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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Wednesday, September 8, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 174

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Buenos Aires to Restructure 98% of Bonds in Debt Deal
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE: S&P Ups ICR to CCC+ Following Debt Exchange
MOLINO CANUELAS: Files for Bankruptcy After Years of Disputes


B A H A M A S

BAHAMAS: Government Debt to Hit $11.5 Billion in 4 Years


B E R M U D A

SEADRILL LTD: Seeks Court Approval to Hire KMPG


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: 2nd Quarter GDP Drops 0.1% From 1st Quarter, IBGE Says
BRAZIL: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Issuer Rating, Stable Trend


J A M A I C A

JP GROUP: Banana Supply Affected by Tropical Storm Grace


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Cinema Sector Appeals to Gov't. for Reopening

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Buenos Aires to Restructure 98% of Bonds in Debt Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Bloomberg News, reports that
Argentina's Province of Buenos Aires says it received creditor
support to restructure 98% of its $7.1 billion in overseas debt,
putting it a step closer to ending a 16-month default.

The province, which is Argentina's largest and most populous, will
swap all of the bonds it had offered to exchange except for
dollar-denominated notes due 2021 and euro-denominated bonds due
2020, which had been issued under indentures that required a higher
amount of creditor participation, according to a statement,
according to globalinsolvency.com.

The deal was expected to settle Sept. 3, notes the report.

The results cap Argentina's most recent round of debt
restructurings, after nearly every province reached deals with
bondholders over the past 12 months and the national government
restructured its own $65 billion in securities a year ago, the
report relates.

The exchange, which was designed to dissuade creditors from holding
out, also marks a success for Buenos Aires Governor Axel Kicillof,
known for butting heads with investors as Argentina's economy
minister during its 2014 restructuring, the report adds.

                        About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept. 28,
2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.



BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE: S&P Ups ICR to CCC+ Following Debt Exchange
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale issuer credit rating on
Argentine province of Buenos Aires (PBA)  to 'CCC+' from 'SD'. The
outlook is stable. S&P also took the following rating actions:

-- S&P assigned final 'CCC+' ratings on the six new bonds issued
as part of the debt exchange.

-- S&P withdrew ratings on the nine international bonds that were
exchanged in their complete amount.

-- S&P maintained its issue-level ratings on the 10.875% dollar
2021 and euro 2020 bonds at 'D', given that not all creditors
entered the exchange.

-- S&P raised the issue-level rating on the province's 2025 local
currency bond to 'CCC+' from 'CC', because it doesn't believe the
PBA will pursue further debt restructurings.

Outlook

S&P said, "The stable outlook on our 'CCC+' credit rating balances
the lower risk of the PBA's default in the next 12-18 months
following the debt exchange with the risks stemming from limited
access to funding and economic growth prospects in Argentina that
could pressure the province's fiscal accounts and liquidity. We
don't expect holdout creditors to undermine the PBA's ability to
seek financing or service its debt in the next 12 months."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could downgrade the province if a sharply
weaker-than-expected fiscal performance or liquidity position
increases the risk of default or a distressed debt exchange in the
next 12 months. In addition, a downward revision of our transfer
and convertibility (T&C) assessment on Argentina (currently at
'CCC+') due to stricter foreign exchange restrictions would result
in the PBA's downgrade. If holdout creditors were to jeopardize the
issuer's ability to access financing, we could also lower the
ratings."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "Given that we don't believe that Argentine local and
regional governments (LRGs) meet the conditions to have ratings
above that on the sovereign, we could only upgrade the PBA if we
take a similar action on Argentina in the next 12 months. This
would have to be accompanied by the province's stronger budgetary
performance and liquidity buffers or greater certainty about
capacity to tap domestic and international debt markets."

Rationale

S&P said, "Given that the debt exchange was broadly accepted, and
the new international bonds become effective on Sept. 3, 2021, we
consider that the province has cured the default. The PBA obtained
the consent of more than 90% of the creditholders to exchange 97.7%
of the aggregate principal amount of its international bonds
totaling $7.2 billion. Nine out of the 11 bonds included in the
debt negotiations were restructured, with holdouts on two bonds
totaling $168.6 million. Although this share of the PBA's currently
defaulted debt hasn't been exchanged, the high acceptance level for
the exchange of the other bonds leads us to believe the holdout
creditors' ability to undermine the PBA's ability to seek external
funding in the near term is limited. In addition, we consider that
resolution of the default on these two bonds won't likely occur in
the short term.

"The six new bonds due 2037 extend maturities to 2024-2037 from
2020-2028, have step-up interest rates that average 5.74% (compared
with 7.5% previously), and a smoother amortization profile. As a
result, the agreement reduces the PBA's debt payments by about $3.5
billion between 2021 and 2023. The PBA's exchanged debt represents
roughly half of all international debt that Argentine provinces
have restructured. All other provincial debt restructurings were
already completed, with exception of La Rioja.

"The 'CCC+' ratings on the PBA also reflect our view that while the
recent restructuring gives short-term debt relief and mitigates the
risk of default in the next two years, financial challenges remain.
The province has maintained balanced fiscal accounts, but its
liquidity is narrow amid Argentina's economic woes and financing
sources are limited. At the same time, Argentina's very volatile
and underfunded institutional framework constrains our ratings on
LRGs."

Fiscal performance to remain balanced, although cash reserves will
still be limited

S&P said, "We expect the PBA's operating surpluses to average 2% of
operating revenues in 2022-2023, with results after capital
expenditures remaining moderately negative and as the province
increases capex. Tax revenue will benefit from the suspension of
the gross receipt tax ceiling and from economic recovery. We
believe spending pressures will remain, with expenditures
potentially increasing above inflation due to upward adjustments in
public-sector salaries (42% of provincial outlays) following three
years of real losses. The PBA's increasing reliance on national
government for non-automatic transfers, along with infrastructure
needs, underline the limited flexibility in the province's
budget."

The PBA's results in 2020 were better than expected, and similar to
those in 2019. The local revenue collapse was offset by an increase
in non-automatic transfers from the central government.
Public-sector wages increased below inflation pace, while pause in
servicing international bonds amid the restructuring negotiations
also provided budgetary relief.

S&P assumes international debt markets will remain closed to the
PBA and it will cover funding needs with pre-approved and
potentially new loans from the multilateral lending agencies,
funding from the national government, and short-term notes in the
local market (authorized for 2% of the budgeted operating revenues
for this year).

While the province's fiscal results have remained broadly balanced,
liquidity is still very limited. S&P said, "We believe that
structural lack of liquidity buffers remains a key risk to the
creditworthiness of Argentine provinces. We estimate that the PBA's
free and readily available cash is currently low and doesn't cover
debt repayment for the next 12 months, which will likely be covered
by regular cash flows and or rolled over in the case of domestic
debt."

Debt stock will remain near 65% of the province's operating revenue
in 2021. This is partly due to the new debt from capitalized
past-due debt payments, according to the restructuring agreement.
About 85% of the debt is denominated in U.S. dollars, which
underscores potential currency risk. S&P expects the PBA's debt
burden to diminish in coming years, because financing conditions
remain tight, with debt levels remaining above 50% of operating
revenue.

A volatile institutional framework and limited growth in Argentina
constrain the rating

The economic outlook for the province is weak, in line with that
for the sovereign. S&P said, "We forecast a 6.9% rebound in 2021
following the contraction in 2020, with slow growth of about 2% in
2022-2023. To tackle its large economic challenges, we believe
Argentina will need to establish policy consistency and reduce
fiscal and monetary imbalances, including lower inflation and a
more stable exchange-rate regime."

Amid increasingly strained financial conditions, including very
limited access to financing, the administration decided to
prioritize operating and capital spending over timely debt payment
obligations.

S&P said, "Finally, we believe that amid eroding macroeconomic
conditions, the sovereign could delay fiscal support measures to
subnational governments, especially given Argentina's history of
major policy swings. We assess the institutional framework for
Argentina's LRGs as very volatile and underfunded, reflecting our
perception of the sovereign's very weak institutional
predictability and volatile intergovernmental system that has been
subject to various modifications to fiscal regulations and lack of
consistency over the years, which jeopardize the LRGs' financial
planning and consequently their credit quality."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  UPGRADED; CREDITWATCH/OUTLOOK ACTION; RATINGS AFFIRMED  
                                     TO              FROM
  BUENOS AIRES (PROVINCE OF)

  Issuer Credit Rating         CCC+/Stable/NR       SD/--/NR

  NEW RATING  

  BUENOS AIRES (PROVINCE OF)

  Senior Unsecured                   CCC+        NOT RATED
ACTION  
                                     TO              FROM
  BUENOS AIRES (PROVINCE OF)

  Senior Unsecured                   NR           CCC+(Prelim)
  Senior Unsecured                   NR               D

  RATINGS AFFIRMED  

  BUENOS AIRES (PROVINCE OF)

  Senior Unsecured                   D

  UPGRADED  
                                     TO              FROM
  BUENOS AIRES (PROVINCE OF)   
  
  Senior Unsecured                   CCC+             CC


MOLINO CANUELAS: Files for Bankruptcy After Years of Disputes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Gilbert at Buenos Aires Times reports that Molino
Canuelas, one of Argentina's leading food producers, has filed for
the local equivalent of Chapter 11 after years of disputes with
creditors.

Molca, as the company is known in Argentina, could not reach an
agreement with creditor financial institutions, so it was forced to
request the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, the firm reported in
a statement sent by email via an outsourced public relations firm,
according to Buenos Aires Times.

The company owes US$1.4 billion to domestic and foreign debtors,
including ING Groep NV and Rabobank UA, a spokeswoman confirmed,
the report notes.

Molca sought a consensual settlement out of court, and at one point
the president, Aldo Navilli, even put up a regional golf course as
collateral, the report relays.

The report discloses Molca, which employs 3,000 workers in 15
plants and is one of the main flour exporters in the region, is now
trying to use the procedure to protect its assets, and intends to
maintain normal operations while the process develops.

In the statement, the company attributes its situation to years of
economic problems in Argentina, including the devaluation of the
currency that also caused the collapse of the giant soy exporter
Vicentin SAIC, the report relays.

The company said the move would allow it to enter a "preventative
insolvency proceedings" as it seeks to "protect its assets and
jobs," the report notes.

Vicentin's own bankruptcy process continues after a default in
December 2019, with the family property poised to hand over a
majority stake to a consortium led by Glencore's Viterra Inc, if
creditors agree, the report adds.




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B A H A M A S
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BAHAMAS: Government Debt to Hit $11.5 Billion in 4 Years
--------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Bahamas government debt is expected to hit an
estimated $11.5 billion in the next four years.

This is according to the 2021 pre-election fiscal and economic
outlook data by the Ministry of Finance, according to RJR News.

Government debt for fiscal year 2021/22 is budgeted to be $10.9
billion, the report notes.




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B E R M U D A
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SEADRILL LTD: Seeks Court Approval to Hire KMPG
-----------------------------------------------
Seadrill Limited and its affiliates seek approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas to employ KPMG,
LLP to provide tax, consulting, accounting, financial reporting,
and valuation services.

The firm has agreed to provide these services:

     Tax and Consulting Services

     i. Assist in gathering necessary quarterly and year-end tax
and financial information and schedules;

    ii. Assist in the identification and computation of temporary
and permanent differences;

   iii. Compute a preliminary income tax provision for the
Debtors'
management review and approval;

    iv. Prepare income tax related balance sheets accounts and
footnote disclosures for the Debtors' management review and
approval;

     v. Assist the Debtors in their efforts to work with their
independent auditors to draft income tax provision work papers;

    vi. Services that may be considered out of scope, include:

        a. Recognizing net deferred tax assets;

        b. Tax law changes;

        c. Significant accounting standards; and

        d. Changes in business or structure that impact tax;

   vii. General tax consulting on matters that may arise for which
the Debtors seek KPMG's advice, both written and oral; and

  viii. Assist with calculating 2021 earnings and profits
calculation for the Debtors and prepare informational Form 8937,
Report of Organizational Actions Affecting Basis of Securities,
with respect to the Debtors' 2021 cash distributions.

     Accounting and Financial Reporting

     i. Assistance with accounting positions including, but not
limited to, the following:

        a. Basis of presentation under Accounting Standards
Committee (ASC) 852;

        b. Evaluating consolidation considerations with respect to
any non-debtor entities and
variable interest entities;

        c. Classification of which liabilities are included in
liabilities subject to compromise (LSTC);

        d. Classification of which expenses (income) are part of
reorganization items;

        e. Treatment of debt and debt attributes determined not
subject to compromise;

        f. Evaluation of stock compensation or deferred
compensation plans;

        g. Treatment of any defaults or modifications on leases,
long-term contracts, guarantees, surety performances, or other
contractual matters that changed as a result of Chapter 11
reorganization; and

        h. Evaluate accounting effects of the plan of
reorganization.

    ii. Other assistance:

        a. Assistance with planning of Securities and Exchange
Commission and Oslo Stock Exchange reporting requirements related
to registrations statements, including Regulation S-X and Article
11 presentation;

        b. Assisting with evaluating fresh-start accounting
positions;

        c. Perform preliminary assessment of fresh-start
applicability criteria -- well before emergence to gauge and plan
for impacts -- upon discussion with the Debtors, finalize
fresh-start applicability test post-emergence;

        d. Assisting the Debtors' management with the
determination
of reorganization gain on settlement of LSTC, inclusive of all
settlements of classes of creditors per the plan of
reorganization;

        e. Determination of fresh-start reporting date, which
tracks the conditions precedent to effectiveness, and the
evaluation and use of convenience date depending on the planned
date of emergence;
        
        f. Summary of fair value approach at account-by-account
level which presents the Debtors' fair value approach to arriving
at its fresh-start fair value balance sheet;

        g. Determination of intangible contacts that arise with
respect to applying fair value; including documentation of
controls
of completeness; and

        h. Accounting for issuance of new capital, related costs,
issuance discounts and timing of recognition of such events if
such
events do not occur concurrently with emergence.

   iii. Assistance with preparing schedules and reconciliations to
support the Debtors' accounting positions, balances and financial
statement disclosures, including:

        a. Four column fresh-start tool, which is used to present
the effects of the plan and fresh-start accounting;

        b. Reconciliations of investment banker enterprise value
estimates from the disclosure statement to emergence
reorganization
value, which is a ASC 852 concept;

        c. Reconciliations of emergence reorganization value to
emergence equity value;

        d. Reconciliations of final claims to expected
recoverability percentages as stated by the plan of
reorganization;

        e. Fair value account by account schedule that outlines
every balance sheet caption and presents the fair value approach
applied; and

        f. Reconciliation of professional fees to be accrued or
recognized at emergence and the distinction between balances paid
at emergence or transferred to escrow, if applicable.

    iv. Assistance with recording the effects of the plan and
fresh-start fair values into the Debtors' general ledger and
related financial reporting for U.S. GAAP and SEC purposes;

     Valuation Services

      i. Reorganization value. Read and identify potential issues
with reconciling the enterprise value approved by the court and
adjustments necessary to arrive at reorganization value, which is
a
concept under ASC 852. Additionally, determine the reconciliation
of enterprise value to the Debtors' reporting units as part of
post-emergence segment reporting (if applicable).

    ii. Identify assets and liabilities. Obtain and read the
Debtors' historical financial statements and detailed financial
records, conduct interviews with management, and conduct site
visits as necessary, to identify assets and liabilities,
regardless
of whether those assets and liabilities are currently recorded.
However, ultimately it is management's responsibility to ensure
all
assets and liabilities required in accordance with ASC 852 have
been identified.

   iii. Fair values. Discuss assets and liabilities with the
Debtors' management to determine which assets and liabilities will
be valued by KPMG and those that are not within scope. Work in
conjunction with the Debtors to prepare fair value estimates for
each identified asset and liability within scope as of the date of
the Debtors' emergence from bankruptcy;

    iv. Goodwill. Determine the difference, if any, between
reorganization value and the fair value of the subject assets and
liabilities identified and valued;

     v. Equity method investments or non-controlling interests.
Prepare fair value estimates for any equity method investments or
non-controlling interests and if required, allocate the fair
values
to identified tangible and intangible assets.

    vi. Remaining useful lives. Estimate remaining useful lives
and
provide amortization schedules for the tangible and identified
intangible assets.

KPMG and the Debtors agreed to a fixed fee of $400,000 for tax and
consulting services except those services that may be considered
out of scope.

Out-of-scope services will be based upon these hourly rates,
reflecting a reduction of approximately 20 percent to 50 percent
from KPMG's normal and customary rates:

     Partners                   $852 per hour
     Managing Directors         $792 per hour
     Directors/Senior Managers  $732 per hour
     Managers                   $684 per hour
     Senior Associates          $516 per hour
     Associates                 $312 per hour
     Paraprofessionals          $252 per hour

Accounting, financial reporting, and valuation services will be
based upon the firm's hourly rates, reflecting a reduction of
approximately 38 percent to 55 percent from the firm's normal and
customary rates:

     Partners/Principal          $700 per hour
     Managing Directors          $675 per hour
     Directors/Senior Managers   $610 per hour
     Managers                    $500 per hour
     Senior Associates           $390 per hour
     Associates                  $290 per hour

KPMG received a retainer in the amount of $125,000.

As disclosed in court filings, KPMG is a "disinterested person"
within the meaning of Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Joseph D. Yusz
     KPMG LLP
     811 Main Street, Suite 4500
     Houston, TX 77002,77002
     Tel: +1 713 319 2000
     Fax: +1 713 319 2041

                        About Seadrill Ltd.

Seadrill Limited (OSE:SDRL, OTCQX:SDRLF) --
http://www.seapdrill.com/-- is a deepwater drilling contractor
providing drilling services to the oil and gas industry. As of
March 31, 2018, it had a fleet of over 35 offshore drilling units
that include 12 semi-submersible rigs, 7 drillships, and 16 jack-up
rigs.

On Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill Limited sought Chapter 11 protection
after reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt. It emerged from bankruptcy
in July 2018.

Demand for exploration and drilling has fallen further during the
COVID-19 pandemic as oil firms seek to preserve cash, idling more
rigs and leading to additional overcapacity among companies serving
the industry.

In June 2020, Seadrill wrote down the value of its rigs by $1.2
billion and said it planned to scrap 10 rigs. Seadrill said it is
in talks with lenders on a restructuring of its $5.7 billion bank
debt.

Seadrill Partners LLC, a limited liability company formed by
deep-water drilling contractor Seadrill Ltd. to own, operate and
acquire offshore drilling rigs, along with its affiliates, sought
Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 20-35740) on
Dec. 1, 2020, after its parent company swept one of its bank
accounts to pay disputed management fees. Mohsin Y. Meghji,
authorized signatory, signed the petitions.

On Feb. 7, 2021, Seadrill GCC Operations Ltd., Asia Offshore
Drilling Limited, Asia Offshore Rig 1 Limited, Asia Offshore Rig 2
Limited, and Asia Offshore Rig 3 Limited sought Chapter 11
protection.  Seadrill GCC estimated $100 million to $500 million in
assets and liabilities as of the bankruptcy filing.

Additionally, on Feb. 10, 2021, Seadrill Limited and 114 affiliated
debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code with the Court. The lead case
is In re Seadrill Limited (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Case No. 21-30427).

Seadrill Limited disclosed $7.291 billion in assets against $7.193
billion in liabilities as of the bankruptcy filing.

In the new Chapter 11 cases, the Debtors tapped Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as counsel; Houlihan Lokey, Inc. as financial advisor; Alvarez
& Marsal North America, LLC as restructuring advisor; Jackson
Walker LLP as co-bankruptcy counsel; Slaughter and May 2021 as
co-corporate counsel; Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS as Norwegian
counsel; and Conyers Dill & Pearman as Bermuda counsel.  Prime
Clerk LLC is the claims agent.

On April 9, 2021, the board of directors of Debtor Seadrill North
Atlantic Holdings Limited unanimously adopted resolutions
appointing Steven G. Panagos and Jeffrey S. Stein as independent
directors to the board.  Seadrill North Atlantic Holdings Limited
tapped Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP as counsel and AMA Capital
Partners, LLC as financial advisor at the sole direction of
independent directors.




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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: 2nd Quarter GDP Drops 0.1% From 1st Quarter, IBGE Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
registered a 0.1% drop in the second quarter of 2021, compared to
the previous three months, in the seasonally adjusted series.

Compared to the same quarter in 2020, at the height of the
pandemic, the Brazilian economy grew 12.4%, according to Rio Times
Online.

In the first half of 2021, GDP has accumulated a 6.4% expansion,
the report notes. In the 12 months ending in June 2021, GDP grew
1.8%, the report adds.

The data are from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020).  S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020.  Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March
2018).


BRAZIL: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Issuer Rating, Stable Trend
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. confirmed the Federative Republic of Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency – Issuer Ratings at BB (low). At the
same time, DBRS Morningstar confirmed the Federative Republic of
Brazil's Short-term Foreign and Local Currency – Issuer Ratings
at R-4. The trend on all ratings is Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of the BB (low) ratings balances Brazil's fiscal
challenges and weak medium-term growth prospects with the country's
credible monetary policy regime, sound financial system, and strong
external position.

The Brazilian economy performed surprisingly well in the first half
of 2021 given the severity of the health situation. The recovery
has been supported by the economic reopening, expansionary
macroeconomic policies, and improving terms of trade. A
strengthening labor market and progress on vaccinations should
bolster confidence in the second half of the year. Over 60% of the
population has received at least one dose and 30% are fully
vaccinated. However, the pace of recovery is likely to be moderate
over the remainder of the year and into next year, as the reopening
effects fade and expansionary policies are withdrawn. According to
the central bank's August 30th FOCUS survey, the median forecast
for GDP growth is 5.2% in 2021 and 2.0% in 2022. In DBRS
Morningstar's view, risks to the near-term outlook are skewed
slightly to the downside, due to the global spread of the Delta
variant as well as the possibility of stronger inflation
pressures.

The task of putting public finances on a sustainable path remains
the central credit challenge for Brazil. Fiscal outcomes are set to
improve markedly this year, as most pandemic-related measures
expire and tax receipts increase on the back of a rebound in
activity and favorable commodity prices. However, compliance with
the constitutional spending cap, which requires tight fiscal
control and structural reforms, will be increasingly difficult for
the next administration, particularly amid public demands for
greater social spending.

The Stable trend reflects DBRS Morningstar's views the upside and
downside risks to the BB (low) ratings are broadly balanced. A
general election is scheduled for October 2022. The evolution of
the ratings could depend on the willingness and ability of the next
administration to pass reforms. Growth prospects could strengthen
if confidence builds on the back of a credible deficit-reduction
strategy and economic reform agenda. Under such conditions, the
outlook for debt sustainability could materially improve. On the
other hand, political support for the fiscal adjustment may weaken,
thereby leaving Brazilian public finances in an unsustainable
position and vulnerable to destabilizing shocks.

RATING DRIVERS

The ratings could be upgraded if the government advances a credible
fiscal consolidation plan, thereby sustaining lower real interest
rates and improving the outlook for public debt sustainability.
Economic reforms that strengthen the growth outlook would
facilitate this adjustment and be viewed as credit positive.

The ratings could be downgraded if the commitment to fiscal
consolidation weakens or there is a material deviation from the
expected consolidation path. Additional shocks – either domestic
or external – that exacerbate Brazil's growth challenges could
make the necessary fiscal adjustment even more difficult to
achieve.

RATING RATIONALE

The Most Important Policy Issue Facing Brazil's Sovereign Credit
Profile Is Consolidating Fiscal Accounts

Fiscal outcomes are expected to improve significantly in 2021, but
the task of putting public finances on a sustainable path will
likely require five more years of tight spending control. The
consolidated public sector primary deficit widened from 0.8% of GDP
in 2019 to 9.4% in 2020, as the government implemented emergency
measures to address the public health crisis and support the
economy. Pandemic-related spending measures totaled 7.0% of GDP
last year, with cash transfers to low-income families comprising
the largest single stimulus item. However, the fiscal outcome in
2021 is set to improve markedly. In the first six months of the
year, primary spending declined sharply as most emergency measures
were unwound, and as tax collection benefited from higher commodity
prices and a recovery in economic activity. The government
estimates a primary deficit of 1.8% of GDP for the year, which is
broadly in line with the market consensus.

Notwithstanding the positive results in the first half of the year,
compliance with the constitutional spending cap, which is Brazil's
key fiscal anchor, will be increasingly difficult over time. In the
near term, two factors will reduce the government's room to
maneuver in 2022: high inflation at the end of this year, which
will feed through to higher mandatory spending, and sizable
court-ordered payments arising from debts owed by the Treasury,
which recently came in well above expectations. DBRS Morningstar
expects that the government will be able to meet the cap in 2022,
but given the high share of expenditure that is mandatory and
either earmarked or indexed, compliance with the cap will become
more difficult in the coming years. The 2019 pension reform
alleviated some pressure on mandatory spending by stabilizing
pension outlays as a share of GDP. In this regard, the reform was a
major legislative accomplishment. However, lowering the
spending-to-GDP ratio will require additional reforms to make the
spending profile more flexible.

The pandemic-induced recession and fiscal response has pushed
public debt levels markedly higher. Gross non-financial public
sector debt (IMF definition) jumped from 88% of GDP in 2019 to 99%
in 2020. Assuming the government complies with the spending cap
through 2026, DBRS Morningstar estimates that the primary deficit
will shift to a balanced position in 2024 and then reach a surplus
of 1.0% of GDP in 2026. In such a scenario, the debt-to-GDP ratio
would decline to 96% in 2021 on the back of strong growth, but it
would then rise gradually through 2025 when it would peak at 100%.
Importantly, this scenario does not include potential extraordinary
receipts, such as BNDES repayments or privatization proceeds, nor
does it include the potential drawdown of the government's sizable
liquid assets, all of which could reduce the gross debt ratio.

Overall, DBRS Morningstar considers debt sustainability risks to be
high. If the next administration does not sustain fiscal
consolidation efforts, the debt ratio would continue on an upward
trajectory, thereby jeopardizing the sustainability of public
finances and, potentially, macroeconomic stability. Tighter
financing conditions or rising risk premiums could also exacerbate
debt dynamics. The vulnerability of public finances to shocks
highlights the importance of pursuing a credible consolidation
strategy that reinforces market confidence and sustains access to
affordable borrowing.

Growth Prospects Are Weak And The 2022 Election Clouds The Outlook
For Fiscal Consolidation And Reforms

While Brazil is recovering from the shock of the pandemic, the
country's medium-term growth prospects are weak. The IMF estimates
potential GDP growth at around 2 percent. The poor outlook partly
reflects a slowdown in the growth of Brazil's labor force as the
population ages. However, interlinking structural constraints of
low investment, high business costs and weak competitive forces
also play a role. Low investment is especially evident in Brazil's
underdeveloped infrastructure. In addition, high tariff barriers,
elevated compliance costs, and inward-looking industrial policy
impede Brazil from more fully benefiting from global trade and
investment. The country's weak medium-term growth outlook has led
us to make a negative adjustment in the "Economic Structure and
Performance" building block assessment.

Uncertainty around the 2022 general election clouds the outlook for
fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. In DBRS Morningstar's
view, the government's pro-market reform agenda – including
rationalizing tax policy, overhauling public administration, and
lowering the cost of doing business – is unlikely to make much
progress in the run-up to the October 2022 election. Moreover, it
is far from clear what the political landscape will look like after
the election and how conducive it will be to passing reforms,
particularly given Brazil's fragmented party system and increasing
social polarization. Recent polls show President Bolsonaro trailing
former president Lula Inacio da Silva by a sizable margin. However,
the election is more than a year away and the field of candidates
is still unsettled. High disapproval rates for both President
Bolsonaro and former President Lula da Silva could create space for
another candidate to mount a competitive run.

Brazil's Credit Strengths: Anchored Inflation Expectations,
Well-Capitalized Banks, And Solid External Accounts

The central bank is withdrawing monetary policy accommodation amid
a surge in inflation. Annual headline inflation reached 9.0% in
July, which is well above the upper limit of the central bank's
target range (5.25%) for the year. While the inflationary pressure
is broad-based, the most significant contributors have been rising
food and energy prices, which have rebounded with recovering global
demand. In addition, drought conditions domestically have adversely
affected hydroelectricity production, causing electricity prices to
rise sharply in recent months. The central bank has responded by
raising the policy rate by 325 basis points to 5.25% over the last
six months. In DBRS Morningstar's view, the central bank will
likely continue to raise rates over the next six months, ultimately
leaving monetary policy in a modestly restrictive stance in order
to ensure inflation converges toward its 3.5% target in 2022. This
may further constrain growth in the near term.

On an institutional level, the central bank has reinforced its
inflation-targeting credibility with the markets over the last five
years, as reflected in anchored medium-term inflation expectations.
The central bank's de facto independence was reinforced in February
2021 when the government passed a reform to provide the central
bank with greater institutional autonomy. The central bank's
enhanced inflation-targeting credibility, combined with the
tapering of directed lending, should strengthen the effectiveness
of monetary policy over time.

While the recession hit banks' profitability, strong capitalization
and ample liquidity – supported by the central bank's liquidity
operations – have helped Brazilian banks weather the Covid-19
shock without any major disruption. Strong loan growth, along with
higher issuance in the capital markets, supported firms and
households through the pandemic, although new loan growth has
moderated over the last 6 months as economic conditions have
normalized. Regarding asset quality, banks renegotiated loans for
clients that were adversely impacted by the virus but were in good
standing prior to the shock. The majority of modified loans have
resumed repayment as grace periods have expired. Banks appear
sufficiently capitalized to digest greater-than-expected credit
losses, if necessary, particularly the larger banks with
well-diversified loan portfolios. In addition, banks' direct
exposure to exchange rate risk is minimal, and secondary effects on
asset quality appear contained.

On the external front, Brazil weathered the shock relatively well,
due in part to its flexible exchange rate and sound external
position. Heightened global risk aversion following the Covid-19
outbreak led to a large and abrupt pullback of foreign capital to
emerging markets. Brazil's equity and debt markets experienced
massive outflows in March and April 2020. However, Brazil's
flexible exchange rate helped facilitate an orderly adjustment. The
current account deficit narrowed from 3.5% of GDP in 2019 to 1.7%
in 2020, as imports were compressed and exports held up relatively
well. Net FDI inflows fully financed the current account deficit in
2020, and portfolio flows recovered in the second half of the year.
Overall, DBRS Morningstar expects Brazil to run modest current
account deficits in the near term, which will be easily financed.
Public and private external debt is at a moderate level, thereby
reducing risks to balance sheets across the economy related to
currency fluctuations. In addition, sizable reserves (23% of GDP)
and a $60 billion dollar swap line with the U.S Federal Reserve
provide the central bank with substantial resources to mitigate the
impact of potential capital flow volatility on the real economy.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Human Capital & Human Rights (S), Bribery, Corruption & Political
Risks (G), and Institutional Strength, Governance, and Transparency
(G) were among key drivers behind this rating action. Similar to
other emerging market economies and many of its regional peers,
Brazil's per capita GDP is low at US$6.8k (US$14.9k on a PPP
basis). According to Worldwide Governance Indicators, Brazil ranks
in the 47th percentile for Rule of Law and 42rd percentile for
Control of Corruption. In addition, Brazil ranks in the 43rd
percentile for Government Effectiveness and 48th percentile for
Regulatory Quality. These considerations have been taken into
account within the following Building Blocks: Fiscal Management &
Policy, Economic Structure & Performance, and Political
Environment.

Notes: All figures are in euros (EUR) unless otherwise noted.





=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JP GROUP: Banana Supply Affected by Tropical Storm Grace
--------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Producers (JP) Group said there will
be a shortage of bananas from its St. Mary farm for the next
several months.

The company said 41 per cent of banana and plantain crops were
damaged following a direct hit from Tropical Storm Grace, according
to RJR News.

JP Group Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Hall says overall damage
included toppled and uprooted trees, lost fruit and downed sections
of the farm's overhead cable guying system, the report notes.

The company has mobilized $130 million to support rehabilitation
efforts, the report adds.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Cinema Sector Appeals to Gov't. for Reopening
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that the cinema sector has appealed to the
Government to be allowed to reopen, stating in a letter to the
Health Minister that no Covid-19 cases have been linked to local
theatres and it is prepared to follow rigid protocol.

The industry has also suffered severe economic stress that has
affected many single-income families, stakeholders stated in a
letter on August 26, 2021, to Health Minister Terrence Deyalsingh,
according to Trinidad Express.  The letter was copied to Prime
Minister Dr Keith Rowley and Chief Medical Officer Dr Roshan
Parasram, the report relays.

The letter was signed by Derek Chin, chairman of MovieTowne
Holdings Ltd; George Borges, director of operations at Caribbean
and Latam Caribbean Cinemas Ltd; Ingrid Jahra, chief executive
officer of CinemaONE Ltd; and Debora Cumberbatch, CEO and managing
director, Estate 101 Ltd, the report discloses.

The letter noted that it originated from "the cinema sector",
comprising licensees under the Cinematograph Act of 1934, the
report relates.

Trinidad and Tobago entered a further three months of a state of
emergency, which entails a 9 p.m.-to-5 a.m. curfew, the
reportnotes.  The last six weeks saw the phased reopening of parts
of the economy, most recently curbside food sale, the retail sector
and personal care services, the report discloses.

The cinema sector stated in its letter that it has "been severely
affected by the lockdown requirements caused by the Covid-19
pandemic," the report says.

"Our businesses have been closed for 112 days in 2021, after being
closed for 194 days in 2020, which has placed tremendous stress on
both us and our staff, many of whom are the sole breadwinners of
their families," the letter stated, the report notes.

It added that the sector has, however, "used these adversities to
retool and reorganise our businesses to prepare for the
post-Covid-19 world," the report discloses.

                        Vulnerable Employees

The letter went on to outline the industry's Covid-19 operations
protocol, and cited the University of Berlin's 2021 study on the
Covid-19 contagion via aerosol particles in comparative indoor
spaces, the report relates.

A copy of the Berlin study was included in the submission to the
Government.

The letter also said it should be noted that "to date, there has
been no record of any Covid-19 infection in a movie theatre
anywhere in the world since the Covid-19 pandemic commenced," the
report notes.

The letter said the industry directly and indirectly employs around
3,500 people, "many of whom are vulnerable, single-income and sole
breadwinners for their families," the report discloses.

It further pointed out that since the onset of the pandemic almost
17 months ago, the cinema sector has been amongst the first to
close and the last to re-open, the report relates.

Citing its relationship with the retail sector, the industry said
it has been confronted with challenges to pay even reduced
rents/leases, bank loans and long outstanding supplier payables,
all of which can result in additional shutdowns or bankruptcy, the
report says.

                       Standard Exceeded

The letter to the Health Minister stated that "during the first
lockdown in 2020, we implemented our sanitisation procedures for
staff, patrons and equipment that were in line or exceeded the
standard set for cinemas in other parts of the world," the report
notes.

It noted the "institution of social distancing regulations in the
lobbies, concessions and inside of the movie theatres that required
that a six-foot distance be maintained between persons or groups
sitting in the theatre along with permitted seating in alternative
rows," the report relates.

There was increased mandatory sanitisation of all of the
high-contact areas in the movie theatre, including the doors,
counters, bathrooms, seats and concession areas during operational
hours, the letter said, the report discloses.

Staff also wore mandatory personal protection equipment such as
masks, gloves and face shields, and patrons had to wear masks in
the lobby and concession area, the report says.

Movie start and end times were managed to avoid congregation, the
letter said, theatres were sanitised between shows and seating
capacity was limited to 50 per cent, the report relays.

These protocols were "fully implemented in cinemas across Trinidad
and Tobago and up until the second lockdown in May 2021", the
sector said, adding, "We have not had a single case of Covid-19
among our staff, nor has there been any outbreak of the virus at a
movie theatre nationwide," the report discloses.

Noting that its staff interact daily with the public, the
stakeholders said up to 75 per cent of employees have been
vaccinated, and while that rate may increase once a reopening is
announced, the sector could operate with a "reduced staff
complement," the report relays.

Expressing confidence in its staff and protocols, the stakeholders
said "we again humbly request your consideration for the full
re-opening of the cinema sector in Trinidad and Tobago," the report
adds.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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