/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/211228.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, December 28, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 253

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: IMF Discusses Ex-Post Evaluation of Access Under Deal


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Informal Employment Grows in Country, Says Ipea
COMPASS GAS: Fitch Assigns First Time 'BB' LT FC IDR, Outlook Neg.
MOVIDA PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms BB- ICR, Alters Outlook to Pos.
SIMPAR SA: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'BB-' ICR
STATE OF ALAGOAS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative

VIACAO ITAPEMIRIM: Could be Fined for Unexpectedly Suspending Ops


M E X I C O

GRUPO POSADAS: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B-', Outlook Stable


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Imports Will Counter 15% Cement Price Hike
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Rock Hard Not Returning to Market

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: IMF Discusses Ex-Post Evaluation of Access Under Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
IMF Executive Board Discusses the Ex-Post Evaluation of Argentina's
Exceptional Access Under the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement
December 22, 2021

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) met to
discuss the Ex-Post Evaluation (EPE) of Argentina's Exceptional
Access Under the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement.

An Ex-Post Evaluation is required in all cases of IMF lending above
normal borrowing limits to review performance against original
program objectives, discuss whether the program design was
appropriate, and assess whether the program was consistent with
Fund policies. This EPE reviews the experience under Argentina's
program, supported by the Stand-By Arrangement, and covers the
period from June 2018 through to August 2019. It examines
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Argentine economy, objectives
and policies under the program, the balance of financing and
adjustment, and the justifications for exceptional access to IMF
financing by Argentina. The EPE also includes an appendix laying
out the authorities' reaction to the report and views on the 2018
Stand-By Arrangement.

In early 2018, Argentina, like other emerging market economies, was
experiencing challenging external financing conditions. The
government announced in May 2018 that it would seek an IMF
arrangement. In support of an economic program, the Executive Board
approved in June 2018 the largest stand-by arrangement in the
Fund's history. After an augmentation in October 2018, access under
the arrangement amounted to US$57 billion (1,227 percent of
Argentina's IMF quota).

The program aimed to restore confidence, reduce balance of payments
and fiscal imbalances, and bring down inflation. Restoring
confidence would, in turn, allow time for the authorities to return
to dealing with longer-term challenges facing the Argentine
economy. The strategy, underpinned by the large financial support
from the Fund, centered on fiscal and monetary tightening, combined
with targeted structural reforms, to catalyze renewed capital
inflows. The program also included specific measures to support
vulnerable segments of the population and to address gender
inequality.

The Ex-Post Evaluation report concludes that relevant Fund policies
and procedures, including those relating to financing, safeguards
and program design, were adhered to. The report also finds that the
program did not deliver on its objectives, despite significant
modifications of economic policies. Mounting redemptions, along
with capital flight by residents, put considerable pressure on the
exchange rate. Despite FX interventions beyond program provisions,
the exchange rate continued to depreciate, increasing inflation and
the peso value of public debt, and weakening real incomes,
especially of the poor. In sum, the report concludes that the
program did not fulfil the objectives of restoring confidence in
fiscal and external viability while fostering economic growth. The
program went off track in August 2019 with only four of the planned
twelve reviews completed by the Executive Board. The authorities
decided to cancel the arrangement on July 24, 2020.

                  Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors welcomed the comprehensive ex-post evaluation
(EPE) of exceptional access to Fund financing under the 2018
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Argentina. While the EPE draws a
number of important lessons, they noted that several of them are
not new. Looking ahead, Directors emphasized that the EPE findings
should inform the ongoing discussions on a potential follow-up
program with Argentina.

Directors regretted that the 2018 program did not deliver on its
objectives of restoring market confidence, bringing down external
and fiscal imbalances, reducing inflation, and protecting the most
vulnerable segments of the population. They considered that the
program's strategy and conditionality was not sufficiently robust
to address Argentina's deep-seated structural problems, including
fragile public finances, dollarization, high inflation, weak
monetary policy transmission, a small domestic financial sector,
and a narrow export base.

Directors noted that the then government's redlines on certain
policies may have ruled out potentially critical measures for the
program. Among those measures were a debt operation and use of
capital flow management measures. A number of Directors, however,
questioned the feasibility of implementing these measures when a
key objective of the program was to restore market confidence.
Directors recognized that the emphasis on government ownership may
have also led to overly optimistic forecasts, which weakened the
program's robustness.

Directors noted that the SBA has created substantial financial and
reputational risks to the Fund. Most Directors concurred that
agreeing with the authorities upfront on contingency plans could
have reduced risks to the program and to the Fund, but a few
Directors noted the difficulties of handling such plans in practice
given market sensitivities. Directors emphasized that better
communication by the authorities could have boosted the catalytic
effect of the program. They also underscored that greater burden
sharing with other official creditors would have provided
additional financing and signaled broader support from the
international community, both of which could have bolstered
confidence.

Directors generally agreed that the SBA was consistent with Fund
policies and procedures but recognized that the application of some
of these policies involved considerable judgment. A few Directors,
however, questioned such consistency. While standard procedures to
assess risks to the Fund were followed, Directors considered that
broader risks could have featured more prominently, and the Board
could have been involved earlier and more deeply in the process.
Many Directors considered that an evaluation of the 2018 SBA with
Argentina by the Independent Evaluation Office could complement the
EPE findings. While the revised Exceptional Access Framework was
followed, they noted that the application of the criteria on debt
sustainability, market access, and capacity to implement the
program was not straightforward and came down to finely balanced
judgments.

Directors highlighted several lessons for Fund-supported programs.
First, it is essential that they incorporate realistic assumptions.
Second, programs should be tailored to country circumstances,
including political economy considerations, which could entail
using unconventional measures if standard macroeconomic policies
are unlikely to deliver. Third, the analysis of risks underlying
key judgments made when applying the Exceptional Access Framework
should be clearly laid out and communicated to the Board. Fourth,
ownership, which should be understood in a broader societal sense,
should not preclude a candid assessment of possible better policy
choices and program outcomes. Fifth, effective external
communication is essential in securing proper buy-in at different
levels and the intended catalytic effect. Finally, an appropriate
burden sharing is needed when entering into exceptional access
arrangements.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as
Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors,
and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities.  

An explanation of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found
here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

                       About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept. 28,
2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: Informal Employment Grows in Country, Says Ipea
-------------------------------------------------------
Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that according to a study
released by Ipea (Institute for Applied Economic Research), Brazil
has 13.5 million unemployed.  Of these, 29% have been looking for a
new job for more than two years, the report discloses.

In 2012, the most significant increase in the population's
occupation was informal jobs, according to Rio Times Online.

Decline in unemployment contrasts with low demand for formal
employment; informal employment is on the rise in the country, the
report notes.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at BB- with
stable outlook (April 2020). S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for Brazil
were affirmed in December 2021 with stable outlook.  Fitch
Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a negative
outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign and
Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021. Moody's credit rating for Brazil was last set at Ba2
with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's credit rating for Brazil
is BB (low) with stable outlook (March 2018).


COMPASS GAS: Fitch Assigns First Time 'BB' LT FC IDR, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Compass Gas e Energia S.A. first-time
Foreign Currency (FC) and Local Currency (LC) Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) of 'BB' and 'BB+', respectively, and Long-Term
National Scale Rating of 'AAA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook for the FC
IDR is Negative, while the Outlook for the LC IDR and the National
Scale Rating is Stable.

Compass' ratings reflect the linkage with its parent Cosan S.A.
(Cosan; FC IDR 'BB'/Negative; LC IDR 'BB+'/Stable; National Scale
Rating 'AAA(bra)'/Stable) and that company's stronger standalone
credit profile (SCP). The application of Fitch's Parent and
Subsidiary Linkage Rating Criteria has resulted in the equalization
of Compass' ratings with those of Cosan. Cosan owns 88% of Compass,
and has open access to Compass' assets because of the absence of
legal ring-fencing between the two companies. The Negative Outlook
for the FC IDR is tied to the Negative Outlook for the Brazilian
sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Gas Distribution Subsidiary: Compass' key asset is its
subsidiary, Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo - Comgas (FC IDR
'BB'/Negative; LC IDR 'BBB-'/Negative; and National Scale Rating
'AAA(bra)'/Stable). Compass has received robust dividends from
Comgas relative to its forecasted debt amount, resulting in low
leverage for this intermediate holding company. In the near future,
Compass' portfolio of assets should diversify due to ongoing
acquisitions.

Fitch views Compass' SCP as weaker than Comgas', as the latter is a
natural gas distributor with regulatory and debt restrictions that
could limit Compass' access to its cash. As an intermediate holding
company of Cosan for investments in the natural gas sector, Cosan
has control over Compass' strategies and cash through its 88%
ownership stake in the company. Fitch believes that Cosan would
support this company, if needed, because of Comgas' value to the
group.

Strong Business Model: Cosan's credit profile is supported by its
strong and diversified asset portfolio, with a leading sugar and
ethanol business, sales of fuels and lubricants, rail operations,
in addition to the natural gas activity. Cosan has a robust
consolidated financial profile, with the expectation of a growing
and consistent flow of dividends to the holding in the coming
years.

Low to Moderate Industry Risk: Compass' exposure to the natural gas
distribution industry with low to moderate business risk is a
positive credit consideration. Natural gas distributors operate
under long term concession contracts with non-manageable cost pass
through mechanisms that protect their cash flows and improving
predictability, despite moderate demand volatility. Gas supply
risks to distributors are expected to be manageable as Petrobras
reduces its position as the main supplier in Brazil. Compass aims
to benefit from high growth potential for natural gas demand
resulting from a new regulatory framework that should stimulate
supply competition and gas prices reduction in the mid-term.

Natural gas distribution operations should contribute to around
90%-95% of Compass' consolidated EBITDA through 2024 with around
80% coming from Comgas. With operations in the state of Sao Paulo,
Comgas is the largest company in this sector in Brazil, and has
robust credit metrics and solid business profile. Once concluded,
Compass' acquisition of 51% of Petrobras Gas S.A, - Gaspetro (with
shares on 19 natural gas distributors concessionaires in Brazil)
and Companhia de Gas do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul - Sulgas, both
expected to occur until mid-2022 subject to preceding conditions,
should improve Compass asset diversification.

Sound Financial Structure: Compass' consolidated financial profile
should remain conservative in the next three years as equity
injections of BRL2.3 billion during 2021 support its growth
strategy through acquisitions. The company's consolidated net
leverage should peak at 1.7x by 2022 due to the approximately
BRL3.0 billion acquisition payment. Compass' consolidated EBITDA in
2021 is projected to reach BRL2.5 billion and gradually increase to
BRL4.2 billion by 2024 underpinned by the Gaspetro and Sulgas
acquisitions.

Strong Cash Flow Generation: The base case scenario forecasts a
consolidated cash flow from operations (CFFO) in 2021 of BRL1.8
billion, resulting on negative free cash flow (FCF) of BRL588
million after dividends of BRL982 million and capex of BRL1.4
billion. Compass' consolidated CFFO should average BRL2.5 billion
in 2022-2023 and its capex should average around BRL1.8 billion.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Compass's ratings are in line with power and gas utilities group in
the Latam region. The company similarly compares with Energisa S.A.
(BB+/Stable), a holding company with diverse operating subsidiaries
in the power distribution segment also in Brazil. Energisa has
solid growth potential through its subsidiaries and above average
performance as compared with the main peers in the segment. Fitch
expects Compass to gradually increase portfolio diversification
while maintaining a conservative financial profile and benefitting
from credit risk related to its parent.

Compass' ratings are influenced by Brazil's operating environment
compared to GNL Quintero S.A.'s (GNLQ; BBB+/Stable), which owns and
operates the largest LNG regasification terminal in Chile, despite
GNLQ operating single asset under expectation of higher leverage
metrics through the rating horizon. Compass also negatively
compares with Promigas S.A. E.S.P. (BBB-/Stable), which benefits
from a strong business position within the Colombian natural gas
transportation and distribution segments, despite expectation of
sustaining higher leverage ratios compared with Compass.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Comgas total volume billed excluding the thermo power
    generation segment growth of 14% in 2021, with an annual
    average increase of 2.7% thereafter, in line with Fitch's GDP
    projections;

-- Comgas annual contribution margin increases in line with
    Fitch's inflation estimates and adjusted by an efficiency
    factor of 0.52%;

-- Compass dividend distribution of BRL780 million on average per
    year in 2021-2023;

-- Acquisition of Gaspetro and Sulgas until mid-2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of Cosan's ratings;

-- A downgrade of Comgas' ratings in more than one notch;

-- A downgrade of the sovereign rating may also trigger a
    downgrade of Compass' Foreign Currency IDR.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Upgrade of Cosan;

-- A revision of the Negative Outlook to Stable for the FC IDR
    could occur if the sovereign's Rating Outlook is similarly
    revised.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Sound Liquidity: Compass, as an intermediate holding company, had
BRL1.7 billion in cash and no on-balance sheet debt at the end of
September 2021, but should raise debt in the near future to finance
working capital. Compass also guarantees BRL700 million debt at a
subsidiary level. Compass holding cash balance reflects the BRL1.6
billion of capital injection received in the 3Q21 from new
shareholders, with an additional capital injection of BRL630
million by the end of November and BRL1.5 billion of dividends
upstream from Comgas expected until December 2021. Those cash
inflows will support Gaspetro and Sulgas acquisitions in 2022.

Compass is expected to receive robust annual dividends of around
BRL1.7 billion during the next three years from Comgas. It should
distribute about half of these proceeds to its controlling
shareholder, Cosan. Consolidated adjusted debt of BRL8.0 billion as
of Sept 31, 2021 consisted mainly of BR5.9 billion in debentures
and BRL1.1 billion of BNDES loans, mostly allocated at Comgas

ISSUER PROFILE

Compass Gas & Energia S.A. (Compass), is a non-operating subsidiary
controlled by Cosan group responsible to develop the group's
activities within natural gas and energy sectors in Brazil. Compass
is strategically focused on natural gas distribution, LNG
regasification infrastructure, gas trading and gas-powered thermal
generation.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

-- Construction revenues are excluded from net revenue;

-- Debt adjusted with hedging derivatives.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

MOVIDA PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms BB- ICR, Alters Outlook to Pos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2021, S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on its
ratings on Brazilian car rental company Movida Participacoes S.A.
(Movida) to positive from stable and affirmed its 'BB-' global
scale and 'brAA+' national scale issuer credit ratings on the
company.

The positive outlook indicates a one-in-three chance of an upgrade
in the next 12-18 months if the company's growth doesn't pressure
credit metrics, resulting in funds from operations (FFO) to debt
above 20% and EBIT interest coverage close to 2.0x on the average
of the next three years.

Movida has expanded its market share in the past year through a
broader presence and diversification of end markets and clients,
and increasing the size of its fleet close to 170,000 vehicles as
of September 2021 from 108,000 as of September 2020. In addition,
after the incorporation of CS Frotas in July and other smaller
acquisitions, the fleet management's share of total revenue rose to
55% this year from the historical level of 35%-40%. S&P said, "We
expect this ratio to reach more than 60% starting in 2023. This
will increase cash-flow predictability due to the segment's
long-term contracts and countercyclical nature, unlike the
rent-a-car (RaC) segment, operations of which are volatile and
depend upon discretionary demand. The company's competitive
advantage in new vehicles sourcing has risen, amid automakers'
supply-chain disruptions, allowing Movida to increase its fleet
organically. Moreover, we don't assume major changes in competitive
conditions in the car rental industry following the merger of
Movida's two major competitors, Localiza Rent a Car S.A. (global
scale: BB+/Stable/--; nationals scale: brAAA/Stable/--) and Unidas
S.A. (brAAA/Stable/--) next year. Once that occurs, Movida will be
the second-largest player in the industry."

S&P said, "Due to these factors, we revised our assessment of the
company's busines risk profile to fair from weak. On the other
hand, the final rating remains the same, because credit metrics
will be somewhat pressured next year mainly due to much higher base
interest rates. If Movida expands its scale without weakening
credit metrics beyond our expectations or its profitability, we
could raise the ratings in the next 12-18 months.

"We expect the car rental industry in Brazil to continue growing
despite likely feeble economic growth, uncertainties due to
presidential election, and higher interest rate and inflation. We
understand that the company can ramp up, because we continue to see
stronger rates and demand in the RaC segment, high prices for used
cars, and the resilience of Movida's fleet management segment.
Moreover, the company has improved its used-car sales unit and that
its current scale and its focus on the fleet management segment
would allow it to grow even if industry conditions weaken."

Movida issued more than R$10 billion in debt during 2021,
consisting of the notes issuance, and add-on to the existing notes
and debentures in the local market. Most of the company's issuances
are to fund capital expenditures (capex) in 2022, given potential
uncertainties in credit markets. S&P said, "We forecast the
company's net debt to jump close to R$6.1 billion in 2021 and R$9
billion - R$10 billion in 2022 from R$2.8 billion in 2020, given
higher capex for fleet growth. This, coupled with significantly
higher interest rates in Brazil, will increase the company's
interest burden significantly, weakening credit metrics in 2022.
But we expect the latter to improve starting in 2023, assuming
declining interest rates and as the company's expansion gains
strength."


SIMPAR SA: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive, Affirms 'BB-' ICR
------------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2021, S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on its
ratings on Brazil-based transportation group Simpar S.A. to
positive from stable, and affirmed its 'BB-' global scale and
'brAA+' national scale ratings. S&P also affirmed its issue-level
ratings on the group, at 'BB-' and 'brAA+', while the '4' recovery
rating on them remains unchanged.

The positive outlook reflects the possibility of an upgrade in the
next 12-18 months if the company continues to gain scale and
diversification while maintaining adequate profitability with EBIT
margin of about or above 20% and EBIT interest coverage close to
2x.

Simpar's scale and business diversification has widened
considerably in the past year across all of its main subsidiaries.
Although S&P expects Brazil's economy to worsen in 2022, because of
high inflation, higher interest rates and limited economic growth,
S&P forecasts Simpar to post another year of solid revenue and
EBITDA growth, above 50%, as it consolidates acquired assets and
thanks to a solid contracted backlog.

Movida Participacoes S.A.'s (close to 40% of consolidated revenue
and about 50% of EBIT) fleet will likely continue growing over the
next few years. Its fleet management segment will likely account
for about 60% of the company's fleet, which provides more
predictability to cash flows due to the longer term of contracts
than those in the rent-a-car (RaC) segment (one to three years,
versus daily or monthly rates). Much higher prices of Movida's
used-car sales, amid the automakers' supply problems, is boosting
the company's revenue and cash generation. S&P expects
higher-than-historical margins in this segment at least for 2022,
given that we might see a normalization of the supply chain in the
second half of the year.

The group's truck leasing subsidiary, Vamos Locacão de Caminhoes,
Maquinas e Equipamentos S.A. (Vamos; about 20% of consolidated
revenue and 25%-30% of EBIT), has also posted solid fleet growth,
and we expect this to continue going forward. The company raised
equity and debt this year to fund about R$3.4 billion of capital
expenditures (capex) in 2022, up from R$2.8 billion in 2021,
primarily for fleet expansion, and to a lesser extent, for fleet
renewal. The subsidiary's long-term contracts provide more cash
flow predictability for the group.

Simpar is a leading transportation company in Brazil, which
provides it scale gains and bargaining power with suppliers,
allowing the group to grow above industry average and generate
higher margins. Apart from the internal growth, the group also
maintains an active M&A strategy. JSL S.A., Simpar's logistics
subsidiary, completed five acquisitions since the end of 2020,
increasing scale and diversification of its segments and types of
services, and its geographic footprint across the country. Also, in
the past two months, the group announced the acquisitions of two
dealerships through its subsidiary, Original Concessionarias, which
will likely result in revenue closer to R$3 billion in 2022,
sharply up from about R$700 million in 2021. The recently approved
incorporation of its sister company, CS Infra, also illustrates
group's gradual business diversification. CS Infra controls Ciclus
do Brasil Ambiental S.A., a solid urban waste management company.
S&P said, "We expect the group to continue targeting acquisitions
in these segments. However, given that we forecast high growth for
Movida and Vamos, they would likely continue to represent more than
70% of group's consolidated EBIT in the next two-three years."

Apart from a recent public commitment from management to gradually
reduce leverage at the end of each year and to reduce it below
3.0x, Simpar also has financial covenants that require net debt to
EBITDA-A (EBITDA plus cost of vehicles sold) below 3.5x and
EBITDA-A to net interest above 2.0x. S&P said, "Our ratings on the
group incorporate potential volatility in credit metrics amid the
substantial growth through acquisitions, but assume leverage will
remain controlled. Still, we expect that any large deal would be
done through share exchange or by raising equity at the
subsidiaries' level. Simpar and its subsidiaries have been raising
debt to fund the bulk of its expansion plan, but we expect it to be
offset by stronger cash flows, leading to relatively stable credit
metrics."


STATE OF ALAGOAS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the State of Alagoas' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-' with a
Negative Rating Outlook and its Short-Term Foreign and Local
Currency IDR at 'B'. Additionally, Fitch has affirmed Alagoas'
National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(bra)' with a Stable Outlook and
the National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(bra)'.

Alagoas's ratings reflect the combination of a 'Weaker' risk
profile and 'a' debt sustainability assessment under Fitch's rating
case scenario. Fitch has assessed the state's Standalone Credit
Profile (SCP) at 'b+' based on a comparison with international and
national peers in the same rating category. Alagoas's 'BB-' IDR
benefits from an uplift from the state's SCP because Brazil's
federal government is the state's most significant creditor. The
Negative Outlook reflects the sovereign's Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Risk Profile: 'Weaker'

Alagoas's risk profile of 'Weaker' is based on a combination of
four attributes at 'Weaker' and two at 'Midrange.' The assessment
reflects Fitch's view of a high risk relative to international
peers that the state's ability to cover debt service with its
operating balance may weaken unexpectedly over the forecast horizon
(2021-2025) due to lower revenue, higher expenditure, or an
unexpected rise in liabilities, debt or debt-service requirements.

Revenue Robustness: 'Weaker'

The Brazilian tax collection framework transfers to states and
municipalities a large share of the responsibility to collect
taxes. Constitutional transfers exist as a mechanism to compensate
poorer entities. For that reason, a high dependency towards
transfers is a weak feature for Brazilian LRGs.

The primary metric for Revenue Robustness is the transfers ratio
(transfers to operating revenues). Fitch classifies LRGs that
report a transfer ratio above or equal to 40% as 'Weaker' and those
with a ratio below 40% as 'Midrange.' Alagoas reports a relatively
high dependency towards the federal government, what drives this
factor to Weaker. As of 2020, transfers represented 46.9% of
operating revenues (48.9% average for 2016-2020).

Revenue Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Brazilian states and municipalities have low capacity for revenue
increases in response to a downturn. There is low affordability of
additional taxation given that tax tariffs are close to the
constitutional ceiling and a small number of taxpayers represent a
large share of tax collection, driving this factor to 'Weaker.' The
10 largest tax payers account for around 40% of Alagoas' ICMS tax
(tax on the circulation of goods and provision of services)
collection.

Alagoas is one of the poorest states in Brazil. GDP per capita was
at 49% of the national average in 2018, and the poverty rate
approximately 47% in 2019. Low per capita income and high poverty
create challenges for further tax increases given that a
significant share of the population spends all its income on basic
items that are essential for their survival.

Expenditure Sustainability: 'Midrange'

Brazilian states are responsible for healthcare, education and law
enforcement. Expenditure tends to grow with revenues as a result of
earmarked revenues. This results in a procyclical behavior in good
times, as periods of high revenue growth result in a similar
behavior for expenditures.

Alagoas presents moderate control over expenditure growth.
Operating margins have strengthened in recent years and averaged
15.7% in 2016-2020. Fitch expects a contraction in operating
margins going forward given lagged effects of higher inflation in
2021 and more modest growth prospects.

Expenditure Adjustability: 'Weaker'

Fitch assesses the state's ability to reduce spending in response
of shrinking revenue as 'Weak'. The Brazilian Constitution allows
low affordability of expenditure reduction, especially for
salaries. Unpredictable reductions in revenues do not automatically
result in lower operating expenditures. In addition, there is a
high share of inflexible costs since there is more than 90% share
of mandatory and committed expenditures. Capex represents less than
10% of the state's total expenditures, supporting the 'Weaker'
assessment.

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: 'Weaker'

There is a moderate national framework for debt and liquidity
management, and the federal government guarantees all U.S.
dollar-denominated debt of the state. As of December 2020, external
debt represented 21% of Alagoas' total debt with no significant
maturity concentration. Debt directly owed to the federal
government represented 66% of total debt. Access to new loans is
limited and mostly relies on federal guaranteed debt with national
public banks or multilateral organizations. There is moderate
off-balance sheet risk from the pension system, driving this factor
to 'Weaker'.

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: 'Midrange'

A framework exists to provide emergency liquidity support from the
federal government via the granting of extended maturity over the
federal debt portion. Alagoas has satisfactory liquidity levels;
short-term financial obligations represented less than 21% of free
cash positions, as calculated by the Brazilian national treasury
(CAPAG liquidity ratio).

Debt Sustainability: 'a'

Fitch's rating case indicates the payback ratio (net direct risk to
operating balance), which is the primary metric of debt
sustainability assessment, will reach 5.8x by 2025. This is aligned
with a 'aa' assessment. However, Fitch projects the actual debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) at 1.6x at the end of the projection
horizon, which indicates an 'a' assessment. Given that the
secondary indicator (DSCR) is positioned one level below the
primary indicator (payback ratio), Fitch assessed overall debt
sustainability at 'a'.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch assesses Alagoas' SCP at 'b+', reflecting a combination of a
'Weaker' risk profile and debt sustainability metrics assessed in
the 'a' category under Fitch's rating case scenario. The SCP,
positioned at 'b+', also reflects the peer comparison. Alagoas's
IDR of 'BB-' benefit from an uplift from the state's SCP because
the federal government is Alagoas's most significant creditor. The
Negative Outlook reflects the sovereign's Outlook.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Qualitative assumptions:

-- Risk Profile: Weaker

-- Revenue Robustness: Weaker

-- Revenue Adjustability: Weaker

-- Expenditure Sustainability: Midrange

-- Expenditure Adjustability: Weaker

-- Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: Weaker

-- Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: Midrange

-- Debt Sustainability: 'a' category

-- Intergovernmental Financing: [+1 notch]

Quantitative assumptions - issuer specific

Fitch's rating case scenario is a "through-the-cycle" scenario that
incorporates a combination of revenue, cost and financial risk
stresses. It is based on the 2016-2020 figures and 2021-2025
projected ratios. The key assumptions for the scenario include:

-- Yoy [6.1]% increase in operating revenue on average in 2021-
    2025;

-- Yoy [8.9]% increase in operating spending on average in 2021-
    2025;

-- Net capital balance of - BRL 1,345 million on average in 2021-
    2025;

-- Cost of debt: 4% in 2021, 6% in 2022; 5% in 2023 and 4% in
    2024-2025.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of Brazil's IDRs could positively affect Alagoas'
    IDRs;

-- A positive rating action on Alagoas' SCP could result from an
    improvement of its operating balance, with actual DSCR above
    2x, provided that the payback ratio remains below 9x.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of Brazil's IDRs (BB-/Negative) would negatively
    affect Alagoas' IDRs;

-- A negative rating action on Alagoas' SCP could result from a
    deterioration of its operating balance, with a payback ratio
    above 9x and actual DSCR below 1.5x.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ISSUER PROFILE

Alagoas is a Type B LRG and is required to cover debt service from
cash flow on an annual basis. The state is home to 3.3 million
people (approximately 1.6% of Brazil's population) with
below-average socioeconomic indicators. Primary revenue sources are
transfers from the federal government and taxes, and spending
responsibilities cover education, healthcare and law enforcement.
Alagoas has the right to borrow through domestic and international
markets, subject to federal government approval.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Fitch has revised Estado de Alagoas ESG Relevance Score for
Population Demographics to '4' from '3'. The score has been
elevated in recognition of the negative weight the municipality's
poverty rate has on its revenue raising ability, which has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Estado de Alagoas has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human
Development, Health and Education due to its Human Development
Index (calculated as a geometric average of health, education and
income) at the bottom of the ranking among Brazilian states, which
has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

VIACAO ITAPEMIRIM: Could be Fined for Unexpectedly Suspending Ops
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that the Brazilian consumer protection
agency, Procon, notified Itapemirim Transportes Aereos, December
21, asking for explanations for the suspension of its services.

The company, which has been operating for less than six months, is
causing losses to thousands of consumers, according to Rio Times
Online.  For the affected customers, the first option is to be
relocated on another airline's flight. Those who do not manage to
be relocated should receive immediate reimbursement of the money
for the tickets, the report notes.

                      About Viacao Itapemirim

Viacao Itapemirim, S.A. is a provider of interstate passenger bus
transportation services in Brazil.  It also offers freight
transportation services.  The company was founded in 1953.  To
learn more, visit https://www.itapemirim.com.br.

Viacao Itapemirim, S.A., filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. S. D. Florida Case No. 18-24871) on Nov. 29, 2018.  The
Debtor estimated $100 million to $500 million in assets and
liabilities.  The  Hon. Robert A. Mark is the case judge.  SEQUOR
LAW, led by Leyza F. Blanco, Esq., is Foreign Representative's
Bankruptcy Counsel.                 




===========
M E X I C O
===========

GRUPO POSADAS: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B-', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 17, 2021, S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Mexico-based lodging company, Grupo Posadas S.A.B.
de C.V. (Posadas) to 'B-'. At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'D'
rating on the 2022 notes.

S&P said, "The outlook is stable, reflecting our view that Posadas'
operations will continue recovering gradually amid still volatile
business conditions due to the pandemic. We expect the company to
post high single-digit revenue growth and its profitability to
recover in the next 12 months, while maintaining tight cost
controls and protecting its cash balance. As a result, we estimate
its gross debt to EBITDA to be near 9x and EBITDA interest coverage
of about 2x by the end of 2022, considering the new capital
structure."

On Dec. 15, 2021, the company announced the conclusion of the
restructuring of its senior unsecured notes due June 30, 2022, for
an outstanding amount of $393 million, plus accrued interest
negotiated with certain bondholders. As of this report's date,
Posadas exchanged a majority of the 2022 notes, and will continue
with the process for the next 180 days, according to the bankruptcy
court ruling. The new $398 million notes due Dec. 30, 2027, have a
similar semiannual interest rate of 4%, gradually increasing to 8%
in the next years. Moreover, the 2027 notes have a payment-in-kind
(PIK) feature for up to half of the notes' principal on coupon
payments due 2022 and 2023. The notes also have a security package
that includes a first priority perfected lien over several
unencumbered real estate assets owned by the company and over
account receivables and collection rights from the company's
vacation club memberships. In S&P's view, debt restructuring
significantly alleviate Posadas' capital structure for the short to
medium term, given the extension of debt maturity and PIK option,
which could reduce cash outflows in periods of stress.

S&P said, "Our revised base-case scenario assumes a continued
operating and financial recovery in the next 12-24 months, although
business conditions could remain volatile given the surge of new
coronavirus variants. Moreover, the company's occupancy rates and
revenue-per-available-room (RevPAR), especially for urban hotels,
will remain below pre-pandemic levels. We expect Posadas' 2021
revenue to be close to MXN7.6 billion (down 16% from 2019) and
EBITDA near MXN1.1 billion (down 33%). Moreover, we estimate
revenue to grow about 10% in 2022 and EBITDA margins to be near 17%
in the next 12 months. Given that pandemic-related risks are far
from over, we believe that the company will continue to implement
various initiatives to protect its liquidity. These include
maintenance of tight cost controls, underperforming hotel lease and
management cancellations, and a cautious hotel opening strategy. We
consider that these measures, coupled with current cash balance of
about MXN2 billion due to asset sales, improving industry
conditions, and a lower debt service burden, should provide the
company ability to maneuver potential headwinds and comply with
operating, fiscal, and debt obligations in a timely manner. We
estimate its EBITDA interest coverage will be close to 2x in
2022-2023.

"Measures to trim the company's cost structure, such as lower
headcount and renegotiation of terms with suppliers, lessors, and
hotel owners, have improved profitability. However, we consider
that Posadas is still highly vulnerable to changes in occupancy
rates. We expect Posadas to continue investing and improving its
product offering, focusing on managed and franchise segments, given
their operational flexibility. However, net hotel and room openings
should remain below pre-pandemic levels, because we expect Posadas'
capex to remain selective, especially for owned and leased hotels,
as well as vacation club properties. The company has historically
partnered with investors for development of projects, and we expect
this strategy to continue. On the other hand, Posadas' vacation
club segment continues to perform well, although it offers lower
gross margins in comparison to owned, leased, and managed hotels.
For 2022, we expect Posadas' vacation club revenue growth to
flatten, given a lack of available inventory in time-share
products, somewhat offset by greater income from KIVAC and ACCESS
products.

"We consider that Posadas and the industry will continue reporting
occupancy rates below pre-pandemic levels. As of September 2021,
nationwide occupancy rates at beach resorts was near 60%, below 74%
in 2019, while urban hotels had an average occupancy rate of 41%,
below 60% in 2019. Although the recovery trend continued throughout
2021, we expect occupancy at beach resorts could reach pre-pandemic
levels by 2023, while our base-case scenario doesn't assume such a
scenario for urban hotels for the next two years. We consider that
sluggish economic growth and the adoption of videoconferences will
undermine business travel activity, which is an important segment
for urban hotels. On the other hand, we expect average daily rates
(ADRs) to fully recover in 2022 for beach resorts, while those for
urban hotels will do so by 2023."




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Imports Will Counter 15% Cement Price Hike
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ria Taitt at Trinidad Express reports that While it is not possible
for the Government to indicate what the price of cement on the
local market would be, Trade Minister Paula Gopee-Scoon said she
believes the increased competition, which will be facilitated from
January 2022, would keep prices in check.

She was responding to a question in the Senate from Opposition
Senator Wade Mark on what would be the effect on the ultimate
price, given Government's measures designed to counter the 15 per
cent price increase by Trinidad Cement Ltd (TCL), according to
Trinidad Express.

Citing rising input costs, TCL announced that it would increase the
ex-factory cost of cement by 15 per cent, the report notes.

Asked by Mark whether Government would seek to incentivise the
entry of other players into the local cement market, Gopee Scoon
said the Government would encourage any players to get involved in
the manufacture of local cement and would welcome any new entrants
into the manufacturing of cement, the report relays.

With respect to importing cement, she said one would recognize
there was currently a quota and an import licensing regime in T&T
under which five companies were registered, the report says.

"There are currently five registered importers. Thus far for 2021
only one of the five registered importers has brought in any cement
for the 2021 period. What can happen is that the other four,
understanding the market to be much more open, would join in with
the importing of cement as well. I can tell you that there is
interest in the region as well for the further manufacturing of
cement," she said, the report relays.

                   Competition and Lower Prices

Gopee-Scoon said what is likely to happen is that the authorized
licence holders, under the quota regime, would now move to import
cement and that cement will enter the market with a 20 per cent
duty, the report notes.  And what is likely is that that
competition will keep the market in check and keep the price of
cement low with the relative competition being in place, the report
discloses.

She said on learning from TCL that it planned to increase the price
of locally manufactured cement, Cabinet took a decision that the
Ministry of Trade and Industry should approach COTED (the Caricom
agency responsible for trade and economic development) to seek a
reduction of the Common External Tariff (CET) on other hydraulic
cement from 50 per cent to 20 per cent beginning on January 1, 2022
and ending December 31, 2022, the report relays.

In addition there is an existing quota on the import licensing
regime for cement and that is all types of cement, which at the
moment is 75,000 tonnes. Cabinet took a decision to increase the
quota to 150,000 tonnes of cement effective January 2022, the
report notes.

Gopee-Scoon said the Government sought to bring relief to the
citizens of T&T bearing in mind that competition would keep the
market in check and therefore prices would remain as low as
possible with the entry of extra-regional cement into the country,
the report discloses.

"We realise the importance of keeping the price of cement as low as
possible for the local construction industry," she said, the report
adds.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Rock Hard Not Returning to Market
----------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that embattled cement importer, Rock Hard
Distributors Ltd, has no intention of returning to the domestic
market, despite a statement by Trade and Industry Minister Paula
Gopee Scoon that four companies could soon import cement, bringing
competition to the market to offset the 15 per cent price hike
recently announced by Trinidad Cement Ltd (TCL).

The price increase took effect and in a message to its "valued
clients", TCL said: "We have been absorbing rising input costs for
a long time and are now unable to continue to maintain our prices,"
according to Trinidad Express.   The cement company did not specify
the quantum of increased costs or their contribution to the 15 per
cent price increase, the report notes.

In August, Rock Hard closed its doors due to the import duties and
implemented restrictions in the domestic market for the commodity,
the report relays.

Speaking with the Express, managing director of Rock Hard
Distributors Ryan Ramhit said the minister's announcement that
increased competition would keep cement prices in check is "too
little, too late," the report discloses.

"When I was asking and begging the Government for their support
when I entered the market in 2016, nobody took me on and a whole
host of restrictions started arising with the company. I wish
whoever cement importer or manufacturer decides to set up shop in
Trinidad all the best," the report relays.

Ramhit said discussions may take place with the Government if it
decides to work with Rock Hard Distributors, by giving the cement
importer what it has been asking for, which was to allow them to
set up a free and open market to compete fairly with TCL, the
report discloses.

"The company has never asked for any incentives, which we all know
that TCL has been getting a whole host of incentives. If for some
strange reason the Government decides to go back with duties from
zero to five per cent and have no quota or restrictions, I would
really have to think long and hard if we would re-enter the market,
simply because this administration has been very volatile and very
unpredictable when it comes to Rock Hard's business," he
explained.

Minister Gopee-Scoon in Senate said on learning from TCL that it
planned to increase the price of locally manufactured cement,
Cabinet took a decision that the Ministry of Trade and Industry
should approach COTED (the Caricom agency responsible for trade and
economic development) to seek a reduction of the Common External
Tariff (CET) on other hydraulic cement from 50 per cent to 20 per
cent beginning on January 1, 2022 and ending December 31, 2022, the
report notes.

However, Ramhit said this move by the Cabinet still would not help
his business to be profitable in this country, the report
discloses.

"The 20 per cent is not helping us as duties are supposed to be
zero to five per cent and I based my business on that. If 20 per
cent was ok with me, when the Government was charging me 15 per
cent under the wrong classification, I would not have bothered to
challenge it before the courts, but still 20 per cent would not
help my business, so I would not come back to the market," the
report relays.

Ramhit noted that T&T is the only country in the region that was
not supportive when another cement competitor came on the market,
the report notes.

"In Guyana, the correct rate of duty was 15 per cent and their
Government realised what competition will go along with them
experiencing a construction boom, so they dropped the rate of duty
from 15 per cent to 5 per cent earlier this year and the same goes
for the other countries in the region," the report discloses.

He added that Rock Hard is awaiting judgment from the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), which is expected sometime next month, the
report adds.




                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Chapman, Editors.

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