/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/221118.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, November 18, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 225

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'CCC+/C' Foreign Currency SCR, Outlook Neg.


B A H A M A S

FTX TRADING: Bahamas Securities Commission Probes Collapse
FTX TRADING: Updated Chapter 11 Case Summary


B E L I Z E

BELIZE: Moody's Upgrades Issuer Ratings to Caa2, Outlook Stable


B E R M U D A

NABOR INDUSTRIES: Fitch Hikes LongTerm IDR to 'B-', Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Remittances Reach US$8.125M in 10Mos of 2022


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Inflation Rises to 9.9% in October


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Economic Activity is Recovering Well, IMF Says


P U E R T O   R I C O

SEARS HOLDINGS: Plan Declared Effective After 3 Years


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Generation to Get External Help

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'CCC+/C' Foreign Currency SCR, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 16, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC+/C' foreign
currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina. S&P lowered the
long-term local currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC-' from
'CCC+' and the national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'raBBB-'. S&P
also affirmed its 'C' short-term local currency rating. The outlook
on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's 'CCC+' transfer and
convertibility assessment is unchanged.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects increased risks in containing
pronounced economic imbalances as the 2023 primaries and national
elections are less than a year away. Global capital markets are
closed to Argentina while the small size of the local market limits
debt management alongside large peso-denominated amortizations.
Policy disagreement within the government coalition, and infighting
among the opposition, are undermining the prospect of placing local
debt at longer horizons. These factors are effectively shortening
the tenors at which debt in the local market is placed.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the ratings over the next six to 12 months on
unexpected negative policy or political developments that undermine
already limited access to financing from the local market or
official sources. Meaningful setbacks in execution under the
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) would complicate access to IMF
financing, and potentially from other multilateral lending
institutions (MLIs). This scenario would likely further damage
local investor confidence and hamper access to peso-denominated
debt markets. It could also exacerbate the need for recourse to
central bank financing amid challenging inflation dynamics and lead
to a downgrade. Heightened pressure in local financial markets,
including the banking system's deposit base, or difficulties in
managing central bank debt (LELIQs), could also lead to a
downgrade.

Moreover, further debt exchanges at this low rating level would
raise the likelihood that S&P would classify an exchange as
distressed, since such developments would typically indicate a
greater risk of a conventional default if creditors do not
participate in the exchange.

Upside scenario

S&P could raise the ratings over the next six to 12 months
following:

-- A track record of successful execution under the EFF, and

-- Clarity on how policy, post the elections, will ease financing
challenges in the local market and provide a road map to correct
Argentina's major structural macroeconomic imbalances.

S&P could also raise the ratings if there is a more pronounced
economic recovery that supports stronger fiscal outcomes that take
pressure off the government's financing needs.

Rationale

A long history of macroeconomic instability and sharp changes in
economic policies underpin the low credibility and predictability
of Argentina's governing institutions.

Political and financial events surrounding Economy and Finance
Minister Sergio Massa's assuming office in August highlight
weaknesses in Argentina's creditworthiness. These include fragile
local financial market conditions, and political and policy
disagreement across the political spectrum. Tension between
factions of the ruling coalition undermined policymakers' ability
to stabilize market confidence in June and July and led to the
departure of two economy ministers in one month.

The new economic team has overseen a successful EFF review with the
IMF, additional disbursements from MLIs, and a reprofiling of
official debt with the Paris Club. Economic authorities also
reiterated the government's commitment and intention to advance
policy aiming to meet key EFF targets. However, doubts remain on
whether the administration can engineer a material reduction in the
fiscal deficit--especially in 2023--as well as comply with central
bank financing targets. This requires expenditure containment,
including reduction of politically sensitive energy subsidies,
whose full implementation has already been postponed. In addition,
concerns remain on the feasibility of bolstering international
reserves as imports of goods and services are robust.

Last week's peso-debt exchange, as in August, included peso bonds
that were originally due in November and December 2022 for bonds
due between June and September 2023. The dual bonds due in 2023
offer inflation or exchange rate protection, unlike the peso
(fixed-rate, floating-rate, or inflation-linked, dollar-linked)
bonds that were eligible for the swap. Participation was 60.4%,
lower than 85% in August, suggesting limited appetite from private
bondholders. It's estimated some 40%-60% of forthcoming
amortizations are held by government entities (mostly the social
security institute ANSES/FGS and the central bank). Private
holdings in funds, in particular, prefer shorter duration and have
a t+0 mandate from their clients.

S&P said, "We don't consider the debt swap as tantamount to
default, despite that our ratings on Argentina are in the 'CCC'
category. In general, at such low rating levels, we would consider
most exchanges distressed and defaults. In our view, the offer did
not meet all conditions of a distressed exchange. This stems, in
part, from the fact that the investor, based on our understanding,
is not receiving less than originally promised. And we expect the
government would have otherwise paid the tendered bonds, with the
central bank acting as a backstop in the local secondary market and
mopping up excess peso liquidity via LELIQ issuance. The government
paid the nontendered bonds following the August 2022 transaction,
and we expect the government to make timely payment on nontendered
bonds in November and December. The clearing out of some of these
maturities on the margin could help take some pressure off the gap
between the official and parallel exchange rates that could
otherwise have occurred.

"We would analyze the rating implications of any potential future
debt exchange on a case-by-case basis considering its own terms and
conditions, as well as the prevailing macroeconomic context and
interim policy developments. Continued, repeated exchanges at this
low rating level would raise the likelihood that we will classify
an exchange as distressed, since such developments would typically
indicate a greater risk of a conventional default if creditors do
not participate in the exchange. A weakening financial position for
the government would raise the risk of nonpayment of nontendered
bonds. We would likely consider any unilateral, uncompensated
change in terms or extension of maturities a distressed exchange
and tantamount to default."

At this time, the Economy and Finance Minister is viewed as the
best option to execute policy in this complex environment, though
concern remains. Follow-through is key--particularly on reducing
energy subsidies over the coming months to lower the deficit and
pressure on local financing needs. Continued access to local market
funding will rely on lowering the overall and primary (noninterest)
deficit and financing from the central bank in line with the EFF.
Access to funding from the IMF and other official creditors is key
to supporting Argentina's economy, as well as timely debt service
over the coming year.

S&P said, "Our ratings in the 'CCC' category are based on the
vulnerabilities around timely commercial debt service (amid
pronounced macroeconomic imbalances), such as high and rising
inflation, pervasive foreign exchange controls, and low
international reserves. We also consider the limited policy room to
maneuver ahead of next year's presidential elections given a high
degree of political polarization. A moderate pace of planned fiscal
consolidation keeps financing needs high relative to the size of
the local market. There is no global market access, and volatile
global economic conditions reinforce the challenges in securing new
deficit financing and smooth rollovers in the small peso-debt
market. Policy execution generally in line with the EFF targets in
the run-up to the 2023 elections will be important for maintaining
access to official financing and supporting local investor
appetite.

"We now differentiate between local and foreign currency ratings in
the 'CCC' category given the different time frames associated with
stressed repayment scenarios. We lowered the long-term local
currency rating to 'CCC-' to reflect the challenges over the coming
six to 12 months associated with the magnitude of peso maturities
vis-à-vis the size of the local market, and the timing of 2023
elections and associated policy uncertainty. Our 'CCC+' long-term
foreign currency rating considers the overall vulnerabilities and
the limited foreign currency amortization due until 2025, under the
next administration, afforded by the 2020 restructuring."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  DOWNGRADED  
                                TO            FROM
  ARGENTINA

   Senior Unsecured             CCC-          CCC+

  DOWNGRADED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION; RATINGS AFFIRMED  

                                TO            FROM
  ARGENTINA

  Sovereign Credit Rating

   Local Currency         CCC-/Negative/C   CCC+/Stable/C

  RATINGS AFFIRMED  

  ARGENTINA

   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment

   Local Currency              CCC+

  ARGENTINA

   Senior Unsecured            CCC+

  RATINGS AFFIRMED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION  

                                TO            FROM
  ARGENTINA

  Sovereign Credit Rating

   Foreign Currency        CCC+/Negative/C    CCC+/Stable/C





=============
B A H A M A S
=============

FTX TRADING: Bahamas Securities Commission Probes Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Securities Commission of The Bahamas said
it is working with other regulators on matters dealing with the
collapse of the Nassau-based FTX.

FTX moved its headquarters from Hong Kong to The Bahamas last year
and the police there have already announced an investigation into
FTX, which rapidly became one of the biggest crypto exchanges in
the world, according to RJR News.

FTX filed for bankruptcy in the US.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the company's collapse was
preceded by the decision to lend billions of dollars' worth of
customer assets to fund risky bets by Alameda, FTX's founder, Sam
Bankman-Fried's crypto hedge fund, the report relays.

FTX TRADING: Updated Chapter 11 Case Summary
--------------------------------------------
Lead Debtor: FTX Trading Ltd.
             10-11 Mandolin Place, Friars Hill Road
             St. John's AG-04

Business Description: FTX is a cryptocurrency exchange built by
                      traders, for
traders.  FTX offers
                      innovative products
including industry-
                      first derivatives,
options, volatility
                      products and leveraged
tokens.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: Nov. 11, 2022 and Nov. 14, 2022

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Delaware

102 affiliates filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code:

     Debtor                                            Case
No.
     ------                                            --------
  1. Alameda Aus Pty
Ltd                               22-11104
  2. Alameda Global Services
Ltd.                      22-11134
  3. Alameda Research (Bahamas)
Ltd                    22-11105
  4. Alameda Research Holdings
Inc.                    22-11069
  5. Alameda Research
KK                               22-11106
  6. Alameda Research
LLC                              22-11066
  7. Alameda Research
Ltd                              22-11067
  8. Alameda Research Pte
Ltd                          22-11107
  9. Alameda Research Yankari
Ltd                      22-11108
10. Alameda TR
Ltd                                    22-11078
11. Alameda TR Systems S. de R.
L.                    22-11109
12. Allston Way
Ltd                                   22-11079
13. Analisya Pte
Ltd                                  22-11080
14. Atlantis Technology
Ltd.                          22-11081
15. Bancroft Way
Ltd                                  22-11082
16. Blockfolio,
Inc.                                  22-11110
17. Blue Ridge
Ltd                                    22-11083
18. Cardinal Ventures
Ltd                             22-11084
19. Cedar Bay
Ltd                                     22-11085
20. Cedar Grove Technology Services,
Ltd              22-11162
21. Clifton Bay Investments
LLC                       22-11070
22. Clifton Bay Investments
Ltd                       22-11111
23. Cottonwood Grove
Ltd                              22-11112
24. Cottonwood Technologies
Ltd.                      22-11136
25. Crypto Bahamas
LLC                                22-11113
26. DAAG Trading,
DMCC                                22-11163
27. Deck Technologies Holdings
LLC                    22-11138
28. Deck Technologies
Inc.                            22-11139
29. Deep Creek
Ltd                                    22-11114
30. Digital Custody
Inc.                              22-11115
31. Euclid Way
Ltd                                    22-11141
32. FTX (Gibraltar)
Ltd                               22-11116
33. FTX Canada
Inc                                    22-11117
34. FTX Certificates
GmbH                             22-11164
35. FTX Crypto Services
Ltd.                          22-11165
36. FTX Digital Assets
LLC                            22-11143
37. FTX Digital Holdings (Singapore) Pte
Ltd          22-11118
38. FTX EMEA
Ltd.                                     22-11145
39. FTX Equity Record Holdings
Ltd                    22-11099
40. FTX EU
Ltd.                                       22-11166
41. FTX Europe
AG                                     22-11075
42. FTX Exchange
FZE                                  22-11100
43. FTX Hong Kong
Ltd                                 22-11101
44. FTX Japan Holdings
K.K.                           22-11074
45. FTX Japan
K.K.                                    22-11102
46. FTX Japan Services
KK                             22-11103
47. FTX Lend
Inc.                                     22-11167
48. FTX Marketplace,
Inc.                             22-11168
49. FTX Products (Singapore) Pte
Ltd                  22-11119
50. FTX Property Holdings
Ltd                         22-11076
51. FTX Services Solutions
Ltd.                       22-11120
52. FTX Structured Products
AG                        22-11122
53. FTX Switzerland
GmbH                              22-11169
54. FTX Trading
GmbH                                  22-11123
55. FTX Trading Ltd. (Lead
Case)                      22-11068
56. FTX TURKEY TEKNOLOJI VE TICARET ANONIM
SIRKET     22-11170
57.  FTX US Services,
Inc.                            22-11171
58. FTX US Trading,
Inc                               22-11149
59. FTX Ventures
Ltd                                  22-11172
60. FTX Zuma
Ltd                                      22-11124
61. GG Trading Terminal
Ltd                           22-11173
62. Global Compass Dynamics
Ltd.                      22-11125
63. Good Luck Games,
LLC                              22-11174
64. Goodman Investments
Ltd.                          22-11126
65. Hannam Group
Inc                                  22-11175
66. Hawaii Digital Assets
Inc.                        22-11127
67. Hilltop Technology Services
LLC                   22-11176
68. Hive Empire Trading Pty
Ltd                       22-11150
69. Innovatia
Ltd                                     22-11128
70. Island Bay Ventures
Inc                           22-11129
71. Killarney Lake Investments
Ltd                    22-11131
72. Ledger Holdings
Inc.                              22-11073
73. LedgerPrime Bitcoin Yield Enhancement Fund, LLC   22-11177
74. LedgerPrime Bitcoin Yield Enhancement Master Fund 22-11155
75. LedgerPrime Digital Asset Opportunities Fund LLC  22-11156
76. LedgerPrime Digital Asset Opport. Master Fund LP  22-11157
77. Ledger Prime
LLC                                  22-11158
78. LedgerPrime Ventures,
LP                          22-11159
79. Liquid Financial USA
Inc.                         22-11151
80. LiquidEX
LLC                                      22-11152
81. Liquid Securities Singapore Pte
Ltd               22-11086
82. LT Baskets
Ltd.                                   22-11077
83. Maclaurin Investments
Ltd.                        22-11087
84. Mangrove Cay
Ltd                                  22-11088
85. North Dimension
Inc                               22-11153
86. North Dimension
Ltd                               22-11160
87. North Wireless Dimension
Inc                      22-11154
88. Paper Bird
Inc                                    22-11089
89. Pioneer Street
Inc.                               22-11090
90. Quoine India Pte
Ltd                              22-11091
91. Quoine Pte
Ltd                                    22-11161
92. Quoine Vietnam Co.
Ltd                            22-11092
93. SNG INVESTMENTS YATIRIM VE DANISMANLIK
ANONIM     22-11093
94. Strategy Ark Collective
Ltd.                      22-11094
95. Technology Services Bahamas
Limited               22-11095
96. Verdant Canyon Capital
LLC                        22-11096
97. West Innovative Barista
Ltd.                      22-11097
98. West Realm Shires Financial Services
Inc.         22-11072
99. West Realm Shires
Inc.*                           22-11183
100. West Realm Shires Services
Inc.                   22-11071
101. Western Concord Enterprises
Ltd.                  22-11098
102. Zubr Exchange
Ltd                                 22-11132

* West Realm Shires Inc. filed on Nov. 14, 2022.  FTX Trading
and
most of the other debtors filed on Nov. 11, 2022.

Additional affiliates listed by the Debtors but so far have not
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy:

     Altalix
Ltd                                              -
     B for Transfer
Egypt                                     -
     B Payment Services
Nigeria                               -
     B Transfer Services
Ltd                                  -
     B Transfer Services Ltd.
UAE                             -
     B Transfer Services
Uganda                               -
     BitPesa Kenya
Ltd.                                       -
     BitPesa RDC
SARL                                         -
     BitPesa Senegal
Ltd.                                     -
     BitPesa South
Africa                                     -
     BitPesa Tanzania
Ltd.                                    -
     BitPesa Uganda
Ltd.                                      -
     Bitvo,
Inc.                                              -
     Blockfolio Holdings,
Inc.                                -
     BT Payment Services
Ghana                                -
     BT Payment Services South
Africa                         -
     BT Payments
Uganda                                       -
     BT Pesa Nigeria
Ltd.                                     -
     BTC Africa
S.A.                                          -
     BTLS Limited
Tanzania                                    -
     CM-Equity
AG                                             -
     Corner Stone
Staffing                                    -
     Exchange 4 Free
Seychellen                               -
     Exchange 4Free Australia
Br.                             -
     Exchange 4Free
Ltd.                                      -
     Exchange 4Free South Africa
Br.                          -
     Exchange 4Free Swiss
Branch                              -
     Finfax
Company                                           -
     FTX US Derivatives
LLC                                   -
     FTX Vault Trust
Company                                  -
     FTX Ventures
Partnership                                 -
     K-DNA Financial Services
Ltd                             -
     Tigetwit
Ltd                                             -
     TransferZero                                             -

Judge: Hon. John T. Dorsey

Debtors'
Counsel:         Andrew G. Dietderich, Esq.
                 James L. Bromley, Esq.
                 Brian D. Glueckstein, Esq.
                 Alexa J. Kranzley, Esq.
                 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
                 125 Broad Street
                 New York, NY 10004
                 Telephone: (212) 558-4000
                 Facsimile: (212) 558-3588
                 E-mail: dietdericha@sullcrom.com
                         bromleyj@sullcrom.
com
                         gluecksteinb@sullcrom.
com
                         lkranzleya@sullcrom.
com

Debtors'
Co-counsel and
Local Counsel:    Adam G. Landis, Esq.
                  Kimberly A. Brown, Esq.
                  Matthew R. Pierce, Esq.
                  LANDIS RATH & COBB LP
                  919 North Market Street, Suite
1800
                  Wilmington, DE 19801
                  Tel: (302) 467-4400
                  Email: landis@lrclaw.com
                         brown@lrclaw.com
                         pierce@lrclaw.com

Debtors'
Claims Agent:     KROLL
                  https://cases.ra.kroll.com/FTX/Home-Index

Estimated Assets: $10 billion to $50 billion

Estimated Liabilities: $10 billion to $50 billion

The petitions were signed by John J. Ray III, chief executive
officer.

The Debtors did not file together with the petitions a list of
their 20 largest unsecured creditors.

A full-text copy of the Lead Debtor's petition is available for
free at PacerMonitor.com at http://tiny.cc/9oz0vz 



===========
B E L I Z E
===========

BELIZE: Moody's Upgrades Issuer Ratings to Caa2, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term local and
foreign currency issuer ratings of the Government of Belize to Caa2
from Caa3 and maintained the stable outlook.

The upgrade reflects the reduction in the debt/GDP ratio following
the buyback of the "superbond" in November 2021, and Moody's
expectation of a further reduction supported by a balanced primary
budget going forward. Under the terms of a loan incurred to buy
back the "superbond", debt affordability benefits from lower
interest payments until 2026 as compared with scheduled interest
payments before the restructuring, thereby supporting Belize's
fiscal strength assessment.

Although the reduction in the debt/GDP ratio benefits from a
statistical nominal GDP rebasing effect that broadens the economic
base the rebasing also highlights the government's inability before
the restructuring to service a lower than initially assumed
debt/GDP burden, underscoring Belize's continued weak debt
tolerance.

The stable outlook indicates that upside and downside risks are
balanced. Upside risks relate to  the prospect of fiscal and
economic reform implementation outlined by the government that
strengthens economic resiliency and reduces the risk of re-default
in the future. Downside risks stem from the economy's limited
external shock absorption capacity with repercussions on the
government's access to external liquidity for external debt service
payments.

Concurrently, Belize's local currency (LC) ceiling has been raised
to B3 from Caa1, reflecting persistent external imbalances and
moderate predictability and reliability of institutions and
government actions. Similarly, the foreign currency (FC) ceiling
has been raised to Caa1 from Caa2 reflecting moderate external
indebtedness, a weak track record of policy effectiveness and
potential capital account restrictions to safeguard the currency
peg to the US dollar in times of stress.

RATINGS RATIONALE

DEBT RESTRUCTURING IMPROVES FISCAL STRENGTH ASSESSMENT

Belize's debt/GDP ratio declined to 82.3% of GDP in 2021 from
104.5% in 2020 following the buyback of the $556 million
"superbond" at 55 cents on the dollar in November 2021. Under the
terms of the $364 million Blue Bond incurred to buy back the
"superbond", debt affordability benefits from lower interest
payments as a share of revenue and a significant maturity extension
that supports Belize's fiscal strength assessment. Looking forward,
Moody's expects the debt/GDP ratio to decline further and converge
toward 72% of GDP in 2023 supported by the maintenance of balanced
primary accounts, while interest/revenue remains below 10% over the
next three years. Belize's credit profile also benefits from a
currency peg, which has remained stable even when the country has
experienced acute external liquidity pressures, an element that
reduces risks to the government's balance sheet derived from
exchange rate shocks.

The reduction in the debt/GDP ratio benefited from a statistical
nominal GDP rebasing effect undertaken in 2022 which raised GDP by
around 25-35%, but it also highlighted the sovereign's inability to
service debt even though the ratio to GDP was lower than assumed
before the rebasing, underscoring Belize's weak debt tolerance.

NORMALIZATION OF TOURISM FLOWS SUPPORTS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND
STRENGTHENS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE BUFFER

After a sharp contraction of 13.7% in 2020, Belize's real GDP level
expanded by 16.3% in 2021, boosting Belize's real GDP back to
pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2021, with a further solid
expansion at 5.9% expected for 2022 before a gradual convergence
towards a relatively low trend growth at about 2%. The economic
recovery was mainly driven by a strong rebound in the crucial
tourism industry which accounts for almost 40% of economic activity
when taking indirect effects into account. As of September 2022,
tourist arrivals have recovered to 76% of arrivals in September
2019. Looking forward, Moody's expects growth to benefit from
previously delayed investment projects in the tourism industry,
including the implementation of several cruise port projects in
full compliance with Belize's nature conservancy commitments
assumed under the Blue Bond debt restructuring.

On the external side, liquid FX reserves rose to $416 million in
August 2022, or about four months of import cover, from a low of
$222 million in March 2020, despite the widening trade deficit on
the back of higher food and energy imports. Very strong services
exports at an annualized $795 million at the end of June 2022 as
compared to $676 million in March 2020 before the outbreak of the
pandemic mitigate the trade balance impact on the current account
which Moody's expects to remain relatively large within the 6-7% of
GDP range. Looking forward, Moody's expects FX reserves to converge
toward the $300-$350 million range which is below current levels,
but sufficient to cover about three months of imports and meet
external debt service payments.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook indicates that upside and downside risks are
balanced. Upside risks relate to  the prospect of fiscal and
economic reform implementation outlined by the government that
strengthens economic resiliency and reduces the risk of re-default
in the future. Downside risks stem from the economy's limited
external shock absorption capacity with repercussions on the
government's access to external liquidity for external debt service
payments.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Belize's ESG Credit Impact Score is highly negative (CIS-4),
reflecting a highly negative social risk issuer profile score, a
weak governance profile, and high exposure to environmental risks
that lead to volatile economic performance.

Belize's exposure to environmental risks is highly negative (E-4
issuer profile score), related to physical climate risks. The
country's infrastructure gap, low lying areas near the coast, and
its geographic location make it vulnerable to climate events like
hurricanes and tropical storms that have had negative economic and
fiscal implications for Belize's credit profile. Droughts can also
lead to production shocks in the primary and electricity sectors
that negatively impact economic performance.

Exposure to social risks is highly negative (S-4 issuer profile
score). An onerous pension scheme with a retirement age of 55 is
weighing on public finances. However, dependency ratios are low and
are expected to remain low relative to other countries in Central
America and the Caribbean. Relatively low income levels and the
country's infrastructure gap result in limited access to basic
public services and education, and although this has not resulted
in social unrest, a deteriorating security situation may be a
reflection of the low State presence and limited availability of
basic services within the sparsely populated territory.

Belize has a highly negative governance profile score (G-4 issuer
profile), balancing a stable political environment, underpinned by
a general consensus around key policy issues, with governance
challenges stemming from low population density, large
infrastructure gaps, the large size of the informal economy and the
government's small size that limits policy implementation. A
track-record of defaults, reflecting low debt tolerance also weighs
on Moody's assessment.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,858 (2021) (also known as Per
Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 16.3% (2021) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 4.9% (2021)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.4% (2021) (also known as Fiscal
Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -6.7% (2021) (also known as External
Balance)

External debt/GDP: 59.5% (2021)

Economic resiliency: b3

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans)
has been recorded since 1983.

On November 11, 2022, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Belize, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have improved. The issuer's institutions and
governance strength, has not materially changed. The issuer's
fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has
materially increased. The issuer's susceptibility to event risks
has not materially changed.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward pressure on the rating could develop over time from a shift
to consistent primary surpluses if fiscal reforms prove effective
in containing current expenditures -- i.e., wages, transfers and
subsidies -- and enhancing the government's revenue intake.
Structural reforms that incentivize investment and increase
potential growth would improve the sustainability of public
finances. A sustained increase in Belize's foreign exchange
reserves commensurate with a pegged exchange rate regime would be
key to reduce foreign currency liquidity risks.

The rating could be downgraded if Moody's conclude that a renewed
tightening in external and/or domestic liquidity conditions will
undermine the government's debt service capacity.
Higher-than-expected accumulation of government debt in a
post-restructuring environment would exacerbate solvency concerns,
as well as a renewed drawdown of foreign exchange reserves which
takes import cover below the three month mark.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Ratings Methodology published in November 2019.



=============
B E R M U D A
=============

NABOR INDUSTRIES: Fitch Hikes LongTerm IDR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) for
Nabors Industries, Ltd. and Nabors Industries, Inc. (collectively,
Nabors) to 'B-' from 'CCC+'. Fitch has also upgraded the revolving
credit facility to 'BB-'/'RR1' from 'B+'/'RR1', upgraded the senior
unsecured priority guaranteed notes (SPGN) to 'B+'/'RR2' from
'B'/'RR2', upgraded the senior unsecured guaranteed notes (SGN) to
'CCC+'/'RR5' from 'CCC'/'RR5' and upgraded the senior unsecured
notes to 'CCC/RR6' from 'CCC-'/'RR6'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

The upgrade to the IDR reflects the improving U.S. drilling
environment, which should enhance Nabors' EBITDA and FCF generation
in 2023 and support debt reduction. The upgrade also reflects the
company's improving credit metrics, continued gross debt reduction
and adequate liquidity profile.

Fitch believes Nabors will be able to re-price the majority of its
existing rig contracts through 4Q22 at leading edge dayrates,
currently approaching $40,000, which should ensure stronger FCF
generation through 2023, provide capacity for debt reduction and
improve their ability to manage the maturity profile. Fitch
believes 2023 FCF generation will be sufficient to repay the
company's 2023 notes, the 2024 notes and part of the 2025 notes,
which provides the company with approximately two years of runway
to address the later maturities.

These factors are partially offset by the company's large note
maturities starting in 2026-2028, which Fitch expects will likely
need to be refinanced through capital markets. Fitch cautions that
a potential decline in rig activity and dayrates could deteriorate
the cash flow profile and limit near-term gross debt reduction.
Another consideration is the company's complicated capital
structure and currently high interest rate environment that could
limit refinancing options and increase interest burden.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving U.S. Activity, Utilization: Fitch expects Nabors' U.S.
drilling segment will improve through 2023 as the company is able
to re-price the majority of its existing contracts at leading edge
dayrates through 4Q22. Nabors' U.S. lower 48 (L48) quarterly
average rig count improved to 92 in 3Q22 from an average of 68 for
3Q21 and the company's gross margins improved to over $11,000 in
3Q22 which should persist through 2023 as dayrates have improved
well into the $30,000 range. Nabors forecasts L48 quarterly average
rig count to increase by approximately five rigs in 4Q22 and is
expected to improve to over 100 in 2023 as the demand for
incremental super spec rigs remains strong given current market
tightness. Fitch believes Nabors' U.S. segment will be the primary
driver of stronger EBITDA and FCF generation in 2023 even despite
inflationary cost pressures.

Stronger FCF Generation: Fitch's base case forecasts positive FCF
generation of over $300 million for Nabors in 2023 which could
improve and continue into 2024 if currently favorable industry
dynamics persist. Nabors forecasts capex of approximately $380
million-$400 million for fiscal 2022, including approximately $140
million supporting the Saudi Aramco Joint Venture (JV) newbuild
program, which Fitch believes will increase in 2023 given Nabors
overall higher rig count and tight labor market conditions. The JV
deployed its first startup rig in early July through its newbuild
program and the second is expected in 4Q22. Management expects the
new build program will generate five rigs annually, with each rig
contributing approximately $10 million of annual EBITDA.

Fitch expects FCF will improve alongside rig count and utilization
rate increases, but understands capex may increase and higher
dayrates may be required to bring idled rigs back to service,
particularly after the company reaches 111 rigs in L48. Fitch
expects management will prioritize FCF first toward reduction of
the 2023 notes and then toward the 2024 exchangeable notes and 2025
senior unsecured notes. Fitch forecasts improvements in leverage
over time as activity increases and FCF is allocated toward gross
debt reduction which should help the company address its maturity
profile and maintain access to capital markets.

Medium-Term Refinance Risk: Fitch believes there is medium-term
refinance risk given the company's large note maturities starting
in 2025-2028. Fitch understands the company does have options to
address its near-term maturities, including the 2025 senior notes,
through a combination of FCF generation, common equity issuance and
accessing the debt capital markets given capacity at the SPGN and
SGN levels.

Fitch believes the company will generate enough FCF to repay all of
the 2023 and 2024 notes with cash on hand and partially reduce the
2025 notes. This will leave the company with approximately two
years of runway to address the remainder of the 2025's and the
2026's notes, which Fitch believes is enough time to generate
meaningful FCF and position themselves to refinance or pay down the
maturities in 2026-2028, especially if the company starts receiving
distributions from the JV.

Fitch recognizes that negative trends in the drilling environment
and a reduction in expected FCF generation, combined with the
complicated capital structure, could present difficulty accessing
capital markets to refinance the debt in the medium term.

Debt Reduction Continues: Nabors continues to reduce its absolute
debt load which has also improved gross leverage metrics. The
company has reduced its total outstanding notes balance by
approximately $220 million through 3Q22 which is expected to
continue into 2023 as FCF proceeds are applied toward the 2023,
2024 and 2025 notes. Leverage at 3Q22 stood at 4.2x and Fitch
forecasts debt/EBITDA will reach 2.5x in 2023 and could improve
thereafter if strong market conditions persist.

International Segment Stability, Limited Access: Nabors'
international drilling segment has exhibited resilience
through-the-cycle, but a considerable portion of international
EBITDA is generated through the Saudi Aramco JV, from which Nabors
has a limited ability to extract cash in the near-term.
Double-digit EBITDA growth is expected for the JV as newbuilds are
deployed and Fitch believes the JV will reach its FCF inflection
point in 2024. Fitch believes Nabors could receive distributions
from the JV in 2025, although the timing and magnitude of
distributions remains uncertain.

The International segment rig count has steadily improved to 75
rigs from 67 in 3Q21, but did not experience as significant of a
decline in rig activity during 2020 versus the U.S. segment.
International margins have historically been slightly higher than
U.S. margins and the longer term of the contracts provide for more
certainty on future utilization. Daily rig margins have remained
relatively resilient overall and have improved from $13,134 in 1Q22
to $14,589 in 3Q22, which should continue to climb in the
near-term.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch compares Nabors with Precision Drilling Corporation
(B+/Stable), which is also an onshore driller with exposure to the
U.S. and Canadian markets. It is estimated that Nabors has the
third-largest market share in the U.S. at approximately 12%
compared with Precision at 8%.

Nabors' gross margins in the U.S. are higher than Precision's
margins which is aided by its offshore and Alaskan rig fleet, which
operates at significantly higher margins. Precision has the highest
market share in Canada, while Nabors' Canadian assets were sold in
July 2021 for approximately $94 million. Nabors has a significant
international presence, which typically has longer-term contracts,
partially negating the volatility of the U.S. market.

Precision has stronger credit metrics and a more extended maturity
profile than Nabors, while the liquidity profiles are relatively
similar. Both companies are expected to generate FCF over their
respective forecast periods and use cash to reduce debt.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- WTI oil price of $95/bbl for 2022, $81/bbl in 2023, $62/bbl in
2024 and $50/bbl thereafter;

- Henry Hub natural gas price of $7.00/mcf in 2022, $5.00/mcf in
2023, $4.00/mcf in 2024, $3.00/mcf in 2025 $2.75/mcf thereafter;

- Double-digit revenue and EBITDA growth in 2023 followed by high
single-digit growth thereafter;

- Capex of $390 million in 2022 increasing toward $480 million in
2023;

- FCF is expected to be positive with the expectation that FCF
proceeds will be used to reduce gross debt.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- Proactive management of the maturity profile that reduces
medium-term refinance risks;

- Positive FCF generation with proceeds applied to reduce of total
gross debt toward $2.0 billion;

- Mid-cycle debt/EBITDA of below 3.5x on a sustained basis.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- Inability to reduce gross debt and proactively manage the
maturity schedule leading to heightened refinance risks;

- Inability to access the revolving credit facility or other
material reductions in liquidity;

- Mid-cycle debt/EBITDA greater than 4.5x on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: Cash attributable to Nabors at 3Q22 was
approximately $115 million which is net of approximately $306
million the Saudi Aramco JV and not available to Nabors. The
company also had full availability under its $350 million secured
revolving credit facility which also includes an accordion feature
for an additional $100 million of commitments, subject to lender
approval. The revolver matures in January 2026, but is subject to
springing maturity dates if certain issues of the company's 2023,
2024 and 2025 notes remain outstanding before their respective
maturity dates.

The facility is also subject to financial covenants including
minimum interest coverage of 1.875x in 3Q22 which tightens to 2.75x
by 2Q24 and a requirement that certain guarantors own a minimum of
90% of the consolidated PP&E of the company. Fitch believes Nabors
will be able to address its near-term maturities to avoid a
springing maturity on the revolver and forecasts the company to
remain within covenants in the base case.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

- The recovery analysis assumes Nabors would be reorganized as a
going-concern in bankruptcy rather than liquidated;

- Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim.

Going-Concern Approach

Nabors' going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects Fitch's view of a
sustainable, post-reorganization EBITDA level upon which Fitch
bases the enterprise valuation. The going-concern EBITDA assumption
for commodity sensitive issuers at a cyclical peak reflects the
industry's move from top of the cycle commodity prices to mid-cycle
conditions and intensifying competitive dynamics.

The going-concern EBITDA assumption equals EBITDA estimated for
2025, which represents the emergence from a prolonged commodity
price decline. Fitch assumes WTI oil prices of $42/bbl in 2023,
$32/bbl in 2024, $42/bbl in 2025 and $45/bbl for the long term.

The going-concern EBITDA assumption reflects a loss of customers
and lower margins, as E&P companies cut rigs and pressure oil
service firms to reduce operating costs. The EBITDA assumption also
incorporates the structural weakness outside of the Saudi Aramco JV
and overall high rig supply, but improving demand.

The assumption reflects corrective measures taken in the
reorganization to offset adverse conditions that triggered default,
such as cost-cutting and optimal deployment of assets.

An enterprise value multiple of 4.0x EBITDA is applied to
going-concern EBITDA to calculate a post-reorganization enterprise
value.

The choice of this multiple considered the following factors:

The historical bankruptcy case study exit multiples for peer energy
oilfield service companies have a wide range with a median of 6.1x.
The oil field service sub-sector ranges from 2.2x to 42.5x due to
the more volatile nature of EBITDA swings in a downturn.

Fitch used a multiple of 4.0x to estimate a value for Nabors
because of concerns of a downturn with a longer duration, a high
mix of international rigs that are not easily mobilized and
continued capital investment to remain competitive with peers to
maintain high quality and technologically advanced rigs for
operators.

Liquidation Approach

The liquidation estimate reflects Fitch's view of the value of
balance sheet assets that can be realized in sale or liquidation
processes conducted during a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding
and distributed to creditors.

Fitch assigns a liquidation value to each rig based on management
discussions, comparable market transaction values, and upgrades and
new build cost estimates.

Different values were applied to top of the line super spec rigs,
lower-value super spec rigs, non-super spec rigs, and higher value
international rigs.

The secured credit facility is assumed to be fully drawn upon
default and is super senior in the waterfall.

The allocation of value in the liability waterfall results in
recovery corresponding to 'RR1' for the secured credit facility, a
recovery of 'RR2' for the priority guaranteed notes, which are
subordinated to the secured credit facility, and a recovery of
'RR5' for the guaranteed notes, which are subordinated to the
priority guaranteed notes. The senior unsecured notes result in a
recovery of 'RR6'.

ISSUER PROFILE

Nabors is one of the largest drilling contractors in the world with
operations in both the U.S. and International markets. Nabors also
owns a Drilling Solutions business that offers specialized drilling
technologies that enhance drilling performance and wellbore
placement.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   Entity/Debt              Rating         Recovery   Prior
   -----------              ------         --------   -----
Nabors Industries,
Ltd.                  LT IDR B-   Upgrade              CCC+

   senior
   unsecured          LT     CCC+ Upgrade     RR5       CCC

Nabors Industries,
Inc.                  LT IDR B-   Upgrade              CCC+

   senior
   unsecured          LT     B+   Upgrade     RR2       B

   senior
   unsecured          LT     CCC  Upgrade     RR6      CCC-

   senior secured     LT     BB-  Upgrade     RR1       B+



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Remittances Reach US$8.125M in 10Mos of 2022
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Central Bank of the Dominican
Republic (BCRD) reported that remittances received by the country
in the first ten months of the year totaled US$8,125.3 million,
exceeding the income of more than US$800 million in October.

Similarly, he highlighted that the accumulated amount exceeds the
remittances received in the first ten months of 2019 by US$2,252.1
million, a period before the start of the covid-19 pandemic, and in
which the United States of America did not yet have the aid schemes
that were implemented after March 2020 and ended in September 2021,
resulting in a reduction of around US$549.8 million when comparing
the flows received as of September 2022 with those of the same
period of 20, according to Dominican Today.

He stated that remittances totaled US$815.9 million in October
2022, representing a 0.3% year-on-year increase, the report notes.
The first observed increase in 2022 results from a comparison with
October 2021, the first month after the US government ceases
economic aid, the report relays.  This result confirms the
establishment of a new monthly remittance flow level of
approximately US$800.0 million, the report discloses.

He stated that a significant increase is seen when comparing the
amount of October 2022 to the average value in the same month
before the pandemic (from 2015 to 2019), which was US$481.9
million, the report says.

According to the BCRD, the United States' economic performance is
one of the main factors that continue to influence remittance
behavior, as US$614.4 million came from that country in October,
accounting for 84.8% of the flows through formal channels, the
report relays.

The non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) of the
Supply Management Institute registered a value of 54.4 in October,
indicating the continued expansion of the North American economy's
services sector, which is primarily used by the Dominican diaspora
in the US, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican To related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: Inflation Rises to 9.9% in October
-------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that inflation now stands at 9.9 per cent.

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) says for the 12
months up to October, the increase in the cost of goods was mainly
influenced by a 10 per cent hike in the cost of 'Food and
Non-Alcoholic Beverages,' according to RJR News.

A 13 per cent rise in the cost of gas also affected inflation over
the period, the report notes.

The point to point results show inflation was 0.6 per cent higher
than the 12 months up to September, the report discloses.

The Bank of Jamaica's target range for inflation is four to six per
cent, the report notes.

STATIN says inflation for the month of October alone was 1.5 per
cent, the report relays.

Inflation for the month was tempered by a 0.3 per cent decline in
transport costs due to lower costs for petrol, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in March
2022, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.



=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================

NICARAGUA: Economic Activity is Recovering Well, IMF Says
---------------------------------------------------------
A staff team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led by Ms.
Alina Carare, held virtual discussions during November 3-4, and
visited Managua during November 7-15 for the 2022 Article IV
Consultation. The team met with the Finance Minister Ivan Acosta,
the Central Bank President Ovidio Reyes, other senior officials,
and representatives from the private sector, banks, and the
international community.

After contracting by about 9 percent during 2018-2020, economic
activity is recovering well, supported by appropriate macroeconomic
and financial policies and substantial pre-crisis buffers from
government deposits and international reserves. International
official financing, including IMF emergency assistance, also helped
the economy to cope with the pandemic and the reconstruction
efforts after the two consecutive hurricanes of November 2020. Real
GDP grew by 10.3 percent in 2021, and is expected to grow by 4
percent in 2022, sustained by private consumption and exports,
given favorable export prices. Strong remittances, large FDI
projects and the SDR allocation in August 2021 allowed the
continued accumulation of gross international reserves to about US$
4.2 billion (6.0 months of imports, excluding maquila), by
end-September 2022. Notwithstanding the government's introduction
of measures in May 2022 to mitigate the impact of the increase in
oil, wheat and fertilizers prices, inflation reached 12 percent
(year-on-year) in October 2022, driven mostly by import prices. The
authorities are appropriately focusing on managing the exit from
accommodative policies adopted during Covid and adjusting the
public finances to tighter global financial conditions. The Central
Bank of Nicaragua also tightened the monetary stance to maintain
exchange rate and financial stability.

Nicaragua's economic outlook is favorable, although risks to the
outlook are on the downside, primarily due to global headwinds .
Real GDP growth is expected to moderate to 3 percent in 2023, due
to weaker external demand and tighter external financial
conditions. Over the medium term, real GDP growth is projected to
converge to its potential of about 3½ percent, given the cautious
recovery in investment and credit to the private sector, and lower
labor force participation. Risks to the outlook are on the
downside: a more severe global downturn, further external monetary
tightening and higher import prices than expected. If these risks
materialize, they could result in lower real GDP and remittances
growth, higher inflation, worse food affordability, and a wider
fiscal deficit. Fiscal balances, economic activity and social
outcomes could be strained by natural disasters, given Nicaragua's
high exposure to climate change and economic dependence on climate
sensitive sectors. A deterioration in the business climate and
stricter international sanctions would affect trade and financing
flows.

Prudent monetary, fiscal, and financial policies need to continue,
to build resilience and achieve sustained medium-term growth . A
consistent policy mix, with appropriately tight fiscal and monetary
policies, is needed to strengthen buffers amid global uncertainty,
accumulate reserves and maintain an interest rate differential with
the U.S. needed to support the exchange rate crawling peg. The
mission supports the authorities' efforts to sustain medium-term
growth through investing in infrastructure, reducing energy costs,
and enhancing human capital. Sustained efforts to improve the
business climate and structural reforms to increase formal
employment will help curb emigration and strengthen the social
security accounts.

The fiscal policy stance for 2023 is appropriate and consistent
with the authorities' commitment to safeguard fiscal sustainability
. In 2023, the consolidated public sector deficit is expected to
improve by 0.9 percentage points of GDP, to 2.4 percent of GDP,
primarily through the unwinding of the crisis-related measures and
the continued consolidation at the central government level. Over
the medium term, a sustainable approach to fiscal policy is
expected to continue, to reduce public debt—which is currently
about 57 percent of GDP. The mission supports the authorities'
efforts to address the structural imbalances of the state-owned
enterprises and social security accounts, and enhance buffers given
the country's vulnerability to natural disasters and expected
tighter global financial conditions. In this respect, the mission
recommends better targeting subsidies and reallocating current
expenditures, to maintain adequate levels of social spending,
reduce poverty and support growth.

While banks are well capitalized and liquid, the resilience of the
financial sector could be further strengthened . Bank deposits
continue to grow, surpassing their pre-crisis aggregate level
(measured in Cordobas), and credit to the private sector is also
rebounding but remains below pre-crisis levels. Non-Performing
Loans (NPLs) have halved over the past two years to 1.9 percent in
September 2022 and the level of distressed assets (comprised of
NPLs, forborne, restructured and refinanced loans as well as
repossessed assets) continues to decline but remains significant
(12.1 percent in September 2022). The mission recommends increasing
the level of provisions for distressed assets and supports the
authorities' efforts to ensure that sound lending practices are
preserved. The authorities should align the crisis preparedness
framework with best international practices and expand the
prudential supervisory perimeter by overcoming data gaps for credit
and savings cooperatives and start their oversight, prioritizing
the largest ones. The authorities should also continue monitoring
FX risk given the high degree of dollarization.

Building on recent achievements, the authorities should continue
strengthening the AML/CFT framework . Nicaragua has implemented a
comprehensive set of legal reforms to align its AML/CFT framework
with international standards. As a result, the FATF has announced
its removal from the "Grey list". The mission recommends the proper
application of the AML/CFT framework and supports the authorities'
efforts to strengthen its effectiveness.

The mission commends the authorities for publishing their first
fiscal risks report in May 2022 and urges the authorities to
sustain efforts for greater fiscal transparency. The authorities
remain committed to publish the external audit reports on the use
of all COVID-19 funds; a first report covering the execution until
May 2021 is expected to be published by end-November 2022. The
Comptroller General Office has taken steps to strengthen the
spending oversight of the use of public funds, yet increased
efforts are needed to ensure risk-based audits and publication of
audit reports.

The state has taken steps to enhance governance and anticorruption
frameworks, and further efforts are needed to strengthen these
frameworks and their effective application. The Comptroller General
Office has introduced a platform to collect asset declarations of
public officials. The mission recommends that the Comptroller
General Office takes additional measures to ensure public access to
these declarations, digital reporting, and to prioritize reviews of
politically exposed persons. To support business climate and
growth, the state should strengthen the capacity to detect and
prosecute possible acts of corruption at all levels of government
by fully implementing the Law of Access to Public Information and
enacting norms that ensure whistleblower protection. Ensuring fair
and impartial access to the court system and to recourse in legal
proceedings, would support property rights, contract enforcement,
and investment protection.

The mission welcomes the authorities' intentions to continue
building on technical assistance recommendations to improve the
quality and consistency of statistics , which is critical to assess
risks, better formulate policies, and improve business confidence.

The IMF Executive Board is expected to hold Nicaragua's Article IV
Consultation in early 2023. The mission expresses its sincere
thanks to the authorities for their warm hospitality, cooperation,
and candor, and other Nicaraguan and international counterparts for
the frank dialogue.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

SEARS HOLDINGS: Plan Declared Effective After 3 Years
-----------------------------------------------------
Sears Holdings Corp. said Oct. 31, 2022, that all conditions
precedent to the Effective Date of the Second Amended Joint Chapter
11 Plan
were satisfied or waived in accordance with the Plan and the Plan
was substantially consummated.  Accordingly, October 29, 2022 is
the Effective Date of the Plan.

As of the Effective Date, the permanent injunction set forth in
Section 15.8 of the Plan is now in place.  Judge Robert D. Drain
earlier confirmed the Plan on Oct. 15, 2019.

                         Down to 20+
Stores

Edmund H. Mahony of Hartford Courant (TNS) reports that Sears
Holdings has emerged from bankruptcy after more than 10,000 court
filings and a four-year stay that saw the department store chain
shrink from almost 700 stores to less than two dozens.

The bankruptcy estate's reorganization plan took effect on Oct.
29, 2022, signaling an end to Chapter 11 and the start of a
liquidation process for its remaining assets.

Sears Holdings is a shell company. It sold its stores in February
2019 to ESL Investments, an affiliate of former Sears chair Eddie
Lampert. The $5.2 billion sale included more than 400 retail
locations.

Syracuse University professor of retail practice Ray Wimer doesn't
expect the remaining 20+ Sears stores from that sale to survive.
"They do not have an appealing value proposition to customers and
the amount of competition in the retail marketplace offering
similar goods means the end will come at some point," he told FOX
Business.

Sears once advertised itself as "Where America Shops" and boasted
merchandise lines from supermodel Cheryl Tiegs and "Charlie's
Angel's" star Jaclyn Smith.

At its peak, Sears, Roebuck was the world's largest retailer, with
nearly 3,500 Sears and Kmart stores, including 2,350 full-line and
off-mall stores, and 1,100 specialty retail stores. Sears also had
a portfolio of prominent brands and operating businesses,
including Kenmore, DieHard, Craftsman, Sears Home Services, Sears
Auto Centers and Innovel.

Competitor Walmart had just over 3,000 stores: 1,353 discount
stores and 1,713 Supercenters.

Lampert, then chair of Kmart Holding, bought Sears for $11 billion
in March 2005 in a bid to hold off brick-and-mortar competitors
such as Walmart and e-commerce competitors such as Amazon.

At the time of the merger, the Sears-Kmart combo, called
Transformco, had annual revenues of $55 billion, a fifth of
Walmart's fiscal 2004 total of $256 billion.

Amazon had annual revenue of $2.54 billion. Since then, the world's
largest online retailer has grown to $469.8 billion in sales while
Walmart ended 2021 at $572.8 billion. Transformco is private and
does not report financial results.

Sears tried to stave off bankruptcy by closing stores and selling
assets. Sears sold its Craftsman brand to Stanley Black & Decker in
2017 for $775 million and closed 300 stores in 2018.

It wasn't enough.

The company entered bankruptcy in October 2018 with 687 stores.
Like many brick-and-mortar retailers, the department store fell
victim to declining sales. Revenues dropped 53.8% in the five years
prior to bankruptcy, prompting some vendors to demand unfavorable
payment schedules, reduce subsidies or ask for cash in advance as a
condition for continued delivery of merchandise.

Lampert bought Sears' remaining assets in a January 2019 bankruptcy
auction and acquired Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores in June 2022.
He sold DieHard to Advance Auto for $200 million in December
2019.

Transformco has continued to sell off stores and closed the final
15 Sears Auto Center locations in January 2023.

Professor Wimer says, based on what he has seen, he expects the
Sears stores to die a slow death, noting it's unlikely anyone would
be interested in buying any of Sears' assets, if Lampert were
interested in selling, given the small footprint of the remaining
stores.

There are now less than two dozen Sears stores, excluding smaller
format Hometown Stores, according to BroStocks and the Sears
website.

                    About Sears Holdings Corp.

Sears Holdings Corporation -- http://www.searsholdings.com/ --
began as a mail ordering catalog company in 1887 and became the
world's largest retailer in the 1960s. At its peak, Sears was
present in almost every big mall across the U.S., and sold
everything from toys and auto parts to mail-order homes.  Sears
claims to be a market leader in the appliance, tool, lawn and
garden, fitness equipment, and automotive repair and maintenance
retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they had
3,500 US stores between them. Kmart emerged in 2005 from its own
bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings left it with 687 retail
stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
as of mid-October 2018. At that time, the Company employed 68,000
individuals.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets against $11.33 billion in total liabilities.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018. The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as legal counsel;
M-III Partners as restructuring advisor; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC as
investment banker; DLA Piper LLP as real estate advisor; and Prime
Clerk as claims and noticing agent.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed nine creditors, including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and landlord Simon Property
Group, L.P., to serve on the official committee of unsecured
creditors. The committee tapped Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
as legal counsel; FTI Consulting as financial advisor; and Houlihan
Lokey Capital, Inc. as investment banker.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 on July 9, 2019, appointed five
retirees to serve on the committee representing retirees with life
insurance benefits in the Chapter 11 cases.

                          *     *     *

In February 2019, Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain authorized Sears
Holdings approval to sell the business to majority shareholder and
CEO Eddie Lampert for approximately $5.2 billion. Lampert's ESL
Investments, Inc., won an auction to acquire substantially all of
Sears' assets, including the "Go Forward Stores" on a going-concern
basis. The proposal allowed 425 stores to remain open and provided
ongoing employment to 45,000 employees.

The new parent is Transform SR Brands LLC, doing business as
Transformco, referred to as "New Sears".  Transform is an
American
privately held company formed on Feb. 11, 2019, to acquire some of
the assets of Sears Holdings Corporation. The new company is owned
by Eddie Lampert's ESL Investments.



=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Generation to Get External Help
--------------------------------------------------
Ria Taitt at Trinidad Express reports that Prime Minister Dr. Keith
Rowley and Minister of Public Utilities Marvin Gonzales expressed
confidence that power outages such as those experienced, would be
reduced in the future.

Responding to a question during Prime Minister's Question Time,
Rowley said the Government had been working closely with Trinidad
Generation Unlimited (TGU) to bring in external technical support
for the La Brea power generation company, according to Trinidad
Express.

"That is actively on the way and TGU is improving its reliability
as I speak and we anticipate that this kind of occurrence will be
reduced and ameliorated," the report notes.

He said TGU was having issues and had taken the correct steps of
getting external technical assistance and there was already an
improvement in performance, the report relays.

He said the disruptions in the supply of electricity were because
TGU suffered simultaneous trips and there was a loss of generation
of 230 megawatts and 235 megawatts respectively which resulted in
under-frequency load shedding events, which affected 16 per cent
and 10 per cent respectively of T&TEC's customer base, the report
discloses.

Gonzales said the Government was confident that as a result of
discussions among the Ministry of Public Utilities, T&TEC and TGU
to reduce the number of interruptions in electricity and the level
of support being given by the Government to TGU, there will be
fewer disruptions in the supply of electricity to consumers, the
report notes.

Responding to an urgent question from Princes Town MP Barry
Padarath in the House of Representatives, Gonzales said T&TEC's
generating plant in Cove, Tobago was functional, the report
relays.

He said T&TEC receives power from three independent power producers
and had limited control over operational issues at these power
producers, the report says.  He said the generators at all three
power stations were functional, except there were more frequent
trips at the TGU plants which they were currently working on. He
said the TGU plant had experienced 36 machine trips, the report
notes.

He said the chairman of T&TEC has had several discussions with his
counterpart at TGU on the frequency of the trips and T&TEC had
written to TGU on several occasions on his matter, the report
relays.  Meetings between officials of T&TEC and TGU have also
taken place, Gonzales said.

"And the Government feels confident that with these discussions and
interventions, the level of interruption that we have been having
at the TGU plant would be minimised," Gonzales said, the report
discloses.

Asked by Padarath about the issue of the availability of fuel to
the plant, Gonzales said the availability of gas was not the
problem, the report relays.

"Because T&TEC is minimising the cost of spinning reserves on the
Commission. The Commission has taken appropriate action to minimise
the amount of spinning reserves to reduce the cost on the
Commission . . ..  The level of disruptions that we are
experiencing from the independent power producers is outside of
T&TEC's control and the lowering of the spinning reserves, it is
causing the level of disruption we have been having within recent
times on the distribution grid," Gonzales said, the report notes.

Asked about the Government's dependence on TGU and whether Gonzales
could ensure that there are alternative avenues for power supply,
Gonzales said TGU was one of the most efficient plants, producing
more electricity and power when compared to the other two
independent power producers, the report says.

He said he was confident that the discussions taking place between
the Government and TGU will result in fewer disruptions on the
distribution grid, the report adds.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                  * * * End of Transmission * * *