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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, September 2, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 170

                           Headlines



B A R B A D O S

BARBADOS: Economy Remains Severely Depressed by Pandemic, IMF Says


B E R M U D A

ALTERA INFRASTRUCTURE: Moody's Affirms Caa1 CFR, Outlook Negative


B R A Z I L

BANCO DE BRASILIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs
BANCO DO ESTADO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
BANESTES SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: Consumer Confidence Falls in Aug for First Time in 5 Mos.
CIELO SA: Denies Reports it May Go Private

CIELO SA: Sells Subsidiary to Bemobi for $24MM


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

AUB SUKUK: Fitch Rates Upcoming Sr. Unsec. Sukuk BB+(EXP)


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gov't. Supports Export of Solid Waste


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Foreign Currency IDR, Outlook Stable


J A M A I C A

JP GROUP: Banana Supply Affected by Tropical Storm Grace


P E R U

ORAZUL ENERGY: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative, Affirms 'BB' Ratings
PESQUERA EXALMAR: Moody's Affirms 'B3' CFR, Outlook Remains Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

AMADO AMADO: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
PATTERN ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' ICR, Outlook Stable

                           - - - - -


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B A R B A D O S
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BARBADOS: Economy Remains Severely Depressed by Pandemic, IMF Says
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At the request of the Government of Barbados, an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Bert van Selm conducted a staff
visit via videoconferencing between August 24-27, 2021 to discuss
the implementation of Barbados' Economic Recovery and
Transformation (BERT) plan, supported by the IMF under the Extended
Fund Facility (EFF). To summarize the mission's findings, Mr. van
Selm made the following statement:

"Barbados' economy remains severely depressed by the ongoing global
coronavirus pandemic. Tourism activity has picked up in recent
months but remains at a fraction of normal levels. The economy is
estimated to have grown 5½ percent in the second quarter of 2021
(relative to Q2 2020). A category 1 hurricane (Elsa) struck
Barbados in July and caused significant damage to the island's
housing. Economic growth for the second half of 2021 and the first
half of 2022 is premised on a gradual recovery of tourism.

"In this very challenging environment, Barbados continues to make
good progress in implementing its ambitious and comprehensive
economic reform program, while expanding critical investments in
social protection. Indicative targets for end-June under the EFF
were met. The global SDR allocation that became effective on August
23, 2021 (including an allocation of about US$129 million to
Barbados) has further boosted international reserves, to more than
US$1.4 billion.

"Structural reforms are ongoing, and structural benchmarks under
the EFF were met. The government developed plans to recapitalize
the Central Bank of Barbados and address medium and long-term
challenges for the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) stemming from
the debt restructuring and the COVID pandemic, and recapitalization
of the NIS has started. A medium-term fiscal framework was tabled
in parliament to enhance transparency and accountability in fiscal
policy, while retaining sufficient flexibility to respond to the
pandemic and other economic shocks.

"The team is looking forward to conducting discussions for the
sixth review under the EFF in November and would like to thank the
authorities and the technical team for their openness and candid
discussions."




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B E R M U D A
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ALTERA INFRASTRUCTURE: Moody's Affirms Caa1 CFR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Caa1-PD rating and
appended a limited default designation to the probability of
default rating of Altera Infrastructure L.P.'s, changing it to
Caa1-PD/LD from Caa1-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Altera
Infrastructure's Caa1 Corporate Family Rating and the Caa3 senior
unsecured rating of the $700 million notes maturing in 2023. The
outlook remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has appended Altera Infrastructure's PDR with the "/LD"
indicator changing it to Caa1-PD/LD from Caa1-PD after the issuer
concluded the exchange of its existing senior unsecured $700
million notes ($687 million outstanding prior to the exchange)
maturing in 2023. The completed transaction entails the exchange of
the existing senior unsecured notes with new senior secured notes
with maturity in 2026. The company's majority owner, Brookfield
Business Partners L.P. (Brookfield), who holds $411 million of the
notes, agreed to the exchange prior to the exchange offer to third
party noteholders. However, the exchange of the remaining $276
million of the notes did not get executed as the 80% consent
threshold was not achieved. Brookfield as the only holder of the
new 2026 notes has opted for an annual 11.5% non-cash PIK coupon
instead of an annual 8.5% cash coupon. Moody's has appended a
limited default designation because it regards the transaction as a
means for the company to address the refinancing of the upcoming
maturities and to avoid a disorderly default on its current debt
structure.

The notes exchange improves the company's debt maturity and
materially reduces the annual cash interest payment by around $35
million as the company owner, Brookfield, has agreed to exchange
its $411 million holding in the $700 million notes to the non-cash
PIK option in the newly issued 2026 notes. As Brookfield has also
agreed to exchange additional debt provided to the company at a
total amount of around $288 million into the new 2026 notes with
non-cash PIK interest, Altera Infrastructure's annual cash interest
to Brookfield will lower by around $50 million in total. In
addition, the company also announced that it suspends its
preference share dividends which results in annual cash savings of
around $30 million.

However, the affirmation of the Caa1 CFR also reflects that the
company continues to be highly leveraged and Moody's expectation
for further falling EBITDA generation over the next couple of years
following weak performance in 2020 and H1 2021. Altera
Infrastructure's reported adjusted EBITDA fell to $230 million in
H1 2021 from $317 million in H1 2020. However, due to higher
equity-accounted income from Altera's JV's and realised gains on
derivatives, the company's Moody's adjusted EBITDA rose slightly to
$530 million as of LTM June 2021 compared with $478 million in 2020
and Altera Infrastructure's Moody's adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio
improved slightly to 6.8x as of the last twelve months (LTM) to
June 2021 compared with 7.4x in December 2020. This is still
significantly above the 5.5x in 2020.

For 2021-22 Moody's expects a further decline of revenues and
EBITDA generation mainly driven by lower FPSO earnings. Moody's
assumes that the Knarr FPSO will remain in operation at a lower
contracted fixed rate but with a variable element related to oil
prices between March 2021 and July 2022 but that it will cease to
operate thereafter, while other FPSOs are also being put on lay-up.
The rating agency expects Altera's Moody's adjusted EBITDA to fall
to around $450 million in 2021 and to below $400 million in 2022
compared with $478 million in 2020. Owing to much reduced capital
expenditures of around $200 million in 2021 and around $100 million
in 2022 compared with around $500 million in 2020 and driven by the
significantly lower cash interest payments, Moody's forecasts
positive Free Cash Flow generation of around $40 million in 2021
and around $130 million in 2022. Nevertheless, the company's net
debt level falls only slightly due to high accumulated PIK interest
which combined to the rating agency's projected EBITDA decline
leads to a further rising Moody's adjusted debt to EBITDA metric of
around 8x in 2021 and more than 10x in 2022.

Despite the improvement of the debt maturity profile as a result of
the exchange transaction, Altera Infrastructure's credit profile
also remains constrained by significant debt maturities that will
need to be funded either with the refinancing of loans for vessel
or the sale of vessels at the end of their life cycle.

Altera Infrastructure's credit profile is supported by relatively
stable and contracted nature of its cash flow; high
barriers-to-entry for competing FPSOs in long-lived fields; and its
strong shuttle tanker market position in the North Sea. Moody's
also notes positively the material financial investments by the
owner Brookfield Business Partners L.P. which made substantial
equity investments in recent years and has now agreed to exchange
around $699 million of debt lent to the company into the new 2026
notes with a non-cash PIK coupon.

LIQUIDITY

Altera Infrastructure's liquidity is weak. At the end of June 2021,
the company had $241 million of cash and a $225 million committed
revolving credit facility provided by the company's owner
Brookfield Business Partners L.P., which was fully drawn.

At the end of June 2021 and pro forma the completion of the notes
exchange, the company still had material debt maturities of $199
million in 2021, $664 million in 2022 (including the unsecured $250
million bond issued by Altera Shuttle Tanker LLC due in August
2022) and $801 million in 2023. As Moody's expects only modest
positive free cash flow generation in 2021-22, Altera
Infrastructure will need to continue to have access to the capital
markets and its relationship banks in order to fund the liquidity
shortfall. The company has a track record of selling end of life
cycle vessels and refinancing loans secured with vessels but the
refinancing of the unsecured $250 million bond maturing in August
2022 is less certain.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Caa3 rating assigned to the $700 million senior unsecured notes
maturing in 2023 ($276 million remain outstanding post the
conclusion of the note exchange), two notches below the Caa1
Corporate Family Rating, reflects material structural subordination
to prior ranking secured debt which amounts to more than $2.0
billion as well as the newly issued 2026 notes. Despite the
increased subordination of the notes owing to the issuance of the
new 2026 notes, which are legally senior to the 2023 notes as they
are secured, Moody's has affirmed the Caa3 rating of the senior
unsecured notes as the rating already reflects severe
subordination.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's forecast of further falling
EBITDA and rising leverage in 2021-22. While the recent note
exchange improves the company's liquidity profile, it does not
address the issue of rising debt levels driven by accumulating PIK
interest. A stabilisation of the outlook requires an operational
turnaround which could make the company's capital structure more
sustainable.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The ratings could be upgraded if the company's liquidity resources
are sufficient to cover all liquidity needs for at least 12 months
without the need to rely on new financing and if Moody's adjusted
debt to EBITDA falls to 6.5x or less.

The ratings could be downgraded if the company's liquidity weakens
or if Moody's adjusted debt to EBITDA increases to 8x or more on a
sustained basis.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Midstream
Energy published in December 2018.

Altera Infrastructure L.P. is a Marshall Islands limited
partnership with headquarters in Scotland and executive offices in
Stavanger, Norway. Altera Infrastructure is an international
provider of marine transportation, oil production, storage,
long-distance towing and offshore installation and maintenance and
safety services to the offshore oil industry.



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B R A Z I L
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BANCO DE BRASILIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Brasilia S.A.'s (BRB) Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
and its Long-Term National rating at 'A+(bra)'. Fitch has revised
the Rating Outlook on the National Rating to Stable from Negative.
Fitch has also affirmed BRB's Short-Term IDR and National Rating at
'B' and 'F1(bra)', respectively.

The LT National Rating Outlook revision reflects that BRB's
performance through the last few quarters has been better than
expected, reducing the likelihood of the downside scenario
contemplated when Fitch assigned the Negative Outlook in April
2020. The bank has maintained adequate asset quality and sound
profitability ratios, which gives Fitch greater confidence that its
financial profile will remain consistent with its current national
rating over the next two years. The Negative Outlook on the IDRs
mirrors the sovereign's Outlook, as BRB's IDRs are at the same
level of Brazil's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BRB's Long-Term Local Currency and Foreign Currency IDRs are driven
by its 'bb-' Viability Rating (VR). The bank's VR is highly
influenced by its resilient company profile and also captures the
limitations imposed by the Brazilian operating environment. BRB
continues to maintain its strong franchise in the Federal District
with a stable and diversified retail funding base and a good
financial profile.

The bank is also investing in its digital platform, with the
objective of expanding its operations to other Brazilian states,
which would strengthen and diversify its revenues sources. During
the first half of 2021 the bank posted 1 million of new digital
accounts, increasing its customer base by 175.2% in one year. In
Fitch's view, although the digital strategy may initially pressure
the institution's results due to the increase in expenses, in the
long term it should expand the bank's franchise, bringing scale
gains and cross-selling opportunities.

BRB's asset quality ratios are good, reflecting its focus on
secured lending. At June 2021, payroll deductible loans and
mortgages made up 48.6% and 18.5% of gross loans, respectively.
Both portfolios present low credit risk due to the robustness of
the type of guarantee. During the same period, nonperforming loans
(NPLs) stood at a comfortable 1.5% of gross loans, down from 1.6% a
year earlier. Loans classified in the 'D-H' range also fell to 3.9%
at June 2021 from 5.0% at June 2020.

Fitch's base case assessment assumes that asset quality will remain
under pressure until at least 2022, but it should remain manageable
aided by the bank's proactive risk management and improved economic
prospects from 2H21 onwards. The small amount of renegotiated loans
related to the pandemic at this stage (around 9.8% of total loans)
signals that borrowers' repayment capacity remains adequate so
far.

The bank maintained solid profitability, with operating profit at a
high 5.0% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) at June 2021 (from a 5.4%
a year earlier), favored by the increase of net interest income and
fees. In Fitch's view even with the increase of expenses related to
development of the digital platform, BRB's profitability will
remain above peers and in line with its current rating category.

BRB's capitalization is adequate, and its common equity Tier 1
(CET1) stood at 12.7% at the end of 2Q21, slightly below its peers'
average of 14.3%. This reduction is result of the strong growth of
29.1% of RWA YoY, due mainly to the high appetite on the market for
payroll loans and mortgages. The bank is planning to carry out a
follow-on in the upcoming months, which in Fitch's opinion will
support its growth strategy.

The bank's funding and liquidity kept good and stable until 1H21.
BRB funds its loan book through a combination of low cost retail
deposits, deposits from related parties (mainly the Governo do
Distrito Federal [GDF]) and judicial deposits. At June 2021, the
Loans/Customers Deposits ratio reached 104.8%.

Support Rating

Fitch has affirmed BRB's Support Rating (SR) at '4'. The bank's SR
reflects the limited probability of support from its majority
shareholder, GDF. Fitch believes GDF has relatively limited
capacity to support BRB should the need arise despite being very
willing to do so. BRB is strategically important for GDF, as it is
the local government's main financial agent and it has a meaningful
market share in the state's loans and time deposits. In addition to
its commercial operations, BRB performs a policy role for the
region through lending operations that promote development and
economic growth.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR and IDRs

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating, due to the
    constraint of the sovereign ratings on the bank's long-term
    IDRs and VR.

-- A sustained decline in the operating profit/RWA ratio below
    2.5%.

-- A sustained deterioration in the bank's CET1 ratio below 11%.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A sustained recovery in the macroeconomic environment,
    including a reduction of vulnerabilities in the Brazilian
    economy that could underpin an IDR's Outlook revision to
    Stable.

-- Although unlikely, an upgrade of the sovereign.

-- BRB's foreign currency IDRs have a Negative Outlook, which
    makes an upgrade in the near future highly unlikely.

National Ratings

-- Changes in BRB's credit profile relative to its Brazilian
    peers could result in changes to its national ratings.

Support Rating

-- Material changes in Fitch's assessment of GDF's ability and
    willingness to provide support to BRB could affect the SR of
    the bank.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

BRB's support rating is driven by Fitch's internal opinion of GDF's
creditworthiness.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

BRB - Banco de Brasilia SA has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Governance Structure due to its ownership by the state, which
increases potential political interference risks. This has a
negative impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

BANCO DO ESTADO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul
S.A.'s (Banrisul) Long-Term, Foreign Currency and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook on the
IDRs is Negative. In addition, Fitch has affirmed the bank's
National Long-Term Rating (NLTR) at 'A+(bra)'. The Outlook on the
NLTR has been revised to Stable from Negative.

Banrisul's NLTR Outlook revision reflects Fitch's view that the
bank will maintain profitability and asset quality ratios
supportive of the bank's current NLTR over the next two years.
Better than anticipated 2020 and 1H21 financial results contribute
to this view.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VIABILITY RATING (VR), IDRS AND NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

The operating environment and company profile highly influence
Banrisul's ratings. Banrisul's ratings reflects the resilience and
stability of the bank's business model and franchise in recent
years. The ratings also reflect the Rio Grande do Sul's operating
environment given the bank's high regional importance and
concentration in the state. The Negative Outlook on the IDRs
mirrors the Outlook on Brazil's Long-Term IDR.

Banrisul operates as a commercial bank, serving both companies and
individuals. The bank has a strong presence in Rio Grande do Sul,
with a 18% market share in credit and 40% in term deposits as of
June 2021. Banrisul has a stable business model and offers a wide
range of financial products and services. The ratings also reflect
the adequate management quality and stable strategies. Like other
public entities, Banrisul is potentially subject to political
influence, given its control structure, despite its solid corporate
governance structure.

Banrisul has a moderate risk appetite, with underwriting standards
in line with major banks. Loans to individuals corresponded to the
main part of the total portfolio in 2021, with a predominance of
payroll loans. The top 11 borrowers accounted for only 2.8% of
total loans; historically this ratio is low. The bank has a
regional concentration, with more the 95% of its credit originated
in southern region, mainly in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Given
the most challenging scenario in 2020 and 1H21, the bank kept the
size of its loan portfolio relatively stable. It´s expected that
the bank will accelerate credit growth in the second half of 2021,
especially in the rural and real estate segments.

Fitch considers asset quality to be adequate. The 90-day
nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio corresponded to 2.2% of total loans
in 1H21 (versus 2.3% in 2020 and 3.4% in 2019). Impaired loans (in
the "D-H" risk range) ratios totaled 10.0% in 1H21 compared to
10.2% in 2020 and 11.3% in 2019. Banrisul´s profitability ratios
remain good, with operating profit to risk-weighted assets (RWAs)
of 3.1% in 1H21, 2.3% in 2020, from an average of 3.4% between 2017
and 2020.

Banrisul's capitalization was satisfactory; common equity Tier 1
(CET1) capital ratio was 14.8% June 2021. During the 1H21, Banrisul
also reinforce its regulatory capital with the issuance of a
subordinated debt, reflecting in the expected increase of total
regulatory capital ratio to 18.1% from 14.8% after the Central
Bank´s approval. One of Banrisul's strengths is it stable and
diversified funding base, with clients related to savings accounts
and time deposits. In Fitch's opinion, Banrisul's liquidity is
adequate, while its policy of minimum cash is conservative. The
bank's loans-to-deposits ratio was an adequate 60.0% in 1H21
(versus 61,7% in 2020 and 68,3% in 2019).

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating (SR) of '4' and the Support Rating Floor (SRF)
of 'B' reflect a limited likelihood of support from the federal
government during a crisis scenario due to the bank's relative
moderate systemic importance. In June 2021, Banrisul was the 12th
largest financial institution in the country in terms of assets and
10th in deposit volume. However, there are no explicit guarantees
of support from the federal government.

Subordinated Debt

Banrisul's subordinated notes maturing in February 2022 are rated
two notches below its VR of 'bb-' reflecting one notch for the
characteristics of loss severity and subordination and one notch
for the moderate non-performance risk.

Banrisul´s subordinated notes eligible as Tier 2 capital due in
2031 are rated two notches below its VR of 'bb-'. The notching is
driven by the notes' high expected loss severity. No notching for
non-performance is applied because coupons are not deferrable and
the write-off trigger is close to the point of non-viability. As a
result, Fitch believes that the incremental non-performance risk is
not material from a rating perspective.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

IDRs and VR

-- While not likely given the current operating environment, a
    sustained recovery in the macroeconomic environment, including
    a reduction of vulnerabilities in the Brazilian economy, that
    underpins an Outlook revision to Stable;

-- While highly unlikely given the current operating environment,
    an upgrade of the Sovereign Rating on Brazil.

SR and SRF

-- The SR is potentially sensitive to any change in Fitch's view
    of the sovereign's propensity or ability to provide support to
    the bank should the need arise.

National Rating

-- Banrisul's national ratings may be affected by a change in
    Fitch's perception of the bank's local affiliates with respect
    to other entities.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

IDRs and VR

-- The operating profits/RWAs ratio average falls below 2.5% and
    NPLs>90 ratio average increase above 5.0%;

-- A sustained deterioration in the bank's CET1 ratio below 11%;

-- Any negative change in Fitch's opinion on the State of Rio
    Grande do Sul's operating and economic situation, given the
    bank's strong presence and concentration in this state;

-- In addition, a downgrade of the Sovereign Rating on Brazil or
    a revision of the Sovereign Outlook to Negative would result
    in a similar action on the bank's Long-Term IDRs.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul S.A. has an ESG Relevance
Score of '4' for Governance Structure due to its state-owned nature
that increases potential political interference risks, which has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
rating[s] in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

BANESTES SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDRs, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banestes SA - Banco do Estado do
Espirito Santo (Banestes) Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-' with a Negative Outlook.
Fitch has also affirmed the bank's National Long-Term Rating at 'A+
(bra)' and revised the Outlook to Stable from Negative.

The Outlook revision to Stable for the national rating reflects
Fitch's expectation that the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on
Baneste's business model and financial profile were lower than
expected, particularly on credit quality and profitability metrics.
This action also considers its maintenance of good capital
indicators, which, for Fitch, represents sufficient capacity to
absorb the potential shocks of a more adverse economic scenario and
maintain the bank's activities. Fitch believes that the financial
profile of the bank will remain consistent with this rating level.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VRs AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Banestes' IDRs are driven from its Viability Rating (VR), i.e. by
the bank's intrinsic creditworthiness. The affirmation of the VR,
IDRs and National Ratings mainly reflects the continuity of the
institution's stable business model, which has a robust regional
franchise but limited market share in the national financial
system. The bank's VR is also highly influenced by Brazil's
challenging operating environment.

The ratings are also moderately influenced by Banestes's risk
appetite, the quality of the management and its financial profile.
As a state-owned bank, a relevant part of its strategy is focused
on providing services and granting credit to state and municipal
public employees, as well as companies interested in investing in
the state. However, the ratings may be impacted by changes in the
State of Espirito Santo's

financial flexibility and/or credit profile, due to the
concentration of the bank's activity in the state and the
correlation between portfolio performance and the local operating
environment. Like other public entities, the bank is subject to
political influence, due to its shareholding control, despite solid
corporate governance structure.

Banestes's underwriting standards are aligned with the practices of
major national banks. Credit risk is the most capital consuming,
representing 83,5% of total risk-weighted assets in June 2021. The
portfolio is consisted of retail loans (63.5%) and non-retail
(36.5%) and presents a pulverized profile, with the top 20 largest
borrowers represented less than 4% of total in the period.

The bank's assets quality is adequate, Banestes's overdue loans
ratio has remained controlled and adequate at 2.8% in June 2021
(1.9% in 2020 and 2.7 in 2019). Loans in the 'D-H' risk range,
according to Central Bank Resolution 2,682 (Bacen), totaled 6.7% of
the portfolio in the period, compared to 7.4% in 2020 and 11% in
December 2019. The positive numbers reflect also the increase of
the portfolio and the Covid renegotiations. Provisions for loan
losses covered 66.5% of doubtful loans (D-H) in the period
(compared to 69.1% in 2020 and 62.9 in 2019). Fitch believes that
the bank will be able to manage the quality of the portfolio,
maintaining the pre-pandemic figures.

In recent years, Banestes has shown adequate and relatively stable
profitability. The operating profit over the average of
risk-weighted assets was of 3.3% in June 2021, compared to 3.4% in
2020 and 2,3% in 2019. Fitch believes that although there may be an
increase in provision expenses for the coming periods, the bank's
profitability should remain adequate, positively impacted by the
increase in economic activity with the advance of vaccination,
which should also improve service revenues from the bank.

The bank presents a good and stable capitalization level. In June
2021, the Tier I Capital ratio was 15,5%, (15.4% at 2020 and 14% at
2019). The portfolio leverage was conservative, 3.2x the Common
Equity in June 2021 (2.9 times in 2020 and 2019). Fitch believes
the bank's capitalization position remains adequate and sufficient
to maintain its strategy in the next periods.

The bank's funding structure is stable and diversified. The bank's
main sources of financing come from cash deposits, savings and time
deposits. The ratio of loans to customer deposits was 34.6% in the
first semester of 2021, from 32.6% in December 2020. The most
liquid assets corresponded to around 50% of total deposits and
financial bills and were mainly composed of federal government
securities. Fitch considers the bank's liquidity adequate and its
minimum cash policy conservative. In addition, regulators have
taken steps to limit the negative impact on market liquidity in
general. However, Fitch will continue to monitor the bank's
liquidity trends due to the negative evolution of the operating
environment.

SUPPORT RATING

Banestes' Support Rating (RS) '4' reflects the limited likelihood
of support from its controlling shareholder, the State of Espirito
Santo. Fitch believes that the state would have a high propensity
but limited capacity to support the bank, if necessary. Banestes is
strategically important for Espirito Santo, as it acts as its main
tax collection agent, making transfers to municipalities and being
responsible for cash management. In addition, public entities, to
which the bank provides services and grants credit to suppliers, as
well as payroll deductible credits to public employees, make up an
important portion of Banestes' business.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- There is limited possibility of positive actions in the medium
    term, given the current operating environment, but a sustained
    recovery of the macroeconomic environment, including the
    reduction of vulnerabilities in the Brazilian economy, could
    support a revision of the Outlook to Stable.

-- Fitch's internal analysis of the State of Espirito Santo may
    affect Banestes' ratings, which would therefore be impacted by
    any change in the state's financial profile.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The ratings may be downgraded if the bank presents a material
    deterioration in its asset quality, which compromises its
    profitability indicators, with an operating result / asset
    weighted by risk below 2%. In addition, a deterioration in its
    capital position with a Tier 1 Capital ratio of less than 11%
    and significant outflows in its funding base, compromising its
    liquidity can lead to negative actions.

-- In addition, negative actions in the sovereign's IDRs may
    result in similar actions for the bank's IDRs.

SUPPORT RATING

Banestes' SR can be revised if there is any change in its strategic
importance or changes in the capacity or propensity of the State of
Espirito Santo to provide support to the bank.

NATIONAL RATINGS

Banestes' National Ratings may be raised by a change in Fitch's
perception of the bank's local relativity towards other entities.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

Banestes's support rating is driven by Fitch's internal opinion of
Espirito Santo State creditworthiness.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banestes S.A. - Banco do Estado do Espirito Santo has an ESG
Relevance Score of '4' for Governance Structure due to its
state-owned nature that increases potential political interference
risks, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

BRAZIL: Consumer Confidence Falls in Aug for First Time in 5 Mos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that consumer confidence in Brazil shrank
in August for the first time since March this year, as
unemployment, inflation, and fears about the spread of the Delta
variant of the coronavirus raised doubts among various income
groups, data from the Getulio Vargas Foundation show.

The FGV's Consumer Confidence Index (ICC) dropped 0.4 points in
August to 81.8 points, a level considered low in historical terms,
according to Rio Times Online.  This was the first drop since March
when the indicator read 68.2, the report adds.

In August, the Current Situation Index (ISA) dropped 1.1 points to
69.8 points, Rio Times relates.

                            About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020).  S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020.  Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March
2018).

CIELO SA: Denies Reports it May Go Private
------------------------------------------
Paula Laier at Reuters reports that Brazilian payments processor
Cielo S.A. has denied a report in newspaper Valor Economico that
said the company's board was considering taking the firm private.

The company said it had consulted its controlling shareholders,
Banco do Brasil SA and Banco Bradesco SA, and both companies had
also denied the report, which cited anonymous sources, according to
Reuters.

"Cielo affirms that the news mentioned above is UNTRUE and that the
topic mentioned in said article, going private, was not discussed
by the board of directors," the company wrote in a securities
filing, the report notes.

Earlier in the evening, Valor had reported on the potential move to
go private, the report relays.  The newspaper said that the board
was divided on the idea, but that it had gained popularity within
the body in recent days, the report adds.

Headquartered in the city of Barueri, Brazil, Cielo S.A. (Cielo)
is the leading corporation in the merchant acquiring and payment
processing industry in Brazil, with presence in almost all
Brazilian municipalities. With shares listed on B3 S.A. - Brasil,
Bolsa, Balcao (B3, Ba1 stable), formerly BM&F Bovespa, Cielo is
controlled by BB and Bradesco, which together hold 58.7% of the
company's voting stocks and are the second and fourth-largest
commercial banks in Brazil, respectively, in terms of total
assets.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Aug. 30, 2021, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Cielo S.A.'s
corporate family rating to Ba2 from Ba1. At the same time Cielo's
senior unsecured notes and the backed senior unsecured notes issued
by Cielo USA Inc. were also downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1. The outlook
is stable.

CIELO SA: Sells Subsidiary to Bemobi for $24MM
----------------------------------------------
David Goodman at Reuters reports that Brazilian payments company
Cielo SA has reached a deal to sell its Multidisplay subsidiary to
Bemobi Mobile Tech SA BMOB3.SA for 125 million reais ($23.81
million), according to a securities filing.

Cielo's filing added that it could receive a further 60 million
reais, depending on certain conditions being met, according to
Reuters.

Headquartered in the city of Barueri, Brazil, Cielo S.A. (Cielo)
is the leading corporation in the merchant acquiring and payment
processing industry in Brazil, with presence in almost all
Brazilian municipalities. With shares listed on B3 S.A. - Brasil,
Bolsa, Balcao (B3, Ba1 stable), formerly BM&F Bovespa, Cielo is
controlled by BB and Bradesco, which together hold 58.7% of the
company's voting stocks and are the second and fourth-largest
commercial banks in Brazil, respectively, in terms of total
assets.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Aug. 30, 2021, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Cielo S.A.'s
corporate family rating to Ba2 from Ba1. At the same time Cielo's
senior unsecured notes and the backed senior unsecured notes issued
by Cielo USA Inc. were also downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1. The outlook
is stable.




===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

AUB SUKUK: Fitch Rates Upcoming Sr. Unsec. Sukuk BB+(EXP)
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Ahli United Bank B.S.C.'s (AUB;
BB+/bb/Stable) upcoming USD500 million-USD750 million senior
unsecured sukuk an expected rating of 'BB+(EXP)'. The sukuk is to
be issued through the trustee AUB Sukuk Limited (AUBSL).

AUBSL is a special purpose vehicle incorporated in the Cayman
Islands and was established solely to issue certificates (sukuk)
and enter into the transactions contemplated by the transaction
documents.

The assignment of the final rating is contingent on the successful
issue of the sukuk and final documents materially conforming to
information already reviewed.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The certificates' expected rating is in line with AUB's 'BB+'
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR), which reflects Fitch's view
that default of these senior unsecured obligations would equal a
default of AUB in accordance with Fitch's rating definitions.

AUB's Long-Term IDR reflects a moderate probability of support from
the Kuwaiti authorities, if needed despite the bank being licensed
and headquartered in Bahrain. The IDR, which takes into account
transfer and convertibility risks, is above the Bahraini sovereign
rating (B+/Stable).

Fitch has given no consideration to any underlying assets or any
collateral provided, as it believes that the issuer's ability to
satisfy payments due on the certificates will ultimately depend on
AUB satisfying its unsecured payment obligations to the issuer
under the transaction documents described in the draft base
offering circular.

In addition to AUB's propensity to ensure repayment of the sukuk,
in Fitch's view AUB would also be required to ensure full and
timely repayment of AUBSL's obligations due to the bank's various
roles and obligations under the sukuk structure and documentation,
especially, but not only, due to the features below:

-- Pursuant to the servicing agency agreement, AUB as servicing
    agent will ensure sufficient funds are available to meet the
    periodic distribution amounts payable by the trustee under the
    certificates of the relevant series on each periodic
    distribution date. AUB can take other measures to ensure that
    there is no shortfall and that the payment of principal and
    profit are paid in full, and in a timely manner.

-- On any dissolution or default event, the aggregate amounts of
    deferred sale price then outstanding pursuant to the master
    Murabaha agreement shall become immediately due and payable;
    and the trustee will have the right under the purchase
    undertaking to require AUB to purchase all of its rights,
    title, interests, benefits and entitlements, present and
    future, in, to and under the relevant assets in consideration
    for payment by AUB of the relevant exercise price.

-- The outstanding deferred sale price payable by AUB under the
    master Murabaha agreement and the exercise price payable by
    AUB under the purchase undertaking together are intended to
    fund the dissolution distribution amount payable by the
    trustee under the relevant certificates, which should equal
    the sum of the outstanding face amount of such series; and any
    due and unpaid periodic distribution amounts for such series,
    or such other amount specified in the applicable pricing
    supplement as being payable upon any dissolution date.

-- The payment obligations of AUB under the service agency
    agreement, purchase undertaking and the master Murabaha
    agreement will be direct, unsubordinated and unsecured
    obligations and shall at all times rank at least equally with
    all other unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness and
    monetary obligations of AUB, present and future.

-- The transaction documents also include an obligation on AUB to
    ensure that at all times the tangibility ratio, which is the
    aggregate value of the tangible assets comprising the relevant
    sukuk assets to the aggregate value of the relevant sukuk
    assets, is more than 50%. Failure of AUB to comply with this
    obligation shall not constitute an obligor event. However, if
    the tangibility ratio falls below 33% (tangibility event),
    this would result in the certificate holders having a put
    right. The certificates would then be delisted and each
    certificate holder can exercise a put option to have their
    holdings redeemed, in whole or in part, at their dissolution
    distribution amount within 30 days after tangibility event
    notice is given. In such an event, there would be implications
    on the certificates' tradability.

-- Fitch expects AUB to maintain the tangibility ratio at above
    50% with support from its extensive asset base. For the
    purpose of issuing this series, AUB has identified a pool of
    USD402 million of non-real estate tangible assets, leading to
    a tangible ratio in the range of 53.6% and 80.4%, depending on
    the final size of the issuance. Further to this, the pool of
    eligible assets, formed mostly of Ijara financing and sukuk,
    amounted to at least USD835 million at end-1H21, which covers
    a USD750 million issuance by around 110%, which is healthy, in
    Fitch's view. Fitch also believes that the pool of assets
    under the structure could further be supported by the
    potential availability of Islamic eligible tangible assets in
    other entities of the AUB group. The bank also has a strong
    liquidity profile which allows AUB to repay the outstanding
    sukuk under the programme in case of a breach of the
    tangibility ratio, which is not Fitch's base case. The USD750
    million maximum issue size would have accounted for about 2.2%
    of AUB's liabilities at end-1H21.

-- The intended transaction does not contain physical tangible
    real estate assets thus no total loss event was included.

-- The sukuk issue includes a negative pledge provision, cross
    acceleration terminology, financial reporting obligations,
    obligor event, and restrictive covenants.

Certain aspects of the transaction will be governed by English law
while others are governed by the laws of Bahrain. Fitch does not
express an opinion on whether the relevant transaction documents
are enforceable under any applicable law. However, Fitch's rating
on the certificates reflects the agency's belief that AUB would
stand behind its obligations.

When assigning ratings to the certificates to be issued, Fitch does
not express an opinion on the certificates' compliance with sharia
principles.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The certificates' rating is sensitive to changes in AUB's Long-Term
IDR, with which it is aligned. The rating may also be sensitive to
changes to the roles and obligations of AUB under the sukuk's
structure and documents.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of AUB's Long-Term IDR would result in an upgrade
    of AUBSL's certificates rating. An upgrade of AUB's IDRs and
    upward revision of the bank's Support Rating Floor (SRF) would
    require an upward revision of Bahrain's Country Ceiling.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A downgrade of AUB's Long-Term IDR would result in a downgrade
    of AUBSL's certificates' rating. AUB's IDR would be downgraded
    and SRF revised downward if Fitch views the willingness or
    ability of the Kuwaiti authorities to provide support to the
    bank as having reduced, or if Bahrain's Country Ceiling is
    revised lower.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

The sukuk certificates' expected rating is aligned with AUB's 'BB+'
Long-Term IDR, which reflects Fitch's view that default of these
senior unsecured obligations would reflect a default of AUB in
accordance with Fitch's rating definitions. AUB's Long-Term IDR is
linked to the Kuwaiti sovereign's.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gov't. Supports Export of Solid Waste
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that The General Directorate of Strategic
and Special Projects of the Presidency (Propeep) and the Center for
Export and Investment of the Dominican Republic (ProDominicana),
began a cycle of training where they expressed their support for
the export of solid waste.

At the event, both entities discussed the challenges and
opportunities in international markets for the export of urban
solid waste, as well as learning about success stories at the
national level, according to Dominican Today.  These talks were
given virtually and free of charge through the ProDominicana
educational platform, the report notes.

A statement details that, within the framework of the cycle, Jose
Leonel (Neney) Cabrera, head of Propeep, gave the conference: "The
circular economy as a new economic paradigm," in which he raised
the need for a change in the production model, to change the
current one, for a transformative one, of environmental, social
responsibility, and sustainable over time, the report adds.

                   About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the
severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).




=============
E C U A D O R
=============

ECUADOR: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Foreign Currency IDR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ecuador's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ecuador's 'B-' rating balances high per-capita income and social
indicators with weak economic growth (both before and during the
pandemic), a low albeit improving external liquidity position, and
a poor debt repayment record that includes a recent distressed bond
exchange in 2020.

The Stable Outlook balances prospects for fiscal consolidation and
stronger growth under a new market-oriented government with
uncertainty around the strategy and political viability of plans to
achieve these goals. Fiscal and financing challenges persist
despite the relief offered by the bond restructuring, although the
postponement in commercial debt service this entailed has helped
reduce near-term repayment risks. Higher oil prices will support
fiscal and growth objectives but do not obviate the need for
potentially difficult reforms and adjustments to achieve them.
Fitch expects the government will be able to renegotiate an
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF, for which talks are
underway.

Guillermo Lasso of the center-right CREO party took office as
president in May, promising a shift toward a more orthodox
macroeconomic policy framework and private-sector-led growth model.
His political standing in his first months has been strong, buoyed
by rapid progress in coronavirus vaccination (46% of the population
was fully vaccinated as of Aug. 28). Lasso has already made
progress on his economic agenda with executive actions, but
prospects are unclear for key reforms requiring approval by the
National Assembly, where CREO and its close allies only have 25 of
137 seats. CREO allied with Pachakutik, Izquierda Democratica, and
independents to designate Assembly leadership posts, but the
reliability of this alliance for legislation is uncertain given
these parties' wide ideological divergence. Strong social movements
could also pose a challenge, namely around energy subsidy policy (a
source of major unrest in 2019) and expansion of extractive
activities in environmentally sensitive areas.

Fitch expects the central government deficit to decline to 4.2% of
GDP in 2021 from 7.6% in 2020, on a cyclical tax revenue recovery,
lower interest costs due to the bond restructuring, and higher oil
prices that have an especially beneficial impact given a rollback
in fuel subsidies implemented last year. The government projects a
USD4.8 billion deficit (4.6% of GDP) in its new 2021 "proforma"
budget, which is greater than the USD3.9 billion EFF target despite
higher oil prices, signaling a more accommodative fiscal policy
stance.

The proforma projects further reduction in the fiscal deficit in
2022-2024 that is smaller and more gradual than expected in the
existing EFF, although definitive plans and targets are likely to
come as part of the on-going EFF renegotiation and upcoming 2022
budget. The government is likely to propose a tax reform much
smaller than the 2.5%-of-GDP bill envisioned in the EFF, having
explicitly ruled out any hike in the VAT rate and promised to roll
back some taxes, and it already cut import tariffs. The proforma
projects spending will be kept flat in nominal terms, balancing
high current spending with lower capital spending. Spending
austerity could be difficult to implement amid constitutional
mandates and social pressures amplified by the pandemic. The
proforma's projections for growth, oil prices and oil production
are conservative, leaving some potential upside to the projected
fiscal path.

Fitch expects the sovereign can cover its 2021 financing needs with
money from the IMF's SDR allocation (USD950 million, usable for
fiscal purposes) and expected funds from the EFF (USD1.5 billion)
and other multilaterals. It has faced financing difficulties so far
in 2021, however, given delays in these multilateral funds,
prompting an accumulation of arrears (largely intra-public) and
greater reliance on short-term local T-bills (Cetes). Starting in
2022 as EFF funds trail off, the sovereign may need to return to
external markets to meet its financing needs. The current EFF
envisions Ecuador tapping private external funding starting in
2022, and any relaxation of fiscal targets without new multilateral
support could increase this market funding need. Ecuador's bond
spreads fell sharply after Lasso's election victory but remain high
at around 750-800 basis points.

Fitch projects general government debt (encompassing all
non-financial public sector debt, adjusted to exclude arrears but
include Cetes) will inch upward to 65% of GDP in 2021, roughly in
line with the current 'B' median of 68%. Fitch projects a continued
real GDP recovery and fiscal consolidation will stabilize debt
around these levels in the coming years, in contrast to official
projections in the proforma that project a rapid reduction starting
in 2022. General government interest/revenues is projected to fall
to 5.8% in 2021 from 10.1% in 2020 on the relief from the bond
restructuring, and gradually increase on the step-up in coupons on
the new bonds.

Fitch projects Ecuador's economy will grow 4% in 2021 after a 7.8%
contraction in 2020, reflecting a relatively slow recovery, albeit
one stronger than previously envisioned given higher oil prices
that will support a more accommodative fiscal stance, a rapid
recovery in credit growth (9% yoy as of July), and the acceleration
in vaccinations.

Prospects for stronger post-pandemic growth will hinge on the Lasso
administration's progress on its economic agenda. It already cut
import tariffs, reintegrated Ecuador into the ICSID dispute
resolution body, unveiled a pipeline of concessions and
privatizations, and announced regulatory changes in the oil sector
in support of an ambitious goal to double oil production by 2025.
While these efforts do not require legislation, explicit opposition
from key political parties and environmentalist groups may be a
challenge nonetheless. A pledged reform of onerous labor laws (a
key constraint to economic flexibility in the context of
dollarization) and trade agreements will require legislative
approval.

Ecuador's current account balance improved markedly in 2020 to a
2.5%-of-GDP surplus. Fitch projects the current account surplus
will moderate starting in 2021 as domestic demand and imports
recover, but remain above pre-crisis levels due to higher oil
prices and strong growth in mining and other non-oil exports,
signaling a structural external improvement. Foreign direct
investment averaged just 1% of GDP in 2015-2019, and Lasso's agenda
could pose some upside.

The current account surplus, the SDR allocation and multilaterals
loans have led to a substantial improvement in central bank (BCE)
reserves, which stand around USD6 billion as of August, up from a
low of USD2 billion in March 2020 at the onset of the pandemic.
Guided by the Defense of Dollarisation Law enacted by the outgoing
government, efforts are underway to further improve external
liquidity by reversing past financial operations that undermined
the BCE's balance sheet and the foundations of the dollarization
regime.

ESG - Governance: Ecuador has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank
Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign
Rating Model. Ecuador has a medium WBGI percentile ranking at 35,
reflecting a recent track record of peaceful political transitions,
moderate voice and accountability, moderately weak control of
corruption and government effectiveness, and weak rule of law and
regulatory quality.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Public Finances: Intensification of financing stress due to
    failure to reduce the fiscal deficit or secure adequate
    external funding, posing a risk to near-term sovereign
    repayment capacity.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Public Finances: Fiscal consolidation that supports a
    sustained reduction in government financing needs and a
    downward trajectory for general government debt/GDP over the
    medium term, and improvement in financing access.

-- Macro: Progress on reforms that could support stronger medium
    term economic growth prospects.

-- External Finances: A favorable trajectory in the external
    position, supportive of adequate reserve levels that support
    the dollarization regime.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Ecuador a score equivalent to a
rating of 'B' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
SRM data and output, as follows:

-- Public Finances: -1 notch was introduced, to reflect
    persisting financing challenges given uncertainty around
    fiscal consolidation plans, the magnitude of support from
    official creditors, and ability to access external markets.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

In line with its most recent Global Economic Outlook (June 2020),
Fitch forecasts Brent crude to average USD63/bbl in 2021, USD55/bbl
in 2022 and USD53/bbl in 2023.

Fitch assumes the authorities will be able to renegotiate the EFF
agreement with the IMF and receive its associated disbursements.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Ecuador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as WBGI have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are
therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver
with a high weight. As Ecuador has a percentile rank below 50 for
the respective governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on
the credit profile.

Ecuador has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
WBGI have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high
weight. As Ecuador has a percentile rank below 50 for the
respective governance indicator, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.

Ecuador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
WBGI is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Ecuador has
a percentile rank below 50 for the respective governance indicator,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Ecuador has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Ecuador, as for all sovereigns. As Ecuador
has a fairly recent restructuring of public debt in 2020, this has
a negative impact on the credit profile.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or to the way in which they
are being managed by the entity.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JP GROUP: Banana Supply Affected by Tropical Storm Grace
--------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Producers (JP) Group says there will
be a shortage of bananas from its St. Mary farm for the next
several months.

The company said 41 per cent of banana and plantain crops were
damaged following a direct hit from Tropical Storm Grace, according
to RJR News.

JP Group Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Hall says overall damage
included toppled and uprooted trees, lost fruit and downed sections
of the farm's overhead cable guying system, the report relays.

The company has mobilized $130 million to support rehabilitation
efforts, the report adds.




=======
P E R U
=======

ORAZUL ENERGY: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative, Affirms 'BB' Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 31, 2021, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on
Peruvian power generator Orazul Energy Peru S.A. (Orazul) to
negative from stable and affirmed the ratings at 'BB'.

The outlook revision to negative follows Orazul's announcement of
its plan to dispose its thermal power generation and hydrocarbon
businesses in Peru, more specifically, selling its interest in
Aguaytía Energy del Peru S.R.L. and Termoselva S.R.L. If the
transaction takes place, the company's total installed capacity
would decline sharply, given that Termoselva operates the company's
thermal plant, which represents 192 megawatts (MW) of the total 568
MW installed capacity. In addition, Aguaytia is engaged in the
production of natural gas and natural gas liquids, and following
the sale, Orazul would no longer benefit from vertical integration
of the natural gas extraction. The announcement follows the sale of
the company's transmission assets in 2020, limiting Orazul's
business to hydro power generation. As a result, S&P considers that
the company's business risk profile, which it currently views as
satisfactory, would weaken. This is because compared with the
regional peers, Orazul would no longer benefit from a large scale
of operations, and will lack a more balanced generation portfolio
of assets or business diversification.

The company's hydro capacity includes Cañon del Pato and
Carhuaquero plants that represent about 66% of Orazul's current
total capacity and have historically reported stable generation
levels with capacity factors of 60%-65%, which are higher than
among other hydro plants in the region. In addition, the hydro
plants are the core generation assets for Orazul, representing
about 88% of its total generation in the past seven years. During
2020, Aguaytia and Termoselva generated 37% of the company's
revenue and 29% of EBITDA, and S&P expects the divestiture to
reduce EBITDA to $70 million - $75 million from the previously
estimated amount of $90 million - $100 million for 2021.

In August 2021, the company tendered $145.3 million of aggregate
principal amount of its $550 million notes through the transmission
lines sale proceeds. Despite the lower EBITDA projected for the
next two years if the sale of Aguaytia and Termoselva is closed,
S&P continues to expect leverage to be about 5.0x in 2021 and
decline to 4.4x-4.6x in 2022 if Orazul uses the proceeds to further
cancel outstanding debt.


PESQUERA EXALMAR: Moody's Affirms 'B3' CFR, Outlook Remains Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Pesquera Exalmar S.A.A.'s B3
senior unsecured and corporate family ratings. The outlook is
stable.

Affirmations:

Issuer: Pesquera Exalmar S.A.A.

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B3

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Pesquera Exalmar S.A.A.

Outlook, Remains Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

Exalmar's B3 ratings primarily incorporates the company's
vulnerability to climatic conditions and fishing quota regulations;
pronounced cash flow seasonality; and limited operating scale and
modest business diversification compared with those of its regional
peers, as well as other seafood and protein industry companies. In
turn, it also reflects the company's exposure to volatile volume
and price trends of the global fishmeal and fish oil markets. These
credit negatives are, to some extent, offset by Exalmar's position
as the third-largest fishmeal producer in Peru (A3 negative), the
world's leading fishmeal producing nation; its successful operating
history in its current business configuration; and some revenue
diversification from its direct human consumption business.

Exalmar's volumes and thus its cash flow critically depend on the
level of the catch of anchovies, the company's main raw material,
which varies with the total allowable catch set prior to each
fishing season by PRODUCE, the Peruvian Ministry of Production.
Anchovy catch levels vary because of changing climatic conditions,
in particular by the El Nino or La Niña effects. The first fishing
season of 2021 was set at 2.5 million metric tons; in line with the
fishing quota average of the previous four fishing seasons.

According to the most recent report from Peru's federal climate
agency ENFEN, it estimates a 67% likelihood of seawater conditions
and temperatures remaining "neutral" in Peru until March 2022, a
15% probability of a weak-moderate El Nino, and an 18% probability
of a weak La Niña, implying a stable operating environment for
Exalmar and other Peruvian fishing companies. Moody's believe that
the next couple of fishing seasons will allow fishing companies in
Peru to catch at least 2 million metric tons per season given this
stable environment.

In 2021, the company's credit metrics have improved driven by
higher volumes processed in the last two fishing seasons combined
with relatively high fishmeal prices resulting in increased EBITDA.
Exalmar's adj. debt/EBITDA was 2.6x as of June 2021 with a Moody's
adjusted EBITDA margin of 27% over the twelve months ended June
2021. Absent severe weather conditions, Moody's estimate adj.
debt/EBITDA to remain below 2.0x by year-end 2023.

Exalmar's liquidity is negatively affected by cash flow seasonality
caused by the working capital build-up that tends to occur during
Peru's two anchovy fishing seasons in the second and fourth
calendar quarters and the subsequent cash inflow when inventories
are shipped in the first and third quarters. Exalmar typically
funds these working capital needs with uncommitted credit
facilities with local and international banks. Exalmar reported
cash on hand of $21 million as of June 30, 2021 that can cover only
14% short-term debt. However, short-term debt is comprised by
working capital related debt that is secured by inventory and
receivables. As a result, the company's cash on hand, inventory and
receivables provide a 1.4x coverage of its short-term debt as of
June 30, 2021.

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation for the next
12-18 months that Exalmar's profitability and credit metrics will
remain adequate in the absence of any strong weather event that
results in a decline in the fishing quota or cancelation of a
fishing season.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

An upgrade will require an improvement in the company's size and
liquidity buffer to withstand the strain on operations because of
adverse weather conditions. To be considered for an upgrade, the
company needs to be able to generate positive cash flow while
maintaining robust credit metrics on a sustained basis, with
adjusted debt/EBITDA below 4.0x.

A downgrade could be triggered by a prolonged period of negative
free cash flow with significant additional external funding needs,
for example, because of the impact of quota cancelations or an
abrupt deterioration in global fishmeal demand or anchovy supply.
An increase in adjusted debt/EBITDA over 7.0x for a prolonged
period, with no expectation of a reduction in the medium term could
also lead to a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Protein and
Agriculture published in May 2019.

Founded in 1992, Pesquera Exalmar S.A.A. (Exalmar) is a Peruvian
fishing company that produces fishmeal and fish oil used for
indirect human consumption. In addition, Exalmar sells fresh and
frozen fish (mackerel, horse mackerel, giant squid and mahi-mahi)
for direct human consumption. Exalmar has a 6.7% assigned quota in
the north central region of Peru and the ability to process
third-party catch, which increases its overall participation in the
market. This positions the company as the third-largest fishing
company in Peru in terms of processed anchovy. Exalmar is majority
owned (71%) and controlled by its founder, Victor Matta Curotto,
and the balance (29%) is publicly traded on the Lima Stock
Exchange. For the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, the company
reported revenues of $415 million.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

AMADO AMADO: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Amado Amado Salon & Body Corp.
        2ndo Nivel Local 525
        Plaza Las Americas
        San Juan, PR 00918

Business Description: Amado Amado Salon & Body Corp. owns and
                      operates a beauty salon in San Juan, Puerto
                      Rico.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: August 31, 2021

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico

Case No.: 21-02630

Debtor's Counsel: Gloria Justiniano Irizarry, Esq.
                  Calle A. Ramirez Silva #8
                  Ensanche Martinez
                  Mayaguez, PR 00680
                  Tel: 787-831-2577
                  Fax: 787-805-7350
                  Email: justinianolaw@gmail.com

Estimated Assets: $100,000 to $500,000

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million

The petition was signed by Amado Navarro Elizalde as president.

A copy of the Debtor's list of 20 largest unsecured creditors is
available for free at PacerMonitor.com at:

A full-text copy of the petition containing, among other items, a
list of the Debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at PacerMonitor.com at:

https://www.pacermonitor.com/view/SJKPBKA/Amado_Amado_Salon__Body_Corp__prbke-21-02630__0001.0.pdf?mcid=tGE4TAMA


PATTERN ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' ICR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
On August 26, 2021, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' issuer
credit rating on Pattern Energy Operations L.P.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB-' issue-level rating and '3'
recovery rating on the company's senior unsecured notes due in 2028
and revised our recovery expectations to 60% from 50%.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Pattern will
continue to develop and operate its renewable energy platform under
long-term contracts with mostly investment-grade counterparties and
generate stable and predictable cash flows.

"Pattern's operational and financial performance for 2020 was in
line with our expectations. Despite the effects of stay-at-home
restrictions and business closures from the COVID-19 pandemic,
stand-alone EBITDA was slightly better than our expectations
largely due to favorable wind conditions in several regions and
increased asset availability. However, we expect the one-off
effects of the severe storm in Texas in February 2021 to result in
some underperformance this year. The freeze impaired operational
and financial performance of the Panhandle 1 and 2 and Logan's Gap
wind farms in Texas, with about $58 million in net cash impact to
Pattern. However, about $34 million in electricity sales at the
Gulf Wind facility in southern Texas during the storm somewhat
offset these losses. Pattern covered the net loss with a
combination of cash on hand and a $21 million shareholder loan from
the Public Sector Investment Board (PSP), co-owner of Panhandle 2.

The losses were primarily attributable to fixed-shape financial
hedges.

"Because of unusually high market prices during the storm, the
three operational projects with hedge obligations had generation
below contracted volumes resulting in material losses. We
acknowledge the winter storm is an isolated event and should not
recur. However, we anticipate some material weakness at the Texas
assets for the remainder of the year due to a combination of
congestion, availability, and curtailment issues that we expect to
reverse in the coming months. We also expect marginal deterioration
in distributions in our forecast horizon for some of the company's
assets because of project-level refinancing (and increased debt
service)."

Pattern's operating portfolio consists of 23 wind power facilities
with a total owned interest of about 2.5 gigawatts (GW). The
facilities are distributed across seven regions in the U.S.,
Canada, and Puerto Rico. Most are fully contracted under long-term
power purchase agreements or hedging arrangements facing primarily
investment-grade counterparties. The weighted-average contract life
is about 14 years, which S&P feels mitigates market risks. Further,
Pattern plans to add the 1,050-megawatt (MW) Western Spirit wind
farm and 83 MW Phoenix solar project to its operating portfolio in
2021, which should add approximately 900 MW of additional owned
capacity. It also recently closed on the sale of 49% of its equity
interest in the newly repowered Gulf Wind asset to PSP. And the
company recently refinanced its corporate revolver, reducing its
size to $375 million from $440 million and amending the covenants.

These now only allow a maximum first-lien leverage ratio of 3.5x
and minimum interest coverage ratio of 1.75x.

S&P said, "Approximately 95% of Pattern's owned capacity across its
operating portfolio is contracted, which we feel provides cash flow
visibility. However, we still believe the company lacks meaningful
diversity in its asset platform considering generation, technology,
and scale compared to peers such as Atlantica Sustainable
Infrastructure PLC, TerraForm Power Inc., and Clearway Energy Inc.
Pattern continues to face material volume risk through its exposure
to wind generation, which accounts for almost all the cash flow
throughout our forecast period. We do not think this resource
volume risk can be meaningfully mitigated, and consequently we use
conservative estimates of energy production in our base case.

"In line with our Project Developer methodology, we assess Pattern
Operations' business risk profile as fair based on a quality of
distribution (QD) of '4'. The QD assessment represents the
stability of distributions to the developer and is analogous to the
competitive position of a corporate entity. We rank QDs on a scale
of '1' to '6', with '1' being the strongest. We also view the cash
flow interruption from the underlying assets as moderate overall,
given our expectation for modest cushion relative to financial
covenants and varying transaction structure at the projects
including project debt or tax equity-financed assets.

"In April 2020, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB)
became the majority shareholder of Pattern Operations parent
Pattern Energy Group Inc. Private equity funds sponsored by
Riverstone Holdings LLC and company management hold minority
interests. Given the organizational structure implemented as part
of the acquisition in 2020, with common ownership across
developmental and operational platforms, we continue to view the
creditworthiness of the consolidated enterprise as a key
consideration in our analysis.

"In our opinion, Pattern will continue to own and operate renewable
power assets funded via a combination of project-level debt and tax
equity partnerships. We project Pattern Operations' financial risk
profile as aggressive with weighted-average funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of 14%-16% and debt to EBITDA of 5x-5.5x over our
forecast horizon. Our analysis excludes nonrecourse project debt
(and associated debt service) from consolidated debt and adjusted
interest expense. We continue to categorize the preferred stock as
having intermediate (50%) equity content as it meets our standards
for permanence, subordination, and deferability.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Pattern Operations'
assets will continue to operate under long-term contracts with
investment-grade counterparties and generate predictable cash flows
to support servicing corporate debt. We forecast a weighted-average
FFO-to-debt ratio between 14% and 16% and a debt-to-EBITDA ratio
between 5x and 5.5x.

"We could lower our rating on Pattern Operations if the
consolidated FFO-to-debt ratio trends below 13% and remains there
for a prolonged period. We anticipate this could occur with
significant operational encumbrances that would stymie upstream
distributions or distributions that are materially less for any
other reason.

"We would consider taking a positive rating action on Pattern
Operations if its consolidated FFO-to-debt ratio improves and
remains above 20%. This is most likely if the consolidated
enterprise were to reduce debt combined with increased cash flows
from existing or new projects."



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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