/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/221101.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, November 1, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 212

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDRs to 'CCC-'
ARGENTINA: Has Reached Debt Agreement With Paris Club
ARGENTINA: Tourists Pay With Wads of Cash as Inflation Nears 100%


B R A Z I L

OI SA: 2023 Bank Debt Trades at 93% Discount
OI SA: 2024 Bank Debt Trades at 93% Discount


C H I L E

CHILE: Economy Undergoing Necessary Transition Towards Growth


C U B A

CUBA: Hunger Drives Cuban Migration to US Higher in 2022


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fuel Prices Remain Unchanged


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Cost of Production Declined in September


P U E R T O   R I C O

EMPACADORA Y PROCESADORA: Secured Creditor Says In Talks w/ Debtor


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: 2022 Deficit Cut to 0.2%

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDRs to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
(FC) and Local-Currency (LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
'CCC-' from 'CCC'. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to
sovereigns with a rating of 'CCC+' or below. Fitch has removed the
Long-Term IDRs from Under Criteria Observation (UCO).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Downgrade of IDRs: The downgrade of Argentina's FC IDR to 'CCC-'
reflects deep macroeconomic imbalances and a highly constrained
external liquidity position, which Fitch expects to increasingly
undermine repayment capacity as foreign-currency debt service ramps
up in the coming years. An Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the
IMF launched in March has not yet proven to be a strong anchor for
policy improvements to build international reserves and improve
prospects for recovery of market access and it is unclear if this
will be possible to achieve in any outcome of upcoming 2023
elections, increasing risks of an eventual credit event. The
downgrade of the LC IDR to 'CCC-' reflects Fitch's view that
local-currency repayment capacity is also comprised, as a heavy
load of peso maturities due in the coming year could be hard to
roll over in the event of pre-election market jitters.

Foreign Reserves Under Pressure: The current account surplus is
eroding (Fitch expects it to flip to a deficit of 0.4% of GDP in
2022) and capital controls have contained but not fully staunched
outflows, largely reflecting monetary and exchange-rate
distortions. Net international reserves (NIR; gross reserves minus
liquid FX liabilities such as the China swap) fell to USD1.3
billion in August from USD2.3 billion at end-2021, and much more
net of EFF financing, before jumping to USD5.5 billion as of
mid-October on the "soy dollar" (a one-month opportunity for soy
producers to liquidate FX at a preferential exchange rate).
However, NIR will likely come under pressure again due to import
payments (many were postponed from mid-year due to a BCRA
requirement that importers seek 180-day trade financing) and a poor
wheat harvest. The BCRA is tightening FX controls, which could
contain reserve declines, but the sustained accumulation targeted
in the EFF appears unlikely in the absence of a holistic shift in
exchange-rate policy.

Record-High Inflation: Fitch projects inflation will reach 100% in
2022 from 51% in 2021, its highest level in decades, driven by a
monetary overhang, global price pressures and devaluation
expectations contaminating price-setting behaviors. The BCRA has
lifted its policy rate to 107% (percent annum) from 45%, after
years of keeping it stable, though this has not yet delivered the
positive real rates envisioned in the EFF. While the BCRA has
dialed back financing of the treasury as required in the EFF, it
has taken other measures with similar monetary effects (e.g. a
massive intervention to stabilize the local bond market mid-year).
These have greatly increased sterilization needs at the same time
as higher interest rates have lifted the cost of doing so, putting
further pressure on the BCRA's already weak balance sheet and
constraining its policy flexibility.

Slow Fiscal Consolidation: The primary budget deficit is declining
in 2H22 after slippage in 1H22 on tighter control of spending and
erosion of pensions and salaries from surging inflation, and Fitch
expects it will reach the 2.8% of GDP EFF target for 2022 (this
excludes accounting profits on bond re-taps found to be spurious by
the IMF). Achieving the 1.9% target in 2023 will be challenging:
the authorities have announced a long-awaited roll-back in energy
subsidies could yield savings of around 0.5% of GDP in 2023, but no
other major structural measures besides this, and spending pressure
will be high given elections and a sharp expected growth slowdown.
Consolidation could become increasingly difficult, given that
rising inflation is benefitting fiscal accounts now, but will add
pressure later on due to backward indexation.

Financing Risks to Rise: The authorities have met their financing
needs mainly in the local peso market as BCRA funding has been
scaled back. This has required shorter tenors and higher rates,
resulting in a clustering of maturities in mid-2023 that could be
difficult to roll over amid possible election jitters.
Foreign-currency debt repayment risks could also rise. Even
relatively low step-up coupons on restructured bonds (USD2 billion
in 2023 and USD3 billion in 2024) could be difficult to pay should
reserves remain at critical levels. Capacity to honor large
amortization payments that will begin in 2025 will hinge on a
substantial FX reserve accumulation and recovery of market access,
which Fitch expects could be difficult to achieve even in any
election outcome.

Government Debt Sustainability Risks: Fitch projects central
government debt will rise to 84% of GDP in 2022 from 81% in 2021
and remain stable thereafter, although this is not indicative of
debt sustainability. A primary deficit, weak trend growth, and the
indexation of most peso market securities to inflation weaken debt
dynamics. Deeply negative real interest rates offset this, but will
be less supportive should the authorities shift away from virtually
zero-interest BCRA financing to costlier market financing, and as
coupons on restructured bonds step up. Real appreciation of the
peso is also helping debt dynamics, but this is not a sustainable
trend.

Growth Momentum to Slow: Fitch has revised its projected real GDP
growth for 2022 up to 4.6%, given better-than-expected momentum so
far this year. High inflation has eroded real incomes, but has also
incentivized acceleration of spending, supporting growth for now.
Growth is bound to slow, however, in the context of surging
inflation, policy adjustments, and FX restrictions that risk
depriving the productive sector of needed inputs. Macro
uncertainties and the absence of an agenda to address longstanding
competitiveness issues undermine the medium-term growth outlook,
though this could improve should an agenda to tackle these issues
gain traction after elections.

Massa Takes Charge: Political conditions for policy adjustment
appear to have improved with the appointment of Sergio Massa (a
heavyweight in the ruling Peronist coalition) as finance minister
in August, after years in which tensions within Peronism hindered
such an agenda. Monetary tightening and energy subsidy cuts are
signs of progress. Nevertheless, a comprehensive policy plan needed
to boost confidence remains elusive, and this appears unlikely to
emerge until after the 2023 elections. The opposition appears well
positioned to win, following its strong showing in the 2021
midterms and given the low popularity of the Alberto Fernandez
administration. However, a complex social and political environment
could complicate adjustments in any election outcome.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5' for both Political
Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and
Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. These scores reflect
the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI)
have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Argentina has a
medium WBGI ranking at the 46th percentile, balancing moderately
high voice and accountability, a moderate level of corruption, and
a recent track record of peaceful political transitions with weak
institutional capacity and uneven application of the rule of law.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- Public Finances: Signs of probable default to private
   creditors, including intensification of financing strains that
   increase risks of and incentives for the sovereign to miss,
   unilaterally reprofile, or renegotiate upcoming bond
   repayments.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- External Finances: A sustained build-up in central bank
   international reserves supported by credible policy
   adjustments;

- Public Finances: Implementation of a credible fiscal adjustment
   that puts government debt/GDP on a downward path and
   materially improves access to market financing;

- Macro: Greater confidence in a policy plan that could support
   economic recovery and improve macroeconomic stability.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Argentina a score equivalent to a
'B-' Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. However, in accordance with
its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating committee has not
utilized the SRM and QO to explain the ratings in this instance.
Ratings of 'CCC+' and below are instead guided by the rating
definitions.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within its
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest
weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the
rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Argentina has
a percentile rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicator,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight. As Argentina has a percentile
rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a
negative impact on the credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a
rating driver. As Argentina has a percentile rank above 50 for the
respective Governance Indicator, this has a positive impact on the
credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Argentina, as for all sovereigns. As
Argentina has a fairly recent restructuring of public debt in 2020,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   Entity/Debt                   Rating             Prior
   -----------                   ------             -----
Argentina         LT IDR           CCC-  Downgrade   CCC
                  ST IDR           C     Affirmed    C
                  LC LT IDR        CCC-  Downgrade   CCC
                  LC ST IDR        C     Affirmed    C
                  Country Ceiling  B-    Affirmed    B-


ARGENTINA: Has Reached Debt Agreement With Paris Club
-----------------------------------------------------
Argentina's Economy Minister Sergio Massa announced that the
government has "successfully" reached an agreement with the Paris
Club group of creditors to restructure the nation's outstanding
debt.

At a televised event with business leaders in Escobar, Buenos Aires
Province, Massa said the agreement paves the way for Argentine
firms to access credit from European institutions.

"[ ], we have successfully closed the agreement with the Paris Club
to return our country's relations with the European bloc to
normal," said the minister, who said it would allow Argentina to
"normalise the relations of our country, of our companies, of our
workers, with the countries of the European bloc."

According to the head of the economy portfolio, "we have to be
credible but firm in defending Argentina's interests."

"Many companies here were denied access to credit in Europe and
trade with companies from the European bloc because we were still
in negotiations with the Paris Club," he said.

Argentina's negotiations with the Paris Club, over a debt of just
under US$2 billion, have dragged on for years while, at the same
time, the country has engaged parallel negotiations with the
International Monetary Fund for a new financing programme.

The two sides amended earlier repayment agreements "to clear the
remaining debt in arrears due to the Paris Club creditors over a
six-year period" running until 2028, the Paris Club said in a
statement.

"The scheme offers a framework for a sustainable solution to the
question of arrears due by the Argentine Republic to Paris Club
creditors, covering a total estimated stock of arrears of US$1.972
billion," it added.

Repayment would now be made in 13 semi-annual instalments, the
first due in December this year and the last in September 2028,
said the club.

President Alberto Fernández's government reached an agreement with
the IMF in March earlier this year to restructure more than US$44
billion in debt, but changes at the helm of the economy portfolio
in July further complicated talks with the wealthy group of
nations.

The country is battling high inflation of 66 percent so far this
year.

Under the IMF deal, Argentina must boost its international reserves
and reduce the fiscal deficit from three percent of gross domestic
product in 2021 to 2.5 percent this year, 1.9 percent in 2023 and
0.9 percent in 2024.

"We are a financial debtor country but an environmental creditor,
we are one of the countries that guarantees global food security.
We are one of the first countries that had to tolerate the impact
of the war [in Ukraine] on its economy," said Massa

"All we have to do is to value our development model," he
stressed.

A mission team from the Economy Ministry is currently in Paris to
finalise the details of the agreement. Massa was previously
expected to travel to Europe in October to continue negotiations,
but that trip was postponed to November.

                             About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South America.  Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel
Fernandez is the current president of Argentina after winning  
the October 2019 general election. He succeeded Mauricio  
Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however,  
its economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Last March 25, 2022, Argentina finalized agreement with the IMF
for a new USD44 billion Extended Funding Facility (EFF) intended
to fund USD40 billion in looming repayments of the defunct
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), with an extra USD4 billion in up-front
net financing. This has averted the risk of a default to the IMF
and is facilitating a parallel rescheduling of Paris  Club debt.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Aug. 12, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its foreign and
local-currency sovereign credit ratings of 'CCC+/C' on the
Republic of Argentina. The outlook remains stable. S&P also
affirmed its national scale 'raBBB-' rating and its 'CCC+' transfer
and convertibility assessment. S&P said the stable outlook reflects
the challenges in managing pronounced economic imbalances ahead of
the 2023 national elections given disagreement on policy within the
government coalition and financing pressures in the local market.

Last April 14, 2022, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'CCC'.
Fitch said Argentina's 'CCC' ratings reflect weak external
liquidity and pronounced macroeconomic imbalances that undermine
debt repayment capacity, and uncertainty regarding how much
progress can be made on these issues under a new IMF program.
On July 19, 2022, Fitch Ratings placed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and Long-Term Local
Currency IDR Under Criteria Observation (UCO) following the
conversion of the agency's Exposure Draft: Sovereign Rating
Criteria to final criteria. The UCO assignment indicates that
ratings may change as a direct result of the final criteria. It
does not indicate a change in the underlying credit profile, nor
does it affect existing Rating Outlooks.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on
Sept. 28, 2020.

DBRS has also confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Rating at CCC and Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Rating at
CCC (high) on July 21, 2022.


ARGENTINA: Tourists Pay With Wads of Cash as Inflation Nears 100%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News reports that paying with cash
is becoming increasingly cumbersome in Argentina, with huge piles
needed as the government refuses to issue bills with larger
denominations despite inflation galloping toward 100 percent.

In scenes reminiscent of Venezuela, the Argentine peso's sharp
decline in parallel markets is multiplying the bills needed for
everyday purchases in a country where the largest bill is worth
less than US$4, according to Bloomberg News.  A gap between
Argentina's official exchange rate and a variety of parallel
exchange rates encourages tourists and locals who have greenbacks
to trade money in cash on the black market, Bloomberg News notes.

The problem stems from the fact that the largest denomination bill
in Argentina is 1,000 pesos, the report notes.  At the official
rate, that's worth US$6.43, but due to strict capital controls,
Argentines and foreign tourists often exchange dollars at the
commonly used black market rate known as "dolar blue," where 1,000
pesos fetches just US$3.44, Bloomberg News discloses.   The Central
Bank told Bloomberg News it's focusing on digital payment systems
instead of promoting cash use, Bloomberg News relays.

Oscar Salem and nine friends left a mound of cash to pay their
restaurant tab at a Buenos Aires steakhouse, including various cuts
of grass-fed meat, top-shelf wine and desserts, Bloomberg News
notes.

The final bill: US$50 per person on average, according to a viral
photo Salem posted on Twitter while visiting Argentina's capital,
Bloomberg News discloses.  Most foreigners who turn to the black
market for pesos benefit from enjoying tourists attractions at a
fraction of the price that they would pay in other countries,
Bloomberg News notes.

"There's no reason for any tourists to pay with a credit card, it's
literally 50 percent more," Salem, founder of consulting firm BCM
Partners in Montclair, New Jersey, told Bloomberg.  Paying in cash
is a "no brainer. In New York City, this meal is US$3,000," he
added.

To be sure, electronic payment options - such as mobile points of
sales, QR codes and direct bank transfers - have jumped in
popularity for Argentines since the pandemic, with 53 percent
growth of transfer payments in August from the prior year,
Bloomberg News says.  But that growth doesn't extend to tourists or
locals who exchange cash dollars to protect their savings from
currency devaluation, Bloomberg News notes.

A Central Bank regulation that sought to encourage tourists to
bring funds into the country through official channels has not yet
been implemented, Bloomberg News relays.

                              Eroded Value

In a written response to a question on the possibility of
incorporating bills of larger denominations, Central Bank Governor
Miguel Pesce pointed to a figure that 98 percent of Argentine
adults have a bank account. (World Bank data shows that figure at
71 percent), Bloomberg News relays.

"The key is in the development of electronic payment systems,"
Pesce said in a statement obtained by Bloomberg News.  "The Central
Bank promotes digital payment methods like debit, credit, automatic
transfers, electronic checks, bank wallets and non-bank wallets,"
the statement added.

In the meantime, the declining purchasing power of the peso
continues to draw jest from foreign tourists, Bloomberg News
relays.  Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of Brazilian President Jair
Bolsonaro, is among foreigners whose social media post was widely
shared after he showed how he paid with a huge pile of cash at a
restaurant, Bloomberg News notes.

In July, Brazilian football fans tore up pesos at a game to mock
their Argentine counterparts. And a Dutch traveller with a quarter
million TikTok followers posted a video laughing in his Buenos
Aires hotel room with 1,000 bills raining down, Bloomberg News
adds.

                             About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South America.  Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel
Fernandez is the current president of Argentina after winning  
the October 2019 general election. He succeeded Mauricio  
Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however,  
its economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Last March 25, 2022, Argentina finalized agreement with the IMF
for a new USD44 billion Extended Funding Facility (EFF) intended
to fund USD40 billion in looming repayments of the defunct
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), with an extra USD4 billion in up-front
net financing. This has averted the risk of a default to the IMF
and is facilitating a parallel rescheduling of Paris  Club debt.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Aug. 12, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its foreign and
local-currency sovereign credit ratings of 'CCC+/C' on the
Republic of Argentina. The outlook remains stable. S&P also
affirmed its national scale 'raBBB-' rating and its 'CCC+' transfer
and convertibility assessment. S&P said the stable outlook reflects
the challenges in managing pronounced economic imbalances ahead of
the 2023 national elections given disagreement on policy within the
government coalition and financing pressures in the local market.

Last April 14, 2022, Fitch Ratings affirmed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'CCC'.
Fitch said Argentina's 'CCC' ratings reflect weak external
liquidity and pronounced macroeconomic imbalances that undermine
debt repayment capacity, and uncertainty regarding how much
progress can be made on these issues under a new IMF program.
On July 19, 2022, Fitch Ratings placed Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and Long-Term Local
Currency IDR Under Criteria Observation (UCO) following the
conversion of the agency's Exposure Draft: Sovereign Rating
Criteria to final criteria. The UCO assignment indicates that
ratings may change as a direct result of the final criteria. It
does not indicate a change in the underlying credit profile, nor
does it affect existing Rating Outlooks.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on
Sept. 28, 2020.

DBRS has also confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Rating at CCC and Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Rating at
CCC (high) on July 21, 2022.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

OI SA: 2023 Bank Debt Trades at 93% Discount
--------------------------------------------
Participations in a syndicated loan under which Oi SA is a borrower
were trading in the secondary market around 7 cents-on-the-dollar
during the week ended Fri., October 28, 2022, according to
Bloomberg's Evaluated Pricing service data.  

The $128.5 million facility is a term loan.  The loan is scheduled
to mature on March 15, 2023.  As of October 28, 2022, $57 million
of the amount has been drawn and outstanding.

Oi, formerly known as Telemar, is the largest fixed telephone
operator and the fourth mobile telephone operator in Brazil, being
the third largest telecommunication company in Latin America. It is
headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.


OI SA: 2024 Bank Debt Trades at 93% Discount
--------------------------------------------
Participations in a 2024 syndicated loan under which OI S.A. is a
borrower were trading in the secondary market around 7
cents-on-the-dollar during the week ended Fri., October 28, 2022,
according to Bloomberg's Evaluated Pricing service data.

The $128.5 million facility is a term loan.  The loan is scheduled
to mature on March 15, 2024.   As of October 28, 2022, $71 million
of the amount is drawn and outstanding.

Oi, formerly known as Telemar, is the largest fixed telephone
operator and the fourth mobile telephone operator in Brazil, being
the third largest telecommunication company in Latin America. It is
headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.




=========
C H I L E
=========

CHILE: Economy Undergoing Necessary Transition Towards Growth
-------------------------------------------------------------
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission met with the Chilean
authorities and other counterparts during October 18-27 to discuss
recent economic developments and policy priorities.  The IMF staff
issued a concluding statement, which summarizes the mission's main
takeaways, which include:

1. After an impressive recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, the
Chilean economy is undergoing a necessary transition towards
sustainable growth. In light of an effective, sizable, and
multi-pronged policy response, the economy recovered very fast from
the fallout of the pandemic, which resulted in the build-up of
macroeconomic imbalances. Amid a positive output gap, inflationary
pressures, and an elevated current account deficit, the authorities
have adequately tightened macroeconomic policies, while supporting
lagging employment and protecting the most vulnerable. GDP growth
is projected to decline from 11.7 percent in 2021 to 2.1 percent in
2022 and turn negative at 1.3 percent in 2023, before returning to
an estimated potential rate of 2.5 percent over the medium term.

2. The balance of risks is tilted to the downside. External risks
include the possibility of an abrupt global slowdown or recession,
with an associated spike in global risk premia and commodity price
volatility; a possible de-anchoring of inflation expectations in
major economies alongside further tightening of global financial
conditions; commodity price shocks; or an intensification of
spillovers from Russia's war in Ukraine. Domestic risks relate to
high inflation persisting for longer than expected, social
discontent over high food and energy prices, or slow progress to
meet social demands. The constitutional reform process is expected
to continue but uncertainty over possible outcomes has narrowed.

3. Very strong fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks
underpin Chile's resilience and capacity to respond to shocks. On
August 29, the IMF Executive Board approved a two-year Flexible
Credit Line (FCL) arrangement for Chile in the amount of SDR 13.954
billion (about US$18 billion) to augment precautionary buffers and
provide substantial insurance against adverse scenarios. Chile
qualifies for the FCL because it has very strong fundamentals and a
sustained track record of implementing very strong policies. The
economy remains resilient, and the authorities have recovered
policy space to respond to adverse shocks. Very strong
fundamentals, including due to a low public debt ratio and ample
liquidity buffers (comprising international reserves, foreign
exchange (FX) liquidity lines, and assets in the sovereign wealth
funds), reinforce a favorable medium-term assessment even in the
face of significant risks.

4. The Central Bank of Chile (BCCh) has appropriately tightened
monetary policy to tame inflationary pressures and remains vigilant
to risks to the macroeconomic scenario. Inflationary pressures have
been significant, as global price spillovers have been compounded
by domestic factors, including a very strong (yet rapidly
narrowing) cyclical position, and currency depreciation. Headline
(core) inflation reached 13.7 (11.1) percent in September, and
two-year ahead inflation expectations stand above the 3 percent
target. The BCCh has pro-actively responded by quickly raising the
policy rate to 11.25 percent in October (substantially above the
neutral rate) and has announced that the policy rate will remain at
that level for as long as necessary to ensure inflation converges
to target over the policy horizon. IMF staff assesses the monetary
stance to be adequate. However, upside risks to inflation prevail,
which might require extending the tightening cycle if inflation
pressures persist. Effective communication continues to be key to
preserving the long-term gains of low inflation and well-anchored
expectations.

5. The FX intervention program was successful in addressing risks
of disorderly market conditions. The sharp fall in copper prices
between June and mid-July triggered a fast and large depreciation
alongside unusually high FX volatility. Stress in the FX market was
aggravated by capital outflows, and the domestic capital market was
less effective in cushioning the shock than in the past, affected
by the three rounds of pension withdrawals. To prevent disorderly
market conditions, the BCCh launched an FX intervention and
liquidity provision program that ran from mid-July to
end-September. The program succeeded in reducing FX volatility,
restoring price formation signals, and preventing broader
spillovers to financial markets and the real economy. Interventions
were implemented with high standards of transparency, fully
sterilized, and consistent with the monetary policy framework.

6. The exchange rate should continue to play its role as a shock
absorber, and a replenishment of external buffers is desirable when
conditions allow. As monetary policy rates in major economies
continue to rise and global financial conditions tighten further,
exchange rate flexibility will remain instrumental to absorb
shocks. FX interventions should continue to be used only in
exceptional circumstances to prevent disorderly market conditions.
The BCCh has ample FX liquidity buffers, including international
reserves, FX liquidity lines, and the FCL. When market conditions
are conducive, a substantial reserve accumulation program would be
advisable to replenish buffers.

7. The financial sector remains resilient, and banks have adequate
profitability, capital, and liquidity. The banking sector is sound,
despite a sluggish credit recovery, with adequate funding and
profitability, and low impairments. The capital adequacy and
liquidity ratios are comfortably above regulatory requirements. The
non-performing loan ratio remains below the historical average, and
banks' profitability has returned to pre-pandemic levels. The
adoption of Basel III standards and the establishment of the
Financial Market Commission (which consolidated the supervision of
insurance, securities, and banks) are further supporting financial
sector soundness and resilience. Pockets of vulnerability are
focalized among low-income indebted households, smaller firms, and
those in sectors more affected by the pandemic and by cost
increases (such as construction). Against the backdrop of
tightening financial conditions and the unwinding of Covid-19
liquidity measures, closely monitoring vulnerabilities is key to
identify early signs of stress and prevent disorderly
consequences.

8. The authorities' fiscal overperformance in 2022 was remarkable.
The headline fiscal balance is expected to reach a surplus of 1.6
percent of GDP (the first surplus in a decade), compared with a
deficit of 7.7 percent of GDP in 2021. This extraordinary
consolidation was underpinned by the removal of Covid-19 stimulus
measures and strong revenue collection (partly due to one-off
factors). The government also replenished US$6 billion in the
sovereign wealth fund and reallocated spending to support the most
vulnerable within the budget envelope, including: (i) measures to
mitigate the impact of high energy and food prices; (ii) employment
subsidies in lagging sectors; and (iii) targeted transfers to
households.

9. The 2023 draft Budget focuses on social spending and public
investment consistent with the authorities' pre-announced
medium-term fiscal plan and debt sustainability. Amid a negative
output gap, the draft Budget envisions higher mandated spending on
universal guaranteed pensions and other social areas, and aims to
increase public investment and foster productivity within a
sustainable medium-term path. At the same time, IMF staff estimates
that the 2023 fiscal stance would be expansionary when both
inflation and the current account deficit are elevated. To support
the disinflationary process and current account convergence, it
would be advisable to save any stronger than projected revenues and
wait to disburse unallocated funds. The authorities' commitment to
a multi-year fiscal consolidation plan to achieve a broadly
balanced structural fiscal position and keep gross public debt
below a prudent ceiling of 45 percent of GDP over the medium term
is essential for maintaining sustainability. This would require a
fiscal consolidation of about 3 percent of GDP over the next five
years, in line with the authorities' commitment, accompanied by
targeted measures to protect to the most vulnerable.

10. Efforts to refine Chile's very strong fiscal framework are
welcome. Recent enhancements to parameters in the structural
balance rule, the adoption of medium-term fiscal targets, the
introduction of a prudent debt ceiling, and the disclosure of the
sensitivity of fiscal projections to macroeconomic shocks support
Chile's long-standing fiscal framework. The introduction of an
explicit escape clause and a natural disaster fund, under
consideration by congress, are also a positive step. Further
enhancements would be desirable, including on the analysis and
management of assets and liabilities and of fiscal risks; and the
supervisory and advisory role of the Autonomous Fiscal Council.

11. Social spending reforms should advance as yields from tax
reform materialize in line with medium-term fiscal objectives. The
tax reform plan is ambitious and comprehensive. It pursues
worthwhile goals, including raising revenues for an expansion of
social services; increasing the progressivity of the tax system;
simplifying and lowering compliance costs; reducing incentives for
aggressive tax planning; and fostering a green economy. The reform
to the personal income tax would reinforce one of the weakest
pillars in the system, but the exemption threshold would remain
high, and tax rates for low and middle brackets modest, by
international standards. Moreover, cross-country experience
suggests that the expected yields from tax administration and the
wealth tax could be difficult to realize. To preserve fiscal
sustainability, higher spending should advance conditional on
revenue performance and medium-term fiscal consolidation goals.

12. Pension reform remains critical to tackle inadequate pensions.
The introduction of a guaranteed universal pension addressed
challenges for the most vulnerable retirees. However, many Chileans
still face inadequate pensions, a predicament aggravated by the
pension withdrawals. Replacement rates for middle-income households
compare unfavorably with international standards due to low
contribution rates and contribution density, as well as a
retirement age that has not kept up with life expectancy. Critical
aspects to be considered in pension reform include: (i) the scope
to expand the universal pension in a sustainable manner; (ii) an
increase in contribution rates and their destination (individual
accounts versus a redistributive pillar); (iii) measures to improve
contribution density, particularly for younger cohorts, and reduce
informality; (iv) increases in the retirement age; and (v) the role
of Pension Funds (AFPs). New pension withdrawals should be
avoided.

13. After sizable pension withdrawals, the authorities are
considering measures to deepen capital markets. Pension funds have
played a key role in capital market deepening, serving market
segments not covered by other institutional investors, favoring
local equities and corporate bonds, showing more appetite for
longer-term maturities, and acting as shock absorbers. However,
pension withdrawals and uncertainty about the future of AFPs have
hurt the depth and liquidity of the domestic capital market. The
envisaged pension reform should be mindful of the capital market
and macroeconomic implications, including the need to increase
aggregate savings and finance long-term investment. The
authorities' plans to establish a repo market, develop a primary
dealer system, promote fintech (supported by the new Fintech Law),
and foster the internalization of the Chilean peso could provide
additional avenues to deepen capital markets. Enhancing
productivity and innovation are also key government priorities.

14. A broader use of green taxes should support Chile's ambitious
climate agenda. Chile continues to enhance its climate strategy,
including though the recent Framework Law on Climate Change, and is
a global leader in the issuance of ESG bonds. It has committed to
decommissioning coal-fired power plants by 2040 and achieving
carbon neutrality by 2050. Chile was also a pioneer and remains one
of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that
implemented a carbon tax. IMF simulations suggest that a gradual
increase in the carbon tax to at least US$60/tCO2e by 2030, coupled
with higher excises for diesel, would be needed to reach Nationally
Defined Contribution goals, while a carbon tax of US$150/tCO2e
would allow Chile to stay on track to net-zero. These estimates
would need to be re-calibrated if combined with complementary
measures to curb CO2 emissions. The proceeds from carbon pricing
(of up to 2 percent of GDP) could be recycled for targeted
transfers and public investment to offset the impact on vulnerable
households and boost potential growth.

The mission sincerely thanks the authorities and other counterparts
for the excellent cooperation, warm hospitality, and engaging
discussions.




=======
C U B A
=======

CUBA: Hunger Drives Cuban Migration to US Higher in 2022
--------------------------------------------------------
Jamaica Observer reports that Cuba remains one of the top
migrant-sending nations to the United States, with an uptick
reported after Hurricane Ian in September.  But, months before
this, an increased flow from the Caribbean island was already being
reported, according to Jamaica Observer.

The New York Times predicted the highest numbers seen in four
decades to occur this year, with 150,000 expected in 2022 as the
economic and political situation on the island grows more critical,
the report notes.

Since 1959, Cubans have been running from food insecurity and
economic pressures, risking life and limb to reach the United
States, the report relays.  Migrationpolicy.org outlines how, in
1959, the Cuban Revolution triggered the largest refugee flow, with
approximately 1.4 million people fleeing after the toppling of
dictator Fulgencio Batista by Fidel Castro's fighters, the report
discloses.

The news source notes that the Cuban exodus has been oriented
primarily toward the mainland United States but, in addition, at
least 300,000 Cubans have relocated to Spain, Puerto Rico,
Venezuela, Mexico, and other Latin American and Caribbean
countries, as well as Canada and European nations such as Germany,
Italy, and France, the report relays.

In total, approximately two million US residents are natives of
Cuba or claim Cuban ancestry, the report notes.

On September 15, 2022 Kimberly Gabriela Martinez of
Latinarepublic.com quoted US immigration officials as noting a
sharp increase in Cuban migration to the United States, the report
discloses.  Martinez states that many are now arriving on foot,
their flight aided by Nicaragua, which dropped visa requirements
late 2021 for Cubans, the report relays.

It is noted that some Cuban migrants leave the island on expensive
charter flights to Nicaragua, the report says.  Cuban migrants
travel through Central America and Mexico to the US border. Many
others with less resources find their way to the same border, the
report notes.

Latinarepublic.com says that, since October 2021 "more than 177,000
Cubans have arrived in the United States, six times more than in
the same period of the previous year, according to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS)," the report discloses.

The surge in numbers is attributed to Cuba's severe economic
crisis, the report says.  Cuba's economy has been constrained by US
sanctions and the aftermath of the novel coronavirus pandemic, it
was stated, the report relays.

                             Hunger

Migrants interviewed quote economic hardship as the main problem
with an increase in hunger being experienced by many, the report
notes.  Borgenproject.org notes that Cuba has consistently scored
"low" (less than five) on the Global Hunger Index (GHI) since 2005.
A GHI score of



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fuel Prices Remain Unchanged
------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that for the week of October 29 to November
4, 2022, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and MSMEs (MICM) provides
that fuels are marketed at the following prices:

   -- Premium gasoline will be sold at RD $ 293.60 per gallon,
      maintaining its price.

   -- Regular Gasoline RD$274.50 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Regular Gasoil RD$221.60 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Optimal Gasoil RD$241.10 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Avtur RD$273.91 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Kerosene RD$338.10 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Fuel Oil #6 RD$192.11 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Fuel Oil 1%S RD$211.77 per gallon maintains its price.

   -- Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) RD$147.60 per gallon maintains

      its price.

   -- Gas Natural RD$28.97 per m3 maintains its price.

Ramon Perez Fermín, Deputy Minister of Domestic Trade, informed
that the government of President Luis Abinader had allocated more
than 466 million pesos to prevent dramatic increases in fuel prices
for the week of Oct. 29 to Nov. 4 of this year, for which reason
the prices of all fuels will remain unchanged, according to
Dominican Today.

Perez Fermin explained that the international price of WTI averaged
85.77, maintaining an accumulated annual increase of almost 19%,
the report relays.  "The global market looks uncertain and
ambiguous, with a marked volatility that consequently makes it
difficult to predict," he explained, the report notes.

With this extraordinary subsidy of 466 million pesos, the
government is holding back increases from 24 pesos per gallon in
premium gasoline to 73 pesos per gallon in optimum diesel, the
report adds.

                About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: Cost of Production Declined in September
-------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that in Jamaica, the cost to produce outputs in
the manufacturing industry declined in the month of September.

The Producer Price Index for the sector fell by 0.4 per cent,
according to RJR News.

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica says the main contributor to
the drop was a four per cent decline in the cost of fuel, the
report notes.

The decline was, however, tempered by a 3.6 per cent increase in
the cost of 'Chemical and Chemical Products,' the report relays.

'Fabricated Metal Products, excluding 'Machinery & Equipment' also
increased for the month, up by 5.4 per cent, the report says.

September's Producer Price Index movement brought the
point-to-point index for the manufacturing industry up by 18.9 per
cent, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in March
2022, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

EMPACADORA Y PROCESADORA: Secured Creditor Says In Talks w/ Debtor
------------------------------------------------------------------
Secured creditor Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") requests a
short extension of the deadline to submit its position as to the
confirmation of Empacadora y Procesadora Del Sur, Inc.'s First
Amended Chapter 11 Plan (the "Plan").

After several procedural events, on Aug. 19, 2022, the Debtor filed
the Plan.  On Sept. 1, 2022, the Court entered an order approving
the disclosure statement related to the Plan, scheduling a hearing
on confirmation for Nov. 4, 2022.

Further, pursuant to the Order, (i) "acceptances or rejections of
the Plan may be filed in writing by the holders of all claims on/or
before 14 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of
the Plan" and (ii) "any objection to confirmation of the plan shall
be filed on/or before 14 days prior to the date of the hearing on
confirmation of the Plan."

At this juncture, although the Debtor and BPPR are actively engaged
in communications to attempt to reach and finalize a consensual
resolution of the matters pending between them in the captioned
case, a final written agreement has not yet been executed.

Thus, to allow the parties to continue such communications, BPPR
requests that the deadline to submit its position as to the
Confirmation of the Plan, and to submit its votes in connection
therewith, be extended until October 28, 2022.

Attorneys for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico:

     Luis C. Marini-Biaggi, Esq.
     Carolina Velaz-Rivero, Esq.
     Ignacio Labarca-Morales, Esq.
     MARINI PIETRANTONI MUNIZ
     250 Ponce De Leon Ave., Suite 900
     San Juan, PR 00918
     Tel: (787) 705-2171
     E-mail: lmarini@mpmlawpr.com
             cvelaz@mpmlawpr.com
             ilabarca@mpmlawpr.com

            About Empacadora Y Procesadora Del Sur

Empacadora Y Procesadora Del Sur, Inc., sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
22-00354) on Feb. 15, 2022.  In the petition signed by Carlos C.
Rodriguez Alonso, president, the Debtor disclosed $11,604,565 in
assets and $10,598,204 in liabilities.

Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law Office represents
the Debtor as counsel.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: 2022 Deficit Cut to 0.2%
-------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that the Ministry of Finance reported that
Trinidad & Tobago's deficit for the 2022 fiscal year, which ended
on September 30, 2022, has been revised downwards to 0.2 per cent
of gross domestic product (GDP).

In a news release, the Ministry of Finance said at the time of the
presentation of the 2023 Budget on September 26, 2022, the revenue
figures for Fiscal 2022 were based on actual figures, from October
1, 2021 to August 31, 2022, and estimated figures for the month of
September 2022, according to Trinidad Express.

The ministry said it is now in receipt of the final figures for the
actual revenue collections in Fiscal 2022, up to the end of
September 2022, the report relays.

Those actual revenue numbers came from the Board of Inland Revenue,
which finalized the actual revenue for fiscal 2022, the report
discloses.

The total revenue for fiscal 2022 has been determined to be $54.21
billion, "which is $2.57 billion more than the revised estimate
announced in September 2022, and $10.88 billion more than the
original revenue estimate of $43.33 billion for fiscal 2022, made
in October 2021," the ministry said, the report relays.

It added that with total expenditure for fiscal 2022 now estimated
at $54.54 billion, the fiscal deficit for 2022 is now estimated at
$329 million, which is less than 0.2 per cent of GDP, well below
the international benchmark for fiscal deficits of 3 per cent of
GDP, the report says.

"In essence, we have achieved an almost balanced national budget in
Fiscal 2022, something that has not occurred in Trinidad and Tobago
since 2008, 14 years ago," said the Ministry of Finance, the report
notes.

The report discloses that the deficits since the 2016 fiscal year
have been as follows:

--  2016 - $7.97b

--  2017 - $13.53b

--  2018 - $5.69b

--  2019 - $4.02b

--  2020 - $16.68b

--  2021 - $13.74b

--  2022 - $0.329b

The fiscal deficits between 2016 and 2021 would have resulted in an
increase in T&T's debt, as the Government borrowed from domestic
and external sources to fill the gap between expenditure and
revenue, the report relays.

The 2022 Review of the Economy indicates that T&T's total
Government debt, excluding open market operations, increased by
49.2 per cent from $84.87 billion in 2016 to $126.62 billion in
2021, the report notes.

The report discloses that the Government would also have tapped the
Heritage and Stabilization Fund to fund the deficits, especially in
the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

In delivering the 2023 budget on September 26, 2022, Finance
Minister, Colm Imbert, said the invasion by Russia of Ukraine in
February 2022, heightened the supply constraints already affecting
the global economy because of Covid-19, causing an escalation in
commodity prices, the report discloses.

He said all of the petrochemical commodities that T&T exports
experienced price increases in the 2022 fiscal year, including oil
prices, which doubled, ammonia prices, which increased by 300 per
cent in one year and the price of Urea increasing by 100 per cent,
the report relays.

"Henry Hub natural gas prices which had crashed and reached as low
as US$1.63 per MMBtu in June 2020 at the start of the pandemic
began an upward trend in 2021 and have remained at elevated levels
following the Ukraine war - exceeding US$9.00 per MMBtu in early
September 2022, and still close to US$7.00 per MMBtu," Imbert said
in the budget speech, the report adds.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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