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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, February 11, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 25

                           Headlines



B R A Z I L

JALLES MACHADO: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'BB' on Stronger Liquidity
RIO OIL: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series 2014 and 2018-1 Notes


C O L O M B I A

TECNOGLASS INC: Fitch Affirms and Then Withdraws 'BB-' IDRs


C O S T A   R I C A

BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative


C U B A

CUBA: Opens Broad Swath of Economy to Private Enterprise


E L   S A L V A D O R

AES EL SALVADOR II: Moody's Confirms B2 CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg.


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Counting on Bovine Traceability to Conquer US Market


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

VEHICLE MANAGEMENT: Owing Millions to NIB and BIR


V E N E Z U E L A

MOVILNET: Venezuela Mulls Sale of State-Owned Wireless Carrier

                           - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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JALLES MACHADO: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'BB' on Stronger Liquidity
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 8, 2021, raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Brazil-based sugarcane processor, Jalles Machado
S.A. (Jalles), to 'BB' from 'BB-' on the global scale and to
'brAAA' from 'brAA+' on the national scale. The outlook on both
scales is stable.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Jalles will
maintain its adjusted debt to EBITDA consistently well below 2.0x,
funds from operations (FFO) to debt well above 45%, and slightly
positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt, despite the
sizeable expansion investments in the next three years.

The company will use slightly over half of the proceeds to expand
the crushing capacity of its cluster in the state of Goias from 5.3
to nearly 6.5 million tons of sugarcane per harvest in the next
three years. Jalles will use the remaining proceeds to acquire a
mill in another state. This will enhance Jalles' scale and
geographic diversification, although operating efficiency could
slip from the company's historically high standards, as it adjusts
the new mill's operations.

The cash inflow, combined with expected high cash generation from
record-high sugar in reals and favorable ethanol prices, as well as
Jalles' operational flexibility to shift its production mix between
sugar and ethanol and its product diversification into organic
sugar, anhydrous ethanol, and sanitizers will enable the company to
maintain its leverage low despite the acquisition and expansion
investments. S&P expects the company to continue maximizing the
production of sugar because its price differential compared with
ethanol remains favorable, although ethanol prices remain robust
given the weaker real and the recovery in oil prices.

Jalles has kept a comfortable liquidity cushion against the
industry volatility for the past few years, gradually extending
overall debt maturities even amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The IPO
will further strengthen the company's liquidity, with more than
enough cash to cover maturities for the next four years. This
prompted S&P to revise its liquidity assessment on Jalles to
adequate.


RIO OIL: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series 2014 and 2018-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term series 2014 and 2018-1
notes issued by Rio Oil Finance Trust at 'BB-'. The Rating Outlook
remains Negative. Additionally, Fitch has affirmed the series
2014-2 special indebtedness interests' national scale rating at
'AA(bra)', and revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative.

The ratings are not directly linked to the originator's credit
quality. The ratings are based on potential production and
generation risk and are ultimately linked to Petrobras' Issuer
Default Rating (IDR), as it is the main source of cash flow
generation. The ratings are capped at Petrobras' rating level
(BB-/Negative/ AA(bra)/Stable), as the largest obligor of royalties
and special participations payments. Additionally, the ratings are
also capped at Banco do Brazil's rating level
(BB-/Negative/AA(bra)/Stable), given it cannot be replaced as
collection account bank.

The assigned ratings address timely payment of interest and timely
payment of principal on a quarterly basis.

       DEBT                    RATING             PRIOR
       ----                    ------             -----
Rio Oil Finance Trust

2014-1 76716XAA0        LT  BB-        Affirmed    BB-
2014-1 REGS U76673AA7   LT  BB-        Affirmed    BB-
2014-2 Natl             LT  AAsf(bra)  Affirmed    AAsf(bra)
2014-3 76716XAB8        LT  BB-        Affirmed    BB-
2014-3 regs U76673AB5   LT  BB-        Affirmed    BB-
2018-1 76716XAC6        LT  BB-        Affirmed    BB-

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes issued by Rio Oil Finance Trust, a Delaware-based special
purpose vehicle (SPV) constituted for the sole purpose of this
transaction are backed by the royalty flows owed by oil
concessions, predominantly operated by Petrobras, to the government
of the state of Rio de Janeiro (RJS), which has assigned 100% of
the flows to RioPrevidencia (RP). For the purpose of this
transaction, RP sold its rights to Rio Oil Finance Trust.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Not Directly Linked to Originator's: RP is an autonomous
government agency that is part of the Secretary of Treasury of RJS
(BB-/AA(bra)/Negative). The originator's performance will not
affect the collateral as the generation of the cash flow needed to
meet timely debt service is not dependent on either RP or RJS.

Future Production Risk: The transaction benefits from growth in
production levels as it increases the total royalty flows.
Depressed oil prices have led Petrobras to reduce production
targets on multiple occasions. Therefore, sustained low oil prices
could translate into further capital expenditure cuts by
Petrobras.

Cash Flows Support Rating: The expected levels of Annualized
Average DSCRs (AADSCRs) over 2.0x partially mitigate the
transaction's exposure to fluctuations in oil prices and production
levels at the current rating level. Fitch expects AADSCRs to be
over 2.0x for the life of the transaction, assuming Law 12,734 is
implemented after 2020.

Ample Liquidity for Timely Payment: The transaction benefits from
liquidity in the form of a Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA) and
a Liquidity Reserve Account. Funds in deposit in these two accounts
shall at all times be sufficient to cover three principal and
interest (P&I) payments, which Fitch considers sufficient to keep
debt service current on the notes under different stress
scenarios.

Largest Obligor Rating Cap: Petrobras' rating is the ultimate cap
for the proposed transaction, as it is the main source of cash flow
generation. Petrobras Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) are BB-/AA(bra)/Negative. The company is majority
controlled by the Brazilian federal government and has the rights
to E&P of the vast majority of Brazil's oil fields.

Potential Exposure Political Risk Partially Mitigated: The state's
liquidity constraints, evidenced by various delays in commercial
and other payments, have heightened the transaction's political
risk exposure. However, provisions included in the sixth rescission
waiver and amendment, such as the rescission of the trapping of
excess cash and of the early amortization period, will increase the
cash flows returned to the state, and, in turn, decrease the
transaction's exposure to potential political risk.

Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification Mitigates Redirection
Risk: Pursuant to the Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification
Legislation, the RioPrevi Oil Revenues initially deposited to the
RJS Oil Revenues Dedicated Account are no longer required to be
deposited into a state-owned account, per legislation. Oil revenues
assigned to this transaction are instead deposited into an account
under the name of the issuer. This change in the account mitigates
potential redirection of flows to RJS. As Banco do Brasil (BdB)
cannot be replaced as a collection bank, the transaction is
directly linked to BdB's credit quality
(BB-/Negative/AA(bra)/Stable).

Legal Changes May Affect Collateral Stability: Although no
amendments affecting the distribution of royalties for the existing
concession regime have been implemented, provisions regarding the
change in allocation percentages incorporated in Law 12,734 are
currently under review. The transaction was analyzed assuming the
law will change, and DSCRs remain sufficiently robust and
commensurate with the expected ratings.

True Sale Valid Under Brazilian Law: Collateral backing this
transaction was transferred to RP by RJS through a state decree,
making RP the legal owner of the royalties. This transfer gives RP
the right to sell the collateral into the trust.

Transfer and Convertibility Risk: Series 2014-1, 2014-3 and 2018-1
notes are exposed to transfer and convertibility risk as royalty
flows are paid in an account in Brazilian reals. This exposure caps
the rating of the transaction at the country ceiling of Brazil,
which is currently 'BB'. To partially mitigate operational risk
that may arise from transferring and converting flows on a daily
basis to an off-shore account, the transaction contemplates reserve
funds that covers three principal and interest (P&I) payment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The transaction is exposed to oil price and production volume
    risks. Sustained low prices or further declines in prices or
    production levels significantly below expectations may trigger
    downgrades.

-- The ratings are capped by the credit quality of Petrobras, the
    main obligor generating cash flows to support the transaction,
    and to the sovereign rating and country ceiling assigned to
    Brazil. A downgrade of Petrobras or the sovereign would
    trigger a downgrade on the notes.

-- The ratings are sensitive to the rating of BdB as a direct
    counterparty to the transaction; therefore, a downgrade of BdB
    would trigger a downgrade on the notes.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Given the Negative Outlook on the notes, an upgrade is
    unlikely at this time. However, an upgrade of both Petrobras
    and BdB, together with a continued recovery in oil prices,
    which in turn supports growth in production levels, could
    trigger a positive rating action.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch received historical data on royalties and special
participations flows and an independent engineer report accessing
forecast production and price assumptions for oil and gas produced
in each field located in RJS. The data were provided in a manner
requested by Fitch and, upon review, found to be adequate for the
purposes of Fitch's analysis.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




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C O L O M B I A
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TECNOGLASS INC: Fitch Affirms and Then Withdraws 'BB-' IDRs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and simultaneously withdrawn Tecnoglass
Inc.'s 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) and Local Currency
(LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs).

Fitch has withdrawn Tecnoglass' ratings as the entity has no public
debt outstanding and does not intend to issue debt in the near
term.

The ratings reflect Tecnoglass' competitive cost structure,
above-average growth profile supported by its solid order backlog,
long-term relationships with customers and robust demand for its
products. The ratings are tempered by its production site
concentration and high working capital needs, which have resulted
in weak cash flow from operations during periods of rapid growth.
The ratings also reflect the high cyclicality of the new
construction industry that leads to cash flow volatility.

Tecnoglass repaid its 2022 notes in full in February of 2021. The
ratings are being withdrawn for commercial reasons due to a lack of
market as the company's public bond has been repaid in full.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings affirmation reflects Fitch's view that there are no
material changes to Tecnoglass' credit profile since the last
ratings review on Nov. 12, 2020.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities are no longer applicable since the ratings
have been withdrawn.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.




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C O S T A   R I C A
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BICSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica's
(BICSA) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-' and
Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb-'. The Rating Outlook is Negative
(RON). The bank's Short-Term IDR is also affirmed.

The Negative Rating Outlook reflects Fitch's view that BICSA's
ratings could be affected in the medium term due to the adverse
operating environments it operates - mainly Costa Rica and Panama,
which have the largest proportion of asset exposure and continue to
exert increased risks to the bank's financial performance and
prospects.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs and VR

BICSA's IDRs are driven by its VR. BICSA's VR reflects, with high
importance, Fitch's blended operating environment assessment, which
considers 30 countries. However, the operating environments of
Costa Rica and Panama have the most influence, since nearly 67% of
the bank's earning assets are located in these countries. BICSA´s
blended operating environment remains unchanged at 'bb-' with a
negative trend despite Panama's recent sovereign rating Downgrade
to 'BBB-', RON.

The bank's company profile also has a high influence on the ratings
supported by its geographic diversification which is wider than
that of its similarly rated peers, and its reasonable competitive
position in the regional trade finance with a stable base of
regional clients. Due to the pandemic, the bank has shifted its
focus to less sensitive economic sectors while reducing its new
business volume on other sectors, such as construction, and finance
and insurance.

BICSA's asset quality metrics remain in line with its current VR
despite moderate deterioration. As of 3Q20, the bank's impaired
loans-to-gross loans increased to 2.3% from the previous 1.6% as of
YE19. Favorably, the proportion of "modified" loans amount to 16%
of total gross loans, which is well below the 39% registered by the
banking industry. Fitch believes the risk of deterioration of the
portfolio under alleviation measures is low as all of these loans
are fulfilling its obligations under the new conditions. However,
further deteriorations cannot be discarded as economic recovery is
forecast to be slow.

Fitch considers that the bank's profitability has been sustained by
adequate product pricing but affected by high operating costs and
increasing loan impairment charges. As of 3Q20, operating return of
risk-weighted assets is a low 0.37%. The agency believes that the
bank will register a similar return 2021 since its currently
prioritizing liquidity and solvency over profitability. Pressures
still remain due to the potential deterioration that a proportion
of loans could have in the near future, thus the negative trend.

Fitch believes that the bank's funding structure and liquidity
indicators have proven stable during the ongoing economic slowdown.
Wholesale funding lines comprise 53% of total funding, have not
diminished in number and register a higher proportion of available
funds in relation to total funds granted as the bank has repaid
lines and demanded less funds, hence increasing total funds
available in case of need. The loans-to-deposits ratio is still
high at 197% but improved in relation to its recent history. On the
other hand, customer deposits remain concentrated on term deposits
with a high concentration by depositor rate of around 40%.
Liquidity indicators remain well above the minimum regulatory
limits and are considered sufficient to cover the bank's needs: The
regulatory liquidity index was 66.1%, better than the 30% required
by total regulation.

BICSA's capitalization, measured by its common equity Tier 1 (CET1)
ratio, is adequate and has remained commensurate with its VR. As of
September 2020, BICSA's CET1 was 13.1%, above the 12.1% registered
in 2019, supported by a full retention policy and benefiting from
loan contraction (-14% with respect to YE19) that offset lower
profitability.

Fitch considers that the possibility of a rating action on BICSA
due a to potential sale is low for the foreseeable future as the
Costa Rican government did not include it in its revised proposal
of economic measures to be taken as part of a potential agreement
with the IMF in late 2020. If Fitch believed that there is a
renewed probability or certainty of sale, BICSA´s ratings would
likely be placed on Rating Watch.

Support Rating

BICSA's Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion of the entity's
shareholders, Banco de Costa Rica (BCR) and Banco Nacional de Costa
Rica (BNCR), and their ability and propensity to support BICSA
should the need arise. The Support Rating of '4' reflects a limited
probability of support from the shareholders given their capacity,
as demonstrated by their IDRs.

The agency's support assessment places high importance on the
support track record and the implication of subsidiary default.
Fitch also recognizes BICSA´s role in its parent companies'
strategies.

National Senior Debt Ratings in El Salvador

The National Rating of BICSA's senior unsecured debt issuances in
El Salvador, rated 'AAA(slv)', reflects the relative strength of
the Panamanian bank compared to other issuers in El Salvador.
BICSA's IDR is three notches above El Salvador's 'B-' sovereign
rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs and VR

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A further Downgrade or material deterioration of the main
    operating environments where BICSA holds its major exposures,
    namely in Costa Rica and Panama;

-- A deterioration of the bank's financial profile reflected in a
    material and sustained increase of its impaired loans, and a
    further reduction of its operating return of RWAs that reduces
    its CET1 ratio below 12%;

-- A Downgrade of BICSA's VR could likely affect its IDRs and
    national ratings as well, but the resulting levels of these
    ratings would be determined by the implicit floor derived from
    its shareholders' IDRs, as the ratings could return to being
    driven by parental support.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The ratings could be affirmed and the Rating Outlook revised
    to Stable if the bank's profitability and asset quality ratios
    return to their pre-pandemic levels on a consistent basis;

-- An improvement in the bank's operating environments,
    particularly in Panama and Costa Rica, could lead to a rating
    Upgrade over the medium term.

Support Rating

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The Support Rating is sensitive to negative changes in BCR's
    and BNCR's capacity or propensity to provide timely support to
    the bank.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Although not expected within the foreseeable future, the
    Support Rating is sensitive to significant positive changes in
    BCR's and BNCR's capacity or propensity to provide timely
    support to the bank.

National Senior Debt Ratings In El Salvador

The National Ratings could be downgraded in response to a material
reduction in BICSA's IDR.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica's Governance Structure score
changed to '3' from a '4' due to the reassessment of how Fitch
considers governance for this bank. In Fitch's opinion, BICSA's
policies, controls and oversight of related-party transactions are
effective and relatively independent from its parent companies
Banco de Costa Rica and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, both
state-owned banks.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




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C U B A
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CUBA: Opens Broad Swath of Economy to Private Enterprise
--------------------------------------------------------
Lorena Canto at EFE News reports that Cuba's Communist government
vastly expanded the scope for private enterprise on the island by
opening the vast majority of recognized occupations to
self-employed individuals.

More than a decade after authorizing private initiative in 127
categories, the Cabinet approved the scrapping of that list in
favor of liberalizing all but 124 of the upwards of 2,000
occupations recognized in the National Classification of Economic
Activity, official Communist Party daily Granma reported, according
to EFE News.

Officials have yet to identify the 124 occupations that will be
reserved, but areas such as education, health, telecommunications
and media are expected to remain restricted, the report notes.

Under the new system, the government will establish a one-stop
permitting process for would-be entrepreneurs, making it "possible
to unleash the productive forces in this sector," Labor and Social
Security Minister Marta Elena Feito told her Cabinet colleagues,
according to Granma, the report relays.

The Cuban economy shrank by 11 percent in 2020 due to the Covid-19
pandemic - devastating to the island's vital tourism industry - and
the intensification of the embargo the United States imposed on the
country in 1962, the report notes.

The report discloses that official data show that 600,000 people,
representing 13 percent of Cuba's labor force, work in the private
sector. But that figure refers only to the individual licensed
entrepreneurs, most of whom have employees of their own.

There have long been voices, including some inside officialdom,
urging the government to eliminate most of the remaining limits on
self-employment, the report relays.

"It's good news," economist Ricardo Torres said of Cabinet
decision. "A step in the right direction that, unfortunately, took
too long," the report notes.

He said he was confident that the government would soon institute
"similar changes in relation to the possibility of establishing
private enterprises of up to medium size and cooperatives," the
report relays.

Oniel Diaz, co-founder of business consultants AUGE, called the new
policy "an enormous and historic step" and a "paradigm shift" in
the realm of official attitudes toward self-employment, the report
discloses.

"If with a meager list of authorized activities with inflexible
extent, shortage of raw materials, deficient regulations and
economic sanctions we have been capable of raising enterprises come
hell or high water, this new scenario opens a path with no turning
back for us to play an ever more important role in the national
economy," Diaz added.




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E L   S A L V A D O R
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AES EL SALVADOR II: Moody's Confirms B2 CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has concluded the review initiated on
November 17, 2020 and has confirmed the B2 ratings for AES El
Salvador Trust II bis (Trustco II) and changed the outlook to
negative.

Trustco II issued the 10-year $310 million senior global notes due
in 2023 for the benefit of four affiliated electric distribution
companies in El Salvador: Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de San
Salvador, S.A. de C.V. (CAESS), Empresa Electrica de Oriente, S.A.
de C.V. (EEO), AES CLESA S. en C. de C.V. (CLESA) and Distribuidora
Electrica de Usulutan (DEUSEM). These four distribution utilities,
which are majority owned by The AES Corporation (AES; Ba1 stable),
unconditionally and severally guarantee the debt of Trustco II,
collectively the guarantors.

Confirmations:

Issuer: AES El Salvador Trust II bis

Corporate Family Rating; Confirmed at B2

Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture; Confirmed at B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: AES El Salvador Trust II bis

Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 ratings confirmation of Trustco II with negative outlook
reflects the B3 sovereign bond rating confirmation of the
Government of El Salvador with negative outlook.

Trustco II ratings factor in an expected deterioration of combined
credit metrics in 2020 reflecting a lower demand and collections as
a result of measures implemented by the government to weather the
economic crises related to the pandemic. However, Moody´s
anticipates that the guarantors will be able to record an
improvement of consolidated performance in 2021, leading to
stronger metrics, given that collections have registered an
improvement in the last four months. Specifically, CFO pre-working
capital changes to debt will continue to exceed 12% on a
sustainable basis. The metrics are supported by the constructive
outcome of the 2018-2022 tariff review and a more timely collection
of the electric subsidies following the changes implemented in
2017.

In addition, the ratings also take into account that under the
terms of the Notes, the structure has a six-month interest only
debt service reserve account. Moody's also consider in our
liquidity assessment that the guarantors are entitled to receive
interest income (approximately $11 million p.a.) from two
intercompany loans amounting to USD 183.4 million made by CAESS,
CLESA and EEO in connection with their acquisition by AES. The
ratings also consider AES' historical track-record of reducing the
dividend pressure on its El Salvadorian subsidiaries amid the
country's financial and liquidity challenges.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The prospects of an upgrade of Trustco II are limited given the B3
sovereign rating and negative outlook for El Salvador. We would
consider downgrading Trustco II's ratings if El Salvador's rating
is downgraded. In addition, downward pressure on the ratings is
likely if Moody's perceive a deterioration in the regulatory
framework that reduces the predictability and consistency in which
the regulation is applied. Negative momentum is also likely if the
current economic disruption causes a further deterioration in the
guarantors' combined key credit metrics than currently expected;
specifically, if the consolidated interest coverage ratio and the
ratio of CFO pre-W/C to debt fell below 2x and 5%, respectively,
for an extended period. An aggressive distribution policy that
contributes to a material deterioration in the credit metrics or
the liquidity profile would also likely result in a downgrade.
Moody's assessment that the guarantors' financial and/or liquidity
profiles are no longer appropriate to maintain the one-notch
difference between Trustco II's ratings and the sovereign rating
could also result in a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in June 2017.




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N I C A R A G U A
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NICARAGUA: Counting on Bovine Traceability to Conquer US Market
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Maria Cristina Mena and Pedro Antonio Sevilla
Molina's San Antonio ranch located in the town of Morrito in
Nicaragua's Rio San Juan department, cattle roam fertile grasslands
wearing numbered earrings, their ID.

This system is known as bovine traceability, a plan that in its
beginning, in 2006, was financed by the Inter-American Development
Bank, and 15 years later, it is part of the commitment of
Nicaraguan livestock to improve their productivity, quality of
bovine meat and its cuts, and conquer the US and European markets,
the executive director of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Bovine Meat
Export Plants (Canicarne), Juan Velazquez, told EFE News.

Of the more than 146,000 cattle farms in Nicaragua, which generate
650,000 jobs, 125,220 are registered in the National Bovine
Traceability Information System (SNITB), equivalent to some 6.28
million head of cattle, each with an earring, according to EFE
News.

Velazquez, who has a master's degree in Agriculture and a doctorate
in Zootechnics, explained that the SNITB identifies the cattle herd
with an earring and with a number that corresponds to a farm or
production center, the report notes.

"Through this system it can be ensured that an animal does not come
from areas where it is not allowed to buy or produce animals, such
as protected areas and biosphere reserves," or from indigenous
communities, he added.

That allows ranchers in Nicaragua, who are 85% to 90% small and
medium-sized, to focus on improving the productivity and quality of
their cattle, he said, the report relays.

"The first thing European and North American consumers do is go to
the product and see the label, where it is produced, if it has
traceability, if it is produced naturally, which is how Nicaragua
produces in the open field, in grasslands, under shade, and based
on grass, mainly," Ronald Blandon, general manager of the National
Livestock Commission (Conagan), told EFE News.

Blandon, who noted that in Nicaragua there is practically one head
of cattle per inhabitant, explained that the union's line and
strategy is "to continue advancing in the strengthening of these
control tools" to obtain better quality meat and to be able to
place it in demanding markets and then create a country brand for
Nicaraguan meat, the report relays.

In Nicaragua, there are eight industrial plants or slaughterhouses,
of which seven are authorized to export, including one with Mexican
capital and the other Panamanian, which are annually certified by
the US in risk analysis and critical control points, the report
says.

Nicaragua mostly exports industrial meat to the United States,
which is consumed in hamburgers and tacos, however what the
livestock sector is betting on is also placing cuts of select beef
in that large market, the report notes.

For the Conagan chief, the United States and other markets can be
conquered if they strive to produce a differentiated meat, of
better quality, with safety and complying with the control and
verification tools "of what is really done in a farm, and that tool
is bovine traceability," the report discloses.

In Central America, Nicaragua is the largest producer of cattle and
has chosen bovine traceability to conquer new markets, the report
says.

Another challenge to compete in demanding markets, according to the
ranchers' union, is to develop and fatten the steers in 24 months,
because at that age the meat is of better quality, it is soft and
juicy and has more flavor, the report relays.

They must also try to increase productivity and intensify the
silvopastoral system, which is the practice of integrating trees,
forage and grazing domesticated animals in a mutually beneficial
way, the report discloses.

"Our challenge is to disseminate and massify the silvopastoral
system in 10 years. If we continue at this rate, we are going to
make our country exemplary, not only in producing good quality
meat, but also in a carbon neutral system," stressed Blandon, the
report adds.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

VEHICLE MANAGEMENT: Owing Millions to NIB and BIR
-------------------------------------------------
Camille Hunte at Trinidad Express reports that the Vehicle
Management Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (VMCOTT) is owing
millions of dollars to the National Insurance Board (NIB) and Board
of Inland Revenue (BIR), which represent statutory deductions which
have not been paid for years.

This was one of the revelations made during a Public Accounts
(Enterprises) Committee meeting held to examine the Corporation's
financial statements for the years 2012 and 2013, according to
Trinidad Express.

Committee chairman Wade Mark is now questioning whether VMCOTT
broke the law in making the deductions from their employees'
salaries but failing to remit the payments to the relevant
agencies, the report notes.  Further, he said, employees may face
challenges when they attempt to claim pension benefits after their
retirement due to non-payment by VMCOTT, the report relays.

Speaking during the meeting, VMCOTT chief executive officer Natasha
Prince said the Corporation is presently owing $1.2 million in
unpaid NIS contributions, $1.1 million in unpaid income tax
contributions and over $45,000 in unpaid health surcharge
deductions, the report relates.

She said while the deductions were being made from employees'
salaries, it was being used to fund VMCOTT's operations to keep the
company afloat, the report notes.

"It was also used to pay off suppliers who wanted to take
litigation against the company . . . to enter payment plans to try
and absorb that debt to pay them off," the report discloses.

Mark said this was a very serious matter.

"You have employees who would be retiring. . . and if you have an
employee . . . if somebody reaches the statutory retirement age and
they have to leave VMCOTT and their monies have been deducted
because their salary pay slips would reveal monies going to income
tax and Board of Inland Revenue office, monies are going to the
agency responsible for collecting health surcharge and the agencies
responsible for receiving NIS which is the NIB. When that person
retires, what would be their situation in terms of accessing their
monthly pensions?" he questioned, the report notes.

"This is an emergency. People are retiring. They have paid their
NIS, their health surcharge, their income tax and PAYE. What is the
Ministry of Finance doing to make sure that this entity really
honours their commitment to the NIB as well as to the Board of
Inland Revenue? Isn't this a breach of the law to deduct monies
from workers' salaries and wages and not have those monies sent to
the relevant agencies?," the report discloses.

Prince noted that VMCOTT began to make the payments in 2018 for the
previous years, while payments for 2019 onward are still
outstanding, the report notes.  She however said VMCOTT had two
employees who have since retired and did not face any problems
accessing their benefits, the report relays.

"We know that this is serious and in the long-term will affect
their payments. Therefore, we are working on whatever cash that we
have on hand to try and clear it up," she added.

Prince said VMCOTT is experiencing cash flow challenges that is
hampering it from clearing its debts, the report notes.

"We have a lot of suppliers who we are owing a huge amount of money
to for goods and services that they have provided to us," she
added.

            PTSC Owes $6.4 Million

Additionally, VMCOTT is owed money by several of its clients
including the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) and the
Public Transport Service Corporation (PTSC), the report relates.

Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Works and Transport
Dhanmattee Ramdath said PTSC is indebted to VMCOTT in the sum of
$6.4 million while the TTPS owes an unspecified amount of money,
the report relays.

Prince said the TTPS was VMCOTT's main client as the company
repairs and maintains TTPS vehicles, the report notes.  She said
the TTPS' failure to pay on time crippled the company's ability to
pay its creditors, the report discloses.

Police Commissioner Gary Griffith, in a letter to the Parliament
earlier this month, noted the issue and said in order for the TTPS
to pay any invoices from VMCOTT, the company must provide proper
documentation, the report says.

Mark said VMCOTT had asked the TTPS to pay invoices dating as far
back as 2001 but had not provided any substantiating documentation,
the report relays.

Ramdath noted that Griffith has since appointed a committee to look
into what is owed and work on clearing the debt and VMCOTT has been
recovering the debt slowly but surely, the report relays.

She added that the Ministry has been injecting some $10 million per
year into VMCOTT to help the company meet its operating costs, the
report discloses.

Questioned whether the company is still viable as it continues to
operate at a loss, Ramdath said she believed VMCOTT can be turned
around once it works on rebranding and exploring new ventures, the
report notes.

"We have attempted to restructure and reduce the operating costs so
they can meet their statutory obligations at this time," she
added.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

MOVILNET: Venezuela Mulls Sale of State-Owned Wireless Carrier
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Latin American Herald reports that it is quite likely that
Movilnet, a telecommunications unit owned by state-run phone
monopoly Cantv, will pass onto private hands any time soon as the
regime of leftist incumbent Nicolas Maduro may be mulling the sale
of the cash-strapped wireless carrier.

Sources familiar with the report also revealed that Cantv may be
sold as well at a later stage without the approval of the
Parliament (aka National Assembly or AN) through the so-called
"Anti-Blockade Law," conceived to bypass the harsh sanctions
imposed by Washington under the administration of former US
President Donald Trump, according to The Latin American Herald.

Fran Monroy and Arnaldo Espinoza, two specialized Venezuelan
technology-savvy journalists, said on a radio interview that the
sale is estimated at "no less than $500 million" and that it would
take "at least $1.8 billion to resuscitate the company," the report
notes.

Monroy pointed out that "they're creating a market strategy for
[Movilnet] authorized dealers, with each one of them managing an
advertising and network budget separated from the company," the
report relays.

Movilnet needs to provide 5G coverage to their subscribers and at
least three frequency bands, Monroy said, the report notes.  "One
low, one mid-range, and one high.  The low frequency still
represents a problem for all local carriers.  The mid-range
frequency may be set at 1,700 MHz, but it may affect the few 4G
customers they got and these will have to be migrated at once. You
need a higher frequency band, probably one of 2,600 MHz," the
report discloses.

Espinoza, for his part, claimed that the government of Maduro had
entered into talks with would-be buyers to discuss the sale of
Movilnet's assets, which reportedly split from Cantv a year ago,
the report notes.

When asked whether Movilnet's prospective buyers would have the
legal framework to develop 5G technology, Espinoza's straight
answer was "yes," the report notes.

"I think Movilnet is a very appealing asset that needs a lot of
investment, but that has all its components there," the report
relays.

Movilnet was founded in 1991 reaching roughly 21,000 subscribers
during its first year of operations while deploying an AMPS network
over major cities throughout Venezuela. The remaining two wireless
carriers in Venezuela (Movistar and Digitel) are currently
privately-owned, the report adds.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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