/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/220328.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, March 28, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 56

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Foreign and Local Curr. IDRs
ARGENTINA: Gets IMF Approval of $44BB Debt Deal, Avoids Default
ARGENTINA: President Calls for Steps to Tackle Inflation
ARGENTINA: To Resume Paris Club Talks Over US$2-Billion Debt


B R A Z I L

INVEPAR: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
OEC SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Oppose Tariffs


M E X I C O

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Board Loses Appeal to Limit Adviser Disclosures Scope
PUERTO RICO: Judge Approves $130 Mil. Deal on Whitefish Contract


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week March 21 to March 25, 2022

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Foreign and Local Curr. IDRs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AES Argentina Generacion S.A.'s (AAG)
Long-Term Foreign-Currency (FC) and Local-Currency (LC) Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed AAG's
'CCC'/'RR4' ratings for the company's USD278 million senior
unsecured notes due 2024.

AAG's ratings reflect the company's exposure to the Argentine
sovereign ('CCC') due to the electricity sector's reliance on
government subsidies and AAG's dependence on payments from
FONINVEMEM funds, which is a sovereign obligation. Fitch rates AAG
on a standalone basis from its parent, AES Corporation
(BBB-/Stable), due to a lack of legal guarantees from the parent
and a low strategic and operational incentive to support AAG.

The 'CCC'/'RR4' ratings on the USD278 million senior unsecured
notes is based on AAG's equal FC and LC IDRs. AAG is capped at an
average Recovery Rating of 'RR4' as Argentina is categorized within
Group D with a soft cap of 'RR4'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Heightened Counterparty Exposure: AAG depends on payments from
CAMMESA, which acts as an agent on behalf of an association
representing agents of electricity generators, transmission,
distribution and large consumers or the wholesale market
participants. Argentine generation companies received payments from
CAMMESA within 42 days after the close of the period, but payments
have been delayed to an average of 62 days in recent months.
Roughly 60% of the system cost as of 4Q21 was funded with
government subsidies, and AAG was owed USD180 million as of 4Q21
through FONINVEMEM, an Argentine sovereign-owned fund.

Uncertain Regulatory Environment: The electricity market remains a
priority of the Argentine government. Further regulatory reform is
highly probable to reduce costs and prevent the system from
becoming insolvent. Fitch estimates the government transferred
USD5.7 billion in funds to CAMMESA in 2021, which represented 63%
of the total implied cost of the system of USD9 billion. Fitch
expects the portion of the system that is subsidized may have
peaked in 2021 given the stated plan to raise tariffs in the Buenos
Aires region as well as the goal in Argentina's new IMF agreement
for electricity subsidies to be 1.7% of GDP, down from 2.3%.

Medium-term Deleveraging Expected: AAG's leverage will decline to
1.2x, in dollar terms, by 2024 as the company uses its operating
cash flow and FONINVEMEM collections to pay off the majority of its
2024 global bond and other loans at maturity. In 2021, the
company's credit metrics strengthened, with gross leverage falling
to 2.7x in 2021 from 4.2x in 2020. The fall was primarily due to
increased EBITDA of USD137 million from an inflation adjustment to
spot market framework Base Energy, stronger electricity demand, and
higher coal dispatch at the San Nicolas plant. The company also
repaid USD8 million of its Goldman Sachs loan and repurchased
USD22.5 million of its 2024 global bond.

Base Energy Inflation Adjustment: The indexation of Energia Base
will be important for AAG and other producers, whose revenue is
nearly 60% derived from Energia Base when FONINVEMEM collections
are considered. With Resolution 31/2020, Base Energy was pesified,
or denominated in Argentine pesos, at an effective rate of ARS60
per USD. Resolution 440/2021 took effect in February 2021 and
provided a roughly 30% upward adjustment, or 60% of ARS inflation,
in rates over Resolution 31/2020. Fitch estimates that if 2023's
adjustment covered 100% of ARS inflation, versus only 60% as in the
current base case, AAG's EBITDA would be USD16 million higher, or
USD106 million instead of USD90 million.

Low Commodity Price Impact: AAG's exposure to rising global
commodity prices will be low. The company's revenue comes primarily
from Base Energy, which is the country's spot market framework
whose participants have their fuel sourced and paid for by CAMMESA.
While the coal used in the San Nicolas plant is sourced
internationally, namely from Colombia, Australia and South Africa
and is part of AAG's cost structure, its cost is entirely
reimbursed by CAMMESA in the company's revenue. AAG's other major
revenue source is its newly constructed 200MW of wind farms, which
generate revenue in excess of USD40 million per year and do not
depend on commodity inputs.

FONINVEMEM Receivables in Place: AAG's EBITDA generation will be
affected by the pesification of Base Energy will be compensated by
the company's receivables from its FONINVEMEM investments with
USD50 million received in 2021. Upon repayment of the outstanding
USD180 million owed to AAG as of YE 2021, the company will own an
equity stake of 30% in Guillermo Brown, a 578MW single-cycle plant.
Unlike CAMMESA, repayments of FONINVEMEM obligations are U.S.
dollar-denominated and have been made on schedule.

Hydro Concession Expirations: The expiration of concessions for key
hydro assets will lower the company's future EBITDA to below USD100
million in 2024. The concession for the 1,050MW Alicura hydro plant
on the Limay River is set to expire in July 2023, which Fitch
estimates will lower revenue by USD17 million on a full-year basis.
The expiration of concessions for the 102MW Cabra Corral and 45MW
El Tunal assets on the Juramento River in November 2025 will have a
less pronounced impact given their smaller size.

Strong Competitive Position: AAG owns a diversified portfolio of
3GW, or 7% of Argentina's installed capacity, consisting of 53%
thermal, 40% hydro, 6.5% wind and 0.5% battery storage. The
company's new 200MW of wind assets are remunerated under dollar
denominated contracts through the RenovAR program and with
industrial clients.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

AES Argentina's Long-Term FC and LC IDRs reflect the company's
exposure to CAMMESA as an offtaker, which is reliant on subsidies
from the Argentine government. This is the same situation for
Argentine utility and energy peers Pampa Energia S.A. (B-/Stable),
Capex S.A. (CCC+) and Genneia S.A. (CCC). AAG is concentrated only
in the electricity generation sector, presenting a balanced
portfolio between thermal and hydro assets.

Pampa has a more diversified business profile as a leading company
in electricity generation, distribution, transmission, gas
production and transportation. While Capex has an advantageous
vertical integration in the thermoelectric generation, with the
flexibility of having its own natural gas reserves to supply its
plants. Genneia is the leading wind power generation provider in
the country with an aggressive expansion plan in renewables.

In term of credit metrics, AAG's gross leverage as of year-end 2021
was 2.7x in peso terms, compared with Pampa at 1.6x, Genneia at
3.9x, Generacion Mediterranea S.A. (CCC) at 5.6x, MSU Energy S.A.
(CCC) at 5.1x and Capex at 1.7x as of Oct. 31, 2021. On a net
basis, AAG's leverage was 2.3x in 2021, reflecting USD46 million of
cash and equivalents. Fitch estimates that AAG's projected gross
leverage will average 2.2x in the medium term, slightly below its
Argentine peers' median of 3.0x.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Base Energy assets are remunerated under Resolution 440/2021
    with inflation adjustments equal to 60% of ARS inflation in
    each subsequent year;

-- Gross generation of approximately 9,500GWh during 2022,
    falling to roughly 7,800GWh in 2024 after the expiration of
    the Alicura hydro concession in 2023;

-- AAG achieves generation capacity factors of 45% for thermal
    assets, 20% for hydro and 45% for wind during the rating
    horizon;

-- 20% rise in coal unit costs in 2022 versus 2021, to be
    reimbursed by CAMMESA. Costs will fall to historical average
    thereafter;

-- Average annual maintenance capex of USD20 million over rating
    horizon;

-- No dividend payments until 2024 when annual payments of USD50
    million begin;

-- USD-denominated receivable related to FONINVEMEM of
    approximately USD50 million per year until 2026, all related
    to Guillermo Brown;

-- Majority of outstanding USD278 million bond due 2024 is paid
    off upon maturity in 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade to the ratings of Argentina could result in a
    positive rating action;

-- Given the issuer's high dependence on the subsidies from
    CAMMESA, any further regulatory developments leading to a more
    independent market less reliant on support from the Argentine
    government could positively impact the company's
    collections/cash flow.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of AES Argentina below 'CCC' would be due to
    Fitch's belief that a default of some kind appears probable or
    a default or default-like process has begun, which will be
    represented by a 'CC' or 'C' given that the ratings of AES
    Argentina are linked to those of the Argentine sovereign at
    'CCC' due to the high reliance on government subsidies to the
    electricity sector.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: As of December 2021, AAG reported available
cash of ARS4,900 million (approximately USD46 million) covering one
year of interest expense, assuming no additional debt is raised.
Fitch expects the company will be able to comply with the central
bank capital controls limiting corporates' access to the foreign
exchange market.

Although the rules were extended through the end of 2022, AAG's
only financial obligation which would be subject to the rule in the
future is its USD278 million bond due 2024. Fitch expects the
company to be able to pay off the majority of this bond at maturity
with its cash flow from operations and FONINVEMEM collections.

ISSUER PROFILE

AES Argentina Generacion S.A. (AAG), which is 100% owned by The AES
Corporation (BBB-/Stable), is an electricity generation company in
Argentina with an installed capacity of 3,001MW.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

ARGENTINA: Gets IMF Approval of $44BB Debt Deal, Avoids Default
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
approved a 30-month extended arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) for Argentina amounting to SDR 31.914 billion
(equivalent to US$44 billion, or 1000 percent of quota) and
concluded the 2022 Article IV Consultation. The Executive Board's
decision allows the authorities an immediate disbursement of SDR
7.0 billion, equivalent to US$9.656 billion. The EFF arrangement
aims to provide Argentina with balance of payments and budget
support that is backed by measures designed to strengthen debt
sustainability, tackle high inflation, boost reserves, address the
country's social and infrastructure gaps and promote inclusive
growth.

The authorities' IMF-supported program, which was recently approved
by the Argentine National Congress, aims to strengthen public
finances and start reducing persistently high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and an enhanced monetary and
exchange rate policy framework. The program also envisages steps to
strengthen the domestic peso debt market, the effectiveness of
government spending, labor and gender inclusion, and the
competitiveness of key sectors.

Following the Executive Board discussion, Ms. Kristalina Georgieva,
Managing Director and Chair, made the following statement:

"While an economic and employment recovery is underway, Argentina
continues to face exceptional economic and social challenges,
including depressed per capita income, elevated poverty levels,
persistent high inflation, a heavy debt burden, and low external
buffers. Against this backdrop, the authorities' economic program
sets pragmatic and realistic objectives, along with credible
policies to strengthen macroeconomic stability and begin to address
Argentina's deep-seated challenges. Important financial commitments
secured from Argentina's international partners will support the
authorities' reform efforts and improve the country's external
buffers. Strong political and social consensus is key to sustain
the implementation of the reform agenda, including over the medium
term, which is essential to address the country's long-standing
vulnerabilities.

"The program contains a carefully calibrated set of economic
policies. A sustained and growth-friendly fiscal consolidation will
strengthen debt sustainability and allow for the elimination of the
monetary financing of the fiscal deficit, which will help to start
tackling persistent and high inflation. In addition, an enhanced
monetary and exchange rate framework delivering positive real
interest rates and a competitive real exchange rate will help
support the demand for peso assets and improve reserve coverage.
These actions will help pave the way for an eventual,
conditions-based, easing of foreign exchange controls.

"Importantly, the program includes policies to strengthen the
domestic peso debt market, enhance the effectiveness and
transparency of government spending, promote labor and gender
inclusion, and improve the sustainability and efficiency of key
sectors.

"Risks to the program are exceptionally high and spillovers from
the war in Ukraine are already materializing. In this context,
early program recalibration, including the identification and
adoption of appropriate measures, as needed, will be critical to
achieve the program's objectives."

                   Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors broadly agreed with the thrust of the staff
appraisal. Noting the fragile economic, financial, and social
situation in Argentina, which has been aggravated by the pandemic
and, more recently, by the spillovers from the war in Ukraine,
Directors supported the Argentine authorities' request for an
Extended Arrangement under the Fund's Extended Fund Facility. They
underscored that strong ownership as well as sustained and
steadfast implementation of the authorities' program will be
critical to strengthen economic stability and begin to address
Argentina's deep-seated challenges.

Directors emphasized that a credible, sustained, and
growth-friendly fiscal consolidation is key to strengthen debt
sustainability and discontinue monetary financing of the fiscal
deficit. They stressed the need to improve the efficiency and
fairness of, and compliance with, the tax system. Directors called
for improvements in the structure of spending, including by
reducing costly and untargeted energy subsidies while expanding
infrastructure spending. They stressed the need for protecting
well-targeted social assistance programs and for a prudent
management of the wages and pensions.

Directors underscored the criticality of reducing persistent high
inflation and rebuilding international reserves. To support this,
they stressed the importance of ending monetary financing and
implementing the enhanced monetary policy framework to deliver
positive real interest rates and encourage peso demand. Directors
underscored the importance of maintaining a competitive real
exchange rate and adapting the capital flow management
framework-over time and as conditions permit-to secure trade
surpluses, encourage long term inflows, and boost reserve
accumulation, which would enable an eventual re access to
international capital markets.

Directors called for structural reforms that address Argentina's
long-standing structural vulnerabilities. They emphasized the
importance of strengthening the domestic peso debt market;
enhancing the sustainability and efficiency of key sectors,
including energy; and promoting labor and gender inclusion.
Directors stressed the need to strengthen the investment climate by
gradually removing economic distortions and providing a more
predictable regulatory framework, including in strategic sectors.
They also called for improving governance, including by boosting
the efficiency and transparency of public spending and reinforcing
the AML/CFT regime.

Directors agreed that the program is subject to exceptionally high
risks. They recognized Argentina's vulnerability to external shocks
and implementation difficulties given the complex social and
political situation. Noting that the spillovers from the war in
Ukraine are materializing, Directors welcomed the authorities'
agreement to bring forward the first review of the program and
urged them to recalibrate policies, as needed, to secure the fiscal
objectives and contain second-round inflationary effects from
rising commodity prices.

Directors noted that the elevated exposure to Argentina over an
extended period creates major financial and reputational risks for
the Fund. As these risks cannot be fully mitigated through program
design and contingency planning, Directors agreed that finely
balanced judgments will be needed when assessing difficult
tradeoffs that are likely to arise during the life of the program.

Directors concurred that beyond the program period, further efforts
will be required to cement stability and address longstanding
structural challenges. In particular, they agreed that over the
medium term, Argentina will need to further strengthen debt
sustainability, bolster the central bank's balance sheet and its
governance framework, and tackle regulatory barriers to
productivity, investment, and formal employment. Some Directors
called on the authorities to incorporate some of these reforms in
the current program to increase its credibility.


                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South
America.  Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept.
28, 2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported
on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American,
DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new
agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.

ARGENTINA: President Calls for Steps to Tackle Inflation
--------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that Argentina's President Alberto
Fernandez called on his government to implement "all necessary
measures" to combat 52 percent inflation that's been aggravated by
the surge of global commodity prices due to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.  

In a somber, 18-minute speech, Fernandez said his ministers would
start rolling out new measures without providing specifics,
according to Buenos Aires Times.  Earlier, he declared a "war on
inflation" shortly before data posted showed prices accelerating
for a third straight month in February, the report notes.

"We're in an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary
solutions," Fernandez said, the report relays.

His government's focus "from this moment on will be implementing
all the necessary measures to confront inflation," the report
discloses.

The government raised export taxes on soy meal and oil to 33 from
31%, according to a decree, which cited the invasion of Ukraine,
the report relays.  It also created a "stabilization fund" for
wheat in a separate decree, the report discloses.

Fernandez's speech comes a day after Argentina's senate approved
the government's pending US$45-billion agreement with the
International Monetary Fund, the report notes.  The upcoming
measures are likely not part of the policies outlined in the IMF
pact, which could be approved by the institution's board, the
report notes.

Fernandez's broad ruling coalition emerged divided after the IMF
vote, with the inflation strategy a central issue, the report says.
Some senators from his coalition voted against the deal, saying
that this year's target range of inflation of 38 to 48% "will never
be met," the report relays.

The president said the war in Ukraine isn't the root cause of
Argentina's inflation, the report notes.  but it's "causing bigger
problems." Private economists outline other factors driving
inflation higher in South America's second-largest economy: The
eventual unwinding of electric bill subsidies, a faster pace of
controlled peso devaluations and wage negotiations with labor
unions, among others, the report discloses.

Prices aren't expected to ease soon since the food costs have
climbed higher still in March and the government implemented a
nearly 10 percent hike on fuel, the report relays.  Analysts at
JPMorgan Chase & Co project annual inflation reaching 62 percent by
the end of this year, the report notes.

"We'll put ourselves in front of the fight against inflation,"
Fernandez concluded, the report relays.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept.
28, 2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.


ARGENTINA: To Resume Paris Club Talks Over US$2-Billion Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News reports that Argentina is
resuming negotiations with a wealthy group of nations known as the
Paris Club over US$2 billion in outstanding debt as a grace period
ends.

Economy Minister Martin Guzman will meet with Paris Club President
Emmanuel Moulin in the French capital to restart talks.

Argentina last year agreed to push out the bulk of payments it owed
to the group of nations until March 31, while Guzman negotiated a
new program with the International Monetary Fund, according to
Bloomberg News.

As part of the June agreement with the Paris Club, the government
paid US$430 million in a series of installments between July and
this year, Bloomberg News notes.  Both sides agreed to restart
talks by March 31 on the outstanding US$2 billion, Bloomberg News
relays.

The Paris Club usually requires countries to have an IMF program in
order to restructure debt payments, the report adds.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept.
28, 2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

INVEPAR: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
On March 24, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC+' ratings
on Brazil-based transportation infrastructure group Investimentos e
Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. – Invepar (Invepar). The
outlook remains stable.

S&P said, "Our 'CCC+' global scale rating on Invepar reflects
our view that it depends on favorable conditions outside its
control in order to complete the debt exchange, for which the group
reached agreement with its creditors. The partial debt
restructuring in November 2021 improved Invepar's credit quality,
because it helped to ease liquidity pressures at the holding level
by amortizing 68.3% of its debt and extend the final payment to
August 2024 from October 2021. The completion of debt restructuring
is subject to transferring Lamsa in exchange for the remaining debt
at Invepar, but it depends on the resolution of a judicial dispute
between Invepar and the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. For further
information, please see "Investimentos e Participacoes em
Infraestrutura S.A. - Invepar Upgraded To 'CCC+' From 'D' On New
Capital Structure," published on Jan. 19, 2022."

E-2, S-3, G-5 (health and safety; risk management, culture and
oversight)

S&P said, "Given that we reassessed Invepar's credit quality on
Jan. 19, 2022, after the partial completion of its debt
restructuring, we're now assigning our E-2, S-3, and G-5 ESG credit
indicators on the group.

"Governance factors are a very negative consideration in the credit
analysis of Invepar. We believe the group's aggressive stance on
risk management, particularly on refinancing risk took a toll on
its credit quality during the past few years. As a result, we
assess the group´s capital structure as unsustainable since 2019.
These factors continue to drive our assessment of weak management
and governance. Nevertheless, we notice that Invepar has been
working on enhancing its governance during the past few years,
including through a comprehensive set of policies and controls,
while the group improved compliance standards and broadened its
assessment of risk tolerances. For instance, we see the partial
conclusion of the debt restructuring as a positive development,
because it helped to balance Invepar's capital structure.
Nevertheless, as the company has just emerged from a distressed
exchange, we would need a longer track record of consistent
application of Invepar's strategy and risk tolerances before
reassessing its governance score to a better category.

"We assess social factors as a moderately negative consideration in
the credit analysis of Invepar because we view air travel as having
high sensitivity to health-related cross-border and travel
restrictions, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
latter caused passenger traffic in 2020 at the group's Aeroporto
Internacional de Guarulhos S.A. (GRU Airport) to plummet to 32% of
the 2019 level, and it recovered to 57% in 2021. We expect domestic
passenger volumes to continue fueling recovery in traffic at the
airport, approaching 90% of 2019 levels in 2022 and a full recovery
in 2023. We assume the international air travel at the airport will
recover more slowly, at 40%-45% and 60%-65% of 2019 levels in 2022
and 2023, respectively, with full recovery in 2025.

"Environmental factors are overall neutral to our analysis of
Invepar, given that airports are only indirectly exposed to carbon
emissions (unlike airlines). At the same time, we view the risk of
slower air travel growth or secular change amid the transition to a
low-carbon economy as a manageable and likely long-term issue for
Invepar."

Invepar operates the Guarulhos International Airport outside the
city of Sao Paulo, which is the group's main asset. In addition,
Invepar plans to divest its toll roads and urban mobility assets,
Linha Amarela S.A. (LAMSA) and Concessionaria Litoral Norte S.A.
– CLN (CLN) (currently accounted as available for sale), while
Via 040 is a discontinued operation. The three major local pension
funds--Previ, Funcef, and Petros--are in aggregate the majority
shareholders of the group and control 75% of its shares. An
investment fund, Yosemite, holds the remaining shares.


OEC SA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed OEC S.A.'s (OEC) Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC-' and a
National Long-Term Rating at 'CCC(bra)'. Fitch has also affirmed
OEC Finance Ltd.'s (OEC Finance) USD1.6 billion senior unsecured
payment-in-kind (PIK) toggle notes at 'CC'/'RR5', which are
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by OEC. The Outlook for
OEC's corporate ratings is Stable.

OEC's ratings reflect the still-elevated operational challenges and
uncertainties to obtain new projects, execute current
infrastructure contracts, as well as to satisfactorily recover
margins and cash flows. Financial flexibility remains too weak to
support operations and service debt and fines of plea bargain
agreements. The base case scenario also reflects OEC's weak capital
structure and negative FCF over the rating horizon, and
incorporates no support from its ultimate parent, Novonor S.A.,
formerly Odebrecht S.A. The cyclicality and volatility of Latin
America's engineering and construction (E&C) sector as well as
fierce competition are also reflected in the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Turnaround Remains Challenging: OEC is still challenged to pursue
new contracts and recover profitability consistently to support
operations and service coupons and fines of the plea bargain
agreement that amounts USD2.9 billion to be paid until 2038. The
base case projection assumes a backlog of around BRL16 billion
within the next two years but EBITDA to remain negative in the
period. OEC has prioritized activities in Angola, Peru, Brazil and
Panama, with the first two countries benefiting from the hike in
commodity prices. The recovery of OEC operations will largely
depend on the GDP growth of these four countries and the company's
capability to add profitable projects.

Negative FCF Pressured by Heavy Fines: OEC is expected to report an
average negative FCF of about BRL500 million per year in 2021-2023,
mainly pressured by the fines of the plea bargain agreement and
capex that should be funded by short-term credit lines. Fitch
projects a negative EBITDA of BRL226 million in 2021 and BRL260
million in 2022, reflecting limited dilution of fixed costs and
pressured margins. CFFO is estimated at negative BRL314 million and
BRL564 million in 2021 and 2022 that, after investments of BRL82
million and BRL107 million, respectively, results in negative FCF
of BRL396 million and BRL671 million in the same periods.

Weak Capital Structure: Total debt is projected to reach BRL10.3
billion in 2021 and BRL11.4 billion in 2022, pushed by the accrual
of the coupons and negative FCF. Total debt consists of new USD1.55
billion senior unsecured PIK toggle notes issued by OEC Finance and
working capital lines related to ongoing projects. Fitch believes
OEC will pay-in-kind OEC Finance coupons over the next five years,
which alleviates cash flow pressures in the short term, though
increases the outstanding debt. There is an additional challenge to
increase hard-currency revenues to partially mitigate the FX
exposure.

Operating Environment Stabilizing: The operating environment for
E&C companies in Brazil is expected to stop deteriorating and
gradually improve in 2022 and 2023 given development infrastructure
projects within airports, ports, railroads, toll roads, water &
sewage and energy, sectors. An overall reduction of
pandemic-related restrictions, as vaccination efforts advance, may
also mitigate additional costs and expenses that have pressured
margins. The hike in commodity prices may also favor exporters of
oil and metals, such as Angola, to unlock their infrastructure
agendas.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

OEC's rating is stronger than General Shopping e Outlets do Brasil
S.A. (CC/CC(bra)) that was severely affected by the pandemic when
it reported an aggressive capital structure, FX exposure, and low
unencumbered assets base, which leads Fitch to believe that a
default, including debt restructuring, is probable over the outlook
period. OEC's rating is also stronger than Andrade Gutierrez
Engenharia S.A. (RD/RD(bra)) that has missed coupon payments and
seeks to sell assets to reduce debt.

OEC's credit profile is weaker than InterCement Participacoes S.A.
(CCC/B-(bra)), which also has refinanced it debt and remains highly
leveraged, though has reported an EBITDA growth supported by the
recovery of the cement market in Brazil.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Order book of BRL15.7 billion in 2021 and BRL15.8 billion
    2022, and executed on average in five years;

-- Negative EBITDA of BRL226 million in 2021 and BRL255 million
    in 2022;

-- Capitalization of the coupons of OEC Finance notes, as per
    indenture;

-- Payment of fines per consent solicitation;

-- Capex of BRL82 million in 2021 and BRL109 million in 2022;

-- No dividends.

Key Recovery Rating Assumptions

-- The recovery analysis assumes that OEC would be liquidated in
    a bankruptcy rather than considered a going concern;

-- Fitch assumed a 10% administrative claim.

GC Approach

Fitch excluded the going concern approach due to expectations of
negative EBITDA in the foreseeable future. In a scenario which OEC
starts reporting positive EBITDA, the going concern will be the
preferred approach because Brazilian bankruptcy protection
legislation tends to favor the maintenance of the business to
preserve direct and indirect jobs.

Liquidation Approach

Fitch considered 75% of the accounts receivables, 50% of the
inventory and 50% of net PP&E reported in September 2021 to
calculate the liquidation value (LV). The allocation of value in
the liability waterfall corresponds to a 'RR5' recovery for the
senior unsecured notes and other bank debts of BRL9.3 billion. The
'RR5' Recover Rating reflects below-average recovery prospects, and
indicates a recovery ranging from 11%-30%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Capacity to consistently increase backlog above Fitch's
    expectations;

-- Substantial improvements in profitability;

-- Improved financial flexibility.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

-- Failure to recover backlog and operating margins;

-- Higher refinancing risks in the short-term.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Weak Financial Flexibility: OEC's liquidity is tight and financial
flexibility is expected to continue to be weak despite the debt
restructuring in early 2021. Access to new long-term credit lines
is very restricted and will depend on the company's ability to turn
around its operations. OEC is expected to continue financing the
execution of contracts with short-term credit lines, obtained with
financial institutions of the countries in which the specific
projects have been executed.

In September of 2021, OEC had a cash position of BRL383 million,
enough to cover the short-term debt of BRL379 million. The upcoming
bond amortizations of USD38 million in 2024 and USD74 million in
2026 are expected to increase to USD55 million and USD99 million at
their maturity, respectively, with the PIK coupons. At Sept. 30,
2021, OEC's total debt of BRL9.3 billion (USD3.7 billion) was 95%
composed by the restructured bonds while the remaining 5% were
working capital lines.

ISSUER PROFILE

OEC is one of the largest Latin American contractors, operating in
nine countries mostly in the Americas and Africa. The Novonor Group
has a diversified portfolio of investments in several areas,
including Petrochemical, Oil & Gas, Sugar & Ethanol, Real Estate,
among others.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch considers interest paid as operating cash flow. Fitch also
adds unconsolidated dividends to the EBITDA for leverage and
coverage purposes.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

OEC S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Management Strategy,
as it relies mostly on winning sizable contracts in upcoming years,
which has a high degree of uncertainty and depends on economic
growth, funding availability, clients' financials and competition.
This has a negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to
the ratings in conjunction with other factors. This RS could be
lowered to '3' if the company manages to win and execute the
expected contracts without sacrificing profitability.

OEC S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Group Structure due
to its complexity with participations within sister companies,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the ratings in conjunction with other factors. Fitch sees the
provisions made by the company to simplify related-party
transactions with other entities of the Novonor Group as
constructive, and a lower relevance score would require a more
tangible simplification of the group structure.

OEC S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Governance Structure
due to pending plea bargain agreements and qualified financial
statements, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and
is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors. The
agency recognizes the company's progress made since car wash
investigations began in 2014. Plea bargain agreements have been
signed and most of the top management was replaced. Stringent
compliance rules and internal controls were implemented to guide
stakeholders' relationships and to avoid repeating misconduct
practices. Lowering this ESG.RS to '3' would require more concrete
steps such as signing the remaining plea bargain agreements and
publishing unqualified financial statements.

OEC S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Financial
Transparency due to the periodic restatements of historical
figures, consolidation of assets with minority economic stake, and
several partnerships that retain cash before it reaches the parent,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Oppose Tariffs
---------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the leadership of the Association of
Industries of the Dominican Republic (AIRD) once again opened on
the bill that would eliminate tariffs on more than 67 products from
the basic basket, stressing that the measure "instead of helping
would bring more problems."

According to Dominican Today, Circe Almanzar said that they
expressed their disagreement to the Chamber of Deputies considering
that, although the situation is dire worldwide, it is not the best
option to dismantle the tariffs, even for six months:

"Because tariffs are part of a commercial policy that countries
have in a sovereign manner, which they do to strengthen their
productive sectors and to manage their commercial relations with
other countries.

"Opening tariffs on products manufactured in the Dominican Republic
could jeopardize that trade policy and that productive development
policy that we have in the country, even for six months, because it
is a precedent.

"And it creates a certain uncertainty in economic agents and
especially in rural producers who are the ones who generate jobs
and generate our food security," she said, the report adds.

                  About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2021, revised the Outlook on Dominican
Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to Stable from Negative and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.  The
revision of the Outlook to Stable reflects the narrowing of
Dominican Republic's government deficit and financing needs since
Fitch's last review resulting in the stabilization of the
government debt/GDP ratio, as well as the investment-driven
economic momentum, reflected in the faster-than-expected economic
recovery in 2021 that Fitch expects to carry into above-potential
GDP growth during 2022 and 2023.

Standard & Poor's, also in December 2021, revised its outlook on
the Dominican Republic to stable from negative.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB-' long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings and its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings.  The
stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of continued favorable
GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12 to 18 months that
will likely stabilize the government's debt burden, despite lack of
progress with broader tax reforms, S&P said.  A rapid economic
recovery from the downturn because of the pandemic should mitigate
external and fiscal risks.

Moody's affirmed the Dominican Republic's long-term issuer and
senior unsecured ratings at Ba3 and maintained the stable outlook
in March 2021.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Petroleos Mexicanos' (PEMEX) Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable. The rating action applies to
approximately USD80 billion of international notes outstanding.

Petroleos Mexicanos' (PEMEX) ratings reflect moderate linkage to
Mexico's (BBB-/Stable) credit quality coupled with a weak
Standalone Credit Profile (SCP), which Fitch Ratings believe is
commensurate with a 'ccc-'. The SCP reflects PEMEX's elevated and
raising leverage levels, limited financial flexibility, high tax
burden and high investment needs to maintain production and
replenish reserves.

Fitch estimates PEMEX's FCF will average approximately negative
USD11 billion per year from 2023 through 2025, as the company seeks
to increase capex to revert the historical production decline rate.
Fitch believes the company will continue to need significant
government support in the near term. The moderate linkage between
PEMEX's ratings and those of the sovereign reflects the delay and
uncertainty of significant support from the government due to
PEMEX's financial difficulties resulting from high taxes. PEMEX's
Stable Rating Outlook mirrors Mexico's sovereign Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Underlying Credit Quality: PEMEX's SCP is aligned with a
'ccc-' credit profile, were it not state owned and receiving
government support. The company's high tax burden, even after the
decrease in the government profit sharing scheme to 40% from 54%,
and limited financial flexibility to navigate lower oil prices
continues to erode its SCP. The SCP reflects PEMEX's elevated
leverage and low cash flow from operations, which limits support
for sustainable upstream capex that could deliver consistent stable
production and 100% reserve-replacement ratios in the long term.

PEMEX preliminarily reported Fitch-defined lease-adjusted EBITDA,
before net pension expenses, of approximately USD23.3 billion in
year-end 2021, and FFO of around USD4.3 billion, up from USD7.6
billion and negative USD4.5 billion, respectively in 2020. Total
financial debt amounted to about USD110.0 billion down slightly
from USD113 billion in 2020, translating into total debt/EBITDA of
approximately 4.7x. The SCP reflects the company's low liquidity
position, with only USD3.7 billion of cash on hand, as of December
2021.

Transfers Weaken SCP: PEMEX's weak underlying credit quality is
primarily the result of excessive distributions to the government.
Contributions to Mexico averaged about 11.6% of government revenue
between 2015 to 2019, although they declined to around 4.9% in 2020
due to lower oil prices, but reverted up to 8.4% in 2021. Transfers
from PEMEX to the government remain high, relative to the company's
cash flows, as transfers were approximately 25% of sales during the
past three years, or about 80%-100% of adjusted EBITDA in 2019 and
2021. The government lowered the cash taxes in 2021 to 40%, which
represented nearly 60% of EBITDA in 2022 and 2023. The company's
balance sheet remains weakened, and its debt lacks an explicit
guarantee from the Mexican government.

Weak Government Support: Mexico has demonstrated weak support for
PEMEX through delayed implementation of measures to alleviate the
company's credit quality deterioration. This weak support
assessment also reflects high levels of transfers from PEMEX to the
government. Fitch believes the government might continue to provide
meaningful support if necessary.

Total government support for PEMEX was about USD15.4 billion in
2020 in the form of tax credits and capital injections, of which
more than USD3.5 billion per year was earmarked for liability
management. This support includes a previously announced tax
reduction of 7% in 2020 and a further 4% relief in 2021. Net
transfers from PEMEX to the government amounted to about USD13.5
billion after tax credits in 2021. Mexico announced further tax
credits for 2022, lowering cash tax obligations to 40% from 54% in
2021. Fitch expects this level to remain through the rating
horizon, averaging USD17 billion per annum.

Moderate Government Linkage: Fitch expects the government will
ensure PEMEX maintains sufficient liquidity to service debt,
despite the moderate rating linkage, which supports the material
rating uplift from the SCP. Fitch assesseses government support for
PEMEX as weak and government incentives sub-factors as moderate.
Fitch views Mexico's ownership and control of PEMEX as very
strong.

This assessment results in a three-notching differential between
PEMEX and Mexico's ratings. The Mexican government has strong
incentives to support PEMEX, given the socio-political and
financial consequences of a default for the country. It is Mexico's
largest company and one of the government's major sources of funds,
with material contributions to government revenues.

Strategic Importance for Energy Security: The sovereign linkage
stems from the company's strategic importance in supplying liquid
fuels to Mexico. A financial crisis at PEMEX could potentially
disrupt the country's liquid fuel supply. Mexico is a net importer
of liquid fuels due to low refinery utilization rates. The country
relies on PEMEX for almost all of its supply of gasoline and
diesel, about 52.5% of which is from imports. Financial distress at
PEMEX could also have very severe financial consequences for the
Mexican government and other government-related entities,
especially regarding access to funding.

Continued Upstream Underinvestment: Fitch expects production and
reserves to remain stable over the rating horizon, should PEMEX
continue increasing exploration and production (E&P) capex, while
reducing lifting, finding and development (F&D) costs. Fitch
estimates projected capex will likely be insufficient to
sustainably replenish 100% of reserves without further reducing F&D
costs, as the company would require annual E&P capex of about USD12
billion to replenish 100% of 1P reserves on a sustainable basis.
This is based on a F&D and acquisition cost estimate of
USD13.00/boe and annual production of 900 million boe/year.

PEMEX's crude oil production stabilized in the past 24 months at
about 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) after decades of continued
declines. Fitch assumes total production may remain stable over the
rating horizon as the company's increase in capex may only be
sufficient to offset production declines from mature fields.
PEMEX's production from new fields increased by around 322,000 bpd
as of December 2021, which helped offset declines in production
from mature fields.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

PEMEX's linkage to the sovereign compares unfavorably with peers
Petroleos Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras; BB-/Negative), Ecopetrol S.A.
(BB+/Stable), Empresa Nacional del Petroleo (ENAP; A-/Stable) and
Petroleos del Peru - Petroperu S.A. (BBB-/RWN). All of PEMEX's
regional peers have strong linkages to their sovereigns due to
strong government support. Fitch believes governments in the
region, except for Mexico, implemented different measures to ensure
the SCPs of their respective national oil and gas companies remain
viable in the long term.

PEMEX's ratings continue to reflect its close, albeit
deteriorating, linkage to the Mexican government due to its fiscal
and strategic importance. The ratings also reflect the company's
competitive pre-tax cost structure, national and export-oriented
profile, sizable hydrocarbon reserves and strong domestic market
position. The ratings are constrained by PEMEX's substantial tax
burden, high leverage, significant unfunded pension liabilities,
large capital investment requirements, negative equity and exposure
to political interference risk.

Fitch views PEMEX's SCP as commensurate with a 'ccc-', which is 10
notches below Petrobras' and Ecopetrol's SCPs of 'bbb'. The
differences are primarily due to PEMEX's weaker capital structure
and increasing debt and leverage trajectory. PEMEX's SCP reflects
the company's large transfers to Mexico's federal government, large
and increasing financial debt balance when compared with 1P
reserves and elevated EBITDA-adjusted leverage. Comparatively,
Ecopetrol and Petrobras significantly strengthened their capital
structures and maintained stable operating profiles.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Average West Texas Intermediate crude prices of USD95/bbl in
    2022 and trending toward USD50/bbl in the long term;

-- Upstream capex moderately increases to USD8.0 billion per
    annum;

-- Production continuing its stabilization trend at 1.9mmboed;

-- PEMEX will receive necessary support from the government to
    ensure adequate liquidity and debt service payments

-- Profit sharing duty rate of 40% per annum

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of Mexico's sovereign ratings.

-- An irrevocable guarantee from Mexico's government to
    sustainably cover more than 75% of PEMEX's debt.

-- A material capitalization, coupled with a material reduction
    of taxes, with a business plan that results in neutral to
    positive FCF through the cycle, while implementing sustainable
    upstream capex that is sufficient to replace 100% of reserves
    and stabilize production profitably.

-- Sustainable FFO leverage below 5.0x and/or Gross Leverage of
    4.0x

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of Mexico's sovereign rating.

-- A sustained deterioration of PEMEX's financial flexibility,
    coupled with government inaction to support liquidity,
    potentially resulting from continued negative FCF or a
    material reduction of cash on hand, credit facilities and
    restricted capital markets access.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Weak Liquidity: PEMEX's liquidity position continues to be weak as
a result of negative FCF, which resulted in a relatively low cash
position and reduced availability of its lines of credit. PEMEX
reported total cash and equivalents of aroundUSD3.6 billion as of
year-end 2021. Its liquidity compares unfavorably with principle
debt amortizations of USD7.5 billion due in 2022.

Fitch expects PEMEX will require material external funding in 2022
through 2024, given expected negative FCF resulting from a high tax
burden under Fitch's price assumptions for oil. Absent capital
increases from the Mexican government, PEMEX is likely to continue
funding its negative FCF with debt and potentially further erode
liquidity.

ISSUER PROFILE

PEMEX, Mexico's state oil and gas company, is the nation's largest
company and ranks among the world's largest vertically integrated
petroleum enterprises.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch adjusted PEMEX's EBITDA to add back non-cash pension
expenses.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

PEMEX's ratings are directly linked to the sovereign rating.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

PEMEX has an Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Relevance
Score (RS) of '4' for Governance Structure, resulting from its
nature as a majority government-owned entity and the inherent
governance risk that arises with a dominant state shareholder,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant
to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

PUERTO RICO: Board Loses Appeal to Limit Adviser Disclosures Scope
------------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Wolf of Bloomberg Law reports that a federal judge ruled that
professionals working on Puerto Rico's restructuring proceedings
must disclose connections with both past and present creditors in
order to get their fees approved.

U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain rejected the
Puerto Rico Federal Oversight and Management Board's proposed list
of "material interested parties," which omitted creditors whose
claims "have not been expunged, settled, withdrawn, or otherwise
resolved."

The board, a federally appointed panel that has steered the
island's process of overhauling $123 billion worth of funded debt
and pension liabilities, had proposed distinguishing between
creditors with "active" and "inactive" claims.

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                          *     *     *

The two Title III plans of adjustment have been confirmed to date,
for the Commonwealth and COFINA debtors.



PUERTO RICO: Judge Approves $130 Mil. Deal on Whitefish Contract
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer of Law360 reports that a federal judge approved
a $130 million deal to settle claims against Puerto Rico's bankrupt
electric utility, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, by a
company, Whitefish Energy Holdings, that briefly held a
controversial contract to repair the island's hurricane-damaged
electric grid.

U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain's order approves a
settlement between the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and
Whitefish Energy Holdings over claims by Whitefish seeking payment
for the two months it worked restoring the island's electrical
system.  In September 2017, PREPA -- which only a month before had
begun proceedings to restructure its $9 billion in debt -- signed a
$300 million contract with Montana-based Whitefish.

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                          *     *     *

The two Title III plans of adjustment have been confirmed to date,
for the Commonwealth and COFINA debtors.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week March 21 to March 25, 2022
---------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                  * * * End of Transmission * * *