/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/220721.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, July 21, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 139

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms 'CCC' LT FC Issuer Rating, Trend Stable


B R A Z I L

BANRISUL SA: Fitch Withdraws 'b' Government Support Rating


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

VANGUARDIA GROUP: Oct. 13 Hearing for Settlement Motion Set


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pro Consumidor to Address Soaring Housing Price


P A N A M A

PANAMA: Completes 2nd Review Under US$2.5BB PLL Arrangement w/ IMF


P A R A G U A Y

BANCO GNB: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings


P E R U

AUNA SAA: S&P Places 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
PERU: Central Bank Expects July Inflation to Fall Below June Rate


P U E R T O   R I C O

TOYS "R" US: Executives Renew Call to End Chapter 11 Suit


V I R G I N   I S L A N D S

SPYGLASS INVESTMENT:  Oct. 13 Hearing for Settlement Motion Set
THREE ARROWS: Liquidators Ask Court to Force Founders to Cooperate
THREE ARROWS: NY Judge Freezes Founders' Remaining Assets

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms 'CCC' LT FC Issuer Rating, Trend Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Republic of Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
Currency – Issuer Rating at CCC and Long-Term Local Currency –
Issuer Rating at CCC (high). At the same time, DBRS Morningstar
confirmed the Republic of Argentina's Short-Term Foreign and Local
Currency – Issuer Ratings at R-5. The trend on all ratings is
Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of the ratings at CCC/CCC (high) reflects DBRS
Morningstar's view that Argentina faces deep-seated economic and
policy-related challenges. While Argentina reached an agreement
with the IMF in March 2022 for a $44 billion Extended Fund Facility
that included an economic stabilization program, spillover effects
from the war in Ukraine and domestic political uncertainties have
aggravated the country's macroeconomic imbalances. Rising global
commodity prices have added to inflationary pressures and
complicated deficit-reduction and reserve accumulation efforts.
Moreover, open divisions within President Fernandez's
administration over the direction of economic policy raise
implementation risks. The rift between factions of the governing
coalition could deepen as elections approach in October 2023.

Argentina has recovered from the shock of the pandemic, but the
economy's acute imbalances have not been addressed. Output in the
first quarter of 2022 was 4.4% above the fourth quarter of 2019.
This is a relatively strong performance compared to other large
economies in the region. However, fiscal consolidation plans are in
jeopardy due to a sharp increase in spending in the first half of
the year. Inflation is now running above 60% year-over-year, and
the pace will likely accelerate due to greater monetary financing,
faster currency depreciation, and growing wage pressures.
Furthermore, reserves remain at very low levels, despite capital
controls, and the unofficial peso-dollar exchange rate is about
100% above the official rate, which highlights the market's
increasing concern with the credibility of the currency. In our
view, Argentina's challenges, if unaddressed, pose material risks
to macroeconomic stability and the government's capacity to repay
its debt to private creditors.

While policy risks are rising, we expect Argentina will continue to
implement the basic pillars of the IMF program in the near term,
even as several key targets will likely be missed in 2022. Due to
deteriorating external conditions, rising inflation, and slightly
tighter macroeconomic policies, we expect the economy to slow
markedly through the rest of the year. The IMF projects GDP growth
of 4.0% in 2022 and 3.0% in 2023. The statistical carryover from
the first quarter is 4.1%, so the forecast implies no growth over
the next three quarters. In addition, Argentina's weak fundamentals
make it highly vulnerable to downside risks, including
weaker-than-expected global demand or material policy deviations
from the program.

DBRS Morningstar rates the Long-Term Foreign Currency – Issuer
Rating one notch lower than the Long-Term Local Currency – Issuer
Rating to reflect additional risks that stem from Argentina's
limited access to foreign exchange and the high share of government
debt denominated in foreign currency.

RATING DRIVERS

The ratings could be upgraded if the government implements a
credible macroeconomic program that durably lowers inflation and
puts fiscal accounts on a sustainable path. Reforms that increase
investment and productivity growth would also be credit positive.

The ratings could be downgraded if the IMF program is suspended, or
if government debt dynamics deteriorate such that the odds of a
restructuring of bonds held by the private sector materially
increase.

RATING RATIONALE

Spending Growth In Early 2022 Risks Derailing Fiscal Consolidation,
And Concerns Mount About The Political Commitment To Adjust

Arguably the most pressing policy issue facing Argentina is the
fiscal deficit. The government pledged to narrow the primary
deficit from 3.0% of GDP in 2021 to 2.5% in 2022, but fiscal
results year-to-date and uncertainty around the government's
commitment to the adjustment suggest that even this modest
tightening is at risk. In the first five months of the year, real
primary expenditure increased 15% y/y, while revenues (excluding
property income) grew by 2% y/y. The sharp increase in expenditure
partly reflects rising energy subsidies, as energy costs have
increased much more than tariffs, but spending growth was elevated
across expenditure categories. The government reaffirmed its
commitment to the 2022 primary deficit target of 2.5% during the
IMF's First Review. However, achieving the target will require
substantially tighter policy in the second half of the year. In our
view, it is not clear that the government is willing to implement
such a restrictive fiscal stance, especially in light of the recent
cabinet changes within the Fernández administration.

The IMF program calls for the fiscal consolidation to continue
through 2024, when the program ends. The primary deficit target is
1.9% in 2023 and 0.9% in 2024. In our view, implementation risks
are high, as reducing the deficit will require reforming
politically sensitive spending items such as energy subsidies at a
time when poverty levels are elevated and general elections are
approaching in October 2023. Moreover, additional consolidation
will need to continue in the post-program period to put public
finances in a sustainable position. The challenging fiscal outlook
combined with historical weaknesses in fiscal policy formulation
weigh negatively on the Building Block Assessment for "Fiscal
Management & Policy".

Fiscal Slippage And Shallow Local Bond Markets Will Likely Lead To
Greater Monetary Financing

The reluctance of the domestic bond market to rollover government
debt jeopardizes the government's plan to reduce its reliance on
central bank financing. According to the IMF program, the
government aims to increasingly meet its financing needs in the
domestic peso-denominated bond market while capping monetary
financing at 1.0% of GDP in 2022 (and fully eliminating monetary
financing by 2024). The shift to market financing would be
supported by a lower primary deficit, a shift to positive real
rates, and improvements in market infrastructure. In the first
quarter of the year, the government was able to issue
peso-denominated debt, as planned, with high rollover rates.
However, market conditions deteriorated in the second quarter, with
short-term bond yields surging in June despite central bank
intervention. Fragile domestic market conditions could lead the
government to increase its reliance on central bank financing,
thereby surpassing the ceiling set in the IMF program and adding to
inflationary and exchange rate pressures.

On the external front, Argentina has reduced its external debt
servicing needs through 2024 but policy implementation slippage
could lead to tensions with the IMF. In September 2020, Argentina
reached an agreement with private creditors to restructure $82
billion in debt, which provided substantial FX liquidity relief
through 2024. Argentina also reached an agreement on an Extended
Fund Facility with the IMF in March 2022 to refinance repayments to
the IMF that were largely coming due in 2022 and 2023. Despite
these developments, Argentina has failed to regain market access,
and disbursements from the IMF and other official creditors could
be in jeopardy if policy implementation materially deviates from
the IMF program.

In our view, risks to debt sustainability are elevated. The IMF
program's baseline scenario projects government debt-to-GDP, which
was 80% at the end of 2021, to gradually decline over the medium
term. However, deteriorating global conditions and policy
implementation concerns, combined with the high share of debt
denominated in foreign currency (70%), pose significant risks to
debt dynamics. The considerable risks to debt sustainability
combined with Argentina's weak liquidity position lead DBRS
Morningstar to make a negative adjustment in the Building Block
Assessment for "Debt & Liquidity".

The Inflation Outlook Has Materially Deteriorated Due To Global
Shocks And Domestic Political Uncertainties

Headline inflation increased to 61% y/y in May 2022. Higher global
food and energy prices, largely due to the war in Ukraine, have
contributed to rising inflation since February, but upward price
pressures are broad-based, reflecting strong aggregate demand and a
recent acceleration in the pace of currency depreciation. The IMF's
First Review under the EFF projected that year-end inflation would
be 14 percentage points higher than previously assessed (52-62%
from 38-48%). In DBRS Morningstar's view, risks to the revised
inflation outlook are still clearly skewed to the upside. Greater
monetary financing, further adjustments to utility rates, faster
currency depreciation in order to maintain competitiveness, and
growing wage pressures will likely lead to an acceleration in
inflation in the second half of the year. Uncertainties around the
direction of macroeconomic policy could also increase inflation
expectations and contribute to inertial forces. Inflation
expectations remain unanchored. According to the June Survey of
Market Expectations by the central bank, the median forecast for
CPI inflation in December 2022 is 76%. The upside risks to the
inflation outlook lead DBRS Morningstar to make a negative
adjustment to the Building Block Assessment for "Monetary Policy
and Financial Stability".

The central bank has started to tighten monetary policy in order to
strengthen demand for peso assets and dampen inflationary
pressures. In the first six months of the year, the central bank
raised the effective annual policy rate from 45% to 67% (on the
28-day LELIQs). That puts the nominal monthly policy rate at 4.3%,
which is still below the monthly rate of inflation for every month
since February. We expect the central bank to tighten monetary
policy further so as to deliver a positive real policy rate. In
addition, the interest rate floor on deposits and ceiling on credit
have been raised to facilitate the transmission of monetary policy.
We view these actions positively. However, other short-term
measures to combat inflation, such as price controls and import
restrictions, will likely end up exacerbating underlying economic
imbalances, leading to a further deterioration in the investment
climate and an acceleration of inflation down the road.

Argentina's financial system remains small in size. State-owned
Banco Nacion remains a dominant player in the banking sector. While
profitability has suffered amid the pandemic, the banking system
has high levels of liquidity and is well-capitalized. Exposure to
the public sector has increased over the last year, but net FX
exposure is modest.

Low Reserves And A Sizable Exchange Rate Gap Signal Currency
Vulnerability

Argentina has recently undergone a significant adjustment in its
external accounts. The current account shifted from a deficit of
5.0% of GDP in 2018 to a surplus of 1.4% in 2021. The adjustment
was led by import compression in 2019 and 2020, as the pre-pandemic
recession and Covid-19 shock led to a massive cutback in imports.
Imports rapidly recovered in 2021 but were outpaced by strong
export growth, which benefited from higher volumes and favorable
terms of trade. Lower primary income payments, as a result of the
debt restructuring agreements, also contributed to the adjustment
in 2020 and 2021. The current account is projected to remain in a
modest surplus position in 2022, but the outlook is somewhat
uncertain due to spillovers from the war in Ukraine. Higher global
grain prices are boosting Argentina's export receipts, but the
positive effect on the trade balance is being offset by higher
natural gas and fertilizer prices, as well as strong underlying
demand, which is driving capital and consumer import volumes
higher.

Despite running a current account surplus and incrementally
tightening capital controls, Argentina has not been able to rebuild
external buffers. Capital outflows have continued because of
private sector debt repayments and Argentine savers' preference for
hard currency assets. The latter has led Argentina to build a
considerable stock of external assets. From Q3 2019, when capital
controls where imposed, to Q1 2022, currency and deposits held
abroad by Argentine residents increased by $25 billion, thereby
lifting the stock to $244 billion (47% of GDP). On the other side
of the ledger, Argentina has been unable to attract meaningful
inflows. As a result, Argentina has maintained a sizable net
international asset position (NIIP), amounting to $119 billion in
Q1 2021 (23% of GDP).

Low reserves and a widening exchange rate gap could put pressure on
the currency. Gross reserves amounted to $43 billion at the end of
June, but liquid net reserves (calculated as gross reserves minus
dollar deposits from financial institutions, central bank currency
swaps and credit lines, and gold) amounted to about $5 billion
(supported by a $4 billion disbursement from the IMF in June).
Concerned about reserve levels, the central bank added new
restrictions on importers' access to foreign exchange in late June,
which may support reserve accumulation but will likely damage
growth prospects and contribute to inflationary pressures.
Moreover, the spread between the official ARS/USD rate and the
unofficial rate increased from 65% in early June to 100% in
mid-July, highlighting the market's increasing concern with the
credibility of the currency. Overall, we continue to see
considerable external risks that, despite Argentina's current
account surplus and positive NIIP, warrant a sizable negative
adjustment to the Balance of Payments building block.

Argentina Has Rapidly Recovered From The Pandemic But Medium-Term
Growth Prospects Are Weak

The economy has recovered rapidly from the shock of the pandemic.
Output in the first quarter of 2022 was 4.4% above the fourth
quarter of 2019. However, the Argentine economy was already
suffering from a two-year recession prior to the pandemic, and GDP
is still 2.9% below the fourth quarter of 2017 when GDP peaked.
Notwithstanding the strong recovery in 2021 and early 2022, we
expect the economy to slow markedly through the rest of the year
due to deteriorating external conditions, rising inflation, and
tighter macroeconomic policies. The IMF projects GDP growth of 4.0%
in 2022 and 3.0% in 2023. The statistical carryover from the first
quarter is 4.1%, so the forecast implies no growth over the next
three quarters.

Poor macroeconomic management, an unpredictable and onerous
regulatory environment, and limited global integration have
contributed to Argentina's poor growth performance. In the eight
years prior to the pandemic, GDP growth contracted on average by
0.4% per year. During this time, investment averaged 16.9% of GDP,
one of the lowest rates among emerging markets, and the number of
private sector jobs created was close to zero. The IMF program
primarily aims to address macroeconomic imbalances, and leaves most
of the necessary structural adjustments to the next government.
Absent a plan that restores policy credibility and enacts
structural reforms, we expect medium-term growth prospects to
remain weak, with Argentine policymakers having limited room to
stimulate growth without exacerbating macroeconomic imbalances.

Deteriorating Macroeconomic Conditions And Domestic Political
Considerations Increase IMF Program Implementation Risks

Congress approved the IMF program with large majorities in both
houses, including near-unanimous support from the opposition
coalition. However, more than one-third of the governing coalition,
led by Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, voted
against the program or abstained. In our view, implementation risks
are high. The government's popularity is at its lowest level since
2010, and public support for the IMF could erode amid accelerating
inflation and weakening growth prospects. With elections
approaching in October 2023, intra-government divisions generate
uncertainty over the government's willingness to fulfill its
commitments under the program.

DBRS Morningstar also views the broader issue of institutional
quality in Argentina as a credit challenge. In many respects,
Argentina's democracy is quite strong: competitive and fair
elections are regularly held, basic civil and political freedoms
are protected, and an active civil society is engaged in the
democratic process. According to the Worldwide Governance
Indicators, Argentina scores relatively well compared to regional
peers in terms of Voice & Accountability. However, a key governance
challenge is the Rule of Law. Public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary and other branches of government is generally low. In
addition, we view policy predictability as weak, with frequent and
significant changes to policy settings and frameworks over the
electoral cycle. The heightened policy-related risks weigh on the
Building Block Assessment "Political Environment".

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Social (S) Factors

The Human Capital and Human Rights factor affects the ratings.
Similar to other emerging market economies and many of its regional
peers, Argentina's per capita GDP is relatively low, at US$10.7k
(US$23.6k on a PPP basis). This reflects the low level of labor
productivity. This factor has been taken into account in the
Economic Structure and Performance building block. In addition,
labor and social conflicts have at times been a source of economic
volatility in Argentina.

Governance (G) Factors

Two governance factors affect the ratings: (1) Bribery, Corruption
and Political Risks, and (2) Institutional Strength, Governance,
and Transparency. According to Worldwide Governance Indicators,
Argentina ranks in the 34th percentile for Rule of Law and 50th
percentile for Control of Corruption. Argentina ranks in the 43rd
percentile for Government Effectiveness and 31st percentile for
Regulatory Quality. These factors have been taken into account in
the Political Environment building block.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
Fiscal data refers to the federal government. Other public finance
statistics are reported on a general government basis.




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B R A Z I L
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BANRISUL SA: Fitch Withdraws 'b' Government Support Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul
S.A. (Banrisul) a 'b+' Shareholder Support Rating (SSR).

The rating actions on Banrisul's support framework reflect Fitch's
opinion that external support for Banrisul, if needed, is now more
likely to come from the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Banrisul's main
controlling shareholder, instead of the federal financial
authorities due to Banrisul's systemic importance. The State of Rio
Grande do Sul's credit profile is assessed internally by Fitch.

The reassessment on Rio Grande do Sul's overall credit profile
stems from the ratification of the state's fiscal recovery regime
after several years of negotiations and commitment to reforms. The
federal government will perform debt service payments of guaranteed
debt as per the original contract, while it grants Rio Grande do
Sul a debt service relief for the following nine years.

In addition, Fitch has withdrawn Banrisul's 'b' Government Support
Rating (GSR).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Banirisul's 'b+' SSR reflects a limited likelihood of support from
its controlling shareholder. Fitch believes that the state would
have a high propensity but limited capacity to support the bank if
needed. Banrisul is strategically important for Rio Grande do Sul,
acting as its main tax collection agent, making transfers to
municipalities and providing cash management serviced. In addition,
public entities, to which the bank provides services and grants
credit to suppliers, as well as payroll deductible credits to
public employees, make up an important portion of Banrisul's
business.

Banrisul's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic strength, as reflected
in its 'bb-' Viability Rating (VR). The ratings primarily reflect
Banrisul's stable business profile, oriented towards corporate and
households, as well as the bank's moderate risk profile and its
adequate financial profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Banrisul's SSR would be revised if there is any change in its
    strategic importance or changes in the capacity or propensity
    of the State of Rio Grande do Sul to provide support to the
    bank.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Banrisul's SSR would be revised if there is any change in its
    strategic importance or changes in the capacity or propensity
    of the State of Rio Grande do Sul to provide support to the
    bank.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   DEBT             RATING                             PRIOR
   ----             ------                             -----

Banco do Estado    Government Support   WD   Withdrawn   b
do Rio Grande
do Sul S.A.



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C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
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VANGUARDIA GROUP: Oct. 13 Hearing for Settlement Motion Set
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The liquidators of Vanguardia Group Inc, which is in liquidation,
filed a motion to request that the bankruptcy court enter an order
barring, enjoining, and restraining all "barred persons" from
commencing, prosecuting, continuing, or asserting all "barred
claims against any "protected persons" including any Debtors (SGG
Party) in this Chapter 15 case.

The hearing to consider the settlement motion will be held before
Hon. A. Jay Cristol of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern
District of Florida on Oct. 13, 2022 at 10:30 a.m.  It will be held
at the C. Clyde Atkins United States Courthouse, 301 N. Miami
Avenue, Miami, FL, 33128, Courtroom #7.

Any objections to the relief sought in the Settlement Motion must
be filed with the court in accordance with the application rules by
no later than Sept. 23, 2022 at 5:00 p.m.

The liquidators are:

       William Sugden
       Leah Fiorenza McNeill
       Christopher Coleman
       Alston & Bird LLP
       1210 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta Georgia 30309
       will.sugden@alston.com
       leah.mcneill@alston.com
       chris.coleman@alston.com

                         About the Debtor

South Bay Holdings, LLC, was an entity formed to develop real
estate projects in Florida.  When South Bay was originally
founded, it financed its activities primarily through bank
loans and "friends and family" money.

In 2006 and 2007, South Bay sought to significantly expand its
business, including by acquiring 29 lots and associated
memberships at an exclusive resort in Key Biscayne, Florida.

To finance the expansion, the owners then began to form certain
special purpose vehicles to sell notes that were intended to
support these development activities. The Notes were issued in
multiple series through SG Strategic Income Ltd., GMS Global
Market Step Up Note Ltd., and Preferred Income Collateralized
Interest Ltd. Collectively, these three entities appear to have
issued not less than $260 million of these Notes; however, the
actual number is yet to be verified by transaction records and
statements which have not yet been received.  Certain other
related entities were otherwise involved with the issuance of
the Notes.

These entities are all collectively owned either by Vanguardia
Trust (BVI), a British Virgin Islands trust, or SBH Trust (BVI),
also a British Virgin Islands trust. Both of the Trusts have a
common set of principals: Mr. Ernesto Weisson, Mr. Roberto Cortes,
Mr. R. Cortes Rueda, and Mr. J.C. Cortes Pablo.

Starting no later than 2016, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission commenced an investigation of the Principals, Biscayne
Capital International, LLC, and others concerning the issuance and
marketing of the Notes.

In August 2018, the companies owned by the Trusts were put into
liquidation proceedings.

The liquidators of North Pointe Holdings (BVI) Ltd - In
Liquidation and 11 affiliates, including Biscayne Capital (BVI)
- in Liquidation, and Diversified Real Estate Development Ltd.,
(in Official Liquidation) filed Chapter 15 cases in Miami,
Florida (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 18-24659) on Nov. 26, 2018.

The Florida Bankruptcy Court entered an order on Jan. 14, 2019
recognizing the Cayman Islands liquidations of Vanguardia Group
Inc. (In Official Liquidation), SG Strategic Income Ltd. (In
Official Liquidation), Diversified Real Estate Development Ltd.
(In Official Liquidation), GMS Global Market Step Up Note Ltd. (In
Official Liquidation), Preferred Income Collateralized Interest
Ltd. (In Official Liquidation), Sentinel Investment Fund SPC (In
Official Liquidation), and Sports Aficionados Ltd. (In Official
Liquidation) (collectively, the "Cayman Island Debtors") as
"foreign main proceedings".



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pro Consumidor to Address Soaring Housing Price
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Eddy Alcantara, executive director of
the National Institute for the Protection of Consumer Rights (Pro
Consumidor), informed that people who have filed claims against
suppliers for increases in the price of contracted real estate,
that "The Executive Directorate of Pro Consumidor, communicates to
all consumers acquiring real estate and who have filed claims
against their suppliers for an increase in the originally
contracted purchase price, that the resolutions regarding those
cases will be issued and notified," says the message published on
the social networks of the entity defending the rights of
consumers.

The measure of Pro Consumidor is taken after the frequent
complaints of people due to the variation in the price agreed in
their contracts with the different construction companies,
according to Dominican Today.

Given the situation, the real estate companies allege that the
variation is due to the increase in the price of construction
materials, the report notes.

The president of the Association of Housing Developers and Builders
of Cibao (Aprocovici), Landy Alberto Colon Liz, stated that the
construction sector had been greatly affected by the rise and
instability of prices caused by the shortage of containers to
transport goods worldwide, as well as the increase in raw
materials, the report relays.

"The crisis represented our greatest challenge as a board of
directors, due to the vulnerability of the sector to situations
beyond our control. In spite of the situations, we generated
intense work days and dialogues to look for solutions to a crisis
generated by external factors," he expressed, the report notes.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.




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P A N A M A
===========

PANAMA: Completes 2nd Review Under US$2.5BB PLL Arrangement w/ IMF
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
completed the second review under the Precautionary and Liquidity
Line (PLL) Arrangement for Panama for SDR 1.884 billion (500
percent of Panama's quota, equivalent to about US$2.5 billion). The
Panamanian authorities have not drawn on the arrangement and intend
to continue treating it as precautionary. The PLL serves as
insurance against extreme external shocks stemming from the
persistent global uncertainties.

Panama's economy recovered strongly in 2021 with the gradual easing
of the temporary containment measures as health and sanitary
conditions improved. Real output expanded by 15.3 percent in 2021,
and the growth momentum is expected to continue into 2022,
reinforced by the resumption of the construction of a new metro
line and improving private investment.

While Panama is able to meet its external financing needs under
present conditions, the PLL arrangement provides insurance against
externally driven downside risks. Policy priorities under the PLL
include boosting the post-pandemic recovery, supporting an adequate
level of spending on health and social needs, fortifying financial
stability, and further strengthening institutional policy
frameworks that include financial integrity and data adequacy.
Panama has adopted these policies envisaged under the PLL
arrangement and continued to adhere to the amended fiscal rule
which safeguards debt sustainability over the medium term. The
authorities remain committed to continue strengthening Panama's
institutional frameworks, including for the effectiveness of the
AML/CFT regime, transparency of legal persons and legal
arrangements including for beneficial ownership information, data
adequacy and statistics reporting, multi-annual budgeting, and
financial sector regulation and supervision.

Following the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy
Managing Director and Chair, made the following statement:

"Panama's economy recovered strongly in 2021, driven by a rebound
in domestic demand and higher copper exports, despite continuing
challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic and global uncertainties. The
recovery is expected to continue in 2022, subject to significant
risks, including from global uncertainties arising from the war in
Ukraine, higher crude oil prices, tighter global financial
conditions, and new variants of the COVID-19 virus. Continued
strong policies and commitment under the PLL will help to alleviate
vulnerabilities, strengthen the recovery, and enhance market
confidence.

"Panama continues to meet the PLL qualification criteria. The
authorities intend to continue to treat the PLL arrangement as
precautionary.

"The authorities are committed to the fiscal rule and to gradual
fiscal consolidation, which is central to reinforcing debt
sustainability. Efforts to strengthen revenue mobilization and
contain current expenditure, while prioritizing and appropriately
targeting capital and social spending are important. Continued
prudent policies and contingency planning would help to alleviate
risks to the budget. Measures to strengthen public financial
management and fiscal transparency are also important.

"Measures to strengthen financial stability and enhance financial
integrity are central to preserving Panama's position as a regional
financial center. Avoiding further delays in implementing the FATF
action plan, and the related reputational risks, would support an
exit from the FATF grey list. Efforts to address the remaining
deficiencies in the AML/CFT regulatory framework are critical. The
authorities are taking steps to strengthening regulatory,
supervisory, and macroprudential policy frameworks."





===============
P A R A G U A Y
===============

BANCO GNB: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings, assessments
and outlooks assigned to Banco GNB S.A. (proceso fusion p.
absorcion), including the Ba1/Not Prime local and foreign currency
deposit ratings, as well as its Ba1/Not Prime Counterparty Risk
Ratings (CRRs) and its Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR)
Assessments. The bank's ba2 Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) and
Adjusted BCA were also withdrawn. At the time of the withdrawal,
the bank's long-term deposit ratings carried a negative outlook.

Moody's has withdrawn these ratings for reorganization reasons.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The withdrawal follows Banco GNB S.A. (proceso fusion p.
absorcion)'s merger into Banco GNB Paraguay S.A.'s, which took
place on July 1, 2022, as a result of which Banco GNB S.A. (proceso
fusion p. absorcion) ceased to exist as a separate legal entity.
All of the entity's assets and liabilities have been directly
assumed by Banco GNB Paraguay S.A., formerly Banco GNB S.A.
(proceso fusion p. absorcion)'s sole shareholder.



=======
P E R U
=======

AUNA SAA: S&P Places 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
On July 19, 2022, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B+' long-term
issuer and issue-level credit ratings on Peruvian private health
care service provider, Auna S.A.A. (Auna) on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

Auna recently announced it acquired a controlling stake in IMAT
S.A.S. and Oncomedica S.A. (both not rated), which together form a
leading health care group in Monteria, Colombia. Auna has also
agreed to acquire a 100% equity stake in Organizacion Clinica
America (OCA; not rated), a leading health care group in Mexico.

S&P plans to resolve the CreditWatch listing once it has fully
assessed the details of the IMAT-Oncomedica acquisition and the
proposed OCA transaction once it's closed, including their effects
on Auna's liquidity, capital structure, gross leverage, and
business profile.

S&P said, "As of the first quarter of 2022, our adjusted leverage
for Auna was above our current 5.0x rating threshold because it was
hurt by weak operating results in the second half of 2021. These
results were mainly due to lower demand considering a wave of
COVID-19 cases during the fourth quarter of 2021 and higher
expenses related to its new hospitals in the ramp-up phase that
added approximately 245 beds. However, we expect Auna's results to
strengthen in 2022, because it has been able to grow revenues
despite losing all COVID-19-related revenues from its health care
mix. Auna also continues to monetize its increased bed capacity and
take advantage of higher Oncosalud memberships (over 1.0 million
members as of first quarter 2022).

"We consider that the announced transactions will result in
increased scale and geographic footprint, and Auna has indicated
that they will also improve its operating and financial
performance, including EBITDA margins and leverage position.
However, at this stage, Auna hasn't publicly disclosed the
acquisitions' financial terms, including details of their price and
how it will fund them. As a result, given the still uncertain
funding structure and amount, we placed all our ratings on Auna on
CreditWatch negative until we're able to fully assess the
transactions' details and assessed their effects on the company's
liquidity, capital structure, and gross leverage."

The IMAT-Oncomedica acquisition closed on April 21, 2022, and will
add a capacity of 427 beds in two adjacent hospitals. With this
transaction, Auna will have 1,062 beds in Colombia, allowing it to
expand its targeted population to about 3 million people.
Oncomedica is a mature hospital that has two facilities, including
102 inpatient beds and 29 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, and
specializes in fully integrated oncology services. IMAT offers
complementary oncology services and general health procedures with
an emphasis on cardiology. IMAT is currently in a ramp-up phase and
its installed capacity has 84 inpatient beds and 44 ICU beds. Auna
also indicated that IMAT's infrastructure has capacity to increase
its inpatient and ICU beds to a total of 233 hospital beds and 63
ICU beds.

In Mexico, Auna entered into an agreement to acquire a 100% equity
stake in OCA, a leading health care group providing premium health
care and oncological services in Monterrey. The transaction was
approved by the Mexican anti-trust commission and is still subject
to the fulfillment of customary closing conditions.

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-3


PERU: Central Bank Expects July Inflation to Fall Below June Rate
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Peru's central bank expects monthly inflation
in July to be lower than June's rate of 1.19%, a bank official
said, offering some optimism after annual inflation rates hit a
two-decade high in the copper-producing Andean nation.

Adrian Armas, the bank's manager of economic studies, added he
expects monthly consumer prices to ease further in August, but
noted that the impact of inflation would continue to be felt,
according to Reuters.

"The pressures that we have seen on domestic inflation
unfortunately remain," Armas said, adding "the bank's forecast
indicates that monthly inflation rate will still be high," the
report notes.

Prices in Peru rose 4.44% in the first half of the year, while
annual inflation stood at 8.81% in June, its highest level since
July 1997 when the country was struggling with an inflationary
problem, according to official data, the report relays.

Fuel and food prices have been soaring worldwide in the past months
amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the report discloses.  Europe
has been particularly impacted but the situation has affected
economies all over the world, the report says.  

Aiming to mitigate soaring consumer prices, Peru's central bank
raised the country's benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points to
6.0% earlier, the twelfth consecutive hike, as authorities attempt
to battle stubbornly high inflation, the report adds.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

TOYS "R" US: Executives Renew Call to End Chapter 11 Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer of Law360 reports that a group of former Toys R Us
executives on Tuesday, July 12, 2022, asked a Virginia district
judge to overturn a bankruptcy judge's finding they will have to
face claims stemming from the company's bankruptcy, saying the
allegations lack the evidence needed to back them up.

In the objection, the 10 executives argued the Toys R Us litigation
trust had simply not provided the evidence required by law for the
judge to allow the claims they wrongly authorized payments and
misled vendors to go to trial. "The court's baseless leap therefore
cannot stand," they said.

A full-text copy of the article is available at
https://www.law360.com/bankruptcy/articles/1510563/ex-toys-r-us-execs-renew-call-to-end-ch-11-suit

                        About Toys "R" Us

Toys "R" Us, Inc., was an American toy and juvenile-products
retailer founded in 1948 and headquartered in Wayne, New Jersey, in
the New York City metropolitan area. Merchandise was sold in 880
Toys "R" Us and Babies "R" Us stores in the United States, Puerto
Rico and Guam, and in more than 780 international stores and more
than 245 licensed stores in 37 countries and jurisdictions.
Merchandise was also sold at e-commerce sites including Toysrus.com
and Babiesrus.com.

On July 21, 2005, a consortium of Bain Capital Partners LLC,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and Vornado Realty Trust invested $1.3
billion to complete a $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of the
company.

Toys "R" Us, Inc., and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries and its
Canadian subsidiary voluntarily filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. Case No.
17-34665) on Sept. 19, 2017. In addition, the Company's Canadian
subsidiary voluntarily commenced parallel proceedings under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") in Canada in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The Company's operations outside
of the U.S. and Canada, including its 255 licensed stores and joint
venture partnership in Asia, which are separate entities, were not
part of the Chapter 11 filing and CCAA proceedings.

The Company's consolidated balance sheet showed $6.572 billion in
assets, $7.891 billion in liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit
of $1.319 billion as of April 29, 2017.

Judge Keith L. Phillips presides over the Chapter 11 cases.

In the Chapter 11 cases, Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Kirkland & Ellis
International LLP served as the Debtors' legal counsel.  Kutak Rock
LLP served as co-counsel.  Toys "R" Us employed Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as its restructuring advisor; and Lazard Freres
& Co. LLC as its investment banker.  It hired Prime Clerk LLC as
claims and noticing agent. Consensus Advisory Services LLC and
Consensus Securities LLC, served as sale process investment banker.
A&G Realty Partners, LLC, served as its real estate advisor.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the U.S. Trustee for Region 4 appointed an
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee retained
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP as its legal counsel; Wolcott
Rivers, P.C., as local counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc., as financial
advisor; and Moelis & Company LLC as investment banker.

Grant Thornton was the monitor appointed in the CCAA case.

                       Liquidation of Stores

Toys "R" Us, Inc., on March 15, 2018, sought court approval to
start the process of conducting an orderly wind-down of its U.S.
business and liquidation of inventory in all 735 of the Company's
U.S. stores, including stores in Puerto Rico.

Toys "R" Us Limited, Toys "R" Us, Inc.'s UK arm with 105 stores and
3,000 employees, was sent into administration in the United Kingdom
in February 2018.  Unable to find a buyer, Moorfields Advisory
Limited shut the all stores in April 2018.




===========================
V I R G I N   I S L A N D S
===========================

SPYGLASS INVESTMENT:  Oct. 13 Hearing for Settlement Motion Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
The liquidators of Spyglass Investment Management Ltd, which is in
liquidation, filed a motion to request that the bankruptcy court
enter an order barring, enjoining, and restraining all "barred
persons" from commencing, prosecuting, continuing, or asserting all
"barred claims against any "protected persons" including any
Debtors (SGG Party) in this Chapter 15 case.

The hearing to consider the settlement motion will be held before
Hon. A. Jay Cristol of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern
District of Florida on Oct. 13, 2022 at 10:30 a.m.  It will be held
at the C. Clyde Atkins United States Courthouse, 301 N. Miami
Avenue, Miami, FL, 33128, Courtroom #7.

Any objections to the relief sought in the Settlement Motion must
be filed with the court in accordance with the application rules by
no later than Sept. 23, 2022 at 5:00 p.m.

The liquidators are:

       William Sugden
       Leah Fiorenza McNeill
       Christopher Coleman
       Alston & Bird LLP
       1210 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta Georgia 30309
       will.sugden@alston.com
       leah.mcneill@alston.com
       chris.coleman@alston.com


THREE ARROWS: Liquidators Ask Court to Force Founders to Cooperate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dietrich Knauth of Reuters reports that representatives for Three
Arrows Capital (3AC) have asked a U.S. bankruptcy court in
Manhattan to force the cryptocurrency hedge fund's founders to
participate in the liquidation proceedings, saying they can't be
located and have blown off requests for necessary information.

The court scheduled an emergency hearing to address
concerns raised by the company's liquidators.

Singapore-based 3AC, which was reported to have $10 billion in
cryptocurrency earlier in 2022, held $3 billion in assets as of
April 2022, according to the liquidators' court filing. The company
filed for bankruptcy in the British Virgin Islands in late June
2022 after being hammered by a sharp sell-off in digital
currencies.

3AC's insolvency has destabilized other crypto lenders like Voyager
Digital, which filed for bankruptcy after 3AC failed to repay a
loan of approximately $650 million in cryptocurrency, and
Blockchain.com, which loaned $270 million to 3AC.

3AC's liquidators Russell Crumpler and Christopher Farmer, said in
a court filing that they cannot locate 3AC's founders, Zhu
Su and Kyle Livingstone Davies. Crumpler and Farmer were appointed
by a British Virgin Islands court to represent the company, wind
down its operations and repay creditors. They filed a parallel
bankruptcy case in New York in order to shield 3AC's U.S. assets
and gain international recognition of the liquidation proceedings.

The liquidators said Su and Davies have not yet begun to cooperate
in the liquidation effort, and that they are not only concerned
about delays to their work, but the "actual and imminent risk" that

the founders or other parties will whisk away 3AC's cryptocurrency

assets.

They are demanding immediate access to 3AC's Singapore offices and
information about 3AC's bank accounts and digital wallets.

The liquidators said they have had Zoom and email communications
with a Singapore law firm purporting to represent Zhu and Davies,
but they could not be sure they were actually reaching the
founders. On a recent Zoom call, Su and Davies' names appeared,
but their video was turned off and they were on mute at all times.
Neither answered direct questions on the call, according to the
liquidators.

They also said they had stopped by 3AC's Singapore office, but
could not enter because the door was locked. Mail had piled up
unanswered by the door, and neighbors said no one had been in the
offices since late May or early June, according to the court
filing.

Zhu is attempting to sell a Singapore mansion that could be worth
tens of millions of dollars, according to the court filing.

            About Three Arrows Capital

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. was an investment firm engaged in
short-term opportunities trading, and is heavily invested in
cryptocurrency, funded through borrowings.

As of April 2022, the Debtor was reported to have over $3 billion
of assets under its management.

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. was incorporated as a business company
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.  Its sole shareholder
owning all of its "management shares" is Three Arrows Capital Pte.
Ltd., which previously operated as a regulated fund manager in
Singapore until 2021, when it shifted its domicile to the BVI, as
part of a global corporate plan to relocate operations to Dubai.

The Debtor borrowed digital and fiat currency from multiple lenders
to fund its cryptocurrency investments.   After cryptocurrency lost
99% of its value, and then prices of other cryptocurrencies had
rapid declines, the Debtor reportedly defaulted on its
obligations.

On June 24, 2022, one of the Debtor's many creditors -- DRB Panama
Inc.  -- filed an application to appoint joint provisional
liquidators -- and thereafter, full Liquidators -- in the Eastern
Caribbean Supreme Court in the High Court of Justice (Commercial
Division) located in BVI. The application was assigned claim number
BVIHCOM2022/0117.

Subsequently, on June 27, 2022, the Debtor filed its own
application for the appointment of joint liquidators before the BVI
Commercial Court.

On June 29, 2022, the Honorable Mr. Justice Jack of the BVI
Commercial Court appointed Russell Crumpler and Christopher Farmer
of Teneo (BVI) Limited as joint liquidators of Three Arrows Capital
Ltd.

On July 1, 2022, liquidators of Three Arrows Capital filed a
Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the U.S. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
22-10920) to seek recognition of the BVI proceedings.  Judge Martin
Glenn is the case judge.  Latham & Watkins, led by Adam J. Goldberg
is counsel in the U.S. case.

The law firm of Ogier, led by Grant Carroll, is advising the
liquidators in the BVI proceedings.


THREE ARROWS: NY Judge Freezes Founders' Remaining Assets
---------------------------------------------------------
MacKenzie Sigalos of CNBC Cryptoworld reports that a federal judge
in a New York bankruptcy court has frozen the remaining assets of
crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital following the firm's rapid
fall from prominence.

The fund, founded nearly a decade ago, managed $10 billion in
assets just a few months ago. Now, its two co-founders are in
hiding from angry creditors, who are trying to recoup some of
their losses.  Prior to the bankruptcy filing, a court in the
British Virgin Islands ordered the beleaguered fund to
liquidate in order to pay back its debts.

Judge Martin Glenn of the Southern District of New York granted
the emergency motion on Tuesday, July 12, 2022, to freeze
Three Arrows' assets.

Judge Glenn noted in the written decision that only the assigned
bankruptcy liquidators have the authority to "transfer, encumber
or otherwise dispose of any assets of the Debtor located within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."

As part of Judge Glenn's ruling, global advisory firm Teneo, which
was assigned to manage the liquidation, was also granted
permission
to subpoena Three Arrows co-founders Zhu Su and Kyle Davies, as
well as banks, crypto exchanges and other institutions and firms
that have done business with the firm.

The chief concern is that Three Arrows, also known as 3AC, and its
leadership team might be siphoning funds ahead of the formal
liquidation. Coindesk reported that Zhu is looking to sell his $35
million Singapore property, and there are reports of at least one
other digital asset transfer of a non-fungible token held by the
fund.

"A key part of this motion is to put the world on notice that it is
the liquidators that are controlling the debtor's assets at this
stage," Adam Goldberg, an attorney representing Teneo, said in
Tuesday's, July 12, 2022, hearing.

Zhu and Davies didn't respond to requests for comment. Their
lawyer, Christopher Anand Daniel of Singapore-based Advocatus Law,
also didn't respond to CNBC's request for comment.

Goldberg, of law firm Latham & Watkins, said liquidators are
looking for documents such as account statements and digital wallet
information.

A main reason for the aggressive action is that the physical
whereabouts of Zhu and Davies are "currently unknown," according to
lawyers representing the creditors. The creditors also allege that
liquidators in Singapore found that 3AC's offices were vacant, save
for a few inactive computer screens.

But after a nearly month-long hiatus from Twitter, Zhu broke his
silence on Twitter early Tuesday, July 12, 2022, writing that the
firmâ's efforts to cooperate with creditors had been met with
"baiting."

From his verified account, Zhu shared screengrabs of emails sent by
his lawyer to counsel representing liquidators. In those messages,
the attorney wrote that the families of the co-founders "have
received threats of physical violence." He also said Zhu and Davies
have been "working under a lot of time pressure," noting that they
"had to field queries from the Monetary Authority of Singapore."

In the email, Daniel, their attorney, said he attached a
spreadsheet with details of the company's assets and said they
would be providing additional information about the firm's assets
"on a rolling basis."

CNBC asked Daniel for the spreadsheet, but didn't hear back.
Goldberg said during the hearing that the information provided to
his team is "by no means a sufficient form of cooperation."

Nic Carter of Castle Island Ventures, which invests in
blockchain-based companies, said the process could ultimately take
years.

"I wouldn't hold my breath to see the situation resolved," said
Carter. "I"d be extremely concerned about dispositions of assets
and trying to extricate them or maybe expropriate assets that are
owed to creditors, and siphon those out of the process for the
personal usage of the principles here."

Carter said the case is particularly complex because it involves
entities in Dubai, Singapore and other offshore locations.

"The level of coordination that's required in order to unify the
legal process here is very significant," Carter said.

            About Three Arrows Capital

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. was an investment firm engaged in
short-term opportunities trading, and is heavily invested in
cryptocurrency, funded through borrowings.

As of April 2022, the Debtor was reported to have over $3 billion
of assets under its management.

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. was incorporated as a business company
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.  Its sole shareholder
owning all of its "management shares" is Three Arrows Capital Pte.
Ltd., which previously operated as a regulated fund manager in
Singapore until 2021, when it shifted its domicile to the BVI, as
part of a global corporate plan to relocate operations to Dubai.

The Debtor borrowed digital and fiat currency from multiple lenders
to fund its cryptocurrency investments.   After cryptocurrency lost
99% of its value, and then prices of other cryptocurrencies had
rapid declines, the Debtor reportedly defaulted on its
obligations.

On June 24, 2022, one of the Debtor's many creditors -- DRB Panama
Inc.  -- filed an application to appoint joint provisional
liquidators -- and thereafter, full Liquidators -- in the Eastern
Caribbean Supreme Court in the High Court of Justice (Commercial
Division) located in BVI. The application was assigned claim number
BVIHCOM2022/0117.

Subsequently, on June 27, 2022, the Debtor filed its own
application for the appointment of joint liquidators before the BVI
Commercial Court.

On June 29, 2022, the Honorable Mr. Justice Jack of the BVI
Commercial Court appointed Russell Crumpler and Christopher Farmer
of Teneo (BVI) Limited as joint liquidators of Three Arrows Capital
Ltd.

On July 1, 2022, liquidators of Three Arrows Capital filed a
Chapter 15 bankruptcy in the U.S. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
22-10920) to seek recognition of the BVI proceedings.  Judge Martin
Glenn is the case judge.  Latham & Watkins, led by Adam J. Goldberg
is counsel in the U.S. case.

The law firm of Ogier, led by Grant Carroll, is advising the
liquidators in the BVI proceedings.




                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Chapman, Editors.

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