/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/210614.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, June 14, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 112
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
MERCADOLIBRE INC: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB-
B R A Z I L
AZUL SA: Moody's Rates Unit's New $600MM Unsecured Notes 'Caa1'
BRAZIL: Corporate Fin'l Restructuring Requests up 48.4% in May-Apr
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
KATERRA INC: Files for Chapter 11 After Greensill Woes
C H I L E
LATAM AIRLINES: To Delay Plan, To Take Add'l. $500M Funding
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Allows Imports to Offset Rising Prices
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Liquidity Intervention Crucial for SME Sector
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week June 7 to June 11, 2021
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A R G E N T I N A
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MERCADOLIBRE INC: Egan-Jones Cuts Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB-
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Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 3, 2021, downgraded the foreign
currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued
by MercadoLibre Inc. to BB- from BBB-.
Headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, MercadoLibre Inc.
operates an online trading site for the Latin American markets.
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B R A Z I L
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AZUL SA: Moody's Rates Unit's New $600MM Unsecured Notes 'Caa1'
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Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Caa1 rating to the
proposed up to $600 million senior unsecured notes due in 5-7 years
to be issued by Azul Investments LLP and unconditionally guaranteed
by Azul S.A. ("Azul") (B3 stable) and Azul Linhas Aereas
Brasileiras S.A. Azul's existing B3 corporate family rating and
Caa1 senior unsecured rating remain unchanged. The outlook is
stable.
The proposed issuance is part of Azul's liability management
strategy and proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes,
including strengthening liquidity and prepaying operational and
financial liabilities that were deferred during the pandemic.
Azul's total debt can increase depending on how much of the
proceeds the company directs to the payment of non-financial
obligations, but liquidity will improve.
The rating of the proposed notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.
Rating Assigned:
Issuer: Azul Investments LLP
up to $600 million Gtd Senior Unsecured Notes due in 5-7 years:
Caa1 (global scale)
The outlook is stable.
RATINGS RATIONALE
Azul's B3 CFR is supported by the better passenger traffic in
Brazil (Ba2 stable) versus Moody's estimates at the beginning of
the virus outbreak. Azul's ability to reduce costs during the
pandemic that resulted in lower than expected cash burn and its
proven access to the financial markets also support the rating.
Moody's expectation that Azul will succeed in taking advantage of
the recovery in the market through its unique position in most of
its network while keeping liquidity at adequate levels is also
reflected in the B3 rating. Moody's also believes that there is
strong potential for Azul to substantially improve key credit
metrics towards 2019 levels through 2023.
The B3 rating is constrained by the still fragile situation of the
airlines industry combined with Azul's still weak credit metrics.
The rating incorporates the uncertainties ahead of the sector as a
result of the coronavirus pandemic that could lead to slower
economic recovery or another round of restrictions for travel and
tourism reducing the speed of the rebound in the industry. Despite
the recovery observed so far, the capital markets are still
demanding stronger collaterals packages and higher returns when
offering new funding to airlines in general. The ability to raise
liquidity and control cash burn will still be key aspects in Azul's
ratings assessment. Finally, Azul's stated intention to pursue M&A
activity in Brazil could be an additional credit concern depending
on the funding structure of a potential transaction.
Azul's senior unsecured notes are rated Caa1, one notch below the
CFR, reflecting the effective subordination of unsecured creditors.
Moody's understands that the senior unsecured notes rank below
Azul's existing and future secured claims that pro forma to the
proposed issuance will account for around 60% of the company's
indebtedness.
The notes proceeds will bolster the company's liquidity and
potentially improve its debt maturity profile through the
prepayment of operational and financial liabilities that were
deferred during the pandemic. The liability management will also
release working cash that can be deployed to finance working
capital and fleet requirements to support the expected growth in
demand in the second half of 2021.
Moody's estimates that after the transaction Azul's cash position
will hover at around BRL2.5-3.0 billion, which compares to about
BRL1.4 billion in financial debt maturing until the end of 2022.
The company also has around BRL4.0 billion in other potential
liquidity sources including receivables and financeable deposits,
in addition to having unencumbered assets that could be used in
potential secured financing transactions.
Azul's passenger revenue and the number of flights it offers have
been more resilient than Brazil's industry average because of
Azul's unique network and fleet flexibility, which makes it easier
for the company to tackle demand at profitable manners in different
demand and aircraft scenarios. As such, despite the second wave of
COVID-19 infections in Brazil in February, March and April 2021,
Azul's passenger revenue (measured by RPK) stood at 76% of 2019's
in the first four months of 2021, while Brazil's average excluding
Azul stood at 46%. Similarly, Azul's flight offer (measured by ASK)
was at 82% of 2019 levels, while the industry (excluding Azul) was
at 50%.
The resurgence of COVID-19 cases in Brazil during the first quarter
of 2021 strained Azul's forward bookings, but the company reported
an increase north of 40% in forward bookings already at the end of
April 2021 with the roll-out of vaccination in Brazil and reduction
of hospitals occupancy, which will help restoring receivables
volumes during the second quarter of 2021.
The recovery of the company's network and operating performance
will help improving Azul's adjusted gross leverage to high
single-digit to low double-digit levels in 2021, and with the
current trajectory of EBITDA approaching pre-pandemic levels in the
next 12-18 months, leverage would fall further to mid-single digits
in 2022.
RATING OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects Moody's belief that Azul will succeed
in taking advantage of the recovery in the market through its
unique position in most of its network while keeping liquidity at
adequate levels.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS
Azul's ratings could be upgraded if risks and uncertainties are
reduced significantly, and passenger demand begins a sustainable
recovery towards pre-coronavirus levels. A rating upgrade would
also require Azul to maintain an adequate liquidity profile, with
cash consistently above 20% of revenues, and key metrics to improve
with debt / EBITDA declining below 6.0x and funds from operations +
interest / interest sustainably above 3.0x.
Azul's ratings could be downgraded if the pace of recovery of
passenger demand is slower than Moody's expects, and liquidity
concerns increase. A downgrade could also occur if the company is
unable to strengthen credit metrics through the recovery phase or
if there are increased expectations of a default in the company's
financial obligations.
COMPANY PROFILE
Headquartered in Barueri near the City of Sao Paulo, Brazil, Azul
is a Brazilian airline founded by David Neeleman in 2008. The
company is the largest airline in Brazil by number of cities and
departures, serving 117 destinations with an operating fleet of 162
aircraft and operating 700 flights daily. The company also flies
its aircraft to select international destinations, including Fort
Lauderdale, Orlando and Lisbon. Azul is the sole owner of the
loyalty program TudoAzul, a strategic revenue-generating asset,
which had around 12.8 million members in the end of March 2021. In
the twelve months ended March 2021 Azul generated BRL4.8 billion in
net revenue.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Passenger
Airline Industry published in April 2018.
BRAZIL: Corporate Fin'l Restructuring Requests up 48.4% in May-Apr
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Rio Times Online reports that the number of financial restructuring
requests by companies in Brazil reached 92 in May this year,
representing an increase of 48.4% compared to April, according to a
survey by Serasa Experian.
The majority concern micro and small companies. Compared to May
last year (94 requests), there was a 2.1% drop in the total number
of requests, according to Rio Times Online.
When analyzing sectors, services stood out with 62 requests in May
2021, followed by commerce (15) and industry (12), the report
notes.
About Brazil
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.
Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020). Fitch's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) has been affirmed
in May 2021. Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at
BB- with stable outlook (April 2020). S&P's 'BB-/B' long-and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings for
Brazil were affirmed in December 2020. Moody's credit rating for
Brazil was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook
(March 2018).
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C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
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KATERRA INC: Files for Chapter 11 After Greensill Woes
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Despite an investment of over $2 billion from Japan-based
SoftBank's Vision Fund, Katerra Inc. has sought bankruptcy
protection in the U.S., citing ongoing losses, an investigation
into certain accounting regularities at its Renovations business,
and the collapse of UK-based financial services firm Greensill
Group.
Co-founded in 2015 by Michael Marks, Jim Davidson, and Fritz Wolff,
Katerra is an innovative and eco-conscious construction company
that develops, manufactures, and markets products and services in
the commercial and residential construction spaces.
Marc Liebman, Chief Transformation Officer of Katerra Inc.
(Cayman), explained in a bankruptcy court filing that over its six
years in operation, Katerra has raised close to $3 billion in
equity investments but was unable to generate a profit.
Katerra's manufacturing network specializes in "productized
design," whereby Katerra manufactures building components as
repeatable modules. In furtherance of productized design, in 2019,
Katerra launched "K3," a building platform focused on the
construction and assembly of high-quality apartment buildings
through the use of modular building components that are assembled
onsite. Katerra also has pioneered the use of new building
technologies, such as cross-laminated timber.
In pursuit of a fully integrated business model, Katerra acquired
several general contractor businesses specializing in commercial,
residential and multi-family projects in the West, Northeast,
Mid-Atlantic and South East regions.
Although Katerra won numerous projects, rapidly expanded its
national footprint, and completed a series of successful capital
raises, it was unable to generate a profit. Over time, Katerra
experienced losses on contracted projects that experienced
significant cost overruns, resulting in massive, ongoing losses,
especially when Katerra had to honor the maximum price guarantees
and discounts it had provided to certain legacy customers. In
hindsight, those discounts were value destructive.
In May 2020, Katerra commenced a sixth round of financing with one
of its existing investors, SVF Abode (Cayman) Limited, to raise
additional capital -- on top of close to $3 billion previously
raised -- to fund its operations. Pursuant to the terms of the
Series F financing, SVF Abode provided Katerra with an initial $100
million in funding and agreed to fund another $100 million
approximately 45 days later. In addition, SVF Abode exchanged its
49% ownership stake in non-Debtor Katerra Middle East Inc. for
another $150 million in Series F shares.
At the end of May 2020, Katerra identified potential improper
revenue recognition practices related to its Katerra Renovations,
LLC business. Within days, an independent committee of the Board
of Directors of Katerra Cayman was formed to oversee an
investigation into these potential accounting irregularities, and
Katerra elected to freeze its equity raises while that
investigation was ongoing. As a result of this investigation, SVF
Abode elected to exercise its contractual right to withhold the
additional $100 million of financing on the 45-day timeline.
During the investigation, and in part due to the freeze on raising
capital, Katerra continued to face worsening liquidity that
threatened its operations. Katerra experienced financial and
technical setbacks on some of its legacy construction projects due
to re-work issues related to earlier-completed work. The
Company's exposure to expensive long-term, third-party commitments
in real estate, IT, and software further restrained cash flow.
Finally, the Greensill Receivables Facility was already fully
drawn, and the debt level thereunder, combined with Katerra's
inability to comply with the covenant criteria since early 2020,
made it difficult to obtain bonding for new project starts,
impeding Katerra's ability to secure new business.
In July 2020, Katerra appointed new management to address its
constrained liquidity, which was preventing investment in new
growth areas and timely vendor payments, straining those
relationships and placing projects at risk. Further, due to
COVID-19, Katerra, along with the rest of the global construction
industry, experienced unprecedented economic disruption, including
project delays, shutdowns, and cancellations. Despite its best
efforts, Katerra was unable to reduce its heavy operating-cost
structure and high cash burn to optimize its business.
Given these difficulties, Katerra engaged restructuring advisors
and investment bankers in August and September 2020 to evaluate its
restructuring alternatives, including raising additional capital.
Also in September 2020, Katerra appointed two independent directors
with extensive restructuring experience to the Board of Directors
of Katerra Cayman. Around this time, Katerra also voluntarily
contacted the SEC to inform the SEC of the findings of the
Independent Committee investigation.
After several months of exploring options to restructure its
business and balance sheet (including negotiating a prospective
transaction with a consortium of new and existing investors that
ultimately did not materialize), in late November 2020, Katerra
reached a non-binding term sheet with the only investor willing to
engage in an out-of-court restructuring, SVF Abode, and other key
stakeholders, agreeing to a series of transactions that resulted in
the financial recapitalization and restructuring of Katerra's
material obligations, whereby, among other things:
* SVF Abode agreed to invest $200 million in new money in
exchange for approximately 75% of Katerra's post-closing
equity;
* Certain of Katerra's contract counterparties agreed to global
amendments to their project contracts to amend and extend
project timelines and completion dates in exchange for
granting releases of certain claims regarding active
projects;
* Greensill Limited extinguished approximately $440 million
owed by Katerra under the Greensill Receivables Facility
in exchange for approximately 5% of the post-equity
closing in Katerra, which equity was immediately
transferred by Greensill to an affiliate of SoftBank
Vision Fund II in connection with a transaction in which
SVF II invested $440 million in Greensill's parent
company; and
* 5% of the post-closing equity was reserved for certain
existing equity holders and 15% of the post-closing
equity was reserved in a share pool for an equity
incentive plan and related grants.
The transaction was implemented, allowing Katerra to avoid a
near-term Chapter 11 filing, and it was expected to provide Katerra
with sufficient liquidity to address its immediate ongoing
obligations and continue operating in the ordinary course of
business pursuant to a new business plan.
While negotiating the December 2020 transaction, Katerra was also
negotiating the final terms of the PIF Sale, which was expected to
generate approximately $147 million of additional capital, $47
million of which was expected to go directly to Katerra Cayman.
The PIF Sale was not expected to close until early 2021.
In March 2021, Greensill filed multiple insolvency proceedings in
the United Kingdom, Australia, and in the United States. Certain
of Katerra's important bond providers demanded exorbitant cash
collateral to facilitate construction and certain of Katerra's
contract counterparties stopped doing business with Katerra,
speculating that Katerra was still burdened with the Greensill
Receivables Facility and would be implicated in the Greensill
proceedings. In addition, the PIF Sale did not close and Katerra
Cayman needed to use $23 million of its own liquidity to address
covenant compliance concerns under the Samba Credit Facility.
Katerra was thus unable to bond certain contract projects,
exacerbating its existing operational issues because, without
appropriate bonding, it was unable to provide the security of
payment and performance of its obligations under certain projects.
All of which created massive liquidity constraints and, in some
instances, a halt to existing construction projects.
After providing Katerra with over $2 billion in equity funding to
support ongoing operations and the direct repayment to Greensill of
$440 million to facilitate the 2020 recapitalization, SoftBank
Vision Fund I explained to Katerra that it could not responsibly
continue to support Katerra with go-forward equity in May 2021.
Immediately thereafter, on May 17, 2021, three members of Katerra's
senior management team resigned, further straining Katerra's
already tenuous position.
In response, Katerra's board of directors formed a special
committee comprised of its two independent directors. The Special
Committee called upon the same legal and financial advisors to once
again start exploring strategic alternatives. Unfortunately,
Katerra's liquidity continued to rapidly deteriorate and, by the
end of May 2021, the Company found itself facing an overdrawn cash
position unless it received an immediate capital infusion. Katerra
immediately shut down several unprofitable and unmarketable active
projects to preserve liquidity and implemented a substantial
reduction in force (approximately 730 employees). Katerra
continues to work on certain projects to preserve value so that
certain business lines may be sold.
Notwithstanding that SVF (together with its affiliates) has
invested over $2 billion into Katerra and is unlikely to receive a
distribution in the Chapter 11 cases, SB Investment Advisers (UK)
Limited, an affiliate of SVF, has agreed to provide $35 million of
postpetition financing as a sign of continuing support to
facilitate a marketing process for the Debtors' remaining assets
and an orderly wind-down of the Debtors' business for the benefit
of the Debtors' estates. Time is clearly of the essence, and
Katerra intends to move expeditiously to maximize value for the
benefit of all stakeholders.
Over $1 Billion in Debt
As of the Petition Date, the Debtors and certain of their
non-debtor subsidiaries have an aggregate principal amount of
approximately $1.29 billion to $1.55 billion in estimated
obligations, consisting primarily of (i) prepetition funded debt of
certain of the Debtors' foreign non-Debtor subsidiaries, (ii)
surety bond obligations, (iii) letters of credit, and (iv)
corporate guarantees.
The aggregate outstanding amount of each debt obligation is as
follows:
Funded Debt Principal Amount (in USD)
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Prepetition Foreign Funded Debt $72.4 million
Prepetition Samba Credit Facility $16.7 million
Prepetition SIDF Term Loan $16.3 million
Prepetition YES Bank Facility $39.5 million
Bonding and Letters of Credit $699.1 million
Surety Bond Obligations $676.7 million
Letters of Credit $22.3 million
Corporate Guarantees $514.8 million
to $779.2 million
-----------------
Total Debt Obligations $1.29 billion
to $1.55 billion
Sale of Assets
To provide Katerra with liquidity to commence a smooth landing into
the Chapter 11 cases, SB Investment Advisers (UK) Limited agreed to
provide a $35 million senior secured superpriority DIP Promissory
Note. The purpose of the DIP Promissory Note is to provide Katerra
with enough liquidity to run an in-court marketing process with the
goal of consummating one or more sales of Katerra's assets and an
orderly wind-down of the Company.
Given its position as equity holder in Katerra, its familiarity
with Katerra's business and assets, and Katerra's impending
liquidity shortfall, SB Investment Advisers (UK) Limited was best
positioned to provide the DIP Promissory Note to facilitate
Katerra's soft landing into Chapter 11.
Because time is of the essence to minimize costs while preserving
the value of key assets, the Debtors propose the following case
timeline:
* On or before 5 days after the Petition Date, the Debtors
shall file a Bidding Procedures Motion;
* On or before 45 days after the Petition Date, the Court
shall enter an order approving the bid procedures;
* On or before 60 days after the Petition Date, the Court
shall enter one or more sale orders;
* On or before 60 days after the Petition Date, the
Debtors shall file a Plan and Disclosure Statement;
* On or before 90 days after the Petition Date, the Court
shall enter an order approving the Disclosure Statement;
* On or before 120 days after the Petition Date, the
Court shall enter an order confirming the Plan; and
* On or before 135 days after the Petition Date, the
effective date of the Plan shall occur.
During the Chapter 11 process, the Debtors are focused on marketing
Katerra's key assets and operations, including: (a) the CLT
Facility, equipment, and land; (b) the Tracy Factory equipment; (c)
Katerra Saudi Arabia; (d) operations in India; and (e) the K3
building platform. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors have
entered into term sheet commitments to sell the following
businesses, subject to Court approval, LAS and Renovations. The
Debtors expect to have final terms sheets to sell non-Debtors MGA
and Equilibrium in the near future.
The Debtors believe that a Chapter 11 process provides the best
avenue for the Company to maximize value for stakeholders by
continuing to market the assets of the business and effectuating an
orderly wind-down of operations.
About Katerra Inc.
Based in Menlo Park, California, Katerra is a Japanese-funded,
American technology-driven offsite construction company. It was
founded in 2015 by Michael Marks, former CEO of Flextronics and
former Tesla interim CEO, along with Fritz Wolff, the executive
chairman of The Wolff Co.
Katerra offers technology-driven design, manufacturing, and
assembly solution for bathroom pods, door and window, furniture,
and modular utility systems.
Katerra Inc. and its affiliates sought Chapter 11 protection
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 21-31861) on June 6, 2021. In its
petition, Katerra estimated liabilities of between $1 billion and
$10 billion and estimated assets of between $500 million and $1
billion.
The Debtors tapped Kirkland & Ellis LLP as counsel; Jackson Walker
LLP as co-bankruptcy counsel; Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc., as
investment banker; and Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC, as
financial and restructuring advisor. Prime Clerk LLC is the claims
and noticing agent.
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C H I L E
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LATAM AIRLINES: To Delay Plan, To Take Add'l. $500M Funding
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Reuters reports that LATAM Airlines Group, the region's largest
carrier, said that it had sought to extend until September the
deadline to present its restructuring plan as part of the
bankruptcy protection process initiated in 2020.
A judge had previously ordered the company deliver its
restructuring plan by the end of June, and the company has said it
hopes to wrap up the process in 2021.
"The extension request is a common alternative contemplated within
the process and does not modify the intention of the LATAM group to
exit Chapter 11 by the end of this year," the firm said in a
statement.
Latam also told Chilean securities regulators it has requested a
second disbursement for $500 million under the DIP Credit Agreement
(Debtor-In-Possession). The airline said the additional funds were
necessary given "the extension of the health and mobility
restrictions imposed by the authorities in the different countries
in that the Company operates, as well as the analysis of the
Company's liquidity projection".
The company also received a $1.15 billion debtor-in-possession loan
in October last year.
Earlier Latam said it expects to ramp up its June operations to 36%
of their pre-coronavirus pandemic levels, bolstered by the
quickening pace of vaccination in some countries in the region.
"All markets show projections higher than those of the previous
month," the company said in the statement.
LATAM, headquartered in Santiago, also operates in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, as well as international operations
throughout Latin America, Europe, the United States and the
Caribbean.
About LATAM Airlines Group
LATAM Airlines Group S.A. -- http://www.latam.com/-- is a
pan-Latin American airline holding company involved in the
transportation of passengers and cargo and operates as one unified
business enterprise. It is the largest passenger airline in South
America.
Before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, LATAM offered passenger
transport services to 145 different destinations in 26 countries,
including domestic flights in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru, and international services within Latin America
as well as to Europe, the United States, the Caribbean, Oceania,
Asia and Africa.
LATAM and its 28 affiliates sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 20-11254) on May 25, 2020. Affiliates in
Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and the United States are part of
the Chapter 11 filing.
The Debtors disclosed $21,087,806,000 in total assets and
$17,958,629,000 in total liabilities as of Dec. 31, 2019.
The Hon. James L. Garrity, Jr., is the case judge.
The Debtors tapped Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP as
bankruptcy counsel, FTI Consulting as restructuring advisor, Lee
Brock Camargo Advogados as local Brazilian litigation counsel, and
Togut, Segal & Segal LLP and Claro & Cia in Chile as special
counsel. The Boston Consulting Group, Inc. and The Boston
Consulting Group UK LLP serve as the Debtors' strategic advisors.
Prime Clerk LLC is the claims agent.
The official committee of unsecured creditors formed in the case
tapped Dechert LLP as its bankruptcy counsel, Klestadt Winters
Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP as conflicts counsel, UBS
Securities LLC as investment banker, and Conway MacKenzie, LLC, as
financial advisor. Ferro Castro Neves Daltro & Gomide Advogados, is
the committee's Brazilian counsel.
The Ad Hoc Group of LATAM Bondholders tapped White & Case LLP as
counsel.
Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes, LLP, led by managing partner Andrew
Glenn and partner Shai Schmidt, has been retained as counsel to the
Ad Hoc Committee of Shareholders.
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D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Allows Imports to Offset Rising Prices
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Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic President Luis
Abinader revealed that his Government has decided to authorize the
import of "many" mass consumption products and other
characteristics as a way to counteract the "disproportionate
increases" of prices experienced by various items in the local
market.
The head of state said it's a measure that is under study by his
administration, but that its enactment is a practical decision,
according to Dominican Today.
As if he were anticipating the opposition or rejection that a
measure of that nature could eventually provoke in sectors of the
country, Abinader warned that his commitment is with the Dominican
people, the report discloses.
He stressed that the increase in prices of different raw materials
in the international market, generates increases in essential
products in the Dominican Republic, but affirms that they have been
produced "disproportionately," the report adds.
About Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."
An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.
Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, 2021, assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.
Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the severe
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.
Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).
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T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
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TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Liquidity Intervention Crucial for SME Sector
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Andrea Perez-Sobers at Trinidad Express reports that Confederation
of Regional Business Chambers Coordinator Jai Leladharsingh said if
the Trinidad and Tobago Government does not lend liquidity support
to the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), many will be out of
business permanently. Leladharsingh said after listening to the
Finance Minister Colm Imbert on the Appropriation Bill reporting in
parliament, on the Revenue inflows and global pricing of primary
commodities, he hopes when the actual Mid-Year review Imbert will
address the burning issues of direct assistance to the SME sector.
"As it stands right now many small and medium size businesses would
not be able to reopen its doors, once the restrictions are lifted,
that's why the liquidity support for the sector is very important,
as only essential businesses are open at this time," according to
Trinidad Express. He noted as the vaccination program continues to
roll out non-essential businesses, the report notes.
According to the coordinator of the chamber, the SME Loan which was
implemented by the Government, is not serving any purpose in
supporting the continued existence of this sector as it was poorly
designed without any stakeholder consultations, and further to
this, high barriers were put up to prevent any SME to access any
kind of access to finance, the report notes.
"This SME Loan must be revamped, redesigned and transformed
subsequent to relevant consultations not only with the Banks, but
with the CRBC and Joint Chambers as well," Leladharsingh said, the
report relays. In March, the World Bank reported that small and
medium-sized enterprises play a critical role in developing
economies, in particular where they provide employment to persons
of all skill levels, thus promoting social inclusion for a fairly
large segment of the population, the report discloses.
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week June 7 to June 11, 2021
------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr
----------- --- ----- -------- ------- ---
Noble Holding Internat 5.3 60.5 3/15/2042 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 72.7 8/1/2027 AR USD
Province of Santa Fe 6.9 74.7 11/1/2027 AR USD
Provincia de Rio Negro 7.8 70.3 12/7/2025 AR USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6.0 16.4 4/5/2023 KY USD
Cia Latinoamericana de 9.5 73.9 7/20/2023 AR USD
Cia Latinoamericana de 9.5 74.3 7/20/2023 AR USD
Polarcus Ltd 5.6 71.8 7/1/2022 AE USD
AES Tiete Energia SA 6.8 1.2 4/15/2024 BR BRL
Provincia de Rio Negro 7.8 70.3 12/7/2025 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 8.3 72.9 12/31/2033 AR USD
Empresa Electrica de l 2.5 63.8 5/15/2021 CL CLP
Argentine Republic Gov 7.1 75.7 6/28/2117 AR USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar 9.4 74.8 8/18/2024 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 0.5 27.6 12/31/2038 AR JPY
Banco Macro SA 17.5 65.2 5/8/2022 AR ARS
Esval SA 3.5 49.9 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Argentine Republic Gov 8.3 72.9 12/31/2033 AR USD
Automotores Gildemeist 6.8 54.9 1/15/2023 CL USD
Argentine Republic Gov 8.3 72.9 12/31/2033 AR USD
Enel Americas SA 5.8 32.7 6/15/2022 CL CLP
Noble Holding Internat 6.1 62.0 3/1/2041 KY USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar 4.0 0.0 12/4/2026 AR USD
Provincia de Buenos Ai 7.9 75.3 6/15/2027 AR USD
Noble Holding Internat 6.2 62.2 8/1/2040 KY USD
Provincia de Rio Negro 7.8 70.4 12/7/2025 AR USD
YPF SA 16.5 67.3 5/9/2022 AR ARS
Provincia del Chubut A 4.5 2208 3/30/2021 AR USD
Avadel Finance Cayman 4.5 55.0 2/1/2023 US USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6.0 16.4 4/5/2023 KY USD
Sylph Ltd 2.4 65.1 9/25/2036 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 74.7 8/1/2027 AR USD
YPF SA 16.5 67.3 5/9/2022 AR ARS
Automotores Gildemeist 8.3 54.2 5/24/2021 CL USD
Cia Energetica de Pern 6.2 1.1 1/15/2022 BR BRL
Banco Macro SA 17.5 65.2 5/8/2022 AR ARS
Argentina Bonar Bonds 7.6 74.4 4/18/2037 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 8.3 74.5 12/31/2033 AR USD
KrisEnergy Ltd 4.0 40.4 6/9/2022 SG SGD
Metrogas SA/Chile 6.0 41.6 8/1/2024 CL CLP
Corp Universidad de Co 5.9 64.2 11/10/2021 CL CLP
City of Cordoba Argent 7.9 73.1 9/29/2024 AR USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6.0 16.4 4/5/2023 KY USD
Province of Santa Fe 6.9 74.7 11/1/2027 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 8.3 74.5 12/31/2033 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 6.9 75.2 1/11/2048 AR USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 5.8 75.2 4/18/2025 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 4.3 70.0 12/31/2033 AR JPY
Automotores Gildemeist 6.8 54.9 1/15/2023 CL USD
Province of Santa Fe 6.9 75.2 11/1/2027 AR USD
Argentine Republic Gov 6.3 74.1 11/9/2047 AR EUR
Fospar S/A 6.5 1.2 5/15/2026 BR BRL
YPF SA 16.5 67.3 5/9/2022 AR ARS
Automotores Gildemeist 8.3 54.2 5/24/2021 CL USD
Province of Santa Fe 6.9 75.2 11/1/2027 AR USD
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
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