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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, April 12, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 67

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: To Avoid Limiting Economic Activity in 2nd Wave Response
STONEWAY CAPITAL: Case Summary & 24 Unsecured Creditors
STONEWAY CAPITAL: Owner of 4 Argentine Power Plants in Chapter 11


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Auctions 22 Airport Operating Concessions
INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Raises LT IDRs to 'CCC'
JBS SA: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1 on Strong Operating Performance


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Growers Seek Aid for Sector
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Oil, Egg and Milk Prices Remain High


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


M E X I C O

CULIACAN MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Affirms B3 Issuer Rating


P A R A G U A Y

BANCO REGIONAL: Moody's Lowers Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba3


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week April 5 to April 9, 2021

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: To Avoid Limiting Economic Activity in 2nd Wave Response
-------------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Argentina is already contending with the
second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic and authorities at all levels
of government are working on "localized, intensive and temporary"
measures to reduce mobility and expedite vaccination of people over
60, the health minister said.

"With this sustained and accelerating increase in the number of
cases, the second wave is a fact," Carla Vizzotti told a press
conference, according to EFE News.

She added, however, that the situation in Argentina did "not exceed
the global context," pointing to surges in case numbers in the
Northern Hemisphere and strains on the health care systems in
neighboring South American countries, the report notes.

Vizzotti spoke ahead of a meeting set among officials from the
national government, Buenos Aires province and the municipality of
Buenos Aires to determine the next steps, the report discloses.

In finalizing the approach to the second wave, she said,
authorities will strive to avoid limiting economic activity or
impinging on individual exercise and recreation, "taking into
account society's fatigue" with the pandemic, the report relates.

Policy-makers also want to avoid closing schools just weeks after
the resumption of in-person classes, the health minister said, the
report notes.

Argentina set a new record for additional coronavirus infections in
a 24-hour period with 20,870. The total number of cases since the
start of the pandemic stands at 2.4 million, while the death toll
is 56,471, the report discloses.

Vizzotti appealed to Argentines to act responsibly, labeling as
"false" the notion that young, healthy people are not at risk, the
report says.

EFE News notes that amid ongoing delays with vaccine deliveries
from abroad, the Argentine government has decided to delay giving
second doses to people who have gotten the first dose in the
interest of administering the initial dose to as much of the
population as possible before the onset of winter in the Southern
Hemisphere.

To date, Argentina, a nation of 45 million, has received 7.27
million vaccine doses and administered 4.4 million, according to
official figures, the report relays.

More than 90 percent of health care workers have received at least
one dose and nearly 60 percent are fully vaccinated, Vizzotti said,
the report discloses.

Roughly 56 percent of people 80 and older have gotten the first
dose, along with 40.7 percent of the 70-79 age cohort, the report
says.

Vizzotti, herself a physician, said that Argentina's health system
has made great strides in the last 13 months, increasing intensive
care beds by 50 percent and the number of ventilators by 60
percent, the report adds.

                          About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Argentina stands at CCC+ with
stable outlook, which was a rating upgrade issued on Sept. 8,
2020.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Ca on Sept. 28,
2020.  Fitch's credit rating for Argentina was last reported on
Sept. 11, 2020 at CCC, which was a rating upgrade from CC.  DBRS'
credit rating for Argentina is CCC, given on Sept. 11, 2020.  

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin American, DBRS
noted that the recent upgrade in Argentina's ratings (September
2020) follows the closing of two debt restructuring agreements
between the Argentine government and private creditors.  The first
restructuring involved $65 billion in foreign-law bonds.  The deal
achieved the requisite participation necessary to trigger the
collective action clauses and finalize the restructuring on 99% on
the aggregate principal outstanding of eligible bonds.  DBRS added
that the debt restructurings conclude a prolonged default and
provide the government with substantial principal and interest
payment relief over the next four years.

DBRS further relayed that Argentina is also seeking a new agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace the canceled
2018 Stand-by Agreement.  Formal negotiations on the new financing
began in November 2020.  Obligations to the IMF amount to $44
billion, with major repayments coming due in 2022 and 2023.

STONEWAY CAPITAL: Case Summary & 24 Unsecured Creditors
-------------------------------------------------------
Lead Debtor: Stoneway Capital Ltd.
             80 Main Street
             P.O. Box 3200
             Road Town, VG1110, British Virgin Islands

Business Description: The Debtors are holding companies that do
                      not directly carry on material business
                      operations (except for SCC, which leases
                      turbines to the Argentine Operating
                      Subsidiaries), other than maintaining their
                      ownership interests in their non-Debtor
                      operating subsidiaries: Araucaria Power
                      Generation SA, Araucaria Energy SA, SPI
                      Energy SA and Araucaria Generation SA.
                      The principal business of the Argentine
                      Operating Subsidiaries is the construction,
                      ownership and operation of four power-
                      generating plants in Argentina that provide
                      electricity to the wholesale electricity
                      market in Argentina.

Chapter 11 Petition Date: April 7, 2021

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York

Six affiliates that concurrently filed voluntary petitions for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code:

    Debtor                                       Case No.
    ------                                       --------
    Stoneway Capital Ltd. (Lead Case)            21-10646
    Stoneway Capital Corporation                 21-10647
    Stoneway Energy International LP             21-10648
    Stoneway Energy LP                           21-10649
    Stoneway Group LP                            21-10650
    Stoneway Power Generation Inc.               21-10651

Judge: Hon. James L. Garrity, Jr.

Debtors' Counsel: Fredric Sosnick, Esq.
                  Ned S. Schodek, Esq.
                  Jordan A. Wishnew, Esq.
                  SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP         
                  599 Lexington Avenue
                  New York, NY 10022
                  Tel: (212) 848-4000
                  Email: fsosnick@shearman.com
                         ned.schodek@shearman.com
                         jordan.wishnew@shearman.com
Debtors'
Claims &
Noticing
Agent:            PRIME CLERK LLC
                 
https://cases.primeclerk.com/StonewayCapital/Home-Index
Estimated Assets
(on a consolidated basis): $500 million to $1 billion

Estimated Liabilities
(on a consolidated basis): $1 billion to $10 billion

The petitions were signed by David Mack, director.

A copy of Stoneway Capital Ltd.'s petition is available for free
at PacerMonitor.com at:

https://www.pacermonitor.com/view/KS6C5SQ/Stoneway_Capital_Ltd__nysbke-21-10646__0001.0.pdf?mcid=tGE4TAMA

Consolidated List of Debtors' 24 Unsecured Creditors:

   Entity                          Nature of Claim    Claim Amount
   ------                          ---------------    ------------
1. Siemens Energy Inc.            Litigation Claim     $22,523,011
4400 Alafaya Trail
Orlando, FL 32826-2399
Tel: 407-736-7075
Paula Gonzalez
Email: paulargonzalez@siemens.com

2. DF / Mompresa, S.A.U.          Litigation Claim      $4,480,653
Parque Cientifico Tecnologico
Ada Byron, 90
33203 Gijon, Asturias (Spain)
Tel: +34 985 1991 16
Ignacio Rodriguez
Email: direccion.juridica@durofelguera.com

3. Siemens Energy AB              Litigation Claim      $1,735,208
Slottsvagen 2-6
612 83 Finspang, Sweden
Peter Hjelm
Email: peter.hjelm@siemens.com

4. Gramercy Energy Secured            Unsecured         $1,116,017
Holdings II LLC                       Note Claims
c/o Gramercy Funds Management LLC
20 Dayton Avenue
Greenwich, CT 06830
Tel: 203-552-1943
Attn: Tomas Serantes; Marc Zelina
Email: tserantes@gramercy.com;
mzelina@gramercy.com

5. Simpson Thacher &               Legal Services         $151,489
Bartlett LLP
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Tel: 212-455-2664
Todd Crider
Email: tcrider@stblaw.com

6. Gemcorp Fund I Limited          Unsecured Note         $122,989
c/o Gemcorp Capital LLP                Claim
1 New Burlington Place
London, W1S 2HR
United Kingdom
Attn: General Counse/Operations
Email: generalcounsel@gemcorp.net;
ops@gemcorp.net

7. Gemcorp Multi Strategy Master   Unsecured Note          $47,489
Fund SICAV SCS                         Claim
c/o Gemcorp Capital LLP
1 New Burlington Place
London, W1S 2HR
United Kingdom
Attn: General Counsel/Operations
Email: generalcounsel@gemcorp.net;
ops@gemcorp.net

8. Araucaria Capital S.A.          Administrative          $45,790
Av. del Libertador 498,               Services
15th Floor
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Tel: 54-11-5252-0303
Attn: President or General Counsel
Email: info@araucariaenergy.com

9. Sargent & Lundy LLC              Engineering            $28,000
55 East Monroe Street                 Services
Chicago, IL 60603
Tel: 312-269-9675
Terrence P. Coyne
Email: terrence.p.coyne@sargentlundy.com

10. SS&C Intralinks                 Virtual Data           $27,310
685 Third Ave, 9th Floor            Room Hosting
New York, NY 10017                    Services
Tel: 212-342-7676
Susie Xiao
Email: sxiao@intralinks.com

11. Vista South America Inc.        Travel Agent           $25,000
12405 NE 6th Avenue                   Services
North Miami, FL 33161
Tel: 305-266-3029
Attn: Ariel Wainer

12. Maples and Calder BV           Legal Services          $21,308
Sea Meadow House
PO Box 173
Road Town VG1110
British Virgin Islands
Tel: 284-852-3000
Chloe Harris
Email: chloe.harris@maples.com

13. Aldebaran Group Ltd.              Financial            $19,719
12 Gough Square, 3rd Floor           Consultant
London, EC4A 3DW                      Services
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 7392 742245
Attn: Jacques Marie Blehaut

14. Epiq Corporate                    Consultant           $19,213
Restructuring LLC                      Services
777 Third Avenue, 12th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Tel: 312-560-6333
Attn: Brad Tuttle, Senior Managing Director
Email: btuttle@epiqglobal.com

15. Baker & McKenzie LLP           Legal Services          $16,618
452 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10018
Tel: 212-626-4100
Clyde Rankin, III
Email: clyde.rankin@bakermckenzie.com

16. WD Capital Markets Inc.           Financial            $11,419
Wildeboer Dellelce Place              Services
Suite 805
365 Bay Street
Toronto, Ontario M5H 2V1
Tel: 416-847-6907
Artur Agivaev
Email: artur@wdcapital.ca

17. Cratos Global                      Power               $11,411
3225 Shallowford Road, Suite          Project
810 Marietta, Georgia 30062         Consulting
Tel: 770-691-3120                    Services
Attn: President or General Counsel

18. Kekst and Company Inc.           Media and              $9,855
437 Madison Avenue, 37th Floor     Communication
New York, NY 10022                    Services
Tel: 212 521 4800
Daniel Yunger
Email: daniel.yunger@kekstcnc.com

19. Atahualpa USA LLC              Communication            $8,000
6820 Indian Creek Dr., Unit 2F       Services
Miami Beach, FL 33141
Attn: Carlos Bussolini, Director

20. CT Lien Solutions                Federal                $7,535
c/o Wolters Kluwer                 Litigation
2700 Lake Cook Road                  Search
Riverwoods, IL 60015                Services
Tel: 800-833-5778
Attn: President or General Counsel
Email:
liensolutions.clientsupport@waltersk
luwer.com

21. Citrix Systems Inc.           Information               $1,707
851 W. Cypress Creek Road         Technology
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309          Services
Tel: 800-424-8749
Attn: President or General Counsel

22. O'Farrell Inc.              Legal Services              $1,340
167 Madison Avenue, Suite 303
New York, NY 10016
Tel: 305-468-4614
Attn: Michael Joseph
Email: info@ofarrelusa.com

23. Samuel Knight                 Consulting                  $468
City Quadrant, Offices 13-15       Services
Waterloo Square
Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE1 4DP
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (191) 481 3620
Attn: President or General Counsel
Email: energy@samuel-knight.com

24. Broadridge Financial Solutions                            $364
51 Mercedes Way
Edgewood, NY 11717
Tel: 631-254-7422
Attn: Joseph Naso
Email: joseph.naso@broadridge.com

STONEWAY CAPITAL: Owner of 4 Argentine Power Plants in Chapter 11
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Argentine power plant operator Stoneway Capital Ltd. is seeking
bankruptcy protection in the U.S. after failing to extend a
standstill agreement with its creditors.

The company, which had defaulted on bonds, filed for Chapter 11 in
the Southern District of New York.  It listed estimated liabilities
of $1 billion to $10 billion, compared with estimated assets of
$500 million to $1 billion.

The Debtors are holding companies that own Argentine subsidiaries
that own and operate four power-generating plants in Argentina that
provide electricity to the wholesale electricity market in
Argentina.

                          Liquidity Woes

David Mack, sole director, explained in court filings that despite
generating over $100 million of EBITDA since its inception, the
Company has struggled to generate sufficient free cash flow to
support its working capital requirements and satisfy its ongoing
principal and interest repayment obligations under its secured
indebtedness. The Company's liquidity position also deteriorated
significantly as a result of a number of industry and
Company-specific challenges, including:

   a. Slower economic growth in Argentina, which resulted in a
decline in aggregate energy consumption, and which coincided with
the addition of generation capacity from new hydroelectric and
renewable energy projects in the Argentine power market;

   b. The Company has experienced timing issues with respect to its
revenue receipt from CAMMESA due to a number of reasons, including
currency devaluation;

   c. SGLP incurred significant refinancing costs in relation to
the Argentine Revolving Credit Facilities between September 2019
and February 2020, and several of its working capital facilities
that matured in the third and fourth quarters of 2019 were not
renewed; and

   d. the Argentine Operating Subsidiaries were required
temporarily to adjust the form of upstream payments made to SCC due
to Argentine exchange rate controls, resulting in delays and
additional taxes on those payments.

As a result of these business challenges, the Company has struggled
to generate the liquidity necessary to satisfy its working capital,
supplier and financial obligations.  These issues are exacerbated
by the Company's highly-leveraged capital structure.

                            Funded Debt

The Debtors' obligations for funded debt consists of: (i) senior
secured notes in an aggregate outstanding principal amount,
together with accrued and unpaid interest, of approximately $686.6
million issued by SCC, and which are guaranteed by two of the
Debtors (SEI and SELP) and benefit from pledges of equity interests
and other assets from each of the other Debtors; (ii) approximately
$26.1 million in outstanding principal due under revolving credit
facilities -- Argentine Revolving Credit Facilities -- for which
certain of the Argentine Operating Subsidiaries are borrowers, but
which also benefit from the same guaranty and collateral package as
the Notes; and (iii) a term loan, the borrower of which is
non-debtor GRM, but which is guaranteed by Stoneway Capital, SGLP
and Stoneway Power, under which the outstanding principal amount,
together with accrued and unpaid  interest, is $271,680,900, plus
fees, expenses, costs, and other charges arising under or related
to the Term Loan.

                       Canadian Proceedings

Following a series of initial defaults in early 2020 and a limited
exercise of remedies -- 2020 Exercise of Remedies -- by Gramercy
Energy Secured Holdings II LLC, Gemcorp Fund I Limited and Gemcorp
Multi Strategy Master Fund SICAV SCS -- Term Lenders -- the Company
entered into a series of informal standstill agreements with the
Term Lenders and holders of approximately 80% of the total
principal amount of the Notes.

On Sept. 21, 2020, the parties entered into a Restructuring Support
Agreement, which contemplated a restructuring transaction to be
implemented pursuant to a corporate plan of arrangement to be
commenced by the Company under the Canada Business Corporations
Act.  The RSA demonstrated that the Debtors' key financial
creditors believed that the Debtors could sustain indebtedness
without a principal reduction in the Notes, and that the Debtors
could achieve a comprehensive restructuring in the form of the
Consensual Restructuring.  Under the terms of the Consensual
Restructuring, upon consummation of the Plan of Arrangement, (i)
the Notes, would be converted into new secured new senior secured
notes issued by the Company with a principal amount equal to the
principal amount of the Notes and (ii) the Term Loan would be
converted into 50% of the common shares and 100% of the preferred
shares of GRM.

Although the CBCA Proceedings had been commenced in the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) on Oct. 8, 2020, and
the Debtors were well on the way toward closing the Consensual
Restructuring, on Dec. 4, 2020, the Argentine Supreme Court issued
a decision in an ongoing noise discharge dispute involving the
Matheu Generation Facility, one of the Generation Facilities
located in Pilar, Argentina.  The Argentine Supreme Court Decision
created significant uncertainty as it overturned a decision of the
federal appeals court in San Martin, Buenos Aires, which previously
had invalidated a 2017 injunction issued by the Campana Federal
Court regarding the construction and operation of the Matheu
Generation Facility.

Due to the uncertainty caused by the Argentine Supreme Court
Decision, the meeting of holders of Notes that had been scheduled
to approve the Plan of Arrangement on Dec. 22, 2020, was adjourned
to a date to be determined.  On March 15, 2021, the Company, the
Term Lenders and the Ad Hoc Group agreed to certain further
amendments to the RSA in light of the developments with respect to
the Argentine Environmental Claims, including the addition of
certain additional covenants of the Company and the inclusion of a
provision that would automatically terminate the RSA at 12:01 a.m.
New York City Time on March 31, 2021 (the "Expiration Date"),
unless extended by members of the Ad Hoc Group holding a majority
of the Notes (the "Majority Members") by providing written notice
at least three business days prior to such date (the "Extension
Deadline").  On March 16, 2021, the Argentine Federal Court of
Appeals issued its decision (the "March 2021 Decision") to uphold
the 2017 Matheu Injunction and remanding the case to the trial
court for further consideration.

                      The Chapter 11 Filings

The Extension Deadline for the RSA passed without the Expiration
Date having been extended by the Majority Members.  Even after the
passing of the Extension Deadline, it is my understanding that the
Term Lenders made one or more new proposals to the Ad Hoc Group,
and that negotiations among the parties continue in an effort to
reach a consensual resolution.  

In addition, the Debtors' counsel explored with counsel to both the
Term Lenders the possibility of a forbearance short of a full
resolution on the terms of an amendment to the RSA.

Late in the evening of March 30, 2021, an informal standstill
through 11:59 p.m. on April 7, 2021, was agreed to among counsel to
the Debtors, counsel to the Ad Hoc Group and counsel to the Term
Lenders.  During the period of that informal standstill,
discussions among the parties continued, however, as the expiration
of the standstill approached, it became apparent that the
discussions would not prove fruitful, and that the standstill would
not be extended.

As a result of the looming expiration of the informal standstill
arrangement, the Debtors have commenced chapter 11 cases in order
to put the automatic stay in place, maintain the status quo pending
resolution of the various issues in Argentina, and ensure that
neither the Indenture Trustee nor the Argentine Trustee take any
action that could be detrimental or value destructive to the
Company.  

It is possible that the Argentine Operating Subsidiaries may
commence concurso preventivo proceedings under article 5 et seq. of
the Argentine Bankruptcy Law No. 24,522 (Ley de Concursos y
Quiebras), in the ordinary commercial courts of the Republic of
Argentina ("Argentine Concurso Proceedings").  In addition, if
appropriate, certain of the Debtors may also consider commencing
Argentine Concurso Proceedings of their own.

                      About Stoneway Capital

Stoneway Capital Corporation is a limited corporation incorporated
in New Brunswick, Canada, formed for the purpose of owning and
operating, through its Argentine subsidiaries, power generation
projects that will provide electricity to the wholesale electricity
markets in Argentina.  The Argentine subsidiaries operate four
power-generating plants in Argentina that provide electricity to
the wholesale electricity market in Argentina.

Stoneway is 100% owned by GRM Energy Investment Limited.

On Oct. 8, 2020, the Company commenced proceedings under the Canada
Business Corporations Act (the "CBCA").   The Debtors were well on
the way toward closing the consensual restructuring when on Dec. 4,
2020, the Argentine Supreme Court issued a decision in an ongoing
noise discharge dispute involving one of the Generation Facilities
located in Pilar, Argentina.  The Argentine Supreme Court Decision
created significant uncertainty as it overturned a decision of the
federal appeals court in San Martin, Buenos Aires.

As a result of the looming expiration of the informal standstill
arrangement, the Debtors have commenced chapter 11 cases in the
U.S. in order to put the automatic stay in place, maintain the
status quo pending resolution of the various issues in Argentina,
and ensure that neither the Indenture Trustee nor the Argentine
Trustee takes any action that could be detrimental or value
destructive to the Company.

Stoneway Capital Ltd. and five related entities, including Stoneway
Capital Corp., sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 21-10646) on April 7, 2021.  Stoneway estimated
liabilities of $1 billion to $10 billion and assets of $500 million
to $1 billion.

Shearman & Sterling LLP is the Debtors' counsel.  Prime Clerk LLC
is the claims agent.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: Auctions 22 Airport Operating Concessions
--------------------------------------------------
Rio Times Online reports that projecting investments of BRL10
billion, the government was carry out the auction of operating
concessions for 22 airports, 1 railroad and 5 port terminals.

Divided into three regional blocks, the airports will be auctioned
starting at 10am at the B3 stock exchange in Sao Paulo, according
to Rio Times Online.  The minimum bids will be BRL130.2 million for
the South Block, BRL47.8 million for the North Block and BRL8.1
million for the Central Block, the report notes.

Called by the government Infra Week, the week of auction bids began
April 7, with the concession of air terminals to private enterprise
for 30 year periods, the report notes.

                         About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed on December 14, 2020, its 'BB-/B'
long-and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Brazil. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains
stable.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020). Moody's credit rating for Brazil
was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's
credit
rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March 2018).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings' stable outlook assumes that timely implementation
of fiscal adjustment and modest economic recovery will help
preserve market confidence and adequate funding conditions for the
government in local markets in the next two years, despite a
sustained increase in the debt burden.

INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Raises LT IDRs to 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded InterCement Participacoes S.A.'s
Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
to 'CCC' from 'C.' Fitch also upgraded InterCement's 2024 notes to
'CCC'/'RR4' from 'C'/'RR4' and its national scale rating to
'B-(bra)' from 'C(bra)'.

The upgrade reflects the improvement in the Brazilian cement
market, which has allowed InterCement to bolster its EBITDA
generation in the country to USD125 million in 2020 from
USD75million 2019. The company's EBITDA in this market should grow
to more than USD150 million in 2021, which combined with EBITDA
generated by African subsidiaries should allow the company to
continue to service interest payments on its debt. The upgrade also
reflects the company's improved liquidity profile after the bank
debt refinancing of 2020, which pushed back debt amortizations on
USD900 million of debt until 2023.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Leverage: Loma Negra C.I.A.S.A., InterCement's 51% owned
Argentine subsidiary, generates around 50% of InterCement's
consolidated Adjusted EBITDA but holds only 2% of the net debt and
is subject to currency control restrictions. Excluding Loma Negra,
the company's net debt to Adjusted EBITDA ratio would be
approximately 8x. On a proportional basis, excluding the 49% of
Loma Negra that InterCement does not own, leverage stood at 5.4x as
of year-end 2020.

Argentina Remains Challenging: Loma Negra is experiencing weak
cement demand due to the country's macroeconomic situation. Cement
demand in Argentina declined to 10 million metric tons (MT) in 2020
from 11MT in 2019 and 12MT in 2018. Loma Negra generated USD171
million of EBITDA in 2020. This figure benefited from an official
exchange rate whose volatility was reduced due to strict capital
controls and would likely be lower should the country lift
controls. Fitch incorporated cement volume growth of 7% for 2021 in
this market as strict capital controls have boosted the
construction activity.

Brazilian Cement Recovery: Consumption in Brazil's cement market
fell to 52 million tons (MT) from a high of 72 MT during the
economic downturn of 2015-2018. The market rebounded to 54MT in
2019 and then grew to 60MT in 2020 due to increased spending on
home improvements, hard asset investment in light if low interest
rates, a sharp currency depreciation in addition to Brazil's
sizable economic stimulus package. EBITDA from this country should
increase to above USD150 million in 2021 from USD125 million in
2020 and USD75 million in 2019 with the current demand run-rate, a
more stable currency and pricing.

Debt Refinancing: InterCement refinanced approximately USD900
million of amortizing bank and debenture debt, which represented
more than 50% of debt outstanding with the issuance of local
debentures in June 2020. These debentures have a final debt
maturity of 2027 and begin to amortize in June 2023. They are
secured by a first lien on the shares of publicly listed Loma Negra
held by InterCement. Holders of the debentures have the right to
shorten the maturity of these instruments to May 2024 should
InterCement be unable to extend the maturity of its unsecured 2024
notes.

Debenture Issuance Lowered FX Exposure: Foreign Exchange (FX)
mismatch was lowered after the debenture issuance, as 38% of total
debt should be either U.S. dollar or Euro denominated compared with
69% prior to the debenture issuance. This is an important reduction
as the company does not generate hard currency revenue. InterCement
mainly relies on its pricing strategy to offset U.S. dollar cost
inflation and revenue weakness resulting from currency
depreciation.

Solid Business in Depressed Markets: InterCement is the
second-largest cement producer in Brazil, which is one of the
world's largest cement markets, and the leading cement producer in
Argentina with close to 50% market share. The company also operates
in Mozambique, where it is the largest producer with a 50% market
share, as well as in Egypt, and South Africa. InterCement's
businesses in Argentina is operated through its 51%-owned
subsidiary Loma Negra. InterCement's EBITDA is split among Brazil
(30%), Argentina (41%), and its African subsidiaries.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

InterCement's 'CCC' rating reflects substantial credit risk due to
weak cash flow generation relative to large debt burden. The
company has a strong business position in most of the markets in
which it operates and a relatively large scale particularly in
Argentina and Brazil. Despite its scale, InterCement's cash flow
has varied greatly as it operates in highly volatile markets such
as Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Mozambique and South Africa. This
compares with a greater exposure to developed markets or highly
rated emerging markets of other cement producers, such as Cemex
(BB-/Negative).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Brazilian volumes increase by low-single digits in 2021 and
    2022.

-- Argentine volumes rebound mid-high single digits in 2021 and
    low-single digits in 2022.

-- Capex levels around USD160 million in 2021 and USD120 million
    in 2022.

-- Dividends to minorities and preferred shareholders of around
    USD30 million in 2021 and 2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Increasing cement demand in the Brazilian market or increased
    market share that leads to higher EBITDA generation;

-- Additional proactive steps by the company to materially
    bolster its capital structure in the absence of high operating
    cash flow;

-- Improved access to cash from the company's Argentina
    operations for debt service;

-- Successful refinancing of capital market debt bonds;

-- Expectations of net debt / EBITDA excluding Loma Negra below
    6.5x.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Deterioration in InterCement's liquidity profile;

-- Lack of progress in refinancing the 2024 notes before the
    beginning of 2023;

-- Material weakness in Brazilian construction that leads to
    expectations of lower EBITDA generation.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Near-term Liquidity: InterCement refinanced approximately
USD900 million of bank and debenture debt at the beginning of June
2020 through the issuance of local debentures. The refinancing
together with debt repayment reduced the company's short-term debt
maturities including revolving credit lines to USD152 million as of
year-end 2020. This compares with USD261 million of cash and
short-term investments. USD52 million of this amount was in
Argentina. The extent of the Brazilian recovery will be crucial
over the next 24-36 months as it will largely determine the
company's ability to extend the maturity of its 2024 notes and
avoid the debentures becoming fully due in 2024.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

InterCement has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Governance
Structure due to limited board independence through ownership by
key shareholder, Mover Participacoes S.A. This has a negative
impact on the credit profile and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

JBS SA: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1 on Strong Operating Performance
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded JBS S.A.'s corporate family
rating to Ba1 from Ba2 and the senior unsecured ratings of its
wholly-owned subsidiaries JBS USA Lux S.A. and JBS Investments II
GmbH to Ba1 from Ba2. The rating of the secured term loan under JBS
USA Lux S.A. was upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1. The outlook for all
ratings is stable.

Ratings actions:

Issuer: JBS S.A.

Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

Issuer: JBS Investments II GmbH

$1000 million GTD global notes due 2026, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

$750 million GTD global notes due 2028, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

Issuer: JBS USA Lux S.A.

$900mm GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2028, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

$1000mm GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2029, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

$400mm GTD NOTES due 2029, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

$1250mm GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2030, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

$1900mm GTD SR SEC TERM LOAN due 2026, Upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: JBS Investments II GmbH

Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: JBS S.A.

Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: JBS USA Lux S.A.

Outlook, Remains Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of JBS's ratings is supported by the continued strong
operating performance, which has led to further improvement in
liquidity and lower refinancing risk. JBS has implemented a number
of initiatives to extend debt maturities, amortize debt and reduce
funding costs, supported by clear financial policies for minimum
cash requirement and leverage. Accordingly, JBS' target leverage is
a range between 2x-3x net debt to EBITDA, which increases to 3.75x
in periods of expansion. The positive environment for the protein
industry will allow JBS to further strengthen its business profile,
credit metrics and liquidity.

The reduction in event risks related to some litigations and
investigations involving the company and its shareholders also
supports the upgrade, which include the removal of the auditors'
emphasis of matter on the investigations and judicial procedures
from 3Q20 financial statements, as well the settlement with the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on their respective investigations of JBS
controlling shareholder J&F Investimentos S.A. and JBS S.A. in
October 2020.

JBS credit profile continues to reflect the strength of its global
operations as the world's largest protein producer, and its
substantial diversification across protein segments, geographies
and markets. JBS' strategy to expand its global footprint into
value-added processed food segments has improved its business
profile and resulted in more stability in its operating margin and
cash flow over time. Its strong liquidity and successful liability
management initiatives, which started in September 2018 and
resulted in the extension of debt maturities and reduced funding
costs, support the ratings. JBS has strong liquidity, with BRL19.7
billion in cash as of the end of 2020 and about BRL10 billion in
revolving credit facilities. Liquidity is further supported by a
comfortable debt amortization schedule.

JBS' credit profile is constrained by the volatility in the protein
industry, which is subject to risk factors such as weather
conditions, diseases, supply imbalances and global trade variables.
Despite the business diversification, the company still has large
exposure to the beef segment (about 57% of revenues 54% of EBITDA)
that also constrains the ratings. Corporate governance concerns
continue to weigh on the company's credit profile, given the
ownership concentration at J&F Investimentos, a privately held
holding company owned by the Batista family, and their involvement
in corruption investigations in the past.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that JBS'
operational performance will remain strong, including in the beef
segment, as well as in the processed and prepared foods segments in
the US, Brazil and its export business. The stable outlook also
reflects Moody's expectation that strong cash flow from operations
will allow JBS to further reduce funding costs and leverage.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

An upgrade would be subject to the overall earnings stability of
JBS, sustained conservative financial policies, and continued
evidence of enhanced risk control and governance oversight, with a
track record of absence of event risks related to litigations and
investigations involving the company and its controlling
shareholders. An upward rating movement would also require JBS to
maintain strong liquidity and stable credit metrics, with leverage
sustained at 2.5x or below and interest coverage (EBITA/interest
expense) improving toward 6x.

The ratings could be downgraded if the company's operating
performance weakens, its financial policy becomes more aggressive
or its liquidity deteriorates. A downgrade could be triggered by
events that can increase liquidity risk or cause reputation damage,
including litigations and M&A. Quantitatively, a downgrade could
also occur if the company's leverage (total debt/EBITDA) stays
above 3x and cash flow from operations/debt stays below 25%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Protein and
Agriculture published in May 2019.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, JBS S.A. (JBS) is the world's
largest protein producer in terms of revenue, slaughter capacity
and production. The company is the leader in beef, chicken and
leather, and it is the second-largest pork producer in the US. The
company has operations in more than 20 countries with more than 450
offices and plants, which support its large scale and
diversification.

In 2020, JBS reported consolidated revenue of BRL270.2 billion ($52
billion), with a consolidated EBITDA margin of 11%. JBS USA Beef,
which represents the beef and lamb operations in the US, Canada and
Australia, is the company's largest business segment, accounting
for 41% of its total revenue in 2020. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation
(Pilgrim's Pride, Ba3 stable) accounted for 22% of the total
revenue, while the US pork business contributed with 12%. JBS S.A.
Brasil (Beef Brazil) represented 15% of the total revenue for the
same period, while Brazil-based Seara S.A. (Seara), which comprises
poultry, pork and processed foods operations, accounted for about
10% of revenue in 2020.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Growers Seek Aid for Sector
------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that on the occasion of the celebration of
the "National Coffee Day" this April 11, the president of CONCAFED
assured that measures would be implemented to benefit cooperative
groups, nuclei, federations, and independent producers in the
country who have been forgotten by the authorities and excluded
from the development policies announced by President Luis
Abinader.

"It is necessary that the authorities promote the renovation and
maintenance of farms, proper post-harvest management, value-added,
transformation, and commercialization in export markets of the
Dominican coffee sector," CONCAFED president Lespin de la Cruz
said, the report notes.

Likewise, Lespin recalled that for 2019 the disease is known as
Coffee Rust, a plague that began in the country in 2011, affected
around 200 thousand quintals of coffee, and that the sector has not
been able to recover from that blow due to the lack of support from
the Government, but that despite this for 2020-2021, it was
expected to produce 700 quintals of coffee, an amount that is
estimated to be the national consumption per year, the report adds.


               Self-sufficient in Coffee Consumption

In a separate report, Dominican Today said that the goal of the
Dominican Coffee Institute (Indocafe) is to control rust and CBB
and improve the roads in the coffee-growing areas and provide
technical and financial assistance to producers, said the executive
director of the institution Leonidas Batista Diaz.

The official stressed that one of his priorities is for the
Dominican Republic to once again be self-sufficient in coffee
consumption, according to Dominican Today.

"If there is something that for us is a columnar need, it is to
bring the country back to being self-sufficient in national
consumption, because now the coffee that the people consume is not
Dominican," the report relays.

According to his comments, the country's coffee sector was homeless
in the last 16 years, revealing that more than a million tasks were
left uncultivated, the report notes.

"Fortunately for the Dominican coffee society, we have a president
of the Republic identified with the people, so on November 20, he
arranged RD$1 billion at zero rates as a way to revive coffee,"
said Batista Diaz when interviewed. The program "Esta Manana" is
broadcast on RTVD 17 of the State Radio and Television Corporation
(CERTV), the report discloses.

He reported that thanks to the financial incentive of President
Luis Abinader, each week, coffee producers are elected, who are
visited, given assistance, and loans are approved for their
production, the report relays.

                               Announcement

Batista Diaz revealed that by September, they would announce the
entry into the country of a variety of coffee resistant to rust, a
disease caused by a fungus that affects coffee plantations. He said
that more than 12,000 producers would soon have the National Health
Insurance (Senasa) card, the report notes.

Among other information, he said that they are delivering about
190,000 coffee plants from the Sur Futuro Foundation, of which
100,000 have already been planted, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, assigned a 'BB-' rating to Dominican
Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the severe
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Oil, Egg and Milk Prices Remain High
--------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that although the buyers and merchants of
the New Market on Avenida Duarte assure that the prices of some
products such as onion, garlic, bananas, and rice have begun to
fall and remain stable, others such as oil, eggs, milk, and salami
are worrying people.

Felo Gil is in charge of purchasing a dispenser and explains that
although some products have dropped in price, others have caused
him to carry a "little extra money," so he won't be unpleasantly
surprised because the oil, egg, and milk have not yet stabilized,
but have been increasing, according to Dominican Today.

Carlos is a salesman at the pump where Felo works and comments that
an egg is sold for RD$5 to grocery stores so that the population
finally gets it at between RD$7 and RD$9, the report discloses.

He also adds that "oil is increasing every day by more than RD$10"
and that other products that are not used daily at home have also
been increasing, such as juices and soft drinks, the report
relays.

Carlos emphasizes that if a product is expensive for the
colmaderos, it will reach people much higher and cites two cases,
the report relays.  They sell cod for RD$130 per pound and in
grocery stores for RD$180, the report notes.  Milk has gone up from
RD$10 now to RD$60 per liter, the report adds.

                 Products Whose Prices Fell

The cost of products such as garlic, onion, chili pepper, and
tomato began to fall in price in recent weeks, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Fitch Ratings on Jan. 18, assigned a 'BB-' rating to Dominican
Republic's USD1.5 billion 5.3% notes due Jan. 21, 2041.
Concurrently, the Dominican Republic reopened its 2030 4.5% notes
for an additional USD1.0 billion, which Fitch rates 'BB-', raising
the total outstanding amount of the 2030 notes to USD2.0 billion.

Standard & Poor's, on December 4, 2020, affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Dominican Republic. The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings. The negative
outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the ratings on the
Dominican Republic over the next six to 18 months, given the severe
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the sovereign's already
vulnerable fiscal and external profiles, as well as the potential
for a weaker-than-expected economic recovery.

Moody's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3
with stable outlook (July 2017). Fitch's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with negative outlook
(May 8, 2020).



=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================

EL SALVADOR: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and short-term
sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador. The outlook remains
stable. Its transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment remains
'AAA'.

Outlook

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that El
Salvador will continue to receive important external support in
2021, amid a difficult fiscal situation, which will provide
liquidity and limit the rollover risk of sovereign debt over the
next 12-18 months. We also expect moderate economic growth in the
coming years backed by a strong rebound in the U.S. economy.
Nonetheless, we don't expect the economy to return to pre-pandemic
levels until 2023. We expect the government will make only gradual
progress in implementing its plans for boosting economic growth and
strengthening public finances."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if El
Salvador faces difficulties accessing financing from official
creditors and international markets and fails to implement
corrective fiscal actions, which, in turn, could stress local
market conditions. This would increase refinancing risk in the
short term. We could also downgrade the sovereign if the economic
recovery is delayed, weighing on long-term trend GDP growth and
keeping fiscal deficits high for longer than we currently expect."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "In contrast, we could raise the ratings over the next
12-18 months if the economic recovery is more vigorous than
expected and translates into stronger fiscal and external results,
which would portend a substantial decline in the sovereign's debt
burden. In this scenario, we would also look for a track record of
political commitment by the authorities to advance fiscal policy
measures after the pandemic."

Rationale

The ratings on El Salvador are based on the country's institutional
weaknesses, reflected in political instability amid poor checks and
balances; low per capita GDP; and only moderate GDP growth due to
persistently low investment. In addition, they incorporate the
sovereign's weak public finances and high debt burden, which partly
reflects many years of stalemate on economic policies between the
country's congress and president.

Political polarization has led to poor policymaking, as seen in the
government's heavy reliance on short-term domestic debt, which has
created rollover risk only partially offset by the sovereign's
access to official funding. Vulnerabilities associated with
external debt and financing are key rating weaknesses. As a fully
dollarized economy, El Salvador has limited monetary flexibility.

Institutional and economic profile: The victory of President
Bukele's party in the legislative elections could result in new
fiscal and economic legislation during the next three years

-- The new congress--which will take office in May 2021--will be
dominated by the ruling New Ideas party and its ally.

-- Control over congress should enable the administration to pass
measures to correct fiscal weaknesses and enhance policy
credibility.

-- Following a severe contraction in 2020, we expect GDP growth to
rebound about 4% in 2021 and average 2.4% thereafter.

Economic activity will start to pick up in 2021, following a
contraction of nearly 8% last year. S&P assumes the dynamism of the
recovery in the U.S. and more favorable external conditions will
help boost growth to around 4% in 2021. The economic impact of the
pandemic has been more severe for El Salvador than it has for
peers, likely as a result of the longer and stricter lockdown and
uncertainty caused by political confrontation between the congress
and the president. On the other hand, remittances, which account
for about 20% of GDP, have proven more resilient than expected and
should benefit from accelerated GDP growth this year in the U.S.

El Salvador has low per capita income, estimated at about $4,000
for 2021. The country has experienced only moderate economic
growth, averaging 2.4% in the three years prior to the pandemic, as
it has suffered from many years of low investment, political
gridlock, weak competitiveness, and high emigration. S&P projects
that El Salvador's GDP per capita will return to pre-pandemic
levels in 2023.

Raising potential growth in the coming years will require reforms
to foster competitiveness and investment and a sustained reduction
of criminality. Job creation through more dynamic economic activity
is essential to tackle the large informal sector, which is
estimated to employ about 70% of the working-age population.

In the midterm election held on Feb. 28, 2021, the New Ideas party,
led by President Nayib Bukele, secured a landslide victory of 56
out of 84 seats in the Legislative Assembly. The party had no
representation in congress before the election. This victory should
help the president to pass reforms, to approve budgets and new
borrowings, and to make key appointments at the Supreme Court of
Justice (five of 15 judges will be renewed under the next
legislature) and the attorney general. Nevertheless, higher
concentration of policymaking in the hands of the president could
affect already weak checks and balances between the country's
public institutions.

After 18 months in office, President Bukele's popularity remains
very high, likely reflecting the government's expansive support to
the economy during the pandemic and perceptions of an improvement
in public security.

The confrontational situation between the presidency and the
outgoing congress had hampered the legislative approval of
government financing during the pandemic, including several budget
support loans, and interfered with the 2021 budget debate.

The Bukele Administration has reduced red tape and burdensome
regulations to facilitate private investment. Nevertheless, the
pandemic has delayed potential advances on economic reforms to
increase productivity and the implementation of an ambitious
public-private partnership investment program. The dynamics between
the government and the private sector are strained as investors
complain about a weakening rule of law.

Flexibility and performance profile: El Salvador's fiscal situation
is likely to worsen amid limited financing options

-- The fiscal deficit has substantially increased because of the
pandemic, and S&P expects it to narrow only gradually during the
next three years.

-- S&P expects the government to negotiate a multiyear program
with the IMF in the coming months, which would secure official
funding and provide a policy anchor for fiscal correction.

-- The government does not face significant external bond
amortization until March 2023, although the rollover of domestic
debt will remain a challenge over the short term.

-- El Salvador's deficits and debt rose in 2020, exacerbating
already weak public finances. The government's fiscal deficit
widened to 10% of GDP (from 3% in 2019) as a result of the economic
contraction and important spending measures to bolster the health
care system and mitigate the social and economic impact of the
crisis.

S&P said, "We anticipate that the fiscal deficit will narrow to
about 6% of GDP in 2021 as pandemic-related spending needs decline,
but the risks of fiscal slippage are significant. Accordingly, we
project that the change in net general government debt will average
4.9% of GDP in 2021-2024, which is worse than our previous
projection (which had assumed a faster fiscal correction after
adjusting for the one-off impact of the pandemic)."

The government has largely borrowed externally, from official
creditors and capital markets, to finance the fiscal deficit. This
has exacerbated El Salvador's high government debt burden, which
could jump to about 90% of GDP over the next two years (in net
terms). Fiscal consolidation efforts, supported by the Fiscal
Responsibility Law of 2016 and pension reform in 2017, have proved
insufficient to reduce the sovereign's very high debt burden. In
S&P's base case, it expects the government's interest burden to
average 21% of revenues in the coming years due to the country's
high debt.

An important portion of the multilateral financing approved in 2020
was not disbursed by lenders and was transferred to the 2021
budget, which alleviates short-term financing pressure. The
government has been in negotiations with the IMF on a multiyear
program that would secure additional funding for the country. A
qualified majority in the new congress should support a fast
approval of an IMF program and any associated reforms.

The country's external amortization profile is relatively smooth,
with no significant external capital payments until 2023 (US$800
million due in March 2023). However, El Salvador relies largely on
short-term domestic debt (LETES and CETES) to finance its deficits.
We expect the government will continue to roll over its domestic
obligations in 2021-2022, although local banks are unlikely to
increase their exposure. Moreover, the limit of LETES was reduced
to 25% of expected current revenues as part of the 2021 budget,
which puts the current debt stock near the upper limit. El
Salvador's debt profile is subject to vulnerabilities, given that
nonresidents hold over 60% of sovereign commercial debt.

El Salvador's limited fiscal flexibility remains a key credit
constraint--in particular, it has restricted monetary flexibility
because of its use of the U.S. dollar as the official currency. In
our view, significant shortfalls in basic services and
infrastructure continue to limit the government's ability to curb
expenditure, while a large informal economy constrains its ability
to raise additional revenue.

S&P said, "Externally, we expect the current account deficit (CAD)
to slightly widen in 2021 as the economy recovers, and we expect it
to average 2.8% of GDP in 2021-2024. This incorporates trade and
income deficits, partially offset by solid transfers from
remittances. We estimate foreign direct investment will remain
around 2% of GDP over 2021-2024, broadly covering the CAD. As a
result, we expect El Salvador's narrow net external debt to average
101% of current account receipts over the next three years. We also
expect its gross external financing needs to average 126% of its
current account receipts and usable reserves.

The authorities have implemented various measures to provide
liquidity to the financial sector, which the pandemic has had a
limited impact on. Liquidity in the system, profitability, and
capital ratios remain solid. Credit to the private sector has
remained stagnant in 2020 while total deposits have continued to
perform strongly because of limited spending options. S&P said,
"Given that the banks' assets-to-GDP ratio is about 80% and that
our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) is '8', we
consider El Salvador's contingent liabilities to be limited.
(BICRAs are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what
we view as the lowest-risk banking systems [group '1'] to the
highest-risk [group '10'].)"

Finally, the ratings on El Salvador are constrained by the absence
of monetary policy flexibility. S&P said, "While we expect
dollarization will continue to contain inflation, it has
constrained the authorities' ability to support the economy during
the pandemic. The country moved to full dollarization in 2001, and
we expect no change in the exchange rate regime, given the very
high exit costs. This supports our 'AAA' T&C assessment, as well as
our opinion that the sovereign would not restrict dollar outflows
by private parties to make debt service payments."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Ratings Affirmed

  El Salvador

  Sovereign Credit Rating     B-/Stable/B
  
  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
  
  Local Currency              AAA

  El Salvador

  Senior Unsecured            B-




===========
M E X I C O
===========

CULIACAN MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Affirms B3 Issuer Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico S.A. de C.V. affirmed the issuer ratings of the
Municipality of Culiacan at B3/B1.mx (Global Scale, local
currency/Mexico National Scale) and changed the outlook to stable
from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The change of outlook to stable from negative reflects the
municipality's sustained positive gross operating balances (GOBs)
and cash financing results, even in the face of challenges related
to the pandemic in 2020 that could have led to an erosion of it's
already weak liquidity. In spite of the economic shock, liquidity
instead strengthened slightly and the municipality was able to
avoid relying on short-term bank debt.

In 2021, Culiacan is focusing on increasing its collections of
own-source revenues, which grew a solid 14% in the first two months
of the year, and implementing cost controls which have so far led
to a 6% reduction in operating spending over the same period.

Moody's expects Culiacan will continue to report positive GOBs of
4.2% in 2021 and 2.5% next year, and modest cash financing
surpluses of 2.6% and 1.1%, supporting gradual increases in
liquidity. These low but positive results support Moody's
expectation that Culiacan will be able to continue to avoid
contracting short-term bank loans in 2021 and 2022, further
underpinning the stable outlook.

RATIONALE FOR THE AFFIRMATION OF THE B3/B1.mx RATINGS

The affirmation of Culiacan's ratings reflects expectations that
credit metrics will remain well positioned in the B3 rating
category, while liquidity will gradually improve. Moody's expects
cash will cover approximately 0.4x current liabilities at the end
of 2022, a level that provides only a modest cushion against
unexpected shocks. The affirmation also reflects Moody's
expectation that Culiacan's debt levels will remain manageable. Net
direct and indirect debt was equivalent to 22.2% of operating
revenues in 2020, and there are currently no plans to acquire
additional long or short-term debt.

The B3 rating also takes into account the drag on operating
flexibility arising from Culiacan's elevated unfunded pension
liabilities, which the municipality is already covering through
operating expenditures. In 2020 pension costs were equal to 14% of
operating revenues and Moody's estimates this will rise to 15% in
2021 and 2022. Offsetting some of these pressures are Culiacan's
strong own source revenue collections, which averaged 42% of
operating revenues over the past five years, above B-rated Mexican
peers.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward pressure on the ratings could arise if the municipality
shows a stronger than expected improvement in its operating and
financial balances, that in turn strengthens the liquidity position
and/or if the municipality implements measures to reduce its
unfunded pension liabilities. On the other hand, if liquidity
deteriorates below current levels and the municipality makes use of
short term debt, this could lead to a downgrade of Culiacan's
ratings.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

In Moody's assessment, environmental and social considerations are
not material to Culiacan's credit profile. Governance
considerations are material to Culiacan's ratings. The municipality
generally complies with the institutional framework determined by
national legislation for all state and municipal governments.
However, Culiacan's limited liquidity reflects historically poor
planning and budget management. Pressures related to pension
payments also reflect poor governance. These governance
considerations are already incorporated in Culiacan's ratings and
were not a driver in the action.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.



===============
P A R A G U A Y
===============

BANCO REGIONAL: Moody's Lowers Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded certain long-term ratings
and assessments of Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A. (Regional) and
affirmed all ratings of Banco Continental S.A.E.C.A. (Continental)
and Banco Basa S.A. (Basa).

Moody's downgraded Banco Regional's long-term local and foreign
currency deposit ratings to Ba3, from Ba2, long-term local and
foreign currency counterparty risk ratings to Ba2, from Ba1, and
the senior unsecured debt rating to Ba3, from Ba2. This followed
the downgrade of its baseline credit assessment and adjusted
baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba3, respectively.
Regional's long-term counterparty risk assessment was downgraded to
Ba2(cr) from Ba1(cr). The bank's Not Prime short-term ratings were
also affirmed. The outlook on the ratings is now stable.

Moody's also affirmed Banco Continental's Ba1/Not Prime long- and
short-term local currency deposit ratings, the Ba1/Not Prime long-
and short-term foreign currency deposit ratings, as well as the
Ba1/Not Prime long- and short-term counterparty risk ratings. The
outlook on the ratings is now stable. The bank`s ba2 baseline
credit assessment and ba2 adjusted baseline credit assessment were
also affirmed, along with its Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) long- and
short-term counterparty risk assessments.

In addition, Moody's affirmed all of Banco Basa's ratings and
assessments. These included the bank's Ba2/Not Prime long- and
short-term local currency deposit ratings, the Ba2/Not Prime long-
and short-term foreign currency deposit ratings, as well as the
Ba1/Not Prime long- and short-term counterparty risk ratings. The
outlook on the ratings is stable. The bank's ba3 baseline credit
assessment and ba3 adjusted baseline credit assessment were also
affirmed, along with its Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) long- and short-term
counterparty risk assessments.

RATINGS RATIONALE

BANCO REGIONAL S.A.E.C.A.

The downgrade of Banco Regional's (Regional) long-term ratings and
assessments reflects the continued significant challenges to the
bank's asset quality and profitability following its management's
decision to defer provisions for loan losses under the Paraguayan
central bank measures introduced during the pandemic in 2020. The
extensive use by Regional of the central bank's pandemic measures
signal the challenges it faces in building provisions in the
context of its weak profitability. Were further asset quality
deterioration to trigger the need for additional provisioning,
Regional's profitability could weaken further, hurting its internal
capital generation.

As of December 2020, Regional had placed 33.4% of its loans under
special provisioning deferral measures and had 2.7% of its loan
book still under pre-pandemic deferral measures. The central bank
measures announced in 2020 allows banks to restructure loans, even
if they have been previously restructured; grant grace periods;
defer provisioning on new loans for a period of 18 months. Had
Banco Regional provisioned for the loans it placed under special
measures before and during the pandemic, it would have recorded
losses both in 2019 and in 2020, thereby reducing its
capitalization.

Regional's profitability has lagged its peers since 2017, driven by
a mixture of increased competition, higher provisioning expenses
relative to peers and a higher cost base. In 2020, the bank's loan
book contracted by almost 9%, which led to a significant decline in
its net interest income and meant the bank was unable to provision
for its loans on a normal basis. This followed its inability to
fully provision for problem loans without reporting losses in
2019.

Regional was the third largest bank in Paraguay as of February 2021
in terms of loans, and its operations are focused on lending to
large agricultural corporations, which tend to expose its asset
quality to volatility. In December 2020, the bank's 60-day problem
loan ratio was 1.96%, up from 1.52% in 2019, despite the central
bank measures. Regional also had 10.1% of its total loans
restructured or refinanced. Moody's notes that Regional's asset
quality is supported by loan loss reserves equivalent to 259% of
problem loans as adjusted by Moody's, but over a third of these
provisions are yet to go through the bank's income statement. The
bank also has guarantees of approximately 48.5% of total loans.

The bank's b1 BCA is supported by Regional's predominant deposit
funding, equivalent to 83% of total funding, by its access to
dollar-based funding sources, and credit facilities that buttress
its liquidity, as well as its capitalization levels of 15.8%,
calculated by Moody's as tangible common equity (TCE) to risk
weighted assets (RWA). The stable outlook reflects Moody's view
that the bank's asset risk and profitability metrics will be
commensurate with its b1 BCA over the next 12-18 months.

BANCO CONTINENTAL S.A.E.C.A.

The affirmation of Banco Continental's ratings reflects its
controlled asset risk, as evidenced in limited use of central bank
provision deferral measures, and its above-peer capitalization,
which bolstered by Continental's historically strong profitability
of 16.1%.

Continental' sizable exposure to the agricultural sector causes
volatility to its asset quality. The bank's 60-day problem loan
ratio increased modestly by 11 basis points to 1.87% in 2020, up
from 1.75% in 2019, and refinanced and restructured loans were 2.4%
of total loans, which is well below system levels of 3.4%.
Importantly, Continental had 10.2% of its loans under special
deferral measures, also lower than the system average of 19.1%, and
the bank has maintained a policy of building provisions according
to normal central bank regulations. However, foreclosed assets
continued to rise and are now equivalent to 2.7% of total assets,
representing 31% of total foreclosed assets in the Paraguayan
banking system. Given the rise in commodity prices and the
improving operating environment in Paraguay, Moody's expects that
Continental will be able to reduce its foreclosed asset exposures
throughout the course of 2021.

However, the bank's asset risk is mitigated by reserve coverage of
183% of its problem loans and its use of guarantees. In addition,
Continental's capitalization remains well above peer levels, with
its Moody's capitalization ratio, measured as tangible common
equity (TCE) to risk weighted assets (RWA), at 16.1% in December
2020, lower than 16.5% in 2019. Continental's consistently strong
profitability is shown by net income to tangible assets of 1.5% in
2020 despite the pandemic, and 2.2% on average between 2017-2019.
Moody's also noted that the bank was the largest lender in Paraguay
as of February 2021 and second largest deposit taker; core deposits
represented over 70% of total funding as of December 2020. Although
the bank has a greater reliance on market funds than peers, it
holds adequate levels of liquid assets, equivalent to 29.7% of its
tangible banking assets in 2020 to face market funding risks.

BANCO BASA S.A.

The affirmation of Basa's ratings and assessments reflects its
better-than-peers' asset quality metrics, its adequate
capitalization and profitability ratios, stemming from continued
growth of its universal banking operation. The ratings also
incorporate its predominantly deposit-based funding and high liquid
assets ratios.

Banco Basa has grown over the last five years in line with its
strategy to become a universal banking operation, predominantly
serving corporates and small to mid-sized enterprises and is the
7th largest lender in Paraguay. Because of rapid growth, as
evidenced by average loan growth of 19.5% from 2017 to 2020, the
bank's 60 day problem loan ratio has been consistently lower than
that of the system and in 2020 it was 2.1%, 30 basis points below
the system average of 2.4%, although up from 1.8% a year earlier.
Restructured and refinanced loans accounted for only 0.4% of the
portfolio, well below the system as a whole. Basa had 18.2% of its
loans in the central bank's special provisioning measures by year
end 2020, lower than system level ratios. The bank's loan book
tends to be less exposed to the agriculture sector than the larger
banks in Paraguay.

Banco Basa will likely grow above system levels in 2021 as it
consolidates its corporate bank franchise, although at a slower
pace than in in previous years, which could lead to increased asset
risk in its balance sheet as loans season. Moody's notes that the
bank's reserve coverage of 183% and use of guarantees help offset
these risks. In addition, the bank's capitalization has risen to
12.3% in 2020, owing to no dividend payouts and the full
capitalization of its 2019 earnings, despite loans growing by 11%,
a level that is lower than the large bank peers'.

Basa's profitability has remained above the system's average in
2020, although it declined to 1.6% from 2.1% a year earlier driven
by lower fee income and a 146% increase in provisioning expenses .
The bank also has set an investment banking and fund management
subsidiary company, Basa Capital S.A., which will contribute to
earnings generation and diversification as it consolidates its
activities in the Paraguayan market.

Basa's BCA incorporates its funding profile and reflects its access
to stable and inexpensive deposit funding which represented 81% of
total funding in 2020. In addition, the bank held liquid assets
equivalent to 30% of tangible banking assets, proving adequate
buffer against any volatility in its access to market funding.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

The deposit ratings of Continental, Regional and Basa continue to
benefit from one notch of uplift from their respective BCAs given
Moody's assessment of a high probability of support in the event of
stress given the banks' systemic importance to the Paraguayan
banking system.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS -
BANCO REGIONAL

Following the rating downgrade, upward pressure on Banco Regional's
ratings is limited. However, the bank`s ratings and assessments
could be downgraded if its asset quality shows a substantial
deterioration over the next 12 to 18 months, profitability
continues to be very low and capitalization shows little
improvement.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS -
BANCO CONTINENTAL

Positive pressure on Continental's standalone BCA could derive from
significant improvement in asset quality, combined with a more
diversified loan book and earnings, and continued increase in
capitalization levels. The bank's BCA could be downgraded if
Continental's asset quality materially deteriorates or if its
profitability weakens. A substantial increase in provisioning
deferrals that could lead to reduced core earnings profile could
also be negative for the ratings.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS -
BANCO BASA

Basa's BCA could be upgraded if asset quality and capitalization
are maintained at high levels as its loan book seasons and growth
moderates. Basa's ratings could be downgraded if problem loan
ratios rise above expectation, creating significant provisioning
expenses, which, in turn, lower its profitability and capital
generation.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in March 2021.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

The following ratings were downgraded:

Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A.:

Long term local currency deposit rating to Ba3 from Ba2, stable
outlook from negative

Long term foreign currency deposit rating to Ba3 from Ba2, stable
outlook from negative

Long term local and foreign currency counterparty risk ratings to
Ba2 from Ba1

Long term counterparty risk assessment rating to Ba2(cr) from
Ba1(cr)

Senior unsecured foreign currency debt rating to Ba3 from Ba2,
stable outlook from negative

Adjusted baseline credit assessment to b1 from ba3

Baseline credit assessment to b1 from ba3

The following ratings were affirmed:

Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A.:

Short term foreign currency deposit rating of Not-Prime

Short term local currency deposit rating of Not-Prime

Short term local and foreign currency counterparty risk ratings of
Not Prime

Short term counterparty risk assessments of Not Prime(cr)

Banco Continental S.A.E.C.A.:

Long and short term local currency deposit ratings of Ba1, stable
outlook from negative, and Not Prime,

Long and short term foreign currency deposit rating of Ba1, stable
outlook from negative and Not Prime

Long and short term local currency counterparty risk ratings of
Ba1 and Not Prime

Long and short term foreign currency counterparty risk ratings of
Ba1 and Not Prime

Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2

Baseline credit assessment of ba2

Long and short term counterparty risk assessments of Ba1(cr) and
Not Prime(cr)

Senior unsecured foreign currency debt rating of Ba1, stable
outlook from negative

Banco Basa S.A.

Long and short term local currency deposit ratings of Ba2, stable
outlook, and Not-Prime

Long and short term foreign currency deposit rating of Ba2, stable
outlook, and Not-Prime

Long and short term local currency counterparty risk ratings of
Ba1 and Not-Prime

Long and short term foreign currency counterparty risk ratings of
Ba1 and Not-Prime

Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3

Baseline credit assessment of ba3

Long and short term counterparty risk assessments of Ba1(cr) and
Not-Prime(cr)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Banco Continental S.A.E.C.A.

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Negative

Issuer: Banco Regional S.A.E.C.A.

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Negative

Issuer: Banco Basa S.A.

Outlook, Remains Stable



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week April 5 to April 9, 2021
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
China Huiyuan Juice Gr     6.5    46.6    8/16/2020    CN     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Empresa de Transporte      4.3    30.9    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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