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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, March 19, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 51

                           Headlines



B E L I Z E

BELIZE: Severely Affected by the COVID-19 Pandemic, IMF Says


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Struggles Amid 2nd Wave, ICUs at Breaking Point


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

CHINA FISHERY: Kirkland & Ellis Updates on Noteholders


C O S T A   R I C A

COSTA RICA: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Foreign-Currency IDR, Outlook Neg.


H O N D U R A S

HONDURAS: Marks 1 Year of Epidemic With Many Cos. in Bankruptcy


M E X I C O

CSI COMPRESSCO: GP OKs Amended COC Agreement With Senior VP
FRONTERA HOLDING: Investors Get Zapped w/ Bet on Mexico's Market


P A N A M A

ENA NORTE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $600MM Notes, Outlook Neg.


P U E R T O   R I C O

POPULAR INC: Moody's Reviews B1 Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating for Upgrade
PUERTO RICO: Files Debt Cutting Plan to Bankruptcy Court


X X X X X X X X

[*] LATAM: Sustainable Debt Sales Surge Amid Global Boom

                           - - - - -


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B E L I Z E
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BELIZE: Severely Affected by the COVID-19 Pandemic, IMF Says
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An International Monetary Fund team led by Jaime Guajardo conducted
discussions for the 2020 Article IV consultation with Belize
between February 24 and March 10. The team met with the Honorable
Mr. John Briceno, Prime Minister; Amb. Joy Grant, Governor of the
Central Bank of Belize; Mr. Christopher Coye, Minister of State,
Mr. Joseph Waight, Financial Secretary; and other senior government
officials, representatives of the opposition, private sector, and
public sector unions.

                Recent Developments, Outlook, and Risks

Belize has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Following a successful containment of the first wave of the
pandemic, Belize experienced a large domestic outbreak starting in
the summer of 2020, which has left the country with one of the
highest numbers of cases and deaths per capita in the Caribbean.
The pandemic also led to a 72 percent decline in tourist arrivals
in 2020, which had a large impact on the economy as tourism
accounts for around 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings and 40
percent of GDP. Social distancing and lockdowns also hurt activity
in contact intensive sectors of the economy. As a result, real GDP
contracted by 14.1 percent in 2020.

Belize's fiscal and external positions worsened from already weak
levels. The pandemic resulted in a sharp fall in revenue and a rise
in expenditure aimed at combating the pandemic and supporting
affected households and firms. This led to an increase in the
primary deficit from 1.4 percent of GDP in FY2019/20 to 8.3 percent
in FY2020/21, and a rise in public debt from 98 percent of GDP in
2019 to 126 percent in 2020. Public external debt also rose, while
the net international investment position deteriorated. However,
the current account deficit narrowed owing to a sharp contraction
in imports and lower repatriation of profits from foreign owned
business, which more than offset the fall in tourism receipts.
This, together with higher external financing to the government,
increased international reserves from US$271 million (3.6 months of
imports) in 2019 to US$346 million (4.3 months of imports) in 2020.
However, as noted below, reserve adequacy is projected to worsen
over the medium term.

The recovery from the pandemic is projected to be protracted, with
real GDP regaining its 2019 level only by 2025. Tourist arrivals
are expected to remain subdued in 2021 given still high levels of
COVID-19 cases in Belize's main trading partners and stringent
requirements on passengers returning to the US. Belize may also
remain exposed to the pandemic as it has secured vaccines for just
about one-third of its population. Tourist arrivals are expected to
pick up in 2022 when vaccines are more widely available in advanced
countries. As a result, real GDP is projected to grow by 1.9
percent in 2021, 6.4 percent in 2022, and return to potential
growth of 2 percent over the medium-term.

In a baseline scenario underpinned by current policies, the fiscal
and external positions are projected to remain weak over the medium
term. The primary budget deficit is projected to fall gradually
from 8.3 percent of GDP in FY2020/21 to 0.9 percent from FY2023/24
onwards as revenues gradually revert to their pre-pandemic level
and pandemic-related expenditures are scaled back. Public debt is
projected to rise to 133 percent of GDP in 2021, and to fall
gradually thereafter to 128 percent in 2031. The continued primary
deficits and high public debt are expected to limit Belize's access
to external financing going forward and lead to a fall in
international reserves to below 3 months of imports and 100 percent
of gross external financing needs starting in 2024.

Public debt is assessed as unsustainable in staff's baseline
scenario. Public debt is projected to remain well above the
thresholds for sustainability in the debt sustainability analysis
(DSA) framework. Public sector gross financing needs are also
projected to remain above the DSA thresholds for sustainability
over the next 10 years. Moreover, public debt and gross financing
needs could increase further if prominent downside risks to the
outlook materialize.

Risks to the outlook are substantial and remain tilted to the
downside. A key risk is an intensification of the pandemic
domestically and abroad. Continued spread of the virus in the U.S.
and Europe could delay the recovery of tourism, while continued
spread in Belize could lead to more stringent social distancing and
hurt activity in contact intensive sectors. Belize also remains
highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Materialization of these
shocks would reduce economic activity, weaken the recovery of
revenues, delay the unwinding of COVID-19-related expenditures, and
accelerate the decline in international reserves.

Policies to restore debt sustainability and strengthen the currency
peg

Fiscal policy needs to strike a balance between supporting those
affected by the pandemic and enabling a large public debt reduction
over the medium term. In the near term, the authorities should
maintain fiscal support to mitigate the socio-economic impact of
the pandemic but should change course once the pandemic begins to
wane. Beyond the immediate response to the crisis, the key policy
imperative for Belize is to restore public debt sustainability and
strengthen the currency peg. This will require a fine balancing act
involving ambitious, yet realistic, fiscal consolidation,
growth-enhancing structural reforms, and debt restructuring, all
aimed at targeting reduction of public debt to 60 percent of GDP by
2031. Such strategy would also improve reserve adequacy and
strengthen the currency peg.

A. Balanced and Sustained Fiscal Consolidation

The authorities need to implement a medium-term fiscal strategy
aimed at restoring debt sustainability, while preparing the ground
for the future adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) with
explicit fiscal rules. In the near term, the authorities should
maintain fiscal support to mitigate the socio-economic impact of
the pandemic, which should be gradually unwound once the pandemic
begins to wane. For the medium-term, the government needs to
elaborate a fiscal strategy that targets a reduction of public debt
to 60 percent of GDP by 2031 accompanied by a consistent and
credible fiscal consolidation plan. To enhance credibility, the
authorities should publicly commit to this strategy. At the same
time, efforts should be made to prepare the ground for the
implementation of a well-designed FRL with explicit fiscal rules by
introducing the necessary public financial management (PFM) reforms
and seeking broad political support for the law.

Implementation of an FRL with explicit fiscal rules in the future
would strengthen the commitment to restoring debt sustainability.
This framework would make the debt reduction process transparent
and predictable. Its key features could include: (i) a public debt
anchor of 60 percent of GDP by 2031; (ii) a gradual increase in the
primary balance to 3 percent of GDP from FY2024/25 onwards; (iii)
an escape clause for major shocks, such as natural disasters,
triggered with approval by Parliament and a fiscal council; (iv) an
automatic correction mechanism to be triggered by large cumulative
deviations from the primary fiscal balance target; and (v) an
independent fiscal council that produces unbiased forecasts and
evaluates compliance with fiscal rules.

Restoring debt sustainability requires a gradual and sustained
increase in the primary balance. To strike a balance between the
need to support those affected by the pandemic in the near term and
enable a large public debt reduction over the medium term, the
authorities should gradually increase the primary balance to 3
percent of GDP in FY2024/25 and keep at that level until FY2031/32,
which relative to the baseline scenario, implies a fiscal
consolidation of 3.9 percentage points of GDP over the next four
years.

Fiscal adjustment should rely on both expenditure and revenue
measures. With regard to expenditures, the authorities are
appropriately focusing on reducing the wage bill and purchases of
goods and services, both of which account for a larger share of GDP
in Belize than in peer countries. Prioritizing infrastructure
projects could also create savings. Over time, the authorities
should also set a natural disaster reserve fund to fund the
response to natural disasters and increase targeted social
spending. On revenues, the authorities should focus on reducing the
number of zero-rated items of the general sales tax (GST), taxing
them at the standard GST rate instead, and raising the standard GST
rate to a level in line with peer countries. GST revenue could also
be expanded by taxing the hotel sector at the standard GST rate
instead of the 9 percent hotel tourist accommodation tax levied on
room revenue administered by the Belize Tourism Board. Other
options to mobilize revenues include lowering the threshold for
exemption in the personal income tax, increasing excise taxes, and
enhancing revenue and customs administration.

Executing this consolidation path will be challenging given limited
implementation capacity, political pressures, and uncertainty about
the cyclical recovery of revenue. Belize will need to demonstrate
resolve and commitment in undertaking the adjustment needed to
restore debt sustainability and market confidence. Moreover, the
adjustment needed to reach the primary balance targets could be
larger if the cyclical recovery of revenue is weaker than expected.
In this context, it will be important to elaborate contingency
plans in case the rise in the primary balance is not proceeding as
expected, including further increases in the GST rate and larger
cuts to nonpriority expenditure. A less ambitious fiscal
consolidation effort will require larger efforts in other areas,
while failure to restore debt sustainability would put the fiscal
position and the currency peg at risk of disorderly adjustment.

PFM systems and procedures should be strengthened to make the
rules-based fiscal framework more effective. A well-designed FRL
with explicit fiscal rules requires modernizing the PFM systems and
procedures, including multi-year budget preparations, cash
management, fiscal risk assessment, public investment management,
and coverage of government accounts. The authorities should also
ensure transparency and accountability in crisis-related spending,
including by publishing the audit reports when they become
available.

B. Growth-enhancing Structural Reforms

Belize needs to tackle long-standing structural barriers to growth
and diversification. Priority areas include: (i) improving access
to credit through the creation of a credit bureau and credit
collateral registry; (ii) accelerating registration processes to
lower barriers to entry and exit from the market; (iii) introducing
labor market reforms that allow for more flexible working hours and
lower labor market rigidities to help businesses adapt to changing
market conditions; (iv) reducing skill mismatches by improving
education and technical training; and (v) enhancing road
infrastructure by reprioritizing investment projects.

Belize also needs to reduce crime to promote entrepreneurship.
Reducing crime through the provision of adequate resources to law
enforcement and social programs that keep at-risk youth away from
crime would help promote domestic and foreign investment and
enhance the attractiveness of the country among tourists.

Building resilience to climate change and natural disasters would
lower output volatility and boost growth. In line with the
recommendations of the 2018 Climate Change Policy Assessment, the
authorities should elaborate a comprehensive Disaster Resilience
Strategy, that internalizes resilience building into a credible
macroeconomic framework, and focuses on three key areas: (i)
investing in climate-resilient infrastructure, including in robust
roads, bridges, and seawalls; (ii) enhancing financial resilience
by establishing a natural disaster reserve fund of 1 percent of GDP
to finance the immediate response to high frequency, low-severity
natural disasters, and using contingent lines of credit and
participation in regional insurance mechanisms for more severe
events, and (iii) improving post-disaster resilience by reforming
social protection programs to scale up quickly after a disaster.

C. Debt Management and Restructuring

The authorities have recognized the critical nature of their
financial situation and are evaluating needed remedial measures.
Complementing these measures, they recently announced the intention
to approach their external private sector creditors to seek a
restructuring of the superbond to complement the efforts to restore
debt sustainability through balanced and sustained fiscal
consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms.

D. Monetary and Financial Policies

Belize's external position is assessed as substantially weaker than
warranted by medium term fundamentals and desirable policies. The
current account deficit remains higher than its estimated level of
equilibrium. Failure to address these imbalances increase the risk
of disorderly external adjustment over the medium term.

Reducing external imbalances and strengthening the currency peg
requires successful implementation of the strategy to restore debt
sustainability. The authorities are strongly committed to the
currency peg, which they see as a key anchor for macroeconomic
stability. , Reducing external imbalances will require restoring
debt sustainability, which would also lower the current account
deficit and increase international reserves. Strengthening the
currency peg also requires limiting government financing by the
Central Bank of Belize (CBB) over the medium term.

Safeguarding financial stability remains a priority. The banking
system entered the pandemic with abundant liquidity and strong
capital buffers. Non-performing loans (NPLs) have remained
manageable at 5.8 percent of total loans as of end-2020, although
this partly reflects forbearance measures introduced by the CBB to
mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the banking system. A slow
recovery from the pandemic could accelerate the erosion in asset
quality and increase NPLs, especially for banks exposed to
vulnerable sectors such as tourism. In this context, the CBB should
maintain loan classification and provisioning rules to appraise the
banks' potential credit losses as accurately as possible, phase out
forbearance measures and loan deferrals by banks, and strengthen
prudential standards as the pandemic recedes. Dividend payments
should be restricted until the full impact of the pandemic on
banks' capital is known. A comprehensive third-party asset quality
review should be done when the economy recovers from the pandemic.
Efforts to strengthen AML/CFT supervision of banks should continue
and sanctions for non-compliance should be enforced.

The authorities must continue strengthening the AML/CFT framework
and its implementation especially in the international financial
services (IFS) sector to enhance financial integrity and prevent
loss of CBRs. Policy priorities include: (i) conducting a
cost-benefit analysis of the international business sector
including by deepening the understanding of associated financial
integrity risks of IFS practitioners, (ii) increasing the resources
and capacity of the IFSC to properly license, regulate and
supervise IFS practitioners, and imposing dissuasive and
proportionate penalties when breaches are identified; (iii) legal
reforms informed by a risk assessment to implement AML/CFT
standards on virtual assets and VASPs; (iv) identifying and
sanctioning IFSC licensees falsely claiming to be licensed to
provide virtual asset-related services; and (v) ensuring that
beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements
is accurate, up-to-date, and available in a timely manner.

The IMF Executive Board is expected to discuss Belize's Article IV
consultation in May 2021. The mission expresses its sincere thanks
to the authorities and other Belizean stakeholders for their
cooperation and candor during the discussions.



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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Struggles Amid 2nd Wave, ICUs at Breaking Point
-------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Meneses Sanchez at EFE News reports that hospitals and
cemeteries in Brazil, which marked one year since it recorded its
first death from Covid-19, are close to overflowing as the country
grapples with a major surge of coronavirus infections.

Brazil is the second worst affected country overall in the world by
Covid-19, and is currently home to the highest infection rate and
daily number of deaths, according to EFE News.

As the contagion stabilizes across the world, Brazil is one of the
few nations where the virus is rampant and out of control, the
report notes.

In the last two days, it has reported more than 2,000 deaths per
day, while deaths from Covid in Brazil account for 10% of the
global total, the report relays.

In Sao Paulo's Vila Formosa, the largest cemetery in Latin America,
history is repeating itself: one burial after another, just as in
the first wave, the report discloses.

The gravediggers are worn out, utterly exhausted. Their workload
doubled in 2020 and in 2021 it shows no signs of slowing down, the
report says.

"We thought it was going to stabilize this year but so far it
hasn't," James Alan, 35, a coordinator in Vila Formosa, tells EFE.

Shovels in hand, they dig between 60 to 66 graves a day.

Dressed in white plastic overalls, Pedro, 55, and his team have
barely a few seconds of rest between the endless stream of coffins.
It's a mammoth effort, and leaves hardly any time for family
farewells or eulogies, the report adds.

                           About Brazil

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas.  Jair Bolsonaro is the current president, having
been sworn in on Jan. 1, 2019.

S&P Global Ratings affirmed on December 14, 2020, its 'BB-/B'
long-and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Brazil. The outlook on the long-term ratings remains
stable.

Fitch Ratings' credit rating for Brazil stands at 'BB-' with a
negative outlook (November 2020). Moody's credit rating for Brazil
was last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). DBRS's credit
rating for Brazil is BB (low) with stable outlook (March 2018).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings' stable outlook assumes that timely implementation
of fiscal adjustment and modest economic recovery will help
preserve market confidence and adequate funding conditions for the
government in local markets in the next two years, despite a
sustained increase in the debt burden.



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C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
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CHINA FISHERY: Kirkland & Ellis Updates on Noteholders
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In the Chapter 11 cases of China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman), et
al., the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis LLP submitted an amended
verified statement under Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, to disclose an updated list of Ad Hoc Group
that it is representing.

K&E's representation of certain entities that hold, or that act as
investment manager of or advisor to certain funds, controlled
accounts, and/or other entities that hold or are beneficial owners
of the 9.75% Senior Notes Due 2019, the Club Loan Facility
obligations that matured as of 2018, and claims arising under that
certain $35 million facility letter dated August 26, 2014 among
Bank of America, N.A., China Fisheries International Limited, and
South Pacific Shipping Agency Limited. K&E previously represented
certain entities in their capacities as holders of the Senior
Notes.

K&E represents only the Ad Hoc Group and does not represent or
purport to represent any entity other than the Ad Hoc Group, in
connection with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. In addition, the Ad
Hoc Group does not represent or purport to represent any other
entity in connection with the Debtors' chapter 11 cases at this
time.

As of March 16, 2021, the Committee Members and their disclosable
economic interests are:

Burlington Loan Management DAC
Pinnacle 2
Eastpoint Business Park Dublin 3
Ireland

* $65,571,000 principal amount of Senior Notes
* $53,250,000 principal amount of Club Loans

Cowell & Lee Asia Credit Opportunities Fund
c/o Cowell & Lee Capital Management Limited
Room 1501 Ruttonjee House,
11 Duddell Street
Central Hong Kong
People's Republic of China

* $47,282,000 principal amount of Senior Notes

Monarch Alternative Capital LP
50-52 Welbeck Street
1st Floor
London, United Kingdom
W1G 9HL

* $32,101,000 principal amount of Senior Notes
* $115,629,369 principal amount of Club Loans
* $30,998,083.56 of CF Facility Claims

VCFG, LLC
3600 West 80th Street Suite 225
Minneapolis, MN 55431

* $80,000,000 principal amount of Club Loans

SC Lowy Primary Investments, Ltd.
8 Queens Road Central 17th Floor
Hong Kong
People's Republic of China

* $9,874,000 principal amount of Senior Notes
* $18,500,000 principal amount of Club Loans

Arkkan Capital Management Limited
8 Queens Road Central 23rd Floor
Hong Kong
People's Republic of China

* $11,122,000 principal amount of Senior Notes
* $12,000,000 principal amount of Club Loans

Deutsche Bank, London Branch
c/o: Deutsche Bank AG
Hong Kong Branch
61/F, International Commerce Centre
1 Austin Road West
Kowloon, Hong Kong

* $7,185,000 principal amount of Senior Notes
* $18,173,076.60 principal amount of Club Loans

Counsel to the Ad Hoc Group can be reached at:

         KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
         KIRKLAND & ELLIS INTERNATIONAL LLP
         Patrick J. Nash, Jr., P.C., Esq.
         Gregory F. Pesce, Esq.
         Heidi M. Hockberger, Esq.
         300 North LaSalle
         Chicago, IL 60654
         Telephone: (312) 862-2000
         Facsimile: (312) 862-2200

A copy of the Rule 2019 filing is available at
https://bit.ly/3vIGbl0 at no extra charge.

                    About China Fishery Group

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.

In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group was
estimated to have assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at
$10 million to $50 million.

The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead
bankruptcy counsel for China Fishery and its affiliates other than
CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore).  Weil Gotshal
replaces Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm
initially hired by the Debtors.  The Debtors have also tapped
Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict
counsel; Goldin Associates, LLC, as financial advisor; RSR
Consulting LLC as restructuring consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy
Solutions, LLC, as administrative agent.  Kwok Yih & Chan serves as
special counsel.

On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter 11
trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one of
the Debtors.  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves as
the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves as
special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, serves
as special litigation counsel.



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C O S T A   R I C A
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COSTA RICA: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Foreign-Currency IDR, Outlook Neg.
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed Costa Rica's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' with a Negative Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Costa Rica's 'B' rating reflects weaknesses in public finances and
political gridlock that has prevented timely passage of reforms
addressing these and constrained the government's external
financing capacity. This is counterbalanced by structural strengths
relative to the 'B' category with strong governance, higher
economic development and per capita income. An economic model
centered on high-value-added manufacturing and service activities
has supported macroeconomic stability.

The Negative Outlook reflects downside risks to fiscal
consolidation and debt stabilization due to political uncertainty
amidst a long-standing inability to reach consensus on how to
address the fiscal imbalances created by high fiscal deficits,
rising interest payments and a steep amortization schedule. Fitch
expects that the government will be able to meet the targets of the
recently announced IMF program and the proposed external
multilateral financing is set to ease borrowing constraints.
Nonetheless, these measures are contingent on securing
congressional approval and ensuring political support for fiscal
consolidation beyond the current administration. Costa Rica has a
track record of congressional fragmentation that has restricted the
government's external financing capacity and delayed needed fiscal
measures. Continued implementation of fiscal austerity measures
beyond 2021 will depend on the next administration as presidential
elections are scheduled for February 2022 with no clear front
runner.

Costa Rica's central government fiscal deficit increased to 8.1% of
GDP in 2020 from 6.7% in 2019. Revenue loss caused by the pandemic
more than offset efforts to reduce primary expenditure.
Nonetheless, the authorities managed to comply with the fiscal
rule's spending growth cap, a signal of initial progress in
addressing the fiscal imbalance. Fitch projects that the central
government's fiscal deficit will decline to 7.1% of GDP in 2021 and
6.2% in 2022 as the government complies with the fiscal
consolidation outlined by the IMF program.

The IMF's Executive Board approved a three-year Extended Fund
Facility (EFF) program, with a lending facility of approximately
USD1.8 billion. The approval allows one immediate disbursement of
USD296.5 million (contingent upon congressional approval of the
EFF) followed by five equal tranches starting in October,
contingent on bi-annual reviews from the IMF.

The program is ambitious; the structural primary balance adjustment
over the three-year period (3.7% of GDP) is higher than 83% of
international experiences (three-year primary fiscal adjustments in
countries with debt greater than 60% of GDP from 1990 to 2011),
according to the IMF. Cyclical recovery (0.6% of GDP) and
phasing-out pandemic-related measures (0.6%) will further improve
the fiscal balance. The EFF program anticipates fiscal
consolidation beyond the three-year program, forecasting the
primary surplus to reach above 2% of GDP by 2025, an improvement
close to six percentage points of GDP relative to 2020.

Fitch expects the legislative assembly to approve the IMF program
along with additional fiscal measures and multilateral lending. The
legislative assembly must approve any external borrowing by a
two-thirds majority (including the EFF program). Political gridlock
is the key risk to addressing the fiscal imbalances given the track
record of failing to reach consensus. The legislative assembly
rejected two lending facilities from the Inter-American Development
Bank in 2020, signaling its fraught relationship with the
executive. Political opposition criticized the government's lack of
transparency on the IMF negotiations and its original proposal.
Political consensus may improve ahead of the campaign for the 2022
presidential elections, having secured the IMF's approval, as
political parties prefer to avoid the political cost of approving
fiscal measures and securing external financing for the next
administration.

Strict compliance with the IMF program fiscal targets would help to
alleviate Costa Rica's narrowing fiscal space and rising debt
sustainability concerns. Reliance on the domestic market for budget
financing at higher borrowing costs combined with a continuous
increase in the debt burden have driven a steep rise in Costa
Rica's interest bill. Interest payments rose to 35.2% of central
government revenues in 2020.

The central government debt burden rose to 67.5% of GDP in 2020
from 56.5% in 2019. This represents a doubling of the debt ratio
over the past decade. Fitch estimates general government debt (net
of social security holdings) reached 60.6% of GDP in 2020, slightly
below the current 'B' median of 63.8% this year. Central government
debt will increase to 71.6% in 2021 and rise at a slower pace in
2022. Gross general government debt/GDP will stabilize over a
five-year projection if the government meets the EFF targets and
continues to adhere to its fiscal rule, coupled with stable
economic growth of around 3% p.a. and diminishing borrowing costs.
This would represent a rapid fiscal consolidation path and Fitch
notes the execution risks in terms of the projected improvement in
the primary deficit. In a plausible alternative scenario, if fiscal
consolidation is slower because of higher primary deficits, lower
GDP growth or higher financing costs, gross general government
debt/GDP could continue rising over the forecast period, reaching
above 73% by 2025.

Fitch estimates government financing needs of 13.8% of GDP for 2021
(6.5% of GDP in debt repayments and 7.3% of GDP for budget
financing). Funding for 2021 will come from the domestic market and
multilateral organizations. External debt access is expected to
ease borrowing costs, contingent on congressional approval. The
government is submitting for approval USD2.6 billion in
multilateral borrowing (including the EFF drawdown) as several
multilateral organizations have signaled willingness to expand
their lending portfolios following the IMF agreement. Authorities
are not planning to issue a Eurobond this year but expect to
request legislative approval for USD4 billion for 2022-2026.

Fitch forecasts that real GDP growth will reach 3.3% in 2021 from a
4.5% contraction in 2020. Economic recovery will be constrained by
high unemployment (19.1% in January 2021), restrictive fiscal
policy and a slow tourism recovery. Costa Rica was among the
earliest in Latin America to begin the vaccination drive and has a
relatively robust health system, which reduces downside risks from
the pandemic. The 2020 economic recession was driven by mobility
restrictions and a deep tourism impact. The pandemic disruption to
the economy began receding in line with the gradual reopening
during the second half of the year.

External finances were affected by a large decline in
tourism-related receipts and lower foreign direct investment. The
central bank (Banco Central de Costa Rica, BCCR) has maintained a
flexible exchange rate, intervening to limit market volatility.
Access to multilateral loans this year is set to reduce the
government's reliance on the local FX market, but failure to secure
borrowing approvals would lead to increased exchange rate
pressures, as has been the case in the past.

Banks have adequate capitalization and liquidity levels but remain
vulnerable to high credit dollarization, largely to unhedged
borrowers. Non-performing loans have been low, at 2.7% of total
loans as of December 2020. The local regulator authorized financial
institutions to modify loan conditions without considering them as
restructured until December 2021, reducing the impact on reported
asset quality metrics through the pandemic. The BCCR expanded its
repo facility in early 2021 to USD1.3 billion to alleviate any
liquidity pressures.

ESG - Governance: Costa Rica has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both Political Stability and Rights, and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as
is the case for all sovereigns. Theses scores reflect the high
weight the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's
proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Costa Rica has a high WBGI
percentile of 71.5%, reflecting its long track record of stable and
peaceful political transitions, well-established rights for
participation in the political process, strong institutional
capacity, effective rule of law and a low level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Public Finances: Evidence of sovereign funding stress in the
    event that external and domestic borrowing sources cannot be
    accessed, or a significant build-up of short-term debt
    liabilities;

-- Public Finances: Increased risks to debt sustainability
    reflected by difficulty in post-crisis fiscal consolidation,
    for example failure to adhere to the IMF program or the fiscal
    rule's spending cap, weaker economic recovery prospects or
    increase in borrowing costs;

-- External: Evidence of external liquidity stress; for example,
    a significant sharp decline of international reserves.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Public Finances: Greater confidence in the political
    commitment to fiscal consolidation that significantly reduces
    the steep upward trajectory of the government's debt/GDP
    ratio, for example approval and execution of the IMF program,
    along with additional pending fiscal legislation.

-- Structural: Reduction of political fragmentation that supports
    more cohesive policy making, for example, a significant
    improvement in the relationship between the executive branch
    and the legislative assembly.

-- Public Finances: Sustained improvement in government financing
    flexibility, including sustained access to external funding
    sources, thereby lowering the cost of borrowing.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Costa Rica a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB-' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

In accordance with its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating
committee decided to adjust the rating indicated by the SRM by more
than the usual maximum range of +/- three notches because of the
extent of Costa Rica's sharply rising debt burden and fiscal budget
financing constraints leading to concerns about debt
sustainability, as well as the emergence of macroeconomic
vulnerabilities.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
SRM data and output, as follows:

-- Structural: -1 notch; one negative notch reflects a long track
    record of institutional gridlock that has hindered progress on
    necessary reforms and external financing, which is not fully
    captured in the WBGI in the SRM.

The committee removed a -1 notch in Structural reflecting progress
on external financing challenges in the context of the IMF program
and increased likelihood of multilateral and other external lending
approvals from the legislative assembly. Fitch expects the
Legislative Assembly will approve the EFF program, its accompanying
fiscal measures and multilateral lending. Nevertheless, the
Negative Outlook on the IDR reflects some continuing downside risks
relating to the political approval of the EFF program and continued
government support for it beyond next year's election and over its
term.

-- Fiscal: -2 notches; reflects the severe constraints on fiscal
    financing flexibility, and continuing risks over the prospect
    of debt stabilisation, notwithstanding the more positive
    financing outlook led by the IMF EFF programme.

-- External: -1 notch; reflects the institutional gridlock that
    led to periodic barriers to external bond issuance. Absent
    authorization for further external bond issuances, the
    government would be a net buyer of FX rather than a supplier,
    increasing external vulnerabilities.

-- Macro: -1 notch; reflects policy framework weakness, as
    evidenced by the government's decision to use short-term
    financing from the central bank, as well as spillover effects
    from the fiscal imbalances affecting macro stability.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The global economy performs largely in line with Fitch's Global
Economic Outlook.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Costa Rica has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political
Stability and Rights, as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM, are highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with
a high weight.

Costa Rica has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as
WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM, and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a
high weight.

Costa Rica has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms, as strong social stability and voice and
accountability are reflected in the WBGIs that have the highest
weight in the SRM. They are relevant to the rating and a rating
driver.

Costa Rica has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights,
as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating
and is a rating driver for Costa Rica, as for all sovereigns.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or to the way in which they
are being managed by the entity.



===============
H O N D U R A S
===============

HONDURAS: Marks 1 Year of Epidemic With Many Cos. in Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that in a year of pandemic, many micro, small and
medium-sized companies went into total or partial bankruptcy, while
in others there were drastic cuts in personnel to avoid closing
operations, according to statements by their owners, the report
notes.

One year after the confirmation of the first two Covid-19 cases in
Honduras, the country is nearing 180,000 infections including 4,500
deaths as the vaccination process crawls along, notes the report.

"Honduras is currently in a critical situation of the pandemic due
to the increase in cases that have been registered in the last
three months, with an increase in mortality and incidence of
cases," scientist Marco Tulio Medina told EFE in Tegucigalpa.

The expert said the situation is "very difficult" for the country
because not enough PCR tests are being carried out and the health
system has not been strengthened, especially with regard to
hospitalization, according to EFE News.

Of seven mobile hospitals purchased in Turkey between March and
April 2020 -- on which reports of alleged corruption in their
acquisition hang -- as well as other medical equipment and
supplies, only two are operating, Medina added, the report notes.

He said "the country's hospital capacity is weak" and a big concern
is the "many intra-hospital diseases, which are the cause of the
death of patients with Covid-19," which has been analyzed with the
National Autonomous University of Honduras, the report relays.

In addition, there is contamination in intensive care units and in
the testing laboratories, which has caused "enormous problems," EFE
News discloses.

Added to this is the slow vaccination process, which began at the
end of February with the inoculation of 2,684 people with a batch
of Moderna doses donated by Israel, the report notes.

Another 48,000 vaccines donated through the Covax facility will be
received, from a batch of 424,800 that will arrive in the country
between March and May, to immunize 20 percent of the Honduran
population that needs to be vaccinated, the report relates.  Around
4.2 million doses of the Russian Sputnik V have also been
purchased, the report adds.

The country is also suffering the effects of a population that does
not wear masks or practice biosecurity measures, including social
distancing, to the extent required, the report relays.

The first two Covid-19 infections detected in Honduras were
confirmed on Mar. 11, 2020, in two women who arrived in the country
on the 4th and 5th of that same month, from Spain and Switzerland,
the report discloses.

The government imposed a curfew the next day, which remains in
force, although total confinement was in place until mid-July, when
a slow process of economic recovery began, the report relays.

The Honduran Council of Private Enterprise estimates that around 1
million people were unemployed in 2020 due to the virus, the report
says.

Analysts believe that the country will begin to recover
economically from 2022, the report relays.

The Covid-19 epidemic is the worst health disaster that Honduras
has suffered in its entire history, the report adds.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

CSI COMPRESSCO: GP OKs Amended COC Agreement With Senior VP
-----------------------------------------------------------
CSI Compressco GP LLC, the general partner of CSI Compressco LP, a
Delaware limited partnership, approved amendments to the change of
control agreement with Roy E. McNiven, senior vice president of
operations of the general partner.  Mr. McNiven's original change
of control agreement was executed in August 2020.

Under the Amended COC Agreement, if Mr. McNiven resigns from the
General Partner beginning July 29, 2021 and ending Feb. 4, 2022,
the Company will have an obligation to pay Mr. McNiven (a)
$550,000.00, less applicable tax withholdings and deductions, in a
single lump sum payment; and (b) a pro rata short-term cash-based
incentive plan award for 2021 to the extent the applicable
performance objectives are met.  The COC Agreement also provides
for full acceleration of vesting of any outstanding restricted unit
awards, phantom unit awards, and other unit-based awards upon Mr.
McNiven's resignation to the extent permitted under the applicable
plan.

Mr. McNiven will not be eligible for payouts if resigns (i) prior
to the Resignation Period claiming a material diminution in his
authority, duties, or responsibilities or (ii) following the
Resignation Period claiming Good Reason (as defined in the Existing
COC Agreement), unless in either event such resignation follows a
new Change of Control (as defined in the Existing COC Agreement)
separate and apart from Spartan Energy Partners' acquisition of the
General Partner.

All payments and benefits due under the Amended COC Agreement or
the Existing COC Agreement are conditioned upon the execution and
nonrevocation by Mr. McNiven of a release for the Company's
benefit.

                         About Compressco

CSI Compressco is a provider of compression services and equipment
for natural gas and oil production, gathering, artificial lift,
transmission, processing, and storage.  CSI Compressco's
compression and related services business includes a fleet of
approximately 4,900 compressor packages providing approximately 1.2
million in aggregate horsepower, utilizing a full spectrum of low-,
medium- and high-horsepower engines.  CSI Compressco also provides
well monitoring and automated sand separation services in
conjunction with compression and related services in Mexico. CSI
Compressco's aftermarket business provides compressor package
reconfiguration and maintenance services.  CSI Compressco's
customers comprise a broad base of natural gas and oil exploration
and production, midstream, transmission, and storage companies
operating throughout many of the onshore producing regions of the
United States, as well as in a number of foreign countries,
including Mexico, Canada and Argentina.  CSI Compressco is managed
by Spartan Energy Partners.

CSI Compressco reported a net loss of $73.84 million for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2020, compared to a net loss of $20.97 million for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2019.  As of Dec. 31, 2020, the Company had
$709.96 million in total assets, $59.41 million in total current
liabilities, $675.88 million in total other liabilities, and a
total partners' deficit of $25.33 million.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the TCR on Feb. 25, 2021, Moody's Investors Service
has completed a periodic review of the ratings of CSI Compressco LP
and other ratings that are associated with the same analytical
unit.  Moody's said CSI Compressco's Caa1 corporate family rating
reflects its modest scale relative to its peers and high but
improving debt leverage.

FRONTERA HOLDING: Investors Get Zapped w/ Bet on Mexico's Market
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tim McLaughlin at Reuters reports that U.S. private equity firm
Blackstone in 2016 unplugged a Texas power plant that it owned from
the state's grid in a bet that it could make a fortune as the only
American-based generator selling electricity exclusively to
Mexico.

That bet has gone south.

Nearly five years later, Blackstone's gas-fired plant, Frontera
Holdings LLC, is struggling to exit bankruptcy after burning
investors holding nearly $1 billion of its debt -- the victim of a
succession of problems ranging from a power market collapse in
Mexico in 2020 to last month's severe cold snap, according to
Reuters.

Frontera filed for bankruptcy protection last month in Houston,
extinguishing loans and notes held by U.S. hedge funds, mutual
funds, pensions and private equity firms, according to U.S.
regulatory filings, the report notes.

While the company has since secured $145 million in financing for a
fresh start, its future is uncertain: Mexico has announced market
reforms that could undo Frontera's business model, and the facility
is at risk of big fines for failing to deliver power during the
regional deep freeze, the report relays.

Early last month, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador
said he would crack down on his country's wholesale electricity
market, saying power producers are among those that have made
excessive profits, the report discloses.

He is also now armed with a new law that would open the door to
renegotiating and potentially terminating contracts with
independent producers such as Frontera, the report relays.

About two weeks later, the deep freeze hit Texas and northern
Mexico, knocking Frontera and other power generators offline, the
report says.  Lawyers for Frontera say the plant may face penalties
for not being able to supply power for several days, the report
notes.

Blackstone Group LP declined to comment on the impact of the
developments on Frontera's plans to exit bankruptcy.

Frontera attorney Matthew Fagen of Kirkland & Ellis told U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge Marvin Isgur, after the cold snap, that the
company's planned exit from bankruptcy in the spring remains on
track, the report discloses.

Frontera's bet was going well before things fell apart.

The plant, for example, generated about $87 million in profit on
nearly $200 million of revenue in 2019, according to disclosures in
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Houston, the report relays.

That year, Blackstone paid itself a dividend of about $116 million,
following a similar payout of $120 million the previous year, from
operating cash and incremental debt, court disclosures show, the
report relays.

Frontera owns 100% of its transmission line to Mexico and has
exclusive use of it. New U.S.-based entrants likely would not have
that advantage because of rule changes at the U.S. Department of
Energy, the report notes.

But last year, peak pricing for electricity in the Mexican market
tumbled 70%, in part because of the coronavirus pandemic's impact
on the economy, the report relays.

Frontera posted a $9 million operating loss on $79 million in
revenue that year, court disclosures show, the report adds.



===========
P A N A M A
===========

ENA NORTE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $600MM Notes, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On March 16, 2021, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' rating on
ENA Norte Trust's $600 million notes.

The negative outlook indicates a one-in-three chance of a downgrade
in the next 12 months if the project generates lower CFADS amid a
weaker traffic recovery, which could result in a lower prepayment
capacity and increasing refinancing risk compared with S&P's
current base-case scenario.

S&P said, "We have updated our forecast for ENA Norte. We now
anticipate traffic levels will increase 30% in 2021, versus the
previous 65% forecast, amid new mobility restrictions and temporary
lockdowns that the government imposed in January 2021 given the new
wave of COVID-19. Therefore, we now assume the project will reach
traffic levels similar to 2019 figures by the end of 2023, instead
of 2022.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

POPULAR INC: Moody's Reviews B1 Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating for Upgrade
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
long-term debt and deposit ratings of Popular, Inc. (Popular, long
term senior unsecured debt B1), and its subsidiaries, including the
baseline credit assessment of its bank subsidiary, Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico (long-term deposits Ba1/NP, long-term issuer rating B1,
BCA ba3).

The review for upgrade is prompted by the assessment of Popular's
operating resilience in a scenario characterized by economic
challenges, including Puerto Rico's continued public sector
austerity measures, a sectorial and geographically-concentrated
island economy, and most recently, the economic disruption caused
by the global pandemic.

List of affected ratings:

On Review for Upgrade:

Issuer: Popular, Inc.

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently (P)B1

Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently (P)B1

Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for Upgrade,
currently B3(hyb)

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently B1, Ratings Under Review from Stable

Junior Subordinated Shelf, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently
(P)B2

Issuer: Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Placed on Review for Upgrade,
currently ba3

Baseline Credit Assessment, Placed on Review for Upgrade,
currently ba3

LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Placed on Review for Upgrade,
currently Ba2(cr)

ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Placed on Review for Upgrade,
currently NP(cr)

LT Counterparty Risk Rating (Local Currency), Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently Ba3

LT Counterparty Risk Rating (Foreign Currency), Placed on Review
for Upgrade, currently Ba3

ST Counterparty Risk Rating (Local Currency), Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently NP

ST Counterparty Risk Rating (Foreign Currency), Placed on Review
for Upgrade, currently NP

LT Issuer Rating, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently B1,
Ratings Under Review from Stable

LT Bank Deposits, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently Ba1,
Ratings Under Review from Stable

ST Bank Deposits, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently NP

Issuer: Popular Capital Trust I

Backed Pref. Stock, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently
B2(hyb)

Issuer: Popular Capital Trust II

Backed Pref. Stock, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently
B2(hyb)

Backed Pref. Shelf, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently (P)B2

Issuer: Popular North America, Inc.

Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
for Upgrade, currently (P)B1

Backed Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
Upgrade, currently (P)B1

Issuer: Popular North America Capital Trust I

Backed Pref. Stock, Placed on Review for Upgrade, currently
B2(hyb)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Popular, Inc.

Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Banco Popular de Puerto Rico

Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE / FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR
DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The review for upgrade will focus on Popular's expected future
performance relative to peers as the coronavirus-pandemic
challenges abate, and on Popular's capital and profitability
strength in light of the bank's resilience against Puerto Rico's
continued economic challenges and recovery prospects.

Additionally, Moody's review will assess the long-term
consolidation trend of the island's banking sector, and the
potential for higher operating margins for remaining banks. The
Puerto Rican banking system has undergone a period of gradual
consolidation over recent years as foreign banks have exited the
island.

Popular's ongoing credit challenges include the bank's relatively
high problem loan ratio of 7.6% as of 30 September 2020, which is
significantly higher than US mainland peer median of 1.6% for the
period. Asset quality remains a ratings constraint given Puerto
Rico's weak economy.

Moody's adjusted TCE as a percentage of risk-weighted assets
(Moody's TCE ratio) was 15.95% at 31 December 2020. Popular's
capital position remains a credit strength helping to buffer
against unexpected credit and/or operational losses. While
Popular's capitalization ratio has declined following dividend
distribution and share repurchases early in 2020, there is an
expectation that the bank will maintain capital levels higher than
US mainland peers.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico's BCA could be upgraded if we were to
assess further sustainable improvement in Puerto Rico's bank
operating environment, which we believe would lead to a reduction
in problem loan levels. Improved asset quality while maintaining
good capital levels and profitability would create upward rating
momentum. A higher BCA for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico would
likely lead to rating upgrades.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico's BCA could be downgraded if we were
to assess a deterioration of bank operating conditions in Puerto
Rico. It could also be downgraded if Popular's risk appetite
increases, for example because of above-peer average loan growth or
a notable increase in lending concentrations. Additionally, a
sustained decrease in capital, liquidity or a deterioration in the
bank's funding profile could lead to a downgrade in the BCA. A
lower BCA would likely lead to ratings downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in November 2019.

PUERTO RICO: Files Debt Cutting Plan to Bankruptcy Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico is asking
the court overseeing its record bankruptcy to consider a revised
restructuring plan to cut $18.8 billion of bond debt backed by the
central government, reviving a restructuring effort that has
largely been stalled for a year by the coronavirus pandemic.

Puerto Rico's financial oversight board filed its debt adjustment
plan, which hews to the terms of the tentative deal between the
board and rival creditor groups announced last month, according to
Bloomberg News.  Owners of more than $13 billion of the securities
have signed on to the revised plan, accounting for more than 70% of
the debt, according to the board, Bloomberg News notes.

The proposal also seeks to fix Puerto Rico's pension system, which
owes more than $50 billion and has no assets, Bloomberg News
relays.  That means all payments to retirees come from the
commonwealth's operating budget, Bloomberg News discloses.  The
board aims to reduce some pensions by 8.5% while leaving those at
$1,500 a month and below intact, Bloomberg News relays.  It would
also create a pension reserve trust to help fund the retirement
system, Bloomberg News notes.

"This plan substantially reduces the burden of debt payments on
future generations, stabilizes and protects pensions that have been
mismanaged for so long, and affirms the collective bargaining
agreements of government workers," David Skeel, the board's
chairman, said in a statement, Bloomberg News notes.

The court filing is a major step in the island's nearly four-year
long bankruptcy and reflects the economic toll that the pandemic
has taken on the island's economy, Bloomberg News discloses.  The
board filed a similar restructuring plan in February 2020, only to
ask the court one month later to delay hearings on the debt deal as
it grappled with the outbreak, Bloomberg News says.

While investors holding more than 70% of Puerto Rico's
general-obligation bonds and Public Buildings Authority debt have
agreed to the new plan, there is push back from elected officials
whose power over the process has been curtailed by the federal law
that allowed for the bankruptcy, Bloomberg News relays.  Governor
Pedro Pierluisi and Puerto Rico lawmakers have said they won't
support a debt restructuring deal that includes any reductions to
pension benefits, though the outcome will ultimately be determined
in court, Bloomberg News discloses.

"My administration has been emphatic that this pension cut is not
reasonable and is also not necessary to confirm the amended plan of
adjustment," Pierluisi said in a statement.  "So we will clearly
establish our position in the confirmation process that will begin
before the Title III court," he added.

Under the terms of the deal, holders of the island's
general-obligation and Public Buildings Authority debt would
receive $14.4 billion, $7 billion in cash and the rest through the
sale of new securities, including current-interest bonds and
capital appreciation debt, Bloomberg News relays.  Investors would
also receive a so-called contingent-value instrument that would pay
off if sales-tax revenue surpasses targets, Bloomberg News notes.

The earlier 2020 plan gave investors $15.6 billion, which included
a smaller cash payment and didn't offer a contingent-value
instrument, Bloomberg News notes.

Prices on some Puerto Rico securities increased after the board on
Feb. 23 released details of the pact, Bloomberg News relays.
General obligations with an 8% coupon and maturing in 2035, one of
the government's most actively traded bonds, at an average 77.4
cents on the dollar, up from an average 75.7 cents since the start
of 2021, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Still, the recent trading price is higher than the 67.7 cents on
the dollar that investors would receive for that security in the
restructuring deal, Bloomberg News discloses.  That reflects
speculation that the new general obligations will increase in the
secondary market, just as the commonwealth's restructured sales-tax
bonds have done, as well as the potential gains investors will
receive if sales taxes exceed estimates, Bloomberg News relays.

Under the terms of the plan, the 8% coupon general-obligation bond
-- which has a claim of $4.18 billion -- would receive a $1.2
billion cash payment and $1.6 billion of new current interest debt
and capital appreciation bonds, according to court documents,
Bloomberg News notes.  That would give those investors 67.7 cents
on the dollar even before calculating the potential payments from
the excess sales-tax revenue, Bloomberg News relays.

Overall, the pact will allow bondholders to recover between 67.7%
to 80.3% of their investment, depending on the class of security
and based on what the commonwealth owed when the bankruptcy began
in May 2017, according to a disclosure to investors last month,
Bloomberg News notes.  That range falls to 53% to 74.5% when
considering unpaid interest on the securities, Bloomberg News
adds.

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and chair of a committee to review professionals' fees.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] LATAM: Sustainable Debt Sales Surge Amid Global Boom
--------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Bloomberg News, reports that
sustainable debt sales are suddenly booming in Latin America, as
investors looking for larger returns in environmentally and
socially friendly securities grow more comfortable with buying
high-yield bonds.

Borrowers in the region have raised about $8.7 billion in
international debt deals tied to environmental, social and
governance projects so far this year, according to data compiled by
Bloomberg.  That's approaching the record $10.8 billion issued all
of last year, according to globalinsolvency.com.  And there's
plenty more to come, the report relays.

Governments across the region are planning green bond sales, and
IDB Invest, a part of the Inter-American Development Bank, is
working with borrowers on 15 additional green, social and
sustainability bonds this year, the report notes.  The growing
volume of sales reflects a market that was once relatively small
and is becoming increasingly global and liquid, in part because
investment funds focusing on ESG debt have grown bigger, the report
says.  Many issuers can cut their borrowing costs by borrowing in
the market, by 0.15 percentage point or more, the report adds.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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