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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, April 29, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 80

                           Headlines



B R A Z I L

DIAMOND OFFSHORE: Exits Chapter 11 Process, CEO Retires
EMBRAER SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative
SABESP: Fitch Raises Local Currency IDR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable


C H I L E

CHILE: Economic Activity Projected to Have Declined by 5.8% in 2020


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

AES ANDRES: Fitch Rates Proposed USD300MM Unsec. Issuance 'BB-'


M E X I C O

GRUPO AEROMEXICO: Cuts Boeing 737 Max Order in Restructuring
INTERJET SA: Mulls Filing for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy


P A N A M A

TOCUMEN: S&P Places 'BB+' Secured Notes Rating on Watch Neg.


U R U G U A Y

PORTO SEGURO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 IFS Rating, Outlook Now Stable


V E N E Z U E L A

[*] VENEZUELA: 185,000 School Kids to Get Food From UN Deal


X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Tax Revenues Declined Sharply in 2020 Due to COVID-19 Crisis

                           - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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DIAMOND OFFSHORE: Exits Chapter 11 Process, CEO Retires
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Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., announced that, on April 23, 2021,
it and its debtor affiliates emerged from their chapter 11 process
after successfully completing a financial reorganization pursuant
to their joint plan of reorganization.

The restructuring significantly delevers the Company's balance
sheet and provides substantial liquidity for the Company, resulting
in the equitization of approximately $2.1 billion in senior
unsecured note obligations and providing the Company with over $625
million of new available capital.

In accordance with the joint plan of reorganization, a newly
constituted Board of Directors of the Company was appointed,
consisting of Raj Iyer (Chairman), Neal Goldman, John Hollowell,
Ane Launy, Patrick "Carey" Lowe and Adam Peakes.

Mr. Iyer commented, "I am extremely pleased to have such an
experienced and uniquely qualified Board of Directors. They
undoubtedly have the necessary financial and business expertise and
industry knowledge to oversee Diamond's post-emergence strategy."

Mr. Iyer continued, "I've had the opportunity to engage with the
Company's stakeholders to review and evaluate the Company's assets,
balance sheet and operational performance and have confidence that
Diamond is well-positioned for the future. I'm looking forward to
working with the Diamond team to help drive the Company's strategic
plan and achieve sustainable, long-term success while continuing to
focus on safe and reliable services for our global customers."

In connection with its emergence from chapter 11, the Company also
announced that Marc Edwards has retired as Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer, effective immediately. Mr. Edwards joined
the Company in March 2014 and has played a key role in transforming
Diamond into a leader in offshore drilling, including leading the
Company through its successful chapter 11 restructuring process.
The Company is currently in discussions regarding appointment of an
Executive Chairman and a Chief Executive Officer and expects to
make announcements in the near future.  Until a Chief Executive
Officer is appointed, Ronald Woll, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer, will serve as Interim CEO in addition to
his current position.

Mr. Edwards commented, "We commenced the chapter 11 process with
the goal of strengthening our capital structure to position Diamond
for long-term success and growth.  I would like to thank our
lenders and other stakeholders, our suppliers and customers and
most of all our incredibly talented team of employees, for working
together to consummate this restructuring plan to position Diamond
for a strong and bright future."

Mr. Iyer commented, "On behalf of the entire organization, I thank
Marc for his many years of service and invaluable contributions to
the company and the industry and especially the significant time
and effort he has expended over the past year as the company
successfully restructured. We appreciate the leadership and
dedication he has exhibited during this time and wish him every
success in the future."

Mr. Iyer concluded, "We believe that our executive leadership team
is well-positioned for future success, and I look forward to the
next chapter in Diamond's history."

Additional details of the Company's restructuring transactions can
be found in the Company's prior filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and in a Current Report on Form 8-K to
be filed  with the SEC. These documents can be obtained for free by
visiting EDGAR on the SEC website at www.sec.gov.

               About Diamond Offshore Drilling Inc.

Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., provides contract drilling
services to the energy industry worldwide. The company operates a
fleet of 15 offshore drilling rigs, including 4 drillships and 11
semi-submersible rigs. It serves independent oil and gas companies,
and government-owned oil companies. The company was founded in 1953
and is headquartered in Houston, Texas. Diamond Offshore Drilling
is a subsidiary of Loews Corporation. The company has major offices
in Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Scotland, Singapore, and Norway.

Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., along with its affiliates, filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 20-32307) on April
26, 2020.  The petitions were signed by David L. Roland, senior
vice president, general counsel, and secretary.

As of Dec. 31, 2019, the Debtors disclosed $5,834,044,000 in total
assets and $2,601,834,000 in total liabilities.

The case is assigned to Judge David R. Jones.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP and Porter Hedges LLP
are acting as the Company's legal counsel and Alvarez & Marsal is
serving as the Company's restructuring advisor.  Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC is serving as financial advisor to the Company.  Prime
Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.

EMBRAER SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed Embraer S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign and
Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and its
National Scale Rating at 'AAA(bra)'. Fitch has also affirmed the
'BB+' unsecured notes of Embraer, Embraer Overseas Limited and
Embraer Netherlands Finance BV. The Rating Outlook for the IDRs
remains Negative and for the National Scale it was revised to
Negative from Stable.

The Negative Rating Outlook reflects the challenges Embraer faces
to restore its backlog and capital structure amid the still high
uncertainties surrounding the aviation industry and ongoing risks
of an extended coronavirus pandemic. The partial recovery of the
commercial aviation backlog for 2022 along with extraordinary
measures taken by Embraer to strengthen its capital structure will
be key to returning the Rating Outlook to Stable within the next 12
months-18 months.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Backlog Pressure Remains: Fitch expects commercial aircraft
deliveries for 2021 to be 38% below 2019 levels and those for 2022
to remain 21% below pre-pandemic levels. For business jet
deliveries, the decline should continue but at the lower pace of
17% for 2021 and 8% for 2022 (pre-pandemic levels). Embraer is
expected to continue to face challenges to boost the orders of its
new 175-E2 aircraft. Embraer's firm order backlog stood at 281
aircraft at the end of 4Q20, down from 435 planes three years ago
and from 338 in 2019. In Fitch's view, the backlog supports
production for the next several years but suffers from
concentration and quality.

Strong Market Position: Embraer's strong market position for
commercial jets with fewer than 150 seats and within the global
executive jets are key factors supporting the expected recovery in
the company's backlog in the medium term. Midsize commercial jets
producers are expected to have opportunities with mainline or
low-cost carriers that are currently looking to right size their
fleet to adjust capacity. The weaker financial or business position
of few competitors, or in some cases a change in strategy, are
allowing growth opportunities for Embraer that could help the
company see deliveries rebound in 2022. Embraer's high exposure to
the U.S. regional/domestic market, which is recovering at a better
pace than in some markets, is also a key rating consideration.

Modest Brazilian Risk: Approximately 93% of Embraer's revenue is
generated from exports or from business operations based abroad.
Nonetheless, Brazil's economic and political environment is a
concern as the majority of Embraer's operating asset base is
locally domiciled, and the government represents a large portion of
the defense segment backlog. Brazil is listed as a related party in
Embraer's SEC filings as a result of the Brazilian government's
"golden share" and a direct shareholder stake (approximately 5% of
Embraer) via a company controlled by the government.

Rating Above Country Ceiling: Fitch does not consider Brazil's
country ceiling a rating constraint for Embraer currently, given
the company's large cash holding outside of Brazil, as well as its
heavy focus on exports and growing business outside of Brazil.
Based on these factors, under Fitch's criteria, Embraer could be
rated up to three notches higher than the Brazilian country
ceiling.

Slight Recovery EBIT Margin: Embraer's operating performance has
been weaker than expected during the past years. Embraer was facing
pressures on its operating margins as it navigates several new
development programs. The lower deliveries in commercial aviation
and less favorable mix have affected the company's fixed cost
dilution. During 2021, Fitch projects that Embraer's EBIT margins
will recover to around 3% and will continue to expand in 2022, with
the likely increase in backlog.

FCF to Remain Negative: The still depressed levels of aircraft
deliveries during 2021 will continue to pressure operating cash
flow generation, but the significant lower working capital needs
will benefit free cash flow generation. FCF is expected to be
negative around USD170 million, per Fitch's estimates. This
represent an improvement from the USD1 billion of FCF burn in 2020.
Capex is estimated around USD250 million. For 2022, FCF is expected
to be breakeven level after capex of USD250 million. For 2021 and
2022, Fitch's rating case does not incorporate dividends
distributions.

High Leverage: Fitch forecasts Embraer's net leverage (net
Debt/EBITDA) to reach 6.30x in 2021 and then to decline to 4.8x in
2022 (not incorporating any equity or asset sale). This compares to
2.0x in 2018 and an average of 1.0x during the 2015-2017 period.
The company's strategy to strengthen its capital structure through
extraordinary measures is key to maintain its current ratings. The
company has publicly stated its strategy to raise cash through
non-core asset sale and/or via new investments by strategic
partners in certain special development programs.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Embraer is one the market leaders for commercial jets with fewer
than 150 seats. Its aircraft are known for their engineering,
commonality across models and interior design. The company had 281
firm jet orders in backlog at the end of Dec. 31, 2020, including
jets in the new E2 family. Embraer's total backlog, including
contracts from all segments, was USD14.4 billion at Dec. 31, 2020.
Embraer's weaker competitive position compared with major global
peers, notably Boeing and Airbus, based on scale and financial
strength, is partially offset by its good business position in the
niche of commercial jets with fewer than 150 seats, and its
manageable financial profile.

Embraer compares favorably versus its competitor Bombardier Inc.
(not rated) in leverage, margins and liquidity. Embraer's bulk of
operations are in Brazil, but the company is shifting much of its
executive jet assembly to the U.S. Fitch's rating above
country-ceiling methodology is being applied.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Embraer's commercial deliveries to be around 55 in 2021 and 70
    in 2022 (-38% and -21% versus 2019);

-- The business jet market deliveries to be around 90 in 2021 and
    100 in 2022 (-17% and -8% versus 2019)

-- EBIT margin to be just around 3% in 2021 and then slightly
    recover during 2022;

-- Embraer to generate negative USD167 million in FCF in 2021;

-- Investment expenditures are around USD250 million in 2021 and
    2022;

-- Embraer to maintain its strong liquidity throughout the
    forecast period and to remain actively on its liability
    management strategy to avoid refinancing risks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A revision of the Rating Outlook to Stable could occur if
    Embraer's performance during 2021 and 2022 leads to net
    leverage moving around 3.5x;

-- Strong rebound in deliveries to 2019 levels earlier than
    expected;

-- Solid positive FCF generation;

-- EBIT margin expansion;

-- An upgrade to investment grade level would dependent on a
    return to net leverage below 2.5x on sustainable basis, in
    addition to maintenance of a strong liquidity position with no
    major refinancing risks in the medium term.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Substantial order cancellations in the E1 and E2 programs and
    business jet segment;

-- Significant delays and cost increases on the E2, KC-390 or
    other programs;

-- Failure to sufficiently reduce costs and post larger than
    expected negative FCF generation;

-- Net leverage remaining consistently above 3.5x by end of 2022;

-- Substantial declines in liquidity without commensurate debt
    reductions;

-- Multiple notch downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating, along
    with a similar reduction in the country ceiling.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: Embraer's financial flexibility is solid and it
is a key factor supporting the ratings. The company had USD4.5
billion of debt as of Dec. 31, 2020 with cross-border unsecured
bonds representing 74% of this amount. Total cash and investments
at the end of the period were USD2.7 billion, which is sufficient
to support debt amortization up to at least 2024. The company has
around USD332 million of outstanding bond coming due 2022 and
USD458 million in 2023. Fitch expects Embraer to remain disciplined
with its liquidity position, maintaining its proactive approach in
liability management to avoid exposure to refinancing risks. At
Dec. 31, 2020, approximately 99% of the company's cash, equivalents
and financial investments were in U.S. dollars and a major part
being held abroad. Embraer does not have a revolving credit
facility, which is not uncommon for Latin American corporate
issuers.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

SABESP: Fitch Raises Local Currency IDR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has upgraded Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado
de Sao Paulo's (SABESP) Local Currency (LC) Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'BB+' from 'BB', and its National Scale Rating to
'AAA(bra)' from 'AA(bra)'. Fitch also affirmed the Foreign Currency
IDR at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook on the Foreign Currency IDR remains
Negative, while the Outlook on the Local Currency IDR and National
Scale Rating is Stable.

The upgrade reflects SABESP's strengthened credit profile after the
third tariff review cycle that supports its forecast cash flow from
operations (CFFO) increase through the regulatory cycle 2021-2024,
with EBITDA margins above 45% during 2022-2024 and positive FCF.
The company expected sustained net leverage below 2.0x and the
successful reduction of its FX debt exposure in 2020 were also
incorporated.

The ratings consider the solid fundamentals of the water/wastewater
industry under resilient demand, as well as SABESP's robust
liquidity position, manageable debt maturity schedule and its
condition as a state-owned company. The Negative Outlook for the
Foreign Currency IDR follows Brazil's Sovereign Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Tariff Review Increases Predictability: The approval for overall
tariff increase of 7.1% in May 2021 and the required regulatory
revenue of BRL17.5 billion from May 2021 to April 2022, with
gradual increase to BRL18.7 billion from May 2024 to April 2025,
should support growth of SABESP's revenue during this regulatory
cycle. The company's required revenue is 21% above 2020 and is now
protected by the range of +/-2.5% band within the next four years.
The company is to receive/return in the following year through
tariff adjustment if effective revenues falls outside this range.
This condition provides further predictability for its results
irrespective of volume billed, with potential frustrations on
revenues accounted during a 12-month period, when compared with the
regulatory number, being compensated on the following period.

Higher EBITDA Margins: SABESP's regulatory required revenue
supports stronger EBITDA and EBITDA margins in 2022-2024 at above
45%. The base case scenario assumes no material impact on SABESP's
EBITDA and cash flow generation coming from potential higher water
losses or delinquency, as well as significant lower volumes billed,
due to increased tariffs. EBITDA in 2021 should be stable at BRL6.2
billion, with EBITDA margin reduction to 40% given projected cost
pressure and low total volume growth of 0.5%. EBITDA margin should
increase to 46%-48% in the following three years supported by
revenue growth, resulting in BRL8.3 billion-BRL9.0 billion annual
EBITDA in the period.

Positive FCF from 2022: Fitch forecasts SABESP's CFFO at BRL3.4
billion in 2021 resulting in negative FCF of BRL662 million,
pressured by capex of BRL3.7 billion and BRL272 million of
dividends. 2022-2024 FCF should position at BRL239 million positive
on annual average favored by stronger CFFO of BRL5.4 billion of
annual average despite total BRL11.3 billion in capex and BRL2.6
million in dividends in the period. The base case scenario assumes
manageable working capital requirements despite potential
delinquency pressure with higher tariffs particularly to the
residential client segment as approved on the new tariff
structure.

Conservative Leverage and Lower FX Exposure: SABESP's net leverage
should remain conservative and below 2.5x over the next three years
― including 2.3x in 2021, which is low for the industry and for
its IDRs ― supported by stronger EBITDA through the cycle. Net
debt/EBITDA was 2.1x at YE2020. The company has successfully
reduced its foreign-currency debt exposure to 21%, from 48% in
2019, given its strategy for new debt issuances in local currency
to mitigate FX volatility impact. This mitigates concerns related
to financial covenants and during periods of high FX debt
maturity.

Reduced Business Risk: SABESP's credit profile benefits from
resilient demand and from its low business risk, with its
near-monopolistic position as a provider of an essential service
within its operational area, as well as its economies of scale as
the largest basic sanitation company in the Americas by number of
customers. The assessment also reflects SABESP's still-developing
regulatory environment, the intrinsic hydrological risk of its
business and the political risk associated with its position as a
state-owned company subject to potential changes in management and
strategy after each state of Sao Paulo election. SABESP's activity
in the state of Sao Paulo, which has the country's largest GDP and
population, is viewed as positive.

Stand Alone Credit Profile: Per Fitch's Government-Related Entities
Rating Criteria, Fitch assesses SABESP on a standalone basis. This
approach is supported by Fitch's perception of a reduced incentive
for SABESP's major shareholder to provide support if needed, given
minimal financial implications for the state of Sao Paulo if SABESP
defaults, and limited evidence of a record or expectations for the
state to provide support. SABESP's activities are independent from
its major shareholder, both financially and operationally. A
default should have only moderate sociopolitical implications for
the state, despite the assessment as strong of its status,
ownership and control by the state.

New Regulatory Environment: The base case scenario incorporates no
major impact on SABESP's operations and cash flow from the recent
regulatory changes. Discussions about regulatory guidelines for
national water/wastewater should facilitate greater participation
by private companies and enhance the industry's investment
capacity. Private participants account for around 6% of the
industry's market share and their growth should occur mainly at the
expense of highly inefficient state-owned companies or local
municipality operators, which is not the case for SABESP.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

SABESP's mature operations and its position as the largest
water/wastewater utility in Brazil benefit its business profile in
terms of economies of scale and capital structure when compared
with Aegea Saneamento e Participacoes S.A. (Local Currency [LC] IDR
BB/Stable and Foreign Currency [FC] IDR BB/Negative), which has
moderate leverage, reflecting its growth strategy. SABESP's
strengthened CFFO generation capacity after 3rd tariff revision
also supports the one notch difference on the LC IDR, despite
exposure to political risk given its status as a state-owned
company. Aegea's credit profile benefits from its diversified
concessions within Brazil, while SABESP operates exclusively in the
state of Sao Paulo, which concentrates operational and regulatory
risks. Both SABESP and Aegea have similar and strong EBITDA
margins.

Compared with power-transmission companies Transmissora Alianca de
Energia Eletrica S.A. (LC IDR BBB-/Negative and FC IDR BB/Negative)
and Alupar Investimento S.A. (LC IDR BBB-/Negative and FC IDR
BB/Negative), SABESP presents higher regulatory risk, lower
operational cash flow predictability and less asset
diversification, which explain the difference on the LC IDRs,
despite SABESP's expected lower leverage metrics.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Marginal total volume billed growth of 0.5% in 2021;

-- Total annual tariff increase of 7.1% on May 2021;

-- Effective net revenue in line with 97.5% of regulatory
    required revenue from May 2022 onwards;

-- 2022 and 2023 net revenues include increase of BRL1.4 billion
    (pro rata) related with the difference of effective net
    revenue and regulatory required net revenue from May 2021 to
    April 2022;

-- Average annual capex of BRL3.8 billion in 2021-2023;

-- Dividends of BRL272 million in 2021 and a payout ratio of 30%
    of net profits thereafter.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Positive rating actions on the LC and FC IDRs depend on
    positive actions on the sovereign rating;

-- Upgrade on National Scale Ratings does not apply as the rating
    is at the top of the national scale.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Negative rating actions on the sovereign rating may lead to
    negative action on FC and LC IDRs;

-- EBITDA margins below 40%;

-- Net leverage sustained above 3.0x;

-- Increased political and/or regulatory risk;

-- Lower financial flexibility.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity Profile: SABESP's robust cash position, sound CFFO
and proven financial market access is crucial for the company to
manage expected negative FCF in 2021 and to refinance debt
maturities. SABESP's cash and equivalents of BRL3.8 billion at
YE2020 covered short-term debt of BRL3.0 billion by 1.3x. SABESP's
total debt of BRL17.2 billion at YE2020 presented a lengthened
maturity profile and consisted mainly of multilateral agency loans
of BRL6.1 billion and BRL6.6 billion in debenture issuances. From
total debt, BRL3.5 billion, or 21%, were linked to FX rates without
any hedge protection, which represents moderate FX volatility
exposure risk. Only BRL2.8 billion of total debt at YE2020 was
secured by future flow of receivables linked with Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) and Caixa Economica
Federal loans, which do not pressure unsecured rated issuances.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

-- Construction revenue is excluded from total revenues;

-- For 2020 and 2019, operating leases are not considered as
    debt;

-- In the cash flow statement, the amount of related to "public
    private partnership" is transferred to operating cash flow
    from financing cash flow.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



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C H I L E
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CHILE: Economic Activity Projected to Have Declined by 5.8% in 2020
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The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
concluded the Article IV consultation with Chile.

The pandemic hit Chile as it was recovering from the economic
consequences of the social unrest in October 2019. Economic
activity is projected to have declined by 5.8 percent in 2020,
about 7 percentage points below staff's pre-pandemic projection.
Inflation has hovered around the central bank's target of 3 percent
and inflation expectations remain well-anchored. Although
employment has recovered from a contraction of 20.6 percent in
mid-2020, it remains below its pre-pandemic level. At end-March
2021, due to rapidly increasing COVID-19 cases, the government
tightened mobility restrictions but expanded existing fiscal
measures to mitigate their impact, while the vaccination process is
proceeding expeditiously (in this respect Chile is not only the
regional leader but also among the top performers globally).

The government adopted a wide-ranging and well-planned set of
fiscal, monetary, and financial policy actions to ease the effects
of the pandemic. The government is implementing a multi-year fiscal
package, amounting to about 13 percent of GDP, focused on
safeguarding health, protecting incomes and jobs, and facilitating
credit, refinancing, and repayments. The Central Bank introduced a
broad range of unconventional measures to support liquidity,
including through funding-for-lending facilities, asset purchase
programs, and an expanded collateral framework. Financial sector
policies have been introduced, aimed at facilitating the flow of
credit, especially to households and SMEs, including by relaxing
liquidity requirements, and facilitating the issuance and placement
of securities. The IMF's Flexible Credit Line has contributed to
the ability to withstand external stress, while the exchange rate
has been allowed to freely float and act as a shock absorber.

Economic activity is expected to grow at 6.5 percent in 2021, as
the fallout from the pandemic gradually recedes and mobility
restrictions are relaxed, while the economy continues to get
support from accommodative policies and the strong vaccination
process. Over the medium term, growth is projected to converge to
its potential of 2.5 percent. The current account balance is
expected to remain close to zero in 2021, owing to strong terms of
trade and despite the surge in imports associated with the
recovery, before gradually moving over the medium term towards a
small deficit.

Risks remain amid high uncertainty, but the country exhibits strong
resilience, thanks to its large policy response, the remaining
fiscal space, and the very strong institutional policy framework.
External risks are largely related to the dynamics of the pandemic,
though the fast pace of the vaccination program is expected to
contain such risks. Movements in the price of copper would
significantly affect exports, fiscal revenues, and prospects for
investment and growth. Domestic risks stem primarily from a series
of elections and the outcome of a New Constitution
process-scheduled to finish in mid-2022-which are expected to shape
the public discourse and influence the policy agenda.

Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors recognized that Chile's strong policies enabled
the authorities to respond swiftly to the health and economic
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the rapid rollout of
vaccines. Directors noted that although the economy is beginning to
recover, uncertainties remain. They emphasized that continued
strong policies and advancing structural reforms will be key to
mitigating the impact of the pandemic and supporting inclusive
growth.

Directors commended the authorities' fiscal efforts in response to
the crisis, while maintaining a very strong fiscal position. They
emphasized that, as the recovery strengthens, medium-term revenue
and targeted spending measures will be needed to address social
needs, protect the vulnerable, and rebuild buffers, while
preserving debt sustainability. Directors encouraged steps to
strengthen the fiscal rule and revisit exemptions, deductions, and
special regimes, increase direct taxation, and raising green taxes
towards international standards.

Directors highlighted that further pension withdrawals should be
avoided, as they have weakened the pension system. They recommended
that if additional support is needed, it should be delivered via
targeted fiscal measures which are more effective in reaching those
in need.

Directors welcomed the Central Bank's broad range of conventional
and unconventional measures to support liquidity and facilitate the
flow of credit, especially to households and SMEs. They also
highlighted that financial sector vulnerabilities should continue
to be closely monitored and that financial sector reforms would
need to resume their pace as the recovery advances.

Directors highlighted the urgency of reaching broad agreements to
unlock structural and social reforms which would invigorate
confidence, support the recovery and growth, and promote social
cohesion. In particular, they stressed the need for comprehensive
pension and health reforms. Directors noted that improving
education quality and financial integration, reducing labor market
inefficiencies and informality, promoting trade integration, and
responding to climate change will also be crucial to foster
productivity and inclusiveness.

A full copy of this press release is available at:
https://bit.ly/3vn7xMz




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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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AES ANDRES: Fitch Rates Proposed USD300MM Unsec. Issuance 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB-' rating to AES Andres B.V.'s
(Andres) proposed senior unsecured issuance of up to USD300
million. Andres plans to use the proceeds from the issuance to
refinance its outstanding USD270 million notes due 2026 and to pay
off an outstanding bank loan. Fitch currently rates Andres'
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB-'. The
Rating Outlook is Negative. In addition, Fitch currently rates
Andres' National Long-Term rating 'AA(dom)'/Stable and the
company's USD270 million notes due 2026 'BB-'.

The rating for the proposed notes considers the combined operating
assets of Andres and Dominican Power Partners (DPP) (jointly
referred to as AES Dominicana). Andres and DPP are guarantors of
the proposed notes. Fitch expects the bond refinancing will not
significantly affect the issuer's credit metrics.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Dependence on Government Transfers: High energy distribution losses
of 27% in 2019, low level of collections and important subsidies
for end-users, have created a strong dependence on government
transfers. This dependence has been exacerbated by the country's
exposure to fluctuations in fossil-fuel prices and strong energy
demand growth from distribution companies. The regular delays in
government transfers have pressured generators' working capital
needs and added volatility to their cash flows. This situation
increases sector risk, especially at a time of rising fiscal
vulnerabilities affecting the Central Government's finances.

Strong Credit Metrics: The combined credit metrics for Andres and
DPP are strong for the rating category, with expected 2021 EBITDA
of USD258 million for the combined companies. Fitch expects 2021
debt to EBITDA to be 2.6x, down slightly from 2.7x in 2020,
following issuance of the new notes.

Leverage is expected to fall through 2022 before increasing to 3.6x
in 2023 as renegotiation of Andres's gas supply contract lowers
EBITDA. While the commencement of operations of the government's
750MW coal-fired Punta Catalina power plant has lowered spot
prices, Andres and DPP are substantially contracted through 2022,
and their lower leverage provides a cushion against eventual PPA
revaluations.

High-Quality Asset Base: Andres ranks among the lowest-cost
electricity generators in the country. Andres's combined-cycle
plant burns natural gas, and is expected to be fully dispatched as
a base-load unit as long as the liquefied natural gas (LNG) price
is not more than 15% higher than the price of imported fuel oil No.
6.

In March 2021 Andres brought the 50 MW Bayasol solar plant online,
adding just over 100 GWh of power production at zero variable cost.
Fitch expects higher medium-term margins, although generation may
contract initially with Punta Catalina's entry into the dispatch
curve.

Moderate Cash Flow Volatility: Cash flow to Andres and DPP has
historically been affected by delays in payment from the
state-owned distribution companies, particularly during periods of
high fuel oil prices, which have pressured the system financially.
Fitch expects future payment delays to moderate with the entrance
of the 750 MW Punta Catalina plant, which will lower spot prices
and relieve financial pressure on the system.

Andres reported little impact on collections from the pandemic. In
October 2020, Andres and DPP together received USD146.9 million
from distribution companies and state power holding company CDEEE,
bringing Andres and DPP's combined accounts receivable days to just
over 70 days, down from 110 days in 2019.

Expanding Natural Gas Business: Andres operates the country's sole
LNG import terminal, offering regasification, storage, and
transportation infrastructure. In the medium term, the company
plans to expand its transportation network and processing capacity
for its LNG operations, as illustrated by the recent 10-year gas
supply agreement with Barrick.

In addition, a 50-kilometer gas pipeline from Andres's terminal to
San Pedro de Macoris was constructed in February 2020 to facilitate
the conversion of 730 MW of generation capacity from heavy fuel oil
to natural gas combined cycle in that region. Andres' gas supply
contract with BP plc prices gas imports at the NYMEX Henry Hub
benchmark plus USD1.20; gas costs are expected to rise
significantly upon the contract's expiration in April 2023.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Andres's ratings are linked to and constrained by the Dominican
Republic's ratings, from which it indirectly receives its revenues.
As a result, Andres's capital structure is strong relative to
similarly rated, unconstrained peers. Orazul Energy Peru S.A.
(BB/Rating Watch Positive), whose rating reflects combined results
that include its subsidiary, Aguaytia Energy del Peru S.R.L., has
similar installed capacity and is expected to generate around
USD100 million in EBITDA annually, with estimated leverage of
approximately 5.0x.

Orazul Energy Peru benefits from the stability conferred by its
asset diversification and the flexibility allowed by its vertical
integration. Comparatively, the combined Andres/DPP operations are
expected to generate approximately USD258 million of EBITDA in
2021, with leverage below 3x over the next two years.

Fenix Power Peru S.A. (BBB-/Stable) is considered another
operational peer to Andres. Fenix has high leverage, similar to
Orazul, but benefits from its strategic linkage to its parent
company, Colbun S.A. (BBB+/Stable), resulting in a three-notch
uplift from its standalone credit quality. Additionally, Fenix's
capital structure benefits from a steady deleveraging trajectory in
the medium term as its international bond amortizes.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Full recovery of lost EBITDA for operational problems at
    Andres;

-- Fuel prices track Fitch price deck;

-- 70% of previous year's net income distributed as dividends
    through 2024;

-- Accounts receivable days fall to 90 following government
    payment in 2020.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A positive rating action for Andres could occur if the
    Dominican Republic's sovereign ratings are upgraded or if the
    electricity sector achieves financial sustainability through
    proper policy implementation.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A negative rating action for Andres would occur if the
    Dominican Republic's sovereign ratings are downgraded; if
    there is sustained deterioration in the reliability of
    government transfers; or financial performance deteriorates to
    the point of increasing the combined Andres/DPP ratio of debt
    to-EBITDA to 4.5x for a sustained period.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Well-spread Maturities: Andres and DPP have historically reported
very strong combined credit metrics for the rating category. Both
companies have financial profiles characterized by low to moderate
leverage and strong liquidity. Combined EBITDA as of Dec. 31, 2020
totaled USD234.1 million (versus USD271.4 million at December 31,
2019), with total debt/EBITDA of 2.7x and FFO interest coverage of
3.5x. The companies' strong liquidity position is further supported
by the refinancing of their 2026 international bond to mature in
2031. Andres also has local bonds due in 2027.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

GRUPO AEROMEXICO: Cuts Boeing 737 Max Order in Restructuring
------------------------------------------------------------
Grupo Aeromexico, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV: AEROMEX) said April 23,
2021, it has reached agreement to increase its fleet with 24 new
Boeing 737 aircraft, including B737-8 and B737-9 MAX, and four
787-9 Dreamliner aircraft as part of the airline's restructured
agreements with the manufacturer and certain lessors to incorporate
new aircraft.  Other suppliers and financial entities also
participated in these transactions, resulting in a comprehensive
deal that offers multiple benefits to the carrier.

The addition of the first aircraft is scheduled for this year, with
nine offering service beginning this summer season, and the rest
arriving in the second half of 2021 and during 2022.  These
transactions represent a milestone in Aeromexico's transformation
for the upcoming years, and their economic terms are highly
competitive compared to current market levels.

These transactions make it possible for Aeromexico to modify
long-term maintenance contracts and reduce leasing costs of
eighteen (18) other aircraft that are part of the current fleet.
Aeromexico estimates that reaching this comprehensive agreement
will lead to total savings of approximately 2 billion dollars.    

   
Thanks to the savings, the Company can offer even more competitive
fares, guaranteeing the best travel experience for customers in
state-of-the-art aircraft with on-ground and in-flight services
that only Aeromexico offers.

The comprehensive agreements are subject to the approval of the
United States Court for the Southern District of New York, in
charge of Aeromexico's Chapter 11 voluntary financial
restructuring
process.

Andres Conesa, CEO of Aeromexico, stated: "These transactions show
the confidence of our employees, customers, lessors, manufacturers,
investors, and business partners in the future of Mexico's global
airline. It will also give us flexibility to complete other
negotiations and put Aeromexico on a strong path to exit Chapter 11
later this year."

The Boeing 737 MAX aircraft stands out for being highly efficient
and environmentally-friendly, generating fuel savings of up to 14%,
reducing CO2 emissions by 15%, and reducing the noise footprint by
up to 40% compared to aircraft of previous generations.

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is one of the most modern, safe,
comfortable, efficient and least polluting long-range aircraft in
the global airline industry. It generates savings of up to 23% in
fuel consumption and 25% in CO2 emissions.

Aeromexico's current fleet is comprised of 107 aircraft: 47 Embraer
190s, 42 Boeing 737s, and 18 Boeing 787 Dreamliner.

Aeromexico will continue pursuing, in an orderly manner, its
voluntary financial restructuring through Chapter 11, while
continuing to operate and offer services to its customers and
contracting from its suppliers the goods and services required for
operations. The Company will continue to strengthen its financial
position and liquidity, protect and preserve its operations and
assets, and implement the necessary adjustments to face the impact
from COVID-19.

                          Order Cut in Half

Tom Boon of Simple Flying reports that Grupo Aeromexico has
apparently cut its order for new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft by half.
The airline has received six 737 MAX aircraft so far and was one of
the first to return the type to service.  The MAX reduction is
accompanied by an increase in the airline's expected 787 Dreamliner
deliveries.

The Boeing 737 MAX order book has taken some hits, and the recent
cash crunch airlines have faced as a result of the ongoing crisis
along with the type's grounding did not help sales for some time.
However, since its recovery, some substantial orders have been
placed for the type, most recently by Southwest Airlines.  Now
Aeromexico has seemingly cut its order, but it appears to be
unrelated to the aircraft's grounding.

Aeromexico revealed that it had reached an agreement to alter its
Boeing aircraft orders as part of its ongoing restructuring under
Chapter 11.  According to the airline, the deal will see it take 24
737 MAX aircraft and four more Boeing 787 Dreamliners.

So far, Aeromexico has received six 737 MAX aircraft, with Boeing's
order book showing 54 outstanding orders as of the end of March.
This gives 60 overall orders.  However, if the airline only takes
24 737 MAX aircraft, the order will effectively be halved.

Interestingly, the airline currently has zero outstanding Boeing
787 Dreamliner orders, according to the manufacturer.  This
suggests that it perhaps sees long-haul as more important as it
deals with the industry post-COVID.  The airline will take four new
787 Dreamliner aircraft, adding to its current fleet of 18
aircraft.  In 2013 Boeing reported that the airline had ordered 19
Dreamliners. However, one recently left the airline, bound to
become a private jet.

                           About Grupo Aeromexico

Grupo Aeromexico, S.A.B. de C.V. -- https://www.aeromexico.com/ --
is a holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in commercial
aviation in Mexico and the promotion of passenger loyalty
programs.

Aeromexico, Mexico's global airline, has its main hub at Terminal 2
at the Mexico City International Airport. Its destinations network
features the United States, Canada, Central America, South America,
Asia and Europe.

Grupo Aeromexico and three of its subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 20-11563) on June 30,
2020. In the petitions signed by CFO Ricardo Javier Sanchez Baker,
the Debtors reported consolidated assets and liabilities of $1
billion to $10 billion.

Timothy Graulich, Esq., of Davis Polk and Wardell LLP, serves as
counsel to the Debtors.


INTERJET SA: Mulls Filing for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------
Interjet SA's board voted Monday, April 26, 2021, to seek
bankruptcy protection in Mexico and is considering whether or not
to also file for Chapter 11 in the U.S., a company spokesman told
Bloomberg.

According to Simple Flying, Interjet's management and stakeholders
approved filing a bankruptcy and reorganization process under
Mexican law.  After nearly five months of not flying, the Mexican
low-cost carrier will attempt to reorganize and relaunch
financially.

Simple Flying recounts that Interjet stopped flying on December 11,
2020. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Mexican airline had three
years of continuous net losses. Then, the worldwide crisis served
as the final nail in the coffin, and Interjet lost its fleet, its
market share, and even its reputation.

Among Mexican travelers, Interjet was a favorite. It had a good
service, with decent connectivity throughout Mexico, the US,
Central, and South America. But now, the Interjet brand drags a
heavy weight of unreliable schedules, unredeemable travel vouchers,
and lost money.

                            About Interjet

Interjet is an international airline based in Mexico City carrying
almost 14 million passengers annually within Mexico and between
Mexico, the United States, Canada, Central, and South America.  In
all, it provides air service to 54 destinations in 10 countries
offering its passengers greater connections and travel options
through agreements with major airlines such as Alitalia, All Nippon
Airways (ANA), American Airlines, British Airways, Emirates, Air
Canada, LATAM Group, EVA Air, Iberia, Lufthansa, Hainan
Airlines,Hahn Air, Qatar Airlines and Japan Airlines.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sep.
3, 2019, Interjet Airlines re-iterated the airline is not in
"technical bankruptcy" as erroneously reported by a financial news
agency.

Interjet Airlines is in a dispute with Mexico's Tax Administration
Service (SAT), related to alleged taxes owed by the airline. An
attempt by SAT to seize control of the airline's bank accounts in
an effort to collect the alleged taxes was denied by the courts and
the airline is in negotiation with the tax authorities to determine
what back taxes are actually due.





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P A N A M A
===========

TOCUMEN: S&P Places 'BB+' Secured Notes Rating on Watch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------
On April 23, 2021, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB+' rating on
Aeropuerto Internacional de Tocumen S.A.'s (Tocumen or the project)
senior secured notes on CreditWatch with negative implications and
revised downward the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'b' from
'b+'.

The negative CreditWatch listing reflects a 50% chance of a
multiple-notch downgrade in the next three months if Tocumen's cash
flows continue deteriorating amid a slower-than-expected traffic
recovery and the absence of any additional extraordinary support
from the government. S&P could also lower the rating if it was were
to cut its ratings on Panama.

Despite the resumption of international flights in October 2020 at
Tocumen, monthly traffic levels in the past six months remained on
average 30% of the 2019 figure, while we previously expected it to
be 40%-60%. S&P said, "Moreover, we believe this trend will
continue up to mid-2021, given the current delay in the vaccine
distribution program, particularly in South American countries that
represent 40% of Tocumen's total flights. Although vaccinations are
not mandatory to get on international flights, they reduce the risk
of contagion and increase people's willingness to travel abroad.
Moreover, we believe the current economic slump and the
restrictions and protocols with which travelers will have to comply
in order to take international flights also diminish the incentive
to travel abroad. Due to the slower traffic recovery, we now expect
Tocumen's aeronautical revenue to be 30% lower than our previous
expectations."

S&P said, "In addition, we expect the project to receive GMI
collections from new tenants, which mainly include sales commission
and rents, starting in 2022 instead of 2021. This is mainly because
the construction of most stores at Terminal II isn't completed,
given that the cash held in the capex reserve account for their
construction was used instead to fund the debt service account to
cover interest payments due November 2020 and May 2021.

"Under our base-case scenario that incorporates traffic in 2021 of
approximately 40% of 2019's traffic, the project will face a
shortfall of about $40 million in the next six months, which
Tocumen will cover with its existing liquidity. As of this report's
date, Tocumen still has a fully available six-month debt service
reserve account (DSRA) of about $46 million, an available credit
facility of about $17 million, and a capex reserve of $9 million
that's available for debt payment if needed. In addition and based
on the indenture's new terms and conditions, the project still has
the option to incur new debt for up to $50 million. Although the
latter hasn't occurred, the project already received several loan
proposals from state-owned banks.

"Our downside-case scenario now expects traffic to reach only 35%
of the 2019 figure versus the previous forecast of 40% in 2021.
This will result in shortfalls of about $65 million during the next
18 months. Under such a scenario, we still expect the project to
comply with its financial obligations until November 2022. However,
we believe that Tocumen's resilience to a further deterioration of
its cash flows is weaker than the forecast in our last report,
which we tend to see as negative from a credit standpoint. For
instance, if traffic level in 2021 remains in line with that of
2020 (27% of 2019 figures), Tocumen's current liquidity position
won't be sufficient to comply with its financial obligations unless
the project issues new debt or receives additional support from the
government, as was the case in 2020.

"We assume the likelihood of extraordinary government support to
the project as very high. At this point, Tocumen's status as a
government-related entity provides a four-notch uplift to the
rating from the project's 'b' SACP. Our assessment of government
support reflects Tocumen's status as Panama's only international
airport. We believe it's an economically and strategically
important asset for the country, given the government's broader
economic development plan that aims to expand Panama's logistics
and tourism sectors. Moreover, the airport provides an essential
transport service that can't be substituted easily in the short to
intermediate term due to the constraints of alternative modes of
transport (notably, time and capacity) and the difficulty of
building new airports with easy access. Our assessment also
incorporates the airport's ownership structure (Panama owns all of
the shares), the government has more than one representative on
Tocumen's board, it participates in the project's daily decisions,
and our belief that the airport wouldn't be privatized.

"In addition, we believe that if the project requires additional
liquidity to meet its short-term obligations, we expect the
government to provide access to additional funding, pause dividend
distribution payments, or provide some technical assistance to help
Tocumen reorganize its cost structure and provide some spending
relief as seen in 2020. However, the absence of any of these
actions, while Tocumen's cash flows continue to deteriorate, could
signal a diminishing support from the government, which could
prompt us to revise the likelihood of extraordinary support."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Health and safety




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U R U G U A Y
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PORTO SEGURO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 IFS Rating, Outlook Now Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 global
local-currency insurance financial strength (IFS) rating of Porto
Seguro - Seguros del Uruguay S.A. (Porto Uruguay). The outlook was
changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Porto Uruguay's rating reflects its still
adequate capitalization, good asset quality -mostly composed of
investment-grade securities- and relatively low product risk. The
company's capital adequacy has been supported by moderate premium
growth in the last three years, a US$ 3.5 million capital injection
in 2018, contained dividend payments and capital replenishment from
earnings.

Furthermore, the change in the company's rating outlook to stable
from negative captures the recovery in its underwriting results in
2019 and 2020 from the losses reported in 2018, and Moody's
expectations that it will be able to keep adequate capital buffers
over the coming 12 to 18 months. Despite competitive pressures in
the Uruguayan automobile insurance industry, Porto Uruguay's main
line of business, continue to be significant, we expect that the
measures taken by the company to recover its profitability metrics
will likely lead to more stable results and an overall credit
profile which continues to be consistent with its current Ba1
rating.

Porto Uruguay, similarly to many peers in the Uruguayan insurance
industry, had suffered in 2018 steep losses in its automobile
portfolio -mainly caused by price competition and increased claims
frequency and severity- which led to net losses and a reduction in
its capital adequacy. Since then, the company has adjusted premium
rates and tighten its underwriting standards, which have all led to
a gradual recovery of its profitability metrics. As of December
2020, the company's Return on Capital (ROC) increased to 24.5% from
9.7% in 2019 and a negative 19.3% (-19.3%) in 2018, the latter
being adjusted for inflation. Additionally, Porto Seguros' Moody's
adjusted Gross Underwriting Leverage (GUL) improved to 3.5x as of
2020 year-end from 4.2x in 2019.

The company also benefits from a good market position and brand
recognition within the Uruguayan insurance industry, particularly
in automobile insurance segment. However, the company's still high
business concentration on automobile insurance -though improving in
recent years as the company grew in other coverages- and a its
recent relatively weak reserve adequacy development, partially
offset the company's credit strengths.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

Porto Uruguay's ratings could be upgraded if: 1) combined ratios
improve, with metrics persistently below 100% for its main business
lines, 2) further improvements in its business diversification, 3)
an improvement on its capital metrics, with gross underwriting
leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis, or 4) an upgrade of
Uruguay's sovereign rating.

Porto Uruguay's ratings could be downgraded if: 1) profitability
declines, with combined ratios consistently above 100%, 2) its
capital adequacy weakens, with gross underwriting leverage
consistently above 6.0x, or 3) a downgrade of Uruguay's sovereign
rating or a deterioration of the country's operating environment.

Headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay, Porto Uruguay reported net
profit of UYU214 million and gross premiums written of UYU3.1
billion for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020. Also, the
company reported total assets of UYU3.1 billion and shareholders'
equity of UYU939 million.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Property and
Casualty Insurers Methodology published in November 2019.



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V E N E Z U E L A
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[*] VENEZUELA: 185,000 School Kids to Get Food From UN Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP) and Venezuelan
officials said they had reached a deal to supply food to school
children in the South American country suffering a humanitarian
crisis spurred by an economic collapse.

The program will reach 185,000 children in the crisis-stricken
country this year, and aims to expand to some 1.5 million by the
end of the 2022-2023 school year, the WFP said in a statement.
Child malnutrition has increased in Venezuela as the
once-prosperous country's economy collapsed.

"This is the first step toward a series of ambitious projects that
will provide food support to all of the Venezuelan people,"
Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro said in an address from the
Miraflores presidential palace broadcast on state television, where
visiting World Food Programme Executive Director David Beasley was
also present.

Humanitarian aid groups have long pushed for Maduro's government to
allow the WFP to distribute food aid in Venezuela. The political
opposition accuses Maduro's government, which it calls a
dictatorship, of conditioning state food assistance on political
loyalty, a claim Maduro denies.

"Thank you for allowing us to be independent and to not let any of
our work be politicized by anybody," Beasley said. An earlier WFP
statement had said schools were the "most appropriate platform" to
"reach communities in an independent manner."

Beasley also met with Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido and
ambassadors from several European countries, according to tweets
from Guaido and France's ambassador.

The agreement was applauded by Venezuelan aid workers and
activists.

"This agreement with the WFP to start operations in Venezuela is of
vital importance," Feliciano Reyna, president of Caracas-based aid
group Accion Solidaria which focuses on HIV/AIDS treatment and
other medical relief, wrote on Twitter. "We hope it will build
trust to broaden its areas of action."

                              Venezuela

Venezuela, officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is a
country on the northern coast of South America, consisting of a
continental landmass and a large number of small islands and
islets in the Caribbean sea.  The capital is the city of Caracas.

Hugo Chavez was president to Venezuela from 1999 to 2013.  The
Chavez presidency was plagued with challenges, which included a
2002 coup d'etat, a 2002 national strike and a 2004 recall
referendum.  Nicolas Maduro was elected president in 2013 after
the death of Chavez.  Maduro won a second term at the May 2018
Venezuela elections, but this result has been challenged by
countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, France and the United States who deemed it fraudulent and
moved to recognize Juan Guaido as president.

The presidencies of Chavez and Maduro have challenged Venezuela
with a socioeconomic and political crisis.  It is marked by
hyperinflation, climbing hunger, poverty, disease, crime and death
rates, social unrest, corruption and emigration from the country.

S&P Global Ratings, in May 2019, removed its long- and short-term
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela from
CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed them at
'CCC-/C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency rating is
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D' long- and
short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Venezuela.

Moody's credit rating (long term foreign and domestic issuer
ratings) for Venezuela was last set at C with stable outlook in
March 2018.  Meanwhile, Fitch's long term issuer default rating
for Venezuela was last in 2017 at RD and country ceiling was CC.
Fitch, on June 27, 2019, affirmed then withdrew the ratings due to
the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

LATAM: Tax Revenues Declined Sharply in 2020 Due to COVID-19 Crisis
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tax revenues rose moderately across Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) in 2019 before declining sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19
pandemic drove down global economic activity, according to new
analysis released.

Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2021 shows
that the average tax-to-GDP ratio in the LAC region rose to 22.9%
in 2019, an increase of 0.3 percentage points, due largely to
increases in the Caribbean sub-region. Although the COVID-19
pandemic subsequently caused a sharp decline in tax and resource
revenues in 2020, the report identifies the key role of fiscal
policy in the region's response to the pandemic and considers how
tax policy can contribute to a green and inclusive recovery.

Tax-to-GDP ratios in the LAC region ranged from 13.1% in Guatemala
to 42.0% in Cuba in 2019. Of the 26 countries covered by the
average, which includes Antigua and Barbuda for the first time and
excludes Venezuela due to data availability issues, 14 registered
an increase in their tax-to-GDP ratio in 2019 and 12 experienced a
decline. Other than Cuba, the rest of the countries (25) recorded
tax-to-GDP ratios below the OECD average of 33.8%. However, the gap
between the LAC and OECD averages has narrowed from 15.4 percentage
points in 1990 to 10.9 percentage points in 2019.

The largest increases in tax-to-GDP ratios between 2018 and 2019
occurred in Nicaragua (a rise of 2.7 percentage points [p.p.]),
Belize (2.2 p.p.) and the Bahamas (2.1 p.p.). Looking at the
different sub-regions, the Caribbean's average tax-to-GDP ratio
rose by 0.8 p.p. between 2018 and 2019 to 24.9%, while South
America's declined by 0.1 p.p. (to 22.9%) and the tax-to-GDP ratio
of Central America and Mexico increased by 0.2 p.p. (to 21.3%). The
report details how tax reforms in countries such as Nicaragua and
Bahamas have been an important driver of the positive trends.
Meanwhile, in all countries where tax-to-GDP ratios went down
between 2018 and 2019, the decline did not exceed 1% of GDP.

According to a special feature in the report examining the fiscal
policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, tax revenues declined
sharply during the first half of 2020 amid a collapse in domestic
demand, but showed signs of recovery in the second half of the
year. Countries expanded social protection provisions, provided
direct support to firms, deferred tax payments and established
programmes to ease tax liabilities. Meanwhile, latest estimates
indicate that total tax revenues in 18 countries across the region
declined by 11.2% on average in 2020 from 2019. External public
debt rose over the same period and will need co-ordinated
management over the period ahead.

The report's second special feature examines the performance of
hydrocarbon and mining revenues in 2019 and 2020. It shows that
hydrocarbon revenues in major regional producers rose from 2.5% of
GDP on average in 2018 to 2.7% in 2019, driven by one-off
extraordinary receipts. Mining revenues in major producers
contracted very slightly over the same period to 0.37% of GDP.
Preliminary data show that fiscal revenues from non-renewable
natural resources fell sharply in 2020, mainly due to sharp
declines in oil prices and the effect of COVID-19 tax relief
measures on corporate income tax payments in the mining sector.

The report explains how fiscal policy - and tax policy in
particular - will play an essential role in ensuring the LAC region
builds back better from COVID-19, while also addressing social
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in productive capabilities that
pre-dated the pandemic. Once the recovery is well under way,
countries in the LAC region need to promote tax and spending
policies that will underpin inclusive and sustainable economic
growth.

There is scope to increase revenues from personal incomes taxes
(PIT) and environmentally related taxes, as well as social security
contributions (SSC) in most countries.  PIT and SSC generated 9.2%
and 17.1% of total tax revenues in 2019 respectively, compared with
23.5% and 25.7% in the OECD (2018 figure). Meanwhile,
environmentally related tax revenues amounted to 1.2% of GDP on
average in 2019 in the 25 LAC countries for which data are
available, below the OECD average of 2.1%.

Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2021 is a
joint publication by the Inter-American Center of Tax
Administrations (CIAT), the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Centre for Tax Policy and Administration and the OECD
Development Centre. This is the tenth edition in the series and the
third produced through the European Union's Regional Facility for
Development in Transition for Latin America and the Caribbean.  

                        About the IDB

The Inter-American Development Bank is a leading source of
long-term financing for economic, social and institutional projects
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Besides loans, grants and
guarantees, the IDB conducts cutting-edge research to offer
innovative and sustainable solutions to our region's most pressing
challenges. Founded in 1959 to help accelerate progress in its
developing member countries, the IDB continues to work every day to
improve lives.



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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