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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, August 5, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 150

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms LT Foreign Currency Issuer Rating at 'CCC'
ARGENTINA: Gov't. Accelerates Monetary Issuance Before Elections
GENNEIA SA: Fitch Lowers LT IDRs & Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating to 'C'


B E R M U D A

SEADRILL LIMITED: Unsecureds Will Recover 0.02% Under Plan


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: 30% of Minas Gerais Coffee Plantations Affected by Frost
VALE SA: Posts Q2 2021 Earnings Call Transcript
VALE SA: Revises Down Year-End Iron Ore Output


P E R U

ORAZUL ENERGY: Extends Notes Tender Offer Expiration Date to Aug. 1


P U E R T O   R I C O

LATAM: Pay Cuts of 36% Show Region's Economies Faltering
MORE AUTOMOTIVE: Taps Luis R. Carrasquillo as Financial Consultant

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: DBRS Confirms LT Foreign Currency Issuer Rating at 'CCC'
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DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Republic of Argentina's Long-Term Foreign
Currency - Issuer Rating at CCC and Long-Term Local Currency -
Issuer Rating at CCC (high). At the same time, DBRS Morningstar
confirmed the Republic of Argentina's Short-Term Foreign and Local
Currency - Issuer Ratings at R-5. The trend on all ratings is
Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of the ratings at CCC/CCC (high) reflects DBRS
Morningstar's view that, despite favorable external conditions and
a recovering domestic economy, Argentina continues to face
significant economic and policy-related challenges. If left
unaddressed, these challenges pose material risks to the
government's capacity to repay its debt to private creditors.

In DBRS Morningstar's view, the Fernandez administration has not
yet outlined a plan to address the country's weak economic
fundamentals. Fiscal consolidation remains a major political
challenge. Inflation is running at 50% year-over-year. Reserves are
low and the unofficial peso-dollar exchange rate is about 80% above
the official rate. Moreover, Argentina experienced a prolonged
period of stagnation prior to pandemic, primarily due to poor
macroeconomic management and unpredictable regulation. While the
economy is recovering from the shock of the pandemic, we expect
growth to remain relatively weak over the medium term. In addition,
the debt restructuring agreement in September 2020 with private
creditors provided Argentina with substantial debt servicing relief
through 2024, but the level of public debt remains elevated and
primarily denominated in foreign currency.

Argentina is currently in negotiations with the IMF on a new
program. Without market access and with sizable loan repayments
coming due in 2022 and 2023, the Argentine government will need to
reach an agreement with the Fund by early next year to avoid going
into arrears on its obligations to multilateral creditors. Striking
a deal would likely entail an extension of payment terms. In
return, Argentina would need to commit to a program of economic
stabilization and structural reform. In DBRS Morningstar's view, a
credible commitment to address macroeconomic imbalances could help
restore market confidence and improve growth prospects. However, it
is unclear whether the Fernandez administration can garner and
sustain sufficient public and congressional support to reach a deal
with the IMF and implement the requisite policy changes and
reforms.

DBRS Morningstar rates the Long-Term Foreign Currency – Issuer
Rating one notch lower than the Long-Term Local Currency – Issuer
Rating to reflect additional risks that stem from Argentina's
limited access to foreign exchange and the high share of government
debt denominated in foreign currency.

RATING DRIVERS

The ratings could be upgraded if the government implements a
credible macroeconomic program that durably lowers inflation and
puts fiscal accounts on a sustainable path. Reforms that increase
investment and productivity growth would also be credit positive.

The ratings could be downgraded if the government fails to reach an
agreement with the IMF and faces difficulties meeting its gross
financing needs.

RATING RATIONALE

Negotiations With The IMF Provide Argentina With An Opportunity To
Restore Confidence

The debt restructuring agreement in September 2020 with private
creditors provided Argentina with substantial debt servicing relief
through 2024. However, the deal was not accompanied by an economic
plan to rebuild confidence and strengthen competitiveness. As a
result, the agreement failed to restore market access. At the
conclusion of the debt restructuring, the EMBI Global Diversified
Sovereign Spread for Argentina declined from about 2,100 basis
points (bps) to 1,100 bps, but then increased in the subsequent
months and has hovered around 1,500-1,600 bps during the first six
months of the 2021, effectively signaling that markets remain
closed to Argentina. Furthermore, while the restructuring reduced
near-term financing requirements, it did not materially alter the
longer-term debt sustainability risks. Government debt-to-GDP
increased to 103% in 2020 from 90% one year earlier (largely due to
the economic shock of the pandemic and higher fiscal deficit), and
the share of debt denominated in foreign currency – at roughly
three-quarters – was left broadly unchanged.

Negotiations with the IMF on a new Extended Fund Facility program
started last August. Argentina has $19 billion in principal and
interest payments to the Fund coming due in 2022 and again in 2023.
Argentina will need to reach an agreement by early next year to
avoid arrears on its IMF obligations. A new program would likely
entail an extension of IMF loans in return for Argentina committing
to a macroeconomic stabilization program that includes tighter
fiscal and monetary policies, potentially coupled with a foreign
exchange strategy to replenish reserves and reduce the spread
between the official and unofficial exchange rates. Given the
near-term political costs of such policies, a deal is not expected
until after the November mid-term election. Argentina appears to
have sufficient dollars to service its debt until then, due to
strong export revenues and the expected allocation of $4.6 billion
in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the IMF in August or September.
Moreover, Argentina reached a separate deal with the Paris Club in
June 2021 to defer $2.0 billion in loans until March 2022.
Following the mid-term elections, the IMF negotiations present
Argentina with an opportunity to formulate a consistent set of
macroeconomic policies that reduce imbalances and strengthen
growth. But restoring market confidence will depend on the
government's willingness to build and sustain political support for
such a program. The considerable risks to debt sustainability
combined with Argentina's weak liquidity position lead DBRS
Morningstar to make a negative adjustment in its Building Block
Assessment for "Debt & Liquidity".

The Economy Is Recovering But Growth Prospects Are Weak Without A
Shift In Policy Direction

The pandemic has had a severe impact on an Argentine economy that
was already suffering from a two-year recession prior to the shock.
Cumulatively, the economy contracted 14% from 2018 to 2020.
Activity was picking up in the second half of 2020, but growth
momentum slowed in early 2021 as new COVID-19 cases surged and
restrictions were reimposed. We expect the recovery to resume in
the second half of this year as more people are vaccinated and
health conditions improve. Only 14% of the population is fully
vaccinated, but the pace of vaccinations has accelerated in recent
months. In addition to the economic reopening, the growth outlook
should benefit from favorable external conditions, including high
commodity prices and stronger demand from Brazil. The median GDP
growth forecast according to the central bank's Market Expectations
Survey (June 2021) is 6.3% in 2021 and 2.5% in 2022. Despite the
return to growth, we expect Argentina's recovery to be slow and
prolonged, with output only returning to its 2017 level in 2026.

Poor macroeconomic management, an unpredictable and onerous
regulatory environment, and limited global integration have
contributed to Argentina's poor growth performance. In the eight
years prior to the pandemic, GDP growth contracted on average by
0.3% per year. During this time, investment averaged 17.6% of GDP,
one of the lowest rates among emerging markets, and the number of
private sector jobs created was close to zero. Absent a
stabilization plan that restores policy credibility, we expect
medium-term growth prospects to remain weak, with Argentine
policymakers having limited room to stimulate growth without
exacerbating macroeconomic imbalances.

Fiscal Consolidation In The Wake Of A Three-Year Recession Will Be
Politically Challenging

One of the most pressing policy issues facing Argentina's sovereign
credit profile is the fiscal deficit. The Macri government made
some headway in reducing the fiscal imbalance. The primary deficit
narrowed from 4.4% of GDP in 2015 to 0.4% in 2019. However, in the
first year of the Fernández administration, fiscal consolidation
was subordinated to the pandemic response. Emergency spending and
revenue measures amounted to 3.9% of GDP in 2020. In terms of the
scale of fiscal support, this placed Argentina's response close to
middle of pack relative to other emerging markets. The
pandemic-related support plus the recession led the primary deficit
to widen to 6.4% in 2020.

The government looks set to achieve its primary deficit target of
4.5% for this year. This looks likely even if we exclude the IMF's
new special drawing rights, which will likely total about 1% of
GDP. In the first six months of the year, the primary deficit was
0.5% of GDP. Revenues were supported by sharply higher export tax
receipts and a one-off wealth tax, while expenditure growth was
restrained by lower social security spending. Despite the
encouraging start to the year, we expect the deficit to quickly
widen through December – though still achieve the annual target
– as pre-election spending picks up, pensions adjust, and energy
subsidies increase.

Implementing a durable consolidation over the next few years will
be difficult, particularly as it will require reforming politically
sensitive spending items such as energy subsidies at a time when
labor market conditions are weak and poverty levels are elevated.
The challenging fiscal outlook combined with historical weaknesses
in fiscal policy formulation weigh negatively on the Building Block
Assessment for "Fiscal Management & Policy". DBRS Morningstar notes
that Argentina has made some progress in improving the quality of
public statistics and in making available additional analysis
around fiscal policy measures, including with the creation in 2016
of the Congressional Budget Office (OPC), but it remains to be seen
whether this will improve fiscal policy outcomes.

High Inflation Is A Symptom Of Weak Policy Credibility On Several
Fronts

Headline inflation was 50% y/y in June 2021. On a monthly basis,
inflation has recently decelerated: from 4.8% in March to 3.2% in
June, a trend aided by weak demand as pandemic-related restrictions
were tightened, the widening use of price controls, and
policymakers' decision to slow the pace of peso depreciation. In
DBRS Morningstar's view, the disinflationary trend is not likely to
continue. In the run up to the November elections, we think fiscal
policy will likely turn more expansionary and rely primarily on
monetary financing. This, combined with strengthening aggregate
demand as the economy reopens and recent collective bargaining
agreements that have increased wages by more than 40%, will
reinforce inflationary pressures. According to the June Survey of
Market Expectations by the central bank, the median forecast for
CPI inflation is 48% in December 2021 and 42% in December 2022.

The central bank has limited room to maneuver in the current
environment. Without market access and with a large gap between the
official and unofficial exchange rates, expansionary monetary
policy to finance fiscal deficits could further damage policy
credibility and strengthen inflationary pressures. In DBRS
Morningstar's view, the problem of high inflation is unlikely to be
addressed in a durable manner unless accompanied by a credible
economic plan that narrows the fiscal deficit, provides greater
stability to the currency, and reorients towards more
forward-looking wage-setting processes. Moreover, short-term
measures such as price controls and capital restrictions will
likely end up exacerbating underlying economic imbalances,
ultimately leading to a further deterioration in the investment
climate and an acceleration of inflation down the road.

Argentina's financial system remains small in size and provides
only a limited capacity to finance government deficits
domestically. State-owned Banco Nacion remains a dominant player in
the banking sector. While profitability has suffered, evidence
suggests that the banking system has high levels of liquidity and
is well-positioned to weather asset-quality deterioration
associated with the pandemic-induced recession. The banking system
has limited exposure to the consolidated public sector, and net FX
exposure is modest.

Low Reserves And Capital Controls Signal Currency Vulnerability

Argentina has undergone a significant adjustment in its external
accounts. The current account shifted from a deficit of 5.8% of GDP
in mid-2018 to a surplus of 0.9% in 2020. The adjustment was led by
import compression, as the pre-pandemic recession and Covid-19
shock led to a massive cutback in imports. Lower primary income
payments also contributed the adjustment. The current account is
likely to remain in a modest surplus position in 2021,
notwithstanding an expected recovery in imports, as rising
agricultural prices support higher exports receipts.

Foreign exchange reserves increased modestly in the first half of
2021, but they remain very low. Gross reserves amounted to $43
billion in mid-July. However, liquid net reserves (calculated as
gross reserves minus dollar deposits from financial institutions,
central bank currency swaps and credit lines, and gold) amount to
just $4-5 billion. Both gross and net measures are up about $3
billion since the start of the year. The central bank has been able
to accumulate reserves while slowing the pace of peso depreciation
because of strong export revenues and tight capital controls.
However, the spread between the official ARS/USD rate and the
unofficial rate was close to 80% in mid-July 2021, highlighting the
lack of credibility in the currency. The policy mix along with
favorable commodity prices may provide some near-term relief in
terms of inflation and the exchange rate, but restrictions on hard
currency will diminish incentives to save and invest over time,
which will ultimately weaken prospects for robust and durable
growth.

Argentina retains a considerable stock of external assets, largely
driven by the preference of Argentine savers for hard currency
assets. Argentina's net international investment position (NIIP)
reached an all-time high of $129 billion in Q1 2021 (33% of GDP).
Currency and deposits held abroad by Argentine residents have
jumped by $80 billion since end-2016, an increase of more than 50%.
Portfolio investment claims also increased substantially over this
period (up $30 billion). On the other side of the ledger, portfolio
investment liabilities, which surged from under $60 billion to $165
billion in just over two years (Q4 2015 to Q1 2018) as the country
ramped up external borrowing, subsequently plummeted to $56 billion
as foreign investors fled the country. The debt default further
reduced the value of external claims. Consequently, and in spite of
Argentina's current account surplus and positive NIIP, DBRS
Morningstar continues to see considerable external risks, reflected
in a negative adjustment to its Building Block Assessment for
'Balance of Payments.'

The Government Faces Populist Political Pressures Amid A Difficult
Economic Reality Heading Into Elections

Mid-term elections are scheduled for November 14, 2021. Nearly half
of the seats in the lower house and one-third of the seats in the
Senate will be up for grabs. Poor economic conditions have hurt the
ruling coalition's electoral prospects. In June 2021, the
Confidence in Government Index hit its lowest point during this
administration's term. However, it is unclear if the opposition can
capitalize on the public's discontent. One challenge for the
opposition is that it is defending more seats than the ruling
coalition in the lower house. While there is a lot of time until
the elections, most polls show a divided electorate, with neither
major coalition likely to win decisively.

The potential policy formulations available to the Fernández
administration in the aftermath of the mid-term elections carry
economic and political risks. It is possible that President
Fernández will reach an agreement with the IMF while promising to
keep a tight grip on spending and limit monetary financing. Such a
strategy could help President Fernandez avoid the economic pitfalls
of taking a more expansionary and interventionist approach. Yet, it
could also increase political risk. In addition to anti-austerity
voters, a powerful faction within the Peronist government, led by
Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, could act as a
forceful opposition to such a "moderate" approach. Any IMF
agreement in Argentina must be approved by Congress, which could be
difficult without at least the tacit approval from the Vice
President. Alternatively, populist political pressures may
encourage the government to take a more hardline stance, convinced
that it does not need to reach an agreement with the IMF. However,
with a large fiscal deficit, high inflation, low reserves, and weak
confidence in the peso, the government will not have policy space
to stimulate the economy without worsening macroeconomic
conditions. Consequently, the economic fallout of a "go-it-alone"
strategy could intensify the political risks facing the Fernández
administration in the second half of its term.

In addition to an uncertain post-election political environment,
DBRS Morningstar views the broader issue of institutional quality
as a credit challenge. In many respects, Argentina's democracy is
quite strong: competitive and fair elections are regularly held,
basic civil and political freedoms are protected, and an active
civil society is engaged in the democratic process. According to
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Argentina scores relatively
well compared to regional peers in terms of Voice & Accountability.
However, a key governance challenge is the Rule of Law. Public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and other branches of
government is generally low. In addition, we view policy
predictability as weak, with frequent and significant changes to
policy settings and frameworks over the electoral cycle. The
heightened policy-related risks weigh on the Building Block
Assessment "Political Environment".

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Human Capital & Human Rights (S), Bribery, Corruption & Political
Risks (G), and Institutional Strength, Governance, and Transparency
(G) were among key drivers behind this rating action. Similar to
many emerging market peers, per capita GDP is relatively low, at
US$8.6k (US$20.8k on a PPP basis). According to Worldwide
Governance Indicators, Argentina ranks in the 37th percentile for
Rule of Law and 53rd percentile for Control of Corruption. In
addition, Argentina ranks in the 49th percentile for Government
Effectiveness and 33rd percentile for Regulatory Quality. These
considerations have been taken into account within the following
Building Blocks: Fiscal Management & Policy, Economic Structure &
Performance, and Political Environment.

Notes: For more information regarding rating methodologies and
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS
Morningstar press release:
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357883



ARGENTINA: Gov't. Accelerates Monetary Issuance Before Elections
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globalinsolvency.com, citing Bloomberg News, reports that
Argentina's central bank is issuing money to the General Treasury
at the fastest rate so far this year, which could fuel even faster
inflation, while helping finance public spending ahead of the
legislative elections of November.

The monetary authority led by Miguel Pesce sent between July 1 and
22, ARS180,000 million (US$ 1,860 million) to the Government,
double the amount for the entire month of June and the highest
figure since last December, according to globalinsolvency.com.

The bank sent funds to the Treasury for the third time this month,
according to the most recent data released. In total, the central
bank has sent the Treasury ARS510,000 million (US $ 5,300 million)
so far this year, just under half the amount estimated in the
Government budget for 2021, the report notes.

Without access to external credit after incurring in a sovereign
default last year, President Alberto Fernandez has relied on
monetary issuance to finance social spending and other stimulus
programs during the pandemic, the report adds.


                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept. 28,
2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.


GENNEIA SA: Fitch Lowers LT IDRs & Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating to 'C'
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Fitch Ratings has downgraded Genneia S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign and
Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'C' from 'CCC'.
Fitch has also downgraded Genneia's senior unsecured notes due 2022
to 'C'/'RR4' from 'CCC'/'RR4'. These downgrades follow an
announcement by Genneia that it is launching an offer to exchange
its 8.75% USD500 million notes due 2022 and USD53.286 million
private notes due 2022 with amortizing 8.75% senior secured notes
due 2027.

Per Fitch criteria, the exchange offer is considered a distressed
debt exchange (DDE), which is necessary in order to comply with
central bank restrictions on dollar debt refinancings. Fitch also
rates the proposed senior secured notes due 2027 'CCC(exp)'/'RR4'.

The proposed new notes will carry the same interest rate of 8.75%
and have equal semi-annual amortizations beginning in March 2023
with maturity in 2027. The notes will be secured by revenues from
the Madryn I & II wind farms, which total 222MW and have net annual
sales of USD90 million with long-term power purchase agreements
(PPAs). Cash flow from the collateral will fund an account equal to
one sixth of a coupon payment and be deposited in a USD account in
Argentina.

Early-exchanging investors can choose between Option A and B.
Option A offers a minimum of USD1,010 and a maximum of USD1,020 of
new notes per USD1,000 of existing notes, depending on Option A
participation. Option A has a maximum participation of USD200
million with any amounts above the maximum allocated on a pro rata
basis to Option B. Option A also has a maximum of USD2 million of
additional new notes on top of the amount exchanged, payable on a
pro rata basis, such that each investor choosing Option A receives
a minimum of USD1,010 and a maximum of USD1,020 per USD1,000 of
existing notes exchanged.

Option B offers a minimum USD200 and a maximum USD800 cash
consideration per USD1,000 of existing notes from a USD100 million
pool to be payable on a pro rata basis. Option B also includes a
withdrawal right if the cash component is less than 30%. The
remaining consideration for those choosing Option B will be
participation in the new notes up to a total consideration of
USD1,000 in cash plus new notes per USD1,000 of existing notes.

The company has been granted an exception by the central bank to
access up to US$ 100 million in cash (equal to 20% of the amount
outstanding) 150 days before maturity, as opposed to 45 days, and
thus is making this exchange offer five months prior to maturity.
The exchange offer's early participation deadline is Aug. 16th and
the offer expiration date is Aug. 30th. The exchange offer has a
minimum participation of 70% of 2022 noteholders and the issuer
considers the new notes to be green bonds under its framework.

If the proposed exchange offer is successfully completed, the IDR
will be downgraded to Restricted Default (RD). Subsequently, Fitch
will re-rate Genneia's IDRs to a level that is consistent with the
company's post-exchange risk profile, which is expected to be
within the 'CCC' category. This level reflects the company's
exposure to offtaker Compania Administradora del Mercado Mayorista
Electrico (CAMMESA), which acts as a market agent on behalf of
companies in the electricity sector and is largely dependent on the
Argentine sovereign (CCC).

Genneia is capped at an average Recovery Rating of 'RR4' since
Argentina is categorized within Group D with a soft cap of 'RR4',
per the Country-Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings Criteria.
This assumes a recovery in the range of 31% to 50%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Exchange Offer Qualifies as DDE: Fitch believes the company's
refinancing proposal qualifies as a DDE under its criteria, as the
modification of covenants for the USD500 million notes due January
2022 is a material reduction in terms for non-exchanging
bondholders. The exchange is necessary to comply with central bank
capital controls restricting companies' ability to convert
Argentine pesos into dollars in order to repay dollar debt abroad.

The current capital controls are set to last through the end of
2021 but the company has been granted the ability to convert up to
20% of the amount outstanding 150 days before maturity, as opposed
to 45 days, and is seeking to refinance as soon as possible.

Dominant Player in Renewables: Although Genneia is considered a
relatively small player in the local power generation industry
(3.3% of the system's installed capacity), the company is the
leading wind power generation provider in the country, with
approximately 25% of the renewable installed capacity of Argentina
as of April 2021. The company added 166MW (Chubut Norte II, III and
IV) of wind capacity in 2021. Fitch expects that in 2021
renewables, including wind, solar and biomass, will constitute 83%
of the company's revenue and 83% of its EBITDA.

Heightened Counterparty Exposure: Genneia depends on payments from
CAMMESA, which acts as an agent on behalf of an association
representing agents of electricity generators, transmission,
distribution and large consumers or the wholesale market
participants (Mercado Electrico Mayorista; MEM). CAMMESA's payment
delays to the electricity sector have risen from 50 days at the
beginning of 2019 to currently over 77 days. This risk is slightly
mitigated in the RenovAr program with the presence of the FODER
trust fund, which is prefunded with one year of revenue.

Payment days for the FODER are 42 days, resulting in a consolidated
payment lag for Genneia of approximately 56 days. The company
estimates 20% of its consolidated EBITDA is backed by a World Bank
guarantee.

Predictable Operating Cash Flow: Genneia's cash flow generation is
relatively stable and predictable. Almost all of the company's
revenue is related to sales to the wholesale electricity market
(MEM) under contracts signed under RenovAr, GENREN and 21/16. The
company benefits from USD-denominated PPAs expiring between 2018
and 2027 for its thermal capacity, and between 2027 and 2041 for
renewables. These PPAs support the company's cash flow stability
and predictability through fixed payments and fuel supplied by
CAMMESA.

Strong EBITDA Margins: Fitch expects the company's EBITDA to be
USD246 million in 2021, 83% of which will be from renewables. The
company's EBITDA margins remained high in 2020 at 83%, in line with
82% in 2019. Fitch expects EBITDA margins to remain stable at 80%
in 2021 and beyond, as the company does not plan any expansions
after 2020, and no PPA or regulatory changes are anticipated until
2027.

Due to its low variable cost, EBITDA margins on the company's
renewable assets are 88%, while margins for its thermal projects
are approximately 83%. Genneia has relatively fixed and stable
operating costs and does not need to acquire fuel.

Improving Credit Metrics: Fitch expects Genneia to de-lever to 3.4x
in 2021, and to 2.5x in 2022, in line with its Argentine utility
peers. The company's leverage peaked in 2018 at 6.1x to finance the
addition of 500MW of renewable energy capacity between 2017 and
2020 with an additional 166MW of new wind capacity expected in
2021.

Fitch estimates Genneia will be FCF positive starting in 2021 after
its imminent expansion capex has concluded. Fitch's base case is
assuming the company will begin paying dividends in 2023, the year
after its 2022 bond matures, at a rate of 50% of the previous
year's adjusted net income, or approximately USD57 million.

Uncertain Regulatory Environment: Fitch believes the electricity
market remains a priority for the Argentine government. Further
regulatory reform is highly probable to reduce costs and prevent
the system from becoming insolvent. Fitch estimates the government
transferred USD3.0 billion in funds to CAMMESA in 2020, which
represented 40% of the total implied cost of the system of USD7.6
billion. Fitch expects subsidies to increase to 50% of the system
cost in 2021 unless end-user tariffs are adjusted.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The completion of the proposed exchange offer will lead to a
downgrade of the Long-Term IDRs to 'RD'. The IDR would subsequently
be upgraded to a rating level reflecting the post-DDE credit
profile.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

ISSUER PROFILE

Genneia S.A. is an Argentine power company, primarily engaged in
the generation of electrical power from both renewable (wind, solar
and biomass power) and conventional (thermal power) sources. As of
June 2021, Genneia had a total installed capacity of 1,279 MW
(866MW of renewable and 413MW of thermal).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



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B E R M U D A
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SEADRILL LIMITED: Unsecureds Will Recover 0.02% Under Plan
----------------------------------------------------------
Seadrill Limited, et al., submitted a Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization and a Disclosure Statement.

The Debtors and certain stakeholders, including holders of
approximately 57.8 percent of the Claims arising under the
Prepetition Credit Facilities, support confirmation of the Plan
pursuant to the Plan Support and Lock-Up Agreement.

Despite Seadrill's prepetition efforts to build consensus for a
restructuring transaction, as of the Petition Date, the parties
had not agreed on the terms of a comprehensive, consensual
restructuring.  In large part, this was due to the different debt
holdings of the CoCom and the Ad Hoc Group and the disparate views
those groups held about the optimal approach to this
restructuring.

Most of Seadrill's secured debt is contained in 12 distinct silos,
each secured by one or more individual rigs as collateral, and
which share pari passu first liens in common collateral consisting
primarily of cash.

Following the Petition Date, the Debtors have continued to build
consensus with their constituents.  After extensive negotiations,
on July 23, 2021, (i) the Debtors and the Consenting Lenders
executed the Plan Support Agreement, pursuant to which the
Consenting Lenders holding 57.8 percent of the aggregate Credit
Agreement Claims have agreed to support the Plan, and (ii) the
Backstop Parties and the Company entered into the Backstop
Commitment Letter, pursuant to which the Backstop Parties will
backstop a $300 million new money credit facility. The Plan
provides for the reorganization of the Debtors as a going concern
with a deleveraged capital structure and sufficient liquidity to
fund the Debtors' post-emergence business plan.

The Plan, among other things, provides the following:

   * Holders of Allowed Credit Agreement Claims will (a) receive
$750 million of takeback debt, (b) be entitled to participate in a
$300 million new-money raise under the New First Lien Facility, and
(c) receive 83 percent of equity in Reorganized Seadrill, subject
to dilution by the Management Incentive Plan and the Convertible
Bond Equity (if any), on account of their Allowed Credit Agreement
Claims, and 16.75 percent of equity in Reorganized Seadrill if such
holders elect to participate in the Rights Offering (including, for
the avoidance of doubt, the Backstop Parties), in accordance with
the Backstop Commitment Letter and the New First Lien Finance
Documents, subject to dilution by the Management Incentive Plan,
the Convertible Bond Equity (if any);

   * Where applicable, Net Scrap Proceeds from the recycled Rigs
will be paid in cash to the lenders under the applicable
facilities;

   * Holders of the $360 million Asia Offshore Drilling credit
facility will receive the option to elect (a) their pro rata share
of the AOD silo's takeback debt and equity allocation, or (b) their
pro rata share of cash for the full amount of their claim in lieu
of such debt and equity allocations; and

   * If Classes 4 and 6 each vote to accept the Plan, holders of
Interests in Seadrill Limited will receive a Pro Rata share of 0.25
percent of the New Seadrill Common Shares, subject to dilution by
the Management Incentive Plan and the Convertible Bond Equity (if
any).

To capture the full benefit of the compromises embodied in the Plan
and the Plan Support Agreement, and to avoid any default under the
Cash Collateral Order, the Debtors must move through these chapter
11 cases at a steady pace. The Cash Collateral Order has certain
key milestones, including:

   * entry of an order confirming the Disclosure Statement on or
before July 30, 2021; and

   * entry of an order confirming the Plan on or before August 31,
2021.

Moreover, the Plan Support Agreement contains the following
milestones:

   * entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the
Disclosure Statement within 45 days of the Plan Support Agreement
Effective Date (i.e. by September 6, 2021);

   * entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court confirming the Plan
within 105 days of the Plan Support Agreement Effective Date (i.e.
by November 5, 2021); and

   * occurrence of the Effective Date within 165 days of the Plan
Support Agreement Effective Date (i.e. by January 4, 2022).

The formulation of the restructuring embodied in the Plan Support
Agreement, the Backstop Commitment Letter, and the Plan is a
significant achievement for the Debtors in the face of historic
commodity price declines and a depressed operating environment. The
Debtors strongly believe that the Plan is in the best interests of
the Debtors' estates, and represents the best available alternative
at this time. Given the Debtors' core strengths, including their
modern fleet, highly-skilled workforce, global reach, and
successful operating and safety track record, the Debtors are
confident they can efficiently implement the restructuring set
forth in the Plan Support Agreement, the Backstop Commitment
Letter, and the Plan to ensure their long-term viability and
success. For these reasons, the Debtors strongly recommend that
holders of Claims and Interests in the Voting Classes vote to
accept the Plan.

Under the Plan, Class 6 General Unsecured Claims total
$1,124,035,708. Each holder of an Allowed General Unsecured Claim
against the Debtors shall receive its Pro Rata share of $250,000 in
Cash; provided, however, that holders of Credit Agreement Claims
shall be deemed to have waived their recovery (but not their right
to vote) on account of their General Unsecured Claims.  Creditors
will recover 0.02% of their claims.  Class 6 is impaired.

On the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtors, including
Reorganized Seadrill, shall consummate the Rights Offering in
accordance with the Rights Offering Procedures, the Backstop
Commitment Letter, the Plan, and the New Credit Facility Term
Sheet. Subscription Rights to participate in the Rights Offering
shall be allocated among the holders of Credit Agreement Claims as
of a specified record date in accordance with the Rights Offering
Procedures, the Backstop Commitment Letter, and the Plan. The
issuance of such Subscription Rights shall be exempt from SEC
registration under section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code and shall
not constitute an invitation or offer to sell, or the solicitation
of an invitation or offer to buy, any securities in contravention
of any applicable law in any jurisdiction.

Holders of the Subscription Rights, which include the Backstop
Parties, shall receive the right to lend up to $300 million under
the New First Lien Facility in accordance with and pursuant to the
Plan, the Rights Offering Procedures, the Backstop Commitment
Letter, and the New Credit Facility Term Sheet.  Rights Offering
Participants shall also receive, in consideration for their
participation in the Rights Offering, 12.5% (the "Rights Offering
Percentage") of the issued and outstanding New Seadrill Common
Shares as of the Effective Date (subject to dilution by the
Management Incentive Plan and the Convertible Bond Equity (if any))
allocated among the Rights Offering Participants based on the total
Subscription Rights subscribed by such Person relative to the total
Subscription Rights subscribed by all such Persons (the "Rights
Offering Participation Equity"), provided, that if the Rights
Offering is not fully subscribed, the Rights Offering Percentage
shall equal 12.5% multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which
is the principal amount of the New First Lien Facility committed in
the Rights Offering and the denominator of which is $300 million.

As consideration for the Backstop Commitment of each Backstop Party
and the other agreements of the Backstop Parties as set forth in
the Backstop Commitment Letter, (a) the Backstop Parties will be
issued the number of New Seadrill Common Shares equal to the sum
of: (1) (x) the percentage of 12.5% minus the Rights Offering
Percentage multiplied by (y) the total number of New Seadrill
Common Shares issued and outstanding on the Effective Date (subject
to dilution by the Management Incentive Plan and the Convertible
Bond Equity (if any)), plus (2) 4.25% multiplied by (y) the total
number of New Seadrill Common Shares issued and outstanding on the
Effective Date (subject to dilution by the Management Incentive
Plan and the Convertible Bond Equity (if any)) (the "Equity
Commitment Premium", and together with the New Seadrill Common
Shares described in the foregoing clause (1), the "Backstop
Participation Equity"); and (b) the Debtors shall pay or cause to
be paid in cash to the Backstop Parties a premium (the "Commitment
Premium") equal to 7.5% of the $300 million in total commitments
under the New First Lien Facility, in each case, allocated among
the Backstop Parties as set forth in the Backstop Commitment
Letter.

Co-Counsel to the Debtors:

     Matthew D. Cavenaugh
     Jennifer F. Wertz
     Vienna F. Anaya
     Victoria Argeroplos (TX Bar No. 24105799)
     JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.
     1401 McKinney Street, Suite 1900
     Houston, TX 77010
     Telephone: (713) 752-4200
     Facsimile: (713) 752-4221
     Email: mcavenaugh@jw.com
            jwertz@jw.com
            vanaya@jw.com
            vargeroplos@jw.com

Co-Counsel to the Debtors:

     Anup Sathy, P.C.
     Ross M. Kwasteniet, P.C.
     Brad Weiland
     Spencer Winters
     KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
     KIRKLAND & ELLIS INTERNATIONAL LLP
     300 North LaSalle Street
     Chicago, Illinois 60654
     Telephone: (312) 862-2000
     Facsimile: (312) 862-2200
     Email: asathy@kirkland.com
            rkwasteniet@kirkland.com
            bweiland@kirkland.com
            spencer.winters@kirkland.com

           - and -

     Christopher Marcus, P.C.
     KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
     KIRKLAND & ELLIS INTERNATIONAL LLP
     601 Lexington Avenue
     New York, New York 10022
     Telephone: (212) 446-4800
     Facsimile: (212) 446-4900
     Email: cmarcus@kirkland.com

A copy of the Disclosure Statement dated July 24, 2021, is
available at https://bit.ly/37beZAm from PacerMonitor.com.

                         About Seadrill Ltd.

Seadrill Limited (OSE:SDRL, OTCQX:SDRLF) --
http://www.seapdrill.com/-- is a deepwater drilling contractor
providing drilling services to the oil and gas industry. As of
March 31, 2018, it had a fleet of over 35 offshore drilling units
that include 12 semi-submersible rigs, 7 drillships, and 16 jack-up
rigs.

On Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill Limited sought Chapter 11 protection
after reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt. It emerged from bankruptcy
in July 2018.

Demand for exploration and drilling has fallen further during the
COVID-19 pandemic as oil firms seek to preserve cash, idling more
rigs and leading to additional overcapacity among companies serving
the industry.

In June 2020, Seadrill wrote down the value of its rigs by $1.2
billion and said it planned to scrap 10 rigs. Seadrill said it is
in talks with lenders on a restructuring of its $5.7 billion bank
debt.

Seadrill Partners LLC, a limited liability company formed by
deep-water drilling contractor Seadrill Ltd. to own, operate and
acquire offshore drilling rigs, along with its affiliates, sought
Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 20-35740) on
Dec. 1, 2020, after its parent company swept one of its bank
accounts to pay disputed management fees. Mohsin Y. Meghji,
authorized signatory, signed the petitions.

On Feb. 7, 2021, Seadrill GCC Operations Ltd., Asia Offshore
Drilling Limited, Asia Offshore Rig 1 Limited, Asia Offshore Rig 2
Limited, and Asia Offshore Rig 3 Limited sought Chapter 11
protection.  Seadrill GCC estimated $100 million to $500 million in
assets and liabilities as of the bankruptcy filing.

Additionally, on Feb. 10, 2021, Seadrill Limited and 114 affiliated
debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code with the Court. The lead case
is In re Seadrill Limited (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Case No. 21-30427).

Seadrill Limited disclosed $7.291 billion in assets against $7.193
billion in liabilities as of the bankruptcy filing.

In the new Chapter 11 cases, the Debtors tapped Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as counsel; Houlihan Lokey, Inc. as financial advisor; Alvarez
& Marsal North America, LLC as restructuring advisor; Jackson
Walker LLP as co-bankruptcy counsel; Slaughter and May as
co-corporate counsel; Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS as Norwegian
counsel; and Conyers Dill & Pearman as Bermuda counsel. Prime Clerk
LLC is the claims agent.

On April 9, 2021, the board of directors of Debtor Seadrill North
Atlantic Holdings Limited unanimously adopted resolutions
appointing Steven G. Panagos and Jeffrey S. Stein as independent
directors to the board.  Seadrill North Atlantic Holdings Limited
tapped Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP as counsel and AMA Capital
Partners, LLC as financial advisor at the sole direction of
independent directors.





===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: 30% of Minas Gerais Coffee Plantations Affected by Frost
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that flying over the Varginha
coffee-growing area in southern Minas Gerais, brown spots can be
seen on a large part of the plantations, indicating that the July
20 touches of frost have burned the coffee trees affecting up to
30&% of the area, and will mean losses for at least the next two
harvests.

"It was worse than I imagined . . . It's hard to see a plantation
that didn't suffer," said agronomist Adriano Rabelo de Rezende,
technical coordinator of the Minasul cooperative to Reuters, after
flying over farms in the municipalities of Varginha, Eloi Mendes,
Paraguacu, Alfenas, Machado, Boa Esperan, according to Rio Times
Online.

Minasul operates in major production centers in Minas Gerais state,
which accounted for about 40% of Brazilian Arabica coffee
production in 2020, the report notes.

                             About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020).  Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021.  Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020).  S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020.  Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March
2018).

VALE SA: Posts Q2 2021 Earnings Call Transcript
-----------------------------------------------
Vale SA shares earnings call for the period ending June 30, 2021.

"We have reached as well an annual capacity of 335 million tons,
and we expect to operate with an average production of one million
tons per day in the second half of the year. We remain confident
that we will achieve our production guidance for 2021," the company
disclosed in the call.

A full text copy of the press release is available free at:
https://bit.ly/3C0pRz1

                       About Vale SA

Vale S.A. is a Brazilian multinational corporation engaged in
metals and mining and one of the largest logistics operators in
Brazil.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in
September 2019, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale S.A.'s Ba1
senior unsecured ratings and the ratings on the debt issues of Vale
Overseas Limited, fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale
S.A.

Moody's also affirmed the Ba2 senior unsecured ratings of Vale
Canada Ltd.  The outlook changed to stable from negative.

At the same time, Moody's America Latina Ltda. affirmed Vale's
Ba1/Aaa.br corporate family rating and the Ba1/Aaa.br ratings on
its senior unsecured notes. The outlook changed to stable from
negative.

VALE SA: Revises Down Year-End Iron Ore Output
----------------------------------------------
Gram Slattery and Marta Nogueira at Reuters report that Vale SA
flagged potential production setbacks amid temporary issues at
multiple iron ore mines, but executives said the Brazilian miner
was still on track to ramp up output in the second half of the
year.

In a presentation released in the morning of July 29, the world's
second largest iron ore producer revised down its guidance for
year-end production capacity to 343 million tonnes per annum from
350 million tonnes previously, notes the report.

Among the issues holding back production, Vale said, are licensing
issues at its Sistema Norte and Mutuca assets in Brazil, as well as
temporary restrictions on the disposal of mining waste at its
Itabira mine, reports Reuters.

In a call with analysts later in the morning, which followed Vale's
second quarter results release on July 28, executives also warned
that an ongoing strike at its operations in Sudbury, Canada, would
hit third-quarter production there. The company and union
representatives have been back at the table for 10 days in a bid to
hash out a deal, they said, according to the report.

Still, the company is on track to hit its annualized 2021 guidance
of between 315 and 335 million tonnes, executives said, adds the
report.

Reuters relates that in July, Vale received authorizations for key
mills at its Fabrica mine in southeastern Brazil and began
operations at its Maravilhas III tailings dam at the firm's Vargem
Grande mine, according to the presentation.

"All these contributions make us believe that it's possible to
deliver more than last year in the second half (of 2021)," Reuters
quotes Marcello Spinelli, head of the company's ferrous metals
division, as saying.

Vale reported a quarterly net income of $7.586 billion, a
significant increase in annual terms, but slightly below the
Refinitiv consensus estimate, the report relays.

                       About Vale SA

Vale S.A. is a Brazilian multinational corporation engaged in
metals and mining and one of the largest logistics operators in
Brazil.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in
September 2019, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale S.A.'s Ba1
senior unsecured ratings and the ratings on the debt issues of Vale
Overseas Limited, fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale
S.A.

Moody's also affirmed the Ba2 senior unsecured ratings of Vale
Canada Ltd.  The outlook changed to stable from negative.

At the same time, Moody's America Latina Ltda. affirmed Vale's
Ba1/Aaa.br corporate family rating and the Ba1/Aaa.br ratings on
its senior unsecured notes. The outlook changed to stable from
negative.




=======
P E R U
=======

ORAZUL ENERGY: Extends Notes Tender Offer Expiration Date to Aug. 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Orazul Energy Peru S.A. (f/k/a Orazul Energy Egenor S. en C. por
A.) ("Orazul") has amended its previously announced "Modified Dutch
Auction" tender offer to a fixed price tender offer (the "Tender
Offer") for its 5.625% Senior Notes due 2027 (CUSIP Nos. 68559B
AA5; P7372B AA1) (the "Notes"). As a result of the amendment and
the new fixed price Total Consideration (as defined below), the
Tender Offer has been extended and will now expire at 11:59 P.M.,
New York City time, on August 11, 2021, unless further extended or
terminated (the "New Expiration Date").

In the Tender Offer, Orazul is offering to purchase for cash for up
to an amount of its Notes that would not result in the aggregate
purchase price exceeding $150.4 million (the "Maximum Tender
Amount"). As amended, Orazul is now offering to pay for each $1,000
principal amount of Notes validly tendered (and not validly
withdrawn) at any time prior to the New Expiration Date and
accepted for purchase a fixed price of $1,035.00 (the "Total
Consideration"). The Tender Offer originally contemplated that the
total consideration was to be determined according to the
procedures of a "Modified Dutch Auction," with the purchase price
to be set at an amount not less than $1,000.00 nor greater than
$1,020.00 per $1,000 principal amount.

A full text copy of the press release is available free at
https://prn.to/3yfqkeh

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July
29, 2021, Fitch Ratings has removed Orazul Energy Peru S.A.'s
ratings from Rating Watch Positive and affirmed its Long-Term
Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'BB'
with a Stable Rating Outlook. Fitch has also affirmed Orazul's
USD550 million senior unsecured notes.





=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

LATAM: Pay Cuts of 36% Show Region's Economies Faltering
--------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Bloomberg News, reports that of all
the numbers that lay bare the pandemic plight of blue-collar
workers, few are as jarring as the pay cut suffered by the millions
of Argentines who toil in off-the-book jobs.

globalinsolvency.com reports that the decline for people like
waiters, construction workers and candy-vendors was 36% on average
last year, considering inflation.

That staggering number is almost four times the average pay cut
that Argentines in the formal economy had to absorb, the report
notes.

More Latin Americans are stuck in informal jobs every day, an
explosive surge trapping millions in an abyss of unsteady work,
poverty and dependence on aid from suddenly cash-strapped
governments, the report relays.

About 7.6 million more people in the region, the equivalent of
everyone in Bogota, will work informally this year than before the
pandemic, according to the Inter-American Development Bank, the
report adds.


MORE AUTOMOTIVE: Taps Luis R. Carrasquillo as Financial Consultant
------------------------------------------------------------------
More Automotive Products, Inc. seeks approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire Luis R.
Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C. as its financial consultant.

The Debtor needs a financial consultant to assist in the financial
restructuring of its affairs, advise on strategic planning, assist
in the preparation of a plan for reorganization, and participate
in
the negotiation with creditors.

The firm's hourly rates are as follows:

     Luis R. Carrasquillo, Partner                   $175 per hour
     Marcelo Gutiurrez, Senior CPA                   $125 per hour
     Arnaldo Morales, Senior Accountant              $100 per hour
     Carmen Callejas Echevarria, Senior Accountant    $90 per hour
     Zoraida Delgado Diaz, Junior Accountant          $65 per hour
     Enid Olmeda, Junior Accountant                   $45 per hour
     Rosalie Hernandez Burgos, Administrative
     and Support                                      $35 per hour
     Kelsei Lopez, Administrative and Support         $35 per hour

The Debtor paid $12,000 to the firm as a retainer fee.

Luis Carrasquillo Ruiz, a principal at the firm, disclosed in a
court filing that his firm is a "disinterested person" as the term
is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached at:

     Luis R. Carrasquillo Ruiz, CPA
     Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C.
     28th St., Turabo Gardens Ave.
     Caguas, PR 00725
     Tel.: 787-746-4555
     Fax: 787-746-4564
     Email: luis@cpacarrasquillo.com

                       About More Automotive

More Automotive Products, Inc., doing business as Dollar Rent a
Car, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 21-02142)
on July 15, 2021. At the time of the filing, the Debtor had between
$10 million and $50 million in both assets and liabilities. Alberic
Colon Zambrana, president, signed the petition.

Judge Enrique S. Lamouttee Inclan oversees the case.

Charles A. Cuprill P.S.C. Law Offices serves as the bankruptcy
counsel while Saldana, Carvajal & Velez-Rive, P.S.C. serves as the
special counsel. The Debtor's financial consultant is Luis R.
Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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