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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, July 25, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 141

                           Headlines



B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Startups Facing Wave of Layoffs due to Investment Cuts
RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms IDR at BB-, Alters Outlook to Stable


C O S T A   R I C A

BAC SAN JOSE: Fitch Affirms LT FC IDR at B+, Outlook Stable
BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Fitch Affirms LT FC IDR at B+, Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pension Funds Take a Hit, Managers Say
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Power Distributors Lose US$258.7M in Jan.-April
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Tax Reform 'Inevitable' in Country, Hatton Says


H O N D U R A S

HONDURAS: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' SCRs, Alters Outlook to Negative


P E R U

PERU: 3.6% Growth Forecast for 2022 Despite Slowdown Concerns


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CL FIN'L: Privy Council Hears Clico Matter


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week July 18 to July 22, 2022

                           - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: Startups Facing Wave of Layoffs due to Investment Cuts
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Brazil, the mecca for emerging companies in
Latin America, is facing a wave of layoffs and resignations among
its startups amid a worldwide investment "crisis" due to global
uncertainties and an environment of progressively more restrictive
monetary policies.

Brazil, the country with the most so-called "unicorns" in the
region, is experiencing a "period of correction" after the boom of
the past five years, especially during the coronavirus pandemic,
when interest in emerging technology firms skyrocketed, according
to EFE News.

Nevertheless, the appetite among investors has waned in recent
months as interest rates have increased in the world's main
economies to try and put the brakes on rising inflation, the report
notes.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 18, 2022, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating at 'BB-' and revised the
Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative.

On June 17, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Brazil.

Moody's Investors Service also affirmed on April 15, 2022, Brazil's
long-term Ba2 issuer ratings and senior unsecured bond ratings,
(P)Ba2 senior unsecured shelf ratings, and maintained the
stable outlook.


RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms IDR at BB-, Alters Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Rating Outlooks of seven Local and
Regional Governments (LRG) in Brazil to Stable from Negative. The
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of these issuers were affirmed at
'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The revisions are due to Fitch revising the Outlook of the
Brazilian sovereign to Stable from Negative on July 14, 2022.

Fitch did not review National Ratings and Short-Term Ratings of
these issuers. Risk profiles, Key Risk Factors, debt sustainability
metrics, and standalone credit profiles (SCPs) were not revised
under this review.

The state of Rio de Janeiro's IDRs are derived from the sovereign
support to the state's debt. The federal government has serviced
most of Rio's debt since 2016. For that reason, its IDRs are
equalized to the sovereign IDRs. Fitch estimates that close to 95%
of the state's debt is either directly guaranteed by the federal
government, or benefits from debt service postponement for the case
of debt owed to the Federal Government. Rio de Janeiro´s SCP was
assessed at 'd' in the last annual review of August 2021.

The IDRs of the states of Alagoas and Santa Catarina benefit from
an uplift from their SCPs of 'b+' because Brazil's federal
government is their most significant creditor. Fitch distinguishes
the debt owed to the federal government as it offers greater
flexibility in its terms compared with traditional debt. All debt
types are included in the debt sustainability metrics that produce
the SCP. However, Fitch calculates a supplementary ratio excluding
intergovernmental debt, known as the enhanced debt sustainability
ratio. This is used to estimate the uplift between the SCP and IDR,
which results in the equalization of Alagoas and Santa Catarina´s
IDRs to the sovereign IDRs, the supporting government.

The IDRs of the states of Maranhao, Paraná and Sao Paulo are at
the same level as the sovereign IDRs. The SCP of the three states
was assessed at 'bb-' in the last annual review and no other rating
factors influence their IDRs. While the federal government is also
a relevant creditor for these states, they do not benefit from
intergovernmental financing support due to the fact that their SCPs
are already at the same level as the sovereign IDRs. Fitch is
changing the Outlook of Negative to Stable for these states since
the sovereign cap of Negative no longer applies.

The IDRs of the Municipality of Sao Paulo are capped by the
sovereign rating. Fitch assessed the Municipality of Sao Paulo SCP
at 'bbb-' in the last annual review of September 2021. No
subnational can be rated above the sovereign in Brazil due to the
regulatory framework. The Federal Government has strong influence
over LRG´s in Brazil, such as by assigning expenditure
responsibilities, limiting revenue raising capacity, and closely
supervising and structuring their ability to take new debt.

ESG -- Credit Rights: State of Rio de Janeiro track record in the
breach of legal documentation stating full debt service payments,
reflects the very low willingness to pay. The SCP will be
reassessed once State of Rio recovers and it is able to honor its
committed financial obligations in due time with no federal
government aid.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A positive rating action on Brazil's IDR would lead to a
    corresponding rating action on the States of Rio de Janeiro,
    Alagoas and Santa Catarina given that these ratings are
    equalized to the sovereign through intergovernmental support;

-- Positive rating action on Maranhao's IDRs could result from an

    improvement of its SCP, currently at 'bb-', in conjunction
    with a Sovereign action of upgrade, since the State is aligned

    with the sovereign. Maranhao´s SCP could improve if its actual

    debt service coverage ratio (ADSCR) improves to above 2x and
    its payback ratio remains below 5x;

-- Positive rating action on Parana's IDRs could result from an
    improvement of its SCP, currently at 'bb-', in conjunction
    with a sovereign action of upgrade, since the State is aligned

    with the sovereign. Parana´s SCP could be raised if the
    payback ratio remains between 5x and 9x and the ADSCR
    approaches 3x, and its debt metrics compare well relative to
    peers;

-- Positive rating action on the State of Sao Paulo's IDRs could
    result from an improvement of its SCP, currently at 'bb-', in
    conjunction with a sovereign action of upgrade, since the
    State is aligned with the sovereign. Sao Paulo´s SCP could be

    upgraded if its payback ratio remains below 13x and its ADSCR
    is equal to or above 1.5x under Fitch´s rating case scenario;

-- A positive rating action on Brazil´s IDR would lead to a
    positive rating action on the municipality of Sao Paulo given
    that the ratings of the municipality are currently capped by
    the sovereign.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of the sovereign rating would result in a
    downgrade of the IDRs of the seven issuers;

-- Maranhao's IDRs could be downgraded if its payback ratio is
    projected above 5x, and ADSCR remains below 1.5x;

-- Parana's IDRs could be downgraded if its payback ratio is
    projected above 9x and/or DSCR below 2x;

-- State of Sao Paulo IDR´s could be downgraded if its payback
    ratio is projected between 9x and 13x, aligned with an ADSCR
    below 1.2x;

-- Municipality of Sao Paulo's IDRs could be downgraded if its
    payback ratio is projected above 9x and the ADSCR below 1.2x.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Estado de Alagoas has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Population
Demographics due to the negative weight the municipality's poverty
rate has on its revenue raising ability, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating[s] in
conjunction with other factors.

Estado de Alagoas has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human
Development, Health and Education due to its Human Development
Index (calculated as a geometric average of health, education and
income) at the bottom of the ranking among Brazilian states, which
has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
rating[s] in conjunction with other factors.

The state of Maranhao has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Population Demographics due to the negative weight the state's
poverty rate has on its revenue raising ability, which has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
rating[s] in conjunction with other factors.

The state of Maranhao has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human
Development, Health and Education due to its Human Development
Index (calculated as a geometric average of health, education and
income) close to the bottom of the ranking among Brazilian states,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the rating[s] in conjunction with other factors.

Rio de Janeiro has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Creditor
Rights due its track record in the breach of legal documentation
stating the full debt service payments, reflecting the very low
willingness to pay, which has a negative impact on the credit
profile, and is highly relevant to the rating, resulting in {an
implicitly lower/higher rating or outlook/watch or cite specific
change(s) to the rating/outlook/watch: stable from positive, stable
from negative, one notch downgrade, etc.}.

Rio de Janeiro has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption due to
the fact that government effectiveness and institutional &
regulatory quality was not sufficient to prevent the state from
resorting to external financial support (namely the federal
government) to pursue fiscal balance, which has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating[s] in
conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   DEBT            RATING                      PRIOR
   ----            ------                      -----

Rio de Janeiro    LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
State of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Estado de         LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
Alagoas

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Sao Paulo,        LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
State of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Maranhao,         LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
State of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Sao Paulo,        LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
Municipality of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Parana,           LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
State of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-

Santa Catarina,   LT IDR      BB-   Affirmed   BB-
State of

                  LC LT IDR   BB-   Affirmed   BB-



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================

BAC SAN JOSE: Fitch Affirms LT FC IDR at B+, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco BAC San Jose, S.A. 's (BAC San
Jose) Long-Term (LT) Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'B+' and its Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'BB-'. Fitch has
also affirmed BAC San Jose's Short-Term (ST) FC and LC IDRs at 'B',
its Viability Rating (VR) at 'b' and the Shareholder Support Rating
(SSR) at 'b+'. The Rating Outlook for the LT ratings remains
Stable. At the same time, Fitch has affirmed BAC San Jose´s
National LT Rating at 'AAA(cri)' with a Stable Outlook and its
National ST Rating at 'F1+(cri)' both for the bank and its
issuances programs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Support-Driven Ratings: BAC San Jose's IDRs, SSR and National Scale
ratings are driven by the high probability that the bank's
shareholder, BAC International Bank, Inc. (BIB; BB/Stable), would
support the subsidiary if needed. In Fitch's view, BIB will
continue to have a high propensity to provide support to its Costa
Rican subsidiary, given its importance to the group, full
ownership, common branding, and strong integration.

Country Risk Exposure: Fitch caps BAC San Jose's SSR and IDR one
notch above the 'B' Costa Rican sovereign rating to reflect
domestic banks' exposure to country risks. The LT LC IDR is not
constrained by transfers and convertibility risks, captured in
country ceiling of 'B+' that could limit BIB's ability to provide
support or BAC San Jose's ability to use it, and it is rated at the
maximum uplift of two notches above Costa Rica's sovereign rating.
The Outlook on BAC San Jose's IDRs mirrors that on its parent,
considering also that of the sovereign.

Core Role in Group: BAC San Jose's ratings incorporates Fitch's
view of the importance of the Costa Rican subsidiary for BIB's
international expansion, and the bank's core role in the group, as
its strong franchise and market position provides products in a
jurisdiction identified as strategically important.

Close Integration, Reputational Risks: BIB's subsidiaries in
Central America operate under the same brand and benefit from a
high strategic and operational integration that derives in
competitive advantages and enhanced franchise in each country.
Therefore, Fitch's assessment of support considers that an event of
unexpected default of one of its rated subsidiaries would
constitute a huge reputational risk for BIB and could have
significant impact on its franchise.

Strong Franchise and Market Position: BAC San Jose's VR reflects
its solid company profile reflected in its business model and
corporate culture, which has resulted in a strong market position,
leading in certain business lines. BAC San Jose is the third
largest Costa Rican commercial bank, diversified through several
business lines. As of 1T22 total assets, loans and deposits
represented 16.0%, 17.5% and 18.0%, respectively, of the Costa
Rican banking system.

Asset Quality at Moderate Risk: BAC San Jose's impaired loan ratio
improved to 1.7% at end-march 2022 from the past 4-year average of
2.3%. Fitch believes non-performing loans (NPLs) will stabilize at
pre-pandemic levels supported by moderate loan growth, appropriate
risk controls and underwriting standards. The bank's conservative
strategy, to include additional loan loss reserves (LLR), led to a
coverage ratio of 2.9x as of March 2022 (2018-2021 average: 2.2x),
notably higher than that of its private peers.

Improving Core Profitability: As of January 2022, BAC San Jose's
results have benefited from the merger of sister companies'
operations, mainly related to credit card issuing activities. As of
March 2022, the operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWA)
indicator reached 5.4% versus 2.1% at the end of 2021. Fitch
expects this ratio to move to percentages above historical levels.
Improvements over the medium term will also be driven by higher net
interest income, increased efficiency and lower or even a possible
reversal of impairment charges as asset quality improves.

Satisfactory Capital Buffers: As of March 2022, the effects of the
merger of the three entities were already perceptible. After the
bank's capitalization slightly declined as of 2021 to 12.6% due to
lower profitability, at March 2022 its FCC to RWA ratio reached
14.2%. BAC San Jose, maintains satisfactory capital buffers above
regulatory requirements with a regulatory capital ratio that stood
at 14.3% at the end of March 2022 (2021:12.4%), despite dividend
payments.

Stable Funding and Liquidity: BAC San Jose's main funding source is
a stable and granular customer-deposit base, which fully funds the
bank's loan book. The bank's loans/deposits ratio has gradually
improved to 84.0% at the end of March 2022 (2021: 87.5%) driven by
customer deposit growth in excess of loan growth underpinned by its
strong franchise. Liquidity levels are adequately managed allowing
the bank to have up to 2x coverage of upcoming liabilities
maturities. In addition, liquid assets provide coverage of around
40% of total deposits and reflected in sound regulatory liquidity
ratios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Negative changes in BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSR would mirror
    any movement in Costa Rica's Sovereign and Country Ceiling
    
ratings;

-- Any perception by Fitch of a relevant reduction in BIB's
    propensity of support may trigger a downgrade of BAC San
    Jose's IDRs, SSR and National Ratings;

-- BAC San Jose's ratings could be downgraded following a multi-
    notch downgrade of BIB's IDRs;

-- BAC San Jose's VR could be downgraded in the case of a
    material deterioration of the bank's financial performance
    resulting from a material asset-quality deterioration that
    significantly erodes its profitability and drops its FCC to
    RWA consistently below 9%.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- BAC San Jose's IDRs and SSR could be upgraded in the event of
    an upgrade of Costa Rica's sovereign rating and Country
    Ceiling;

-- The VR could be upgraded if Fitch revises upward its OE
    assessment while the bank maintains a very strong financial
    profile;

-- The National Ratings of BAC San Jose are at the top of the
    scale, so there is no room for positive actions.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

Senior Unsecured Debt: BAC San Jose's National Scale ratings of its
outstanding senior unsecured obligations are at the same level of
the issuer's National Ratings as the likelihood of default of the
obligations, in Fitch's opinion, is the same as the one of BAC San
Jose, given the debt does not have specific guarantees.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

-- BAC San Jose's senior unsecured debt national ratings would
    mirror any potential negative change on the entity's national
    ratings.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The Operating Environment score of 'b' has been assigned below the
implied score of 'bb', due to the following adjustment reasons:
Sovereign Rating (negative).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch reclassified pre-paid expenses as intangible assets and
deducted them from the Fitch Core Capital (FCC) since they have a
low capacity to absorb losses.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   DEBT        RATING                          PRIOR
   ----        ------                           ----

Banco BAC   LT IDR        B+         Affirmed   B+
San Jose, S.A.

            ST IDR        B          Affirmed   B

            LC LT IDR     BB-        Affirmed   BB-

            LC ST IDR     B          Affirmed   B

            Natl LT       AAA(cri)   Affirmed   AAA(cri)

            Natl ST       F1+(cri)   Affirmed   F1+(cri)

            Viability     b          Affirmed   b

            Shareholder   b+         Affirmed   b+
            Support

   senior   Natl LT       AAA(cri)   Affirmed   AAA(cri)
   unsecured

   senior   Natl ST      F1+(cri)    Affirmed   F1+(cri)
   unsecured

BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Fitch Affirms LT FC IDR at B+, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Davivienda (Costa Rica), S.A.'s
(Davivienda CR) Long-Term (LT) Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'B+', and Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'BB-'. Fitch
has also affirmed Davivienda CR's FC and LC Short-Term (ST) IDRs at
'B', Shareholder Support Rating (SSR) at 'b+' and Viability Rating
(VR) at 'b'. Fitch has also affirmed bank's National LT and ST
Ratings at 'AAA(cri)' and 'F1+(cri)', respectively, as well as
their debt issue programs.

The Rating Outlook of all the LT ratings are Stable.

Fitch has assigned a LT National rating to the new issue program
"Programa I de Emisiones de Bonos Estandarizados en Colones y en
Dolares" of 'AAA(cri)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Shareholder Support-Driven Ratings: Davivienda CR's ratings are
based upon Fitch's assessment of the potential support that it
would receive from its Colombian shareholder Banco Davivienda S.A.
(Davivienda, BB+/Stable), if needed. The national rating reflects
Davivienda's relative credit strength relative to other rated
issuers in Costa Rica.


Significant Potential Reputational Risk: A relevant factor in
Fitch's support evaluation is the very high reputational risk to
Davivienda CR's parent, in case of a default of its subsidiary, as
they share the same brand. Propensity of support is strong to
prevent any event that might alter negatively its Colombian
shareholder's businesses.

Ratings Capped by Costa Rica's Country Risk: In Fitch's
appreciation of support, country risks have a high influence over
the subsidiary's ratings, since the SSR, which is the driver for
the LT FC IDR, limits it at 'B+' by the Costa Rican country ceiling
of 'B+', which captures transfers and convertibility risks (T&C
risks), and constrains the ratings to a lower level. The LT LC IDR
of 'BB-' is two notches below its parent's company LT FC IDR and
equally two notches above Costa Rica's sovereign rating, since it
is not constrained by T&C risks, according to Fitch's criteria. The
Stable Outlook for the bank's LT IDRs mirrors that of the
sovereign.

Important Role in Group: Fitch believes that propensity of support
is moderately related to the role of Davivienda CR in its parent's
strategy, since in Fitch's view, the bank is an integral and
relevant participant to the group, due to potential businesses,
geographical diversification and products provided in core
markets.

Davivienda CR's Performance and Prospects: Fitch believes that the
bank's financial profile moderately influences the potential of
support. The bank represents around 8% of parent's consolidated
assets, as of March 2022, and nearly 12% of net income.

Consolidated Franchise: Davivienda CR's VR reflects its business
profile, which is characterized by its stablished and consistent
franchise in Costa Rica, positioning as the second private largest
bank, in a system dominated by sovereign owned banks, reaching
market shares of nearly 8% in assets and loans, and 7% in deposits,
as of March 2022.

Good Asset Quality: Davivienda CR's asset quality has remained at
good levels, viewed in its non-performance loans (NPL) indicators,
as the 90 past due days impairment was 1.8% (system: 2.5%) as of
March 2022 (2019-2021 average: 1.9%). While the delinquency ratio
may exhibit a slight deterioration, Fitch estimates the metric
would remain consistent with the bank's current rating level.

Profitability with Positive Trend: Fitch considers that Davivienda
CR's profitability indicators were resilient to the pandemic
economic effects, and these maintained a positive trend during the
last two years (which Fitch expects to continue), mainly as a
result of the controlled asset quality metrics, which decreased the
credit costs. As of March 2022, its operating profit / Risk
Weighted Assets (RWA) was 3.7% (2018-2021: 1.3%).

Reasonable Capital: In Fitch's view, the bank's capital position
benefits from its parent, even though the Fitch Core Capital to RWA
metric is lower than other peers, 11.9% as of 1Q22, similar to the
regulatory capital ratio of 12.1% (requirement 10%).

Stable and Diversified Funding: Davivienda CR's funding profile is
stable and benefits from its consolidated franchise and the
parent's support. As of March 2022, loans represented close to 121%
of customer deposits (2019-2021: 131%). Liquidity remained high at
31% and 54% of assets and deposits, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Negative changes in Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR would mirror
    any movement in Costa Rica's sovereign ratings and Country
    Ceiling;

-- Any perception by Fitch of significantly reduced parent's
    propensity to support the subsidiary may trigger a downgrade
    of IDRs, SSR and national ratings;

-- A multi-notch downgrade of Davivienda's IDRs would also entail

    a downgrade in Davivienda CR's IDRs, SSR and national ratings;

-- A downgrade of Davivienda CR's VR could result from a material

    deterioration of the banks' financial performance that drops
    its FCC/RWA consistently below 9% alongside incurring in
    sustained operating losses.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Davivienda CR's IDRs and SSR could be upgraded in the event of

    an upgrade of Costa Rica's sovereign rating and Country
    Ceiling;

-- Davivienda CR's VR could be upgraded in the event of an
    improvement in the local OE and if the bank continues with
    consistent financial performance metrics;

-- The bank's national scale ratings are at the top of the scale,

    and therefore there is no room for positive actions.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

Senior unsecured debt ratings are at the same level as Davivienda
CR's national ratings, since Fitch believes that debt programs
equals the bank's probability of default, as the debt does not have
any explicit guarantees. Also, the LT national rating assigned to
the new issue program "Programa I de Emisiones de Bonos
Estandarizados en Colones y en Dolares" of 'AAA(cri)', reflects
that the program shares identical conditions as the other bank's
senior unsecured debt.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Senior unsecured debt national ratings would be reduced in
    case of negative rating actions on the bank's national
    ratings.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Debt issue programs national ratings are at the top of the
    scale. Therefore, there is no room to upgrade.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The Operating Environment score of 'b' has been assigned below the
implied score of 'bb', due to the following adjustment reason:
Sovereign Rating (negative).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch reclassified prepaid expenses as intangibles and deducted
them from equity to reflect their lower absorption capacity.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   DEBT          RATING                           PRIOR
   ----          ------                           -----

Banco       LT IDR        B+         Affirmed      B+
Davivienda
(Costa Rica), S.A.

            ST IDR        B          Affirmed      B

            LC LT IDR     BB-        Affirmed      BB-

            LC ST IDR     B          Affirmed      B

            Natl LT       AAA(cri)   Affirmed      AAA(cri)

            Natl ST       F1+(cri)   Affirmed      F1+(cri)

            Viability     b          Affirmed      b

            Shareholder   b+         Affirmed      b+
            Support

   senior   Natl LT       AAA(cri)   Affirmed      AAA(cri)
   unsecured

   senior   Natl LT       AAA(cri)   New Rating
   unsecured

   senior   Natl ST       F1+(cri)   Affirmed      F1+(cri)
   unsecured



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pension Funds Take a Hit, Managers Say
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the profitability of pension funds
continues to slow down. The Dominican Association of Pension Fund
Administrators (Adafp) attributes it to the inflationary scale that
is recorded by Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory and the
appreciation of the peso against the US dollar, which in June 2022
was valued at 36 cents.

For last February, the Adafp indicated that the benefits, product
of the investments made by the pension fund administrators, had
been affected by the behavior of the peso against the dollar and
the variation in the interest rates of financial instruments,
according to Dominican Today.  An effect that, it assured, would be
transitory, the report notes.

However, the Superintendence of Pensions (Sipen) recorded that the
average nominal rate of return of individual capitalization
accounts (CCI) has been falling since January, when it stood at
11.90% per year, until it reached 7.50% in June of this year, the
report adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Power Distributors Lose US$258.7M in Jan.-April
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that between January and April of this
year, the Electricity Distribution Companies (EDEs) lost US$258.7
million between the cost of energy purchased to sell to their users
and the total energy charged.

In terms of collection, the EDEs lost 36.4% of the energy
purchased, according to the figures presented in the Management
Report of the distributors posted on the website of the Ministry of
Energy and Mines (MEM), notes Dominican Today.

According to the data presented, the tariff adjustment increased
the income of the three EDES by US$99.6 million as of October 2021,
but the payment to the generation companies also increased by
US$122.78 million, so the financial deficit grew, despite the rate
increase, US$23.18 million, this without counting the operating
expenses of these companies, the report notes.

                     About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Tax Reform 'Inevitable' in Country, Hatton Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Minister of the Environment and
Natural Resources, Miguel Ceara Hatton, assured that fiscal reform
would be "inevitable" because the country spends more than it
receives.

For months, from time to time, this possibility has been raised,
which is rejected by broad social sectors on the grounds that the
population cannot bear more tax burdens, according to Dominican
Today.

"We have a structural deficit that is around 3%, that is, we spend
an average of 3% more than we receive in income," he stressed, the
report notes.

He added that "to all these efforts that have been made in legal
matters of transparency, to improve the efficiency of the State,
zero democracy, if all we are trying to do is part of what needs to
be advanced on the spending side, because that's not enough," the
report notes.

                  About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.




===============
H O N D U R A S
===============

HONDURAS: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' SCRs, Alters Outlook to Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
On July 21, 2022, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on
Honduras to negative from stable. S&P also affirmed its 'BB-/B'
long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings. S&P's transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment remains 'BB'.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three chance that it could lower the ratings on Honduras
over the next six to 18 months if fiscal slippage worsens the
sovereign debt burden beyond our expectations. Additionally, a
consistent deterioration in the current account balance could
weaken the country's external liquidity position and lead to a
downgrade.

Upside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next six to 18 months
if faster-than-expected economic growth, along with cautious fiscal
policy (including the fiscal impact of losses in the energy
sector), stabilizes the sovereign's debt burden and anchors
economic stability .

Rationale

The ratings on Honduras reflect the country's low per capita GDP,
shortcomings in governance and public institutions (including in
public enterprises), and very limited exchange-rate flexibility
that constrain monetary policy effectiveness. The ratings also
incorporate moderate external vulnerabilities. The country's access
to official sources of funding should sustain external liquidity
and financial market stability.

Institutional and economic profile: Institutional challenges still
limit the sovereign's ability to accelerate economic growth

-- S&P expects GDP growth to slow to about 3% in 2022 and 3.6%
thereafter.

-- Bolstering GDP growth prospects remains key to achieving the
administration's development objectives.

-- Despite still-evolving public institutions, the Honduran
government has set a strong commitment to tackle corruption and
improve fiscal transparency.

President Xiomara Castro of the Partido Libertad y Refundacion
party (Libre) took office on Jan. 27, after winning the November
2021 election. President Castro won the presidential election with
more than 50% of the vote. Popular support for President Castro's
anticorruption and anticrime agenda could partially offset that the
Libre party does not have a majority in the 128-seat Congress;
Libre and its coalition partner, Partido Salvador de Honduras
(PSH), have 50 and 10 seats, respectively.

The anticorruption agenda includes the creation of the
International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in
Honduras (CICIH), backed by the U.N. S&P believes a continued
commitment to fighting corruption is key to strengthening the
Honduran justice system and improving investor confidence. High
levels of poverty and informality, corruption, and violence remain
major challenges.

The government-owned electricity company Empresa Nacional de
Energía Eléctrica (ENEE) poses a fiscal risk to the government,
typically running losses of around 1% of GDP annually. We expect
the government's commitment to repair ENEE's financial health and
make its finances more sustainable will lead it to offer transfers
to compensate for ENEE's losses. Congress recently approved the
Special Energy Law, which will review and renegotiate contracts
with energy generators and push back unbundling the ENEE in
subsidiaries (for generation, transmission, and distribution),
reducing financing costs and electricity losses. An effective
energy reform could lower production costs and create a more
efficient electricity system, improving the economy's overall
competitiveness.

S&P expects the economy to slow to 3% GDP growth in 2022 and 3.6%
thereafter. Growth prospects depend in part on GDP growth in the
U.S., given that the U.S. is the destination of 40% of Honduran
exports and the main origin of remittances, which account for 25%
of GDP. In 2021, Honduras had a strong recovery with growth of
12.5%, surpassing pre-pandemic GDP levels, backed by strong
remittances performance and external demand.

Honduras is a small open economy with a high informality, affecting
an estimated 70% of the working-age population. Over the next three
to five years, Honduras' economic growth will remain constrained by
limited, albeit expanding, physical infrastructure and its
vulnerability to external shocks. Its per capita income growth has
suffered from many years of low investment and weak
competitiveness. Raising potential growth will require steps to
foster competitiveness and investment.

Flexibility and performance profile: Spending priorities will imply
a larger fiscal package, and fiscal deterioration is not likely to
be reversed in the near term

-- S&P estimates a general government fiscal deficit around 3.2%
of GDP in 2022, pushing net general government debt to 47% of GDP,
from 38.8% of GDP in 2019.

-- The energy sector continues to face financial and regulatory
challenges.

-- S&P expects Honduras' external indicators to remain solid.

Fiscal consolidation will be delayed by fiscal policy amid new
spending priorities. S&P said, "We expect fiscal deficits to remain
substantial over the coming years as the government has new
spending priorities devoted to health, education, security, and
support for ENEE. Honduras' general government posted an estimated
deficit of 3.1% of GDP in 2021. Excluding surpluses in
public-sector pension funds (which we include in our general
government balance), the fiscal deficit was 5% of GDP."

S&P assumes the general government fiscal deficit will hover around
3.2% of GDP (or around 5.2% excluding pension fund surpluses) in
2022, below the budget ceiling of 4.9% of GDP due to sluggish
execution during the first year of the new administration.
Subsequently, according to the administration plans, the general
government deficit as a share of GDP will slightly decrease by 0.5
percentage points per year over the next seven years toward 3.4% of
GDP in 2025 (assuming 2022 ceiling of 4.9% of GDP). In this regard,
the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) target of the nonfinancial
public-sector deficit of 1% of GDP won't be achieved during the
next seven years.

To finance fiscal deficits, net general government debt would
increase toward 47% of GDP in 2022 from 38.8% in 2019. (S&P deducts
intergovernmental debt holdings from its calculation of general
government debt, and we further deduct liquid government assets to
calculate net general government debt.) S&P estimates net general
government debt will average 49.6% of GDP during 2022-2025.

To partially finance the larger deficit, as an extraordinary
measure, the central bank could lend to the central government. S&P
said, "Going forward, we expect increased debt issuance mainly in
the local capital markets. In addition, we expect the government to
maintain solid relationships with multilateral institutions and
keep good access to credit lines."

About 66% of Honduras' external debt is owed to multilateral
institutions, and 57% of its total debt is in foreign currency.
Moreover, S&P projects interest payments on the debt will hover
around 11% of general government revenues in 2022-2025.

Honduras' shortfalls in basic services and infrastructure, which
will require long-term expenditures, constraining its fiscal
flexibility. S&P said, "We estimate that contingent liabilities
from the financial sector and the nonfinancial public sector are
limited. We classify the banking sector of Honduras in group '8'
according to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA),
with '1' being the lowest risk category and '10' the highest."

Honduras' current-account balance fell back to a deficit in 2021,
reaching 4.3% of GDP (the country posted a current account surplus
of 2.9% of GDP in 2020). S&P said, "We expect the current account
deficit will slightly narrow in 2023-2025, reaching 3.6% of GDP by
2025, given expected higher imports and a moderate pace of
remittances growth. Although we expect a sluggish recovery in
foreign direct investment inflows, they will likely continue to
cover over half of the current account deficit. We expect such
inflows to remain around 1.8% of GDP, on average, over the next
three years."

Accordingly, S&P forecasts Honduras' narrow net external debt to
increase to 11% of current account receipts this year, and average
23% during 2023-2025. The country's gross external financing needs
will likely average 89.6% of current account receipts and usable
reserves over the same period.

Honduras has a small domestic capital market, which limits the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Honduras has a managed exchange
rate, though it has taken steps to loosen foreign exchange
restrictions in the transition toward inflation targeting. The
central bank has loosened requirements to surrender U.S. dollars,
recently allowing banks to sell 100% (80% until 2021) of their
foreign exchange inflows in the interbank market.

Inflation had been within the central bank's target in recent years
but spiked to 10% as of June 2022 due to global supply-chain
disruption stemming from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. S&P projects
average annual inflation of 12% in 2022, higher than the inflation
target of 4% +/- 1 percentage point, but S&P expects it will move
within this target range in 2024. The interest rate has remained at
3% since November 2020. Dollar-denominated assets and liabilities
in the banking system account for about one-third of commercial
bank claims and deposit liabilities, creating a vulnerability to
sharp movements in the exchange rate.

  Ratings List

  RATINGS AFFIRMED  

  HONDURAS

   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment

   Local Currency            BB

  HONDURAS

   Senior Unsecured            BB-

  RATINGS AFFIRMED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION  

                                   TO              FROM
  HONDURAS

   Sovereign Credit Rating   BB-/Negative/B    BB-/Stable/B




=======
P E R U
=======

PERU: 3.6% Growth Forecast for 2022 Despite Slowdown Concerns
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marcelo Rochabrun, writing for Reuters, reports that Peruvian
Finance Minister Oscar Graham said that he still expects the
country's economy to grow 3.6% in 2022, reiterating an earlier
forecast despite growing concerns about the potential for a
worldwide economic slowdown.

"With the information we have from the first four months, we still
maintain the 3.6% forecast, however this is a (figure) that is
under constant review," Graham said in a conference with the
foreign press, according to Reuters.

Graham said the figure could be revised in August, when Peru
usually updates its multi-annual economic forecasts, the report
notes.

Peru is one of Latin America's most stable economies and the
world's No. 2 copper producer, the report relays.
While copper prices have fallen in recent weeks, Graham said they
are still within expected parameters, the report notes.

Anglo American has recently opened its large Quellaveco copper
mine, which Graham expects will contribute 0.4 percentage points to
Peru's gross domestic product this year and 1.0 percent in 2023,
the report adds.



=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CL FIN'L: Privy Council Hears Clico Matter
------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that a five-member panel of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council reserved its decision in the matter
of the sale of CLICO's traditional portfolio, after only hearing
from senior counsel Ian Benjamin, who appeared for the Central
Bank.

The Privy Council adjourned after hearing Benjamin's arguments, but
did not call on the attorneys representing Maritime Life, Edward
Fitzgerald QC and Fyard Hosein, SC, to respond, according to
Trinidad Express.

The matter involves the Central Bank's selection of Sagicor Life as
the preferred bidder for the traditional insurance portfolios of
CLICO and British American Trinidad (BAT) in September 2019, the
report notes.  The Central Bank and Sagicor Life signed a sales and
purchase agreement for the transfer of the portfolio on September
30, 2019, the report relays.

Maritime brought an application for leave to apply for judicial
review of the Central Bank's decision to award the sale of the
CLICO and BAT portfolios, the report discloses.  According to the
Privy Council website, Maritime also sought constitutional redress
in respect of alleged violations of its rights under Sections 4(b)
and/or (d) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, the report
says.

On April 6, 2020, the High Court granted Maritime's application for
leave to apply for judicial review and awarded Maritime an interim
injunction to prevent the Central Bank from selling the portfolios
to Sagicor pending the outcome of Maritime's judicial review
proceedings, the report relays.

The Central Bank appealed. On February 17, 2021, by a majority, the
Court of Appeal dismissed the Central Bank's appeal, the report
notes.

The Court of Appeal granted final leave to the Central Bank to
appeal to the Judicial Committee on June 4, 2021, the report
discloses.

The Central Bank selected Sagicor Life after a competitive bidding
process, the report says.

"Maritime has a number of complaints regarding the bidding process,
including that the award of the sale to Sagicor was irrational and
that the procedure adopted was unfair," according to the Privy
Council's outline of the facts in the case, the report relates.

Asked whether the Central Bank had any comment on the sitting, a
spokesperson for the regulator of financial institutions said: "We
await the judgment," the report adds

                  About CL Financial/CLICO

CL Financial was one of the largest privately held conglomerate in
Trinidad and Tobago. It was originally founded as an insurance
company and has since expanded to be the holding company for a
diverse group of companies and subsidiaries.

CL Financial is the parent company of Colonial Life Insurance
Company (Trinidad) Limited (Clico).  CLICO is now the Company's
insurance division.

CL Financial however experienced a liquidity crisis in 2009 that
resulted in a "bail out" agreement by which the government of
Trinidad and Tobago loaned the company funds ($7.3 billion as of
December 2010) to maintain its ability to operate, and obtained a
majority of seats on the company's board of directors.

The companies to be bailed out were: CL Financial Ltd (CLF);
Colonial Life Insurance Company Ltd (CLICO); Caribbean Money
Market
Brokers Ltd (CMMB); Clico Investment Bank (CIB) and British
American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Ltd (BAICO).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in July
2017, CL Financial Limited shareholders vowed to pay back a TT$15
billion (US$2.2 billion) debt to the Trinidad Government.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week July 18 to July 22, 2022
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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