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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, October 18, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 202

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LongTerm IDRs


B E R M U D A

HIGHLANDS HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on USD500MM Sec. Notes


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Economic Activity Falls 0.15% in August


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

CHINA FISHERY: Deadline to File Claims Set for Nov. 15


C O S T A   R I C A

BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Global Eyes Observe Tax Reform Process
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Say No to 'Short-Termism'


J A M A I C A

CAC 2000: Sees Decline in Profit
[*] JAMAICA: IMF Projects Economy Could Grow by 4.6% This Year


P A N A M A

BANCO LA HIPOTECARIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: State Enterprises Still Burden Taxpayers


U R U G U A Y

ACI AIRPORT: Fitch Gives BB+(EXP) Rating to USD260MM Sec. Notes


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Oct. 11 to Oct. 15, 2021

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LongTerm IDRs
--------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Argentina's 'CCC' ratings reflect macroeconomic imbalances and
acute financing constraints that continue to undermine debt
repayment capacity following 2020 bond restructurings, and
significant political uncertainty around how these challenges will
be addressed. The sovereign's external liquidity position remains
critical as central bank (BCRA) reserves erode at low levels,
external market access has not been restored, and a deal with the
IMF to reschedule large upcoming payments has yet to be reached.
The authorities are redoubling populist economic policies ahead of
midterm elections, and mounting tensions within the government
further cloud prospects for post-election adjustments. This could
undermine the sovereign's capacity to repay restructured
foreign-currency bonds coming due beginning in 2024, and even low
step-up coupon payments due before then. Risks to repayment of peso
debt are not fully mitigated by access to BCRA financing in the
face of a severe confidence shock, given the adverse macroeconomic
consequences this poses.

The poor showing of the ruling Peronist coalition in primary
elections on Sept. 12, ahead of legislative midterms on Nov. 14,
has shaken the political landscape and added to near-term policy
uncertainties. The authorities are doubling down on populist
policies ahead of the midterms, which could further aggravate
macroeconomic imbalances and add to post-election adjustment needs.
The authorities' ability to deliver such adjustments is
increasingly uncertain amid rising tensions between leftist and
moderate factions within the coalition.

The authorities have opted to make the initial payments to the IMF
in order to postpone talks around a comprehensive rescheduling of a
total USD45 billion due through 2024, as this requires a new
program with potentially unpopular policy commitments that they are
reluctant to make during elections. Using its USD4.3 billion SDR
allocation, Argentina made the first payment to the IMF of USD1.8
billion in September and could do so for another USD1.8 billion
December. However, the sovereign is highly unlikely to be able to
make even larger payments in 2022 totaling USD17.6 billion that
begin in March.

The authorities have expressed their desire to reach a deal with
the IMF, but disagreements over the terms of the new debt and
policy conditions - both with the IMF and within the government -
pose some risk that a deal may not be reached in this short
timeframe or be ambitious or credible enough to anchor expectations
and boost confidence.

Low and eroding international reserves represent a major near-term
macroeconomic risk. High agricultural export prices, border
closures containing outbound tourism, and interest savings from
bond restructurings (sovereign, provincial and corporate) have
supported a current account surplus, which Fitch projects at 1.3%
of GDP for 2021. Capital-account pressures persist, however, as
strict capital controls have discouraged inflows and have not fully
contained outflows.

The BCRA was able to build up international reserves modestly in
1H21 during the soy harvest, but these are declining once again in
2H21 as election jitters fuel FX demand. Net international reserves
(excluding the China swap and bank reserve requirements) are
falling rapidly after the August SDR allocation on intervention in
official and parallel FX markets and debt payments to the IMF and
other multilaterals, and stood at just USD6.8 billion as of early
October.

The BCRA has tightened import and capital controls to contain FX
demand, but risks of a post-election devaluation appear high. The
peso does not appear overvalued relative to its long-term average,
but devaluation of some sort may be needed to alleviate strong
outward capital pressures (reflected in parallel exchange rates
almost 100% above the official rate) and thus staunch and reverse
the drain in FX reserves.

Inflation has risen sharply in 2021 to 52.5% as of September,
prompting a major tightening of price controls in recent days. The
BCRA has restrained the pace of depreciation of the official
exchange rate to contain inflation, but with limited efficacy amid
expectations of devaluation. It has sterilized most of its massive
peso creation to finance the Treasury in 2020-2021 to contain price
and FX pressures, but this has left it with a large stock of
remunerated liabilities that could pose an unsustainable
quasi-fiscal dynamic if rolled over at much higher rates,
undermining its policy flexibility.

The federal primary deficit fell to 2.7% of GDP in the twelve
months through August, from 6.4% in 2020, on a swift recovery in
tax collections and high inflation, which lifts revenues and erodes
pensions and salaries in real terms. Fitch expects it will rise
back to 3.3% in 2021 on recently announced pre-election spending
measures, below the government's projection of 4.0%.

The proposed budget projects a 3.3% primary deficit in 2022 and
does not envision adjustments beyond the end of pandemic spending.
Likely overshooting of inflation relative to the low budget
projection could lower the deficit in 2022 by lifting revenues more
quickly than spending, as seen in 2021, but fiscal improvement of
this sort may not be politically viable for long. A more proactive
medium-term fiscal consolidation plan is likely to be a requirement
of any IMF program, namely to reduce BCRA financing to levels that
do not undermine other economic objectives, and a credible plan may
need to be more front-loaded in 2022, given that adjustments will
become more politically difficult ahead of 2023 elections.

The sovereign continues to face acute financing challenges. Lack of
market access and low FX reserves have necessitated reschedulings
of debt to the IMF and Paris Club, and could also jeopardize
Argentina's ability to make modest coupon payments due in 2022-2023
on restructured bonds before amortizations begin in 2024.
Peso-denominated debt is short-dated, and any shocks that result in
lower rollover rates would test the sovereign's willingness to
resort to BCRA peso printing to pay these off despite the adverse
macroeconomic consequences of doing so.

Fitch projects central government debt will fall to 83.5% of GDP in
2021 from 102.9% in 2020 on real peso appreciation, a large nominal
GDP rebound, and reliance on non-debt-creating BCRA funding.
Argentina remains far from debt sustainability in Fitch's view,
amid high primary deficits, weak real GDP growth, high market
borrowing costs and acute sensitivity to the exchange rate. The
IMF's views on debt sustainability will be crucial, as this will
determine its ability to support Argentina without a new bond
restructuring. Its debt sustainability analysis (DSA) conducted
before the 2020 restructuring contemplated greater bondholder
losses than were ultimately agreed to.

Fitch projects real GDP will rebound by 8.0% in 2022 before slowing
to 1.7% in 2022, reflecting the knock-on effects of post-election
economic adjustments that have been a hallmark of Argentina in the
past decade. This projection is subject to considerable upside and
downside risk depending on if and how smoothly these adjustments
are implemented. Medium-term growth prospects remain weak in the
absence of concrete plans to address longstanding competitiveness
issues and in the presence of capital controls and other forms of
state interventionism that are being tightened rather than
relaxed.

ESG - Governance: Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
These scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign Rating
Model. Argentina has a medium WBGI ranking at the 46th percentile,
balancing moderately high voice and accountability, a moderate
level of corruption, and a recent track record of peaceful
political transitions with weak institutional capacity and uneven
application of the rule of law.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Public Finances: Signs of probable default to private
    creditors, including intensification of financing strains that
    increase risks of and incentives for the sovereign to miss,
    unilaterally reprofile, or renegotiate upcoming bond
    repayments.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- External Finances: A sustained build-up in central bank
    international reserves supported by credible policy
    adjustments.

-- Public Finances: A sustained reduction in the fiscal deficit
    that puts government debt/GDP on a downward path, and
    improvement in access to financing sources besides the central
    bank.

-- Macro: Greater confidence in a macroeconomic plan that could
    support a post-pandemic economic recovery and improve
    macroeconomic stability.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

In accordance with its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating
committee has not utilized the SRM and QO to explain the ratings in
this instance. Ratings of 'CCC+' and below are instead guided by
the rating definitions.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest
weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the
rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Argentina has
a percentile rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicator,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight. As Argentina has a percentile
rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a
negative impact on the credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a
rating driver. As Argentina has a percentile rank above 50 for the
respective Governance Indicator, this has a positive impact on the
credit profile.

Argentina has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Argentina, as for all sovereigns. As
Argentina has a fairly recent restructuring of public debt in 2020,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).




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B E R M U D A
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HIGHLANDS HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on USD500MM Sec. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BB' rating on the $500 million
7.625% cash interest/8.375% PIK interest senior secured PIK toggle
notes due 2025 issued by Highlands Holdings Bond Issuer, Ltd.
(HHBI).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating on HHBI's $500 million senior secured PIK toggle
notes reflects the high-risk nature of the security. The notes are
substantially distanced from Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited's
(AIHL) operating company cash flows, with HHBI structured to be
highly isolated from AIHL's regulated group. The payment in kind
(PIK) feature of the notes also adds risk with interest deferrals
that increase HHBI's indebtedness. In addition, the short-term,
five-year tenor of the notes creates refinancing risk. Any PIK
(instead of cash payments) will not be viewed as nonperformance of
the notes and will not constitute a default of the issuer.

HHBI is a Bermuda-exempted company formed by Apollo Global
Management, Inc. to issue the notes in October 2020. HHBI is a
sister company of Highlands Bermuda Holdco, Ltd. (HBH), with both
companies owned by AP Highlands Holdings, L.P. (62.1% ownership of
HBH and HHBI)/AP Highlands Co-Invest, L.P. (37.9% ownership of HBH
and HHBI) (collectively APH). APH are the Apollo investment funds
that own AIHL through HBH. The notes are general senior secured
obligations of HHBI and rank structurally subordinated to all
existing and future obligations of HBH and AIHL (and its
subsidiaries), including AIHL's $300 million 4.65% senior notes due
2023 and its $775 million of perpetual preferred equity.

The 'BB' rating is set at the implied HBH Issuer Default Rating
(IDR), which reflects an Average recovery assumption. Fitch
considers the default risk for HHBI to be the same as for HBH given
the security interest collateral that HHBI has in APH's
shareholdings in HBH. The 'BB' rating is set three notches below an
implied AIHL IDR to reflect elevated default risk due to the
remoteness from cash flows and the relatively short-term, five-year
tenor of the notes.

HHBI on-lent the net proceeds ($500 million less $32 million first
interest coupon cash payment, costs, fees and expenses) from the
offering to APH. APH contributed $268 million to HBH to provide
additional capital to the AIHL operating group to take advantage of
the favorable market environment to write new (re)insurance
business. The remaining net proceeds were utilized for a $150
million dividend distribution to their limited partners, Co-Invest
Equity and Apollo Fund IX, which are outside of the restricted
group, with $50 million remaining at HBH.

HHBI is a holding company with no revenue-generating operations and
no independent operations. Thus, in order to satisfy the cash
payment obligations under the notes, HHBI will rely on dividends
provided by the AIHL operating subsidiaries to AIHL that flow
through HBH and then APH. The AIHL operating subsidiaries have no
obligation to make such funds available and they may be prohibited
from doing so by regulators under certain circumstances.

As a PIK toggle, HHBI has discretion to pay interest entirely in
cash, entirely through issuing additional notes or a split of cash
and additional notes. The first interest payment in April 2021 was
made in cash and the final interest payment will be made in cash.
The second interest payment in October 2021 will be PIK interest,
while all other payments will be either cash or PIK depending on
AIHL's dividend capacity.

The notes are structured to be isolated from AIHL's regulated
group, with cross defaults not applicable to AIHL and its
subsidiaries. In addition, a breach of the covenants by HBH and
AIHL (and its subsidiaries) will not constitute a default of HHBI
to the extent doing so would materially and substantially
negatively affect the management and business of AIHL and its
subsidiaries or if it is necessary in order for AIHL and its
subsidiaries to comply with applicable laws or a request from a
relevant regulator.

The notes' security interests include APH's shares in HHBI and HBH.
However, AIHL will maintain the first claim on its operating
companies and HHBI has no recourse to AIHL or its subsidiaries.
Enforcement of the share pledges and charges that make up the
substantial portion of the collateral will require prior approval
from regulatory bodies and may not result in any recovery. The
notes are not guaranteed by HBH or its subsidiaries.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

-- A lowering of the underlying implied ratings of AIHL and/or
    its subsidiaries;

-- Breaching the terms of the indenture governing the notes;

-- Heighted concerns regarding HHBI's ability and/or willingness
    to execute on a refinancing or repayment of the notes.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to a positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An increase in the underlying implied ratings of AIHL and/or
    its subsidiaries.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.




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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Economic Activity Falls 0.15% in August
-----------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that Brazil's economic activity fell by
0.15% in August compared to the 0.23% acceleration recorded in
July, ending a streak of four consecutive monthly rises, the
Central Bank reported.

The so-called Economic Activity Index (IBC-Br), which the monetary
authority measures monthly in an attempt to advance the trend of
the gross domestic product (GDP), reached 139.23 points in August,
which was 0.19 % below pre-pandemic levels, since in February 2020,
the indicator stood at 139.35 points, according to Rio Times
Online.

The financial market result was worse than expectations, the report
notes.

According to the industry, this exceptional volume is mainly due to
the significant gains in productivity and, to a lesser extent, to
the increase in cultivated areas, the report relays.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020).  S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020.  Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March
2018).




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C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
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CHINA FISHERY: Deadline to File Claims Set for Nov. 15
------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York set
Nov. 15, 2021, at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) as the last date and
time for each person or entity to file proofs of claim against
China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its debtor-affiliates.

The Court also set March 7, 2022, at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) as
deadline for all governmental units to file their claims against
the Debtors.

All proofs of claim must be filed (i) electronically through the
website of the Debtors' court-approved claims agent, Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions LLC, using the interface available on the
website at https://dm.epiqaa.com/CHF under the link entitled "File
a Claim" or (ii) by delivering the original proof of claim form by
hand, or mailing the original proof of claim on or before the bar
date:

a) if by U.S. Postal Service Mail or overnight delivery:

   China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) et at.
    Claims Processing Center
   c/o Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC
   PO Box 4419
   Beaverton, OR 97076-4419

        - or -

b) if by hand-delivery:

   China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) et al.
    Claims Processing Center
   c/o Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC
   10300 SW Allen Boulevard
   Beaverton, OR 97005

                   About China Fishery Group

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.

In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group was
estimated to have assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at
$10 million to $50 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr. Weil, Gotshal
& Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead bankruptcy counsel
for China Fishery and its affiliates other than CFG Peru
Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal replaces Meyer,
Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm initially hired by the
Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped Klestadt Winters Jureller
Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict counsel; Goldin Associates,
LLC, as financial advisor; RSR Consulting LLC as restructuring
consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC, as administrative
agent.  Kwok Yih & Chan serves as special counsel.

On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter 11
trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one of
the Debtors.  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves as
the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves as
special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, serves
as special litigation counsel.




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C O S T A   R I C A
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BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica,
S.A.'s (BICSA) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and
Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-'. The Rating Outlook is Negative. In
addition. Fitch has affirmed BICSA's Short-Term IDR at 'B' and the
National Scale ratings at 'A-(pan)'/Outlook Negative and
'F2(pan)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VR, NATIONAL-SCALE RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT IN PANAMA

BICSA's IDRs are driven by its VR, reflecting with a high level of
importance Fitch's blended operating environment (OE) assessment
that considers the countries in which the bank does business and
its company profile supported by is geographic diversification and
competitive position. BICSA's blended OE remains unchanged at 'bb-'
with a negative trend and it is highly influenced by the operating
environments of Costa Rica and Panama, both with a negative trend,
as around 63% of the bank's earning assets are located in these
countries.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative, since it is aligned to those
OEs, which in turn reflects that the downside risk persists and
will continue to challenge BICSA's financial profile in the medium
term.

The bank's company profile is underpinned by its geographic
diversification, which is wider than that of its similarly rated
peers, its reasonable competitive position in the regional trade
finance with a stable base of regional clients and small market
shares. The bank continues to focus its new business generation in
less sensitive economic sectors via new business lines and
locations with very focused customer segmentation.

Fitch believes that BICSA's asset quality ratios remain reasonable.
As of 2Q21, the 90+-days overdue loans ratio was 2.8% while the
proportion of "modified" loans amount to 6.1% of total gross loans,
which compares favorably to the 22.9% registered by the banking
industry. Fitch believes the risk of deterioration of the portfolio
under alleviation measures is low as all of these loans are
fulfilling its obligations under the new conditions; however, Fitch
considers the bank's asset quality to be sensitive to the
challenging OE and the relatively high borrower concentration. The
top 20 ones represent 27% of total gross loans and 1.8x of CET1
capital.

BICSA's operating profitability remains the weakest factor of the
financial profile. As of June 2021, the operating return of
risk-weighted assets was a low 0.32%. The bank's profitability has
been sustained by adequate product pricing but affected by high
operating costs and high loan impairment charges. Fitch believes
that the bank's profitability indicators will remain stable for the
remainder of 2021 and will progressively increase as business
volume recovers, albeit slowly.

Fitch believes that BICSA's capitalization and leverage indicator
remain acceptable to withstand potential losses under the current
economic conditions which hinder business development. As of June
2021, CET1 ratio is 13.98%, up from the 12.8% of YE 2020. This
compares well with other corporate-oriented banks and is benefitted
by the bank's prudent risk policies and full-earnings-retention
policy providing a reasonable cushion to absorb unexpected losses.

As of 2Q21, Fitch believes that the bank's funding structure and
liquidity indicators are adequate during the current economic
conditions. Wholesale funding lines remain with higher proportion
of available funds in relation to total funds granted as the bank
continued to repay lines and demanded less funds, hence increasing
total funds available in case of need. The loans-to-deposits ratio
is still high at 179% but markedly improved in relation to its
recent history (2017-2020 average of 212.7%). On the other hand,
customer deposits remain based on term deposits with a high
concentration by depositor rate of around 54% but this is partially
offset by long-standing relational business focus.

SUPPORT RATING

BICSA's Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion of the entity's
shareholders, Banco de Costa Rica (BCR; LT IDR B/Negative and Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica [BNCR}; LT IDR B/Negative], and their
ability and propensity to support BICSA should the need arise. The
Support Rating of '4' reflects a limited probability of support
from the shareholders given their capacity, as demonstrated by
their IDRs. Fitch's support assessment places a high importance on
the support track record and the implication of subsidiary default.
Fitch also recognizes BICSA's role in its parent companies'
strategies.

NATIONAL SENIOR DEBT RATINGS IN EL SALVADOR

The National Rating of BICSA's senior unsecured debt issuances in
El Salvador, rated 'AAA(slv)' with a Stable Outlook, reflects the
relative strength of the Panamanian bank compared with other
issuers in El Salvador. BICSA's IDR is three notches above El
Salvador's 'B-' sovereign rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

-- A further downgrade or material deterioration of the main
    operating environments where BICSA holds its major exposures,
    namely in Costa Rica and Panama;

-- A deterioration of the bank's financial profile reflected in a
    material and sustained increase of its impaired loans, and a
    further reduction of its operating return of RWAs that reduces
    its CET1 ratio below 12%;

-- A downgrade of BICSA's VR could likely affect its IDRs and
    National Ratings but the resulting levels of these ratings
    would be determined by the implicit floor derived from its
    shareholders' IDRs, as the ratings could return to being
    driven by parental support.

SUPPORT RATING

-- The Support Rating is sensitive to negative changes in BCR's
    and BNCR's capacity or propensity to provide timely support to
    the bank, namely a downgrade of the parents' LT IDR to 'B-' or
    lower.

DEBT RATINGS IN PANAMA

The debt ratings would mirror any potential movements on their
respective IDRs. The senior unsecured debt ratings would continue
to be aligned with the bank's IDR.

NATIONAL SENIOR DEBT RATINGS IN EL SALVADOR

The National Ratings could be downgraded in response to a multi
notch downgrade of BICSA's LT IDR.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

-- The ratings could be affirmed and the Rating Outlook revised
    to Stable if the bank's profitability and asset quality ratios
    return to their pre-pandemic levels on a consistent basis;

-- An improvement in the bank's operating environments,
    particularly in Panama and Costa Rica, could lead to a rating
    upgrade over the medium term.

SUPPORT RATING

-- Although not expected within the foreseeable future, the
    Support Rating could be upgraded in the event of a multi notch
    upgrade of its parents' LT IDR to the 'BB' range.

DEBT RATINGS IN PANAMA

The debt ratings would mirror any potential movements on their
respective IDRs. The senior unsecured debt ratings would continue
to be aligned with the bank's IDR.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Pre-paid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible in order to calculate a consistent tangible common
equity/tangible assets ratio in relation to previous periods.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

BICSA's SR is linked to the ratings of its parent companies Banco
de Costa and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Global Eyes Observe Tax Reform Process
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that in reports prepared this year by
international financial entities, the expectations for the
execution of the reform or fiscal pact in the Dominican Republic
are reflected with a view to reducing the level of indebtedness of
the country and maintaining its rating.

Analysts from Barclays, JP Morgan, Moody's and the IMF agree in
reports released separately on the need for the country to
strengthen its fiscal framework, according to Dominican Today.

On October 7, analysts at J.P. Morgan highlighted that the Ministry
of Finance presented the national budget for next year on the 1st
of this month, the report notes.  "The fact that there was no tax
reform proposal was somewhat disappointing," they said, the report
relays.

Moody's analysts had already issued a critical report on March 26
in which they indicated that a committee was convened in that month
to discuss the country's rating, the report discloses.  Among the
main points raised was that the issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has decreased substantially,
the report adds.

                      About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the
severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Say No to 'Short-Termism'
--------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the business sector of the Dominican
Republic demands that the country comply with the National
Development Strategy Law to address a fiscal pact and not a reform
as the Government is managing, and warns that this would put a
brake and constitute an obstacle to the country's economic recovery
after being rocked by COVID-19.

The Dominican Republic Industries Association (AIRD) said that,
given the situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, "this is not
the time for a hasty tax reform, especially when the high prices of
commodities and the extraordinary increases in maritime freight are
external factors that companies have assimilated momentarily, but
which at a certain moment could translate, together with a
short-term tax reform scheme, into an inflationary pressure that is
difficult to overcome," according to Dominican Today.

"It is necessary to put an end to short-termism in fiscal matters
-- AIRD added -- and embrace the mandate of the National
Development Strategy Law, which indicates that the Economic and
Social Council is the space for discussion and concretion of pacts
between the different economic forces.  and social that allow the
adoption of policies that, by their nature, require a commitment
from the State and the participation of the entire nation, such as
the Fiscal Pact, aimed at financing sustainable development and
guaranteeing long-term fiscal sustainability, through a
comprehensive tax restructuring," the report notes.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the
severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

CAC 2000: Sees Decline in Profit
--------------------------------
RJR News reports that revenues declined while profit was flat at
listed company CAC 2000 during the May to July quarter.

The company raked in J$820 million compared to J$928 million  in
2020, according to RJR News.

It ended the three months with 7-point-8 million dollars profit a
slight improvement over the $7.2 million reported during the same
period last year, the report notes.


[*] JAMAICA: IMF Projects Economy Could Grow by 4.6% This Year
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is
projecting the Jamaican economy will grow by 4.6 per cent in 2021.

The information is contained in the IMF's World Economic Outlook,
according to RJR News.

Overall, Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to record
economic growth of 6.3 per cent this year, the report notes.

                        About Jamaica

Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea.
Jamaica is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily
dependent on tourism.  Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy
include agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining,
financial and insurance services.

Fitch Ratings affirmed in March 2021 Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+', with a stable
outlook.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Jamaica stands at B+
with negative outlook (April 2020).  Moody's credit rating for
Jamaica was last set at B2 with stable outlook (December 2019).  

According to Fitch, Jamaica 'B+' rating is supported by World Bank
Governance Indicators that are substantially stronger than the 'B'
and 'BB' medians, a favorable business climate according to the
World Bank Doing Business Survey, moderate inflation and moderate
commodity dependence. These strengths are balanced by
vulnerability to external shocks, a high public debt level and a
debt composition that makes the sovereign vulnerable to exchange
rate fluctuations.

The Stable Outlook is supported by Fitch's expectation that the
public debt level will return to a firm downward path
post-pandemic, which is underpinned by political consensus to
maintain a high primary surplus, the resilience of external
finances, and stronger economic policy institutions.




===========
P A N A M A
===========

BANCO LA HIPOTECARIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco La Hipotecaria, S.A.'s (BLH) Long-
and Short-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+'/'B'. Fitch has
also affirmed the bank's National Long- and Short-Term Rating at
'AA(pan)'/'F1+(pan)'. The Rating Outlook for the Long-Term Ratings
is Negative.

The affirmation of BLH's IDR reflects Fitch's unchanged view of
potential support, if it were needed, from its ultimate parent,
Grupo ASSA. The Negative Outlooks on BLH's IDRs mirror the Negative
Outlook on its parent's IDR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING AND SENIOR DEBT

BLH's IDRs, Support Ratings (SR), national and senior (secured and
unsecured) debt ratings are underpinned by the ability and
propensity of institutional support the ultimate parent, Grupo ASSA
(BBB-/Negative) would provide, if necessary. The Negative Outlook
on BLH mirrors that on Grupo ASSA which, in turn, is driven by
Fitch's view that pressured post-pandemic economic recovery
represents a risk to the operating environments in which the group
operates.

BLH's Long-Term IDR is notched down once from Grupo ASSA's
Long-Term IDR as Fitch believes the parent's propensity to support
the bank is reflected in the relevant role of BLH as it strengthens
the group's position in a strategically relevant jurisdiction and
in complementary market segments for many of its subsidiaries.
Fitch's propensity-to-support opinion also considers the high
reputational risk for Grupo ASSA and the significant impact that
the default of its subsidiary could have on its business given the
importance of its operations in Panama. Also, any required support
would be significant relative to Grupo ASSA's ability to provide
it, given the size of BLH, which represents about 30% of its
parent's total consolidated assets.

Fitch affirmed BLH's SR at '3', reflecting the opinion that there
is moderate probability of support from Grupo ASSA, if required,
given the strategic role of the bank in the group.

Fitch affirmed National ratings on BLH's senior unsecured issuances
at the same level as BLH's short-term and Long-Term national
ratings as the notes' likelihood of default is the same as BLH's,
due to the absence of any subordination or specific guarantees.

National ratings for secured tranches and on secured negotiable
notes were affirmed one notch above the bank's long-term national
ratings, reflecting benefits of such guarantees. BLH's Panamanian
National Scale Ratings reflect Grupo ASSA's creditworthiness and
financial strength relative to the Panamanian operating environment
and in respect to other rated issuers within the local
jurisdiction. It also considers that the supporting party is a
non-banking financial group exclusively.

VR

BLH's Viability Rating (VR) reflects its relatively narrow business
model with a niche approach on housing financing. The bank plays a
relatively small role in this segment with a 2.3% market share as
of June 2021; however, this approach allowed the bank to maintain
reasonably stable delinquency ratios during the recent health
crisis, albeit with more limited results than more diversified
peers. Fitch believes BLH has some competitive advantages in its
key segment given the benefits from its relationship with Grupo
ASSA and as being one of major players in securitization of
mortgage loans in the region.

The bank's profitability remained limited, although at 1H21 its
operating profit/risk-weighted assets ratio increased to 1.2% (0.6%
in 2020) due to a significant improvement in efficiency along with
a lower loan-loss provision expense. Its narrow net interest
margin, consistent with its business model, showed a slight
improvement compared to 2020 due to better cost of funds, although
it has not yet recovered to pre-pandemic levels. In Fitch's view,
BLH's financial performance could still experience some pressures,
given the negative economic outlook in Panama, that could still
weigh on the generation and stabilization of employment and weight
over its asset quality metrics.

BLH's ratings also benefit from a diversified funding structure and
good liquidity position. Deposits continued to grow but at a slower
pace leading to a loan-to-deposit ratio that remains above 200%.
Customer deposits represent less than 50% of total funding, since
BLH relies on credit lines with multilateral agencies to finance
housing on favorable terms and also on local issuances to diversify
and better match its assets and liabilities terms.

BLH's VR is moderately influenced by the blended assessment of the
pressured operating environments of the countries in which the bank
and its subsidiaries operate, and the stress it exerts on the
entity's financial profile.

BLH's impaired loan ratio rose to 2.3% at 1H21 from 1.5% at YE
2020, above the local banking system's average (2.0%) but still
compares favorably to its closest peers. Relief measures have
expired and Fitch expects NPLs increase in the coming months,
mainly in segments that are particularly vulnerable to economic
stress. Favorably, in 2020 the bank set up additional provisions
providing close to 30% loan loss coverage on top of the warranty.

BLH's conservative capital position provides reasonable buffers
above regulatory requirements. As of June 2021, the bank's common
equity Tier 1 ratio was 11.9% (2020: 11.7%), as a result of its
loan portfolio growing at a slower pace and its internal capital
generation. Capital levels have benefitted from the absence of
dividend payouts, which is not expected to change in the short to
medium term.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Changes in Banco La Hipotecaria's IDR, National Ratings, and
    senior (secured and unsecured) issuances would reflect any
    changes in its shareholder's credit risk profile or changes on
    Fitch's assessment of its ability, or willingness, to provide
    support to its subsidiary, which the agency does not expect in
    the foreseeable future;

-- Negative pressure could be placed on BLH's VR if there were
    evidence of outsized deterioration in the bank's financial
    profile reflected in a material deterioration of its asset
    quality and a significant reduction of its profitability
    metrics relative to peers.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upward potential in Banco La Hipotecaria's IDR, National
    Ratings, SR and senior (secured and unsecured) issuances is
    limited in the short term given the Negative Outlook on its
    shareholder's ratings;

-- The VR could only be upgraded over the medium term as a result
    of improvement within the OE accompanied by improvement in
    BLH's profitability metrics, while maintaining its good
    company profile;

-- The senior (secured & unsecured) issuances' ratings and the
    issuer's IDR and National Ratings could be affirmed (and the
    Negative Outlook revised to Stable) to reflect a change in its
    shareholder's IDR Outlook or changes to Fitch's assessment of
    the parent's ability or willingness to provide support.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Prepaid expenses and other deferred assets were reclassified as
intangible assets and were deducted from Fitch Core Capital due to
their low loss absorption capacity.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

Linked to its parent company Grupo ASSA

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: State Enterprises Still Burden Taxpayers
-----------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that state enterprises in Trinidad &
Tobago remain a drain on the Treasury, despite several reports by
leading local economists calling for their reform.

The most recent report calling for a review and assessment of the
entire sector was completed by a committee chaired by Dr Terrence
Farrell in 2016, according to Trinidad Express.

That report was delivered to Prime Minister Dr Keith Rowley, on
July 18, 2016, and then largely ignored, the report notes.

The Farrell report-which was preceded by reports on State
enterprises in 1985 by Dr Euric Bobb and by Frank Rampersad in
1990-reviewed 44 State bodies and recommended that eight of them be
closed immediately: Taurus Services, Vehicle Management
Corporation, Solid Waste Management, CNMG, Export Centres Company,
National Commission for Self-Help, Government Human Resources
Limited, Government Information Services Ltd (this was closed), the
report notes.

Of those, the report considered that CNMG could be restructured as
a development enterprise within the Arts Council and VMCOTT and
SWMCOL could be divested, the report discloses.

It further suggested that eight be divested: VMCOTT, SWMCOL,
National Petroleum (following a deregulation plan), National
Quarries, First Citizens, Lake Asphalt, National Helicopter (which
it suggested be divested to National Gas Company (NGC) and National
Maintenance Training and Security Limited, the report relays.

It argued that the Trinidad and Tobago Free Zones Company and the
T&T International Financial Management Company, be retained within
InvestTT, the report notes.

"In the minds of many citizens, State enterprises are seen as
mechanisms for the dispensing of political patronage, as
inefficient and loss-making providers of services, or as providing
employment for supporters of whichever party happens to form the
Government," was the opening statement of the report's executive
summary which was dated July 18, 2016, the report discloses.

"In the last ten years (from 2006 to 2016 when the report was
written), there has been a dramatic escalation in failures of
governance at State enterprises. BWIA was shut down and CAL took
its place in 2006, but by 2012, after the change of government and
a new board installed, CAL was again embroiled in controversy, the
report relays.  UDeCOTT was the central concern of the Uff
Commission of Enquiry into the Construction sector and the
procurement practices of a number of State enterprises engaged in
infrastructure development, the report notes.

"Citizens have since seen millions of taxpayers' dollars channeled
through several State enterprises into projects of little or no
merit or, where the project was inherently meritorious, a
significant portion of the expenditure diverted in the form of cost
overruns and otherwise wasted, The examples include: (1) LifeSport
(Sports Company) (2) World GTL (Petrotrin) (3) Development of
Caroni Lands (EMBD) and (4) Project ICON (GISL)," the report said,
Trinidad Express adds.

In his budget 2022 speech, Finance Minister Colm Imbert had said
that there would be an additional public offering of First
Citizens, there would be a merger of the Trinidad and Tobago
Mortgage Finance Company (TTMF) and the Home Mortgage Bank (HMB),
creating in the process the Trinidad and Tobago Mortgage Bank for
which there will be an initial public offering, Trinidad Express
relays.

He said the Government would establish a Special Economic Zones
Authority designed to regulate designated Special Economic Zones
and there would be a merger of InvesTT and ExporTT and the
establishment of a Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, the
report discloses.

                            Fiscal 2021

So how did State enterprises financially stack up in fiscal 2021?

In the Review of the Economy 2021, State enterprises are estimated
to have received $1.66 billion in current transfers from the
Government, a $577.9 million reduction from the $2.24 billion
transferred in the corresponding period of fiscal 2020, the report
notes.

It said that out of the $1.66 billion in current transfers for the
2021 fiscal period, up to June, State enterprises received 50.8 per
cent or $847.4 million, while public utilities were allocated 49.2
per cent or $821.2 million, the report relays.

"This represented a material reduction of $262.9 million in the
Central Government's fiscal support to State enterprises and a
$314.9 million reduction in transfers to public utilities over the
review period," it said, the report notes.

It said amongst all State enterprises, CAL received the largest
fiscal injection from the Central Government in the sum of $355.3
million, followed by UDeCOTT and NIDCO, which received $255.0
million and $114.8 million respectively, the report relays.

"Current transfers to UDeCOTT were however lower by $441.1 million,
while CAL and NIDCO received additional boosts of $249.2 million
and $63.4 million, respectively. As CAL grappled with the severe
effects of the lockdown measures, the Government provided support
in the form of current transfers, which was used to meet its
operational expenditure and loan interest payments. UDeCOTT's
current transfers were utilised for loan interest payments, as the
company undertook projects on behalf of the Government," it said,
the report says.

"Due to the closure of the country's borders as part of the
country's Covid-19 mitigation measures, CAL recorded significant
revenue losses amounting to $1.29 billion, as incoming and outgoing
flights were limited over the period," the 2021 Review of the
Economy said, the report relays.

It said that three non-energy State enterprises also received
fiscal support during the nine-month period of fiscal 2021: The
Trinidad and Tobago Solid Waste Management Company (SWMCOL)-$80.6
million; CreativeTT -$6.1 million; and VMCOTT-$5.7 million, the
report discloses.

The report relates concomitantly, the following eight non-energy
companies reported a collective operating deficit of $216.0
million:

* NIDCO - $91.2 million;

* TTMF - $60.3 million;

* National Helicopter Services Ltd
  - $18.3 million);

* National Quarries - $17.8 million;

* Lake Asphalt - $10.2 million;

* VMCOTT - $6.9 million;

* Evolving Tecknologies and Enterprise
  Development Co. (eTecK) - $6.5 million);
  and

* CreativeTT - $4.8 million.

It noted that in the case of the MTS, despite recording an
operating surplus, it recorded a notable decrease of $190.7 million
in operational performance, thus contributing to the overall
weakening in the cash operations of State enterprises, the report
discloses.

The review said the primary reasons for the $147.2 million
improvement in the cash operations of energy State enterprises were
the sizeable surpluses generated from the activities of Heritage
Petroleum Company ($1.33 billion) and to a lesser extent, Tringen
($304.6 million), the report relays.

"Also contributing was the lower deficit generated by the National
Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Ltd (NGC), which reduced by
$371.9 million," it said, the report adds.

                         Public Utilities

The Review of the Economy 2021 said that amongst the six Public
Utilities, WASA was the beneficiary of the largest transfer of
Government resources ($639.0 million), the report relays.

The Review noted that all six Public Utilities-Airports Authority
of Trinidad and Tobago (AATT); Port Authority of Trinidad and
Tobago (PATT); Public Transport Service Corporation (PTSC);
Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and Tobago (TSTT); Trinidad
and Tobago Electricity Commission (T&TEC); and Water and Sewerage
Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (WASA) ran deficits over the
period, with total operating expenditure amounting to $6,026.8
million, thus outweighing operating revenues of $4,329.4 million,
the report notes.

It said that PTSC and the AATT were allocated sums of $181.3
million and $1 million, respectively, the report says.

WASA's current transfers were utilised for loan interest payments,
the report relays.

Meanwhile, the Port Authority, TSTT and T&TEC) did not receive
current transfers over the review period, the report notes.

"This fiscal position was nevertheless reflective of a 26.5 per
cent reduction from the deficit of $2.30 billion generated over the
corresponding period of the previous fiscal year. The main
contributors to this improvement in cash operations were TSTT,
which improved by 76.8 per cent, WASA, improving by 31.9 per cent
and the PTSC, improving by 2.6 per cent, the report says.

"As was the case for the past ten years, WASA was responsible for
the majority (63.5 per cent or $1.07 billion) of the operating
deficit of public utilities. Despite growth in revenue of 11 per
cent, accompanied by reductions in overall operating expenses of
21.9 per cent, WASA continued to generate deficits," it said, the
report notes.

Conversely, public utilities registered an overall cash deficit of
$800.9 million during the first nine months of fiscal 2021; a 2.3
per cent improvement from the comparative period of fiscal 2020
owing to the reduced need for financing by WASA and TSTT, the
report relays.

"T&TEC was the only company to record a surplus amounting to $210.7
million over the current reference period. Among the Public
Utilities, AATT recorded the strongest deterioration in its overall
cash balance (declining by $172.4 million), with a resultant
financing need of $143.3 million, the report discloses.

"Moreover, PATT and PTSC reported a collective $21.9 million
erosion of their overall cash balances, requiring $75.1 million and
$14.7 million respectively, in financing. Notwithstanding the
improvement in the overall cash balances of TSTT (increasing by
$261.9 million) and WASA (increasing by $122.0 million), the
companies required the largest amounts of financing of $411.4
million and $367.2 million respectively, over the period," it said,
the report adds.




=============
U R U G U A Y
=============

ACI AIRPORT: Fitch Gives BB+(EXP) Rating to USD260MM Sec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected 'BB+' rating to ACI Airport
SudAmerica, S.A.'s (ACI) $260 million senior secured notes (2021
notes) due in 2034 in exchange for the existing $200 million ($207
million outstanding) senior secured notes. The Rating Outlook for
the 2021 notes is Negative.

In addition, Fitch has revised the Rating Watch on the 'B+' rating
of the existing notes due 2032 to Evolving from Negative.

RATING RATIONALE

The ratings of the proposed exchange offer are driven by Carrasco
International Airport's (MVD) strategic but modest traffic base and
its strong origination and destination (O&D) share of passenger
traffic. They are also supported by the addition of six regional
airports with a USD67 million Capex plan, which will allow the
concession to be extended up to 2053, and a dual-till tariff
regulation. Debt will be issued at the HoldCo level and will
benefit from a springing guarantee from Puerta del Sur S.A. (PDS or
the Opco). The exchange offer structure includes important
liquidity enhancements, such as an extension of principal grace
period, an interest payment account (IPA) of USD31 million and a
six-month debt service reserve account (DSRA), to be initially
funded with Letters of Credit (LOCs) at closing. Also, the 2021
notes' legal and target amortization will provide flexibility to
the transaction in case of additional stress.

Under Fitch's rating case, debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs)
minimum and average are 1.26x and 1.50x (2024-2034), respectively.
The airport would not need to draw any amount of its DSRA due to
the IPA and up to USD15 million available in an unsecured working
capital facility. Considering both liquidity enhancements, the
airport is able to withstand 10% of 2019 traffic levels in 2022,
showing an important resiliency. Although Fitch believes that it is
likely that the airport will receive a down payment from the
duty-free operator in 2023 related to an expected contract
extension, there is a risk that the ultimate amount could be less
than anticipated given the airport sector's current operating
environment. For this reason, in Fitch's rating case, this payment,
expected to happen in 2023, is not included.

Under the severe downside case, which assumes a slower traffic
recovery until 2026, DSCRs would be slightly lower, averaging 1.35x
(2024-2034), but also no draws on the DSRA would be necessary. The
resilience to traffic underperformance and no dependency on the
expected duty free payment, due to additional embedded liquidity,
is considered consistent with a 'BB+' rating.

The Negative Outlook on the notes reflect concerns about the speed
of traffic recovery in Uruguay, where a slower pace of recovery
could drain the liquidity embedded in the structure. The Positive
Watch on the existing notes reflect the absence of liquidity
shortfalls over the short to medium terms in Fitch's Rating Case in
light of the proposed exchange offer.

The Rating Watch of the existing notes will be resolved once the
outcome of the exchange offer is known. Fitch's revised rating case
considers that all note holders will accept the exchange, but no
rating change is foreseen in case only 75% of the notes are
exchanged, which is the minimum required according the transaction
documents. Should the exchange offer be successful, but some
existing notes remain untendered, the rating of the 2021 notes and
existing notes will be equalized. In case the Exchange offer is not
successful, the rating of the existing notes should again be placed
on Negative Watch.

Fitch does not consider the proposed exchange offer to be a
distressed debt exchange because it does not impose a material
reduction in terms compared with the original contractual terms,
including the additional tail embedded in the new concession
extension.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Main Uruguayan Airport, Modest Catchment Area [Revenue Risk -
Volume: Midrange]:

Located in Uruguay's capital city of Montevideo, MVD is the main
international gateway to Uruguay with approximately 85% of the
country's flights and a catchment area with 3.4 million people. As
a result, its traffic has historically mostly been from
international passengers traveling from Argentina, Chile, Brazil as
well as Spain. MVD is almost exclusively an O&D airport with less
than 1% of passengers transferring to other destinations. The
carrier concentration is considered moderate, with Latam Airline
Group S.A. (Latam; rated D(cl)) accounting for 33% of the
passengers. The new six regional airports added to the concession
are not expected to increase overall traffic base.

Inflation and Exchange Adjusted Tariffs [Revenue Risk - Price:
Midrange]:

Revenues are 95% denominated in USD, mostly in the form of
regulated passenger tariffs adjusted by a global index that
considers foreign exchange and inflation rates. Tariffs cannot
decrease under the concession adjustment scheme, and increases must
be approved by the Uruguayan government pursuant to a decree.
Commercial revenues derived from the airport's duty-free,
restaurant, among other concessions are not regulated but are also
influenced by traffic patterns.

Well Defined Capex Plan for Regional Airports [Infrastructure
Development & Renewal: Stronger]:

The concession extension to be granted to Puerta der Sur includes
the addition of six regional airports and some certain investment
obligations. Capex to be invested in the new six airport
concessions are expected to be funded with Montevideo's cash flow
generation; the investments are considered simple and are capped at
USD67 million per the concession contract extension. The Montevideo
airport's current capacity of 4.5 million passengers per year is
well above Fitch's rating case forecast over the next 10 years.
Under the previous concession agreement amendment, which extended
the term of the concession through 2033, the new taxiway
construction was extended until the end of the concession. No other
significant mandatory investments are needed in the remaining
concession term. Additional investments related to the SISCA System
are fully funded by the new Security Fee charged to the users since
February 2018 and, therefore, are neutral to the rating.

Debt at HoldCo Level with Enhanced Liquidity Features [Debt
Structure: Midrange]:

The notes are fixed-rate and fully amortizing over the life of the
debt, and will benefit from a springing guarantee, which requires
PDS to guarantee this debt service following the repayment of the
Opco notes, expected to occur in 4Q21. Debt will benefit from a
six-month DSRA and a USD31 million IPA, which supports interest
payment up to November 2023 during the principal grace period,
which will end in November 2024. Also, the notes will benefit from
a legal amortization schedule complemented by a partial cash sweep
up to a target debt balance. Failure to meet the target debt
balance is not an event of default, therein providing flexibility
to the transaction in the event that certain years perform below
original expectations. Fitch's revised rating case considers that
all note holders will accept the exchange, but no rating change is
foreseen in case only 75% of the notes are exchanged, which is the
minimum required according the transaction documents.

Financial Profile

Under Fitch's rating case, the project's DSCR profile (considering
legal amortizations only) from 2024 to 2034 is strong, with a
minimum and average of 1.26x and 1.50x, respectively. Excluding the
expected 2023 duty-free payment, there is no need to draw its DSRA.
Moreover, the airport is able to withstand 10% of 2019 levels in
2022, presenting a solid resilience to a lower-than-expected
traffic underperformance due to additional liquidity embedded in
that structure.

PEER GROUP

Sociedad Concessionaria Operadora Aeroportuaria Internacional, S.A.
(OPAIN), the concessionaire of El Dorado International Airport in
Bogota (rated BB+/Rating Watch Negative), serves as a peer for ACI
in Fitch's LATAM airport portfolio. Both airports are the main
gateways in their respective countries, but OPAIN has a stronger
traffic profile, a larger O&D base, and less dependence on
international traffic, which has allowed for a quicker recovery.
OPAIN's medium-term DSCR profile is consistent with its 'BB+'
rating, but its current Rating Watch Negative reflects Fitch's
expectation the airport will be dependent on additional liquidity
to meet debt service payments in 2022, though these shortfalls
should be manageable given the airport's ability to incur
subordinated debt and substitute its cash DSRA for a LOC. ACI's
rating reflects flexibility to mitigate these two main risks,
similar to the protections embedded in OPAIN's debt structure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Slower traffic recovery leading to further liquidity
    deterioration.

-- Existing notes only: In case the exchange offer does not
    succeed or failure to secure liquidity which sufficiently
    mitigates default risk starting in 2022.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Existing notes only: The Positive Watch will be resolved once
    the outcome of the exchange offer is known.

-- A faster traffic recovery indicating less dependency on
    structure liquidity and external liquidity events, such as
    down payments from commercial contracts, could lead to a
    Stable Outlook.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The exchange offer will be for USD260 million in senior secured
notes. In comparison to ACI's approximately USD207 million
outstanding in 2015 and 2020 notes, the increase in indebtedness
under the 2021 notes (new money) is expected to be principally used
to fund an IPA of USD31 million, as well as fund transaction
expenses, capital contribution to PDS (for the repayment of the
Opco senior notes of USD 8.7 million and general corporate
purposes), as well accrued interest due on the existing notes
tendered and accepted for exchange in the exchange offer.

The IPA is expected to be utilized up to November 2023 during the
interest only grace period, which has been extended to November
2024 under the exchange offer versus May 2021 under the current
notes' structure. The exchange offer also assumes a two-year
extension of the debt tenor through 2034, which is permissible due
the assumed concession extension through 2053. The debt will have a
six-month DSRA initially funded at closing with a LOC, and the Opco
will also have the flexibility to issue an additional USD15 million
in indebtedness through an unsecured working capital facility at
PDS level.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

At present, Fitch is not differentiating between its base and
rating case assumptions, given the level of uncertainty about
future traffic performance. In comparison to Fitch's internal GDP
projections for countries relevant to MVD's traffic base, those
used under ALG's pessimistic case were the most similar over the
short term, as the airport recovers its 2019 traffic levels in the
coming years. For this reason, Fitch adopted ALG's pessimistic
curve as its rating case traffic projection. This case is similar
to Fitch's prior rating case as both assume recovery to 2019 levels
by 2024. Recovery for the coming years has been assumed as follows
under this case: 15% of 2019 levels in 2021, 50% of 2019 levels in
2022 and 85% of 2019 levels in 2023.

Fitch has continued to include a severe downside case within its
financial analysis for ACI, due to the heightened uncertainty
concerning future traffic performance due to ACI's international
traffic concentration, which increases its traffic's dependence on
the lifting of travel restrictions, as well as other countries'
economic recoveries and vaccination distribution timelines. Under
Fitch's severe downside case, which assumes a prolonged recovery
through 2026, recovery levels are similar through 2022 but lower
starting in 2023. Recovery post-2022 has been assumed as follows
under this case: 74% of 2019 levels in 2023, 89% of 2019 levels in
2024 and 94% of 2019 levels in 2025.

Under both the rating and severe downside case, Fitch has also
assumed a 5% stress in opex for the new airports, as a potential
margin of error in comparison to the cost budget. Macroeconomic
assumptions such as inflation and FX were also updated in line with
Fitch's Sovereigns group's forecasts as of September 2021.
Management expects to receive a down payment from the duty-free
operator in 2023 related to an expected contract extension.
Although Fitch believes it is likely that the airport will receive
such a payment, Fitch also believes that the ultimate amount could
be less than expected given the airport sector's current operating
environment. For this reason, this payment has been excluded in
Fitch's rating and severe downside cases.

SECURITY

The security package supporting the 2021 notes is typical for
project financings and includes a pledge of 100% of the shares of
the Opco and a covenant to issue a guarantee from the entity; a
pledge of 100% of the shares of Cerealsur S.A., direct owner of
PDS's shares, and a guarantee from the entity; all of the issuer's
shares; and all present and future payments, proceeds and claims of
any kind with respect to the foregoing. Also, the 2021 notes will
benefit from a six-month DSRA and a prefunded USD31 million IPA.

The 2021 notes include a 'springing guarantee' covenant, which
requires the Opco to issue a guarantee of the rated debt following
the payment in full of the Opco local notes, expected to happen in
4Q21. Therefore, the rated debt will become pari passu with all
senior unsecured debt at the Opco because of the guarantee.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Oct. 11 to Oct. 15, 2021
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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