/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/211004.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, October 4, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 192

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Looks to Mutual Funds for Additional Local Funding
PROVINCE OF LA RIOJA: S&P Raises ICRs to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

BANCO BS2: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDRs to 'B', Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: Public Debt Drops Reaching 82.7% of GDP in August
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Renews Talks With Bondholders on Restructuring


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

CHINA FISHERY: Unsecured Creditors to Recover 8.75% in PAIH Plan


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Alcohol License for Sale Harmful to Economy
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Sputters in August


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: No-Movement Days Shouldn't Affect Economy, Minister Says


M E X I C O

ARMOUR SECURE: A.M. Best Keeps 'B' Fin'l. Strength Rating on Review
BRASKEM IDESA: Fitch Revises Rating Watch on B+ IDRs to Positive
GRUPO MINSA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR, Outlook Negative


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Sept. 27 to Oct. 1, 2021

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Looks to Mutual Funds for Additional Local Funding
-------------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that Argentina took a new step to boost
its local financing options in pesos as the midterm elections
approach.

The Treasury will offer non-transferable promissory notes that can
only be acquired by mutual funds, according to a regulation
published in the Official Gazette, Buenos Aires Times relays.  The
notes will have a 30-day maturity and their returns have not yet
been announced.

The move comes as the government finds it increasingly difficult to
finance itself through local auctions, and after rolling over 97.8
percent of its debts in August and 104 percent in September, the
two lowest levels in 2021 and below the 130 percent needed each
month to meet the budget, the report notes.  Investors are selling
their debt in local pesos and buying dollars in markets that
circumvent exchange rate restrictions amid concerns that, depending
on the outcome of the parliamentary election, the government could
add restrictions to prevent capital flight, the report relays.

This rule, published by the securities regulator, says that mutual
funds may invest up to 15 percent of their assets in
non-transferable notes, the report discloses.  In the case of
non-monetary funds, the institution increased the portion they can
invest in unlisted assets to 25 percent from 20 percent, the report
says.

The reports discloses that MercadoLibre SPAC has 30 Latin America
tech firms in its sights Argentina's mutual fund industry has three
trillion pesos (US$30.3 billion) in assets under management, of
which about 1.4 trillion pesos (US$14.6 billion) are money market
instruments that invest money in bank deposits.  If the funds
decide to invest the amounts allowed by the rule in Treasury notes,
the Government could obtain financing of 450 billion pesos (US$4.6
billion) from the funds, the report relays.

This measure could help the government reduce the stock of Central
Bank debt, while banks invest money received from mutual funds
mainly in notes from that institution, called Leliq and repos, the
report notes.

"This would be very useful for the government in the short term,"
said Javier Marcus, head of investor relations at the Buenos
Aires-based asset management firm Southern Trust, the report adds.

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept. 28,
2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.


PROVINCE OF LA RIOJA: S&P Raises ICRs to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term foreign and local currency
issuer credit ratings to 'CCC+' from 'SD' on the province of La
Rioja. S&P also raised its senior unsecured issue-level rating to
'CCC+' from 'D'.

Outlook

The stable outlook balances La Rioja's more manageable debt service
profile in the next 12-18 months, with the risks stemming from the
expected deficits after capex, limited access to funding, weak
growth prospects, and a vulnerable debt profile, with 90% of the
debt stock in foreign currency.

Downside scenario

S&P could downgrade the province of La Rioja if it perceives that
its fiscal and liquidity profile weakens further, increasing the
risk of default or a new debt exchange in the next 12 months. In
addition, a downward revision of our transfer and convertibility
(T&C) assessment of Argentina (currently at 'CCC+'), due to
stricter foreign exchange restrictions, would also trigger a
downgrade of the province.

Upside scenario

Given that S&P doesn't believe that Argentine local and regional
governments (LRGs) meet the conditions to have ratings above its
T&C assessment of Argentina, S&P could only upgrade the province of
La Rioja if it revises upwards the T&C assessment in the next 12
months. This would have to be accompanied by an improvement in the
province's budgetary performance and liquidity position or greater
certainty about its capacity to tap debt markets.

Rationale

The rating action follows the completion of La Rioja's debt
restructuring on September 24, following a year in default. After
98.6% of the bondholders gave the consent to amend the terms of La
Rioja's only international bond, there are no longer Argentine
subnational governments in default.

The amended terms of the $318 million bond extend the maturity to
2024-2028 from 2022-2025, reduce a step-up average interest to 7.2%
from 9.75%, and extend the amortization profile to 9 semi-annual
installments from four annual ones. Fiscal gains from the debt deal
will mostly occur in 2022-2023, given that annual debt payments
won't exceed $20 million, compared with almost $100 million
originally. The payment calendar becomes heftier in 2024-2027.

Nevertheless, challenges for the province remain significant. S&P
expects its debt stock to remain just below 50% of operating
revenues in 2021-2022, and it's vulnerable to exchange-rate swings.
Moreover, the province's high infrastructure and social needs will
likely result in deficits after capex and weaken liquidity, given a
very limited range of sources of borrowing.

Limited budgetary flexibility and increasing spending pressure will
erode fiscal surplus from the exceptional results in 2020

S&P said, "We expect La Rioja's operating surplus in 2021 to fall
to 4.3% of operating revenue from 12.7% in 2020, as the sovereign
withdraws the pandemic-related fiscal support and spending
pressures emerge. We consider the bulk of the province's fiscal
improvement in 2020 stemmed from transitory measures that would be
difficult to be sustained over time, particularly as
social-distancing restrictions are lifted." In 2020, La Rioja
benefited from restraints on spending due to the suspension of
public servants' salary increases amid the lockdown. The
social-distancing policies also resulted in a significant reduction
(in real terms) of capex and transfers. The suspension of La
Rioja's debt payments in September also helped restrain spending.
Moreover, the province benefited from extraordinary transfers from
the federal level that partly compensated for revenue erosion amid
the steep economic downturn.

Pressure to increase La Rioja's payroll has resumed this year and
has escalated over the last few months amid rising inflation.
Moreover, as the public sector in the province is gradually
returning to normal activity, S&P sees significant increases in all
other items of spending, including on infrastructure. The
province's main infrastructure priorities are related to housing
and water infrastructure, which should keep capex levels at about
12% of total spending. Meanwhile, La Rioja's higher revenue
compensated for the increase in spending in the first half of the
year. However, S&P expects revenue growth to decelerate in the
coming months. La Rioja is heavily dependent on transfers from the
national government, which cover almost 90% of the province's
operating revenues. This has made the province highly vulnerable to
economic swings and national government's decisions on taxation.
Moreover, about 15% of transfers that La Rioja receives correspond
to extra-coparticipation transfers that need to be negotiated on
annual basis.

Improved fiscal performance in 2020 and the recent debt
restructuring have strengthened the province's cash position,
although liquidity coverage could be volatile amid economic
uncertainty. S&P estimates accumulated free cash is sufficient to
cover 40% of financing needs in next 12 months. The amended terms
have reduced debt service payments for 2022-2023 to less than 5% of
operating revenue from more than 13%. Nonetheless, S&P highlights
that the payment schedule becomes heavier in 2024, during which
debt service will jump to almost 10% of operating revenue. Absent
access to capital markets, a key challenge for the province will be
to strengthen its liquidity position in the next few years. Once
debt service rises in 2024 and if liquidity and financing
conditions don't improve, there's a possibility of the province
failing to repay the bond.

The province expects to complete its wind energy plant before the
international bond starts amortizing in 2024, and it estimates that
the plant's cash flows should be sufficient to service the
international bond. Our projections don't incorporate the plant's
revenue in light of past performance. The ARAUCO project includes
four wind parks, which the province constructed with the
international bond proceeds. However, the project ran into
significant delays, and currently only one park is fully
operating.

The restructured bond represents 82% of the province's debt stock.
Most of the remaining outstanding debt is held by the national
government and some multilateral lending institutions. We expect La
Rioja's borrowings next year to be limited to MLI loans or those
from the national government, given that access to capital markets
will remain very limited after the province's recent default. Under
these assumptions, S&P expects La Rioja's debt burden to decrease
to 46% of operating revenue by 2023 from 51% in 2020. Nevertheless,
it highlights that the province's debt structure is vulnerable to
exchange-rate swings.

Ability to restrain spending amid tough economic and political
conditions will remain key to improving finances following the debt
restructuring.

S&P said, "La Rioja has one of the lowest GDP per capita in
Argentina: we estimate it at $3,780 for 2021, less than half of our
estimate for the national level of $9,684. Moreover, the economic
outlook for the province is weak, in line with that for the
sovereign. We forecast a 7.2% growth in 2021 following the
contraction in 2020, and growth of only about 2% in 2022-2023. To
tackle its large economic challenges, we believe Argentina will
need to establish policy consistency and reduce fiscal and monetary
imbalances, including lower inflation and a more stable
exchange-rate regime.

"The institutional framework for Argentina's LRGs is a key rating
constraint. We assess the framework as very volatile and
underfunded, reflecting our perception of the sovereign's very weak
institutional predictability and volatile intergovernmental system
that has been subject to various modifications to fiscal
regulations and lack of consistency over the years, which
jeopardize the LRGs' financial planning and consequently their
credit quality."

Continued macroeconomic instability and lack of predictability have
resulted in a very short-term planning horizon, which focuses on
the balance of revenues and expenses. Amid increasingly strained
financial conditions, including very limited access to financing,
La Rioja decided to prioritize operating and capital spending over
timely debt payment obligations last year. Nevertheless, fiscal
space the province gained from the restructuring provides it the
opportunity to focus on the structural strengthening of its
individual profile. In that sense, the strengthening of the fiscal
and liquidity profile are key areas of opportunity of the
provincial administration.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  UPGRADED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION  
                                 TO         FROM
  LA RIOJA (PROVINCE OF)

  Issuer Credit Rating     CCC+/Stable/--   SD/--/--

  UPGRADED  
                                 TO         FROM
  LA RIOJA (PROVINCE OF)

  Senior Unsecured              CCC+        D




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BANCO BS2: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDRs to 'B', Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco BS2 S.A.'s (BS2) Viability
Rating (VR) to 'b' from 'b+' and its Long-Term Foreign Currency and
Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B' from 'B+'. At
the same time, BS2's Long-Term National Rating has been downgraded
to 'BBB(bra)' from 'BBB+(bra)' and the Short-Term National Rating
has been downgraded to 'F3(bra)' from 'F2(bra)'. The Rating Watch
was removed and Fitch has assigned a Negative Outlook to IDRs and
in the Long-Term National Rating. Fitch has also affirmed BS2's
Short-Term IDRs, Support Rating and Support Rating Floor.

The downgrade of BS2´s ratings reflects the frequent changes in
its business strategy and challenges on execution. In particular,
it reflects the deterioration of the entity financial profile after
the implementation of its digital banking unity strategy back in
2019. In addition, BS2 has not been able to reverse the negative
trend on its profitability and capitalization metrics.

The ratings have been removed from Ratings Watch Negative, since
Fitch doesn't expect a short-term deterioration of its credit
metrics, in particular its capital adequacy ratios. However, the
Negative Rating Outlook assigned reflects the bank's difficulties
to reach (and sustain) an operational breakeven result. Challenges
are expected to last within the ratings' time horizon from 12 to 24
months.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs and National Ratings

BS2´s ratings are highly influenced by its company profile and
capitalization metrics. They mainly reflect the challenges imposed
by the development of new business lines, especially on its digital
bank unit, which has pressured the bank´s profitability during the
last two and a half years. BS2's current strategy has been focused
on growing its SME digital bank platform, sector where the bank
considers less explored and where it has greater potential to offer
a complete solution for clients. In addition, the bank's relatively
low capitalization metrics and pressured profitability ratios
represents a risk for the implementation of its long-term strategy.
The ratings also factor into its stable asset quality metrics,
adequate funding structure and liquidity position.

After two and a half years building its digital banking platform,
BS2's decided in 2021 to reposition its franchise and strategy. In
Fitch´s view, executing the new strategy is challenging given not
only its retail digital banking unit -- which costs now acts as a
drag of its earnings -- but also by its tight capitalization
metrics (Fitch`s trigger was common equity Tier [CET1] at 10%).

The institution was not able to restore its capitalization metrics
by generating operational results. The positive impacts on its
capital ratios over the last quarters derives from recurring
capital injections coupled with non-recurring results. BS2's
capitalization metrics in 2021 remained tight and below peers even
considering positive results in 1H21 and latest shareholders
capital injection. BS2´s CET1 ratio stood at June 2021 stood at
9,4%, from 8,5% in YE 2020, while its total regulatory ratio
remained relatively stable at 11,6%, versus 11,4% at 2020.

After reported losses in 2020, BS2´s reported small but still
positive operational profitability during the 1H21. BS2's operating
profit-to-risk-weighted assets ratio stood at 0.6%, from negative
1,6% in 2020 and a four-year average of a low 0.5%, lower than
peers. Fitch highlights the relevant amount of non-recurring
positive results in the 1H21, and the ones expected to occur during
the 2H21, which partially offsets the costs related with the
bank´s digital initiative. Fitch expects BS2's results to remain
under pressure in the 2H21 and also during 2022.

BS2 continues to report good and better than peer's asset quality
ratios. Loans classified as 'D-H' ratings went down from 5% at YE
2020 to low 1,7%, also reporting an increase on coverage, from 43%
in YE 2020 to 101% at June 2021. However, the SME portfolio
continues to present relatively high concentrations on top clients;
the 10 largest clients account for 55,2% of the loan portfolio as
of 1H21. Fitch considers that the SME portfolio, despite being
relatively stable over the last years, continues to be vulnerable
to operating environment conditions.

The bank's funding profile has been stable since the last review.
BS2 continues with the strategy on diversifying its investors base,
mainly through agreements with brokerages, which distributes its
funding products to retail customers through its own platforms. In
addition to that, BS2´s own platform -- related with the digital
banking -- corresponds now for more than 15% of the bank´s total
funding. However, BS2 still shows concentrations in its top
brokerages. In terms of liquidity, it remained adequate when
compared with its short-term needs. Liquid assets totaled BRL 2,16
billion in June 2021, covering 73% of its funding with maturities
of less than one year.

Support Rating and Support Rating Floor

BS2's Support Rating of '5' and its Support Rating Floor of NF'
reflect the bank's low systemic importance. In Fitch's view, the
bank is not likely to benefit from external support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

IDRs, VR and National Ratings

-- Downward ratings pressure could arise if BS2 is not able to
    maintain a CET1 ratio above 8,5% and/or the bank is not able
    to maintain regulatory capital ratios comfortably above the
    minimum requirements;

-- Further deterioration of Fitch´s assessment of the bank´s
    competitive and business position, resulting from difficulties
    of the bank to implement and escalate its current strategy;

-- If the bank´s IDRs are downgraded, BS2´s long-term National
    Ratings could potentially be downgraded by multiple notches.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The Outlook could be revised to Stable if BS2 manages to
    replenish capital buffers to levels comfortably above
    requirements, CET1 level sustainably above 10% coupled with
    significant improvements in operating profitability;

-- An upgrade is unlikely in the near future.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


BRAZIL: Public Debt Drops Reaching 82.7% of GDP in August
---------------------------------------------------------
Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that even if the
opposition criticizes the Brazilian economy almost daily for
political reasons and says it sees black clouds gathering, there
are not many countries in the world at the moment that are able to
reduce their debts despite the pandemic.

The public debt registered the sixth consecutive month of decline
in August and reached 82.7% of GDP, according to Rio Times Online.
The figure was released by the Central Bank (BC), the report
notes.

The trajectory is downward since the indicator reached a historical
peak of 89.4% in February this year, the report relays.  In April,
the debt/GDP ratio was already at 85.3%, dropped to 83.2% in June
and 83.1% in July, the report adds.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020).  S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020.  Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March
2018).


SAMARCO MINERACAO: Renews Talks With Bondholders on Restructuring
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Cristiane Lucchesi and Mariana Durao of Bloomberg News report,
citing people familiar with the matter, that Samarco Mineracao SA
and its major bondholders are back at the negotiation table as the
company looks to restructure its debt.

The two sides are holding the second meeting in a week,
the people said, asking not to be named because the negotiations
aren't public. The iron-ore company was hit by a dam disaster in
2015 that interrupted production.

The talks bring renewed hope of a negotiated solution to Samarco's
debt crisis, after previous discussion broke down before the
company filed for bankruptcy protection from creditors in April
2021.

                       About Samarco Mineracao SA

Samarco Mineracao SA is a Brazilian mining joint venture between
BHP Group and Vale SA. erves as an iron ore processing company. The
company provides blast furnace, direct reduction, sinter feed, as
well as low and normal silica content pellets.

On April 9, 2021, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for
judicial reorganization in the 2nd Business State Court for the
Belo Horizonte District of Minas Gerais in Brazil pursuant to
Brazilian Federal Law No. 11,101 of February 9, 2005.

Samarco Mineracao filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy recognition
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 21-10754) on April 19, 2021, in New York,
to seek U.S. recognition of its Brazilian proceedings.

The Debtor's U.S. counsel is Thomas S. Kessler of Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP.




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C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
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CHINA FISHERY: Unsecured Creditors to Recover 8.75% in PAIH Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Andes International Holdings Limited (Bermuda) and certain
affiliated Debtors submitted a Disclosure Statement in connection
with the First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (the "PAIH
Plan") dated September 27, 2021.

The Plan Debtors include Pacific Andes International Holdings
Limited (Bermuda) ("PAIH"), Pacific Andes International Holdings
(BVI) Limited ("PAIH BVI"), Nouvelle Foods International Ltd. (BVI)
("Nouvelle"), N.S. Hong Investment (BVI) Limited ("N.S. Hong"),
Clamford Holding Limited (BVI) ("Clamford"), and Pacific Andes
Enterprises (Hong Kong) Limited ("PAE (HK)").

The Debtors' chapter 11 cases have been consolidated for procedural
purposes only and are being administered under the caption China
Fishery Group Limited (Cayman), Case No. 16-11895 (JLG).

On September [27], 2021, certain members of the PAIH Group entered
into those certain Sale Transactions SAs, subject to Bankruptcy
Court approval.

Due to the corporate structure, the business organization and the
companies' operations, the restructuring of the Debtors will be
implemented through three separate chapter 11 Plans - (i) the CFG
Peru Plan, which was proposed by the Creditor Plan Proponents and
previously confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court by the CFG Peru
Confirmation Order dated June 10, 2021, through which, inter alia,
the interests in CFGI were or will be distributed to holders of the
Club Facility Claims and Senior Note Claims in full satisfaction
and payment of the funded debt of the CFG Debtors; (ii) a Joint
Debtor Plan, which addresses and satisfies the claims of the
certain Debtors within the CFGL Group and PARD Group; and (iii) the
PAIH Plan which addresses and satisfies the claims of the creditors
within the PAIH Group.

The PAIH Plan authorizes and approves the sale of certain non
Debtor subsidiaries' real estate holdings and/or Interests in such
entities in exchange for the Sale Transactions Proceeds pursuant
to, inter alia, Bankruptcy Code Sections 1123(a)(5) and 1141.
Specifically, the PAIH Plan provides for the sale of Interests in 6
Property Owning Companies, which hold Real Property in Hong Kong
and Japan, and the sale of Real Property held by PAE (HK).

The Sale Transactions Proceeds, along with all other residual
assets inclusive of the proceeds of the release of the Maybank
Share Pledge, shall be distributed (i) to satisfy and pay the
Allowed Administrative Expense Claims (including those of certain
related parties that advanced sums to fund operations and
professional expenses during the course of the Chapter 11 cases)
and other priority claims; (ii) to satisfy and pay the Maybank
Secured Facility Claim through an aggregate payment of $4.0
million; (iii) to satisfy and pay allowed unsecured claims of the
creditors of PAIH and PAIH (BVI) an amount equal to approximately
8.75% of their Allowed General Unsecured Claims; (vi) to satisfy
and pay the Allowed PAE HK Loan Claim in an amount equal to 60% of
the Allowed claim amount; and (v) to satisfy and pay allowed
unsecured claims of Teh Hong Eng from any Residual Assets.

All Intercompany Claims (except for Intercompany Claims that become
Allowed Administrative Claims or Allowed general unsecured claims),
shall be deemed satisfied and extinguished under the PAIH Plan.

Further, the Qingdao Related-Plant Facilities Claims, which consist
of claims arising from guarantees or expired guarantees of loans
secured by property in the People's Republic of China (excluding
Hong Kong SAR), shall be satisfied in full through their secured
interests in the Qingdao Related-Plant and through actions
previously taken by these creditors in the PRC.

The PAIH Plan contemplates the appointment of a Plan Administrator
to administer the wind down of the Plan Debtors and their non
Debtor affiliates in the PAIH Group. Upon confirmation of the PAIH
Plan, the Plan Administrator shall be authorized to take all
corporate actions necessary consistent with applicable non-United
States law to wind down and liquidate the Plan Debtors.

The PAIH Plan intends to satisfy the claims of the creditors of the
Plan Debtors through, among other things, (i) payment of cash from
the Sale Transactions Proceeds and liquidation of other residual
assets (including any preserved claims and causes of action),
and/or (ii) distribution of property interests held to secure
certain claims.

Attorneys for Plan Debtors:

     KLESTADT WINTERS JURELLER SOUTHARD & STEVENS, LLP
     Tracy L. Klestadt
     John E. Jureller
     Brendan M. Scott
     200 West 41st Street, 17th Floor
     New York, New York 10036
     Telephone: (212) 972-3000
     Facsimile: (212) 972-2245

                   About China Fishery Group

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.

In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group was
estimated to have assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at
$10 million to $50 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr. Weil, Gotshal
& Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead bankruptcy counsel
for China Fishery and its affiliates other than CFG Peru
Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal replaces Meyer,
Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm initially hired by the
Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped Klestadt Winters Jureller
Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict counsel; Goldin Associates,
LLC, as financial advisor; RSR Consulting LLC as restructuring
consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC, as administrative
agent. Kwok Yih & Chan serves as special counsel.

On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter 11
trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one of
the Debtors.  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves as
the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves as
special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, serves
as special litigation counsel.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Alcohol License for Sale Harmful to Economy
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Association of Industries of the
Dominican Republic (AIRD) said legislation for controlling the
sale, supply, and consumption of alcoholic beverages would cause a
very harmful impact on economic activity and job creation.

In objecting to a bill on the subject circulating in the National
Congress, the AIRD indicated that such a legal framework would
create confusion and dualities of institutional roles in the fight
against illicit alcoholic beverages, according to Dominican Today.

The guild of industrialists said that there are mechanisms for the
effective control of the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages without creating a law such as those mentioned above, the
report notes.

Among these legal mechanisms, the association cited Laws 17-19 for
the Eradication of Illicit Trade; 63-17 on Mobility, Land
Transport, Traffic and Road Safety and 136-03 on the Code for the
Protection of Children's Rights and Adolescents, the report
relays.

Likewise, it also cited the General Law 358-05 on the Protection of
consumer or User Rights and tax regulation (implemented by DGII and
DGA), among other provisions, the report discloses.

"The economic recovery that the country shows is nascent, and we
must take care of it and strengthen it. The draft Law for the
Control of Sale, Supply, and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages are
an obstacle to this recovery, especially concerning employment,"
the AIRD warned, the report says.

It further argued that establishing limitations and restrictions on
commercial activities through the imposition of compulsory licenses
on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (especially the more
than 60,000 grocery stores and places of sale of alcoholic
beverages) in the current situation that the country is
experiencing would be counterproductive since it would increase
operational costs and many businesses would be forced to close
their doors, the report discloses.

                    An Incentive to Illicit Trade

The AIRD indicated that these licenses constitute an incentive to
the illicit trade in alcohol, as has been the experience in other
countries in the region, thus punishing those who comply with the
law and giving advantages to continue the illicit trade to the
detriment of the consumer, producers, importers and State
collections, the report notes.

"It is, therefore, an incentive that can be considered perverse,
although it is necessary to clarify that this is not the intention
of the legislator," the association concluded, the report says.

                  About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the severe
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Sputters in August
----------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Monthly Manufacturing Activity
Index (IMAM) of Dominican Republic's Industries Association (AIRD)
fell in August, in relation to July 2021, from 57.3 to 54.4, paced
by sales and production.

The "volume of sales" went from 55.1 in July to 48.3 in August and
that of production from 54.4 to 44, according to Dominican Today.

The variable of "employment" went from 54 in the seventh month of
the year to 50 in August, while the "inventory of premium
materials" went from 65.3 to 66.3 in the same period, the report
notes.

The "supplier delivery time" went from 73.3 in July to 80.9 in
August, or three of the five variables considered showed a downward
trend in August compared to July 2021, the report relays.

"When the IMAM is below the 50-point threshold, it reflects that
the economic conditions and prospects of the manufacturing sector
are considered unfavorable," the report adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the
severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: No-Movement Days Shouldn't Affect Economy, Minister Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Finance Minister Dr. Nigel Clarke is
not expecting the recent no movement days to have a long term
impact on the economy.

Dr. Clarke told the Financial Report that the economy remains
stable, according to RJR News.

"The lockdowns began in August of 2021 and there is no doubt that
the lockdowns have affected the revenues of the government but we
are still able, even after the lockdown to table the supplementary
estimates that proposes an extra $33-billion of expenditure because
the Jamaican economy has so far, for this fiscal year registered a
very strong recovery . . .. uncertainty exists and we have to
balance and we have to balance what we know today with the
uncertainties of tomorrow," the report notes.

Meanwhile, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) says the
equivalent of 255 million full time jobs were destroyed and US$ 3.7
billion in income wiped off last year due to the covid-19 pandemic,
the report relays.

ILO Director General Guy Ryder says the impact of  the pandemic has
been four times greater than the global financial crisis which
occurred between 2008 and 2009, the report relates.

Ryder says the human cost of  the pandemic is a direct consequence
of  past policy failures, the report notes.

"The world was unprepared and millions vulnerable because the
majority of people had no social protection -- because we had
failed to invest in human security . . . the questions is -- what
happens next" Ryder said, the report notes.

He says it is encouraging that the world has returned to a growth
trajectory, the report discloses.  However, he cautioned that the
growth is dramatically uneven, the report relays.  Ryder was
speaking at the United Nations High Level event on Jobs and Social
Protection for Poverty Eradication and a Sustainable Recovery, the
report adds.

                         About Jamaica

Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea.
Jamaica is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily
dependent on tourism.  Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy
include agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining,
financial and insurance services.

Fitch Ratings affirmed in March 2021 Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+', with a stable
outlook.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Jamaica stands at B+
with negative outlook (April 2020).  Moody's credit rating for
Jamaica was last set at B2 with stable outlook (December 2019).  

According to Fitch, Jamaica 'B+' rating is supported by World Bank
Governance Indicators that are substantially stronger than the 'B'
and 'BB' medians, a favorable business climate according to the
World Bank Doing Business Survey, moderate inflation and moderate
commodity dependence. These strengths are balanced by
vulnerability
to external shocks, a high public debt level and a debt
composition
that makes the sovereign vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.

The Stable Outlook is supported by Fitch's expectation that the
public debt level will return to a firm downward path
post-pandemic, which is underpinned by political consensus to
maintain a high primary surplus, the resilience of external
finances, and stronger economic policy institutions.




===========
M E X I C O
===========

ARMOUR SECURE: A.M. Best Keeps 'B' Fin'l. Strength Rating on Review
-------------------------------------------------------------------
AM Best has maintained the under review with negative implications
status and affirmed the Financial Strength Rating of B (Fair), the
Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating of "bb" (Fair) and the Mexico
National Scale Rating of "a.MX" (Excellent) of Armour Secure
Insurance S.A. de C.V. (Armour) (Mexico).

The under review with negative implications status reflects AM
Best's ongoing review of the financial situation at Armour's
holding company following changes in its corporate structure.

The ratings reflect Armour's balance sheet strength, which AM Best
assesses as strong, as well as its strong operating performance,
limited business profile and marginal enterprise risk management
(ERM).

The strong balance sheet assessment reflects Armour's capital base,
consistently strengthened through the reinvestment of earnings.
Armour has been able to sustain a profitable domestic operation
through its underwriting results and investment income.

Armour's business profile is limited due to its concentration in
the niche market of title insurance in Mexico, coupled with
challenges ahead for the real estate market amid Mexico's weakened
economy.

AM Best's view of the company's ERM is marginal due to concerns
regarding governance and availability of information at its holding
company, Trebuchet Group Holdings Limited.

The ratings will remain under review until AM Best can fully assess
the financial situation at Armour's holding company.


BRASKEM IDESA: Fitch Revises Rating Watch on B+ IDRs to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Braskem Idesa SAPI's (BI) Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+',
as well as the 'B+'/'RR4' rating on its 2029 secured bond. The
Rating Watch for all ratings has been revised to Positive from
Negative.

The Rating Watch Positive (RWP) reflects the decrease in BI's
business risks following the announcement that it has signed an
amendment to the ethane supply agreement with Petroleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX; BB-/Stable). The amendment contract terms reduce
uncertainties regarding business sustainability and profitability
levels, which should remain strong throughout the petrochemical
cycle. It is also expected to benefit financial flexibility as it
should allow the company to pursue its strategy to change its quite
restrictive project finance debt for corporate debt.

The RWP should be resolved within six months. Factors that will be
monitored include pending shareholders and creditors' approvals,
the refinancing of its project finance debt and a sustainable
increase in capacity utilization to 80%-85%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Amendment to Ethane Contract Agreement: PEMEX is expected to
deliver a minimum of 30kbpd of ethane, a decrease from 66kpd, per
the amendment contract until the earliest of the operational
startup of the ethane import terminal, scheduled for the second
semester of 2024, or February 2025. There is also an agreement that
establishes support measures to help the company build an ethane
import terminal with the capacity to meet all of BI's feedstock
requirements. Fitch's base case considers around USD360 million of
capex related to the terminal, to be disbursed between 2022 and
2024. BI has expressed its interest to find operational partners to
develop this project.

Improved Business Risk: The amendment significantly reduces most
immediate political and operational risks, as observed during 4Q20
when BI stopped its operations for 29 days due to lack of natural
gas and political disputes. Pemex provides BI with ethane and
Cenagas, another governmental company provides the transportation
of natural gas used by BI as fuel and to generate electrical
energy. Fitch's base case scenario indicates that Pemex's supply of
ethane should decline to 45% of total needs in 2022 and to 38% in
2026. Until 2020, when BI implemented the fast track project to
import ethane, the company was dependent solely on Pemex. As of
today, the fast track has a capacity to import up to 25 kpbd,
representing around 40% of Braskem Idesa's ethane needs

Profitability to Remain Sound: Despite increases in feedstock costs
that will result from this agreement, BI will continue to remain
extremely profitable due to its large scale and modern facilities.
EBITDA margins are projected to be around 35%-40% in Fitch's base
case scenario that assumes PEMEX delivers about 30k bpd and that
the pricing structure is revised to consider market price
references plus logistics costs. These margins compare favorably
with margins of peers of between 20% and 25% during high periods in
the cycle.

Favorable Backdrop: The combination of weather-related production
disruptions, logistic constrains and strong demand for resins has
resulted in strong petrochemical spreads for 2021. BI is expected
to post record results despite operating rates of around 65%.
Fitch's base case EBITDA is around USD610 million for 2021. For
2022 and 2023, Fitch assumes greater pressure on raw material costs
and mid-cycle price assumptions leading to EBITDA of around USD475
million and USD410 million, respectively.

New Terminal Capex Could Pressure FCF: On a preliminary exercise,
considering the terminal being 100% owned by BI, FCF is expected to
remain negative by USD60 million, USD80 million and USD17 million
respectively in the next three years. Fitch incorporates around
USD40 million of shareholder loans to be distributed in 2022 and
2023. BI expects to find a partner and financing for the project
(60/40 debt/equity ratio), which could alleviate this pressure on
FCF.

Leverage to Peak in 2023: The scenario of strong petrochemical
spreads during 2021 and higher production volume in 2022 are
benefiting Braskem Idesa's deleveraging. Fitch expects the net
leverage ratio to be around 3.0x in 2021 and 4.1x in 2022. For
2023, net leverage is around 4.9x, considering mid-cycle prices
plus capex for the ethane terminal. These leverage levels compare
well with 7.4x in 2020 and 6.0x in 2019.

Moderate Rating Linkage: Braskem Idesa benefits from operational
and commercial synergies with its controlling shareholder Braskem
S.A. (75% equity interests, IDR BB+/Positive) within the production
and sale of PE. Braskem Idesa is strategically important for
Braskem as Braskem Idesa diversifies Braskem's feedstock sources
and increases its access to other markets. Legal ties are weak, as
the parent does not guarantee the debt obligations of the
subsidiary. Braskem Idesa's project finance debt has a strong set
of covenants that limits financial flexibility and dividends
distributions.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Braskem Idesa's current ratings reflects risks associated with the
political risk exposure with Mexican entities, recent track record
of shutdown of facilities and its ongoing disputes with PEMEX on
the amendment ethane contract.

Historically, Braskem Idesa benefited from access to a competitive
cost feedstock, with its EBITDA margin well positioned relative to
other PE producers such as Braskem S.A. (BB+/Positive Outlook) and
more diversified players such as Dow Chemical Company (BBB/Stable)
in terms of operating margins. Braskem Idesa compares positively
with its Latin American chemical peers such as Alpek S.A
(BBB-/Stable) or Orbia Advance Corporation, S.A.B de C.V.
(BBB/Stable). Nevertheless, Braskem Idesa has a higher exposure to
supply/contract risks compared to its peers. The company also has a
weaker position in terms of exposure to a single asset and product,
as well as limited geographic diversification. Braskem Idesa's net
leverage ratio is expected to be above most of its peers in the
region, with net leverage ratio around 3.5x-4.0x through the cycle.
The average net leverage for the Latin American investment-grade
chemicals peers is around 2.5x and 3.5x for solid 'BB' peers.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- PEMEX providing 30kbpd of ethane and imported ethane around
    13kbpd in 2021 and 30kbpd in 2022 and 2023;

-- Industry PE-Ethane's spreads of around USD1,468/t, USD982/t
    and USD967/t for 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively;

-- Operating capex of around USD30million in the next three
    years, and terminal capex of around USD360 million to be
    invested in the next three years;

-- Shareholder distributions around USD40 million per year in
    2021-23.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Approval of the agreement by BI's shareholders and creditors;

-- Successful refinancing of the project finance debt;

-- Sustained capacity utilization levels of around 80%-85%.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Failure to proceed with the approval of the amendment supply
    agreement contract;

-- Pemex's failure to deliver above 25kbpd, pressuring overall
    business profitability;

-- Net debt/EBITDA above 5.0x on consistent basis.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity Including Additional Reserves: As of June 30,
2021, Braskem Idesa reported USD197 million of cash, USD145 million
of short-term debt and USD2.3 billion of long-term debt obligations
(USD1.4 billion of project finance debt and USD900 million of
secured bonds due to 2029). The company also has a debt service
reserve account of USD194 million and access to a contingent equity
line of USD208 million. As of Dec. 31, 2020, Braskem Idesa reported
MXN47 billion of subordinated shareholder loans, MXN35 billion with
Braskem and MXN12 billion with Grupo IDESA.

As of June 30, 2021, Braskem Idesa's project finance debt was
classified at short-term due to the default on the physical and
financial completion covenants. As occurred in the past, the
company is negotiating a waiver with the project lenders and this
should be reallocated to long term. In a normalized scenario, the
project finance has a long-term amortization schedule with an
average of USD160 million of annual payments and final maturity at
2029. As planned, Braskem Idesa's cash flow generation is expected
to be sufficient to cover its project finance debt amortization
schedule.

ISSUER PROFILE

Braskem Idesa was created in May 2010 to develop the petrochemical
complex in Veracruz (Mexico) - Etileno XXI Project, which started
operation in 2Q16. The complex houses an ethane gas-based ethylene
cracker and three polyethylene (PE) plants - two high-density
(705kton) and one low-density (300kton) - with combined annual
production capacity of 1.05 million ktons of PE.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Braskem Idesa has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for governance
structure due to shareholder concentration and track record of
corruption scandal of one of its parent company. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the rating
in conjunction with other factors.

Braskem Idesa has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for financial
transparency with below average financial disclosure. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the rating
in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


GRUPO MINSA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico affirmed Grupo Minsa, S.A.B. de C.V.'s corporate
family ratings of Ba3/Baa1.mx and its short-term ratings of MX-2
(Not-Prime). The outlook is negative.

Affirmations:

Issuer: Grupo Minsa, S.A.B. de C.V.

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba3/Baa1.mx

Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP/MX-2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Grupo Minsa, S.A.B. de C.V.

Outlook, Remains Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

Minsa's ratings reflect the company's franchise strength as
Mexico's second largest corn flour producer, the high relevance of
the tortilla in the Mexican diet, and favorable longer-term growth
prospects for the corn flour industry in Mexico. These credit
positives are partly offset by the company's limited operating
scale and product diversification, along with its exposure to
volatile corn prices and a seasonal cash flow pattern because of
the corn purchase cycle which leads to an increase in its working
capital requirements that typically is financed with short-term
debt. The ratings also consider Minsa's high reliance on short term
debt to cover corn purchases that could pressure liquidity if not
timely refinanced.

During the first half of 2021, the company's sales volumes slightly
grew by 1.6% compared to the same period a year earlier. Moody's
expects volumes to remain at that levels in the second half of 2021
and grow at historical pace for the next two years.

Minsa is the second largest player in the Mexican packaged corn
flour market, with a 16.7% share of total industry capacity. Market
leader Gruma is significantly stronger, with a 68.68% share of
industry capacity in Mexico. Despite the differences in scale
between both companies, the competitive landscape has been
historically stable. But since 2015, several small regional
companies started operations in Mexico. Although competition has
intensified, Minsa has been able to hold to its market share, given
its national presence and track record. Also, Moody's considers
that there are enough opportunities in the Mexican corn flour
market that support the entrance of new players.

In the upcoming years, Moody's expects the market to gradually move
towards the industrialization of tortillas, benefiting larger
players such as Minsa. While around half of the tortillas produced
in Mexico are made with traditional non-industrial methods, the
industrial method with packaged corn flour is cleaner and more
efficient. The production of packaged corn flour requires only 25%
of water when compared to the traditional non-industrial methods.
Yield is also higher for the industrial method with one metric ton
of corn producing 24% more kilograms of tortillas than the
traditional non-industrial method. Another positive development is
the increased penetration of supermarket chains in Mexico, as they
use packaged corn flour in their in-house tortillerías.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Minsa's
revenues and profitability will be pressured by higher corn prices
over the next 12-18 months.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

A ratings upgrade is unlikely in the near to medium-term because of
the company's limited scale and diversification makes it highly
vulnerable to negative external shocks such as unanticipated
commodity price increases. In the long-term, upward rating pressure
could build once the company materially increases its scale. Minsa
will also need to recover profitability through its recent plan
aimed at increasing operating efficiency. Quantitatively, positive
pressure will require Minsa's revenues to be close to $1 billion
with a Moody's-adjusted EBITA margin of around 10% on a sustained
basis.

The rating could be downgraded if Minsa's margins remains below
expectations, for example due to unexpected corn price volatility.
Downgrade pressure could also emerge from an increase in debt
because of an acquisition or a more aggressive capital spending
plan that results in weaker credit metrics. Specifically, downward
pressure could emerge if Minsa's profitability deteriorates,
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA exceeds 3.0x, or if Moody's adjusted
EBITA/Interest expense consistently stays below 2.5 times. A
significant deterioration in liquidity or delay in addressing
short-term debt maturities can also result in a downgrade.

Minsa's cash and marketable securities as of June 30, 2021 totaled
MXN155 million (approximately $7.8 million) which can cover 27% its
short-term debt. Moody's notes that Minsa's debt level is seasonal
and cash needs for the second half remain low, as most of Minsa's
corn needs are sourced in the second quarter when Sinaloa's white
corn is harvested. In addition, the company benefits from its
commercial paper program to cover its working capital requirements.
Larger capital spending of MXN184 million ($9.6 million) in 2017-19
resulted in negative free cash flow. Going forward, Moody's
estimates that Minsa will post positive free cash flow in 2021-22
with lower capital expenditures of around MXN100-150 million ($5
-7.5 million) per year and no-dividend payments.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Packaged Goods Methodology published in February 2020.

Grupo Minsa, S.A.B. de C.V. is the second largest corn flour
producer in Mexico, with MXN5.2 billion (approximately $252
million) in revenues in the twelve months ended June 30, 2021. The
company owns six corn flour plants in Mexico with total capacity of
746 thousand tons per year. Key products are commercialized under
the Minsa brand and include corn flour tortillas, tamales, and
chips, as well as corn seeds for millers. Minsa is majority owned
and controlled by the Gomez Flores family and is listed on the
Mexican stock exchange since 1997 with a 17% public float.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Sept. 27 to Oct. 1, 2021
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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