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                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, April 22, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 81

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Inflation Near 300%, Wipes Out Tourists' Deep Discounts
NUTRIEN: Plans to Sell its Retail Operations in Argentina


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Real Faces Steepest Depreciation Globally in April
GLOBO COMUNICACAO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Now Stable


C O L O M B I A

TERMOCANDELARIA POWER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Now Pos.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Retailers Reveal Increases on Dairy Products


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Assigns 'CCC+' Rating to USD1B Sr. Unsec. Bonds


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT SCRs, Alters Outlook to Positive


P E R U

AENZA SAA: Moody's Assigns First Time 'B1' Corporate Family Rating


P U E R T O   R I C O

ORENGO AIR: Seeks Approval to Hire JPC Law Office as Attorney


X X X X X X X X

LATIN AMERICA: Cheap Chinese Steel Threatens Jobs
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week April 15 to April 19, 2024

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Inflation Near 300%, Wipes Out Tourists' Deep Discounts
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Parks at Bloomberg News reports that Argentina's surging
inflation threatens to crimp a key source of tourism revenue as
foreigners who piled US$3.2 billion last year into the country
that's short on dollars opt for other destinations.

Scenes of South Americans pouring in from air, land and sea to take
advantage of Argentina's cheap cost of living in recent years have
partly reversed since President Javier Milei took office in
December, according to Bloomberg News.  Now Argentines are lining
up to cross the border into Chile as consumer spending plunges at
home, while annual inflation accelerated to 288 percent in March,
up from 104 percent a year ago, Bloomberg News relays.

Travel reservations in Uruguay to Argentina started to drop in
January and are now 50% lower than a year ago, said Gonzalo
Rodriguez who runs travel agency Carrasco Viajes in Montevideo,
Bloomberg News notes.  Rodriguez sees the drop influenced by
Milei's 54 percent currency devaluation and narrowing of the
difference between the official and parallel exchange rates, a
factor that made Argentina very affordable for foreigners but
isolated the economy and previous government, Bloomberg News says.

"It becomes a less attractive destination with the gap between the
official and parallel exchange rates almost gone and the noticeable
rise in prices," he said, Bloomberg News relays.  "Argentina is
starting to have prices like Brazil, Chile and other alternative
destinations in the region."

In recent years, Argentina had become popular among digital nomads,
Russians escaping war and ordinary tourists from neighboring
countries doing grocery shopping, forcing some supermarkets to set
purchasing limits after shelves were emptied, Bloomberg News
discloses.  For example, visitors from Uruguay, a country of 3.4
million people, spent about US$1.2 billion in Argentina last year,
Bloomberg News says.

But since Milei ditched price controls and devalued the currency,
many goods in Argentina, when measured in US dollars, have recorded
such steep price hikes that it's no longer a bargain for
foreigners, Bloomberg News relays.  

A basket of 60 basic goods cost 33 percent less in the Argentine
border city of Concordia than in the neighbouring Uruguayan metro
area of Salto, down from 64 percent last September, according to a
survey by Uruguay's Catholic University, Bloomberg News notes.

Less spending by foreign visitors could widen a tourism services
deficit that topped US$1.2 billion last year due to wealthy
Argentines' penchant for international travel offsetting all the
incoming tourism, Bloomberg News says.  Every dollar counts as the
Milei administration rebuilds the central bank's depleted hard
currency reserves to stabilize the economy and speed the flow of
badly needed imports, Bloomberg News notes.

Tour sales to Argentina, especially shorter trips to Buenos Aires,
have fallen as much as 20 percent from a year ago at
Montevideo-based Cisplatina Turismo, Chief Executive Officer Laura
Leiza said, Bloomberg News discloses.  

"It's still cheaper to have dinner in Buenos Aires than in
Montevideo," Leiza said, Bloomberg News says.  "But if Argentina
starts to get expensive, it will compete with the weather and
beaches of Brazil," he added.
                    
                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.

S&P Global Ratings, on March 15, 2024, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from
'CCC-' and affirmed its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is stable. In addition, S&P
revised its transfer and convertibility assessment to 'CCC' from
'CCC-'.

S&P said the stable outlook on the long-term ratings balances the
risks posed by pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties with the favorable change in near-term debt service
obligations. S&P also expect no further debt exchanges that it
would likely consider to be distressed.

Fitch Ratings upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


NUTRIEN: Plans to Sell its Retail Operations in Argentina
---------------------------------------------------------
Kim Chipman & Jonathan Gilbert at Bloomberg News report that
Nutrien Ltd, the world's largest maker of fertilisers, said it is
seeking to sell its retail operations in Argentina, Chile and
Uruguay in order to focus on Brazil and other global markets.

The Canadian company is prioritizing key markets in a bid to boost
returns for investors, a spokesperson said in an emailed statement
to Bloomberg.

Nutrien, which has been in South America for more than a quarter of
a century, is working to recover after sharply missing profit
expectations in the last three months of 2023 amid plunging
fertilizer prices that hurt retail results, according to Bloomberg
News.

The company said in its annual report that Argentina's currency
controls meant it lost money when it transferred currency out of
the country because it had to use a more expensive exchange rate,
Bloomberg News relays.  New President Javier Milei has promised to
scrap the controls as he seeks to deregulate the economy, Bloomberg
News discloses.

Other companies have also exited Argentina's tough business
environment in recent years, including HSBC Holdings PLC and
Walmart Inc, Bloomberg News discloses.

Bayer AG ditched its Argentine soy seed business in 2021.

Nutrien didn't say what it's planning to do with its 50 percent
stake in Profertil SA, a urea and ammonia manufacturing venture it
has with state-run oil company YPF SA. YPF, under new management
appointed by Milei, is looking to divest assets to focus on shale
drilling, Bloomberg News says.

Nutrien said it would continue to support all customers and
partners through its divestiture process, Bloomberg News adds.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: Real Faces Steepest Depreciation Globally in April
----------------------------------------------------------
Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that April 2024 has been a
challenging month for the Brazilian Real, which saw the sharpest
depreciation globally against the dollar.

By April 16, the Real had fallen by 5.1%, outpacing the declines of
other currencies including Uruguay's peso, Mexico's peso, and
Argentina's peso, according to Rio Times Online.

The Israeli shekel, also affected by ongoing conflict, similarly
struggled, the report notes.

                          About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won the 2022 Brazilian
general election. He was sworn in on January 1, 2023, as the 39th
president of Brazil, succeeding Jair Bolsonaro.

S&P Global Ratings raised on Dec. 19, 2023, its long-term global
scale ratings on Brazil to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the
long-term ratings is stable. S&P affirmed Brazil's global scale
short-term ratings at 'B' and its national scale long-term rating
at 'brAAA'. S&P also raised the transfer and convertibility
assessment on the country to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. S&P said, "The
stable outlook reflects our expectation that Brazil will maintain
a
strong external position, thanks to strong commodity output and
limited external financing needs. We also believe Brazil's
institutional framework can sustain stable and pragmatic
policymaking based on extensive checks and balances across the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. We
expect a very gradual fiscal correction but anticipate fiscal
deficits will remain large."

Fitch Ratings affirmed on Dec. 15, 2023, Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable
Outlook. Fitch said Brazil's ratings are supported by its large and
diverse economy, high per-capita income, and deep domestic markets
and a large cash cushion that support the sovereign's financing
flexibility and its high local-currency debt share. Strong external
finances support resilience to shocks, underpinned by a flexible
exchange rate, robust international reserves and a sovereign net
external creditor position. The ratings are constrained by weak
economic growth potential, relatively low governance scores, high
and rising government debt/GDP, and budgetary rigidities. A new
fiscal framework introduced this year aims to anchor a gradual
consolidation process and address these fiscal weaknesses, but its
effectiveness is increasingly unclear.

Moody's credit rating for Brazil was last set at Ba2 in 2018 with
stable outlook.  Moody's affirmed the Ba2 issuer ratings and
senior unsecured bond ratings in April 2022.

DBRS Inc., on August 15, 2023, upgraded Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings to BB from BB (low).
At the same time, DBRS Morningstar confirmed Brazil's
Short-term Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings at R-4.
The trend on all ratings is Stable (March 2018).


GLOBO COMUNICACAO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Now Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings affirmed Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A.'s
Corporate Family Rating at Ba2. At the same time Moody's Ratings
affirmed Globo's Ba2 senior unsecured global notes ratings. The
outlook changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in outlook to stable from negative reflects the
improvements in Globo's operating metrics, particularly evident in
the recovery of EBITDA, as well as operating and EBITDA margins.
The resumption of positive free cash flow generation in 2023  also
contributes to this positive change.

Globo's Ba2 ratings are mainly supported by its robust liquidity
and its leading market position in the Brazilian TV broadcasting
market, with a 35% share of the overall national audience and 38%
during prime time in 2023. The rating also reflects Globo's
diversification away from advertising revenue toward the
higher-margin content and programming segment, which accounted for
34% of revenue in 2023. The company's high-quality content, with
most of its prime-time programing produced in-house, is an
additional credit strength.

Constraining Globo's ratings are its dependence on Brazil's
economic growth and revenue concentration in the cyclical Brazilian
TV advertising market, which exposes the company´s performance to
economic cycles, specially economic downturns. Strong competition
from streaming platforms and digital media advertising and margin
compression due to the high content and technology investments
necessary to execute its digital transformation strategy, are also
rating constrains.

To position itself as a strong player in this environment of
increasing importance of streaming platforms and digital
advertising, Globo is implementing a digital transformation
strategy, centralizing its content production and digital
businesses in a single business unit. Globo is focused on
strengthening its direct to consumer offers with a balance of
advertising and subscription revenues leveraging its content
production capabilities and its streaming platform, Globoplay.

Moody's Ratings expects 2024 revenues to remain stable compared to
2023, at around BRL15.3 billion. Operating margins are also
expected to expand to 6%, compared to 5% in 2023 and -3.2% in 2022,
supported by a gradual recovery in business activity, increased
participation of content revenues, and benefits from cost savings
measures implemented over the past two years. Moody's
Ratings-adjusted 2-year average gross leverage should continue to
gradually decrease to close 2024 at 2.5x, compared to 3.1x in 2023
and 6.6x in 2022. In addition, the company's 2-year average
interest coverage (measures as [EBITDA-Capex]/Interest Expense)
should increase to 5.5x, from 4.0x in 2023.

Globo has a strong liquidity position, supported by total cash of
BRL14.1 billion as of December 2023. The company's strong liquidity
covers total adjusted debt of around BRL5.6 billion by 2.5x. Globo
has a very comfortable debt maturity profile, with no major
maturities until 2030. Moody's Ratings expects that Globo will
continue to prudently manage its dividend distributions to maintain
adequate liquidity to service its financial obligations while
focusing on implementing its business strategy. In addition,
Moody's Ratings expects Free Cash Flow (FCF) generation to continue
to improve, maintaining the positive trend over the rating
horizon.

The stable outlook considers  Moody's Ratings' expectation that
Globo will maintain its strong liquidity and adequate debt profile
while implementing its digital transformation strategy, gradually
improving diversification of revenues away from traditional
broadcast advertisement while resuming revenue growth and
recovering profitability. Competition from streaming platforms and
digital media advertising will remain intense, however, Globo's
standing as the undisputed leader in broadband and pay-TV in a
market where streaming penetration is still low will support
revenue growth and improvement in credit metrics while the company
transitions to the new business model. The outlook also reflects
Moody's Ratings' expectation that Globo will prudently manage its
dividend distributions to maintain adequate liquidity to service
its financial obligations.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Globo's ratings could be upgraded if the company successfully
executes its digital transformation strategy, while preserving
robust credit metrics, liquidity, and market positioning. The
rating could also see positive momentum from a sustained increase
in EBITDA margin, consistent positive FCF, and an improvement in
Moody's Ratings-adjusted leverage to below 2.0x and interest
coverage increasing to above 2.5x.

On the other hand, Globo's ratings could face a downgrade if the
company fails to maintain profitability enhancement, leading to a
decline in credit metrics or creditworthiness. This could occur if
Moody's Ratings-adjusted leverage exceeds 3.5x and interest
coverage falls below 2.5x over a two-year average period, without
any signs of improvement. A downgrade in Brazil's sovereign rating
could also trigger negative rating actions for Globo.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Media published
in June 2021.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro and owned by the Marinho family,
Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A. is Brazil's largest media
group and leading broadcast TV network, with net revenue of BRL15.1
billion (equivalent to $3 billion) as of December 2023. Globo
engages in other business activities, including pay-TV production
and programing, content streaming, magazine publishing and internet
businesses, through its subsidiaries.



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C O L O M B I A
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TERMOCANDELARIA POWER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Now Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed TermoCandelaria Power S.A.'s (TPL)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'BB' and revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed TPL's USD596 million senior unsecured note
due 2029 at 'BB'.

The Positive Outlook reflects an improved capital structure
supported by a deleveraging trend through reduced debtless capex,
improved EBITDA through more efficient generation, and no dividend
payments in excess of cash surplus. Fitch expects gross leverage to
remain below 3.3x over the rating horizon (excluding intercompany
loan) and for EBITDA generation that benefits from
Termocandelaria's (TECAN) combined cycle project that results in
additional revenue from the reliability charge.

The ratings reflect the strategic importance of TPL's assets for
the Atlantic coast of Colombia as it provides consistent peaking
availability amid chronic energy transmission constraints. The
ratings further reflect the combined operations of its operating
subsidiaries, Termobarranquilla (TEBSA) and TECAN, and a
competitive market position, as well as a limited contracted
position and minimal asset base diversification.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Leverage Profile: The Positive Outlook reflects an
improved leverage profile, tied to reduced capex needs and no
dividend payments in excess of cash surplus, coupled with the
concluded upgrade from an open-cycle gas turbine (OCGT) to
combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) conversion at TECAN, effectively
increasing its installed capacity from 314MW to 555MW and
increasing efficiency, passing from a Net Heat Rate of
10,190BTU/kWh to 6,500BTU/kWh. Fitch expects debt repayments of
around USD250 million in 2024, mainly from new debt incurred in
2023 to cover working capital needs. Fitch expects leverage to
average below 3.3x over the rated horizon as debt levels fall.

Strategic Asset for the Atlantic Region: TPL provides critical
electricity capacity amid strong demand and periods of energy
volatility within the Atlantic coast of Colombia. TPL's assets
support electricity demand peaks, particularly during shortfalls
from the country's hydroelectric plants, as well as mitigate
transmission constraints to maintain consistent energy supply. TPL
constitutes a natural hedge for the intermittency of
non-conventional renewable projects, which are slated to come
online in the short to medium term.

TPL Assets Mitigate Volatility: Dryer and hotter conditions in 2H23
increased the company's total energy generation by 51%, as energy
demand in the country was largely supported by thermal assets amid
a coincident reduction in the country's traditional
hydroelectricity output. The completion of TPL's Tecan combined
cycle units both increased capacity and efficiency, and were
dispatched consistently. Together with higher energy prices and a
raise in gas commercialization revenues, resulted in a 63% yoy
revenue increase in 2023 and an EBITDA increase of 56%.

TPL benefits from the country's transmission bottleneck in the
northern coast, which results in persistent out-of-merit generation
(dispatch due to system inefficiencies remunerated at their
declared variable and production cost) by TEBSA in order to meet
demand despite the company's comparative higher variable costs
relative to renewable power generation plants. Demand
characteristics of the Caribbean coast supports TEBSA's continued
potential of being dispatched, as long as current transmission
bottlenecks and capacity dynamics continue.

Weak Contracted Position: TPL does not contract through long-term
power purchase agreements (PPAs), instead provides critical energy
amid demand peaks through opportunistic spot sales. Risk is offset
by the company's cost competitiveness amid transmission network
inefficiencies as it provides predictable out of-merit generation
at predictable prices. TPL sources gas domestically and has access
to a liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal in the Caribbean coast of
Colombia through a contract maturing in 2031.

Limited Operational Diversification: TPL's credit profile is
constrained by the limited diversification of its operations. The
company is exposed to a higher degree of event risk than local and
regional peers from unexpected outages or disaster disruptions.
TPL's take-or-pay regasification contracts would put additional
pressure on its subsidiaries' cost structure in the event of
business interruption. TPL combines the operations of 1,529MW of
thermal electric assets, which represented around 6.9% of the
Colombian electricity generation matrix and around 25% of the
country's thermal installed capacity as of YE 2023.

Structure Mitigates Market Risks: In the long term, new investments
in the transmission network or the completion of nonconventional
renewable energy projects in Colombia's coastal region could
displace TEBSA within the dispatch curve, resulting in lower
EBITDA. These risks are partially mitigated by TPL's amortizing
structure and a more robust capital structure. Increased EBITDA
generation in 2023 resulted in lower leverage levels, closing at
2.4x.

Credit Profile Linked to OpCos: TPL is a holding company that
combines operations of two electricity generation companies, TEBSA
and TECAN, located on Colombia's Caribbean coast. TPL fully owns
and controls TECAN and has a 57.38% stake in TEBSA. TPL's ratings
are mostly related to TEBSA's credit profile as TEBSA accounts for
approximately 80% of TPL's consolidated EBITDA. With TECANS's
completed combined cycle expansion, Fitch estimates TECAN will
account to close to 30% of EBITDA moving forward.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

TPL's ratings are in line with Nautilus Inkia Holdings SCS's
(BB/Stable), its closest peer. Although lacking Inkia's
geographical diversification and asset base mix provided by its key
subsidiary Kallpa Generacion S.A. (BBB-/Stable), TPL's financial
policy and amortization profile are more conservative, with
expected 2024 gross leverage levels post-expansion of 2.8x, while
Fitch expects Inkia's leverage to be 4.0x in 2024.

Inkia's debt is structurally subordinated to debt at the operating
companies, while TPL's is mainly comprised of a syndicated loan at
TEBSA, and the debt incurred to cover working capital.. TPL's
capital structure also compares positively with Orazul Energy Peru
S.A. (BB/Stable). Orazul's high medium-term leverage of 5.0x under
Fitch's forecast places it at the high end of its rating level.

TPL's business risk is higher than multi-asset energy regional
investment-grade peers such as AES Panama Generation Holdings,
S.R.L. (BB+/Stable), Kallpa and AES Andes S.A. (BBB-/Stable). These
companies benefit from a strong contractual position in their
respective markets. Their PPAs support cash flow stability through
USD-linked payments and, in Kallpa's case, pass-through clauses
related to potential increases in fuel costs.

This contributes to higher EBITDA visibility in the long term
compared to TPL, which remains exposed and exogenous supply/demand
dynamics. Although TPL's key subsidiary TEBSA maintains relative
cost efficiency that places it within the coastal base load, future
additions to the local renewable energy matrix or expansion of the
national transmission network could potentially displace the
company from its strong competitive position in the coastal region
in the long term.

TPL ratings are two notches below Fenix Power Peru S.A.
(BBB-/Stable). As a single-asset generator with a high proportion
of take-or-pay costs and including its deleveraging trajectory of
reaching an average of 3.5x, Fitch views Fenix's standalone credit
quality in line with a 'BB+' rating. Nevertheless, Fenix's ratings
are buoyed by its strong support from its parent Colbun S.A.
(BBB+/Stable).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- The company's reliability charge increases at an average U.S. CPI
rate of inflation of 2.0%;

- Natural gas Title Transfer Facility (TTF) at USD10.00 per
thousand cubic feet (mcf) in 2024-2025, and USD8.00 per mcf in
2026;

- Leverage metrics excluding intercompany loan for USD136 million;

- Debt repayment for USD250 million during 2024;

- Total capex of USD56 million in 2024, and below USD30 million
during 2025-2026;

- TPL's combined annual generation over the medium term of will
average 2,700GWh per year;

- TEBSA's and TECAN's availability factors at 90%;

- No dividend payments in excess of cash surplus are paid over the
rating horizon.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- Reduced debt levels that result in sustained total debt/EBITDA
below 3.3x, and a debt service coverage ratio above 1.8x;

- An improved contractual position

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- Consolidated leverage levels above 4.8x on a sustained basis;

- EBITDA to interest coverage of 2.0x or below on a sustained basis
or a debt service coverage ratio below 1.2x;

- Adverse regulatory changes in Colombia that weaken the company's
commercial policy;

- A weakening of the company's out-of-merit generation profile that
affects revenue visibility.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: TPL's liquidity faced pressures during 2023 as
a result higher working capital needs from the increase in sales of
energy on the market, that resulted in the incurring of new,
short-term debt, as well as an increase in financing costs. As of
YE 2023, consolidated cash on hand ended up at USD173 million and
CFO generation closed in at USD50 million to attend around USD300
million in short-term debt. Fitch expects CFO generation to average
around USD100 million over the rating and the ratio of available
cash to short-term debt to be over 1.0x, as the company reduces its
debt levels. TPL has lending relationships with both local and
international banks for its working capital needs which gives the
company additional flexibility if needed.

ISSUER PROFILE

TPL is a holding company that owns and operates 1,529MW of thermal
power capacity in the Atlantic region of Colombia, through
Termobarranquilla (TEBSA) and Termocandelaria (TECAN), making up
around 6.9% of the Colombian electricity generation matrix and
around 25% of the country's thermal installed capacity as of YE
2023.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                 Rating          Prior
   -----------                 ------          -----
TermoCandelaria
Power, S.A.           LT IDR    BB  Affirmed   BB
                      LC LT IDR BB  Affirmed   BB

   senior unsecured   LT        BB  Affirmed   BB



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Retailers Reveal Increases on Dairy Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that between February and March, dairy
products such as milk and cheese rose from RD$5 to RD$10, which,
according to several merchants in different sectors of the National
District, has affected their businesses' profits.  A minority
believes the opposite, according to Dominican Today.

"There is no gain, one sells at RD$200 a pound of cheddar cheese
and was buying it at RD$180 and RD$185, but before December, it was
at RD$175," indicated Manuel Rodriguez, a merchant in the Villas
Agricolas sector, the report discloses.  Rodriguez emphasized that,
unlike cheese, he continued buying milk for the same price for
several months, the report relays.

Some consumers affirmed that price change is notorious when
obtaining these products and that it will depend on the quality and
the place where the merchants choose to supply themselves, varying
from suppliers to stores and, in the case of consumers,
supermarkets to grocery stores, the report notes.

"Here, things go up and up every day. You buy it today, and
tomorrow it will be at a different price.  I buy half a quart of
cheese in the grocery store, and they charge me between RD$35 and
RD$40. Here, the prices are not stable," expressed Juan Perez, a
resident of Villa Consuelo, the report notes.

Perez continued to complain, saying that prices should be frozen
and avoided constant variation so that people have more money to
spend on food, the report says.

                              Milk

Riqui Soto, another vendor, indicated that it had been about a
month since the milk went up, clarifying that it was in January and
February when he felt the increase specifically in this product,
the report relays.

"I used to buy milk at RD$64 and now at RD$71 to sell it at RD$100;
cheddar cheese at RD$130 now at RD$160 to leave it at RD$200," Soto
explained, notes the report.  Butter and yogurt are some dairy
products that have maintained stable prices, according to
shopkeepers who offered statements to the Listin Diario team, the
report says.

Homel Lara, the employee of a grocery store in Miraflores,
indicated that cheddar cheese was bought at RD$160 per pound
between January and February; however, it is now at RD$180 (up
RD$20 more), and for this reason, they sell the pound at RD$270,
the report notes.

Whole milk of one liter in the same period was sold at RD$90 and
now at RD$100 (RD$10 more expensive), while evaporated milk was
bought at RD$50 and now at RD$60, the report relays.  Lara affirmed
to this newspaper that one of the items that has remained stable is
yogurt, with a price that does not exceed RD$60, the report
discloses.  The same items with different prices, but with the
common denominator that they reflect an increase, this is confirmed
by merchants located in sectors such as Villa Consuelo, Villas
Agricolas, Villa Juana and Miraflores, the report notes.

Other merchants, such as Baez, expressed that the products' prices
are "normal," detailing that the large evaporated milk is RD$85,
the medium goes up to RD$50, and a liter of the whole one only
appears at RD$90, the report relays.

"What happens is that there are merchants who are abusers,"
concluded Baez, the report notes.

                    Prices In Supermarkets

According to a report issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, the
average price of dairy products in Santo Domingo supermarkets up to
the fourth week of March is RD$280 for white frying cheese, RD$268
for butter, RD$71.54 for liquid milk, RD$370.81 for powdered milk,
and RD$138.59 for 32-ounce yogurt, the report adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

On December 4, 2023, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings has
affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the Outlook to Positive
from Stable. Fitch says the Positive Outlook reflects a trend
improvement in governance, and robust growth prospects that should
lead to continued gains in per capita income.  According to Fitch,
growth has decelerated in 2023, but it expects Dominican Republic
to recover to high levels during 2024-2025. External liquidity
metrics have improved in recent years, and foreign currency share
of government debt is on a downward path.

In August 2023, Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on
the Government of Dominican Republic's ratings to positive from
stable and affirmed the local and foreign-currency long-term issuer
and senior unsecured ratings at Ba3.  Moody's said the key drivers
for the outlook change to positive  are: (i) sustained high growth
rates have enhanced the scale and wealth levels of the economy; and
(ii) a material decline in the government debt burden coupled with
improved fiscal policy effectiveness will support medium-term debt
sustainability.

The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings balances the Dominican
Republic's strong economic growth dynamics and relatively contained
susceptibility to event risks, with a comparatively weaker fiscal
position, reflecting long-standing credit challenges which include:
(i) a shallow revenue base compared to peers, (ii) weak debt
affordability metrics, and (iii) high exposure to foreign currency
borrowing.

S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18 months that will likely stabilize the
government's debt burden.

In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy.  It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.



=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Assigns 'CCC+' Rating to USD1B Sr. Unsec. Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'CCC+' rating to El Salvador's USD1
billion bonds and an interest-only bond both maturing April 17,
2030.

The bond has a coupon of 9.25%. The interest-only bond has an
initial coupon of 0.25% with a step up to 4% based on a Macro Test
as defined by the bond's prospectus.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The bond ratings are in line with El Salvador's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'CCC+', which Fitch
upgraded on May 5, 2023.

El Salvador plans to use the proceeds of the bond to repurchase
outstanding debt and general budgetary purposes.

ESG - Governance: El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of
'5' for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of
Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of
Corruption. These scores reflect the high weight that the World
Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) has in Fitch's proprietary
Sovereign Rating Model. El Salvador has a medium WBGI percentile
ranking of 36.7%, reflecting a recent track record of peaceful
political transitions, a moderate level of rights for participation
in the political process, moderate institutional capacity,
established rule of law and a moderate level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- The bond rating would be sensitive to any negative changes in El
Salvador's Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- The bond rating would be sensitive to any positive changes in El
Salvador's Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR.

Date of Relevant Committee

04 May 2023

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political
Stability and Rights as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key
rating driver with a high weight. As El Salvador has a percentile
rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicator, this has a
negative impact on the credit profile.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a
high weight. As El Salvador has a percentile rank below 50 for the
respective Governance Indicators, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights
as willingness to service and repay debt is highly relevant to the
rating and is a key rating driver for El Salvador given the
implementation of buy backs of 2023 and 2025 bonds at below par and
the recent implementation of pension debt exchange that Fitch
deemed a default.

El Salvador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
WBGIs is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As El Salvador
has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective Governance
Indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt             Rating           Recovery   Prior
   -----------             ------           --------   -----
El Salvador

   senior unsecured   LT CCC+  New Rating



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT SCRs, Alters Outlook to Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
On April 18, 2024, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on its
'BB' long-term foreign currency and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Guatemala to positive from stable. S&P also affirmed
these ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. S&P
kept its 'BBB-' transfer and convertibility assessment unchanged.

Outlook

The positive outlook indicates S&P's expectation of an upgrade in
the next 6-12 months if cautious macroeconomic policies prevail,
despite somewhat higher fiscal deficits stemming from the planned
rise in infrastructure spending. The positive outlook also reflects
the country's strong external resilience despite long-standing
institutional challenges and episodes of political uncertainty.

Upside scenario

S&P could raise the ratings in the next 6-12 months on signs that
the new administration and Congress can collaborate on policy
initiatives, particularly those that entrench and extend cautious
macroeconomic policies. This could raise investor confidence and
lead to higher-than-expected economic growth.

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could revise the outlook to stable in the next 6-12
months if worse-than-expected economic performance or increased
political tensions undermine Guatemala's medium-term GDP growth
trajectory or constrain the government's ability to keep cautious
macroeconomic policies. We could also lower the ratings if there
were to be a substantial increase in fiscal deficits and debt
intake to finance operating expenditures, rather than improving the
country's infrastructure."

Rationale

The 'BB' ratings on Guatemala reflect its track record of
macroeconomic stability and economic resiliency. The country's
manageable fiscal deficits, very low net debt, strong external
profile, and history of sound monetary policy constitute key credit
strengths. Guatemala's net debt of about 16% of GDP in 2024 is
among the lowest in Latin America. The country faces substantial
social and infrastructure needs, which curtail growth prospects,
and conservative fiscal policy has limited space for public
investment. On the other hand, the ratings incorporate S&P's view
of Guatemala's still-developing public institutions, high perceived
corruption, and a challenging political environment that constrain
policymaking effectiveness.

Institutional and economic profile: Macroeconomic stability
mitigates the risks from political uncertainty

-- President Bernardo Arevalo took office in January 2024 after a
complicated election and transition period last year.

-- Guatemala has maintained cautious fiscal and monetary policies
despite still-evolving political institutions.

-- S&P expects real economic growth of about 3.5% annually, backed
by consumption fueled by remittances and somewhat better prospects
for domestic private investment.

Guatemala's presidential and legislative elections and transition
period in 2023 were characterized by political uncertainty. For
example, some candidates were barred from running, and there were
several attempts to block the president-elect from taking office,
leading to social unrest. However, Mr. Arevalo took office in
January 2024, where international pressure played a key role. As a
result, political uncertainty seems to have eased and there is an
initial sense of collaboration among the administration, the
private sector, and even some members of the opposition in
Congress.

S&P believes the new administration could struggle maintaining the
working relationship with Congress over the next few years,
particularly as it tries to fulfill its campaign promises. Although
Mr. Arevalo won the run-off with 58% of the votes, he only received
15% in the first round, which granted him only a small share of
legislative representation. Guatemala's Congress has been
historically fragmented among several parties, leading to lengthy
political negotiations to pass reforms.

Furthermore, as Mr. Arevalo's Semilla Party has been suspended by
the electoral body, its legislators had to be sworn in as
independent congressmen, preventing them from chairing
congressional committees. This is making it harder for the
administration to advance its initiatives in Congress. Mr.
Arevalo's main challenges in the short term will be to deliver on
his anti-corruption campaign promises and approve an updated budget
for 2024. This is because the one that had been approved by the
previous Congress was suspended by the Supreme Court on
unconstitutionality allegations; the government is currently
working with the same budget approved for 2023. Our assessment of
Guatemala's institutions as relatively weak is based on fragile
checks and balances, high perception of corruption, and a history
of inefficient policy implementation.

S&P said, "Despite increased political uncertainty last year, we
expect Guatemala's economy to continue growing moderately, at about
3.5% annually, in line with its medium-term historical growth.
Extraordinarily high remittance inflows over the past few years
have helped boost domestic consumption and economic growth.
Remittances accounted for an impressive 20% of GDP in 2023, up
sharply from 10% of GDP a decade ago. Our economic forecast
incorporates our view of a soft landing of the U.S. economy, on
which Guatemala heavily depends, given their linkages through
migration, remittances, and investments."

So far, Guatemala has not been able to substantially benefit from
nearshoring trends, other than receiving some investments to
integrate itself into North American value chains through Mexico.
In order to further reap these benefits, the country will need to
attract international investment, improve its infrastructure, and
address its high social needs. Despite macroeconomic stability, per
capita GDP is estimated at $6,100 for 2024, lower than those of
Guatemala's international peers. Furthermore, high poverty level,
estimated at about 55% of the population in 2023, and a large
informal economy that employs about 80% of the working-age
population, will continue to depress the country's growth
prospects.

Flexibility and performance profile: History of cautious monetary
and fiscal policies will prevail even under the government plans to
increase infrastructure investment

-- The government plans to increase capital expenditure (capex),
posting somewhat higher government deficits financed through debt.

-- Future current account deficits to achieve these investments
will only marginally dent Guatemala's external resiliency.

-- The central bank's sound monetary policy enabled inflation to
drop to the middle of its target range of 4%.

A track record of cautious macroeconomic policies allowed Guatemala
to consistently run manageable fiscal deficits and one of the
lowest net debt levels in Latin America, estimated at only 16% of
GDP in 2024. S&P said, "We expect the government to increase fiscal
deficits in the next three years to boost capex, mainly for
airports, ports, roadways, and energy infrastructure. As a result,
we forecast net general government change in debt to rise to 2.1%
of GDP in 2024-2027 from an average of 0.4% of the past three
years."

The government aims to continue to expand Guatemala's low revenue
base by extending measures that focus on limiting tax evasion and
strengthening tax revenue collection, rather than advancing a tax
reform to raise revenue. Even without a tax reform, government
revenue increased to 16.8% in 2023 from 15.3% in 2019; recently
published data on general government now includes that of central
and local governments, and social security institutes. The revenue
rise stemmed from the implementation of electronic invoicing,
digital tax declaration forms, and better monitoring at customs,
among other measures. S&P believes the space to further increase
tax revenue through improved efficiency is narrower, although
increased digitalization should allow revenue to remain at the
current level in the coming years.

S&P said, "Guatemala has a relatively favorable debt profile,
although it's subject to risks. Given our assumption of somewhat
higher fiscal deficits, we project government net debt to increase
to about 20% of GDP and interest burden to be approximately 9% of
government revenue in 2024-2027; our net debt figure deducts
government liquid assets and intra-public sector debt holdings by
the social security institute."

Guatemala's debt and interest burden are exposed to the risk of a
sudden depreciation of the domestic currency, as about 46% of the
sovereign's debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. However, exposure
to foreign currency has consistently decreased from about 60% in
2015, and the Guatemalan quetzal has been very stable in the past
two decades.

S&P said, "We consider the government could struggle accessing
funding from domestic financial institutions in a stress scenario,
as banks' exposure to the government is already somewhat high, at
about 23% of banking assets. Domestic banks hold about 41% of the
central government's debt, and their exposure to the public sector
also includes central bank notes and government guarantees of
mortgages. Nevertheless, we consider banks' contingent liabilities
to be limited. This is because the banking sector has strong
capitalization, liquidity, and profitability ratios, and has proven
to be resilient to shocks.

"Guatemala's external position will remain a key rating strength
over the coming years. We expect current account surpluses to
gradually turn into deficits in 2025-2027 as remittances normalize
and the government increases goods imports to execute its
infrastructure plans. This will only marginally dent the country's
strong external profile, after eight years of current account
surpluses, which peaked at 3.2% of GDP in 2023. This was thanks to
an extraordinary increase in remittances. Current account deficits
will only be partially covered by foreign direct investment (FDI),
which we expect to remain low at about 1% of GDP in the next four
years.

"As a result, we expect Guatemala's narrow net external debt to
rise slightly to -12% of current account payments during 2024-2027,
keeping a net asset position with the rest of the world." High
dollar inflows into the country through remittances and external
borrowings have allowed the government to accumulate a substantial
amount of international reserves, which accounted for 21% of GDP in
2023, and for the private sector to improve its net external debt
position. Guatemala's external position will remain subject to
potential changes in FDI and remittances, raising risks to external
financing. Still, external liquidity will remain strong in the next
four years, with gross external financing needs averaging 69% of
current account receipts and usable reserves.

Guatemala's sound monetary policy continues to reflect the central
bank's commitment to control inflation as well as its operational
independence. The central bank increased its monetary policy rate
to 5% after global energy and commodity prices increased domestic
inflation. As a result, average inflation dropped to the central
bank's target of 4% (plus/minus 1%) in 2023 from about 6% in 2022.
Despite the increase in the monetary policy rate, banks' credit to
the private sector grew about 16% in 2023.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  RATINGS AFFIRMED  

  GUATEMALA

  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment

   Local Currency          BBB-

  GUATEMALA

   Senior Unsecured        BB

  RATINGS AFFIRMED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION  
    
                                  TO          FROM
  GUATEMALA

   Sovereign Credit Rating   BB/Positive/B   BB/Stable/B




=======
P E R U
=======

AENZA SAA: Moody's Assigns First Time 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings has assigned a B1 corporate family rating to Aenza
S.A.A. Moody's Ratings has also assigned a B1 rating to the
proposed senior secured notes for up to $350 million. The outlook
is positive.

The company will use the net proceeds of the notes for working
capital, capital expenditures, repayment of outstanding borrowings
and/or general corporate purposes.

The rating of the proposed notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's Ratings to date and that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

This is the first time that Moody's Ratings has assigned ratings to
Aenza.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B1 ratings assigned to Aenza S.A.A.'s (Aenza) reflect the
company's leading position in the Engineering & Construction (E&C)
industry and leading concessions developer and operator in the
infrastructure and energy segments in Peru, with long track record
and expertise in Latin America. The ratings also reflect the
company's business diversification across various sectors and
clients, which is integral to its business model because it fosters
beneficial synergies among its different business divisions. Other
factors also embedded in the ratings include its robust portfolio
of concessions in Peru and adequate liquidity profile. The plea
agreement's homologation with the Peruvian Government in August
2023 signifies the resolution of the company's longstanding legal
issues and is also factored into the ratings.

Also embedded in the rating is Moody's Ratings' assumption that the
proposed $350 million notes issuance will further strengthen
Aenza's liquidity by providing additional cash sources to refinance
financial and supplier obligations, as well as provide funding for
capital expenditures and other corporate expenses.

Aenza's ratings are mainly constrained by its relatively modest
revenue and size compared to international counterparts, as well as
the inherent volatility of the construction industry. However,
these limitations are somewhat balanced by the company's steady
income from its concession portfolio. Also embedded in the ratings
is the company's high capital spending requirements related to the
construction, real state and energy businesses; and execution risk
related to its growth strategy.

Aenza's Governance profile reflect a concentrated influence exerted
by its reference shareholder, IG4 Capital Infrastructure
Investments LP (IG4), which holds 28.8% of Aenza's shares as of
April 2024. IG4 has been associated with the company since August
2021 and has led the company's transformation through a
conservative approach, but track record is limited to a few years.

The positive outlook mainly reflects Moody's Ratings' view that
Aenza's credit metrics will strengthen in the next 12-18 months
aided by earnings and cash flow growth as the company expands
operations in oil and gas, real state and infrastructure concession
businesses, coupled with a maintenance of good profitability in the
E&C business. The outlook also reflects Moody's Ratings'
expectation that the company will be able to further enhance its
liquidity profile.

Aenza's strategic blueprint is focused on becoming a prominent
player in Latin America's concession development sector. This
strategy is aimed at capitalizing on the vast opportunities within
the concession market, given the substantial infrastructure deficit
in the region. The company's concessions in toll roads, urban
transportation, and water treatment, combined with its operating
and maintenance services for some of these assets, contributed to
41% of the company's reported EBITDA in 2023.

In addition, Aenza holds significant growth opportunities in in its
energy segment through its plans to expand production at its oil
and gas production fields in Peru. Aenza's E&P production base is
modest in size, with 1,489 thousand barrels of oil equivalent
(Mboe) produced in 2023, up from 1,118 in 2022. The segment's
EBITDA rose by 32% in 2023 to $64 million, from $48 million in
2022. Aenza plans to increase capital spending aided by a portion
of the proposed notes' proceeds to ramp-up production to around
3,100 MMboe by 2026 and 3,600 MMboe by 2028, leading to EBITDA
levels of around $100-120 million, from $64 million in 2023.  

Aenza's corporate strategy also aims to strengthen profitability
and focus on margin recovery of its E&C portfolio through the
strategic selection of new contracts. As of December 2023, the
company's E&C backlog amounted to $704 million, which represents
only around 1.0 year of revenue. But the segment's EBITDA margin
improved to 6.8% in 2023, from a -2.7% in 2022 (mainly because of
certain losses and provisions related projects finalized in prior
years), and higher than the 1.6% average in 2018-2021. Furthermore,
the company will likely maintain EBITDA margins in the range of
3%-4% in the next 12-18 months based on the contracts currently in
its backlog, but it will rely on its ability to secure new projects
beyond that period.  

Aenza's liquidity is adequate and has improved consistently over
the past few years and Moody's Ratings expects the company will
strengthen its liquidity during 2024 by raising funds to pursue
liability management operations to refinance financial and supplier
obligations and provide funding for capital expenditures and other
corporate expenses.

As of December 2023, Aenza's financial debt stood at $443 million,
with a comfortable maturity profile. Cash and equivalents covered
168% of debt maturing within a year and 133% of two-year debt. But
Aenza will require additional funding for its growing capital
spending focused on growth mainly in its energy and infrastructure
segments, and other corporate expenses in 2024-2025, which in turn
will also keep free cash flow negative. The company retains the
ultimate decision to disburse cash related to capital spending and
working capital to preserve liquidity, however.

In this regard, Moody's Ratings expects an estimated $180 million
EBIDTA (Moody's Ratings-adjusted) in 2024, but the company plans to
increase capital and working capital spending aided by the new
notes- proceeds, which will keep free cash flow negative at around
$200 million. At the same time, the proposed notes' issuance, which
will only partially be used for liability management (mainly $100
million in outstanding bridge loan), will increase total debt to
around $640 million by year-end 2024, rising gross debt to EBITDA
(Moody's Ratings-adjusted) ratio to 3.5x in 2024, up from 2.3x in
2023, but still adequate for its rating positioning. Additionally,
further expansion of business operations in 2025, financed through
a combination of internal cash flow and borrowings, will rise gross
debt to around $730 million by year-end 2025; but this will be
partially counterbalanced by higher EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's
Ratings) at around $260 million, leading to a gross leverage ratio
of approximately 2.7x in 2025. Also, increased interest payments
due to higher debt levels will lower the interest coverage ratio,
calculated as EBITA to interest expenses, from 5.0x in 2023 to
approximately 2.3x in 2024, rebounding to around 2.8x-3.0x by the
end of 2025.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Moody's Ratings could upgrade Aenza's ratings if the company
strengthens it liquidity and maintains strong credit metrics
despite growing capital and working capital requirements to fund
growth. Quantitatively, if Aenza is able to sustain debt/EBITDA
below 4.0x, EBITA to interest expense above 2.5x and FFO to debt
above 15%.

Moody's Ratings could downgrade the ratings if operating
performance weakens or the company adds further debt for
acquisitions, resulting in debt/EBITDA leverage of above 5.5x,
interest coverage below 2.0x and FFO/debt below 10%. A significant
deterioration in liquidity could also trigger a negative rating
action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
published in September 2021.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

ORENGO AIR: Seeks Approval to Hire JPC Law Office as Attorney
-------------------------------------------------------------
Orengo Air Corporation seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire JPC Law Office as its
attorney.

The Debtor requires JPC Law Office to:

     a. advise the Debtor with respect to its duties, powers and
responsibilities in the case under the laws of the U.S. and Puerto
Rico in which the debtor in possession conducts its operations;

     b. advise the Debtor in connection with a determination on
whether a reorganization is feasible and if not, help the Debtor in
the orderly liquidation of its assets;

     c. assist the Debtor with respect to negotiations with
creditors for the purpose of achieving a reorganization or an
orderly liquidation;

    d. prepare necessary complaints, answers, orders, reports,
memoranda of law and any other legal paper or document required in
the above captioned case;

     e. appear before the Bankruptcy Court or any other court in
which the Debtor asserts a claim, interest or defense related to
the bankruptcy case;

     f. perform such other legal services for debtor as may be
required in the proceeding or in connection with the operation of
the Debtor's business including, but not limited to, notarial
services; and

     g. employ other professional services, if necessary.

JPC Law Office will be paid at the hourly rate of $200.

JPC Law Office will be paid a retainer in the amount of $10,283.

JPC Law Office will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Jose M Prieto Carballo, partner of JPC Law Office, assured the
Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

JPC Law Office can be reached at:

     Jose M Prieto Carballo, Esq.
     JPC LAW OFFICE
     P.O. Box 363565
     San Juan, PR 00936-3565
     Telephone: (787) 607-2066
     E-mail: jpc@jpclawpr.com

             About Orengo Air Corporation

Orengo Air Corporation filed its voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
24-01434) on April 9, 2024, listing $2,366,403 in assets and
$5,312,448 in liabilities. The petition was signed by Luis D.
Torres Orengo as president. Jose M Prieto Carballo, Esq. at JPC LAW
OFFICES represents the Debtor as counsel.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

LATIN AMERICA: Cheap Chinese Steel Threatens Jobs
-------------------------------------------------
Paulina Abramovich at AFP News reports that Latin American metal
workers are clamoring for higher import tariffs as cheap Chinese
steel floods the region, threatening hundreds of thousands of jobs
linked to the industry.

Last year, the region imported a record 10 million tons of Chinese
steel -- a 44-percent rise from the year before, according to data
from the Latin American Steel Association (Alacero), according to
AFP News.

Two decades ago, the figure was just 85,000 tons, AFP News relays.

"China is too present in Latin America," Alacero executive
Alejandro Wagner told AFP, AFP News notes.

"No-one is against trade between countries, but it must be fair
trade," he added.

As the pressure increases, steel plant bosses and workers in
countries like Chile and Brazil -- the top producer in the region
and number nine in the world -- are pressing governments for higher
import tariffs, AFP News discloses.

If they were to do so, they would follow Mexico and the United
States, which have imposed additional tariffs of 25 percent on
Chinese imports amid a surge of cheap exports as a result of
Beijing subsidies and excess production, AFP News says.

Earlier this month, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen expressed
concern about "substantial overinvestment and excess capacity" in
sectors like steel and aluminum in China, which she said had
"decimated industries across the world and in the United States,"
AFP News relays.

A dive in the Asian giant's construction sector has further added
to an oversupply of steel for exportation, AFP News discloses.

Data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean in 2022 showed China leading global steel production with
54 percent, followed by India with 6.6 percent, AFP News says.

Latin America's top producers -- Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and
Colombia -- came in at a combined 3.1 percent, AFP News notes.

                     'Existence of Dumping'

In Latin America, some 1.4 million people work in the steel
industry, AFP News relays.

But their livelihoods have increasingly come under fire as Chinese
steel now sells as much as 40 percent cheaper than it could viably
be produced on home soil, AFP News discloses.

One casualty is the Huachipato steel plant, Chile's biggest, some
500 kilometres (310 miles) south of Santiago, AFP News relates.

It has announced it is winding down operations, threatening about
2,700 direct and 20,000 indirect jobs, AFP News discloses.

"Closing Huachipato would be like an atomic bomb" hitting the
region, worker Carlos Ramirez told AFP, AFP News relays.

"What we are experiencing is very painful," the 56-year-old said,
warning of a looming "social earthquake" for the port city of
Talcahuano that has lived mainly from steel for 70 years, AFP News
relates.

Since 2009, Huachipato has incurred losses of more than US$1
billion, AFP News recalls.

In a last-ditch effort to stay afloat, the company has asked
Chile's CNDP price-distortion commission to recommend the
government impose a 25 percent tariff on imported steel, AFP News
notes.

The commission in a recent ruling found "sufficient evidence to
support the existence of dumping" -- the selling of Chinese steel
below cost -- and recommended a levy of 15 percent, AFP News
relays.

"We are not asking for subsidies or bailouts.  Huachipato can be
profitable in a competitive environment," its manager, Jean Paul
Saure, said in a press statement, AFP News notes.

Huachipato specializes in key inputs for the mining industry,
including steel bars and balls used in the milling of copper -- of
which Chile is the world's largest producer, AFP News relays.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, when world trade was interrupted, "it
was Huachipato that kept the country's steel supply" afloat,
Economy Minister Nicolas Grau told AFP.

The government, however, has its hands tied: Chile signed a free
trade agreement with China in 2006 and risks punitive measures if
it opts for a tariff to protect its steel industry against dumping,
AFP News relays.

In Brazil, steel imports from China rose 50 percent last year as
production dropped by 6.5 percent, according to the Brazil Steel
Institute, AFP News notes.

Gerdau, one of the country's largest steel producers, has laid off
700 workers due to the "challenging scenario faced by the Brazilian
market in the face of predatory import conditions of Chinese
steel," the company said, AFP News discloses.

Like in Chile, the Brazilian steel industry is demanding the
government increase the import tariff to 25 percent from a base
that varies from product to product, AFP News adds.

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week April 15 to April 19, 2024
---------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name                   Cpn      Price   Maturity      
Cntry   Curr
----------                    ---      -----   --------      
-----   ----
Aeropuerto de Tocumen        4.0 70.3 8/11/2041 PA USD
AES Tiete Energia SA        6.8 0.7 4/15/2024 BR BRL
Agile Group Holdings        5.8 16.3 1/2/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        6.1 13.4 10/13/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        5.5 13.0 5/17/2026 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        7.9 3.3          KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        5.5 15.0 4/21/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        7.8 3.3          KY USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA        4.6 74.5 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA        4.6 74.7 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alibaba Group Holding        3.2 65.4 2/9/2051 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding        2.7 68.6 2/9/2041 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding        3.3 62.9 2/9/2061 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group                1.5 7.5          KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group                4.5 55.3          KY SGD
Amwaj                        6.4 71.6          KY USD
Amwaj                        4.5 50.9          KY USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds        1.0 43.7 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentina Treasury Dual        3.3 45.8 4/30/2024 AR USD
Argentine Bonos del Tesoro     15.5 40.3 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     1.0 47.5 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     0.5 41.9 7/9/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     0.1 42.5 7/9/2030 AR EUR
Ascent Finance                1.2 61.0 7/12/2047 KY EUR
Ascent Finance                3.4 66.6 2/6/2043 KY AUD
Ascent Finance                3.8 67.9 6/28/2047 KY AUD
Astra Cumulative  2019        1.5 62.1 11/1/2029 KY USD
At Home Cayman                11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD
At Home Cayman                11.5 70.6 5/12/2028 KY USD
AYC Finance                3.9 63.2          KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA        6.7 65.8          CO USD
Banco Davivienda SA        6.7 70.3          CO USD
Banco de Chile                2.7 75.1 3/9/2035 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile      3.1 71.2 2/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile      2.8 67.7 3/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco Nacional de Panama       2.5 75.4 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Nacional de Panama       2.5 75.2 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Santander Chile        3.1 71.2 2/28/2039 CL AUD
Banco Santander Chile        1.3 73.9 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banda de Couro Energetica      8.0 55.1 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Baraunas II Energetica S/A     8.0 12.5 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Bishopsgate Asset Finance      4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       4.5 58.3 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       7.5 59.4 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       4.5 58.5 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       7.5 59.5 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   5.0 63.6 10/31/2027 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   3.0 60.5 5/31/2026 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   5.0 51.9 10/31/2027 AR USD
Brazilian Gov't Int'l Bond     4.8 74.1 1/14/2050 BR USD
BRF SA                        5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
BRF SA                        5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
Caja de Compensacion        2.4 49.6 4/5/2025 CL CLP
Camposol SA                6.0 72.3 2/3/2027 PE USD
Camposol SA                6.0 72.6 2/3/2027 PE USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.5 72.7 1/25/2050 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.1 73.6 5/7/2041 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.1 62.8 1/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.5 72.3 4/15/2053 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 54.0 1/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.3 62.9 9/21/2071 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 74.4 7/26/2036 CL EUR
China Yuhua Education Corp     0.9 65.1 12/27/2024 KY HKD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II        3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II        3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20        3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20        3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      4.1 61.2 5/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      3.9 57.2 2/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      5.2 72.4 5/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      4.1 66.7 2/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.0 71.6 6/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombian TES                 7.3 70.9 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombian TES                 6.3 73.1 7/9/2036 CO COP
Coopeucha                 4.6 38.3 6/1/2029 CL CLP
CODELCO                         3.7 67.4 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.7 67.3 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.6 74.7 7/22/2039 CL AUD
Earls Eight                 0.1 64.5 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Earls Eight                 1.7 72.4 6/20/2032 KY AUD
Ecopetrol SA                 5.9 73.6 5/28/2045 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA                 5.9 70.5 11/2/2051 CO USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.3 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.0 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.8 2/1/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.6 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.4 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.9 2/1/2041 SV USD
Embotelladora Andina SA         6.5 23.2 6/1/2026 CL CLP
EFE                         3.8 65.7 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE                         3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE                         3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE                         3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE                         6.5 11.1 1/1/2026 CL CLP
ETESA                         5.1 71.5 5/2/2049 PA USD
ETESA                         5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD
Metro SA                 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA                 3.7 65.0 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA                 5.5 50.1 7/15/2027 CL CLP
Metro SA                 5.0 63.8 5/11/2025 AR USD
ENAP                         4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENAP                         4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENA Master Trust         4.0 70.5 5/19/2048 PA USD
ENA Master Trust         4.0 70.9 5/19/2048 PA USD
Enel Generacion Chile SA 6.2 29.2 10/15/2028 CL CLP
Equatorial Energia         10.9 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL
Equatorial Energia         10.8 1.0 5/15/2028 BR BRL
Esval SA                 3.5 13.1 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Farfetch                 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL
GDM Argentina SA         2.5 0.0 9/8/2024 AR USD
GDS Holdings                 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD
Generacion Mediterranea SA 4.6 0.0 11/12/2024 AR ARS
General Shopping Finance 10.0 66.2          KY USD
General Shopping Finance 10.0 65.0          KY USD
Genneia SA                 2.0 56.9 7/14/2028 AR USD
Greenland Hong Kong         10.2 13.4          KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA         4.6 70.5 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         4.6 71.8 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Hector A Bertone SA         1.9 0.0 4/7/2024 AR USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8  68.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8 69.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8 69.4 11/18/2024 KY USD
Multiplo SA                 3.3 59.5          BR USD
Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau         5.8 20.2 5/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Gov't Bond         6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD
Jamaica Gov't Bond         8.5 73.0 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Lani Finance                 1.7 63.5 3/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance                 1.9 66.9 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance                 3.1 66.1 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Lani Finance                 1.9 65.8 9/20/2048 KY EUR
Link Finance Cayman 2009 2.2 70.0 10/27/2038 KY HKD
LIPSA Srl                 1.0 0.0 8/23/2024 AR USD
Logan Group Co                 7.0 5.1          KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         4.0 43.3 9/16/2029 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         3.4 56.1 4/13/2027 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         3.9 38.4 1/13/2032 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         4.5 53.1 1/16/2028 KY USD
Luminis III                 2.3 41.8 9/22/2048 KY USD
Luminis III                 2.4 55.3 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Luminis IV                 3.2 70.4 1/22/2042 KY AUD
Luminis                         2.3 54.8 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Lunar Funding I                 1.7  8/11/2056 KY GBP
MTR Corp CI                 2.8 73.3 9/6/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 75.4 4/26/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.2 73.7 2/5/2055 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
NIO Inc                         4.6 73.1 10/15/2030 KY USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 63.1 4/1/2056 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         2.3 70.2 9/29/2032 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         3.9 55.8 7/23/2060 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 64.9 4/16/2050 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 62.0 1/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 66.6 5/15/2047 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.3 62.6 4/29/2053 PA USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 71.8 3/10/2051 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.8 57.3 12/1/2060 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.2 57.3 7/28/2121 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 65.7 1/15/2072 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 74.3 3/11/2041 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA         5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA         5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Powerlong Real Estate         6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba         7.1 39.6 10/27/2026 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja         7.5 45.9 7/20/2032 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja         4.5 51.8 1/20/2027 AR USD
Chaco Argentina                 4.0 0.0 12/4/2026 AR USD
QNB Finance                 13.5 63.1 10/6/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance                 11.5 71.7 1/30/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance                 2.9 74.2 9/16/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 2.9 72.9 12/4/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 3.0 75.4 2/14/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 3.4 72.0 10/21/2039 KY AUD
Radiance Holdings Group         7.8 49.6 3/20/2024 KY USD
Rio Alto Energias Renovaveis 7.0 29.1 7/15/2027 BR BRL
Santander Consumer Chile SA 2.9 72.7 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seazen Group                 6.0 75.2 8/12/2024 KY USD
Seazen Group                 4.5 34.1 7/13/2025 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 61.2 6/29/2026 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 73.0 3/3/2025 KY USD
Silk Road Investments         2.9 66.8 1/23/2042 KY AUD
Skylark                         1.8 59.0 4/4/2039 KY GBP
Autopista Central         5.3 37.2 12/15/2026 CL CLP
Autopista Central         5.3 50.6 12/15/2028 CL CLP
SQM                         3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
SQM                         3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
Southern Water Service         3.0 70.8 5/28/2037 KY GBP
SPE Saneamento RIO 1         7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 SA         6.9 10.5 1/15/2034 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA         7.2 10.2 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA         6.9 10.2 1/15/2034 BR BRL
Spica                         2.0 74.9 3/24/2033 KY AUD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 72.2 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 73.0 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 70.3 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD
Sylph                         2.7 68.5 3/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph                         3.1 74.7 9/25/2035 KY USD
Sylph                         2.4 64.2 9/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph                         2.9 74.5 6/24/2036 KY AUD
Telecom Argentina SA         1.0 74.0 3/9/2027 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA         1.0 66.1 2/10/2028 AR USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Tencent Holdings         3.2 67.9 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.3 64.0 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.2 67.6 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.3 64.1 6/3/2060 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance         3.2 71.6 10/16/2049 KY USD
Grupo Travessia                 9.0 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL
Volcan Cia Minera SAA         4.4 62.2 2/11/2026 PE USD
Volcan Cia Minera SAA         4.4 62.0 2/11/2026 PE USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         5.1 61.6 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         4.4 60.8 4/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         5.1 61.9 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         4.4 60.6 4/15/2029 CL USD
YPF SA                         7.0 72.6 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA                         1.0 66.8 4/25/2027 AR USD


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Chapman, Editors.

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