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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Wednesday, October 21, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 211

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

UGEN SA: Fitch Withdraws 'CCC' IDRs on Merger


B R A Z I L

J&F INVESTIMENTOS: Fined $280MM Over Bribery to Fund Expansion
PRUMOPAR: Fitch Affirms 'BB' on $350MM Secured Notes, Outlook Neg.


C H I L E

CORP GROUP: S&P Cuts ICR to 'D' on Bond Coupon Non-payment


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Foreign Tourism Fell by 81.3% During September
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Venezuela Commercial Flights Resume December


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Correa Spurns IMF Deal That Allowed Debt Restructuring


P U E R T O   R I C O

AES PUERTO: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on Series A & B Bonds


V E N E Z U E L A

PDVSA: Boosts Crude Blending, Upgrading as Exports Tick Up

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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UGEN SA: Fitch Withdraws 'CCC' IDRs on Merger
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn UGEN S.A.'s (UGEN) Foreign Currency and
Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'CCC' and UENSA
S.A.'s (UENSA) Foreign Currency and Local Currency IDRs of 'CCC'.
Fitch has also withdrawn UGEN's and UENSA's ratings for the USD600
million senior secured notes due 2025 of 'CCC'/'RR4'.

Fitch Ratings is withdrawing the ratings of UGEN and UENSA because
they were absorbed by MSU Energy S.A. (CCC), which was formerly
named Rio Energy S.A., and no longer exist. Accordingly, Fitch
Ratings will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for
UGEN or UENSA. Fitch will continue to rate MSU Energy and its
USD600 million senior secured notes (CCC/RR4) due 2025.




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B R A Z I L
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J&F INVESTIMENTOS: Fined $280MM Over Bribery to Fund Expansion
--------------------------------------------------------------
opslens.com reports that meat industry giant J&F Investimentos SA
used N.Y.-based bank accounts, real estate for bribes and favors.

The world's largest meat processor, Brazil's J&F Investimentos SA
(J&F), pleaded guilty to bribery in a U.S. federal court after
paying almost $180 million in bribes to Brazilian government
officials, according to opslens.com.  According to a statement from
the U.S. Department of Justice, J&F employees and agents paid the
massive bribes through bank accounts based in New York, with the
aim of obtaining Brazilian government financing to expand its
operations in the United States, the report relays.

J&F is a vast holding company that is the majority shareholder in
JBS, a meat-processing giant that claims to be the largest
protein-producing company in the world, the report notes.  JBS has
extensive beef, pork, poultry, and other meat processing operations
across the United States, the report relays.  At the Federal Court
in Brooklyn, J&F agreed to pay a criminal fine of over $256
million, the report discloses.

"With today's guilty plea, J&F has admitted to engaging in a
long-running pattern of paying bribes to corrupt officials in
Brazil to obtain financing and other benefits," stated Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Brian C. Rabbitt in the statement, the
report says.  "J&F's corrupt conduct involved executives at the
highest levels of the company using New York banks and real estate
to carry out a scheme to pay millions of dollars in bribes to
government officials in Brazil," the report relays.

The Court found that between 2005 and 2017, J&F paid tens of
millions of dollars in bribes to obtain financing from two
Brazilian state-controlled banks and to obtain approval for a
merger from a Brazilian pension fund, the report notes.  J&F then
used the New York bank accounts of shell companies to make the
corrupt payments, the report discloses.

"In addition, between approximately 2011 and 2017, J&F caused
approximately $4.6 million in corrupt payments to be made, and
items of value to be transferred, for the benefit of a high-ranking
executive at Petrobras de Seguridade Social (Petros), a Brazilian
state-owned pension fund," according to the statement from the U.S.
Attorney's Office, the report relays.  "The bribes were paid
through, among other things, the purchase of an apartment in New
York for the high-ranking Petros executive. The bribe payments were
made to ensure that Petros approved a merger involving a
J&F-related entity," the report relays.

In a related case, JBS subsidiary Pilgrim's Pride agreed to pay
over $110 million to the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Division following its investigation into the sales of broiler
chicken products in the United States, the report discloses.

A statue of Pilgrim's Pride founder Bo Pilgrim is displayed outside
the company's distribution center near Pittsburg, Texas on Dec. 2,
2008, the report relays.  Brazilian beef producer JBS SA said it
would buy a majority stake in Pilgrim's Pride for $800 million, the
report notes.

"Pilgrim's is committed to fair and honest competition in
compliance with U.S. antitrust laws," said Pilgrim's Pride CEO,
Fabio Sandri, in a statement obtained by the news agency.  "We are
encouraged that today's agreement concludes the Antitrust
Division's investigation into Pilgrim's, providing certainty
regarding this matter to our team members, suppliers, customers,
and shareholders," the report relays.

                       Request to Investigate JBS

In October of last year, Sens. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) and Bob
Menendez (D-N.J.) wrote a letter to Treasury Secretary Steve
Mnuchin, asking that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) review JBS' business transactions, the report
recalls.

"Given its admitted criminal conduct to secure loans that were used
for investment in the United States and the group's business
relationships with Venezuela's Maduro regime, as well as its
growing reliance on financing from entities aligned with the
Chinese government, we ask that CFIUS conduct a review of JBS
S.A.'s acquisition of U.S. companies," Rubio and Menendez wrote,
the report notes.  "The growing trend of foreign investment in our
food system demands increased attention and scrutiny in order to
safeguard our nation's food supply," the report relates.

The senators also outlined the enormous scale of JBS' acquisitions
in the United States, suggesting that the company's illicit
activities could present issues for American national security, the
report notes.

"In 2007, JBS S.A. established a U.S. subsidiary - JBS USA - that
purchased the American beef and pork processing company Swift Foods
Co.," the senators told Mnuchin.  "Through a deal in 2008, JBS USA
acquired the beef processing operations of Smithfield Foods. In
2009, JBS USA obtained the majority of the poultry processing
operations of Pilgrim's Pride. Additionally, JBS USA purchased
Cargill's pork processing operations in 2015. Today, JBS S.A. is
the world's largest meat-processing company and has major holdings
across the U.S. food sector. These acquisitions have serious
implications for the security, safety, and resiliency of our food
system," the report recalls.

In June 2020, Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Corey Booker
(D-N.J.) put the spotlight on JBS USA and other meat processors
such as Tyson Foods, Cargill, and Smithfield Foods regarding meat
shortages on the American market, the report relates.  Warren and
Booker expressing their concern about "reports that your companies
sent massive amounts of pork and other meats to consumers in China
while threatening the American public with an impending shortage of
beef, pork, and chicken," the report notes.

In a letter to the meat processors (pdf), the senators said they
wanted to find out how many tons of pork, beef, and poultry had
been exported to China in April 2020, at a time when U.S. consumers
were being warned of broken supply chains and possible shortages of
meat products, the report relays.

According to USDA trade statistics, U.S. meatpackers shipped over
115,000 tons of pork products to China in April of 2020 alone - a
figure 465 percent higher than in April 2019, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct.
5, 2018, S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'B-' global scale and
'brBBB-' national scale issuer credit ratings on J&F Investimentos
S.A. and on Eldorado Brasil Celulose S.A. Prior to the withdrawal,
the outlook on J&F was developing and on Eldorado was negative. S&P
also withdrew its issue-level ratings on both companies, given that
these rating actions were at the issuer's request.


PRUMOPAR: Fitch Affirms 'BB' on $350MM Secured Notes, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed the 'BB' rating of the fixed-rate USD350
million senior secured notes issued by Prumo Participacoes e
Investimentos S.A. (Prumopar). The Rating Outlook is Negative.

RATING RATIONALE

The rating reflects Prumopar's stable cash flow, derived from
distributions from Ferroport Logistica Comercial Exportadora S.A.
(Ferroport). Ferroport benefits from a long-term take-or-pay (ToP)
agreement with a creditworthy counterparty and is a strategic asset
for Anglo American plc as the sole export terminal for the iron ore
produced by its Brazilian subsidiary's mines in Minas Gerais state.
Revenues as well as the debt service are linked to U.S. dollars
(USD), while operational expenses are linked to Brazilian Reais
(BRL), exposing the transaction to BRL appreciation.

The notes have fixed rate and include a balloon payment for up to
47.3% of total debt at maturity in 2031. The balloon declined from
51.6% in prior review because of the early redemption of USD29MM in
the first semester of 2020 triggered by the discount on tariffs
related to the Port Access Agreement, as per the financing
documents. In Fitch's scenarios, Prumopar doesn't rely on this
revenues stream to serve the debt. Refinancing risk is partially
mitigated by cash sweep provisions, that reduces the balloon
payment to 22.4% of total debt (USD 78.5 million), and an eight
years ToP tail in Fitch's Rating Case. Balloon payment in prior
Rating Case was USD72.8 million and Project Life Coverage Ratio
(PLCR) decreased to 1.25x in current review from 1.3x in prior
rating case because of Fitch lower expectations on US inflation in
the next 3 years. Peak leverage, measured by Net Debt over Cash
Flow Available for Debt Service (CFADS), is 7.6x in 2020. Despite
slightly lower, credit metrics remain somewhat strong for the
assigned rating level, according to Fitch's applicable criteria.
The rating is constrained, however, by Brazil's country ceiling,
Ferroport's short track record of operations without disruption,
and by a residual exposure to foreign exchange risk.

The Negative Outlook reflects the corresponding Negative Outlook
Brazil's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (LT
FC IDR).

The outbreak of coronavirus and related government containment
measures worldwide create an uncertain global environment for the
transportation sector. While Prumopar's performance data through
most recently available issuer data may not have indicated
impairment, material changes in revenue and cost profile are
occurring across the transportation sector and will continue to
evolve as economic activity and government restrictions respond to
the ongoing situation. Fitch's ratings are forward-looking in
nature, and Fitch will monitor developments in the sector as a
result of the virus outbreak as it relates to severity and
duration, and incorporate revised base and rating case qualitative
and quantitative inputs based on expectations for future
performance and assessment of key risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Dedicated Terminal [Revenue Risk: Volume - Midrange]:

Ferroport has operated since 2014 and benefits from a long-term ToP
agreement with Anglo American Minerio de Ferro Brasil S.A. (AAMFB),
subsidiary of Anglo-American plc (BBB/Stable). It is a small port
of call, built to suit Anglo's Minas-Rio iron-ore project and
handles a specialized type of cargo, with its inbound market access
highly dependent on the slurry pipeline from the mine into the
port.

Long Term ToP Agreement [Revenue Risk: Price - Stronger]:

The ToP agreement sets forth annual tariffs readjustments that
follow two-thirds of U.S. inflation, measured by Producer Price
Index (PPI) for Industrial Commodities, and it has been readjusted
in a timely manner since the port began operations. Fitch's cases
do not include interruptions like the suspension of payments under
the ToP agreement that occurred in 2018 concurrent with leaks in
the slurry pipeline. The revenues and debt are U.S.
dollar-denominated, but operational costs and expenses are
denominated in BRL, exposing the transaction to real appreciation
scenarios when margin EBITDA is reduced due to higher USD
equivalent operational costs and expenses. The transaction can
withstand a 28% BRL appreciation shift in the entire USD/BRL curve,
calculated using Fitch's base case assumptions, before defaulting
on its debt obligations on 2022. Ferroport is also entitled to
collect fees, modest in Fitch's Rating Case, based on the number of
vessels berthing, oil transshipment volume and berthing time.

Adequate Infrastructure [Infrastructure Development & Renewal -
Midrange]:

Ferroport's facilities are new and key equipment is expected to
have long useful lives. No replacement requirements are foreseen
throughout the life of the transaction. Planned investments
comprise predominantly channel dredging, increase of stacking
capacity and maintenance works to preserve operational efficiency
and environmental compliance. The ToP establishes the potential for
expansion, and Ferroport has the option to agree to expand; if it
does, the contract establishes an additional tariff for this
incremental volume, calculated in order to assure an Internal Rate
of Return (IRR) of 15%. Otherwise, AAMFB has the option to make
required the capex itself. However, as per transaction documents,
capex in excess of USD 20 million requires bondholders' approval.

Refinance Risk Partially Mitigated by Cash Sweep [Debt Structure -
Midrange]:

Rated debt is senior at Prumopar's level, but structurally
subordinated to Ferroport. Cash flows to service debt will come
from the payment of intercompany loans and dividend distributions.
Ferroport does not hold financial debt; its capex was funded
through intercompany loans from Prumopar and Anglo American.
Additional indebtedness is limited to USD 50 million, according to
Ferroport's Shareholders Agreement (SHA), which also requires the
distribution of all cash available at Ferroport. The rating
reflects the clause of the SHA which may result in the suspension
of Prumopar's voting rights at Ferroport if the bankruptcy of any
member of Prumopar's shareholder group is not enforceable under
Brazilian law, assuring Prumopar's voting power against new
indebtedness at the operational company, as per the transaction's
documents. This view is supported by a legal opinion on the subject
requested by Fitch.

The debt has a fixed interest rate and its legal amortization
comprises a balloon payment of up to 47.6% (USD 166.6 million) in
2031. The debt structure also contemplates a target amortization
schedule, set to allow for the debt to be fully amortized in 12
years, under the Issuer's case, through a cash sweep mechanism. In
Fitch's Rating Case, the balloon payment is for 22.4% (USD 78.5
million) of the initial debt quantum. The debt structure also
counts with a six-month offshore DSRA and lock up provisions that
require, among others, compliance with target debt balance coupled
for Prumopar to be allowed to distribute dividends.

Financial Summary:

Under Fitch's Base and Rating cases, a balloon payment is due in
2031, indicating a Loan Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR) below 1.0x.
Refinancing risk is mitigated by a PLCR, which considers the cash
flows available for debt service until the end of ToP agreement, of
1.7x in 2031 in Fitch's Rating Case. Prumopar's Net Debt-to-CFADS
decreases from its peak of 7.6x in 2021 to 1.8x in 2031, under
Fitch's Rating Case, a comfortable level considering the eight-year
ToP tail. Credit metrics are somewhat strong for the assigned
rating, which is constrained by Brazil's country ceiling, the
history of some operational disruptions and a residual exposure to
foreign exchange risk.

PEER GROUP

Prumopar's closest peer is Adani Abbot Point Terminal Pty Ltd's
(AAPT) (senior secured notes; BB+/RWN). Both are single-purpose
mineral export terminals, comprise medium- to long-term ToP
contracts and present refinance risk. AAPT's Negative Watch
reflects the failure to start addressing refinancing of debt issues
at least 12 months in advance of maturity considering the
coronavirus pandemic.

Prumopar presents leverage comparable to EP BCo S.A. (EP)
(Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR); BB-/Negative), the
financial vehicle and sole shareholder of Euroports Holdings Sarl
(Euroports). Euroports is a large, deep-sea port terminal operator
in Europe and China that presents a peak-leverage in Fitch's Rating
case of 7.4x, while Prumopar's is 7.6x. The Negative Outlook on
EP's reflects the uncertainty regarding the recovery from the
global coronavirus shock, while Prumopar has a ToP agreement that
provides more resilience in revenues. Additionally, Prumopar's debt
is fixed-rate, while EP's presents exposure to floating rates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

  -- Achievement of the target amortization schedule in a sustained
basis;

  -- Favorable track record of operations without disruption;

  -- A Positive Rating Action on Brazil's Sovereign Rating.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

  -- Outstanding debt balance of USD300 million or higher by
December 2021;

  -- Operational disruption negatively impacting the cash flows;

  -- A Negative Rating Action on Brazil's Sovereign Rating.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Prumopar is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Prumo Logistica S.A. that
holds a 50% share of Ferroport, a joint venture between Prumopar
and Anglo American Investimentos Minerio de Ferro Ltda., a
subsidiary of Anglo-American plc. Ferroport is the exclusive export
terminal for iron ore produced by Anglo's Minas-Rio project located
in Minas Gerais.

Ferroport is the owner of an area of 300 hectares in the Acu Port,
where iron ore is processed, handled, and stored. The facilities
include an offshore structure comprising an access bridge, access
canal, breakwater and two berths for iron ore loading. Ferroport
benefits from a 25-year ToP with AAMFB, until 2039, for 26.6
million wet metric tons per year.

Ferroport was also responsible for the construction of the T1 port
terminal and signed a Port Access Agreement with AAMFB and Acu
Petroleo S.A. (owner of the oil transshipment terminal in the T1 of
Acu Port), also valid until 2039, which establishes that Ferroport
is responsible for the maintenance of T1 offshore infrastructure,
including the dredging of access channel and breakwater, and will
charge port fees based on the number of vessels berthing, oil
transshipment volume and berthing time.

Ferroport is the last line in the logistics chain and an integral
part of Anglo's Minas-Rio iron-ore project, which comprises 5.3
billion tons of mineral resources. The Minas-Rio project is in the
States of Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. It is 100% owned by
Anglo American plc, and it is composed of integrated systems of
open pit mines, a beneficiation plant, a 529 km slurry pipeline and
lastly, Ferroport.

CREDIT UPDATE

In April 2020 there was the arbitration settlement between AAMFB,
Ferroport and Prumopar, which resulted in Ferroport being awarded a
compensation payment for USD60 million by AAMFB. The proceeds from
the settlement were used to fulfil the target amortization reserve
account (TARA), which was part of the notes' debt structure and
represented 8.5% of total debt outstanding amount (approximately
USD29 million).

Later in 2020, Acu Petroleo granted discounts on Port Access Fees
paid by ships accessing the channel. Under rated debt indenture,
any change on the fees paid under the Port Access Agreement would
trigger the TARA payment, which means that in order to change any
fee paid by ships accessing the terminal, Prumopar should early
redeem the rated debt in the amount of the TARA. The payment was
done in June 30, 2020.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

The main assumptions of Fitch's Base Case include:

  -- US PPI: 0.6% in 2020, 0.7% in 2021, 1.2% in 2022 and 2.0% from
2023 onwards;

  -- Foreign Exchange Rate (BLR/USD): 5.30 in 2020, 5.00 in 2021,
4.80 in 2022 and 1.25% yearly depreciation from 2023 onwards;

  -- Volume: minimum guarantee throughput of 26.6 million tons per
year;

  -- Tariffs: adjusted according ToP agreement (67% of US PPI);

  -- Operational and Capital expenses: 5% higher than sponsor's
case;

  -- Transshipment volume: 25 services per year. Additionally, all
services were considered to come from Suezmax vessels, which
provide lower revenues than VLCCs because of lower volume capacity
in each vessel;

  -- Post Balloon interest rate (after 2031): 11.5%.

The same assumptions were used in the rating scenario, except for:

  -- Foreign Exchange Rate (BLR/USD): 5.30 in 2020, 5.00 in 2021,
4.80 in 2022 and 0.63% yearly depreciation from 2023 onwards;

  -- Operational and Capital expenses: 10% higher than sponsor's
case;

  -- Transshipment volume: 13 services per year. Additionally, all
services were considered to come from Suezmax vessels, which
provide lower revenues than VLCCs because of lower volume capacity
in each vessel.

In Fitch's Base Case, minimum PLCR is 1.3x, considering the ToP
tenor. Maximum leverage (net debt/CFADS) is 7.3x in 2021,
deleveraging to 1.3x in 2031. In Fitch's Rating Case, minimum PLCR
is 1.25x, also considering the ToP tenor. Maximum leverage (net
debt/CFADS) is 7.6x in 2021, deleveraging to 1.8x in 2031.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




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C H I L E
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CORP GROUP: S&P Cuts ICR to 'D' on Bond Coupon Non-payment
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its issuer credit and debt ratings on
Corp Group Banking S.A. (CG Banking) to 'D' from 'CC'. The debt
consists of $500 million notes due 2023 with semiannual coupons.

CG Banking missed its bond's interest payment after the grace
period ended on Oct. 15, according to the bond's indenture. The
debt service consists of the interest coupon payments on the $500
million notes in two semiannual coupons of $16.9 million each (due
on March 15 and Sept. 15). Corp Group recently hired advisory
consultants to evaluate the group's financial conditions and
reorganize its debt structure. Negotiations with bondholders and
other creditors are ongoing and potential outcomes remain unclear.

S&P said, "We won't raise the ratings until payments resume in
accordance with the original terms of the obligation, or if new
terms are amended and become legally effective. We expect CG
Banking to continue negotiating with creditors because it faces
substantial challenges, since we don't expect Itau CorpBanca
(BBB+/Negative/A-2), its sole operating company, to distribute
dividends in the next few quarters." Moreover, Itau CorpBanca's
stock prices dropped dramatically in the last six months, which
should pressure recovery prospects for bondholders.




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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Foreign Tourism Fell by 81.3% During September
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the arrival of foreign tourists to the
Dominican Republic fell by 81.3% in September concerning the same
month last year, a slight recovery concerning the previous July and
August, informed this Wednesday the Central Bank.

In its monthly report, the Central Bank emphasized that the
September data reveals "an incipient tendency towards recovery" of
the sector, the most important of the country's economy, since, in
the two previous months, the collapse of tourism was of the order
of 88%, according to Dominican Today.

Specifically, 46,877 foreign tourists arrived in the Caribbean
country in September, a slightly lower figure than that registered
in July (-13.3%) and August (-6.3%), months of high season, but in
which the Dominican beaches were empty due to the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the report relays.

Between January and September, the drop in foreign tourism was
68.1%, and in the same period, there was a 48.4% drop in the
arrival of Dominicans living outside the country, the report
discloses.

In September, nearly 8 out of 10 tourists arriving in the country
were from the United States, a total of 36,961 people, which means
a greater reliance on U.S. travelers than before the pandemic, the
report notes.

The Dominican Republic kept its borders closed by the coronavirus
between mid-March and July 1; the government is making efforts to
reactivate the sector, the report relates.

Among the main measures announced by the Dominican government is
medical insurance that, since September 15, has been offered free
of charge to tourists staying in the country's hotels, the report
says.

During an inauguration ceremony in Punta Cana, President Luis
Abinader said that the Dominican Republic is prepared to receive
the same number of tourists who usually visit the country each
year, the report relays.

"We are prepared to receive the same amount of tourists that
usually visit Punta Cana and the country and, as the statistics
say, with more security than in the countries where they come
from," Abinader said, the report discloses.

He said that the country has the pandemic under control at this
time, thanks to the measures that have been adopted and the efforts
of health professionals, the report relates.

In the last 24 hours, the Dominican Republic registered 654 new
infections of the coronavirus and three recent deaths from
COVID-19, the report notes.

With these figures, published in the last bulletin on the evolution
of the country's disease, there is a total of 119,662 infections
and 2,186 deaths since last March, the report adds.

                     About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.  Luis
Rodolfo Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with negative outlook (April 2020). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (July
2017). Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last
reported at BB- with negative outlook (May 8, 2020).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Venezuela Commercial Flights Resume December
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Venezuela will once again receive
commercial flights from the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Turkey
in December, after seven consecutive months of prohibition of air
operations, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro said.

"By December we will have flights from the Dominican Republic, it
is already established, we will have flights from Mexico (. . . .
), we will have a direct flight from Turkey," one of his
international allies, said the president during a virtual meeting
of the Sao Paulo Forum, according to Dominican Today.

Maduro did not provide details about the flights or when others
will be reactivated, the report notes.

Until next November 12, a commercial flight restriction in
Venezuela is in force due to the pandemic, with a ban that has been
in effect since March, the report relays.

                     About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.  Luis
Rodolfo Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with negative outlook (April 2020). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (July
2017). Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last
reported at BB- with negative outlook (May 8, 2020).




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E C U A D O R
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ECUADOR: Correa Spurns IMF Deal That Allowed Debt Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Bartenstein at Bloomberg News report that Rafael Correa, the
leftist leader who governed Ecuador for a decade and defaulted on
its debt, and his protege in next year's presidential election said
they would reject the spending cuts requested by the International
Monetary Fund as part of a loan deal.

"These austerity policies kill economies," Correa said in an
interview from exile in Belgium. "We'll check all of this. We can't
continue with these IMF policies," according to Bloomberg News.

The Washington-based institution agreed in August to lend Ecuador
$6.5 billion, paving the way for the South American nation to
restructure $17.4 billion of its international debt, Bloomberg News
relates.  Should Correa's favored candidate, Andres Arauz, win the
February election, his administration will focus on increased
public spending and foreign investment, rather than repaying the
IMF, the former president said, Bloomberg News notes.  The comments
raise the stakes in the vote as the government struggles to finance
even the current level of fiscal expenditure, Bloomberg News says.

The 57-year-old politician was blocked from becoming Arauz's
running mate in the election after a court refused to review his
conviction for embezzlement, Bloomberg News discloses.  Arauz
tapped television presenter Carlos Rabascall instead, though Correa
remains a key adviser, Bloomberg News relays.

Among almost 30 other investigations into alleged crimes committed
while he was president, Correa and other defendants in April were
found guilty of funneling bribes to finance political campaigns. He
lost successive appeals, Bloomberg News notes.

In a separate interview, Arauz said the IMF financing contains
language that violates the nation's constitution and that his
administration would seek to negotiate a new deal, Bloomberg News
discloses.

The IMF is pushing for tax increases including a 3-point hike in
value-added tax to 15% and a carbon-emissions tax, along with cuts
to capital spending and more transparent fiscal procurement,
Bloomberg News relays.

The lender forecasts Ecuador's economy will contract 11% this year
and only recover slowly after that, Bloomberg News discloses.  The
IMF's Western Hemisphere Director Alejandro Werner said that Fund
officials have spoken to candidates and legislators from different
political parties and that the accord could be modified under a new
government so long as core targets are maintained, Bloomberg News
relays.

Arauz, 35, and 64-year-old banker Guillermo Lasso are the leading
candidates in the election, Bloomberg News says.  With the
electoral board still processing registrations, polls are
inconclusive and the number of undecided voters remains high,
Bloomberg News discloses.  The first round of the election is set
for Feb. 7.

President Lenin Moreno, who served as Correa's vice president for
six years, isn't seeking a second term, Bloomberg News relays.

The Socialist Who Gave Up Julian Assange and Renounced Socialism

The race bears some resemblance to 2017. That vote also featured a
Correa ally, Moreno, against Lasso, except Moreno pivoted
post-election by renouncing socialism and pursuing free-market
policies, Bloomberg News notes.

"That was the biggest betrayal in Ecuadorean history," Correa said.
"When you're a democratic president, you shouldn't care about what
Wall Street says about you. You should care about what your people
say about you," he added.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

AES PUERTO: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on Series A & B Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has affirmed the rating for the following AES Puerto Rico
L.P. (AES PR) securities issued through the Puerto Rico Industrial,
Tourist, Educational, Medical & Environmental Control Facilities
Financing Authority:

  -- $161.9 million ($160.0 million) cogeneration facility revenue
bonds Series A (tax-exempt bonds) due June 2026 at 'C';

  -- $33.1 million ($32.0 million) cogeneration facility revenue
bonds, Series B (taxable bonds) due June 2022 at 'C'.

RATING RATIONALE

Summary: Fitch has no Rating Outlook on the project given the low
likelihood for any short-term resolution to the off-taker's 'D'
rating or conclusion of its insolvency proceedings, which could
lead to subsequent action on the project's rating. There is an
issue with the off-taker that is evolving, and remaining downside
risks that may materialize in the insolvency process are reflected
in the rating.

AES PR's 'C' rating is linked to, but not constrained by, the
credit quality of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA),
currently rated 'D'. PREPA is the revenue counterparty under AES
PR's power purchase agreement (PPA). A payment default and negative
rating action would result if PREPA failed to make payments under
the PPA, which could become a possibility should PREPA try to
renegotiate the PPA under bankruptcy proceedings. However, PREPA is
currently honoring its PPA payment obligations, demonstrating the
importance of AES PR as a supplier of power for PREPA.

The outbreak of coronavirus and related government containment
measures worldwide create an uncertain global environment for the
energy sector in the near term. While AESPR's performance data
through most recently available issuer data may not have indicated
impairment, material changes in revenue and cost profile are
occurring across the energy sector and will continue to evolve as
economic activity and government restrictions respond to the
ongoing situation. Fitch's ratings are forward-looking in nature,
and Fitch will monitor developments in the sector as a result of
the virus outbreak as it relates to severity and duration, and
incorporate revised base and rating case qualitative and
quantitative inputs based on expectations for future performance
and assessment of key risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Contracted Revenue Profile (Revenue Risk: Midrange)

The 25-year tolling-style PPA with a noninvestment-grade
counterparty effectively mitigates some risk of exposure to
capacity price, energy margin and dispatch risks throughout the
debt term, subject to project availability and heat rates. Further,
project cash flows are materially different from dispatch levels,
and revenues are subject to achievable minimum performance
thresholds of 90% effective availability factor (EAF) under the
project's PPA. However, the off-taker's ability to make future
contractual payments is unclear given its financial and operational
difficulties, which were exasperated by recent natural disasters.

Uneven Operations (Operation Risk: Weaker)

AES PR has historically been susceptible to forced outages, which
have reduced availability and capacity payments. Further, the
operating cost profile has exceeded original estimates. Management
has taken a proactive approach to limit forced outages with some
results; however, extended scheduled outages have continued to
negatively impact project availability in some periods.

Manageable Supply Risk (Supply Risk: Midrange)

Fuel supply risk is mitigated by a two-year, fixed-price fuel
supply agreement sufficient to meet the project's expected fuel
requirements through 2021. The agreement's short term is mitigated
by the historical precedence for renewal and liquid market for
coal. Fuel price risk is mitigated by the tolling-style PPA,
subject to heat rates. Ash inventory is actively managed by the
project via the sale of its various ash products. AES PR's efforts
have helped to offset near-term ash disposal concerns, but cash
flow uncertainty is heightened without a permanent solution.

Typical Structural Features (Debt Structure: Midrange)

The project's bonds are fixed-rate and mature within the PPA term,
but have back-loaded amortization profiles. The equity
distribution, leverage and debt service reserve provisions are
consistent with standard project finance structures. AES PR does
not have O&M or major maintenance reserves, which increases the
importance of operational stability and heightens the project's
reliance on other sources of liquidity. Approximately 55% of the
total debt outstanding, including unrated bank loans, is variable
rate with over 80% synthetically fixed with investment-grade
counterparties.

Financial Summary

The project's 'C' rating is guided by Fitch's ratings definitions,
and the assessments assigned for all the qualitative key rating
drivers. For projects in this rating category, rating case
coverages provide little additional information to evaluate the
risk of default. The rating suggests that this issuer has little
capacity to navigate adverse economic conditions.

ESG Considerations:

Other than for Waste and Hazardous Materials Management, the
highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of 3 - ESG issues
are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the
entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity.

AES PR has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 [-] for Waste and Hazardous
Materials Management due to exposure to waste disposal related to
coal ash management and pollution incidents, and is relevant to the
rating in conjunction with other factors. This has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating in
conjunction with other factors.

PEER GROUP

AES PR is comparable to other coal projects in that its revenues
are secured through a PPA, but the project bears responsibility for
operational performance, fuel supply and operating costs. The
project's low rating, due to the weak credit view on off-taker
PREPA, is comparable to other Fitch-rated projects with ratings
constrained by weak counterparties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:

  -- An improvement in PREPA's long-term credit quality;

  -- Sustained improvements to plant availability or heat rate
could enhance the long-term profile.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:

  -- PREPA's failure to meet its payment obligations would likely
impact AES PR's rating;

  -- PREPA's attempts to renegotiate the PPA under its insolvency
proceedings that negatively impact the project's cash flows and
ability to service debt.

CREDIT UPDATE

Fiscal year (FY) 2019 DSCR fell below 1.0x due to a combination of
lower revenues from the project not earning its full capacity
payments in certain months, and elevated operating expenses in
connection with agremax (aggregate material manufactured from coal
ash) disposal. AES PR has confirmed that the project did not need
to use its debt service reserve and that debt payments were made on
time and in full using cash on hand.

The increase in expenses for FY 2019 was driven substantially by
elevated agremax disposal costs. Management took a more aggressive
stance on disposal of agremax commencing in 4Q19 with total agremax
disposal cost of $45 million for FY 2019, representing a cost
overrun of $8.1 million. Management views the elevated agremax
expenses as being nonrecurring and unlikely to result in a
permanent change to the project's cost profile. The project's
latest forecast (TTM calculation) shows that DSCR is likely to rise
to approximately 1.60x by May 2021. AES attributes this forecasted
increase to the diminishing financial impact of the large, one-time
agremax expenses as time elapses, continued high levels of
dispatch, and high levels of availability.

The project experienced several outages as of fiscal year to date
2020. The outages were originally planned to occur in January 2020
but were delayed until April 2020. The outages were delayed due to
Puerto Rico suffering from an earthquake in January 2020. Given the
essentiality of the plant as a low-cost source of power for Puerto
Rico, PREPA requested that AES delay the outage and continue
operating the plant given that the power grid lost 800MW of
capacity due to an adjacent plant incurring substantial damage from
the earthquake. AES complied with PREPA's request, but took the
plant offline briefly to perform essential maintenance.

The major maintenance was postponed until April 2020, and again
until June 2020 due to labor shortages caused by the coronavirus
pandemic, and leading to an extended outage that lasted through
July 2020. Management estimates that the costs associated with the
maintenance were approximately $2.2 million. Upon completion of the
major maintenance, management confirmed that the plant's units are
operating in a state of good repair; the project has operated
without issue, and is not in need of follow-up repairs.

Excluding months where outages occurred in FY 2020, the project's
capacity factor remained high, ranging between 85%-95%. The
capacity factor fell to 71% in January 2020 due to a series of
earthquakes in Puerto Rico, causing the plant to be taken offline
temporarily. The capacity factor contracted to the 46% - 50% level
in June through July 2020 due to the maintenance activities.
Despite this combination of events, the project earned its full
capacity payment every month, except for July 2020. Under the PPA,
AES PR must maintain a 12-month rolling EAF above 90% to earn the
full capacity payment from PREPA. Over the past several years, the
project's EAF under the PPA has drifted between 85%-95% with
intermittent dips below the PPA threshold. Management believes the
project remains well-positioned given that it is the lowest cost
producer of power in Puerto Rico, and believes it will continue to
experience dispatch levels over 98% going forward.

Agremax continues to be persistent issue for AES PR, and management
has continued to take steps to regulate the level stored onsite by
shipping ash to mainland United States for disposal. Management
expects the operating costs associated with agremax disposal to
reach a state of equilibrium in the near term and expects levels to
remain roughly at 90-100 days onsite relative to the legal limit of
180 days. Agremax disposal will continue to be a major operational
concern that can erode margins for the project.

PREPA remains in default as of July 2020. Management indicated that
PREPA has been paying its bills more frequently, evidenced by
reducing its receivable cycle to about 47 days, which is what is
allowed under the PPA. This represents an improvement from
historical days past due and has made a positive impact on the
project's cash flow.

The project remains dependent on PREPA's continued payments to
service debt and finance operations. PREPA's long-term financial
position and restructuring plans will continue to have an outsized
effect on the project. PREPA's recent payment track record and high
levels of dispatch corroborate the project's view that it is an
important part of Puerto Rico's generation system as a reliable and
a low-cost producer.

AES PR owns and operates a net 454-megawatt coal-fired circulating
fluidized bed combustion power plant in Guayama, Puerto Rico. The
project delivers electric energy and capacity to PREPA under the
terms of a 25-year PPA. The PPA is structured as a modified tolling
agreement that reimburses the project's fuel and O&M costs.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

AES Puerto Rico LP (PR): Waste & Hazardous Materials Management;
Ecological Impacts: 4 [-]

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PDVSA: Boosts Crude Blending, Upgrading as Exports Tick Up
----------------------------------------------------------
Luc Cohen and Marianna Parraga at Reuters report that Venezuela's
state-run Petroleos de Venezuela has boosted crude blending and
upgrading to their highest levels in six months, according to
company documents seen by Reuters, as exports rise despite strict
U.S. sanctions.

The upgraders are crucial to converting extra-heavy oil from
eastern Venezuela's Orinoco belt - the OPEC nation's
largest-producing region - into exportable crude grades, according
to Reuters.  But they have operated only intermittently in recent
months due to a plunge in exports and technical issues linked to
lack of maintenance, the report notes.

The report relates that the Petropiar upgrader - part of a joint
venture with Chevron Corp CVX.N - produced 115,000 barrels of
Hamaca crude and the Sinovensa blending facility, operated along
with China National Petroleum Corp, produced 158,000 barrels of
Merey crude, a PDVSA document showed.

That was the highest joint level since March, as an increase in
September's exports to the highest level in five months allowed
PDVSA to drain inventories, which had risen to near-capacity levels
as U.S. sanctions spooked potential buyers, the report relays.

The facilities have also been plagued by operational issues. On
Sept. 30, the Petropiar upgrader stopped working two days after
restarting due to an electrical outage prompted by a transformer
explosion, the document showed.  It has now operated continuously
since Oct. 3, the report discloses.

The remaining three upgraders have been offline for well over a
year. Petropiar had briefly switched to blending mode to produce
the nation's flagship export grade, Merey, the report says.

PDVSA did not respond to a request for comment.

It is not clear how long PDVSA will able to maintain current levels
of exports and upgrader operations.

Washington - which is seeking to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas
Maduro - gave PDVSA's customers deadlines of between October and
November to schedule their last cargoes under the few remaining
exemptions to its sanctions on the company, the report notes.

                       About PDVSA

Founded in 1976, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is the
Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, which engages
in exploration, production, refining and exporting oil as well as
exploration and production of natural gas.  It employs around
70,000 people and reported $48 billion in revenues in 2016.

In May 2019, Moody's Investors Service withdrew all the ratings of
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. including the senior unsecured and
senior secured ratings due to insufficient information. At the time
of withdrawal, the ratings were C and the outlook was stable.

Citgo Petroleum Corporation (CITGO) is Venezuela's main foreign
asset.  CITGO is majority-owned by PDVSA.  CITGO is a United
States-based refiner, transporter and marketer of transportation
fuels, lubricants, petrochemicals and other industrial products.

However, CITGO formally cut ties with PDVSA at about February 2019
after U.S. sanctions were imposed on PDVSA.  The sanctions are
designed to curb oil revenues to the administration of President
Nicolas Maduro and support for the Juan Guaido-headed party.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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