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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, August 28, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 172

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Brazil Proposes Yuan Guarantees for Exports
ARGENTINA: Expects IMF to Approve US$7.5-Billion Disbursement
ARGENTINA: Inflation at 100% Has Locals Demanding pay in US$


B R A Z I L

AMERICANAS SA: Ex-CEO Says He Did Not Expect to Lead Bankrupt Firm


C H I L E

GUACOLDA ENERGIA: S&P Ups ICR to 'CCC-' on Tender Offer Completion


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 3 Hurricanes Caused Losses of RD$30BB in 5Yrs


E C U A D O R

BANCO PROCEDIT: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Alters Outlook to Stable
ECUADOR SOCIAL: Fitch Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'CCC+sf'


M E X I C O

SU CASITA 2007: Fitch Affirms Class A Notes Rating at 'CCsf'
TRUST 2400-GICSA: Fitch Affirms A-2 MXN Notes Rating at 'BBsf'  


P U E R T O   R I C O

BANCO SAN JUAN: NY Fed Defends Cutoff After Crackdown
GRUPO HIMA: Court OKs Cash Use, Rejects DIP Loan Request


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Aug. 21 to Aug. 25, 2023

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Brazil Proposes Yuan Guarantees for Exports
------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Brazil has submitted a proposal to Argentina
aimed at securing Chinese yuan guarantees for Brazilian exports to
the neighboring country in an initiative involving state-run lender
Banco do Brasil, Finance Minister Fernando Haddad said.

Banco do Brasil under the proposal would oversee the conversion of
yuan back into Brazilian reais, based on provided guarantees,
Haddad told a press conference in Johannesburg on the sidelines of
the BRICS nation summit, according to Reuters.

Brazil's third-largest trading partner, Argentina is suffering an
economic crisis marked by soaring inflation and dwindling central
bank reserves, the report notes.

Chinese yuan guarantees would provide security to Brazilian
companies concerning their sales receipts amid Argentina's dollar
shortage, the report says.

Under the plan, Brazil's government would create a new credit line
of 700 million reais ($144 million) to provide financing for
Argentine importers who engage with Brazilian exporters within the
established framework of the Financing Exports Program (Proex),
instituted in 1991, said a government source with direct knowledge
of the matter, the report adds.

Requesting anonymity due to ongoing negotiations, the source said
the funding would not need any Treasury contribution and would
stand as an autonomous resource ready to be used, Reuters relates.

The proposed approach involves Argentina providing yuan-denominated
guarantees that match the precise value of the credit line,
followed by the transfer of these funds to Brazil via a Banco do
Brasil-managed exchange operation, the report relays.

Proex would pay the Brazilian exporter and, should an Argentine
importer default on obligations within the program, the guarantee
in Brazilian reais, guarded by Banco do Brasil, would be promptly
redirected to the National Treasury by the bank, according to
Reuters.

Brazil's Treasury looks favorably on the idea, Haddad said, because
of the absence of default risk, and Brazil now awaits Argentina's
response, notes the report.

The move, if approved by Argentina, would be positive for Brazilian
companies because "they can have some sales flow for their products
with 100% collateral," Haddad added, says the report.

Speaking a day after Brazil's Congress approved new fiscal rules,
Haddad said his country must work to improve the macro-economic
environment as quickly as possible, adding the government must now
set the pace to balance the budget, Reuters notes. Haddad said the
new fiscal rules, measures to increase revenues and tax changes
that still need Senate approval, should bring a higher economic
growth rate in Brazil.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based
on
the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among
the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a
default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years,
regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC
IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.

ARGENTINA: Expects IMF to Approve US$7.5-Billion Disbursement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Martin at Bloomberg News reports that Economy Minister Sergio
Massa expects the International Monetary Fund to approve a
US$7.5-billion disbursement as Argentina's programme faces growing
uncertainty after primary elections last August 13.

Argentina also expects to receive another US$2.5-billion payment
from the Washington-based institution in November pending a
staff-level review, Massa told reporters in the US capital
following meetings with officials from the World Bank and
Inter-American Development Bank, according to Bloomberg News.

The IMF board is scheduled to vote on Argentina's loan after a
staff-level agreement was reached last month. Massa's comments came
after a senior government official said that the nation intended to
ask the IMF to increase the disbursement, the report discloses.  He
brushed away a question about whether the country was asking for
more, the report relays.

Massa, running as the incumbent party's presidential candidate,
declined to provide a forecast for inflation in August and
September after the annual pace of consumer-price increases reached
113 percent in July, the report notes.  Massa blamed Argentina's 18
percent currency devaluation last week on the IMF, saying it was a
condition for receiving the August disbursement, the report says.

Massa doesn't expect the general election in October to impact
whether the IMF disburses the US$2.5-billion payment in November,
the report discloses.  Javier Milei, a libertarian who wants to
dollarise the economy and close the central bank, catapulted to the
front of the field with this month's primary vote, the report
adds.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based
on
the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among
the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a
default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years,
regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC
IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


ARGENTINA: Inflation at 100% Has Locals Demanding pay in US$
------------------------------------------------------------
Azul Cibils Blaquier & Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News reports
that Javier Milei's push to dollarise the Argentine economy is in
many ways a long shot.  For starters, the political outsider still
has to clinch victory in October's presidential election, according
to Bloomberg News.  Once in office, he'd then have to overcome a
slew of obstacles to scrap the peso as the country's legal tender,
Bloomberg News relays.

But the truth is many Argentines aren't waiting around to see how
it plays out, Bloomberg News notes.  They're dollarising the
economy on their own - one transaction and one contract at a time,
Bloomberg News says.

In industries such as technology and finance, skilled workers are
demanding salaries be paid in dollars, Bloomberg News discloses.
Companies, including MercadoLibre, Argentina's largest tech
company, increasingly are acquiescing, Bloomberg News says.  Most
landlords in Buenos Aires now only accept payments in dollars,
Bloomberg News relays.  Ditto for Airbnb rentals. And the list goes
on and on: musical instruments, divorce lawyers, imported leather -
you want it, you cough up the greenbacks, Bloomberg News notes.

The use of the dollar, while hardly new here, is exploding across
the country as inflation soars above 100 percent and destroys the
value of the pesos people lug around in their wallets and stick
into their checking accounts, Bloomberg News relays.  It's a
classic breakdown of a fiat currency, just like the one witnessed
in hyperinflation-ravaged Venezuela a decade earlier: Confidence
and trust in the currency collapse to the point where people don't
want to use it for even the most basic of transactions, and so it
gradually vanishes from the economy, Bloomberg News notes.

"When there's no demand for a product," Milei said in an interview,
"its value is zero," he added.

The peso's value isn't quite zero yet but it is in free-fall. In
the government-controlled market, one peso fetches less than a
third of a US penny, Bloomberg News discloses.  In the black
market, it's worth even less: one-tenth of a penny, Bloomberg News
says.  It has sunk 23 percent in the past month alone, the biggest
decline among all currencies tracked by Bloomberg, and 91 percent
over the past five years, Bloomberg News notes.  This has deepened
an inflation surge that's been fuelled in large part by the Central
Bank's willingness to print money to finance the government's
budget deficits, Bloomberg News relays.

                     Salaries in Dollars

In Argentina's burgeoning tech industry, an estimated 200,000
people work off the books for companies abroad to get paid in
dollars or euros and dodge income taxes, according to Argencon, a
trade group that counts MercadoLibre among its members, Bloomberg
News notes.  A report by the group found that the turnover rate for
workers in peso-paying jobs has surpassed 30 percent at several
tech firms over the past year, Bloomberg News discloses.

To stem the attrition, MercadoLibre, with over 10,000 employees in
Argentina, is one of many companies that at least pay part of
salaries in dollars and the other part in pesos, Bloomberg News
relays.  Consulting giant Accenture, software company Globant SA
and fintech firm Uala have all begun implementing similar pay
structures, too, according to corporate filings, employees and
local media reports, Bloomberg News says.

"This benefit is given to employees who are in high demand with
local companies as well as with organisations that don't operate in
Argentina but hire top talent by offering salaries in foreign bank
accounts," Uala said in response to questions.  The fintech offers
between 10 to 40 percent of salaries in dollars depending on the
position, and performance bonuses are in greenbacks too, it said,
Bloomberg News discloses.

MercadoLibre and Accenture didn't reply to a request for comment.
Globant declined to comment - earlier this month, the company's CEO
said in an interview that the nation's economic troubles were
contributing to a brain drain, Bloomberg News notes.

For those business owners left behind, like Adrian Turjanski, the
speed at which this new trend is picking up is alarming, Bloomberg
News relays.  The director of DNA-testing company Bitgenia,
Turjanski says he simply isn't in a position to offer pay cheques
in dollars, Bloomberg News notes.  To try to retain staff, he's
increased skills training for junior employees. But he's quickly
detected a problem with this plan: Once the workers have
strengthened their resumes, they often leave for jobs that pay in
dollars, Bloomberg News discloses.

"We're doing big companies a favour," Turjanski said, "and that's
lethal."

                          Greenback Obsession

According to Bloomberg News, Argentines' obsession with the dollar
began decades ago, the result of a never-ending series of crises,
devaluations and inflation spirals.  Once, in the 1990s, the
government even tried a scheme similar to dollarisation in which it
pegged one dollar to one peso until the system collapsed in 2001,
Bloomberg News says.

Argentines have long kept money in savings accounts in greenbacks,
and the country routinely ranks among the biggest importers of
dollar bills, Bloomberg News notes.  Big-ticket purchases like
homes and used cars are almost entirely done in US currency, too,
Bloomberg News discloses.

But what's changing now is the amount of transactions and
industries that are flipping from pesos to dollars, Bloomberg News
says.

In Buenos Aires, for instance, more than 60 percent of rental
apartment listings are now priced in dollars, according to
ZonaProp, a real-estate website. Two years ago, that number was 20
percent, Bloomberg News notes.  And the staff at Roux, a bistro in
the city's upscale Recoleta neighbourhood serving raw oysters,
caviar and Argentine beef, changed some of the menu prices into
dollars, something rarely, if ever, seen before, Bloomberg News
relays.

While increasingly common to now get paid in dollars - at least
among those in wealthier circles - Argentines are still nervous
talking openly about it for fear of retribution from tax
authorities, Bloomberg News notes.  None interviewed by Bloomberg
News would speak on the record for this story.

Except, of course, Milei and his advisers. They can't stop talking
about it, Bloomberg News discloses.

"Argentina is already dollarised - de facto dollarised," Emilio
Ocampo, an economist working with Milei, told Bloomberg in a June
interview. It's the way that people have come to protect themselves
from the "tax" of inflation, he said.  If Milei's dollarisation
plan becomes codified into law, it will be because the country
"basically has no other option," he added, Bloomberg News relates.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None
of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook  on the long-term ratings is based
on
the risks surrounding pronounced  economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among
the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CC' from 'C' and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR
at 'CCC-'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns
with a rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a
default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years,
regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC
IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

AMERICANAS SA: Ex-CEO Says He Did Not Expect to Lead Bankrupt Firm
------------------------------------------------------------------
Carolina Pulice and Peter Frontini at Reuters report that the
former head of Brazilian retailer Americanas SA quit two weeks into
the job because he had not expected to take over a bankrupt firm,
he told Brazilian lawmakers probing its $5 billion accounting
fraud.

Former Chief Executive Sergio Rial, who testified in a
congressional investigation, resigned on Jan. 11, the same day
Americanas revealed accounting inconsistencies that were later
found to be fraud, according to Reuters.  The retailer filed for
bankruptcy protection later in January, the report notes.

"This was not the project I bought into. I did not buy into an
insolvent project," he told lawmakers, saying he had not expected
Americanas' debt to exceed its assets, the report relays.

Rial, formerly chief executive and chairman at bank Santander
Brasil (SANB3.SA), said he had not seen any evidence Americanas'
reference shareholders - the billionaire trio that founded 3G
Capital - had participated in the fraud, the report notes.

"I didn't see any evidence, neither before, nor during nor after in
relation to this," he added, notes the report.

Rial in March testified before senators saying Americanas' previous
management had created difficulties in disclosing information about
the company's situation and the succession process, the report
adds.


                   About Americanas SA

Americanas was one of the largest diversified retail chains in
Brazil, with a wide platform of physical stores, robust
e-commerce,
fintech, and has just entered into the niche food retail.  It is
listed on B3, being indirectly controlled by billionaire Jorge
Paulo Lemann, Carlos Alberto Sicupira and Marcel Telles.

The retailer nosedived in January 2023 after becoming mired in an
accounting scandal.  The firm filed for bankruptcy at a court in
Rio de Janeiro on Jan. 19, 2023.

Americanas sought protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 23-10092) on Jan. 25,
2023.  White & Case LLP, led by John K. Cunningham, is the U.S.
counsel.



=========
C H I L E
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GUACOLDA ENERGIA: S&P Ups ICR to 'CCC-' on Tender Offer Completion
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 24, 2023, S&P Global Ratings raised the issuer credit and
issue-level ratings on Chilean coal-fired power generator Guacolda
Energia SpA to 'CCC-' from 'D'. The 'CCC-' ratings incorporate its
belief of high default risk and the chance of another opportunistic
debt exchange or tender offer in the short term.

The outlook is negative and reflects the likelihood of a downgrade
if the company is unable to cancel its 2025 notes in full, launches
a new tender offer, or repurchases the notes in the secondary
market below par value.

On Aug. 16, 2023, Guacolda completed the tender and exchange offers
for its 2025 notes. Through the tender offer, the company reduced
its debt by $22 million, for which it paid approximately $15
million in cash. In addition, it exchanged the $168 million notes
for new 10% notes with a maturity date in 2030. As a result,
Guacolda improved its debt maturity schedule, with $83 million due
in 2025 and the rest in 2030.

S&P said, "However, we still anticipate a cash deficit of about $50
million in April 2025, when its outstanding proportion of the notes
matures. This shortfall results from the application of the
waterfall as part of the documentation of the new notes, which
includes maintaining a minimum cash and using excess for the
repayment only of the 2030 notes and for dividend distributions.
Absent a successful refinancing or repayment strategy, which is
currently unclear, we believe the company will struggle to honor
its obligations.

"Moreover, the 'CCC-' ratings reflect the shareholder's aggressive
character, considering Guacolda's two cash tender offers well below
par value in the last six months that we viewed as tantamount to
default, as well as the uncertainty regarding the shareholder's
future financial policies. We consider that management could seek
another opportunistic debt exchange or tender offer, as it has done
twice in the past six months, or repurchase its 2025 notes below
par value in the secondary market."




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 3 Hurricanes Caused Losses of RD$30BB in 5Yrs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that annually, from June to November, the
potential for atmospheric events leading to human, material, and
economic losses intensifies during the hurricane season.  Over the
past five years, Hurricanes Fiona, Irma, and Maria have
collectively incurred economic losses of nearly 30 billion pesos,
according to Dominican Today.

Most recently, Hurricane Fiona made landfall on September 19, 2022,
through Punta Cana, the report notes.  The hurricane brought winds
surpassing 100 kilometers per hour and extensive rainfall across
the country, notably affecting areas like La Romana, San Pedro de
Macoris, Hato Mayor, El Seibo, Samana, and María Trinidad Sanchez,
the report says.

The direct economic impact was estimated at $381.74 million,
equivalent to approximately 20.4 billion pesos using the exchange
rate of 53.50 pesos per dollar, the report discloses.  The US
National Hurricane Center (NOAA) reported the displacement of
43,000 people, with 1,500 requiring emergency shelter, the report
relays.

Infrastructure and services were severely affected. Power outages
affected more than 400,000 people, while 1.2 million faced water
supply issues, the report notes.  Additionally, over a million
hectares of land were impacted, the report relays.

Hurricanes Irma and Maria followed Fiona in terms of inflicted
losses, the report notes.  The ONE report from June of the same
year highlighted these hurricanes, occurring on September 7 and 21,
2017, respectively, causing significant human loss and estimated
damage of 8.7 billion pesos, which constituted 1.6% of public
spending that year, the report says.

The year 2017 witnessed the highest number of Civil
Defense-assisted individuals due to flooding, with 67,391 displaced
and 33,315 sheltered, the report discloses.  Hurricanes Irma and
Maria generated varied impacts on the island, from minimal damage
to significant loss of life and infrastructure damage, the report
says.

The Dominican Republic's geographical location and island status
render it vulnerable to various geophysical and hydrometeorological
threats, the report notes.  Ranked 32nd in the 2021 World Risk
Index, the country faces significant exposure to risks like floods
and tropical cyclones, with assets valued in the billions, the
report relays.

Over the past five years, these climatic events have displaced
79,182 individuals and necessitated the sheltering of 35,438, the
report says.  Provinces such as San Pedro de Macoris, Valverde, La
Vega, Samana, Santiago, and Montecristi have been hardest hit due
to rainfall accumulation and overflowing water bodies, the report
notes.

Throughout this period, the nation also encountered five tropical
storms and two tropical depressions, which caused minimal or
undocumented damages, the report adds.

                About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican To related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18
months that will likely stabilize the government's debt burden.

In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy.  It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2022, affirmed the Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Rating Outlook.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.



=============
E C U A D O R
=============

BANCO PROCEDIT: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Alters Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has conducted a portfolio review of five Ecuadorian
Banks following the downgrade of the country's sovereign Rating to
'CCC+' from 'B-'.

Fitch maintained the Ecuadorian banking system's operating
environment (OE) assessment at 'ccc+'/stable outlook. The stable
outlook on the OE reflects Fitch's view that GDP per capita and the
operating risk index (ORI) metrics have room for deterioration and
will still be commensurate with the 'ccc+' OE assessment, which is
below the implied 'bb' score.

Fitch has downgraded Banco Pichincha C.A. y Subsidiarias
(Pichincha) and Banco Guayaquil S.A.'s (Guayaquil) Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CCC+' from 'B-'. Fitch typically does
not assign Outlooks to ratings in the 'CCC+' categories or below.
In Fitch's view, Ecuadorian bank ratings driven by their intrinsic
profiles are constrained by the sovereign's 'CCC+' rating. Fitch
has also affirmed Banco del Austro, S.A.'s (Austro) IDR at 'CCC+.'

Fitch has revised the Rating Outlooks of Banco ProCredit S.A.
(Banco Procredit) and Banco de la Produccion S.A. y Subsidiarias
(Produbanco) to Stable from Negative, and has affirmed their
Long-Term IDRs at 'B' and 'B-', respectively. Both banks' Long-Term
IDRs are support driven and reflect the support they would receive
from their parents. Banco Procredit's Long-Term IDR mirrors
Ecuador's 'B' Country Ceiling (CC). Produbanco's Long-Term IDR
mirrors its 'B-' Shareholder Support Rating (SSR), and Fitch's
revised assessment that Produbanco's IDR are now support driven.

Fitch downgraded Pichincha and Guayaquil's Short-Term IDRs to 'C'
from 'B', and affirmed Austro's Short-Term at 'C'. Produbanco and
Banco Procredit's Short-Term IDRs were affirmed at 'B'.

Fitch also reviewed Promerica Financial Corporation's (PFC)
ratings, given the importance of its Ecuadorian subsidiary,
Produbanco (35.0% of total assets), and has affirmed all ratings.
Fitch's assessment of the OE is a key factor of PFC's
creditworthiness, and is assessed computing a weighted average on
the total assets in each jurisdiction in which the issuer operates.
With the action taken on the Ecuadorian banking system's OE, PFC's
blended OE is unaffected.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, Viability Ratings (VRs) and Government Support Rating (GSR)

Locally Owned Private Banks

The banks' VRs underpin their IDRs. However, the ratings of
Pichincha and Guayaquil are capped by the sovereign, as Fitch
rarely assigns VRs above the sovereign for banks with IDRs driven
by their VRs.

Pichincha's and Guayaquil's VRs, or standalone creditworthiness,
were downgraded to 'ccc+' from 'b-'. Ecuador's sovereign rating and
broader OE considerations highly influence these banks' VRs, given
the impact of the prolonged political uncertainty on these banks'
financial performance. The heightened sovereign political, fiscal,
and financing risks, as well as the potential for renewed social
unrest could negatively result in rising non-performing loans, and
limit the banks' profitability and internal capital-generation
capacity.

Pichincha's VR reflects adequate asset quality and profitability.
Despite the deterioration in asset quality, due to an unwinding of
regulatory forbearance measures and capitalization compared to the
average of the last four years, sound reserves coverage for
impaired loans provide a sound cushion to absorb potential losses.

Guayaquil's VR reflects stable profitability, capitalization,
funding and liquidity metrics. Asset quality ratios deteriorated
due to the unwinding of the regulatory flexibility but remain
within the current rating category.

Austro's VR was affirmed at 'ccc+' and is highly influenced by its
risk profile. Asset quality ratios deteriorated due to the
unwinding of regulatory flexibility but remain within the current
rating category, which already incorporates possible further
deterioration in asset quality that could arise from a more
challenging operating environment.

Pichincha and Guayaquil's GSR of 'ns' reflects that despite these
banks' sizable market position in the local market, Fitch believes
that there is no reasonable assumption of support forthcoming from
the sovereign due to Ecuador's limited financial flexibility and
the lack of a lender of last resort.

In addition, Austro's 'ns' GSR also reflects that there is no
reasonable assumption that such support will be available since it
is not considered a domestic systemically important bank (D-SIB).

Foreign-Owned Private Banks and PFC

Banco Procredit's Shareholder Support Rating (SSR) drives its IDRs.
The SSR was affirmed at 'b'. Banco Procredit's SSR reflects Fitch's
view that there is a limited probability of parent support
(ProCredit Holding AG&Co.KGaA's (PCH) rated BBB/Stable)
forthcoming. Despite the shareholder's strong propensity, this
rating is constrained by Ecuador's transfer and convertibility
risks captured by the 'B' CC.

Fitch's assessment of support considers the strategic role Banco
Procredit plays for ProCredit Group through its operation,
providing core products and services for the group. The ProCredit
group is an international group of development-oriented commercial
banks with a focus on Eastern Europe. Ecuador is the group's only
remaining operation in Latin America.

Banco Procredit's Long-Term IDR (xgs) has been affirmed at 'B(xgs)'
mirroring the support driven IDRs. The bank is not rated as
public-sector policy bank; however, its IDRs incorporate
assumptions of government support.

Banco Procredit's VR was affirmed at 'ccc+' and reflects the bank's
asset quality and profitability deterioration. This is mainly due
to the ending of regulatory forbearance and increased loan
impairment charges and funding costs, respectively. The rating also
incorporates the ordinary support from its ultimate parent in terms
of capitalization and stable funding and liquidity structure.

Produbanco's IDRs are now Shareholder Support driven. Produbanco's
SSR was affirmed at 'b-' , reflecting Fitch's view of potential
external support from its majority shareholder PFC (B+/Stable;
62.2% ownership). The support assessment considers Fitch's view of
the parent's ability and propensity to provide support if required,
as well as Produbanco's consistent key role to PFC's operations
through the years.

Produbanco's VR was downgraded to 'ccc+' from 'b-' reflecting
Ecuador's sovereign rating and broader OE considerations high
influence on the VR. Produbanco's VR also reflects greater
vulnerability in terms of profitability, funding and capitalization
as a result of systemic political situation. Fitch expects
Produbanco's asset quality to remain sound and highlights the
resilience capacity it has shown through different economic
cycles.

PFC's 'B+' IDR is driven by its 'b+' VR, which is based on the
issuer consolidated risk profile with operations in nine countries.
PFC has a noteworthy business profile sustained by its business
model and market position. The company's consolidated figures show
a good asset quality, with a Stage 3 loans ratio of 2.0%, while the
profitability has improved since 2020 and is expected to stabilized
around the current ratio of 1.7% of operating profit to risk
weighted assets (RWAs). Fitch believes PFC's capitalization is
reasonable, with a CET1 to RWAs ratio that should remain close to
10%.

PFC's GSR of 'ns' reflect that, however possible, external support
cannot be relied upon, given the banking system's large size
relative to the economy and weak support stance due to Panama's
lack of a lender of last resort.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

IDRs and VR

- Pichincha, Guayaquil, and Austro's VRs and IDRs are sensitive to
changes in the sovereign rating, or further deterioration within
the local operating environment.

- Produbanco's IDRs could be downgraded if PFC's propensity or
ability to support materially weaken or in the event of regulatory
controls that could undermine potential support.

- Banco Procredit's IDRs could be downgraded if the country ceiling
is downgraded or if PCH's propensity or ability to support is
materially weakened.

- Pichincha, Guayaquil, Austro, Produbanco, and Banco Procredit's
VRs could be downgraded if there is significant deterioration in
the banks' intrinsic credit profile, although downside potential
due to intrinsic financial deterioration is somewhat limited, given
the low VR level imposed by the sovereign constraint.

- PFC's VR and IDR could be negatively affected by a sustained
decline in the CET1 ratio below 8%, and/or a reduction in
subsidiary dividends to upstream to PFC that pressures its debt
service capacity. The ratings could also be pressured by a
materially weaker assessment of PFC's multijurisdictional OE,
especially within its largest markets.

GSR

- Pichincha, Guayaquil and Austro's GSR has no downgrade potential
as it is at the lowest possible level.

- Because PFC's GSR is at the lowest level in its scale, there is
no downside potential for the GSR.

SSR

- Banco Procredit's SSR could be downgraded if PCH's propensity or
ability to support materially weakens.

- Produbanco' SSR could be downgraded if PFC's propensity or
ability to support materially weakens or any likelihood of
regulatory controls that could undermine possible support.

XGS

- Banco Procredit's Long-Term IDR (xgs) could be downgraded if
PCH's ability or propensity to provide support weakens, as assessed
by Fitch. The former could stem from an increase in country risks
as assessed by Fitch.

- Short-Term ex-government support ratings are primarily sensitive
to changes in Long-Term ex-government support ratings and could be
downgraded if the latter is downgraded and the new Long-Term
ratings map to lower Short-Term ratings in accordance with Fitch's
criteria.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

IDRs and VR

- Pichincha, Guayaquil, and Austro's upside potential is limited
given the challenging operating environment.

- A ratings upgrade of Pichincha's and Guayaquil's Long-Term IDRs
would require a sovereign upgrade.

- In addition to a sovereign upgrade, Austro's ratings could be
upgraded if an improvement in the operating environment results in
a meaningful and sustained improvement in the banks' core
profitability, along with improvement in the bank's asset quality
and capitalization.

- Banco Procredit's IDR could be upgraded in the event of an
upgrade of Ecuador's country ceiling. The VR has limited upside
potential considering the still challenging operating environment.
An upgrade of Banco Procredit's VR would also require sustainable
improvements of its profitability ratios.

- Produbanco's IDR could be upgraded in the event of an upgrade of
PFC's Long-Term IDR. The VR has limited upside potential
considering the still challenging operating environment.

- PFC's ratings could be upgraded by an improvement in PFC's
multijurisdictional operating environment.

GSR

- Ecuador's propensity or ability to provide timely support to
Pichincha, Guayaquil and Austro is not likely to change given the
sovereign's low sub-investment-grade IDR. As such, the GSR has no
upgrade potential.

- As Panama is a dollarized country with no lender of last resort,
a PFC's GSR upgrade is considered unlikely.

SSR

- Banco Procredit's SSR could be upgraded in the event of an
upgrade of Ecuador's country ceiling.

- Produbanco's SSR has limited upgrade potential over the rating
horizon, given its size and relevance relative to PFC.

XGS

- An upgrade of Banco Procredit's Long-Term IDR (xgs), which is
constrained by Ecuador's transfer and convertibility risks, would
require an upgrade of Ecuador's Country Ceiling, provided Fitch's
view on the parent bank's ability and propensity to provide support
remains otherwise unchanged.

- The short-term ex-government support ratings is primarily
sensitive to a change in the LT ex-government support rating and
could be upgraded if the latter is upgraded and the new LT rating
map to higher short-term ratings in accordance with Fitch's
criteria.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings assigned to PFC's senior notes of USD200 million and
USD225 million are in line with its Long-Term IDR, as the
likelihood of default on the notes is the same as that of PFC.
Despite the notes being senior secured and comprising
unsubordinated obligations, Fitch believes the collateral mechanism
would not have a significant impact on recovery rates. In
accordance with Fitch's rating criteria, recovery prospects for the
notes are average and reflected in their Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- PFC's senior debt ratings would be downgraded if PFC's Long-Term
IDR is downgraded.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- PFC's senior debt ratings would be upgraded if PFC's Long-Term
IDR is upgraded.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

Pichincha and Guayaquil's 'ccc+' VR has been assigned below the 'b'
implied VR due to the following adjustment reason: Operating
Environment (Negative).

Produbanco's 'ccc+' VR has been assigned below the 'b-' implied VR
due to the following adjustment reason: Operating Environment
(Negative).

Banco del Austro's 'ccc+' VR has been assigned below the 'b-'
implied VR due to the following adjustment reason: Risk Profile
(negative).

Pichincha, Guayaquil, Produbanco, Banco Procredit, and Austro:
Fitch has assigned an Operating Environment score of 'ccc+' that is
below the 'bb' category implied score due to the following
adjustment reasons: Sovereign Rating (Negative).

PFC's OE score has been assigned below the implied score due to the
following adjustment reasons: International operations (negative).

PFC's Business Profile score has been assigned above the implied
score due to the following adjustments: Business Model (positive)
and Market Position (positive).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt               Rating            Recovery   Prior
   -----------               ------            --------   -----
Promerica
Financial C
orporation     LT IDR             B+    Affirmed            B+
               ST IDR             B     Affirmed            B
               Viability          b+    Affirmed            b+
               Government Support ns    Affirmed            ns

   senior
   secured     LT                 B+    Affirmed  RR4       B+

Banco
Pichincha C.A.
y Subsidiarias LT IDR             CCC+  Downgrade           B-
               ST IDR             C     Downgrade           B
               Viability          ccc+  Downgrade           b-
               Government Support ns    Affirmed            ns

Banco del  
Austro S.A.    LT IDR             CCC+  Affirmed           CCC+
               ST IDR             C     Affirmed             C
               Viability          ccc+  Affirmed           ccc+
               Government Support ns    Affirmed            ns

Banco de la
Produccion
S.A.
Produbanco y
Subsidiarias   LT IDR             B-    Affirmed            B-
               ST IDR             B     Affirmed            B
               Viability          ccc+  Downgrade           b-
               Shareholder Support b-   Affirmed            b-

Banco
Guayaquil,
S.A.           LT IDR             CCC+  Downgrade           B-
               ST IDR             C     Downgrade           B
               Viability          ccc+  Downgrade           b-
               Government Support ns    Affirmed           ns

Banco
ProCredit
S.A.           LT IDR             B     Affirmed            B
               ST IDR             B     Affirmed            B
               Viability          ccc+  Affirmed           ccc+
               LT IDR (xgs)       B(xgs)Affirmed         B(xgs)
               ST IDR (xgs)       B(xgs)Affirmed         B(xgs)
               Shareholder Support b    Affirmed            b

ECUADOR SOCIAL: Fitch Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'CCC+sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the class B notes issued by Ecuador
Social Bond S.a.r.l. (ESB) to 'CCC+sf' from 'B-sf' following
Fitch's downgrade of Ecuador's ratings on Aug. 16, 2023 to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'. Fitch typically does not assign Rating Outlooks to
ratings of 'CCC+' or below.

Fitch has also affirmed the ratings of the class A notes at 'AAAsf'
and maintained the Stable Outlook reflecting the guarantee provided
by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB; AAA/Stable).

   Entity/Debt             Rating            Prior
   -----------             ------            -----
Ecuador IDB Repack

   Class A (secured)
   XS2106052827        LT AAAsf   Affirmed   AAAsf

   Class B (secured)
   XS2106053635        LT CCC+sf  Downgrade   B-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The Social Bond, issued by the Republic of Ecuador and partially
guaranteed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB;
AAA/Stable), is the asset backing the Repack Notes.

The assigned ratings address timely payment of interest and
principal on a semi-annual basis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Social Bond Backed by Full Faith and Credit of Ecuador: The Social
Bond issued by the Republic of Ecuador is the asset backing the
Repack Notes issued by ESB. The Social Bond shares all
characteristics of other external indebtedness of the sovereign and
is backed by the full faith and credit of Ecuador. The only
difference is that its proceeds are for specific investment in
Ecuador's social housing program, and its debt service benefits
from a partial credit guarantee by the IDB.

IDB's Partial Credit Guarantee Comprehensive in Scope: The partial
credit guarantee between the IDB and ESB, as initial purchaser of
the Social Bond, partially covers Ecuador's failure to meet its
obligations on the Social Bond. After Ecuador's default on the
Social Bond, all draws from the IDB guarantee will be exclusively
applied by the Trustee to cover 100% of class A's debt service,
covering a percentage of the underlying Social Bond.

The IDB guarantee is comprehensive in scope and effectively covers
100% of the class A notes to be issued by ESB within the 23-day
cure period. IDB's obligations under the partial guarantee
constitute direct, unsecured obligations of IDB.

IDB's Credit Quality Remains Strong: The rating assigned to the
class A notes is commensurate with the Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
of the guarantee provider. On Nov. 16, 2022, Fitch affirmed IDB's
IDR at 'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Class B Notes' Ratings Commensurate with Sovereign: Given that all
flows from the IDB guarantee will be applied to the class A notes
to meet debt service according to the guarantee's schedule, a
default by Ecuador under its obligations of the Social Bond would
lead to a default of ESB's obligations under the class B notes.
Hence, the credit quality of the class B notes is a pass-through of
Ecuador's rating. The rating of Ecuador was downgraded to 'CCC+'
from 'B-' on Aug. 16, 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- The class A notes' ratings are linked to the IDB's Long-Term (LT)
Foreign Currency (FC) IDR; hence, a downgrade of the IDB's IDR
would trigger a downgrade of class A notes in the same proportion.
Additionally, changes in Fitch's view regarding the strength of the
IDB guarantee may affect the class A notes' ratings;

- The class B notes' credit quality reflects Ecuador's rating and,
therefore, is sensitive to changes in Ecuador's LT IDR. Hence, a
downgrade of Ecuador's IDR would trigger a decrease in the class B
note ratings in the same proportion.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- The class A notes' ratings are linked to the IDB's LT FC IDR of
'AAA'/Stable, which is the highest rating assigned by Fitch;

- The class B notes' credit quality reflects Ecuador's rating and,
therefore, is sensitive to changes in Ecuador's LT IDR. Hence, an
upgrade to Ecuador's IDR would trigger an uplift in the class B
note ratings in the same proportion.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

SU CASITA 2007: Fitch Affirms Class A Notes Rating at 'CCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Su Casita Trust 2007's
class A and class B residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS)
as follows:

- Su Casita Trust Class A International Scale Rating at 'CCsf';

- Su Casita Trust Class A National Scale Rating at 'CC(mex)vra';

- Su Casita Trust Class B at 'D(mex)vra'.

   Entity/Debt             Rating                       Prior
   -----------             ------                       -----
Su Casita
Trust 2007

   Class A
   864248AA7      LT       CCsf       Affirmed           CCsf

   Class A
   864248AA7      Natl ULT CC(mex)vra Affirmed     CC(mex)vra

   Class B
   XS0293753058   Natl LT  D(mex)vra  Affirmed      D(mex)vra

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Quality Remains Deteriorated: As of June 2023, the defaulted
portfolio over 180 days as a percentage of the original balance
represents 9.75%, slightly improving from the 11.3% observed on
Fitch's previous review, as restructuring activities continue.
Portfolio deterioration persists, with the outstanding balance
remaining polarized with 62.5% of the balance in a defaulted status
as of June 2023. Last twelve month (LTM) average CPR (Constant
Prepayment Rate, discounting defaulted loans over 180 days) is at
6.8% as of June 2023 (last review: 5.6%).

The servicer continues with repossession activities although the
inventory remains closed to Fitch's previous review as the sale of
assets is slow. As of June 2023, the trust had a total of 632
properties in its inventory, while in Fitch's previous review the
servicer reported a total of 670.

As of June 30, 2023, the portfolio was comprised of 2,091 loans
originated in Mexico with an outstanding balance of 82.39 million
Unidades de Inversion (UDIs) plus 255.87 million pesos (MXN) of
restructured loans (equivalent to around 42.25 million UDIs). Out
of the remaining portfolio, 33.9% has been restructured to pesos
and 66.1% remains denominated in UDIs. Weighted average seasoning
is 165 months with a remaining term of 81 months and annual
interest rate of 10.3%. Reported weighted average current loan to
value (CLTV) is 69.9%. Geographical concentration by the top-three
states is 25.7% in Baja California, 13.2% in Estado de Mexico and
10.5% in Nuevo León, similar to last review.

Decreasing Overcollateralization Levels: As of July 2023, the
overcollateralization level without considering defaults over 180
days stands at -178.8% and -291.2% for Class A and Class B,
respectively (-165.1% and -264.1% as of August 2022, respectively),
further decreasing as seen in past reviews.

The senior bond balance continues amortizing and has an outstanding
balance of 119.56 million UDIs as of July 2023, which represents a
18.1% of the initial balance; over the LTM it amortized a 1.8% of
the initial balance. The subordinated tranche's bond balance
remains at 82.3% of its issuance amount, the same as in Fitch's
previous review as the transaction continues with no principal
payments since 2009. Transaction structure considers a dual
waterfall mechanism, where interest collections are used after
expenses to pay interest while principal collections are used for
amortization. Incomplete interest payments for Class A are made by
the guarantor (MBIA, not rated by Fitch; hence no credit is given
to the notes ratings).

Adequate Servicing: The portfolio is currently serviced by
Adamantine Servicios S.A. de C.V. (Adamantine) rated 'AAF3+(mex)'
with Negative Outlook. Adamantine has proven adequate servicing
capabilities, mitigating exposure to operational risks. Servicing
activities have remained stable, uninterrupted and active in terms
of restructuring loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

The class A notes could be downgraded if the third-party guarantor
stopped making payments to the swap provider since class A's
interest and principal at maturity depend heavily on this external
credit protection.

The class B notes are currently defaulted.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The class A note's rating maintains limited upgrade potential due
to current portfolio deterioration and negative credit enhancement.
As for the Class B notes, the rating may be upgraded if past due
interest were to be paid in full and the transaction exhibited
sustained and consistent payment capacity for its subordinated
tranche.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

TRUST 2400-GICSA: Fitch Affirms A-2 MXN Notes Rating at 'BBsf'  
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the international and national scale ratings
assigned to the notes issued by Fideicomiso Irrevocable y
Traslativo de Dominio Numero 2400 (Trust 2400 - Sponsored by
GICSA). The Rating Outlook is Stable.

   Entity/Debt                Rating                      Prior
   -----------                ------                      -----
Trust 2400
(Sponsored by GICSA)

   A-1 MXN
   XS2094574584       LT      BB+sf      Affirmed         BB+sf

   A-1 MXN
   XS2094574584       Natl LT AA(mex)vra Affirmed    AA(mex)vra

   A-1 USD
   89835RAA2          LT      BB+sf      Affirmed         BB+sf

   A-1 USD
   89835RAA2          Natl LT AA(mex)vra Affirmed    AA(mex)vra

   A-2 MXN
   XS2094576282       LT      BBsf       Affirmed          BBsf

   A-2 MXN
   XS2094576282       Natl LT A+(mex)vra Affirmed    A+(mex)vra

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Adequate Property Cash Flow: Property cash flow over the LTM has
been in line with Fitch's long-term assumptions which estimate a
stabilized annual net cash flow (FNCF) of MXN1,211.6 million.
Average collection during 2Q23 is less than 10% below the observed
collection during the first three months of issuance (1Q20) and is
14% above the observed collection during 2Q22. Collection
improvement is principally driven by a recovery in the retail
sector that drives an occupancy increase to 88.5% as of 2Q23 from
the reported adjusted occupancy of 85.0% in 2Q22. Fitch expects
property cash flow to remain in line with its assumptions.

CRE Sector Still Pressured: As of 2Q23, portfolio remains
concentrated in fashion, office and entertainment tenants which
account for 58.8% of the total monthly rent. Despite pressures from
the pandemic having eased out, the office sector remains uncertain
as corporates are still applying remote or hybrid working policies.
According to the servicer (Desarrolladora 2054, S.A.P.I. de C.V.
primary servicer, not rated by Fitch), renewal negotiations may
still consider less than average rent prices and shorter lease
terms. Fitch considers the current uncertain CRE environment
pressures portfolio's capacity to increase occupancy and rent
income.

Leverage Assumptions Remain: Fitch's property value remains
unchanged since last review at MXN12,238.4 million. The value
considers a cap rate of 9.9% since issuance and Fitch's stabilized
NCF calculation. Given the amortization period has started, LTV for
tranches A-1 is 74.5% and 79.4% for tranche A-2 (last review: 75.2%
and 80.1%, respectively). Using the Fitch's stabilized NCF
assumption and expected debt service considering the amortization
period has started, Fitch calculated the average debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for A-1 tranches and A-2 tranches is 1.15x
and 1.07x, respectively (last review: 1.17x and 1.09,
respectively).

Structural Mechanisms Protect Notes: Since last review, reported
DSCR has started to constrain as the IO period ended. As of 2Q23,
reported MXN DSCR and USD DSCR were 1.47x and 2.02x, respectively
(2Q22: 1.48x and 2.40x, respectively), both numbers still above the
trigger's limit. Fitch considers transaction's structure is
sufficiently solid to protect the notes from decreasing debt
service coverage or performance deterioration as it has triggers
that accelerate amortization or initiate a property disposal.
Additionally, periods of short-term liquidity stress are partially
covered by interest reserves fully funded as of 2Q23 covering three
interest payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Ratings could be downgraded if occupancy rates and cash flow
generation deteriorate below Fitch's expectations, resulting in a
consistent use of reserves and lower debt coverage levels;

- Increased operational risks that negatively impact transaction's
collection levels and or limit liquidity could also derive in a
negative rating action;

- A downgrade of the sovereign could result in a rating action on
the notes, among others.

Fitch analyzed the rating sensitivity to changes to Fitch's NCF in
down environments, results show ratings would not be resilient to a
decrease of 10% in the FNCF leading to a downgrade of at least one
notch. While a decrease of 20% or higher in the FNCF, could lead to
a multiple notch downgrade.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

Sustainable cash flow growth resulting from higher-than-estimated
occupancy rates, higher collection and increase in rent income
could derive a higher Fitch NCF; thus, lower LTV levels, higher
debt coverage and may lead to a positive rating action as long as
operational risk is mitigated.

DATA ADEQUACY

The data used for the development of the rating included the
following information from the following sources:

Email communication and Management calls via conference calls with
the Primary Servicer/sponsor/property manager as of August 2023.

Officers Certificate from the Manager 2Q23

Interim Statements 2Q23

Certificate from the Issuer Trust 2Q23

Master servicer report 1Q23

Additional Information provided by GICSA such as monthly collection
and Interest Reserves as of June 2023.

Rent Roll as of June 2023 provided by master servicer.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

BANCO SAN JUAN: NY Fed Defends Cutoff After Crackdown
-----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York defended
its plan to cut off a Puerto Rican lender's access to the U.S.
central banking system following a federal crackdown on banks with
links to Venezuela.

In July, Banco San Juan Internacional (BSJI) sued the New York Fed
to halt the looming termination of its "master account," which lets
banks access the Fed's electronic payment system, because of
concerns about its compliance with U.S. sanctions and anti-money
laundering rules, according to Reuters.

BSJI said that it had improved compliance during a previous
22-month suspension of its master account between 2019 and 2020.
That followed a federal probe into credit agreements it had with
state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, which is subject to U.S.
sanctions, the report notes.

The bank said the suspension "decimated" its customer
relationships, the report relays.

In court papers, the New York Fed said BSJI processed transactions
that had "multiple red flags for money laundering or other illicit
activity," the report discloses.   

It said that as of June, BSJI served only 13 customers, most based
in Curacao and including close family members of the bank's owner
Marcelino Bellosta, the report says.  The New York Fed also said
BSJI could still seek to access the U.S. financial system through a
third-party correspondent bank, the report adds.


GRUPO HIMA: Court OKs Cash Use, Rejects DIP Loan Request
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico
authorized Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc., and its debtor-affiliates
to continue using cash collateral on a limited basis, initially
through the end of August. The Court denied the Debtors' request
to obtain postpetition financing.

The Court said the Debtors may continue using cash collateral on
seven-day intervals but not to exceed 28 days, but must file a
weekly budget of expenses needed, and must include insurance

premiums of current policies as they may become due, and a report
of expenses paid.

On August 16, Grupo HIMA San Pablo and its affiliated entities
filed a motion for post-petition credit and to use cash
collateral.

The request was opposed by the Municipal Revenue Collection Center
and the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory.
On August 17, the Debtors filed an emergency motion to use cash
collateral. The CRIM again objected to the request, and so did
Island Healthcare, LLC, the lender.

Although not specifically scheduled to be heard at the August 18
emergency hearing, the parties argued their respective positions.

The Debtors informed that, considering the matters discussed at the
August 18 hearing, an amended request for authorization to use cash
collateral would be filed because the Debtor will be forced to
close operations if the cash collateral request is not approved.

The Court stated at the hearing that it was fully conscious that
the HIMA San Pablo Cases carry public policy considerations as
there may be an effect on providing quality healthcare to the
people of Puerto Rico. The Court also stated that its duty and
responsibility is to apply the law, particularly the Bankruptcy
Code and Rules, to the facts, as they are presented to the court.
These statements reflect "the inherent struggle between the goals
and policies of health care and bankruptcy law that arises when a
health care provider files for bankruptcy protection," citing 1999
Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law, Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law,
1999 Edition. Admittedly, "the public policy aspects of health
care may affect the resolution of a health care bankruptcy case,"
the Court said, citing Health L. Prac. Guide § 34.22 (2023).
There
must be a balancing act between bankruptcy and health care
principles, citing Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide par.
130.03[7].

According to the Court, "the statements and arguments presented at
the August 18 hearing show that the Debtors do not have the cash to
continue operations and obtain the sale of the assets as an ongoing
business in an orderly manner. If the Court does not authorize the
use of cash collateral or grants the post-petition financing
proposed by the Lender, the hospital facilities must close
operations. However, the closing of a hospital requires careful
planning as there are unique factors which affect a health care
bankruptcy. Clearly, if a health care entity cannot secure
financing or find a potential buyer, closing the business may be
necessary."

On August 20, the Debtors filed an urgent motion requesting the
scheduling of a hearing for August 23 to consider the DIP Financing
and use of cash collateral. The request was granted.
The cases came before the Court on August 23, 2023, to consider the
Urgent Motion of Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I)
Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (ii)
Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash Collateral, (iii) Granting

Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Claims
(iv) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties,
(v) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (vi) Scheduling a Final Hearing,
and (vii) Granting Related Relief (hereafter the "DIP and Cash
Collateral Motion") as supplemented and amended on August 21.
Considering health care principles, the Debtors' commitment to
continue operations as a going concern to allow a prompt and
orderly disposition of the health care facilities without
interruption to reduce the loss to or diminution of the estate and
secured Lender's interest in the property, and to continue
providing health services, the Court is moved to exercise its
discretion and authorize the Debtors to use cash collateral on an
interim basis, and for a limited purpose and time.

The Court explained the continued operations of the debtor-health
units will prevent the loss of value of the collateral, lenders'
interests, and will support healthcare public policy for a limited
period.

Specifically, the cash collateral used during the interim period
will be equal to a billing of $3,908,000 with operating expenses of
$3,842,000, of which:

-- $2,677,000 are salaries and related to employees,
-- $750,000 are related to physicians,
-- $265,000 are medical supplies, and
-- $150,000 are contract services.

The Debtors are further authorized to use additional cash
collateral funds solely for the payment of insurance premiums and
related expenses, to the extent necessary.
The Court said its Order will not serve as a finding that the
Prepetition Secured Parties are adequately protected and
Prepetition Secured Parties' right to object to the continued use
of cash collateral on any basis or to bring or assert any claim or
defense or seek any other relief in this case or otherwise shall be
fully preserved and will not be waived, impaired, or prejudiced in
any way as a result of this Order.

To the extent of any diminution in the value of the Prepetition
Secured Parties' respective interests in their property collateral
from the Petition Date arising from the use, sale, or lease of such
collateral or the imposition of the automatic stay, that
Prepetition Secured Party is granted a superpriority claim against
the Debtors pursuant to Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, in
each case, subject to the priorities set forth in the Intercreditor
Agreement. The Court's Order will not constitute a finding as to
the validity or perfection of any pre-petition lien. For all
adequate protection and stay relief purposes throughout the HIMA
San Pablo Cases, the prepetition secured parties shall be deemed to
have requested relief from the automatic stay and adequate
protection as of the Petition Date.

The Debtors had obtained interim court approval to use cash
collateral and obtain postpetition financing through August 23
hearing.


The Debtors obtained senior secured postpetition financing on a
superpriority basis in the aggregate principal amount of $6
million, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement by and among Grupo HIMA, HIMA
San Pablo Properties, Inc., Centro Médico Del Turabo, Inc., Jocar
Enterprises, Inc., I.A. Developers Corp., Jerusalen Home Ambulance,
Inc., Host Security Services, Inc., General Contracting Services,
Inc., and CMT Development, LLC, as borrowers, Portal de Caguas,
Inc. and Sabiamed, Inc., as guarantors, Alter Domus (US) LLC, as
administrative agent and collateral agent, and the lenders party
thereto from time to time. $4 million of the DIP facility will be
made available upon the entry of an interim order.

The DIP facility was due and payable six months from the execution
of the DIP Credit Agreement.

The DIP Facility contemplates that the Prepetition First Lien
Obligations (other than Superpriority Term Loans) of each DIP
Lender will be rolled up, and converted into DIP Obligations by
means of a "cashless roll" by each such DIP Lender on a 5:1 basis
based on (i) the amount of DIP Loans actually funded into the DIP
Funding Account (and on such day as the DIP Loans are actually
funded into the DIP Funding Account) plus (ii) the Commitment Fee
due and payable to such DIP Lender under the Closing Date Fee
Letter.
The events of default includes:
(a) The failure to pay principal, interest and other amounts
when and as required by the DIP Credit Agreement;
(b) a Debtor files a motion, without the consent of the
Required Lenders, seeking additional financing under 11 U.S.C.
section 364(d) that is not permitted by section 7.03 of the Credit
Agreement and does not provide for the repayment of the DIP
Facility in full and in cash;
(c) The withdrawal or termination of any stalking horse
agreement, without the consent of the Required Lenders;
(d) The binding, definitive documentation with CRIM with
respect to the CRIM Settlement is (A) amended without the consent
of each Lender or (B) terminated or no longer in force and effect;
and
(e) The failure of the Borrower to satisfy the milestones on
or before the dates specified in the DIP Credit Agreement.
The Debtors require liquidity to cover its payroll obligations,
pay
professionals, finance this process and to address any unforeseen
contingencies should they occur.
The Debtors believe that it is in the public interest to preserve

the healthcare services provided by the Debtors to their
communities in Puerto Rico, and the more than three thousand jobs
that provide income for families in Puerto Rico. These Chapter 11
Cases are currently the only option available to the Debtors to
avoid closure of their operations, preserve existing jobs, ensure
that critical healthcare services provided by the Company will not
be interrupted overnight and allow for a long-term solution that
will ultimately preserve healthcare services to the affected
communities in Puerto Rico. To achieve these goals, the Debtors
seek to effectuate a sale of the Company's operations as a going
concern for each of its hospitals and all assets and related
businesses, pursuant to an open and competitive bidding process
aimed to maximize value for their stakeholders and inure to the
benefit of all parties in interest.

The Debtors have an urgent liquidity need, as evidenced by the fact
that the Debtors were unable to cover payroll for the week ending
on August 11, 2023. And, while the Debtors anticipate these Chapter
11 Cases will be brief in duration, liquidity is necessary to
retain their employees and medical professionals and operate their
business as a going concern, which will preserve jobs and maximize
value of the Debtors' assets and address any unforeseen
contingencies should they occur during these Chapter 11 Cases.

As of the Petition Date, the Debtors have outstanding funded debt
obligations in the aggregate principal amount of approximately $248
million, which amount consists of (i) approximately $162 million of
principal amount of Prepetition First Lien Loans; and (ii)
approximately $86 million of principal amount of Prepetition Second
Lien Loans.

Pursuant to the First Lien Credit Agreement, dated as of January
29, 2013, with the Lenders party thereto and the Administrative
Agent, the Loan Parties, Alter Domus (US) LLC, as administrative
agent and collateral agent, and the lenders party thereto from time
to time, the Lenders provided, as applicable, term loans, revolving
loans, swing loans, and letters of credit to the Prepetition
Borrower.

Prior to the Petition Date, pursuant to the Prepetition First Lien
Credit Agreement and the other Prepetition First Lien Loan
Documents, the Prepetition First Lien Lenders made available to the
Co-Borrowers, (a) Term Loans in an aggregate principal amount not
in excess of $149 million, and (b) Revolving Loans in an aggregate
principal amount at any time outstanding not in excess of $14
million.

Pursuant to the Second Lien Credit Agreement, dated as of January
29, 2013 and any other agreements and documents executed or
delivered in connection therewith, among the Loan Parties,
Wilmington Trust, National Association as administrative agent and
collateral agent, and the lenders party thereto, the Prepetition
Second Lien Lenders provided term loans to the Prepetition
Borrower.

Prior to the Petition Date, pursuant to the Prepetition Second Lien
Credit Agreement and the other Prepetition Second Lien Loan
Documents, the Prepetition Second Lien Lenders made available to
the Co-Borrowers, a term loan in the principal amount of $86
million.

The court ruled that the cash collateral used during the Interim
Period will be equal to a billing of $3.908 million with operating
expenses of $3.842 million of which $2.677 million are salaries and
related for employees, $750,000 are related to physicians, $265,000
are medical supplies, and $150,000 are contract services. Every
dollar of such cash collateral used by the Debtors will result in a
dollar-for-dollar adequate protection claim for the benefit of the
Prepetition First Lien Secured Parties.


To the extent of any diminution in the value of the Prepetition
Secured Parties' respective interests in their collateral
(including cash collateral) from the Petition Date arising from the
use, sale, or lease of such collateral or the imposition of the
automatic stay, the Prepetition Secured Party is granted (i) senior
replacement liens in all assets of the Debtors, which replacement
Liens will be senior to any prepetition statutory liens in favor of
CRIM and (ii) to the extent such Replacement Liens do not provide
sufficient protection of the Prepetition Secured Parties'
interests, a superpriority claim against the Debtors pursuant to 11
U.S.C. section 507(b), in each case, subject to the priorities set
forth in the Intercreditor Agreement dated January 31, 2013. The
Replacement Liens will be deemed duly valid and perfected upon
entry of this Order without the need for further action by any
party or further Court Order.

A copy of the motion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XMe6U4
from PacerMonitor.com.

A copy of the order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=lek1ka
from PacerMonitor.com.

A copy of the budget is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6gLdz7
from PacerMonitor.com.

The Debtor projects $29,061 in total receipts and $33,387 in total
payroll and operating expenses for the six weeks ending September
22, 2023.

              About Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc.

Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc. serves as a diversified healthcare
services holding company pursuant to a corporate reorganization of
several businesses related by common ownership. Through its
subsidiaries and affiliates, the Company primarily owns and
operates hospital facilities and other healthcare related
businesses. As of August 2023, the HIMA GROUP operates four
hospitals, with over 1,200 licensed beds, including an Oncological
Hospital, a multi-specialty physician practice management company,
Home Care Service (including infusion therapies and wound care), a
free-standing Ambulatory Center and a 16-Ambulance Service
Company.

The Debtor sought protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 23-02510-EAG11) on August
15, 2023. In the petition signed by Armando J. Rodriguez-Benitez,
chief executive officer, the Debtor disclosed up to $1 billion in
assets and up to $500,000 in liabilities.

Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan oversees the case.
Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., at Lugo Mender Group, LLC, represents
the Debtor as legal counsel.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Aug. 21 to Aug. 25, 2023
--------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer               Cpn    Price      Maturity   Country    Curr
------               ---    -----      --------   -------    ----
KWG Group Holdings    7.4     15.8      01/13/2027   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       40.8      01/14/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    5.9     22.2      11/10/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6.3     17.6      02/13/2026   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.4     26.5      03/05/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       19.4      08/10/2025   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    6       16.8      08/14/2026   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.9     27.5      08/30/2024   KY        USD
KWG Group Holdings    7.9     60.2      09/01/2023   KY        USD
Telecom Argentina SA  1       56.5      02/10/2028   AR        USD
Telecom Argentina SA  1       64.2      03/09/2027   AR        USD
eHi Car Services      7       64.9      09/21/2026   KY        USD
YPF SA                1       69.8      01/10/2026   AR        USD
YPF SA                7       61.6      12/15/2047   AR        USD
YPF SA                7       61        12/15/2047   AR        USD
UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     73.6      10/01/2038   PA        USD
UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     74.1      10/01/2038   PA        USD
Guaranteed            5.4     73.7      01/29/2038   KY        USD
Guaranteed            5.3     71.9      03/23/2038   KY        USD
Banco Davivienda SA   6.7     66.5                   CO        USD
Banco de Chile        2.7     75.4      03/09/2035   CL        AUD
Banco de Chile        1.7     69.5      04/26/2032   CL        EUR
Banco del Estado      3.1     72.5      02/21/2040   CL        AUD
Banco del Estado de   1.7     70        03/01/2032   CL        EUR
Banco del Estado      2.8     68.9      03/13/2040   CL        AUD
Banco del Estado      1.7     69.2      07/05/2032   CL        EUR
Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.3      04/16/2031   CO        USD
Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.4      04/16/2031   CO        USD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3     57.6      11/29/2034   CL        EUR
Banco Santander Chile 3.1     72.3      02/28/2039   CL        AUD
China Maple Leaf      2.3     75        01/27/2026   KY        USD
China SCE Group       6       29        02/04/2026   KY        USD
China SCE Group       7.4     56.2      04/09/2024   KY        USD
China SCE Group       7       35.2      05/02/2025   KY        USD
China SCE Group       6       42.9      09/29/2024   KY        USD
Panama  Bond          4.5     73.5      01/19/2063   PA        USD
Panama  Bond          4.3     74.8      04/29/2053   PA        USD
Panama  Bond          3.9     66.8      07/23/2060   PA        USD
Earls Eight           0.1     63.8      12/20/2031   KY        AUD
Earls Eight           2.3     75.2      05/20/2032   KY        AUD
Ruta del Maipo        2.3     53.5      12/15/2024   CL        CLP
Santander Consumer    2.9     73.1      11/27/2034   CL        AUD
Seagate HDD Cayman    3.4     73.4      07/15/2031   KY        USD
Seazen Group          4.5     63.6      07/13/2025   KY        USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9     68.8      01/23/2042   KY        AUD
Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR        BRL
Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR        BRL
Skylark               1.8     58.2      04/04/2039   KY        GBP
Chile  Bond           1.3     52        01/22/2051   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           3.1     66.9      01/22/2061   CL        USD
Chile  Bond           1.3     65.4      01/29/2040   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           1.3     71.2      07/26/2036   CL        EUR
Chile  Bond           3.3     66.6      09/21/2071   CL        USD
Ecopetrol SA          4.6     75        11/02/2031   CO        USD
Ecopetrol SA          5.9     63.9      11/02/2051   CO        USD
Ecopetrol SA          5.9     65.5      05/28/2045   CO        USD
Lani Finance          3.1     68.6      10/19/2048   KY        AUD
Lani Finance          1.9     63.3      10/19/2048   KY        EUR
Lani Finance          1.7     60        03/14/2049   KY        EUR
Lani Finance          1.9     62.3      09/20/2048   KY        EUR
QNB Finance           3.4     75.4      10/21/2039   KY        AUD
QNB Finance          13.5     55.7      10/06/2025   KY        TRY
QNB Finance           2.9     75.3      12/04/2035   KY        AUD
Tencent Holdings      3.8     74.1      04/22/2051   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.9     72.3      04/22/2061   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.2      06/03/2050   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.5      06/03/2050   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.3     63        06/03/2060   KY        USD
Tencent Holdings      3.3     63.5      06/03/2060   KY        USD
Three Gorges Finance  3.2     74.2      10/16/2049   KY        USD
Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         3.9     54.8      02/15/2061   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         4.1     61.9      02/22/2042   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5.6     72.7      02/26/2044   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         3.1     74        04/15/2031   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         3.3     72.1      04/22/2032   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5.2     67.3      05/15/2049   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         4.1     58.8      05/15/2051   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         5       66.9      06/15/2045   CO        USD
Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO        COP
Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO        COP
Earls Eight           1.7     71.4      06/20/2032   KY        AUD
Helenbergh China      8       32.9      11/07/2024   KY        USD
             
Agile Group Holdings  6.1     41        10/13/2025   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.5     45        04/21/2025   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.5     39.2      05/17/2026   KY        USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL        USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL        USD
Alibaba Group         2.7     67.4      02/09/2041   KY        USD
Alibaba Group         3.2     65.2      02/09/2051   KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  5.8     50.2      01/02/2025   KY        USD
QNB Finance          11.5     62.1      1/30/2025    KY        TRY
SYN prop e tech SA   13.6     20.3      3/15/2024    BR        BRL
Yango Cayman          12      3.9       09/15/2023   KY        USD
MSU Energy SA         6.9     70.8      02/01/2025   AR        USD
MSU Energy SA         6.9     71.2      02/01/2025   AR        USD
Itau Unibanco SA      5.8     19.4      05/20/2027   BR        BRL
Jamaica Government    8.5     68.9      12/21/2061   JM        JMD
Jamaica Government    6.3     72.7      07/11/2048   JM        JMD
Kaisa Group Holdings 10.9      9.1                   KY        USD
Fospar S/A            6.5      1.3      05/15/2026   BR        BRL
Frigorifico           7.7     71.1      07/21/2028   PY        USD
Frigorifico           7.7     71.4      07/21/2028   PY        USD
Galaxy Digital        3       62.5      12/15/2026   KY        USD
Generacion            9.9     73.1      12/01/2027   AR        USD
Generacion           12.5      0        02/16/2024   AR        USD
Gol Finance Inc       8.8     40.5                   KY        USD
Gol Finance Inc       8.8     42                     KY        USD
Goldman Sachs         2.3     75.9      06/30/2040   KY        EUR
Greenland Hong Kong  10.2     45.9                   KY        USD
Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL        USD
Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     55.3      01/15/2028   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     53.6      01/15/2028   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.4      04/15/2029   CL        USD
VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.5      04/15/2029   CL        USD
Vista Energy          1       73        03/03/2028   AR        USD
Voyager II            3.3     74.3      03/23/2034   KY        AUD
Transocean Inc        6.8     67.6      03/15/2038   KY        USD
Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.6      06/15/2033   CL        USD
Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.8      06/15/2033   CL        USD
El Salvador Bond      6.4     62.3      01/18/2027   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      6.4     62        01/18/2027   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.5      01/20/2050   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.6      01/20/2050   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      5.9     46        01/30/2025   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.6     58.1      02/28/2029   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.6     57.9      02/28/2029   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.4      04/10/2032   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.3      04/10/2032   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.6      07/15/2052   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.5      07/15/2052   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.9      09/21/2034   SV        USD
El Salvador Bond      7.6     50        09/21/2034   SV        USD
Banda de Couro        8       69.1      01/15/2027   BR        BRL
Alibaba Group         3.3     63        02/09/2061   KY        USD
AMTD IDEA Group       4.5     52.5                   KY        SGD
AAC Technologies      3.8     68.6      06/02/2031   KY        USD
ACEN Finance          4       70.9                   KY        USD
AES Tiete             6.8      0.7      04/15/2024   BR        BRL
Agile Group Holdings 13.5      40.7                  KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  8.4      38.1                  KY        USD
Agile Group Holdings  7.9      31                    KY        USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        19.8      7/09/2029   AR        USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        27.5      08/05/2023  AR        USD
Argentina Treasury    2.5      25.3      11/30/2031  AR        ARS
Argentine  Bond       0.5      19.5      07/09/2029  AR        EUR
Argentine  Bond       1        23.7      07/09/2029  AR        USD
Argentine  Bond       0.1      21.5      07/09/2030  AR        EUR
Argentine Bonos      16        72.6      10/17/2023  AR        ARS
Argentine Bonos      15.5      22.2      10/17/2026  AR        ARS
Ascent Finance        3.4      58.4      02/06/2043  KY        AUD
Ascent Finance        3.8      59.8      06/28/2047  KY        AUD
Ascent Finance        1.2      61.4      07/12/2047  KY        EUR
Astra Cumulative      1.5      60.6      11/01/2029  KY        USD


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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