 'bbb' category
implied score due to the following negative adjustment reason:
sovereign rating.
BICSA
The OE score has been assigned below the implied score due to the
following negative adjustment reason: international operations.
The funding and liquidity score has been assigned above the implied
score due to the following positive adjustment reason: liquidity
access and ordinary support.
Summary of Financial Adjustments
BNCR
Fitch reclassified prepaid expenses, deposits as guarantee,
construction in process and other deferred assets as intangibles
and deducted them from total equity to reflect their low absorption
capacity.
BCR
Fitch calculated the consolidated RWAs and related metrics by using
BCR's individual RWAs and those of its main subsidiary, BICSA.
Pre-paid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible and deducted from total equity to calculate FCC.
BPDC
All intangible assets were deducted from total equity to obtain FCC
since the agency believes these are of low loss absorption
capacity.
BAC San Jose
Prepaid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible assets and deducted from total equity, as Fitch
considers these to have low capacity to absorb losses.
Davivienda CR
Prepaid expenses were reclassified as intangibles and deducted from
equity, to reflect their lower loss absorption capacity.
BICSA
Pre-paid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible to calculate a consistent tangible common
equity/tangible assets ratio in relation to previous periods.
Coopenae
Pre-paid expenses and deferred charges were reclassified as
intangible and deducted from total equity to reflect its low losses
absorption capacity.
Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings
BNCR's and BCR's IDRs and GSRs are linked to Costa Rica's sovereign
rating.
BPDC's GSR is linked to Costa Rica's sovereign rating.
BICSA's IDRs and SSR are driven by the potential support it could
receive from its parents, BCR and BNCR, if required.
BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSR are driven by the potential support it
could receive from its parent, BIB, if required.
Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR are driven by the potential support it
could receive from its parent, Davivienda.
ESG Considerations
BCR has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Group Structure, due to
the government's initiative to sell the bank and potential
contagion risk related to the operation of one of its subsidiaries,
which negatively influence Fitch's assessment of the bank's
business profile in conjunction with other factors. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Recovery Prior
----------- ------ -------- -----
Banco Davivienda
(Costa Rica) S.A. LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb- Affirmed bb-
Shareholder Support bb+ Affirmed bb+
Banco Popular y
de Desarrollo
Comunal LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb Affirmed bb
Government Support bb- Affirmed bb-
Cooperativa
Nacional de
Educadores, R.L.
(Coopenae, R.L.) LT IDR BB- Affirmed BB-
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB- Affirmed BB-
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb- Affirmed bb-
Government Support ns Affirmed ns
Banco Nacional
de Costa Rica LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb Affirmed bb
Government Support bb Affirmed bb
Banco
Internacional de
Costa Rica, S.A. LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
ST IDR B Affirmed B
Natl LT AA-(pan) Affirmed
AA-(pan)
Natl ST F1+(pan) Affirmed
F1+(pan)
Shareholder Support bb Affirmed bb
senior
unsecured Natl LT AA-(pan) Affirmed
AA-(pan)
senior
unsecured Natl ST F1+(pan) Affirmed
F1+(pan)
Banco BAC
San Jose, S.A. LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb Affirmed bb
Shareholder Support bb+ Affirmed bb+
Banco de
Costa Rica LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Viability bb Affirmed bb
Government Support bb Affirmed bb
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
[] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Central Bank to Issue New RD$50 Bill
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that The Central Bank of the Dominican
Republic (BCRD) will introduce a new RD$50 bill into circulation on
March 6, 2025. This update follows an international public tender
held in April 2024, aimed at modernizing the country's currency.
Despite the introduction of the new bill, existing RD$50 notes will
remain valid for all transactions.
The new banknotes retain the same security features as their
predecessors, including a latent image with the initials "BCRD," a
security thread with the denomination, microprints, and a
high-relief tactile mark for the visually impaired. The year of
manufacture, 2024, is displayed at the bottom of the obverse side.
This issuance is in accordance with Articles 228, 229, and 230 of
the Dominican Constitution and Article 25 of Monetary and Financial
Law No. 183-02. The BCRD encourages citizens to visit its official
website for more details on the bill's security features and
legitimacy.
About Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.
TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."
An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.
Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic was raised
to 'BB' in December 2022 with stable outlook. Moody's credit
rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 in August 2023
with the outlook changed to positive. Fitch, in December 2023,
affirmed the Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the outlook to positive.
=============
J A M A I C A
=============
JAMAICA: GOJ's 90-Day and 182-Day Treasury Bills Oversubscribed
---------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Government of Jamaica received bids for
$2.99 billion from its 90-day Treasury Bill, which matures on June
6, 2025 at an average yield of 5.75%.
But it was seeking to raise only $700 million from the instrument,
according to RJR News.
Meanwhile, 3.59 billion in bids was submitted for the 182-day bill,
which matures on September 5 this year with an average yield of
5.75% per annum, the report notes.
Again, the central bank was seeking only $700 million, the report
relays.
The money raked-in will be used to help fund this year's budget,
the report notes.
The total amount of Treasury Bills outstanding will be valued at
$10.3 billion or 0.32% of GDP as at settlement date, the report
adds.
About Jamaica
Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea. Jamaica
is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily dependent
on tourism. Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy include
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining, financial
and insurance services.
On Feb. 21, 2025, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-', with a
positive rating outlook. In October 2023, Moody's upgraded the
Government of Jamaica's long-term issuer and senior unsecured
ratings to B1 from B2, and senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)B1
from (P)B2. The outlook has been changed to positive from stable.
In September 2024, S&P affirmed 'BB-/B' longterm foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica and revised outlook to
positive.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
PUERTO RICO: PREPA Bankruptcy Attention Turns to Revenue Dispute
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske of Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico's
bankrupt electric utility and its creditors must resolve
revenue-related disputes before proceeding with a plan to
restructure nearly $9 billion in debt.
On March 4, 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Laura Taylor Swain
directed Puerto Rico's financial oversight board --
overseeing the utility's bankruptcy -- along with investors and
bond insurers to establish a court schedule for addressing these
issues.
A key dispute remains between the oversight board and a group of
bondholders over repayment terms. Swain previously capped their
unsecured lien at $2.4 billion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals is
reviewing the ruling.
About Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States. The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America. The head of government is an elected
Governor. There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats.
In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.
The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and (vii)
David A. Skeel Jr.
On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578. A copy of Puerto Rico's
PROMESA petition is available at
http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf
On May 5, 2017, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) commenced a case under Title III of PROMESA (D.P.R. Case
No. 17-01599). Joint administration has been sought for the Title
III cases.
On May 21, 2017, two more agencies -- Employees Retirement System
of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto
Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Case Nos. 17-01685 and
17-01686) -- commenced Title III cases.
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts named U.S. District Judge Laura
Taylor Swain to preside over the Title III cases.
The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.
Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.
Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains the case Website https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico
Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.
Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.
SAPOBLA INVESTMENTS: Case Summary & Five Unsecured Creditors
------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Sapobla Investments LLC
2212 Calle Gen Del Valle
San Juan, PR 00913-4514
Case No.: 25-00955
Business Description: The Debtor is an investment company based in
San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Chapter 11 Petition Date: March 4, 2025
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Florida
Debtor's Counsel: Jesus Enrique Batista Sanchez, Esq.
THE BATISTA LAW GROUP, PSC
239 Ave Arterial Hostos Ste 206
San Juan PR 00918-1475
Tel: (787) 620-2856
Email: jeb@batistasanchez.com
Estimated Assets: $0 to $50,000
Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million
The petition was signed by Fermin Francinetti Rivas as authorized
representative of the Debtor.
A full-text copy of the petition, which includes a list of the
Debtor's five unsecured creditors, is available for free on
PacerMonitor at:
https://www.pacermonitor.com/view/6ZSAVEY/SAPOBLA_INVESTMENTS_LLC__prbke-25-00955__0001.0.pdf?mcid=tGE4TAMA
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S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
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